

## REPORTS AND COMMENTARY ON SOUTH AFRICAN POLITICS

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Tri-partite peace pact paves the way for  
continuation of aborted negotiations

In a most significant boost to both the peace process and to the continuation of the temporarily aborted negotiations process, representatives of the IFP, ANC and NP agreed on 15 August to wide ranging measures designed to put an end to the internecine conflict that continues to bedevil many communities.

The accord had a troubled history. The ANC boycotted the State President's Summit Conference on Violence held in May on the grounds that it had not been negotiated, because it was insufficient a response to the 5 April demands, and because it was not politically neutral.

The summit went ahead however, nonetheless aware of the need to extend itself to include other parties. A Continuation Committee was thus established which liaised with a Facilitation Committee under Dr Louw Alberts to establish a follow-on from the incomplete summit. A multi-party meeting agreed to the necessity of the three major players - IFP, ANC and NP - taking charge of the peace process.

This Facilitating Committee established a small Preparatory Committee comprising representatives of the IFP, ANC, NP, churches and business to work on further peace initiatives.

Work Groups were established to thrash out an agreement, and it is the result of their deliberations over the past couple of months that the tri-partite agreement was reached on 15 August.

Distinguishing this agreement from anything before is the fact that:

### Contents

Tri-partite peace pact  
Negotiations on board  
National Party's constitutional proposals  
IFP economic thinking geared to growth  
Reconstruction urgently needed, says Ndlovu  
Youth Brigade Conference - Buthelezi's address

- Musa Zondi's report
- Resolutions

e  
VOOV WNN -

VOL 3 NO 8 SOUTH AFRICAN UPDATE AUGUST 1991

â\200\231 it involves the three major participants rather than just two of them;

Â¥ it creates structures designed to produce results; and, most importantly,

Â¥ it has the force of law behind it.

The 70-page draft document binds the three parties to the conflict to a set of common political values that reflect their official acceptance of a culture of political tolerance.

For instance, the accord states that no political party or its representatives would:

kill, threaten or intimidate people because of

their political beliefs;

# interfere, obstruct or threaten people travelling to or from political gatherings; and  
o force anyone to join a political party.

In themselves, these might be said to merely reflect the kinds of pious intentions that achieve little, but added to this was agreement on a prohibition on the carrying of dangerous weapons at political gatherings (a major concession agreed to by the IFP on 21 August) as well as a prohibition on the creation of party political self-defence units. The agreement allows for bona fide self-defence units to liaise with the police who are considered responsible for the maintenance of law and order.

But of far greater significance than unity by the three parties on the necessity of what might often sound like aromanticor idealised picture of desirable political behaviour by the grassroots supporters of the political parties, is the creation of elaborate structures intended to successfully intervene in trouble spots to put an end to violence.

There are three sets of structures intended collectively to accomplish this goal, involving:

t conflict resolution by the parties themselves;  
i neutral investigation of conflict; and  
X the police.

continued on back page

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Negotiations shot in the arm as parties  
prepare for convening of long awaited  
Multi-Party Conference

Political tribulations of the past month, especially the funding row, have stressed the urgency of the major actors making rapid progress towards serious negotiations getting off the ground as soon as possible. Nonetheless, reality probably dictates that negotiations on constitutional substance rather than form remains a little way off.

Noteworthy however, is the fact that rather than the entire negotiations process taking the lengthy five years or so that De Klerk recently suggested it could (he even went so far as to suggest that he might require a mandate by the time elections are due in 1994 merely to continue negotiating), there are several factors pointing to a speedier resolution than this.

TIMETAKEN TODRAFT & FINALISENEW  
CONSTITUTION DEPENDENT UPON  
MULTI-PARTY CONFERENCE & ITS ROLE

For this optimistic prognosis to come true, there are first two major problems to be resolved prior to the new constitution being drafted and adopted, relating to both the negotiating mechanism and the governing of the country during the transitional period. But until parties either give way or compromise, negotiations will be simply unable to start.

The two key issues in this regard are the question of a constituent assembly and that of an interim government, and the possible linkage between the two.

On the one hand, the NP and other parties such as the IFP and DP remain resolute in their rejection of the suitability of a constituent assembly as the negotiating mechanism. But on the other hand, by August, those organisations broadly supportive of the concept (especially the ANC, PAC, Azapo as well as Cosatu and Nactu) eventually appeared to have agreed on the need to formalise arrangements towards the proper formation of the Patriotic Front mooted a whole year ago by PAC President Clarence Makwetu and current ANC President Nelson Mandela.

Part of the reason they took so long to get their act together was possibly because the ANC was unwilling to trap itself into a fixed position with no escape route. It was very noticeable for instance, that the organisation's hardline stance at its December 1990 conference was virtually immediately attenuated by Mandela's 8 January 1991 anniversary message on behalf of the NEC suggesting far greater ANC flexibility by the leadership than by the rank and file membership on the question of the drafting mechanism.

Significantly, his statement referred to the possibility of the proposed Multi-Party Conference (MPC)

VOL 3 NO 8 SOUTH AFRICAN UPDATE AUGUST 1991

changing its function if necessary. He said that once its task was completed, the congress would dissolve unless ... it obtained a specific popular mandate to continue as a constitution making

body, an interim government, or both.

Though this strong door of compromise was quickly closed by hardliners, the offer had in effect been made, signalling the possibility of a compromise.

A successful Patriotic Front conference however, would suggest a retreat towards a more intractable position on the side of the ANC. And as the IFP said at its July conference, such a move would be "regressiveâ\200\235, an appeal "to the apartheid past". It would suggest that a compromise was no longer acceptable to the ANC.

The last minute announcement in late-August that the Patriotic Front conference was off, (difficulties over a suitable venue), implied the ANC might have given itself a breathing space to see whether a less rigid position might come from its participation in other initiatives, especially the peace initiative and the Multi-Party Conference. But this was soon put to rest by agreement on a date (late September) and by continued hardline demands.

#### NEED TRANSITIONAL ARRANGEMENTS

The ANC has maintained a tough position on the second divisive issue, that of an interim government, on which the ANC is demanding that the government make major concessions as a way out of the impasse. There is a general belief that De Klerk's bona fides have been found wanting by revelations of his government's covert political partisanship and to the ANC, this fully justifies its calls for an interim government.

The ANC is certainly not alone in believing that the process requires some new transitional mechanism. The DP has long said the government cannot be both a player and a referee if the negotiations are to be conducted in good faith, and is at times as vociferous in its criticism of De Klerk now as it has been in any period since 2 February 1990 despite their growing confluence on constitutional policy.

Party leader Zac de Beer even suggested that the DP might send an observer to the proposed Patriotic Front conference. Since the sole purpose of this event is purely to unite organisations around the demand for a constituent assembly, a proposal the DP is strongly opposed to, this shows that pressures are mounting on the National Party government to make concessions.

Not that the party is refusing to do so. What the NP has always said it objected to, is that the present government hand over power to a new constitutionally

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sovereign interim government. It does not object to the notion that this transitional period requires multi-party participation in government, and this is indeed something that the IFP has demanded.

The ANC however, has officially rejected this as co-option and has refused to participate in anything less than an as-yet undefined interim government. Its present strategy appears to be one based on frustrating the government at every turn, demanding that no decisions be taken without prior negotiation with and hence approval of the ANC. The present debate on VAT epitomises this, as did its refusal to participate in the State President's Peace Conference.

Fortunately, the lack of definition of exactly what an interim government should comprise provides an escape, and allows an opportunity for the MPC to develop a suitable compromise. On 8 January Mandela said:

The early installation of an interim government ... is critical to the transition process. The National Party must understand and accept that not only apartheid legislation must be done away with, but also that its Government, itself an apartheid institution, should also be abolished. In the interim, it must be replaced by an authority which would include representatives of the NP as well as those of other political formations that would be participating in the process of negotiations.

The abolition of the present government, is however, an unlikely occurrence, much as the ANC might desire it. In February, De Klerk acceded to the idea of the inclusion of representatives of extra-parliamentary organisations participating in the decision-making process, seemingly at both legislative and executive levels. In May De Klerk reiterated this, though with a not unexpected proviso:

This should not, however, impair the orderly progress of good government and administration in terms of the existing Constitution.

But despite the funding scandal demonstrating a government not playing the game, the government stated clear limits to what it would accede to. On 28 July, the ANC/SACP/Cosatu stressed that "the present government cannot supervise the process of transition," and called on all South Africans "to unite behind the call for an interim government of national unity." The government however, noted:

Practically speaking, an interim government means abolishing the present Government and replacing it with a new one, and that's not acceptable.

But De Klerk did try to deal with comments made by Mandela holidaying in Cuba that the government could not be a player and referee at the same time. On 30 July De Klerk committed himself to:

transitional arrangements which will ensure ... that the government is unable to misuse its

position to the detriment of its discussion

VOL 3 NO 8 SOUTH AFRICAN UPDATE AUGUST 1991

partners....Thavean open mind toalternative methods [but] any steps have to result from negotiation.

What De Klerk means in practice by an interim government is really a transitional cabinet, as he made clear in his 2 May reference to non-parliamentary organisations being given a voice in government. And despite the ANC formally rejecting the idea of tokenism, co-option, or acting as a junior partner in government, ex-intelligence chief and current deputy secretary general Jacob Zuma did say on 27 August that he might favourably consider the Justice portfolio. This might point to an ANC more accepting of the improbability of the government conceding to the ANC's present demands, let alone those that might emanate from a Patriotic Front.

#### CONSENSUS NECESSARY ON PRECISE FORM OF TRANSITIONAL GOVERNMENT

The long and short of it is that some sort of transitional arrangement combining the existing government with strong multi-party representation is on the agenda of the Multi-Party Conference. An optimistic appraisal might suggest the difference is not as extreme as rhetoric often suggests it is:

> the ANC calls for a reconstituted government, a

multi-party government of national unity, to

replace the existing regime;

S De Klerk is offering a multi-party government of national unity comprising an extension of the present government; and

x the IFP, which in March last year said that "A mutually agreed procedure for the conduct of negotiations be devised by all negotiating parties" (the 1990 Inkatha Declaration), has long seen the necessity for an interim arrangement, though its position is now closer to that of the NP than of the ANC.

Spurring most parties into action appears to be an all-round willingness to start talking. After all, the pre-negotiations phase has already lasted some 18 months and there has been absolutely no formal negotiations on the substance of the country's new constitution.

