

OIL EMBARGO against SOUTH AFRICA

This Newsletter offers a compilation of reports on the international oil embargo against South Africa.
The Newsletter is published quarterly by the **Shipping Research Bureau**, P.O. Box 11898, 1001 GW Amsterdam,
The Netherlands, Phone + 20 6266073/6251300; Telex 10236 sanam nl; Telefax + 20 6220130

UNILATERAL POLICIES ARE WEAKENING OIL EMBARGO:

DENMARK lifts all trade sanctions

EUROPEAN COMMUNITY lifts ban on oil exports

OAU Chair NIGERIA welcomes De Klerk

SINGAPORE lifts trade ban

BAHRAIN invites South Africa to trade

DENMARK: Oil export and transport ban lifted

Denmark was the first EC Member State to lift its oil embargo legislation, ahead of a joint European decision. After the overwhelming 'yes' vote in De Klerk's only-white referendum of 17 March 1992 the Danish conservative Government decided to remove the country's remaining economic sanctions, thus flying in the face of the majority of Parliament.

In April 1991, the EC Foreign Ministers' wish to lift the European 1986 sanctions package (iron ore, steel, Kruggerands) had for nine months been blocked from taking effect in any EC country by the Danish Parliament refusing to ratify the decision which thus failed to meet the required consensus. But this time there was nothing (short of a vote of non-confidence to topple the Government) Parliament could do to prevent the Danish minority Government to use its power to lift the 1986 boycott law. On 20 March 1992, a royal decree abolishing the law took effect.

The section on oil of Danish boycott law of May 1986 was far stronger than the 'soft' EC oil embargo of 1985. Exports of Danish refined petroleum products as well as crude oil, and moreover all transports of oil and petroleum products on Danish-owned vessels to and from South Africa were prohibited under the law.

Before the law and an earlier policy statement by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of June 1984 came into force, the major Danish shipping company **A.P. Møller-Maersk-Line** had been the single most active shipping company in crude oil transports to South Africa during a short period between October 1979 and February 1981. In this period, its tankers supplied approximately one fifth of South Africa's import needs, thus enabling the South African government to overcome the disruption of its crude oil imports after the fall of the Shah of Iran. One tanker controlled by the company made two further secret oil deliveries to Durban in late 1983 and early 1984 after flagging-out from the Danish register.

Representatives for the Danish parties opposing the

Government's decision, although in favour of a phased lifting of sanctions against South Africa, said they disagreed with the opinion of the Government that the conditions for lifting all remaining sanctions except the mandatory arms embargo had been met with the 17 March 'yes' vote.

At a press conference in Johannesburg on 14 April 1992, after meeting the Danish Foreign minister, Mr Uffe Ellemann-Jensen, who was visiting South Africa, ANC President Nelson Mandela said that Denmark's decision to lift sanctions in March had been premature. 'Sanctions should only be lifted after an interim government is in place. We don't agree the time is opportune,' Mr Mandela told the press. [Politiken (Denmark) 13 March 1992; Det Fri Aktuelt (Denmark) 19 March 1992; The Citizen (SA), 15 April 1992; Business Day (SA), 15 April 1992]

EC oil embargo lifted

On 6 April 1992, in the framework of the European Political Cooperation (EPC), the European Community and its member states decided to lift the EC oil embargo.

continued on next page

In this issue:

<i>Oil Embargo weakened</i>	1-3
<i>UK: New MP was trader for Marc Rich</i>	4
<i>SASOL linked with hit squads and CCB</i>	5
<i>COAL MONITOR</i>	I-II
<i>SASOL and The Executive: Media Council's comment on 'erroneous' references in Newsletter, SRB's reply</i>	7-8
<i>How tankers come to SA in disguise</i>	9-10

Restrictive measures in the cultural, scientific and sporting fields were also formally lifted. The European Council of Ministers expressed its hope that *'these measures will encourage positive developments in South Africa, in particular the establishment of an interim government'*.

The 'cessation of oil exports to the RSA', an oil embargo with very limited impact, had been introduced by the EC in September 1985 as part of a package of restrictive measures against South Africa. In practice the EC oil embargo meant that export of only crude oil produced in EC countries, notably **North Sea oil** produced in the United Kingdom, Denmark and the Netherlands, was prohibited. In January 1986 it was agreed that also **'crude oil brought into free circulation'** with the EC was included in the ban.

A substantial volume of oil, however, was not covered by the EC measure. This was crude oil held in bonded storage (entrepot) and in transit and refined petroleum products. Moreover, involvement by EC-registered shipping companies, oil traders and oil companies with subsidiaries in South Africa (Shell, BP and Total) active in the sale and transport of oil to South Africa was not affected at all by the EC measure of 1985.

