

First class ticket — second class treatment

THERE is this general talk of change, with everything threatening to go multiracial, talk that discrimination may be abolished and many other empty promises that we are fed with from the front line. But sometimes I wonder if all these things will ever come to be.

Recently I was travelling in a Springs-Randfontein bound train and I witnessed an incident that really upset me. The train had stopped at the always-full Johannesburg Station. The one first class coach for blacks was so crammed we had to pass into the white first class coach.

The reaction from the whites occupying that coach was really appalling. They were all glaring at us and glancing at each other as if to see who would brave the situation.

My heart bled when a young white man stood up and asked us to leave. Amongst us was a coloured man who asked this man if there was a difference between the first class tickets that they both possessed. But the other man just started pushing us out.

As long as there is no change in the innermost attitude of

whites towards us, not even Parliament will change the situation. — MMANTOA MAKHAFOLA, Daveyton.

● The Director of Public Relations for SA Railways replies: "Suburban train sets are made up to suit specific services, and the ratio between the various types of coaches is based on the average known passenger mix normally experienced, and supported by censuses.

"Train sets are accordingly made up on a semi-permanent basis to suit those conditions and it is a somewhat complicated operation to exchange vehicles. Such an exchange can in any case not be undertaken during the day when sets are in continuous operation.

"As with all operations based on averages, this system works well most of the time but there are times when conditions deviate from the predetermined 'average' and this is when problems are usually experienced. One of the conditions which develops from time to time is periodic overcrowding of the first class coaches for non-whites, while the first class coaches for whites are still relatively empty.

"We are doing our best to obtain the most suitable train to meet all service conditions, and we hope that we will soon be able to eliminate the type of incident referred to by your correspondent."

Rand Daily Mail Feb 1, 1980

By HARRY MASHABELA

SOWETANS won't have to pay for the cables and trenches that will bring electricity and telephones to Johannesburg's satellite black city.

The Post Office will provide them free of charge as a show of goodwill, the Postmaster-General, Mr Louis Rive, told the Soweto Council yesterday.

This will mean that Sowetans will only have to pay for the use of the new services.

Mr Rive — chairman of the Greater Soweto Planning Council — said the digging and laying of trenches and cables was his goodwill

offer to the community.

And he said the Department of Posts and Telecommunications hoped to spend about R23-million on 32 000 telephone lines for Soweto by 1982.

Mr Rive also warned the council against accepting tenders who charged more than necessary for Soweto's development projects.

"The community must pay for services. But we must not bite off more than we can chew. We must not live above our means. You must see to it that tenders

don't charge more than is necessary," he said.

He said each council on the Witwatersrand would need to become financially self-sufficient. This could only come about if the community played its part by paying for services.

The Greater Soweto Planning Council includes Mr J Knoetze, chairman of the West Rand Administration Board (Wrab), and the chairmen of the other three councils in the Soweto area.

Mr Rive explained that

the council would only deal with the broader projects affecting the entire Soweto area, and appealed for co-operation between the councils and the administration board.

Mr Knoetze also addressed the council and said the Government, the private and the public sectors would need to play their part to solve the area's problems.

The urgent problems facing the council, he said, were the housing backlog

and the question of a budget. For the current financial year there was an estimated deficit of R3-million for electricity, R3-million for water and R2 500 000 for sewerage.

He urged the council to make the community aware that they would have to play their part so that the problems could be solved.

"A large number of these problems will be met if we all join hands and give the best we can," he said.

Mr Knoetze said that be-

tween 10 000 and 15 000 stands could be developed in Soweto. But the absence of a railway line was holding back the development of Protea, a former coloured township, and the Chiawelo buffer strip.

"We can no longer afford any delays. We must put up pressure, wherever we can, to overcome the delays and make progress," he said.

He said housing and electrification of should be the council's first priorities, and added that more houses might be built in Protea.

PO's goodwill phone gift to Soweto

PO's goodwill

Rand Daily Mail Feb. 1. 1980

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General Van den Bergh ... the formidable head of the Security Police who took charge of intelligence operations.

The BOSS/DONS story

PART I: The early days

'Mail' investigation by MERVYN REES

RAND DAILY MAIL FEB 1 - 1980

South Africa's formidable secret service organisation, DONS, has been plunged into a raging controversy over the recent allegations by defector Arthur McGiven. This report, the first in a series which lifts the veil of secrecy surrounding the cloak and dagger activities of DONS and its predecessors, examines the formative years of the secret service. The next reports will look at the men behind the organisations, the "dirty trick" claims and defectors.