The ANC says that the biggest stumbling block to date is the internecine violence and the reactions of certain parties to this. Unfortunately, the IFP/ANC Peace Accord of 29 January 1991 lasted but a few months, undermined, the IFP believes, by the ANC's 5 April letter to the government which blamed the state and the IFP for all the violence. Supporters of the ANC, by way of contrast, were portrayed as no more than innocent victims.

The months following this letter saw an intensive debate on the question of weaponry (traditional and other), on state/security force involvement in violence, and on mass action and its effects on stimulating con-

flict.

The 24/25 May Summit Conference on Violence called by De Klerk was boycotted by the ANC, and though a valuable experience, required the full partici-

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pation of all three major actors if it was to really succeed in forging peace.

A further set of meetings, involving the churches and business as well was therefore called as a follow-on to the first summit. Despite misgivings regarding the churches' partiality as convenors, the IFP agreed to participate. The result has been truly surprising in that consensus was reached by the IFP, the ANC and the NP on action to nurture peace rather than mere words stating good intentions.

The optimistic view suggests all three parties have realised that monitoring and enforcement functions are crucial to the peace process, and have produced a set of proposals far more thorough than anything considered before (see page 20). In terms of this, the agreement was essential for two reasons - to devise mechanisms to bring about peace and to clear the way towards proper negotiations by removing this outstanding stumbling block. (The ANC made the dubious claim that only the violence prevented their earlier willingness to continue negotiations.)

#### TRI-PARTITE PACT HAS IMPORTANT IMPLICATIONS FOR ATTITUDES TOWARDS THE FORTHCOMING MULTI- PARTY CONFERENCE

Cementing this positive view is a further factor. Important as the agreement was, perhaps as significant was the fact that agreement could be reached at all given the distrust occasioned by the funding scandal and the ANC's resultant attempt once again to marginalise the IFP and to challenge its status as a major player.

That the three parties achieved what they did under these circumstances therefore led to speculation that the summit agreement possibly represented the embryonic form of something far more substantial than a peace agreement, that the peace pact could be seen as a possible ideological precursor to negotiations itself.

The Sunday Times, eg, wrote that the pact:

also anticipates the coming constitutional negotiations by uniting the three main political parties in support of a set of common values that may form the basis of a liberal, democratic state. The tone of the agreement is tolerant, and it firmly asserts the primacy of the individual over the state. While intended as an interim measure, the effect of the pact is to bind all three signatories to Western-style democratic norms well in advance of the constitutional talks.

There was also the suggestion by NGK facilitator Professor Johan Heyns that the proposed 14 September peace convention (inclusive of other parties) had a structural role to play in the negotiations by serving to launch the MPC itself.

There is on the one hand, then, a highly optimistic interpretation of events, suggesting that the success of the peace initiative thus augurs very well for this next phase in negotiations. Agreement on democratic values, on enforcing peace and on doing so jointly suggest

that the MPC might find it easier to reach consensus on its task than previously thought.

And unlike previous bilateral agreements reached between the ANC and government or the IFP and government or the IFP and the ANC, this peace agreement represents the first tripartite IFP/ANC/NP agreement, and as such, it is suggestive of what the MPC might achieve especially since the same three parties will constitute the core representation of the MPC as well.

On the other hand, a more cautious perspective is that since the purpose of the two initiatives is very different, one cannot assume consensus from the MPC merely because it was reached over the issue of violence.

The peace initiative was intended to resolve the violence and to remove a stumbling block to negotiations. It is however, no substitute for negotiations and what negotiations are intended to achieve. It is true that negotiations are concerned with the drafting of the new non-apartheid constitution, but just as important is the precise form that the new state takes and, crucially, which party or parties comprise the next government.

Negotiations are thus more concerned with power and cementing prospects of power than with "pure" constitutionalism in abstract, especially since there is already a large measure of constitutional consensus. That is why the outstanding issues that the MPC has to decide upon are still highly contentious - who will negotiate and how negotiations will proceed. This is still the terrain of the struggle.

Some form of initiative on securing peace might well have been achieved then, but the question of where we go from here is ostensibly no closer to a solution since the ANC, its allies and those further to the left are still, officially at least, adamantly wedded to a hardline position. ~

This perspective suggests that the ANC is still doing everything in its power to polarise the body politic into two camps - headed by the NP and the ANC - and that its bottom line strategy of gaining power remains one of forcing the government into giving way on the interim government and constituent assembly issues.

It is difficult to be sure which of the two is the more accurate picture. What nevertheless does count for something now is restoring the trust that has in large measure disappeared between the three major parties, and the peace pact clearly has much to offer here and in determining what happens next. From a structural perspective, the work of the National Peace Commission is irrelevant to the negotiating mechanism no matter what the media or Heynes say, but the restoration of trust may prove vital in determining whether compromises are going to be made by the MPC.

At the end of the day, it is virtually certain that the ANC is still going to have to give ground on a number of issues. Though it is going to try to maximise whatever gain it can from the government's discomfort, it is virtually axiomatic that there will not be a constituent assembly to draft the new constitution or a transitional government of the type demanded by the ANC -

what matters now therefore, is negotiations to discover  
whatever common ground does exist. Â\$

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National Party's constitutional draft  
policy favours a non-racial federation  
with strong minority representation

For the first time since De Klerk supplanted PW  
Botha as NP leader and State President, the NP has  
come out into the open and shown what it intends taking  
to the negotiating table. Its as-yet incomplete draft  
proposals to be put before the party's federal congress in  
Bloemfontein on 4 September, are made up of:

4 a multi-party cabinet:

this unusual body comprises representatives  
of parties with "sufficient" support. It is an  
attempt towards enshrining consensus decision-  
making. From it, an Executive Council of 3 to 5  
members would be drawn.

% a bi-cameral parliamentary system:

comprising a lower house elected in terms of  
proportional representation, and an upper house  
elected from the regions. Equal representation  
for qualifying parties in second house an attempt  
to secure minority party representation.

Â¥ proportional representation:

replacing the traditional Westminster winner-  
takes-all constituency-based electoral system.

Generally considered more representative of  
grassroots political divisions, and thus fairer.  
\* strong regional government:

to replace over-centralism of the past. Regions  
to be totally non-racial and non-ethnic, their

composition being determined by geography and  
economic viability. NP suggests 9 regions.  
& integrated municipalities:

again, non-racial and non-ethnic, to which a large  
measure of power is devolved. Common tax base

of presently racially divided municipalities but  
questionable approach to voting rights.  
i no apartheid:

non-racialism - one person one vote, total

equality before the law and constitution, etc,

guaranteed through an independent judiciary  
and justiciable Bill of Rights. But the recurrent

NP theme of no domination leads not only to

highly defused power, but to many, goes to far in this regard.

Everything that has gone before has either been seriously tainted by naked baaskap apartheid thinking or has been deliberately vague. For instance, the NP fought the last, September 1989, white (general) election on the basis of a "Plan of Action" suggestive of a party dragging its heels in the face of the inevitable democracy that would one day have to come.

The tenor of its rhetoric was modernisation of apartheid rather than its total abolition. It did grudgingly refer to blacks being incorporated into a central legislature and executive, but it also referred to constitutional divisions still based on "groups", to "consensus-

VOL 3 NO 8 SOUTH AFRICAN UPDATE AUGUST 1991

based" government free of "group domination", and to the need for a special conflict-resolving mechanism to be created.

It has taken the NP just two years to have abandoned group-based constitutionalism and to have seemingly accepted (a) non-racialism, and (b), majority rule.

This acceptance of majority rule, is not however, an acceptance of what its spokespersons have on other occasions labelled "unqualified majoritarianism", and to be fair to the NP, no party now advocates no brakes on the possible abuse of power. That is why there is such convergence on the necessity for a justiciable Bill of Rights. But the NP goes further than this in its advocacy of (a) the special form of cabinet, and (b), regionalism.

The proposed composition of the cabinet is likely to be highly contentious. The raison d'être appears to be to nurture a government of national unity irrespective of which single party or alliance of parties wins at the polls, so that if the NP, for instance, won the election, the ANC would still be represented in government.

Not surprisingly, the ANC and others to its left dismissed the NP's proposals. There are, however, two issues that cannot be dismissed.

First, with the exception of these oddities, the proposals constitute an approximation to normal liberal democracy. Indeed, there is a lot that the NP can now be said to have in common with the ANC - non-racialism, proportional representation, a bicameral system, an independent judiciary and Bill of Rights.

Second, the proposals have a lot in common with other parties, most particularly the DP and the IFP, as well as other political leaders likely to be involved in negotiations. This commonality constitutes a powerful bloc negating the centralism espoused by the ANC.

Indeed, the key point of departure between the various parties is increasingly being narrowed down, and is now probably centred around the whole issue of devolution of power, regionalism and federalism more than any other single issue. The ANC and others to its left maintain that federalism is designed to prevent a new government exercising the kinds of powers that this government and its predecessors have enjoyed. They are

correct - proponents of regionalism are very wary of over-centralised government and thus of parties whose constitutional views are based on this.

The NP's proposals only constitute a discussion document and do not necessarily represent its bottom line. Given that the final settlement will be subject to tough negotiation, they will probably have been designed so that contentious issues can be dropped in the name of compromise when appropriate. In the interim, they give the party membership the first chance to mandate new policy since 1983. Â\$

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IFP proposes wealth creation and the distribution of opportunity rather than mere redistribution of existing wealth

There was much that Africa in general and South Africa in particular could learn from Taiwan, said IFP president MG Buthelezi on a recent visit to the Far East. Addressing Premier of the Executive Yuan, Mr Hau Pei-tsun on 1 August in Taiwan, Buthelezi stressed the kernal notions that made IFP economic thinking so appropriate to the economic realities South Africa faced.

"We have the tremendous advantage in South Africa of having the lessons that Africa can teach us before us. We have seen how liberation from tyranny has not meant liberation from poverty, ignorance and disease. And we have seen how spreading mass poverty has become the mortal enemy of democracy. We have seen that wherever liberation has not meant increased standards of living for the poorest of the poor, the people begin to blame the government for their continued poverty.

It is therefore with emphasis that I say that Taiwan has done what we want to do. Taiwan has swept away constraints and allowed that which has enabled every single Taiwanese who wished to do so, to contribute in his or her small way to your economy. And you have co-ordinated the input of your citizens so that their industry was felt on the world stage.

â\200\230You have provided Africa, and in particular South Africa, with an example to follow and we are here to learn from Taiwan.