[EPC press release of 6 April 1992]

UN Special Committee: EC decision undermines negotiations

The lifting of the EC's oil embargo has been strongly criticised by the United Nations Special Committee against Apartheid. The next day the Committee's Acting Chairman, Mr. Jayaraj Acharya of Nepal (replacing Chairman Professor I.A. Gambari of Nigeria) issued a statement in which he expressed the UN Committee's grave concern. The decision by the Council of Ministers of the EC was seen as one of the most serious steps recently taken or being contemplated to lift major sanctions against South Africa: *'The Special Committee considers such acts as extremely serious since they contravene General Assembly and Security Council resolutions and would undermine the negotiations to peacefully end apartheid by eroding the leverage that the international community has so effectively used to help advance the political process in South Africa.'*

The Special Committee considered the political changes, including the outcome of the all-white referendum in March, as significant impetus to move the negotiations forward, but emphasised that the process towards a non-racial democracy was not yet irreversible.

[United Nations, Department of Public Information, Press release of 7 April 1992, New York, USA]

UN monitoring group: EC tends to support only SA government

The oil embargo monitoring group at the UN (the United Nations Intergovernmental Group to Monitor the Supply and Shipping of Oil and Petroleum Products to South Africa) also expressed its regrets at the EC decision. Following meetings of the group, its Chairman, Ambassador Mr. Anthony B. Nyakyi (Tanzania) issued a statement on 16 April 1992. Here reference was made to the latest UN General Assembly resolution of 13 December 1991, which stressed the oil embargo had to be maintained until there was clear evidence of irreversible changes in South Africa.

Mr. Nyakyi emphasised that neither an agreement on transitional arrangements nor on a new democratic constitution had been achieved: *'Against that background, it is regrettable that the European Community has decided to lift the oil embargo since this decision, as any premature decision on sanctions at this time tends to support one party only – the South African Government – in the negotiations conducted within the Convention for a Democratic South Africa (CODESA) rather than the CODESA process as a whole.'*

He made an appeal to the individual Member States of the European Community to continue to respect the oil embargo for the time yet needed to ensure that the ongoing negotiation process was leading to a new constitution, or at least to an interim government.

[United Nations, Department of Public Information, Press release of 16 April 1992, New York, USA]

SA Council of Churches: EC looks from a White perspective

Referring to the outcome of the all-white March referendum and the subsequent 'reward' by western governments of De Klerk's policy of reform, the reaction by the South African Council of Churches (SACC) on the unilateral EC decision to lift its oil embargo was rather bitter. On 8 April 1992 SACC's Communications Department issued a press release in which the Council expressed its deep concern:

'We believed this embargo to be part of the total arms embargo and also that it was under the direction and control of the United Nations. We are concerned that the European Community looks at events in South Africa from a White perspective, and not from the perspective of those who have been, and still are, victims of the minority government of South Africa. We believe that this matter of the oil embargo belongs to the United Nations and should be addressed by that body in consultation with the representatives of the total population of this land.'

[Press release of the South African Council of Churches, Communications Department, Johannesburg, 8 April 1992]

EC Anti-Apartheid Movements: Misguided EC policy rewarding De Klerk

The Liaison Group of National Anti-Apartheid Movements in the Countries of the European Community issued a press release on 7 April 1992, showing its disapproval of the EC's decision to lift the oil embargo. The group stated the EC's decision was a premature move and contrary to consensus decisions of United Nations policies:

'It continues the misguided policy being pursued by the European Community of "rewarding" President De Klerk instead of giving support to the negotiating process as a whole. It would be tragic if it led to the National Party taking a more intransigent position at CODESA and therefore made agreement on the establishment of an Interim Government and a mechanism to draw up a new constitution more difficult.'

The EC Liaison Group consists of anti-apartheid movements of Belgium, Denmark, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, the Netherlands, Spain, Portugal and the United Kingdom.

[Press release of the Liaison group of National Anti-Apartheid Movements in the Countries of the European Community, 7 April 1992]

Oil companies: EC decision has minimal impact

The oil companies in South Africa welcomed the lifting of the EC oil embargo, though industry sources indicated the decision would have minimal impact and that it carried only a symbolic effect, since no European crude oil is shipped to South Africa. Considerable quantities of refined petroleum products have been shipped in recent years from Europe to South Africa, but exports of oil products were never part of the EC ban.

Inside South Africa a shroud of secrecy imposed by the **Petroleum Products Act** still prevents companies, government officials and others from commenting openly about the oil embargo. Therefore all comments reported in the South African press were quoted from anonymous sources.