His police handler at the time, it is now also known, was the young policeman, Johan Coetzee, who sat in the back of the Johannesburg Magistrate's Courtroom when Ludi was unmasked at the trial of Fischer. It was the first of a series of dramatic infiltrations by the fledgling intelligence agency and was a performance to be repeated almost identically 15 years later in 1980.

Again Johan Coetzee, now a Brigadier, went to the rescue of yet another of his underground moles — this time Captain Craig Williamson, the Security Policeman who also started out at Wits and ended up as deputy director of the IUEF in Switzerland.

Both Ludi and Williamson are known to have travelled behind the Iron Curtain on dangerous missions.

But at that time, Ludi's penetration of the Communist Party was a remarkable success achieved in a remarkably short time.

The Ludi operation, however, was but one of the crack unit's successes. Working hand in glove with the overt Security Police, they had soon infiltrate and penetrated virtually all of the underground movements in the country and succeeded in destroying those groups.

Other successes followed, such as the capture in Johannesburg of the Russian spy, Yuri Loginov. Loginov, who was arrested in his Joubert Park flat, was later used in an elaborate Western spy-swap in Germany and was escorted overseas by Mike Geldenhuys.

It was said at the time that the Russian, who travelled on a Canadian passport but who was gathering the names of long-dead South African children for the preparation of false passports for future Soviet agents, was arrested when he took a picture of the Grays, Johannesburg's one-time divisional police and security headquarters.

Years later it was to

emerge that much of the credit for the arrest of Loginov should, in fact, have gone to a foreign intelligence agency which had co-operated with the South Africans.

And even in those days, RI did not confine itself to purely political events. In the mid 60s, its manpower was thrown behind a wide variety of investigations — prominent among them the Glazer kidnapping which took place outside Johannesburg in what is today Sandton.

The kidnapping of the baby son and wife of Johannesburg property tycoon, Mr Bernard Glazer, was at that time the biggest in the world and bigger even than the celebrated Lindbergh kidnapping. It was investigated and successfully solved by the RI men, with Gen Van den Bergh himself at the head of the team.

All of these successes did much to enhance the reputation of Gen Van den Bergh, by then destined to be the man who would fill the shoes of the soon-to-retire Commis-

sioner of Police. He had, through his unorthodox methods and series of spectacular achievements, become something of a legend in his own lifetime.

Policemen of all ranks lived in both fear and awe of the towering and austere general, not only because of his brilliant track record, but because they knew he was the confidant of Mr Vorster. (A dedicated Afrikaner and member of the Broederbond, Gen Van den Bergh and Mr Vorster were interned together during the Second World War as members of the Ossewabrandwag).

Even his opponents conceded that he was a brilliant policeman who often seemed to act on impulse and intuition, and who presented himself as a man of vision and foresight.

But Gen Van den Bergh had other attributes. He was said to have a remarkable and adventurous flair for politics and diplomacy, was tactful, shrewd and a master of the

unorthodox.

And his long-time friendship with Mr Vorster, according to observers, was later to play the major part in the ultimate direction that BOSS would take.


Gen Van den Bergh, too, created a sinister reputation as he flitted around the world. When Mr Vorster travelled into Africa or abroad, the general was invariably at his side. And his role, it is known, was not that of a super bodyguard. Mr Vorster would often be guided by the general in his evaluation of situations, negotiations and decision making.

According to observers, it was from the late 60s, when the decision was taken to bring RI out into the open and give the agency a formal identity, that things started to go wrong — both for the general and his Bureau, even though the problems would only become obvious at a much later date.

And so to the creation of BOSS.

Birth of the Bureau

RAND DAILY MAIL
FEBRUARY 1 1980



Mr Vorster ... in the wake of violent 60s he launched South Africa's first intelligence organisation, Republican Intelligence.

ITS members refer to it simply as "the Bureau". Others, more cynically, dub it "the family" — a play on both its Mafia-type image and long-time tendency to hand-pick members, many of whom in turn recruit from within their own families.

In its short and sinister history, it has already undergone three name changes — from its secret launch and infancy in the early 1960's as the underground Republican Intelligence, to the ill-chosen Bureau for State Security (BOSS).

Today, as the Department of National Security, it labours under the equally unfortunate and sinister sounding abbreviation of DONS.

And it is as DONS that South Africa's most formidable, secret and exclusive of all organisations, the Broederbond included, has been plunged headlong into a raging controversy over revelations and allegations of its misapplication and involvement in party political "dirty tricks".