In a country such as South Africa, where First World and Third World economies co-exist in one country, the First World ideal is a very real one. There is a massive migration away from rural areas and subsistence economies in them. Urbanisation in South Africa is proceeding at something like four per cent per annum as people flock to the cities where they hope to participate in the cash economy.

In Inkatha Freedom Party we know that we will have to fight on two fronts if we are going to eliminate poverty. We will have to fight to increase the productivity of the central cash economy, and we will also have to fight to make the informal sector of the economy more productive and capable of supporting more people. And we also understand that political and economic policies are two sides of the same coin - economic objectives can only be reached through the application of appropriate political policies.

We know that along with everything which a First World cash economy can bring - jobs, taxes, licences, trading, medical aid, and insurance against disaster, and many other things - poverty will grow and spread unless monumental efforts are made to get people to feed themselves and to see to their rudimentary needs in self-

VOL 3 NO 8 SOUTH AFRICAN UPDATE AUGUST 1991

help development schemes.

In my country, the reality is that only one out of every ten school leavers has a chance of finding a job in the formal economy. Every year the 90% of remaining

school leavers add to the unemployed. And unemployment stands at around 40%. The youth have no hope. Poverty is endemic. Urbanisation is occurring at a rate of 4 per cent per annum, with most newly urbanised people moving to unserviced urban slums.

The Black population is increasing at a rate of 3% per annum, inflating the number of unemployed people and inflating the number of people living in poverty. Infant mortality rates, the lack of health services, all tell us South Africa is in trouble. We have stubborn inflation. Economic growth is zero. Government spending is increasing and per capita income is decreasing. Basic needs are not being satisfied. Housing, education, health, water, electricity, the provision of employment, sport, social facilities - all these need urgent attention. This is the Third World reality of my country and is the experience of the 60% of Black South Africans who live below the poverty line.

There are of course other realities in South Africa. The great inequality in the allocation of resources over the many years of apartheid led to the situation where White South Africans hold 80% of all personal wealth in South Africa and control the major resources of the country, despite the fact that they constitute only 13% of the population.

Two primary mechanisms have been advocated as solutions - redistribution and wealth creation. The notion of redistribution has generated impossible expectations in the minds of many Black South Africans. But the IFP and its membership reject this out of hand as redistribution of wealth will only lead to the redistribution of poverty.

The IFP advocates rather the redistribution of opportunity. The political objectives of the IFP reflect this need to redistribute opportunity by ensuring the means of production will be guaranteed to all. We argue that opportunity sufficient to satisfy rising expectations does indeed exist. We have the infrastructure necessary to create opportunity within South Africa. Our water and electricity supply systems for example are the most advanced in Africa. And we have complex transport, banking, telecommunication systems and we have important fiscal management skills. In addition to the necessary infrastructure we have vast supplies of minerals to exploit to enable us to create opportunity for all. And we have the capacity to develop a strong trade and export sector. Proper development and proper planning could create economic opportunity for mil-

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lions of the poorest of the poor.

The IFP, recognising the complexities of the First and Third World realities within South Africa, and recognising the strengths of the South African infrastructure, has developed an economic policy which is designed to serve the pragmatic need to best utilise these strengths for the good of all South Africans. This economic policy is complimented by the IFP's adoption of a political policy necessary to facilitate pragmatic economic growth within the ideals of a broad humanism.

#### GUIDING PRINCIPLES UNDERPINNING IFP'S FAITH IN A MARKET-DRIVEN MODERN INDUSTRIALISED ECONOMY

I cannot, in a short address such as this, do anything other than briefly outline our ideals, our principles, and our economic policy. The IFP advocates a modern, market-driven industrial economy to eliminate poverty and provide the growth necessary to generate wealth to ensure a decent standard of living for all.

In advocating this, we are guided by the principles that:

- there should be private ownership of property and the means of production;
- market forces should be freed;
- State intervention should be minimal (State intervention should indeed only be facilitatory and regulatory);
- economic competition should be promoted,;
- the distribution of wealth and income should be just;
- the distribution of opportunity should be equal and not based on race, creed or gender;
- development should be the development of human potential and opportunity;

The IFP maintains that this economic order cannot work without the rights guaranteed by a democracy. Further, the IFP maintains that this economic order cannot work without the checks and balances which a multi-party democracy would ensure.

The IFP therefore argues that democracy which guarantees all South Africans basic economic rights - such as the right to pursue their economic potential to the full, the right to own property, the right to own the means of production - is crucial to the successful implementation of the economic policy I have just described.

The right to work for gain, the right to equal pay for equal work, and the right to protection from the State against unfair economic exploitation is especially guaranteed by a political order based on multi-Party democracy. It is towards the establishment of this po-

litical order - a multi-Party democracy with checks and balances for all - that the IFP works.

The immediate goal of the IFP economic policy is to expand the industrial base of the economy as a necessary prerequisite for economic growth and wealth creation. Economic expansion must take place to ensure an ever-increasing share of domestic and foreign markets. The most rewarding growth is that in which

VOL 3 NO 8 SOUTH AFRICAN UPDATE AUGUST 1991

there is wealth creation from export-led growth. Access to foreign markets will therefore be pursued vigorously through a multi-sectoral policy.

Economic processes just have to address improved income, equity and services distributions. The IFP argues against redistribution through nationalisation of key industries and instead maintains that the less State interference in the economy the better. The IFP argues against confiscation of assets as mechanisms to achieve this as this would interfere with the rights of the individual to privately own land, to accumulate wealth, to find employment under fair and just conditions and to privately own fixed property.

Instead, the IFP argues that a short to medium term increase in opportunity, which allows people to become participants in the economy, will substantially improve the distribution of wealth. This wealth distribution through economic growth is central to IFP policy. It will serve to avert dependency becoming endemic which could prove problematic.

The IFP sincerely believes that dangers of State interference in the economy would curb productivity, as has been proved all over the world. We therefore argue that the restructuring of the economy will have to ensure that market forces and initiatives are given greater freedom. This can best be achieved through deregulation, commercialisation, privatisation and a reorientation of the economy towards widespread industrialisation that emphasises export trade. This reconstruction will have to be financed through economic earnings, economic savings, and through other sources such as foreign loans, investment and aid.

We have to develop an economy which possesses optimal growth potentials which emanate from a large and competitive productive economic base mostly made up of private sector activity that earns foreign income and creates jobs. Attention will have to fall on those sectors of the economy which can best contribute to the attainment of economic goals.

Initially the government will have to play an influential role in ensuring the establishment of such an economy becomes possible through an improved performance of existing industry, and a doubling of the industrial base in the shortest possible time.

State involvement in the economy has to be limited involvement to establish political and economic structures that encourage enterprise and the creation of wealth. They should also generate equal access to this process for all and ensure benefits from it for all. It is important that in devising State intervention, safeguards against the extension of this interference are guaran-

ted and strategies used by the State are self-cancelling. Africa is full of bureaucratic monoliths. The State must play a role in the establishment of an economic advisory council to research and formulate plans and programmes for long term economic growth and employment in consultation with other bodies.

The State must also play a role in the development and expansion of a competitive capital-intensive high-tech manufacturing sector to serve both export-led growth and increased domestic consumption.

THE INKATHA INSTITUTE FOR SOUTH AFRICA

Research, development and improvement of skills are also areas in which the State must play a role. During the formative period of the new economic order the IFP as government will also have to encourage development away from the over-pressurised metropolitan areas to a more even spacial development by encouraging construction of select industries and will encourage the influx of migrants to economically functional rural towns. These decentralisation efforts will take into account the comparative advantages and cost of creating jobs in the different regions to make decentralisation attractive to foreign investors. Decentralisation to develop growth points where they do not exist will be used very circumspectly, if at all.

Land reform must be principled on the most efficient use of land, and this does not preclude the redistribution of inefficient large units. Government-owned land must be redistributed to those disadvantaged, and mechanisms (possibly Land Courts) must be developed to redress wrongs committed under apartheid and ensure a more equitable distribution of land.

The IFP also recognises the importance of tourism as a labour intensive industry which contributes to foreign exchange and the Gross Domestic Product. The IFP will therefore promote this industry and ensure sound environmental and conservation policies crucial to the survival and growth of this industry.

The informal business sector is estimated to contribute to between 12 and 30 percent of GDP. This is huge considering the gross disadvantages in which the informal sector has had to emerge. One can only assume that its potential is tremendous. The IFP sees this sector as offering a welcome potential for job creation and the promotion of Black business talent. It is the informal sector within which an economy based on community needs can be developed.

The IFP is committed to developing the human resources upon which an informal sector can be based. The informal sector, in the context of the South African situation, is the cradle in which potential and initiative can be nurtured and brought to the fore. It is also the sector in which the population can seize the new opportunities offered by social and political change, and where the focus of IFP economic policy is most immediate.

Vast areas within South Africa do not at the moment have any access to the First World infrastructures, but this cannot be allowed to delay the growth of the informal sector in rural or in urban areas. We need cottage industries and we need craft markets. We need to utilise every possible resource within local communities to generate income.

It is crucial that in this time of transition and during the formative years of the new South African economy that we turn for an example to those who have successfully managed to diminish poverty and generate growth by utilising the informal sector as the basis of a modern, market-driven industrial economy. The IFP as a major player in the immediate the South African context, and as the major player in any future government, turns to you as a model and partner in South Africa's economic growth." Â\$

Reconstruction now  
an urgent priority

Though peace sometimes appeared remote in certain communities, this was nonetheless the time to opt for reconstruction. In a 17 August address read on his behalf to the Pietermaritzburg Chamber of Commerce and Industries, KwaZulu Deputy Minister and IFP CC member VB Ndlovu stressed that peace could in fact come about directly through this upliftment exercise.

"We live in an exciting period of great change, an era we blacks have been waiting for for generations. No one disputes the fact that apartheid ideology is now dead and that we are on a transitional road to a better world. No one denies that the new South Africa is on its way and that we must build the future together. No one disagrees that there must be fundamental change and that it is coming.

But we are also living in a world of great expectations. Liberty, fraternity and equality are great ideals, but we must deliver the concrete as well as nice words. Liberty does not feed an empty stomach. Fraternity doesn't give anyone a job. Constitutional equality does not give a family a house. This means that the better world that we build together, this new South Africa that we are all looking forward to, will be nothing if it does not improve the lot of the majority of our population.

Let me blunt. Our liberation struggle was not only to get the vote. Non-racial universal suffrage is our right, and we shall have it along with multi-party liberal democracy. But as important, the vote is a precondition, a means to an end. It is the means to empower us to transform our lives, to give us the same life chances and life experiences that our more fortunate and more powerful fellow citizens enjoy, frequently at our expense.