A spokesman for **Engen**, the energy division of the mining house GENCOR, said the lifting could act as a catalyst for the UN and Arab League to lift their embargoes. A **Caltex** spokesman said no change in South African petrol prices could be expected. 'Nevertheless, freer access to world crude can only be good thing,' he said. And a spokesman of **Shell** International in London stated: 'We do not see any immediate practical impact.' His colleague in Cape Town, Mr. Roy Derrick, commended the EC decision: 'We are pleased with anything that stimulates trade relations.' In London a spokeswoman of **British Petroleum** (BP) said the company believed it was too early to assess what changes might occur while there were still other international sanctions in place.

[Citizen (SA), 8 April 1992; de Volkskrant (Netherlands), 8 April 1992; South Africa Alert (UK), April 1992]

Pik Botha: Playing field is now level

Responding to the EC decision Mr. Pik Botha, South Africa's Minister of Foreign Affairs, said: '*The playing field is now level. Sanctions have gone and it is now up to us to resolve the situation inside South Africa.*' South Africa's Ambassador to the EC, Dr. Bhadra Ranchod, welcomed the decision by saying that his country had had to compensate for the embargo by spending more on synthetic fuels, on stockpiling oil imported from other sources, and on prospecting for oil within South Africa and its waters. EC oil companies established in South Africa, such as Shell and BP, would be far freer to operate there, Dr. Ranchod added. Officials within the South African Ministry of Mineral and Energy Affairs said the lifting of the EC oil embargo would have little short-term effect on South Africa.

Inkatha has welcomed the EC move. Economic spokesman of the Inkatha Freedom Party (IFP), Mr. Gavin Woods, said fuel that had been stockpiled over the years should now be sold off at a faster rate than at present.

[Financial Times (UK), 7 April 1992; South Africa Alert (UK), April 1992; Business Day (SA), 8 April 1992]

Canada: EC decision is premature

Visiting South Africa at the time when the European Council of Ministers announced the lifting of the EC oil embargo, Mrs. Barbara McDougall, Canada's Foreign Minister, slammed the EC decision, calling it 'prema-

ture'. She said her country would not lift trade sanctions until an interim government was in place in South Africa. Lifting sanctions will not be the answer to South Africa's major economic problems, Mrs. McDougall stated. Attracting foreign investment would also depend upon the ending of political violence across the country, she stated.

[Citizen (SA), 8 April 1992]

NIGERIA

De Klerk's visit to Chair of OAU

In spite of strong opposition by the ANC, South Africa's President Mr. F.W. de Klerk made an official visit to Nigeria on 9 and 10 April 1992 at the invitation of Nigeria's President, Mr. Ibrahim Babangida, who is also the current Chairman of the Organisation of African Unity (OAU). Asked whether ANC president Nelson Mandela had been consulted on this visit, Nigerian Foreign Minister, Mr. Ike Nwachukwu said the decision was based on Nigeria's interests: '*Nigeria is a country. We have our policies and our policies will not be dictated by anyone else's interests but our own.*'

A possible policy change by Nigeria could result in a more rapid erosion of international support for the oil embargo. Not only is Nigeria the current Chairman of the OAU which is still in favour of maintaining economic sanctions, it is also a major oil-exporting nation. Moreover - in this respect even more important - Nigeria is the chairman of the UN Special Committee against Apartheid and a prominent member of the UN Intergovernmental Group that is monitoring the oil embargo.

The official visit by President de Klerk has given rise to speculations that Nigeria might become South Africa's main supplier of oil in the future. The British publication *Africa Confidential* was even speaking of 'oily diplomacy' by the South African Government. Since this visit took place shortly after the EC decided to lift its oil embargo, *Africa Confidential* suggested the reason for Nigeria's more flexible position towards South Africa was that Nigeria might loose out to producers in the British North Sea who could start selling oil openly now to South Africa.

[Business Day (SA), 7 April 1992; Citizen (SA), 9 April 1992; Africa Confidential (UK), 17 April 1992]

SINGAPORE lifts oil embargo

On 6 March the Government of Singapore announced it had lifted its ban on trade with South Africa with immediate effect. This means that the ban on oil exports and transports of oil by Singapore-registered tankers, which was imposed in 1989, is no longer in force.

Singapore will also allow investment in South Africa, though its bans on arms and loans will remain. The first trade delegation from Singapore to South Africa is scheduled to arrive in July 1992. South African oil product exports and Singapore exports of consumer goods were cited by Singapore businessmen as promising areas of trade.

[Business Day (SA), 3 March 1992; Citizen (SA), 7 and 14 March 1992]

BAHRAIN invites South Africa to trade

On 7 April 1992 a private delegation of Bahraini businessmen arrived in Johannesburg with official instructions from their prime minister to invite South Africa to trade. The Bahrain chamber of Commerce vice-president, Mr. Hassan Zainalabedin, said Bahrain was interested in importing South African goods because his country had full confidence and appreciation of the technology of production in South Africa. He also said an official Bahraini delegation would follow this private visit.

