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FIRST SESSION OF THE FIFTH KWAZULU LEGISLATIVE ASSEMBLY

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BY THE CHIEF MINISTER

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The member governments of the EEC do not know where the money

actually ends up. A veil of secrecy is thrown over the whole of the EEC's funding programme. We only know the name of the recipient organisation but the EEC member States are given no details of how these organisations spend EEC money. In a written

question to the European Parliament, No. 1882/87 by Mr. Andrew Pearce and its official answer given on the 24th April 1988 reads as follows:]

Question: Will the Commission indicate which no-governmental organisations have received money for assisting victims of floods in Natal, South Africa?

Answer: [Mr. Natali on behalf of the Commission] EEC emergency aid of R200 000 ECU in favour of victims of floods in Natal province in the Republic of South Africa is being implemented by Irish governmental agency organisation Trocaire along with the following implementing agencies: Kagiso Trust, SACBC, SACC, National Medical and Dental Association and Diakonia.

There we have it, Mr. Speaker, Honourable Members. This is public

knowledge but there knowledge ends. In his reply to written guestion 295/87 Mr. Natali replied on behalf of the Commission saying: "The Commission has consistently declined to discuss the

individual schemes supported by this programme since this could directly or indirectly harm the interests of the beneficiaries concerned or suggest that confidentiality in regard \hat{A} ¢to the programme was not being observed."

The Commission was asked a further two questions as follows:

- 1) Is the EC aid under Programme 935 allocated only for humanitarian purposes? If the beneficiaries are acting openly and legally, as Mr. De Clercqg claims, why must the implementation of the programme be such a closely guarded secret that not even the European Parliament can be told about YE?
- 2) Does it not consider that, by refusing to divulge this information even to the European Parliament, it is providing the South African authorities with a plausible reason for blocking the transfer of the funds, which would not only mean an end to the aid programme, but also lead to a deterioration in relations between the EC and South Africa?

Part of the answer was: "The Commission provides the European Parliament with as much information as it considers compatible with the confidentiality necessary to safeguard the efficient implementation of the special programme." And "The Commission is not prepared to make public details of individual projects since the intention of the special programme is primarily to assist individuals who are victims of the apartheid legislation while at the same time safeguarding their human dignity." In another answer to another question, Mr. Pearce included the following statement: "I would recall that such projects support non-violent activities for peaceful change in South Africa, and are not decided on the basis of political considerations."

The SACC, UDF, COSATU and Diakonia as recipients of EEC money can therefore spend money without being accountable for it. They only have to prove that it has been spent. They need say nothing about what it lis spent on. Let us therefore turn to the Kagiso Trust itself and see what it has to say about who shall and who shall not receive money through it. In a guideline to applicants about the Kagiso Trust's criteria and its project screening methods the trustees say that projects should be non-racial and they should support and promote unity and add: "This implies that projects that, directly or indirectly, attempt to thwart these aims should not be supported. $\hat{a} \geq 0$

They say that the "projects should promote democratic practice, and

should be democratic in their own practices. This implies that projects must either be directly community based, or sthat communities and/or their representative organisations enjoy participation within projects at a policy-making level." This

sounds all very fine, Mr. Speaker, but paragraph 1.4 in this document reads: "

1.4. NON-COLLABORATION. Projects initiated and/or controlled by the South African government, any of its structures cannot be supported. This includes structures under the control of the "homelands." "self-governing states" or organisations participating within any of these structures.

That is the political axe that comes down on Inkatha's neck. The fact that Inkatha is intensely democratic, community based and that Inkatha's Annual General Conference, composed of community selected

representatives, is the supreme decision-making body of the movement lis irrelevant. The trustees of the Kagiso Trust pour abuse on us because they say we work with the enemy. They tow the

ANC line in trying to denigrate us.

You will remember, Mr. Speaker, that the Kagiso trustees told the EEC that unless it towed the line and did what the trustees wanted it to do, the Trust would not accept any EEC money. In. their policy document to guide recipients of funds in South Africa, the Kagiso trustees think on the following lines:

PROPOSED POLICY DOCUMENT TO GUIDE RECIPIENTS OF FUNDS IN SOUTH AFRICA

It is agreed between the recipient organisations and the donor bodies that the donor supports fundamental change in South Africa and the attainment of a non-racial, democratic and unitary society based wupon internationally recognised principles. It lis agreed not to oppose the non-violent measures, deemed effective by the oppressed, in striving to attain the aforementioned ideals.