That is why the IFP's internal constitution is introduced by what it terms its Four Great Tasks, dedicating the party to the achievement of broad socio-economic goals in addition to political democracy.

It cannot be otherwise. It is because we represent a constituency that is at the bottom of the ladder in every conceivable manner that we must prioritise things the way we do. Whether you are talking about housing, jobs, health, the living environment, life expectancy, infant mortality, education, or whatever, in the race that life comprises, we have been left so far behind that we will never be able to catch up unless the system is geared towards achieving this goal.

We in the IFP know, as indeed most of South Africa knows, that as a country we cannot afford to become a welfare state. We do not possess the physical, commercial or financial resources to throw money at levelling the playing field tomorrow. We are so cash-strapped and are inundated with demands to satisfy so many needs, that we will go bankrupt if we fail to exercise strict discipline over our spending.

But by the same token, we cannot over-empha-

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size investment in our country's long term economic future only. We have to look towards making an immediate improvement in the lives of ordinary people or else they will have no faith in negotiations or in the kind of South African economy that we know to be the only sound means of distributing wealth and opportunity.

The new South Africa, or even the transitional South Africa that we are now in, does not mean that while new universities are built, children must die through lack of potable water. It does not mean that while we spend billions on beneficiating minerals, our homes are not supplied with electricity. It does not mean that we as we export millions of rands of manufactured goods, our people stand forlorn without any hope of employment.

Charity, they say, begins at home. It is at home - here in Pietermaritzburg - that we must start what must be done. And if we look for a starting point, we have only to leave the frenetic CBD and the plush suburbs to enter another world that all of Pietermaritzburg relies upon but few see or are prepared to see, the Pietermaritzburg that starts over the hills on the horizon. The immediate task before us is the upliftment and reconstruction of the black areas surrounding the white core.

With or without the violence which has traumatised us over the past few years, our black communities would require upliftment. Apartheid dehumanised us and did so deliberately. Apartheid said we were temporary sojourners whose urban environment should not reflect our permanent presence in so-called white South Africa. Apartheid ensured that we lived in hovels, that our families were crammed into rooms like sardines, that no sports or recreation facilities were built, that minimum infrastructural development took place.

In time, because even our second class citizenship was to be stripped away to fulfil Verwoerd's nightmare, what was already a desperate situation was permitted to worsen substantially. Virtually no new formal housing was provided but the population density increased, along with unemployment, crime and the breakdown of the family and community. Urban squalour was the norm.

And, because black local authorities were not financially empowered, they were unable to deal with the situation at all. Indeed, they were so poorly financed that they could frequently barely keep essential services going, let alone start any upliftment process. Is it really that surprising then, that a revolutionary situation was created and that the country erupted in violence?

But unfortunately, what apartheid created a desperate need for, violence has only worsened, and has done so terribly. If then, upliftment was desirable in the past, reconstruction and upliftment are essential today.

I appreciate the difficulties you might have in thinking of reconstruction without peace, but let me assure you that the two are very easily linked. Peace will come. It might be difficult to see this at times, but peace accords that we have committed ourselves to are succeeding, and more importantly, communities that were being torn apart by violence are taking control of their lives and stopping it. It has happened in Shongweni. It has happened in Mpumalanga. It will come to Pieter-

maritzburg, if needs be, section by section.

What is required is consensus on a process of reconstruction and upliftment in which no one is excluded. Our communities are like war victims - some lightly wounded, some dying, some unscathed physically, but traumatised psychologically. We need to start a healing process and to do this we must pull together everyone with an interest in the recovery. Wounds need to be healed and stopped from festering into yet more violence. Reconciliation must be allowed to take precedence over retaliation. Enemies must talk and in doing so must find whatever common ground there is.

[submit that all those communities torn apart by violence, are in fact sick of the violence. They are tired of hatred. They have had enough of conflict, and in their hearts, there is now a great yearning for peace. We see it not only in the formal peace agreements, but also in the informal ones in which neither the ANC nor IFP regional or national leadership were involved. People now understand the futility of the war and the need to start afresh. It is our duty to encourage this.

I believe that the most positive role we can play is that of facilitating the community taking control of its destiny through participation in the upliftment and reconstruction process. The community knows what it wants. It knows also how to structure itself to do what must be done. It is the community that can best prioritise its needs and it is the community that come together through positive action geared towards improving the lot of those living in the community. We believe there is no reason why the ANC and its followers should not participate in this exercise. The IFP would welcome it, and we hope they would welcome us as well.

Most important, I believe both parties, as well as the community itself, would welcome the positive assistance of any other interested parties, as helpers. This means the central government and its local administrative units, the KwaZulu government, the security forces, the Pietermaritzburg City Council, the Red Cross and other humanitarian aid, the Urban Foundation and other development agencies, and of course, the Chamber of Commerce and Industry. Everyone is welcome if they can contribute positively.

I don't want to conclude by appearing to be more naive than I am. I know this is not a simple exercise and I know that violence continues unabated in certain areas not very far from Pietermaritzburg. But I also know that my people want peace. I know that the politically neutral people want peace. I would like to think this applies also to the ANC's followers.

If this is so, then peace must come some day. We must learn from others how they succeeded, and if necessary we must follow suit. I watch my IFP brothers and my ANC brothers in Mpumalanga and I know we can do it here.

Ladies and gentlemen, when that time comes, and it is not far off, I believe you will also be willing to play your role. I know you are committed and I know you want peace. Together we can all constitute ourselves into a powerful partnership in progress, putting the past

behind us as we jointly enter the new South Africa." Â\$

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Youth Brigade Conference: IFP played a major role in bringing South Africans to

where they are now,

On 23-25 August, the IFP Youth Brigade held its Annual General Conference in Ulundi. Attended by several thousand delegates and observers, the tone of the conference was tough and uncompromising.

On the one hand, Buthelezi lauded the Youth Brigade and the IFP's role in bringing South Africa to the state of preparedness for negotiations that it is now in. On the other hand, his address was marked by a hard attitude to the ANC, its failed strategies and the manner in which it seeks to use the negotiating process to its advantage.

On the theme "Peaceful change through negotiations and tolerance or chaos and conflict through violence and intimidation", Buthelezi said.

"Comrades, this is August 1991. This is the day of the month of the decade in which we know that the struggle for liberation is succeeding. It has been worth it and all the suffering of all the people over all the decades has not been in vain.

Now is the time for us to do more than count our blessings. Now is the time for us to shake our heads, defy the world, gird our loins and get going for the new South Africa that everybody has been struggling for, for so long. â\200\230

You the power of the new South Africa-to-be, you the inheritors of everything your forefathers and ancestors struggled for, you the new leaders of your South Africa tomorrow can now stand up in the Inkatha Freedom Party Youth Brigade and say we did it. We triumphed. When they said we had to kill for political purposes, we said no and we organised and we organised and we mobilised and we developed grassroot structures.

In 1975 to 1978 when we went, entered, went through and went past June 16 1976 and its aftermath, and the Government was at its strongest ever in oppressive terms, people said I could not succeed, they said I could not establish a constituency-based organisation. They said I could not mobilise a Youth Brigade that would be disciplined and work for the time honoured values of the Black struggle for liberation.

They laughed at me when I said I wanted to establish Inkatha as a membership-based organisation with local, regional and national structures. They said the youth of the day was far too impatient and far too strong. You will remember that Archbishop Tutu called the youth who wanted to stone and kill me at Robert Sobukwe's funeral a new breed of South Africans with iron in their souls. You may remember that that great son of Africa, Steve Biko, said that I was only supported by "the oldies."

Everywhere it was the youth who were forming

VOL 3 NO 8 SOUTH AFRICAN UPDATE AUGUST 1991

says Buthelezi

bands of destruction, defying, tearing up and really believing they could put the South African Government on the run. The media encouraged this saying that we had agreed of youth who would put things right in South Africa. They were not as patient in the face of oppression as their elders had been.

You were too young then but you must be told that during those years 1976 to 1978 the ANC actually believed, yes they actually believed, that the South African Government really was on the run. They were

talking about liberation within two years. They were

talking about the South African Government being brought to its knees by sticks and stones, by protest marches and by strikes.

Our youth were hounded. Through the very worst periods of South Africa's intimidatory history our youth took the shock of the frontal attacks, they may have receded a little bit, they may have been battered but they always rallied. Always they rallied. They have never failed to rally. Our youth rallied and rallied and rallied again.

YOUTH BRIGADE THE LARGEST IFP  
FORMATION.

This Conference of vast numbers of youth gathered here today is testimony to the fact that the youth rallied against the worst adversity. You rallied and rallied and rallied again and it is your rallying which has helped to produce the new South Africa. Inkatha would not have done it if you were not there. Inkatha has been dependent upon you being there and Inkatha Freedom Party is dependent upon you now being there. The Youth Brigade membership is the biggest segment of our entire IFP membership.

You are such an important part of the structure of the IFP that your National Chairman has always been a member of Inkatha Freedom Party's Central Committee and he is now a member of the Executive Committee of the IFP's Central Committee. He belongs to the very highest executive structure of the Party. Some guru pontificated recently that we need to give youth more room as if we stifle our youth. You may have read how your National Chairman responded to this.

He is there because your strength needs to be led from the very top of the Party. The youth wing has always been my direct responsibility. I and the Chairman of the Youth Brigade salute you and say how proud we have been to be able to lead.

Look at South Africa around you. A once arrogant brutally destructive government, which had no mercy whatsoever in any of its soul - if it had a soul - and

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which brutalised, trampled upon, oppressed and ground Black South Africa into poverty, has now become a government which is struggling for really good things.

The transition that Black South Africa has forced on to our country is very nearly miraculous. We still do not have the vote because we still have to negotiate a new constitution. That is inevitable but that aside, virtually every cornerstone law of apartheid has had to be discarded.

If this was a church meeting all the angels in heaven would be singing when I said that, and we would spontaneously burst out in songs of praise and glory to God for the transition that we have been witness to.

We are a political Party which can sing our victory song. Let us salute our heroes who have died, and let us now dedicate ourselves forever to stand on the principles for which they died. Let us always honour the struggle they waged for the success we are now reaping.

#### IFP'S STRATEGY ASSURED THE PRESENT NON-VIOLENT DEMOCRATIC STRUGGLE

Young comrades nothing on earth is now going to stop the IFP from being there as one of the three major players when negotiations begin about the constitutional future of our country. In the past we said there shall be a non-violent, democratic struggle. There was a non-violent, democratic struggle because we participated in it. There would not have been a non-violent democratic struggle if we had opted for the armed struggle - it just would not have happened.