The visit had been prepared by the South African Free Trade organisation (Safto) in the autumn of 1991. Safto's international division manager, Mr. David Graham said: *'In addition to being an important commercial centre, Bahrain is an entry point to the markets of Saudi Arabia, Kuwait and Iran.'* He did not comment on the possible Bahraini part in the trade with South Africa, namely oil exports. According to findings by SRB at least 9 oil tankers have sailed from Bahrain to South Africa in the period 1979-1986.

A former subsidiary of ARMSCOR, Lyttleton Engineering (LE), which is now part of the state-owned group DENEL, has taken part in a four-day international defense and security exhibition in Bahrain on 11 May 1992. Lyttleton Engineering has been involved in the production of the G5 and G6 howitzers which have in the past been sold to Iran, Iraq, the United Arab Emirates and Saudi Arabia.

[Business Day (SA), 8 April 1992; Beeld (SA), 14 April 1992; Anti-Apartheid News (UK), May/June 1992]

NORWAY

Mandela's visit postpones lifting of sanctions

The official visit to Norway by ANC President Mr. Nelson Mandela has changed plans by the Norwegian Government on an early lifting of sanctions against South Africa. Mr. Mandela visited Norway on the country's National Day of 17 May 1992. Norway's Minister of Foreign Affairs, Mr. Thorvald Stoltenberg, told Mr. Mandela that Norway was planning to lift all trade sanctions soon. Already on 9 April, the Norwegian Parliament decided to allow the government – without having to change the law – to gradually ease some of the economic sanctions imposed in 1987. But the ANC President reiterated the need of maintaining sanctions. Only a new democratic government in South Africa could ask the outside world to remove the sanctions, he emphasised.

In a meeting with the Parliamentary Committee on Foreign Affairs Mandela surprisingly indicated that a period of **eight weeks** could be sufficient time to reach an agreement with De Klerk on the modalities of an interim government in South Africa.

After pressure from trade unions, political parties and solidarity organisations in support of the ANC, the Norwegian government decided to give in and to wait for at least eight weeks to discuss the sanctions issue with Parliament. In the meantime Norwegian companies planning to start trade with South Africa will experience less strict rules to get dispensation from the law.

The eventual lifting of sanctions is scheduled to take

place in three phases. The ban on trade and services, including shipping, will go first, then the ban on investments, and finally the ban on export of Norwegian crude oil to South Africa.

A similar development is expected in Sweden.

Since Norway is a prominent member of the United Nations Intergovernmental Group that monitors the oil embargo, the Norwegian government plans are quite remarkable.

As a member of the UN Monitoring Group Norway is expected to follow the Group's policy of maintaining the embargo, but at the same time Norway already announced it will lift its own ban on the transport of oil in the next phase of lifting sanctions against South Africa.

[Citizen (SA), 3 April 1992; Aftenposten (Norway), 19, 20 and 21 May 1992]

UNITED KINGDOM

New Conservative MP was MARC RICH-man in secret trade of Brunei oil to South Africa

Mr. **Alan Duncan**, who was recently elected as Member of Parliament for the Conservative Party (the seat of Rutland and Melton in the East Midlands), has been the coordinator for **Marc Rich** in secret oil sales in the mid eighties from Brunei to South Africa. This was revealed by the London weekly *Private Eye* of 8 May 1992.

According to the weekly, Mr. Duncan was sent to the Far East to run the Singapore office of Marc Rich with the particular task to coordinate a special oil trade arrangement whereby the Brunei Government supplied oil to South Africa. On paper the oil deal was arranged in such a way that the oil-producing company **Brunei Shell Petroleum**, which is jointly owned by Royal Dutch Shell and the sultanate of Brunei, was selling oil via a local trader called **Saberu** to the Japanese trading house **Marubeni K.K.** that resold the oil to trader Marc Rich which in turn supplied South Africa.

The claim that the oil was destined for Japanese customers, says *Private Eye*, was bogus and Marc Rich made a vast profit from this sanctions-busting operation. Mr. Alan Duncan received a generous salary advantageously taxed at Singapore levels, but was recalled to the London office of Marc Rich when the secret operation was exposed by the British weekly *The Observer* and the Shipping Research Bureau. He then left Marc Rich and became a freelance trader, serving as a consultant to the Ahmed Mannai Group of Qatar. He also worked as an adviser on oil matters to the Pakistani Government. According to *Private Eye* Mr. Duncan, in the last capacity, made a 'killing' himself during the Gulf war by being able to supply some tankers to Pakistan when this country's regular supplier, Kuwait, had been out of action.

After his study at Oxford Mr. Alan Duncan worked briefly as a researcher for the Conservative Party. Then he joined the oil company **Shell** in London. From Shell he was some years later recruited by Mr. Tony Yewdall, himself a former Shell employee, to join the oil-trading arm of the commodities trader Marc Rich & Co.