But, it is now emerging, the revelations by DONS "defector" Arthur McGiven, the intelligence agency's first full-time officer to reveal details of the inner workings of the Bureau, are only the climax and symptom of more than a year's upheaval and a festering illness in what was once Mr Vorster's most sacred and elitist of all departments.

And although many of the dirty trick allegations are not new, McGiven — once a lowly informer for the Bureau and whose motives for making the disclosures must be regarded as highly suspect — has for the first time provided documentary evidence of irregularities.

If his claims are correct — and those in the know claim that many are — then the department has far exceeded its original brief to function as the co-ordinating watchdog of South Africa's state security.

Indeed so serious are the disclosures, limited as they may be, that they threaten the very future of the agency. Already there are signs that a "clean up" under the P W Botha administration is underway, although this is seen in many quarters as nothing more than a logical culmination of the long feud between former BOSS chief, General Hendrik van den Bergh, and the man said to be his "arch-enemy", the Minister of Defence, Mr Botha.

It is an open secret that for many years Military Intelligence was relegated into the background by Gen Van den Bergh, a situation which brought about an intense rivalry between the two agencies — to the point where they virtually operated independently and in opposition to one another.

Changes in the leadership of DONS, therefore, are interpreted as nothing more than part of the process of restoring military intelligence to its rightful place in South Africa's intelligence community.

The appointment, too, of 31-year-old Professor Lukas Daniel Barnard, former Dean of Politics at the University of the Free State in Bloemfontein, to succeed as head of DONS is seen as the first sign that the agency is changing.

It promises to become more of a "think tank" and evaluation arm, co-ordinating information gathered by South Africa's three long-feuding security and intelligence agencies.

In short, DONS is said to be now reverting to the original purpose for which it was established.

And the overhauling of the DONS apparatus, intelligence observers point out, is long overdue. Over the past 11 years the mushrooming department — which had always operated under a cloak of secrecy and in the mistaken belief that its every move was protected by the Official Secrets Act — is said to have directed an inordinate and haphazard amount of energy into its operational side, primarily the gathering of information.

But what has frightened and disturbed those who have had glimpses behind the DONS' curtain of secrecy, is that somewhere along the line the department not only lost sight of its objective, but that it also developed into a power clique to be used against those who disagreed with Gen Van den Bergh and the man to whom he reported for almost two decades, the former Prime Minister, Mr John Vorster.

Evidence is mounting that, virtually from its official inception, BOSS devoted much of its energy, time and vast resources towards spying on and monitoring South Africans from all walks of life who happened to disagree with either the Government or the men at the head of BOSS.

Among the named targets of the Bureau's attention were Mrs Helen Suzman, Mr Harry Oppenheimer and Mr Jaap Marais. Other victims of the Bureau's surveillance are said to have included academics, politicians, religious leaders, businessmen, journalists and even Cabinet Ministers.

Whatever the truth of the allegations made against the agency, it was this misplaced emphasis, observers now reveal, together with sycophantic recruits, that has led to the problems that the department faces today.

In order to fully appreciate just where BOSS lost its way, one observer explains, it is necessary to first examine the organisation's origins, the reasons for its establishment and the people who were behind its inception.

To do so, even though it is historic, is not a simple task. In the cloak and dagger world of spies and counter spies, few people are prepared to talk about an organisation which holds thousands upon thousands of files on individuals and organisations throughout South Africa — and which operates a formidable network of informers, agents and contacts that extend into every imaginable field, both in South Africa and abroad.

Disclosures by people such as McGiven and self-confessed former BOSS informer, Gordon Winter, go a long way to providing a picture of "the family". But the picture of the Bureau is not a pleasant one. Sometimes bordering on the farcical.

But what of its inception ... various versions have been given, but the following appears to be common view of the birth of what was to become BOSS.

Only a handful of South Africans were let in on the secret at the time, but the bureau was born and moulded in the form of America's Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), in a small suites of offices in Johannesburg's Commissioner Street.

It was the early 1960's, a period in South African history when organised and escalating subversion had come to the fore and when it was an almost daily occurrence that a railway line, police station or electricity pylon was the target of saboteurs.


The authorities were concerned at the growing threat presented by ANC, PAC, POQO, Spear of the Nation and other resistance movements. There were real and mounting signs of well organised and orchestrated subversion, such as the plot hatched and later discovered at Rivonia's Lilliesleaf Farm.

There was the underground Communist Party, led by Braam Fischer, the brilliant Afrikaans advocate who secretly worked towards the overthrow of the Government.

At the same time, too, South Africa had left the Commonwealth, and for the first time found it was not entitled to the official and detailed co-operation of British intelligence.