We did not opt for the armed struggle because we knew that it was a failure from the very beginning. Events today vindicate the stand we in the [FP took. We were right and those who chose the armed struggle were wrong. We are not boasting when we speak thus, but we say these things to record them for history.

#### THE ANC'S ARMED STRUGGLE FAILED

The IFP said no to an armed struggle and there was not an armed struggle. You cannot call what the ANC did conducting an armed struggle. Not even one little corner of South Africa was liberated. Not one place in South Africa was made into a no-go area for security forces. After a quarter of a century there was not one military base in our country. You can hardly call what they did an armed struggle.

Were it not for the innocent victims of their armed struggle, who included women and children, we would be saying that it was all a big joke. Sadly, however, lives were lost, just as lives are being lost even now in their "people's war" which has cost us so many lives. I am pained that as a result of it so many of our members have also been sucked into the violence.

There was not one military base in Botswana, there was not one military base in Swaziland or Lesotho, and the military bases that the ANC did establish in Mozambique were removed because President Samora Machel saw how useless the armed struggle was, and that it would never win.

Because the armed struggle could not succeed, the ANC then very desperately attempted to rely on the UDF to make South Africa ungovernable. It poured millions upon millions of rands into the UDF which it obtained from the international community to empower the UDF and to make it possible for the UDF to attempt to bring South Africa to its knees. Once more there was an utter failure.

A lot of people talked big. Now they shoot their mouths off and they boast that they did it. They cried it was the armed struggle that did it. They cried that it was the mass democratic movement that did it. They cried that it was sanctions that did it but we know those are cries to cover failures. We do not say that they made no contribution towards our common struggle, but it was certainly not what they did which brought us to where we are today.

They did not bring about the fall of the Government by 1978 as they promised to do after June 16 1976. In fact by 1977 the Government moved in to smash up everything with a brutality we had never seen before. 18 organisations were banned and thousands of black leaders were cast into jail. Infact Inkatha as it was then, was almost banned as well. Mr. Jimmy Kruger, then Minister of Justice, summoned me to Pretoria where he threatened to take action against me because I refused to confine the membership of Inkatha only to Zulu-speaking South Africans.

That was a very hideous thing and one does not record it with any pride. One only recalls such action by the South African Government with shame. All I am doing is analysing in retrospect. We know what happened and we see the consequences of stupidity. Bluntly put, it was stupid for the Black Consciousness Movement to attempt to do what it did do. It just got smashed up in the process and set back the whole black struggle for liberation a decade.

I am absolutely sick and tired of people crowing that it was their victory when the victory belonged to the people of South Africa.

I want you now to pause and think. Clear your minds of today. Go back to 1978/79.

Inkatha was in discussions with Biko. Emissaries were going back and forth then. I was talking to Mr Oliver Tambo then. Emissaries were at that time going back and forth across the world to him and his colleagues. Just imagine what we would have achieved if Mr Oliver Tambo and Steve Biko did what they said they wanted to do - join together with me in a common fight against apartheid. Just imagine what would have happened if they did so and they did so behind what Inkatha was doing.

It was internal opposition to apartheid that won the day. At that stage I said to Mr Tambo and I said to Steve Biko - yes we need strikes. It is on record, I have said it. I said at that stage we need mass mobilisation. It is on record, I said it. I said at that stage, yes we must employ the full weight of consumer power. All these statements are recorded.

If Mr Tambo, myself and Steve Biko had come

together to employ the power of the worker and the

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power of the consumer and to mobilise people against apartheid, we would have had a dramatically different, earlier, wonderful final victory against apartheid.

#### COULD HAVE WORKED TOGETHER

Now at this stage when the victory has already been won, the ANC calls for a Patriotic Front and asks me to join it. No, my young brothers and sisters, not now. Not at this stage. The ANC does not want the Patriotic Front to fight apartheid. We do not need the Patriotic Front to fight apartheid. Apartheid is smashed up, it is dismembered and its total eradication is a foregone conclusion.

Now when it is too late the ANC is calling for a Patriotic Front and it is calling for a Patriotic Front because it is looking for partners to push it, the ANC, into government. It does not know how to do it on its own. The ANC wants to line up everybody who opposes apartheid behind it so that it can strut out ahead as the victorious Party. These are not things that I am sucking out of my thumb. The President of the ANC is on record saying over and over again that the ANC is a government-in-waiting.

Today's victory against apartheid which we are witnessing around us in ever greater measure every day of our lives, is a victory that belongs to the people. You share in that victory because you stood with the people. You did not run away from them and pretend to be a great warrior while you sat in some God-foresaken military camp in Africa hearing how marvellous the ANC was, but never participating in any marvellous action.

I am astounded again and again these days. I have witnessed wave after wave of Umkhonto we Sizwe personnel returning to South Africa. From what battles did they return? What victory marches can they have in South Africa? Who did they fight against and win? Where were their triumphs?

Let me pause here, Comrades. I am not humiliating the members of Umkhonto we Sizwe who left our country thinking they were going to be trained to fight. [I am not laughing at them. A great many of them are sons and daughters of Africa who thought they were doing the right thing, the patriotic thing and the brave thing. I respect their decision, however misguided they were in believing that they could successfully challenge the most powerful army in Africa.]

All I am saying is that the ANC falsely recruited these young brave men and women by telling them they would fight a battle they would never win. I am talking about a false analysis of the ANC. For more than a quarter of a century they said the armed struggle was a primary means of bringing about change in South Africa and for that quarter of a century the South African Government grew stronger and stronger where the ANC attacked it most militarily.

A revolutionary victory was never ever in sight. It is your struggle here on the ground that brought about the change. You struggled with the people around you. When the people were poor, you were there with them

being poor with them. When people were angry on the ground in South Africa you were there amongst them being angry with them.

When the people on the ground were rallying you were there rallying with them. You moved with the people. When the people advanced you moved with them and when the people moved to do something else, you moved to do that something else with them. Always you were there amongst the people.

In many, many a case it was the Inkatha Youth Brigade which showed a visible presence in areas of terrible stress. It gave the people hope and rallied them around the demand to eradicate violence from their midst. You were there to provide the moral back-up which the AK's tried to shoot out of the very souls of communities.

August 1991 is a month of honour and acclaim for the IFP Youth Brigade. I salute you.

I say again there will be no transformational moves without the IFP's involvement in them. Just as there was not a true armed struggle because I said no to war and revolution, there will be no multi-Party democracy in which we are not included. There will be no negotiations in which we do not play our own major role. We have that position of strength. I do not say these things because I do not want the IFP to throw in their lot with their brothers and sisters of other organisations. Not at all. No one has a better track record of extending the hand of brotherhood to other black brothers and sisters as I have done over many decades.

Young Comrades, you have struggled so hard with us that you must be enormously pleased when you look around and see that virtually every political Party in South Africa has to be moving to where we have been for a long time in order to remain relevant.

If Mr FW de Klerk had not made his February 1990 speech he would in all probability by now have been well on the way to become as irrelevant as Mr PW Botha is now to the process of change. He who started it all is never remembered even. His name does not cross anyone's lips any more. We don't know what he is doing, we don't know where he is. He does not matter because he did not do the right thing. If this is so with Mr PW Botha who started doing the right thing, how much more would it be for Dr Mandela because he did not start doing the right thing.

Politics has a brutally short memory about people and leaders who fail. Overnight they become nothing but the flotsam and jetsam of yesterday's mistakes.

But Mr FW de Klerk did make his February 1990 speech and you can look at that speech as a speech that I could have delivered. It was my kind of language. In that speech Mr FW de Klerk took the National Party a giant step towards the IFP.

Mark my words, my young Comrades, we are still in opposition. Mr de Klerk is still the State President. We still oppose the Government in its Tricameral ignominy. We have to oppose the Government and oppose it until it does what the people want.

Then turn to look at the ANC. All its grand  
schemes have been deflated and fallen flat and the whole

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world has proved them wrong. They could not win a revolution. They could not make South Africa ungovernable. They could not mount a people's war. They could not establish their grand dream of a Socialist one-Party State. They are now squirming next to their Communist allies and counterparts and the President of the ANC is now coyly talking about the ANC and the SACP moving apart and going their own ways eventually.

#### ANC FORCED TO MAKE CONCESSIONS

The grand alliance which was going to come home marching victoriously as a government returned from exile never succeeded.

Policy point after policy point the concessions the ANC are going to have to make are concessions towards IFP policy. Strategist after strategist and tactic after tactic the ANC is going to be forced into our kind of multi-Party behaviour on the ground. Step by step the ANC will have to be forced into constituency politics where the people on the ground tell the top leadership what to do or to go to hell.

These are all realities young sons and daughters of South Africa. There is a lot more that I could say. What I am saying is that we in the IFP helped shape South Africa to be what it is now becoming. We helped to introduce the process of change through non-violent means. If it were not for us there would have been a revolution that confounded our country's problems forever.

There have been the more frail amongst us who have fled. There have been the frightened amongst us who have cowered. There have been the impatient amongst you who have grumbled. There have been those who found the struggle long and tedious and they became fatigued and they blamed parts of the Party or some Party leaders.

That does not matter, that is normal. That is par for the course in every political organisation. In fact, it is sometimes the weak who in their frailty over-react who are the valuable signs of the times to the leaders of a Party.

Now, however, is the time to rally because we are not cowered, we are not beaten and we are not battered. Now is the time to gather together, to gird our loins with the strength that the Party does in fact have and to go forth into the new South Africa.

Our theme this year is: "Peaceful change through negotiations and tolerance or chaos and conflict through violence and intimidation." Let us look at our recent track record as a Party in terms of this theme.

On the 24th and 25th May the State President held a Summit Conference on Violence and Intimidation. We attended that Conference as the IFP. His Majesty was also present as King of the Zulus. Kwa-Zulu was represented. We went and we conquered.

We conquered in the sense that the ANC refused to go to that Conference because they said it was a government initiative. The SACP refused to go to that Conference. COSATU refused to go to that Confer-

ence. The PAC refused to go to that Conference. AZAPO refused to go to that Conference. The National Forum refused to go to that Conference and to crown it all, the SACC said yes sir, no sir, anything-you-like-sir and also did not go to that Conference.

This grand stay-away they thought will harm the Conference and kill the State President's initiative and that would be that. And they thought they could then mount their own Conference and dictate what should happen in the peace process.