According to earlier investigations by the Shipping Research Bureau, Brunei Shell Petroleum had at least since February 1982 been selling crude oil to Marubeni Corporation. Most of the oil was ostensibly destined for the

USA. Marubeni passed the oil on to Marc Rich which delivered most of it to South Africa. From February 1982 till November 1986 Marc Rich supplied **at least 4.8 million tons** of Brunei crude oil to South Africa. Marc Rich was identified as owner of at least 50 tanker cargoes in this period. Until 1982 Brunei oil could openly be exported to South Africa through direct sales by Shell, BP and others supplying at least 2.8 million tons since 1979. When the Brunei Government joined the UN and Commonwealth oil embargo against South Africa, these open supply lines were no longer possible. As a way-out to continue the trade a solution was found in the use of intermediaries.

In total, the Shipping Research Bureau identified 68 deliveries, about 7.6 million tons, of crude oil from Brunei to South Africa in the period January 1979-November 1986. Since then no more deliveries have been found. Apparently, the embarrassment for Shell and the Brunei Government, in particular for Sultan Hassanali Bolkiah, had become too great.

[Private Eye (UK), 8 May 1992; For more details see a special SRB survey entitled 'SHELL-MARUBENI-RICH, crude oil deliveries to South Africa from Brunei' (Jan. 1979-Oct. 1986) which was published in January 1987; see also the SRB report 'Oil to South Africa. Apartheid's Friends and Partners', September 1988, p.14]

SOUTH AFRICA

Sale of stockpile means less oil imports

Provisional findings by the Shipping Research Bureau on crude oil imports in recent months appear to corroborate the latest figures on decreasing 'unclassified imports' in South Africa. The decrease is generally attributed to lower imports due to larger drawings upon the country's strategic oil stockpile.

In South Africa imports of oil and arms are listed as 'unclassified' by the Department of Customs and Excise. In the current situation it is assumed that figures on 'unclassified imports' refer mostly to oil imports. In October 1991 this figure was R628.6 million, while in November the amount dropped to R192 million. In the months December 1991/January and February 1992 the figures were respectively R388 million, R369 million and R371 million.

The provisional SRB findings indicate that the country was importing only about half of its estimated average crude oil import needs. The number of tanker calls identified thus far is down from about four a month in October 1991 to about two a month in February/March 1992. Provisional figures for the monthly volumes imported have dropped from over 900,000 tons in October 1991 to about 550,000 tons in February/March 1992.

Identified sources of crude oil are still invariably all in the Middle East, with the **United Arab Emirates** and **Egypt** once again topping the list.

The shipping companies most deeply involved are still those which prominently featured in SRB's recent report on 1989-1991: the Hong Kong-based **World-Wide Shipping Group**, and a number of London-based Greek shipping companies including **Andros Maritime** (formerly Embiricos) and **G.P. Livanos**.

Provisional findings also indicate, however, that two

other London-based Greek companies have entered the trade since November 1991. These two companies had not been identified as directly involved in oil deliveries before.

[South African Department of Customs and Excise; SA Reserve Bank, monthly figures on balance of trade]

Oil from stockpile to Madagascar

The first official export of crude oil from South Africa's stockpile has gone to Madagascar. In February 1992 the Geneva-based commodities trader **Addax** brokered the sale of a South African cargo to this country. The Madagascar contract of Addax was won from Total and consists of 60,000 tons every 40 days.

[Petroleum Intelligence Weekly (USA), 2 March 1992]

SASOL linked with Inkatha hit squads and CCB operations

According to the Chemical Workers' Industrial Union (CWIU) SASOL has employed trained Inkatha hit squads. The union also alleged SASOL maintained links with companies connected to the **Civil Co-operation Bureau (CCB)** to undermine and destabilise progressive unions and other organisations in Secunda, where the coal conversion plants of SASOL 2 and SASOL 3 are based. The CCB was a clandestine operation within the South African Defense Force (SADF) and was officially disbanded in 1990.

CWIU acting general secretary Mr. Muzi Buthelezi said questions on these allegations had been raised with SASOL, but the company had either denied or evaded the questions. He also said that CWIU believed that *'covert things are still happening'* at SASOL training camps. The union wanted the Goldstone commission to investigate the allegations and to inspect SASOL's training camps, but the company dismissed CWIU's request. On 5 May 1992 SASOL stated it had *'no information at this stage which we believe is relevant to the Goldstone commission'*. According to Buthelezi SASOL also rejected the union's request to publicly debate the allegations with CWIU.