The donor declares that it does not support any organisations that attempt to thwart the attainment of these ideals, either through such organisations own direct action, or through its support for: orj co-operation with, the South African Government.

The donor declares that it does not support projects that are controlled, directly or indirectly, by a homeland government, or by the government of the Republic of South Africa. This does not preclude recipient agencies from administering aid in areas controlled by such government bodies in times of natural disasters or other extraordinary events.

The donor agrees that it makes funds available to recipient organisations in order to promote fundamental change as enunciated 1n paragraph one, in relation to projects or activities mutually agreed to, without the donor exercising any control over such funds beyond the generally accepted reporting and accounting procedures.

The donor agrees to commit itself to the principle that it may not use the name of the recipient organisation, and the information it receives through the recipient organisation for propaganda purposes or for purposes not in accord with the objectives of the recipient organisation.

The donor agrees to Kkeep its Board and lits governmental sponsors informed that the funds are made available for the support of people or organisations striving to bring about fundamental change as enunciated in paragraph 2, and that as a consequence, many of the recipients are considered by the South African and homeland governments to be enemies of such governments and are persecuted under existing security or states of emergency regulations.

7% The donor agrees to take reasonable measures to ensure that information supplied to it by prospective recipients in the course of making applications or submitting reports is not made accessible to agencies of the South African government, directly or indirectly.

= H In the event that the donor is not prepared to agree to the conditions of paragraphs 1 to 7, it is recommended that the South African organisation concerned decline to receive any further funds from the donor.

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In rand terms about R42 million was channelled through the EEC to South Africa in 1987 and the EEC budgeted for channelling R70 million in 1988. One study estimates that a total of R400 million came linto South Africa in 1987 from various sources to assist projects approved by the SACC, SACBC and the Kagiso Trust. In 1988 at its Annual Conference the SACC tabled financial statements which showed that it had spent R21.8 million in the last financial year

alone. Only 1.1% of it was spent on church mission work and evangelism and 72% was spent on providing grants and donations for non-religious purposes. During that same period it spent Rl.1 million on its own staff and over-budgeted for its own

departments,. The Youth Division was allocated R95 000 but it only spent R73 000 and with previous unspent money, the total unspent money for this Division was then R124 455. The Women's Ministries only used R76 000 of its budget of R119 000. The Home and Family Division only used R87 000 of its budget figure of R124 000. Inter-Church Aid only spent R55 000 of the R80 000 set aside for it. In hunger and relief R712 668 was left unused in a year which spanned periods of drought, floods and starvation. The records show that despite this massive surplus, the SACC only spent R40 000 for flood victims in Natal and KwaZulu.

Of its total income the SACC used 43.6% to fund its Asingeni Relief Fund and its national emergency fund. Both these funds operate secretly and are under the direct control of the SACC's General-Secretary, the Reverend Frank Chikane.

When it is realised that the Reverend Chikane is vice-president of the ANC-backed UDF, one knows quite definitely where his sympathies lie and what kind of projects he would select to assist. Of course it is easier to spend money where there is no accountability and it is not at all surprising to me that while departments of the SACC could not spend the money and showed the surpluses I mentioned above, the Asingeni Relief Fund overspent its budget by R525 028 and the national emergency fund overspent its budget by R787 185. The Dependents Conference Division which also spends political money exceeded its budget by a massive R1.9 million.

Unfortunately so many in the outside world basically see the ANC Mission in exile's judgement that the politics of negotaltion will never achieve anything worthwhile in South Africa as justified. They come to negative conclusions primarily because it is a matter of all eyes on Pretoria and all Pretoria watchers see is recalcitrance and an obdurant government that is not responding to internal and external pressure. They do not look at black politics other than the politics which protests against white recalcitrance.

The kind of work that we are doing in this House, Mr. Speaker, Honourable Members, is downgraded and in the climate that exists the UDF and COSATU merrily go about their way upstaging us because the outside world is looking at the wrong things in this country.

I have recently had again to remind the American government that its aid programmes to South Africa need re-examining. I would like to read into the record the Memorandum I presented to the American

Ambassador, H.E. Mr. Edmund Perkins on the $17 \mathrm{th}$ January this year in Ulundi.