The then Minister of Justice, Mr Vorster, and his Commissioner of Police, General J M Kevy, found there was a critical need for a sophisticated intelligence organisation — one that could co-ordinate intelligence gathering and bring relief to the hard-pressed Security Police.

And so was launched Republican Intelligence, known to its members simply as RI.



GERALD LUDI
... Agent Q018

Although not a legally constituted body with its own built-in powers, it was to be the forerunner of BOSS. But at that time, it was really just an underground extension of the Security Police.

Just how many members RI started with is not known. But certainly its recruits were hand-picked. They represented the cream of the South African police and included men such as Detective-Sergeant Johan Coetzee, today a Brigadier and Deputy Commissioner of Police in charge of the Security Police.

Another member was a relatively junior officer from the Eastern Cape — a tough, brilliant and relatively unknown policeman called Mike Geldenhuys, later to have a meteoric rise through the ranks to become a general and the present Commissioner of the South African Police.

In overall charge of them was the tall and formidable head of the Security Police, then Colonel Hendrik van den Bergh, who had been appointed to that post by Mr Vorster with the blessing of the then Prime Minister, Dr Verwoerd.

But Gen Van den Bergh, confidant and fellow internee of John Vorster and later to be dubbed "the spymaster" by newspapers, had also to run the Security Police. So the man chosen to run the small and exclusive band of Johannesburg operatives was Colonel Att Spengler, a wily old detective with a formidable reputation. He apparently headed the unit for a brief spell.

Little is known of RI's early days, other than that it started in cramped offices near what is today the city's Carlton Centre. In those early days, and even though he was in the background much of the time, it was clear that Gen Van den Bergh saw RI as his personal creation.

Soon it moved into new premises — this time into a luxury house on a ridge overlooking Johannesburg's northern suburbs.

The house, one half of which was lived in by Mike Geldenhuys who took over as the agency's head, was to become the headquarters of the rapidly expanding RI. The move into new premises was not without moments of humour to its hard-working, if inexperienced, members.

One suspicious neighbour, a woman, could not understand the round-the-clock activity at the house. This was to lead to her calling in the Flying Squad on more than one occasion, believing that the house was the headquarters of a gang of criminals. The embarrassed agents had to keep their cover when confronted by the local police and the woman never did discover just what was happening alongside her property.

Already the fledgling intelligence agency, whose members had "dropped out" of normal police activity, was modelling itself on unorthodox CIA-type methods. Its members, virtually all of whom were transferred from the Security Police, told for-

mer colleagues they had left the force.

It was, according to founder members, a tough "trial and error" time. Few knew much about intelligence work, but what they lacked in experience they made up for by sheer hard work and talent. Over a lengthy period of time a careful study was made of methods of similar agencies throughout the world. Genuine attempts were being made, for example, for its men to drop the use of ranks in their everyday working life — and the members responded except on formal occasions.

Although nobody will reveal the extent of the co-operation between RI and its foreign counterparts, it is certain that their was a good liaison and working relationship with similar organisations in the United States, Europe, and Britain. Overseas observers were later to comment that RI and later BOSS was a strange mixture of the CIA, FBI and MI6, together with smatterings of French, German and Israeli intelligence methods.

RI's top men, Gen Van den Bergh and Gen Geldenhuys included, are known to have travelled extensively overseas and returned to South Africa with the latest lectures, methods and techniques.

In an amazingly short time its members had recruited a vast network of contacts and agents drawn from all walks of life. High on its list of targets, in keeping with the practice of overseas intelligence networks at the time, were newspapermen and students.

Says one former member: "If I had to guess, I don't think I'd be far wrong if I said that BOSS started with 50 men and at its height under Van den Bergh it probably had something like 1 000 full-time members. The number of informers is anybody's guess."

And, although it was only to positively emerge much later, one such original link with RI was Gordon Winter, a reporter with the Johannesburg Sunday Express, who had arrived in South Africa with a shady past and extensive British underworld links. Winter, however, was never a full-time employee of the organisation although his depth of knowledge indicates that he might just as well have been.

One full-time member of RI, however, was Warrant Officer Gerard Ludi, the Security Police secret agent and one-time Wits student and newspaperman, who was to cause a sensation when he revealed his true identity as Agent Q018 at the trial of the leader of the Communist Party in South Africa, Braam Fischer.

Ludi, it was later to emerge, was the organisation's first real "mole", a man recruited at the University of Witwatersrand and carefully groomed and nurtured as an agent of the Security Police to infiltrate the inner-most cell of the Communist Party.