Within a very few minutes of the Conference - in fact while our delegates were still registering - Professor Heyns came to me asking for my support to motivate another Conference where everybody could come. In other words, he was negotiating for a new Conference before this Conference even got off the ground.

I said no. I said I had come to this Conference because it was important and that a national effort must be mounted and we who were there would do that this very day.

During the proceedings of the State President's Conference on Violence and Intimidation, attempt after attempt after attempt was made to use those proceedings as launching proceedings for another Conference. We said no and no it was.

Then after two days of hard talk and discussion, we ended up establishing a Continuation Committee on which the IFP served, together with the National Party and the South African Government. Conference also ended up establishing a Facilitating Committee under Dr Louw Alberts. The work of the Conference continued.

The Continuation Committee met and worked and the Facilitating Committee gathered around it businessmen and churchmen and worked to establish a follow-on from the State President's Conference on Violence and Intimidation.

Then the ANC and the PAC and COSATU and the SACP and AZAPO all saw that there was a South Africanism about what was happening which they dare not defy and they came into the peace process that the State President initiated in Pretoria on the 24th and 25th May.

Dr Louw Alberts called a meeting at which virtually all Parties were present and there after a long, long debate all the Parties present accepted that the three major players in South Africa - the IFP, the ANC and the National Party - had to take charge of the peace process and lead the country into peace.

#### THE SUCCESSFUL PEACE INITIATIVE FOLLOWED FROM MAY'S CONFERENCE

That Facilitating Committee meeting then established a smaller Preparatory Committee in which representatives from the IFP, the ANC and the National Party got together with a few businessmen and churchmen to form a new front for peace initiatives. It

established Work Groups and for weeks work groups  
worked around the clock and are now reaching the point  
where they are producing a consensus document which

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all the major parties could sign.

It has been tough negotiating for peace and even while I am preparing this address to you there are some outstanding issues which I can only now report to you verbally.

#### MULTI-PARTY CONFERENCE

The next step of course is going to be the Multi-Party Conference of all Parties which wish to join in a discussion about how to get the negotiation process off the ground. That Conference will be useless without us. We will be there and when we are there and because we are there, nobody is going to ride roughshod over anybody.

This is the power of the IFP, the power to stand and to ensure that politics for peace and prosperity and democracy is kept on track. We are going to ensure that there is going to be a multi-Party democracy. We will be there at every twist and turn. I am not in the least bit deceived by anything the ANC says or does.

If the ANC thought it could gain a one-Party victory tomorrow, it would do it. It would try and do it today. If it thought it could establish itself as THE government in a one-Party democracy tomorrow, it would attempt to do just that today. That is why it is trying to establish a Patriotic Front to rally everybody behind it, to be the leader of everybody and to dominate over everybody politically.

We want a genuine, Western-type multi-Party democracy in which there are regular swings of electoral opinion and governments of the day come and go. We want a situation in which parties in power must govern for the people and mind their p's and q's or be dismissed.

We in the IFP never ever again want to see the kind of monolithic government which is so powerful that it in effect rules as a one-Party State government in an ineffective wishy-washy multi-Party context. That is what the National Party did for decades and we do not want that again.

The IFP is absolutely essential in the negotiation process. We are going to be there in the multi-Party Conference to make quite sure that that Conference sets in motion events which will lead to genuine negotiations about fair and free elections for a new constitution which will be decided by negotiations and not by Party political dictates.

The ANC is now saying that it wants to have an all-Party Conference in order to establish an Interim Government. We say no because that Interim Government would be a first ANC step as an ensconced government-in-waiting. I have already indicated that Dr Mandela actually talks about the ANC as a government-in-waiting. If you give him an Interim Government to play with, he will play with it as a government-in-waiting. We will then simply have a government-in-waiting in an Interim Government with the ANC a giant step nearer becoming a de facto government.

The State President has spoken about transitional arrangements as acceptable to him in principle. We are open to suggestions of this kind as something to

be discussed by all Parties at a multi-Party Conference. We do not want to be led up the primrose path, where we create conditions for "a seizure of power" which is on the agenda of some organisations.

We will accept nothing other than open negotiations for a new constitution and then we will negotiate about how to have fair and free elections to elect a new government into being under that constitution. That is the way forward.

While the country is doing this it has to be governed. The government can expand its representativeness in ten or twenty different ways but while the negotiation process is going on, the Government will have to remain a de facto government, whatever steps it may take to bring Blacks into government decision-making process to ensure that the interim period between now and free and fair elections is not misused by the government for its own Party political ends.

There is too little hard thinking about these matters. The Government is not the National Party and the National Party is not the Government. The two are two separate things. The National Party must now come to the fore in its own right and hopefully this will happen now that the Government has made a decision to free Dr Stoffel van der Merwe to head up the National Party's negotiating team.

GOVERNMENT CANNOT BE PLAYER AND  
REFEREE, BUT CONSTITUENT ASSEMBLY  
NOT NEEDED FOR THIS

The National Party, the IFP and the ANC should actually get together to talk about how to ensure that the South African Government is not both player and referee at the same time. We do not need a Constituent Assembly to do that little job. We simply have to take the Government by the ear and say play the game properly.

The Government is in no position to dictate. It can only succeed if it succeeds in doing what we all agree it should be doing. You do not have to have an election to tell the government that there must now be negotiations.

Patriots, you the young members of the IFP, the power behind the strength of the IFP, have put the IFP in a position where the IFP can play this IFP role. It is IFP, IFP, IFP for victory.

I believe that ultimately the only true democracy we are going to have is going to be a democracy which the people of South Africa want. No political Party is going to dominate and push a democracy of any one kind on the people. We in the IFP are committed to constituencies. We represent constituencies. We want people to tell us what they want and then we go out and fight for it. In the end if we succeed in giving the people the power to appoint and remove governments, then we have succeeded, whether or not we are in government.

I earnestly believe that the whole of South Africa  
- Black South Africa, White South Africa and Coloured

South Africa and Indian South Africa - do not want a  
one-Party dictatorship. All South Africans ultimately

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will back institutionalised moves to ensure that a multi-Party majority actually forms a government and that we are not governed by any one single dominating Party.

There we have it, young Comrades - the ripeness of time in which the victory which is ours can be fashioned into the democracy of tomorrow.

It is against this background of power and certainty and victory for the struggle that we must look at all the attacks against the IFP. We are attacked precisely because we are participants in the victory. We are attacked because we are powerful and can say thus far and no further and mean it. We are attacked because we achieve on the ground what we say on the ground. We are attacked because we are powerful. We are humiliated because we are noble. We are accused of foul things because we are decent and just and because our decency and justice gets us somewhere with the people.

FUNDING ROW & ANC FUNDING |

Comrades, everyone here was witness to the hypocritical attacks by the ANC on the IFP for using money provided by the Government to hold the King's Imbizo rally and the Thanksgiving rally held after Dr Nelson Mandela's release from jail, and the unbanning of black organisations - something we had worked for, for decades.

I want emphatically to say to you that the leadership of the IFP knew nothing about this money being handed to the IFP. But I also want to add that had I been asked about it at the time, I would have said no, simply because I knew that the misunderstandings which now have been shown to be the case, would have occurred. I am not ashamed of the use to which that money was put. We have struggled for acceptance of Black South Africa's right to say no to sanctions. We have struggled for the right of Black South Africa to say no to the armed struggle. We have struggled for the Black South African right to say no to violence inside the country to make our country ungovernable.

That money was used to give expression to this genuine Black South African demand for peace and negotiations. The King's Imbizo rally was a rally for peace which I am proud of. The subsequent rally we held in March 1990 to rally around the call for peace which I made was a rally I am proud of. People turned up to vote in their tens of thousands. The money that was spent bought peace.

Quite clearly the ANC which has received millions from the Soviet Union and has received millions from Cuba and millions from Libya and millions upon millions from Europe and North America to run an armed struggle and a hideous internal campaign of insurrection and violence should be the last organisation ever to blame people for receiving money from somebody else.

It might interest you to know how the former President of the Transvaal Indian Congress, who was also a member of the South African Communist Party, Dr Yusuf Dadoo, took delivery of some of the money that the KGB of the Soviet Union gave to the South

African Communist Party and to the African National Congress. In the book: "KGB - The Inside Story" by Christopher Andrew and Oleg Gordievsky, he relates about this as follows on page 558: "Though encouraged to recruit agents in the ANC, the KGB was forbidden to do so in the SACP. Relations with the SACP were the responsibility of the International Department of the Party Central Committee, but the KGB was used to transmit funds to the SACP as well as the ANC. Between mid 1982 and January 1983 Gordievsky handed Yusuf Dadoo a total of 54,000 pounds sterling for the SACP and 118 000 pounds sterling for the ANC. When the money arrived at the London residency, Gordievsky put on gloves to remove the Moscow bank wrapper and count out the bank notes. Dadoo was welcomed at 18 Kensington Park Gardens by the Party representative, Aleksandr Fyodorovich Yekimenko, who was a KGB co-optee. On receiving the money from Gordievsky, Dadoo signed separate receipts on behalf of the ANC and the SACP. Instead of putting the money in a briefcase, he used to stuff it all in the pockets of his suit and overcoat. Gordievsky was struck by the way Dadoo's thin frame filled out with dollar bills before he set off home on foot, apparently unconcerned by the risk of theft en route."

The ANC is being the most un-South African of all organisations ever in receiving money for the armed struggle which is non-South African and for receiving money to make South Africa ungovernable which none of us wanted. This organisation now seizes on the judgement of someone in the IFP who thought that the money was not dirty and that the only dirt around money comes from the use to which you put it. They have over the years received money to actually kill innocent civilians in this country and to buy petrol to necklance people who do not agree with them.

IN CUBA, MANDELA ATTACKS IFP AS  
AN APARTHEID ALLY

Dr Mandela himself has a lot to answer for. Speaking in Cuba about the South African Government, Dr Mandela said: "They have unbanned the ANC, but we operate under conditions substantially different from that of other organisations. We do not have the same freedom to organise as does Inkatha and other organisations allied to the apartheid regime. Our members are harassed and even killed. We are often barred from holding meetings and marches."

Comrades that is a blatant lie and a horrible distortion of South Africa's political reality. How dare Dr Mandela talk about the IFP as an organisation allied to the apartheid regime. That is very ugly and he complicates his ability to talk to us. He is endorsing himself out of talking to us. He is pandering to a faction in the ANC which wanted to throttle him when he wanted to talk to us.