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MEMORANDUM FOR DISCUSSION WITH H.E. MR. E. PERKINS, UNITED STATES AMBASSADOR TO SOUTH AFRICA BY MANGOSUTHU G. BUTHELEZI, CHIEF MINISTER OF KWAZULU AND PRESIDENT OF INKATHA

ULUNDI. 17TH JANUARY 1989

I am very pleased to have this opportunity of comparing notes with you and conveying to you some of my deeper concerns about the South African struggle for liberation and the role of the United States in the background of that struggle.

The fact that you have come to Ulundi to see me is not gratifying because I expect people of your prominence playing roles as important as yours to be at my beck and call. It is gratifying because it indicates your personal interest in going to find out the facts of the matter for yourself. Your coming here is also a recognition that this place has to be visited because the role that we are playing in the South African struggle cannot be ignored.

I have in recent months, Mr. Ambassador, been feeling that there is something not quite right about the way in which the United States is attempting to assist in the South African struggle. Wou will undoubtedly have been informed that I have been somewhat Ycritical of the kind of commitment and the kind of action the United States is taking with regard to the South African problem.

I must say at the outset of any further remarks that I really do congratulate President Reagan and his Shultz/Crocker cutting edge in Southern African diplomacy. I have always said that wyou can

We have our own first-hand direct knowledge of the SACC at work in South Africa. We know that it is a massive machine for pursuing political objectives. We know also that the money that comes to it from the EEC and from various ecumenical donor agencies around the world lis money that is given to the SACC dominantly to be used for

political purposes. The EEC and the churches are funding a fight against apartheid. It is political money that they are giving the SACC.

To the uninformed and the misinformed this amounts to doing something noble but when you take the kind of thinking into account which lis reflected in the 'Proposed Policy Document to Guide Recipients of Funds in South Africa' you know that this money does not go to whoever fights apartheid. This money is funnelled to UDF/ANC alliance supporters. We know the who's who by the language they use. Take this sentence: "It is agreed not to oppose

the non-violent measures, deemed effective by the oppressed, in striving to attain the aforementioned ideals." Who other than Dr. Boesak, Archbshop Tutu, Dr. Beyers Naude and the Reverend Chikane

would dare stand up and use the words "deemed effective by the oppressed"?

What mechanisms does the SACC have or what mechanisms do the Kagiso Trust have of establishing what the "oppressed" think and feel about anything? It is not through its member churches that the SACC is informed about the oppressed and its feelings. It is SACC staff sitting behind their desks making personal choices and coming up with personal judgements which informs the SACC about the "oppressed".

We know, Mr. Speaker, Honourable Members, that this is the case. There is no black church in the country that is not ambiguous about political tactics and strategies. There is no township, there is no neighbourhood in which there is not ambiguity. There lis a raging battle for minds taking place amongst Black South Africans. There is point and counter-point; there is debate, there are lies and there lis distortion. There is no overall "voice of the oppressed". There are only organisations claiming to speak on behalf of the rest of Black South Africa which make this claim without having the mechanisms to demonstrate the authenticity of what they say.

When Inkatha has a card-carrying membership; when we have our Annual General Conference, when we have our Youth Conferences and when we have our Women's Brigade Conferences, we are in a position to establish the wishes of Black South Africa fairly effectively. We also have our mass meetings. We are in direct touch with the masses to provide the masses with mechanisms of making views known.

It is our informed opinion about the SACC and the Kagiso Trust that makes me query their funding. I am informed by the people the SACC and the Trust purport to represent. I have mechanisms of establishing what the people's views are which they do not have. There lis not one person in the Kagiso Trust who is elected by the masses to represent them on that Trust. Not one person, Mr. Speaker.

There lis not one person at the SACC who has been elected to the SACC 'by grass-root members of any church. They are all there as representatives chosen by committees which in turn are chosen by committees. They are twice, three times or more times removed from the man in the street who could vote yea or nay on any person's acceptability.

I have diverted somewhat; I have made an excursion into the funding of the SACC and the Kagiso Trust simply to illustrate the point I was making that vendettas against Inkatha are carried across the world to the uninformed and the ill-informed by people who are building up some kind of imagery which is worth money in the big business of world funding for South African projects.

Mr. Speaker, Honourable Members, I have the unfortunate responsibility of having to travel a great deal more than I would ever wish to do for myself. I go regularly to North America and

West Europe and I not only meet a very wide $cross-a^200^24-section$ of opinion but I am also questioned, and at times accosted, about the South African situation. I am well aware of prevailing perceptions of South Africa and how in these perceptions black politics is so little understood.