The union alleged that SASOL employed a former KwaZulu Police member, Mr. Bhekithemba Xesibe, who reportedly commanded a base in Secunda for 'hit men'. SASOL has denied it employed Xesibe. However, in an affidavit prepared for submission to the Goldstone commission, Xesibe has said he was employed at SASOL's Secunda Collieries in 1989 and at SASOL Collieries from February to September 1990. He said he accompanied a group of eight 'Caprivi trainees' to Secunda where CWIU claimed they were deployed to undermine progressive organisations. About 200 Inkatha members are known as 'Caprivi trainees' who underwent SADF training specifically for hit squad activities in the Namibian Caprivi Strip in 1987.

An ex-deputy national organiser of the Inkatha Youth Brigade who has given extensive evidence of Inkatha hit-squad activities to the Goldstone commission, Mr. Mbongeni Khumalo, told the commission Xesibe was assigned to Secunda, at SASOL's request, in 1989 to *'discourage strikes and restore stability'*. At the time CWIU was involved in a 'bitter' strike at SASOL, said Mr. Buthelezi.

COAL MONITOR

No. 11, second quarter 1992

1991: EC imports of South African coal continue to rise

In 1991 South Africa exported 48.5 million tonnes of coal, nearly one million less than in 1990. More than half of 1991 exports was taken by the European Community countries: 25.413 million tonnes. **Germany** is, with almost 5.5 million tonnes, now EC's biggest importer of South African coal. The other countries belonging to the top-four importers are **Italy**, **Spain** and **Belgium**.

In the Far East, imports by **South Korea** and **Taiwan**, which had taken increasing volumes since France and Denmark imposed sanctions in 1986, were significantly **lower** than in 1990. This indicates that South African coal exporters have almost regained their 1985 export record to the EC of 26 million tonnes.

After gold, coal exports were still South Africa's largest foreign exchange earner. Revenue amounted to R4.2 billion, about R200 million higher than in 1990, although the export tonnage was lower.

The volume exported through the Richards Bay Coal Terminal (RBCT) in 1991 was 45.3 million tonnes. Since its start in 1976 the Richards Bay terminal has shipped 500 million tonnes overseas. Through the ports of Durban and Maputo, respectively 1.9 and 1.3 million tonnes were shipped in 1991.

DESTINATION OF SOUTH AFRICAN COAL EXPORTS 1989-1991:

Importing country	1989	1990 (million tonnes)	1991
Germany	2.544	4.490	5.455
Italy	4.928	4.371	4.927
Spain	4.986	4.667	4.831
Belgium	3.178	4.501	4.423
Portugal	1.757	2.086	1.687
Netherlands	1.136	1.396	1.207
Greece	0.725	0.925	1.187
France	0.848	0.864	0.936
United Kingdom	0.338	0.252	0.576
Luxemburg	0.124	0.139	0.118
Ireland	0.076	0.060	0.066
Denmark	0.000	0.000	0.000
European Community-12	20.640	23.878	25.413
Japan	5.586	5.040	5.217
Taiwan	4.915	5.460	4.570
Hong Kong	4.888	3.217	3.057
South Korea	5.500 (*)	5.500 (*)	3.000 (*)
Israel	2.294	2.583	2.954
Turkey	1.084	1.100	1.101
Switzerland	0.254	0.421	0.338
Malta	0.160	0.160	0.160
Chile	0.800	0.900	0.900 (*)
Brazil	0.400	0.400	0.400 (*)
Others (**)	0.400	0.700 (*)	1.400 (*)
Total SA coal exports	46.700	49.400	48.500

(*): SRB estimates.

(**): including Romania.

[Sources: International Coal Reports' COAL YEAR 1992; Eurostat]

Ban on SA coal imports lifted by France, Denmark and the Netherlands

FRANCE

EdF cheaply purchases 800,000 tonnes of SA coal

French national electricity producer Electricité de France (EdF) quickly reacted to the end of the import ban, by purchasing 800,000 tonnes of South African steam coal at very low spot market prices.

On 12 March 1992 the French government announced it had decided to lift its embargo on coal imports from South Africa. In a communique the Ministry of Industry stated the lifting of the embargo was intended to strengthen bilateral economic ties and show encouragement for President De Klerk's reform policy which would be tested some days later in the only-white referendum. The French embargo which affected only public utilities as EdF, not private industry such as steel producer Sollac, had been imposed in 1985. At the time France imported 6.4 million tonnes of South African coal, equal to 30 per cent of France's total requirements.

The suppliers of South African coal to EdF will be **SHELL** (Rietspruit), **Marc Rich** (coal from Rand amongst others), **Lonrho** (Duiker), **Total**, **Amcoal**, **Minemet** (Rand coal) and **Newco/Agip**. The lowest price was quoted by traders as US\$26.50 a tonne FOB Richards Bay. Beyond the 800,000 tonnes spot business EdF was planning three long-term contracts of about 500,000 tonnes each with Amcoal, RandCoal and Total.