On his arrival from Cuba he was quoted in the media saying that he will no longer talk to us, because of this funding controversy. He stated once he had spoken to the government, he will have spoken to us. One

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media report reads:

On ANC/Inkatha relations following the scandal Mr Mandela said it was clear that the IFP President, Chief Mangosuthu Buthelezi, had allowed himself to be used by the government. "They are on the same payroll and that discovery, which we have been suspecting all along, must affect our relations and our strategy."

What is more no one talks about the R116,159.78 which was spent by the South African Government for the fares, accommodation and other expenses of Dr Mandela and the delegation of the ANC when the Groote Schuur discussions took place in Cape Town. No one talks about the millions of rands that the South African Government is paying for ANC exiles. A few weeks ago, I learnt that an old Convent was being purchased by Dr Rina Venter for about R4 million for ANC exiles. Just now the ANC MK cadres have been integrated into the Transkei Defence Force and because of the strains caused by this on the Transkeian budget, the South African Government has had to bale out the Transkei with millions of rands when it could not even pay its civil servants. All this money comes from the same South African fiscus. It is terrible to use moral standards which are not used in every case.

Of course Dr Mandela raises this great hoo-ha about this paltry sum compared to the money he has received from the Gadaffis, the Castros and the Arafats of this world because he wants to soften up the South African Government so that he can force his longed-for Interim Government on us all. In the same address in Cuba he said:

All this proves the necessity of creating an Interim Government of national unity that can preside over the transition. We need a government that enjoys the widest confidence so that it can govern during this delicate period to assure that they do not permit the counter-revolutionaries to change the process and that can guarantee that the constitution is written in a climate that is free from repression, intimidation and fear.

That is sheer political audacity. The ANC believes that we can establish an Interim Government which enjoys the widest possible popular confidence.

South Africans did not want the armed struggle. It rejected the armed struggle. South Africans did not want sanctions. They rejected sanctions. South Africans did not want to make our country ungovernable through violence and they did so. The people marched with their very feet against the very things that the ANC is now boasting about. It is time the ANC realised that. Justice will be done and it will be seen to be done in our country. There will be political justice. The IFP will remain highly relevant, very central and effective for the future.

Our theme is correct - either we have peaceful change through negotiations and tolerance or we have chaos and conflict through violence and intimidation.

Our responsibility is to bring peace to South

Africa through IFP power. Nobody can push us out of the way of creating peace. Those who have tried have failed. Those who try again will fail again. We are powerful for peace.

Let us be quite clear about one thing and that is peace is delicately poised. We dare not blunder. We dare not allow impatience to over-rule judgement and discretion. Ireallyam with those who are angry. Ihear cries from everywhere that our people are being killed. Death continues to stalk the political scene. We are going to end it. We have a duty to see that it does not escalate. We are not going to turn current unrest and violence into civil war which would be totally destructive. That is why we agreed to the Peace Accords that we authored with the ANC on the 29th of January. That is why we agreed last year to participate in the 12-a-side Peace Committee with the ANC 12-a-side. That is why we have participated in the present peace Accord initiatives.

We are committed to a peace process which has got further down the road than any peace process has ever got down the road in South Africa. We from our side are not going to dig trenches across that road so that we can go no further. Nor will we stand by while others do so.

The whole peace process has now moved into the position in which unquestionably the ANC will have to agree to a cease-fire and a laying down of arms as opposed to a suspension of the armed struggle. I cannot see us going to the negotiating table with the spectre of a private ANC army hanging over our heads. We will not have that. The ANC has had long enough to make the necessary adjustments. There must now be an end to talk about Umkhonto we Sizwe being kept intact until such time as there is some kind of future government where security forces can be rationalised.

We say no to that. We say no a million times no, and we say that if our no does not count, then we too may want our own army.

That is out of the question now. It has not even been entertained in our thinking. We do not intend resorting to violence to fix South Africa's problems. We say now is the time, today is the day on which the ANC should disband its army and make a real commitment to become involved in peaceful negotiations without an escape hatch from which it could run out into violence.

At the very most we can have a peace convention on the 14th September but I cannot see us succeeding in getting a multi-Party Conference off the ground unless there are unequivocally clear statements of disbanding Umkhonto we Sizwe and leaving South Africa free to negotiate peacefully without the threat of revolution. Some members of Umkhonto from the Transkeian Defence Force were arrested near Port Shepstone recently with guns and lists of our leaders. Among those arrested included Mr Hani's right hand man.

I repeat again, there are no vanquished and there are no victors in this country. South Africa is not like Zimbabwe with Mr Ian Smith on the one side and Mr Robert Mugabe on the other side keeping their armies

ready to deploy them if necessary.

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Defenceless people must be defended. Killing must stop but there we must rely on community responses. Here we must be quite sure that the whole process of establishing defence units, which have to be permitted in terms of common law which says that a man has a right to protect his property, must be considered now. That is not something that we can decide on at this conference of the Youth Brigade. It is quite clear that only peaceful change is the answer in South Africa, if we do not want our country to end up in chaos and conflict.

I repeat, however, that nothing will be done in this regard without the youth. Your Youth Brigade leadership will be involved in every step that will be taken, if ever we move in that direction. Those who have used violence have used black youth to create this mayhem.

COMMUNITY CIVIL DEFENSE UNITS MAY  
BE NECESSARY TO PROTECT THE  
DEFENCELESS

The KwaZulu Government does not have the constitutional right to have an army. It cannot run defence units but we must now seriously look at the options that are open to us. Civil defence in one form or another must be available to the people. Somehow we must look at what can be done between the IFP and the KwaZulu Government without even thinking about establishing a private army or Party political armed units.

You have seen recently how some people in the media have tried to link all violence in South Africa to the IFP. In the mid-eighties we had information from the late Reverend Londa Shembe that one Derrick Lionel, a Zulu-speaking Coloured member of Umkhonto weSizwe, was training a unit of members of this military wing of the ANC to come to Ulundi to assassinate me and to destroy government buildings. It was at this point in time that the then KwaZulu Acting Commissioner of Police, Brigadier SM Mathe, selected 150 youth for training in VIP protection services. I was told at the time that a security company was to train them. We have since heard that they were trained by the SADF. This fact was then known even to the South African Government as President de Klerk confirmed on the 30th July at his press conference. These young men were later trained as policemen as we are not allowed in terms of the 1971 legislation to have anything military or para-military. These young men were later allocated to me, to His Majesty the King, to Cabinet Ministers and Deputy Ministers and some were posted to guard government buildings in Ulundi which were under threat. It is disgraceful to see certain people in the media attempting to distort facts by stating that these young men were trained at Mkhuzo as a hit squad to attack ANC members when the ANC had not even been unbanned at that time. The whole idea that we could depend on 150 young men to stand against the military wing of the ANC is ludicrous.

In my entire political career I have never been involved in plotting the deaths of any one single human

VOL 3 NO 8 SOUTH AFRICAN UPDATE AUGUST 1991

being. If there were people who were involved in that sort of activity, then I do not know anything about it. I

have always believed in non-violence and I am no less a protagonist of non-violence than I was 30 years ago. I have dedicated my entire life to working for peaceful change.

The IFP will not develop its own Party political militia. That is out of the question. What is possible is for members of local communities to say enough is enough. There are many people who have got together to stand against the onslaughts of those who have unleashed violence against our black communities. People have done this without being directed by the leadership of the IFP.

In this month of August 1991 we know that apartheid is broken. We know that the Black struggle for liberation has not been in vain. We know that however difficult it is going to be, we are going to triumph. There will be a democracy in South Africa, it will be a multi-Party democracy and it will be a multi-Party democracy because we will make it a multi-Party democracy.

I would like our youth today to fully realise that we have more to do than mop up the mess of apartheid and lay the constitutional foundations for a new South Africa. We have to start preparing our people to live in that new South Africa we have struggled for.

I could have a whole Conference address simply on the question of how important it is going to be for the Black people of South Africa to maximise the advantages that liberation is going to give them by preparing to pull themselves up by their own boot straps.

Political liberation is going to shower manna on nobody's head. It is absolutely stupid to think in terms of taking away from the haves and giving to the have-nots as the only way of bringing about a redistribution of wealth. That will destroy the economy, it will break up the country's growth potential and within a very short space of time we would be worse off than we ever were before. That happened across the length and breadth of Africa, and it is not going to happen here.

I am extremely frustrated by the 40 per cent unemployment figure which we face in our country. I know that you as young people are facing this unemployment problem. I am very concerned to know that there are now thousands of our matriculants who have no jobs. I am concerned that thousands of young people have been retrenched from their jobs because of the poor performance of our economy. We are still going to go through a very difficult time as the new South Africa dawns.

I have never deceived you that when we have a multi-racial government, or even a black government, that this country will be turned overnight into a paradise. Our economy has been battered, and we have backlogs that no other race group has in our country. We need to devise ways and means of looking at self-help schemes. In the new South Africa we must accept that it will take time before things get right. We need technical education for our youth. Recently your leader and National Chairman, Mr. Musa Zondi, and a delega-

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tion of the IFP, were impressed by some of the vocational centres we saw in Taiwan where young people learn skills.

I believe our Youth Brigade should be a vanguard movement in Black society now breaking new ground in the whole urbanisation process, in the whole process of bringing order to bear in our squatter areas, and in generating powerful self-help schemes so that people can at least feed themselves while we struggle to put the economy right.

We must prepare now for the time which lies ahead in which substantial funding could flow to the areas where we are active on the ground. I believe the Youth Brigade should be more employed than it has ever been employed before in practical on-the-ground

community development work and self-help project Work.

The year that lies ahead is an exciting year of political achievements and a year of hard work on the ground to make those achievements meaningful to people in terms of taking advantage of freedom for personal, family and community improvements in standards of living.

Never before has any Youth Brigade anywhere in the world faced such daunting challenge, accompanied by real prospects of success, as there are for you the young people of South Africa. Develop South Africa for your future generations. Develop South Africa as the place where you are going to be. Develop South Africa for God and the people." Â\$

Youth Brigade national chairperson's report

Youth Brigade national chairperson Musa Zondi's report was in three parts.

## 1 PROGRESS & ACHIEVEMENTS

### (a) constitutional developments

Last July the decision was taken to transform the IFP into a political party, and in December, the new constitution was adopted. The party, said Zondi, was now in a transitionary phase, whose completion is still some time off.

The Youth Brigade has new structures from branch level up - constituencies, regions, provinces, National Executive Committee, and National Youth Council. "Our greatest challenge is to translate these constitutional directives into practical structures on the ground."

