M (R: 3 htabbib

Feiiowing P.W. Botha's assumption of office as Premier in September '1978 the apartheid state's regional policy was' restructured in a number of important respects in accordance with the basic propositions of the Totai Strategy. Firstiy, the processes of decision-making on both domestic and foreign policy were reorganised. A three-phase "ratinnalisation? programme was begun in March 1979. In the first phase , a cabinet secretariat was set Up in the Office of the Prime Minister. The twenty cabinet committees which had existed on an ad hoc basis under the Vorster regime gave way first to six, then five and finality four permanent Cabinet Committees - for National Security, Constitutionai, Economic and Sociai affairs. These revamped cabinet committees were not the advisory bodies to the cabinet they had been. under Vorster but became integrai components of the highest level of the decision making machinery. yThey were given the right to make decisions, and Ministers could now refer matters directiv to a cabinet committee without first going through the cabinet.

i. The Basic Propositions of-the Botha Regime's Regional Strategy

By far the most important of the cabinet committees, and the one which deals with foreign policy issues, is the Committee for National Security, known as the State Security Councii (550). Set up by an Act of Parliament in 1972, it functioned under Vorster as a purely advisory body and\_met only sporadically. Howevek, according to General Maqnus Maian, the debacle of the first South African invasion 'of Angola in 1975-6 "focussed attention on the urgent necessity fer the State Security Council to play a much fuller role in the national security of the republic than hitherto" (13). An interdepartmental committee on which the SADF was strongly represented met to devise the organisational structure for "the formulation of strategy at a national level". Out of this emerged the components of what is now termed the "national security management system" at whose pinnacie stands the revamped SSC.

In effect the BBC became the primary decision making body in the South African state. It is presided ever by the Executive President (the Prime Minister prior to the coming into effect of the "new constitutional dispensation" in September 1984). Its other statutory members include five ministers - Defence, Foreign Affairs, Justice, Law and Order, "Heme hffairs pius the Senior Cabinet Minister, if not aiready included in the above purtfolios - and the ?Diiowing senior state officiais - the head of the National Intelligence Service (NIB), the Chief of the SADF, the Directors-General of Foreign Affairs, Justice and Home Affairs, and the Commissioner of Poiice. The SEC has its own secretariat, currently headed by Lt. Gen. P.J. van der Westhuizen, the former head of Militarv Intelligence. This secretariat is directly responsible to the the President and its staff is drawn from various government departments, with a high military component including a number of important officials from Military Inteiiiqence.

Ell

Secondly, the objectives' of regional policy were somewhat reformulated. The vague notion of a constellation of states first put forward by Verster in 1974 was substantially developed and 'defined as he ultimate objective of regional strategy (14). There were a number of aspects to this. The need to bring about such. a constellation was seen as being partly derived from the worsening situation for the apartheid regime in Southern hfrita, and partly from South Africa's then deteriorating relations with the major Western powers. In this new regional situation, the "moderate states of Southern Africa" were seen as facing a commbn "Marxist onslaught" but could not depend on support from the Western powers. This led to a need to construct a "regional alliance" in which South Africa would play the pivotal role. However it was recognised that aspects of apartheid policies were a barrier to formalised alliances with surrounding states. Therefore -it was seen to be necessary to generate a "counter ideology" to "Marxism" in the region. This could be partly consolidated by the promotion of a number of Joint economic projects between South Africa and other regional states. These were to demonstrate the superiority of South African capitalism over \_"socialist" alternatives, and would thus depend on a high level of involvement by the "private sector".

The other crucial element in the consolidation of such a "counter ideology" was seen from the outset as the luring of regional states into "Non aggression Pacts" with Pretoria as a first step towards promoting "the concept of mutual defence against a common enemy" (15). Such action on both the economic and security fronts would significantly deepen the ties between South Africa and its neighbours and slowly bring into being the objective basis for what Foreign Minister Pik Botha described as "a common approach in the security field, the economic field and even the political field" (16).

From the outset of its adoption by the Botha regime, the premotion of the constellation was seen as an attempt to seek "regional solutions to regional problems". This would lead to South Africa becoming internationally recognised as the de facto "regional power" with whom the major powers would have to deal, and Southern Africa would now effectivevi'acknowledged to be a sphere of South African influence.

Finally, the constellation was to be'linked to domestic apartheid policies. Its component states would include the so-called "independent" bantustans. This would perform two functions for Pretoria. Firstly it would finally create the institutional mechanism to regulate relations between the now fragmented parts of South hfrica and the central apartheid state - for which the regime had long been searching. Setondly by drawing the bantustans into an association with independent black states, it was seen to be the means of finally providing them with a measure of international recognition.

In addition to the ultimate objective of the bringing into being