[Business Day (SA), 13 March 1992; The Citizen (SA), 13 March 1992; International Coal Report (UK) [hereafter ICR], 15 April and 1 May 1992]

DENMARK

Elsam orders 270,000 tonnes for testing

Rapidly following the lifting of Danish sanctions, the national utility Elsam ordered a total of 270,000 tonnes of various qualities of South African steam coal for testing during 1992. Returning from South Africa in the beginning of April, Mr. Paul Sachmann, Elsam's chief buyer, said he held talks with all South African producers to re-cement supply relations. In 1985, two years before the Danish ban came into effect, Denmark imported 3.5 million tonnes of South African coal for electricity production.

Mr. Sachmann said that Elsam would send two of its own bulk carriers, the ships ELSAM FYN and ELSAM JYLLAND, to Richards Bay to load 135,000 tonnes each in May and July. Since each vessel has nine separate holds, there was enough space for Elsam to test a wide range in readiness for negotiating the 1993 contracts towards the end of 1992. Mr. Sachmann also said he expected Elsam to buy some **1 million tonnes** for 1993 and at least the same volume, or possibly more, in the years ahead.

[ICR (UK), 23 March 1992; Coal Week International (USA) [hereafter CWI], 14 April 1992]

THE NETHERLANDS

GKE also buys South African coal for tests

The Dutch coal importing agency for public utilities, GKE, has purchased two types of South African coal, one believed to be Optimum coal from Gencor's coal division Trans-Natal. The reported price on this high quality coal

was close to US\$32 FOB Richards Bay (on a basis of 6,200 kcal).

Mr. Martin Bloemendal, director of the Gemeenschappelijk Kolenbureau Electriciteitsproducenten (GKE), visited South African coal mines at the end of March 1992 and said prospects for future deliveries were positive. 'The feeling in the electricity world is that there are no obstacles anymore to imports from South Africa', Mr Bloemendal said. He indicated GKE planned to buy South African coal cargoes for testing in the second half of 1992. If these tests would meet the technical needs of Dutch utilities, GKE would start importing South African coal in 1993, he said.

The Dutch representative of the ANC, Mr. Carl Niehaus, said the resumption of coal contracts with South Africa at this stage was 'unacceptable'. And Mr. Erik van den Bergh, the spokesman of Kairos, the Working Group of 'Christians against Apartheid', stated: 'We think it's wrong to tighten economic links just before an interim government in South Africa is lining up.'

[ICR (UK), 23 March 1992; De Volkskrant (Netherlands), 31 March 1992; NCR Handelsblad (Netherlands), 31 March 1992]

FINLAND

IVO: Trial shipment of SA coal

In Finland the utility **Imatran Voima Oy** (IVO) will import its first South African coal, three months after Finnish unions followed the government's decision to lift trade bans with South Africa. IVO got response from a dozen bidders for a trial shipment of 65,000 tonnes.

[CWI (USA), 12 May 1992; ICR (UK), 15 May 1992]

SPAIN

Carelec increases SA coal imports

Carbones de Emportacion SA (Carelec), which imports coal for Spain's nine private electricity producers, will double its 1991 imports of 1.3 million. In 1992 about 2.5 million tonnes will be imported by Carelec for 14 coal-fired plants. About 70 per cent of the supply will come from South Africa.

Spain is increasing coal imports because of declining domestic production and in an effort to comply with EC regulations on sulfur emissions. In addition, Spain attempts to lower subsidies to its domestic mining industry in accordance with EC guidelines.

[CWI (USA), 21 April 1992]

ISRAEL

2.5 million tonnes from South Africa

The National Coal Supply Corporation (NCSC) of Israel will import in 1992 about 2.5 million tonnes of South African coal. This volume is about half of Israel's total demand. NCSC has reached agreements with five South African suppliers which are Amcoal (Anglo American), Trans-Natal (Gencor), Rand Mines (Barlow Rand), Agip (subsidiary of the Italian national company ENI) and Transvaal Coal Owners' Association (TCOA). In 1991 Israel imported 2.9 million tonnes of South African coal.

[CWI (USA), 5 May 1992]

Buthelezi also claimed that SASOL used the legal firm DPS & Partners where Mr. Hans Pienaar, who was reportedly involved with a CCB labour-related front company, was a partner. SASOL has said it was aware Mr. Pienaar had worked for a CCB front organisation called LIAISON, but not that he was a CCB member himself. Buthelezi further alleged that SASOL used the services of Matthysen Bus Company, which reportedly acted as a front for a CCB cell under the command of former policeman and CCB operative Mr. Staal Burger. SASOL stated it was not aware of any link between the company and CCB.

Moreover, CWIU has claimed it had evidence that SASOL had been approached by the Inkatha-linked United Workers' Union of South Africa (UWUSA) for funding. SASOL has denied this. However, the newspaper *Business Day* was given a letter on a UWUSA letterhead addressed to Mr. du Toit, the manager of SASOL 2. This letter showed a request for money to open an UWUSA office in Secunda.