### (b) numerical growth and expansion

The movement has grown and expanded, new branches being formed in areas where there were none before, mushrooming in the Western transvaal, Northern Transvaal, Eastern Transvaal, Northern Cape and Western Cape.

A new phenomenon in membership has been that of people throughout the country joining as individuals, not via branches.

(c) leadership training and development

This, said Zondi, was vital for any organisation, noting that "more and more of our local and regional leaders participated in various training programmes." He urged all youth leaders to participate.

In particular, the NEC wished to concentrate upon women leadership development to enable "our sisters in the Youth Brigade to play their role effectively."

(d) branches in tertiary educational institutions

The breakthrough a few years ago of a branch at the University of Zululand has led to similar breakthroughs at the universities of Durban-Westville and Natal (Durban). Members are working "flat out" to

VOL 3 NO 8 SOUTH AFRICAN UPDATE AUGUST 1991

emulate this at the universities of Rhodes, Stellenbosch, Pretoria, etc. Zondi said that the Youth Brigade's presence in colleges of education was already good, but that this should be expanded to colleges of other race groups.

(e) overseas visits

Youth Brigade representatives participated in international events. In February the YB was an observer in the launching of the International Young Democratic Union in Washington DC. The decision of whether to join is yet to be taken. Links were formed with many other youth organisations.

Youth leaders also visited Denmark, former East Germany, Poland, Hungary and Czechoslovakia on a fact-finding tour in March.

In June, the National Chairperson visited the UK as a guest of the Foreign and Commonwealth Office of the UK government.

In August there was a visit to Taiwan and Hong Kong.

2 PROBLEMS & DIFFICULTIES

(a) violence

"Violence", said Zondi, "remains the single most formidable stumbling block to peace, stability and progress." He spoke of violence against the IFP in many areas, mostly involving ANC supporters, and the dangers of the ANC's "defence units".

He referred to failed attempts to get down to talks with the ANC Youth League as the latter refused to talk to the Youth Brigade. The Youth League instead

"heaped vitriol" upon the IFP president.

(b) poverty and unemployment

It was extremely worrying that most Youth Brigade members are subject to poverty and destitution in a country without economic growth and with high unemployment towards which sanctions had contributed.

(c) education and vocational training

"Problems in education persist more so because

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organisations like Sansco, Cosas and the NECC continue to disrupt schools in an effort to use black students for political purposes." The result, said Zondi, was that black pupils became losers as they failed their examinations in their droves.

The lack of vocational guidance was problematic, as was an over-emphasis on academic education at the expense of technical education. Also, as a developing country, blue-collar employment must be promoted.

### 3 PRESENT AND FUTURE CHALLENGES

#### (a) political challenges

As a political party, the IFP is faced with the challenge of giving South Africa "a new democratic, non-centralised and good government." And to do this, added Zondi, entailed getting more and more support

#### Resolutions:

There were 8 resolutions, whose general tenor, given the militance of the delegates since the funding row and the ANC's attitudes, was hard-hitting.

#### RESOLUTION 1

The IFP youth expressed their loyalty and confidence in party leader MG Buthelezi whose "impeccable leadership record is measured by the phenomenal growth of the Youth Brigade of the IFP, the biggest cohesive youth movement the country has ever known".

Delegates resolved

i that they were not ashamed at the use to which secret funds had been used. But they resolved also

ii "to condemn and deplore the actions of the Government, which secretly and clandestinely funded the said rallies without prior knowledge of the Inkatha leadership structure."

#### RESOLUTION 2

The conference dismissed and rejected "with coritempt" media allegations of Youth Brigade paramilitary training as anti-ANC hit squads. Delegates called on the media "to desist from fanning the fires of violence and divisive tactics against blacks."

#### RESOLUTION 3

The Youth Brigade condemned the continued recruitment by the ANCS Umkhonto we Sizwe of "young blood to cross the borders of South Africa with intent to undergo military training in neighbouring countries."

Delegates not only called on Umkhonto we Sizwe to stop this, but called on the organisation to "disband with immediate effect" failing which future peaceful negotiations may be prejudiced.

#### RESOLUTION 4

The conference expressed its "deep regret that

the commitment of the ANC to honest and unqualified search for peace is in serious question in view of its

VOL 3 NO 8 SOUTH AFRICAN UPDATE AUGUST 1991

19

behind the cause.

"As a liberation movement our job was to agitate for the downfall of apartheid. As a political party our job is to replace apartheid with good government." To do this required training and learning the art and skill of winning elections.

(b) peace and stability

Resolving violence is a major challenge said Zondi: we must "bend every fibre in our bodies to bring about peace and stability." Negotiations amidst this violence was not possible.

(c) constitutional and structural challenges

The IFP's new constitution should be implemented without delay urged Zondi, and "all areas where we have a presence need to be part of this transformation from a liberation movement to a fully-fledged political party."

ambivalence and double talk since its track record is fraught with contradictions".

Reference was made to Mandela's comments in Cuba, as well as Mandela and Ramaphosa's comments to the effect that the ANC would not talk to the IFP and that the IFP was on the government's payroll.

Delegates resolved to "call upon the ANC to come clean on the points raised above and to publicly denounce this new obstacle to reconciliation and future negotiations in order to purge our society of war talk and violence.

#### RESOLUTION 5

The delegates commended the "wise decision" of the Zulu king and of the IFP president to attend the 24/25 May peace conference, and mandated the IFP to send delegates to the 14 September National Peace Convention.

#### RESOLUTION 6

The Youth Brigade was sceptical of the ANC's attempts to achieve by way of a constituent assembly and interim government what it had failed to achieve by military means. It instead resolved that the "Multi-Party Conference be convened with immediate effect to determine and agree upon a political process that will be pursued to secure national consensus.

#### RESOLUTION 7

Delegates condemned the Patriotic Front as racial ganging-up breeding fear. It called upon whites, coloureds and Indians to reject the Patriotic Front as inappropriate.

ate to negotiations.

#### RESOLUTION 8

Delegates strongly condemned the ANC's "atrocities" as reported by ANC ex-prisoners to the conference, called for Red Cross intervention, SACC balance, and SA Government investigations. Â\$

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First is the National Peace Committee (NPC), chaired and vice-chaired by church and business leaders, on which sit the parties to the accord. Decisions are to be made by consensus, failing which an arbitrator will recommend a decision. A later amendment noted that this would not be not binding on the signatories.

The National Peace Committee is charged with the task of implementing the accord, and to do so, sits at the apex of a number of subsidiary bodies.

First is the National Peace Secretariat (NPS), to combat grassroots violence and intimidation.

The Secretariat will establish and co-ordinate Regional Dispute Resolution Committees (RDRC's) comprising representatives of political parties, churches, trade unions, industry, business, local management organisations, the police and the defence force. Reporting upwards, they would advise the Secretariat on violence in their region, and below them, would guide the Local Dispute Resolution Committees (LDRC's).

These LDRC's, comprising representatives of the parties to the accord, would settle disputes; eliminate conditions threatening the accord; nurture inter-party grassroots trust and that between the parties and the security forces; agree to rules for rallies, marches and gatherings and liaise with police on this.

To act as their "eyes and ears", justices of the peace will work with the LDRC's.

The second key structure is the Commission, built on the statutory commission of inquiry established by the Prevention of Public Violence and Intimidation Act of 1991. This body is to investigate and expose the background to and the reasons for the violence.

It will be headed by a judge (or retired judge) assisted by a senior attorney, advocate or law professor, and its members will include representatives of the IFP, ANC and NP. Its function will include:

- % to investigate the causes of violence and intimidation;

- i to recommend means of containing violence;

- % to make recommendations on funding of the peace process; and

- % to recommend recompense for victims of violence.

The Commission will report to the State President and inform the National Peace Committee of its findings. It can refer evidence to the courts for investigation.

The third set of structures concern the South African Police for which two bodies, each headed by a general, will be established.

The first is a Special Unit to Investigate Political Violence linked to special criminal courts to deal with the crime of political violence. The National Peace

Committee is to be kept informed of the investigations.

The second body is a Special Unit to Investigate

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VOL 3 NO 8 SOUTH AFRICAN UPDATE AUGUST 1991

20

Allegations against the Police. Regional invsetigation units will be overseen by an ombudsman (appointed by the minister) able to recommend appropriate disciplinary action against policemen.

Separate from these bodies is a Police Board to make recommendations on future policing policy.

So much for the structures and policing of the accord. The fact that the three parties have accepted the draft document is only the first step. Next comes the proposed 14 September National Peace Summit at which other parties who have been studying the agreement, are also expected to participate. Only after this can the structural side of the agreement really be implemented.

However, even then it is necessary to exercise caution. The natural euphoria that comes from reaching agreements of this nature is not necessarily translated into action where it counts. The agreement is unique, it is true, in the manner in which it considers the questions of monitoring, policing and resolving the violence, but it is likely that the structures will be sorely tested and that some of the functions are going to prove more difficult to achieve in practice than on paper.

For instance, given the complex dynamics to much of the violence - the difficult and turbulent history to the political emnity behind some of the conflict, the socio-economic causes of the violence - the Commission's ability to investigate the background to violence

will not prove either academically or legally easy. Answers are also likely to be hotly contested depending upon the political implications of the Commission's findings. The danger is that the Commission might defuse this by developing wishy-washy answers ("apart-heid is to blame") or that it might infuriate some organisations who thereafter refuse to cooperate.

Again: the point of the whole exercise is to bring peace to troubled areas. It must therefore intervene successfully in places like Richmond in Natal, or like Alexandra in the Transvaal, if it is to justify its existence. But we know from previous experience (Shongweni, Mpumulanga) that peace imposed from above is no substitute for peace from below. The RDRC's and LDRC's biggest task is therefore to alter grassroots attitudes more than to police the conflict, and this is not easy where the conflict is bitter.

. Whether these and many other potential difficulties can be overcome is difficult to say. The main issue is less one of monitoring and policing than of political will. It is vital that the accord be monitored and that it be enforceable and these have been taken care of in a reasonable fashion.

Most important, there must be a total commitment by the parties to peace rather than a mere verbal commitment. It means that all activities resulting in violence must be stopped. But in the immediate short term, this is as unrealistic as it is desirable because the nature of the struggle and the high stakes do not encourage tolerance. If all that is achieved initially then, is a reduction in the inflammatory tendencies of township politics and a subsequent reduction in violence, this will be a major step forward. After all, building peace is a process, not an event, and it will take time to succeed. Â\$

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