Those lin South Africa who receive the most substantial backing do so because they tell the story that West Europeans and North Americans most like to hear. They like to hear about the heroics of the struggle. For them the hideousness of apartheid demands a particular brand of protest and when that protest whips up feelings and protest action spills over into violent action, then they hear spokesmen such as Archbishop Tutu when they say things like: "there is a new breed of young Blacks with iron in their souls."

Dr. Boesak, Dr. Beyers Naude and the Reverend Frank Chikane paint pictures of township heroes and heroines braving the onslaught of the system to proclaim their opposition to apartheid. Itwis v the high profile actions, the media-acclaimed actions and the actions

which can be praised as the action of freedom fighters expressing,

themselves lin desperation rather than resorting to premeditated violence that catches the imagination.

Those who applaud what they see as heroism today are quite unmindful that the heroes of the Black People's Convention and Black Community Programmes are lost and forgotten in by-gone tactics and strategies that never worked. They forget that it is important to accumulate gains and to consolidate followings.

I have found that even foreign ministries where specialist Southern African desks exist fall prey to the propaganda of the ANC, the UDF and COSATU. It is almost as though if these organisations did not exist they would have to be invented to satisfy some Western opinions.:

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When you look at real political power as we are doing here in this House, you come to the sober realisation that power actually revolves around mobilising individuals and building them into work units capable of being sent out to achieve objectives. You also realise that power is more than the ability to sustain hit-and-run tactics which you start up afresh each time.

I come back again to the point that it is how one ultimately expects the South African cookie to crumble that determines basic attitudes to the questions of what objectives should be sought and what tactics and strategies should be used to achieve them.

I remember so well the excitement at Inkatha's birth and its emergence as the fastest growing black political organisation in the country. It gripped the imagination and people like Steve Biko offered to serve under me if I would abandon my position here in this House, Mr. Speaker, Honourable Members. The ANC Mission in exile was excited and offered co-operation while they thought Inkatha could be used in the politics of confrontation regardless of whether or not this would make Inkatha expendable in medium term or sooner.

And then there was the shock of realising that I would not deviate from the tried and trusted objectives of the struggle for liberation. While others were pursuing new-fangled ideas in newly-created organisations which were strange to black \hat{A} «ipolitiecs I continued with the tried and the tested and refused to change horses in midstream of the Black struggle for liberation.

You will remember that in the 1976-78 period we were being told by Black Consciousness activists that the South African Government would fall in the course of the following 18 months. You will remember how the whole world was agog with the believed news that

South Africa was being turned upside down and that apartheid would go up in flames. It was this spirit of false optimism which gave birth to slogans such as "liberation now, education later." The youth were encouraged to think that the struggle for 1liberation would turn out to be a hiccup in their educational programmes.

All this cost Black South Africa so very dearly. It squandered the country's leadership potential but importantly, it robbed Black South Africans of the experience of building up black political programmes and sustaining what was being done on a step to step basis to ensure that the struggle would not be a yo-yo of pseudo gains and real set-backs.

Even today you cannot get a sensible answer to the question of what, say, the UDF's political programme really is. You cannot see where the UDF is actually attacking apartheid per se. Protesting, yes; embarrassing, may be; obstructing, yes; but it is protest, embarrassment and obstruction which could as equally be part of making opposition to apartheid a permanent way of life as it could be part of anything else. These hard truths create incredulous indignation when they are uttered.

Mr. Speaker, Honourable Members, we in this House know that nobody is going to come and liberate South Africa for us and we know that we cannot indulge in the luxury of being high profile flamboyants in our opposition to apartheid while we wait the day of liberation. We know that the masses have to live each day and they have to struggle within the circumstances of their daily living. We also know that even revolutions begin the hard, grinding work of organising people and building up organisational strength. Above all we know that if we are going to do more than survive this interim period during the certain demise of apartheid and its final eradication, and actually get' on with the job of building power bases which will be useful in the future, we have to start engaging apartheid where apartheid can be engaged.

We too would act differently if we had grand visions of marching revolutionaries taking over a government and setting up a new society. That kind of thing which could be attempted in the smaller-scale societies of Angola, Mocambique and Zimbabwe lis totally unrealistic here. The power bases we are building are power bases which will enable us to gather our strength today, consolidate it tomorrow and employ it the next day.

% TO BE CONTINUED. **