[Flame (SA), March and May 1992; *Business Day* (SA), 6 May 1992]

NAMIBIA

Enters sanctions buster Marc Rich

The Namibian government has signed an agreement to explore for energy resources with a Dubai-based consortium in which the Switzerland-based commodities trader Marc Rich, well-known as a major oil supplier to South Africa, is a prominent partner. While on a six-day trip to Bahrain and the United Arab Emirates (UAE) in April 1992, the Namibian Prime Minister, Mr. Hage Geingob, signed the agreement with Mr. Mohammed Mahdi Al-Tajir, chairman of the **International Development Corporation (IDC)**. The IDC is involved in establishing aluminum smelter plants and is a consortium of **Marc Rich & Co**, **George Wimpey** (a UK construction and engineering firm), **Caradel Investments Inc.** and an ex-UAE oil official.

According to IDC officials both Bahrain and the UAE are important aluminium processors and the technology would be of use in the Namibian economy because of its enormous reserves of gas which could feed aluminium smelters. Namibia has deposits of natural gas estimated at 5 trillion to 7 trillion cubic metres, said Prime Minister Geingob who was referring to the gas reserves of the **Kudu** field offshore the Orange River. He would not give a value for the agreement, explaining that the IDC must first survey the sites. According to the Prime Minister the IDC would start this survey as soon as possible. The agreement includes plans for the IDC to develop and construct an aluminium smelter in Namibia. Mr. Geingob also said Namibia was planning to export the aluminium to neighbouring states, in particular to South Africa.

At his arrival back in Windhoek Mr. Geingob showed great expectations on the agreement reached: *'I am very happy with what we have achieved by way of trying to jump start our economy. We have opened up, I think, Namibia to the Middle East'*.

The Prime Minister further indicated the agreement would facilitate other forms of economic development in

stating: *'They [the IDC] will be our agents and advisers and mobilise financial resources for development schemes. We are also looking at establishing a free zone.'*

[The Namibian, 27 April 1992]

Oil exploration by Norwegian consortium

The first licence to drill for oil in independent Namibia has been granted to a Norwegian consortium. The area in question is a block of 11,000 square kilometres (block 1911) off the northern Namibian coast, near the Skeleton Coast park. The consortium consists of Norway's state oil company **Statoil**, **Norsk Hydro** (51 per cent state-owned) and the private Norwegian oil company **Saga Petroleum**. 'This will be much more important than any kind of development aid can ever be,' said Norway's ambassador to Windhoek Bernt Lundt. 'The size of this investment is probably the largest single investment in Africa'.

The consortium outbid six other contenders for Permit 1911 by committing itself to an extensive work programme involving drilling three deep test wells and spending more than US \$45 million during the first four years. At least \$1 million would be spent in training Namibian workers. The Namibian Government would be paid through special petroleum taxes and a substantial share of profits if commercially viable oil and gas discoveries were made.

In May 1991 the Namibian Government announced the opening for the first bidding round for oil and gas exploration licences. According to Mr. Jesaya Nyamu, Namibia's deputy minister of Mines and Energy, the response at the close of applications on November 1, 1991 was 'extremely encouraging to that first round and competition for several areas, including Area 1911, was particularly intense'.

A total of 18 companies had submitted bids by 1 November 1991. The oil companies known as bidders, other than the Norwegians, were Amerada Hess, Chevron and Mobil from the USA, the French oil companies Elf Aquitaine and Total CFP, and Engen from South Africa. Another area of interest is the Kudu gas field, in which Royal Dutch Shell reportedly has shown an interest.

In December 1991 hopes of an early commercial oil find had been scotched by a decision by the Taiwanese company Overseas Petroleum Investment Corporation (OPIC) to halt exploration in northern Namibia. OPIC pulled out after drilling a 700 metres dry well in the Oponono basin near Etosha wildlife park. OPIC also terminated its sub-lease agreement with the US company Brilund Mining that holds rights to a 250,000 square kilometre concession covering much of Namibia.

[Dagens Naeringsliv (Norway), 13 March 1992; Sowetan (SA), 6 May 1992]

SRB Newsletter incites SA Media Council to comment on 'totally erroneous' references

In its previous issue this Newsletter reported on the effects of a leading article entitled 'Inside SASOL' by the South African magazine *The Executive* on the oil-from-coal industrial giant SASOL. The article, written by the magazine's editor Kevin Davie who now is the new editor of the Business Times, questioned SASOL's profitability. According to The Executive SASOL's profits of R1 billion were in fact subsidies supplied by state protection. The magazine pleaded for an end to apartheid economics, for deregulation of the oil industry and for a public inquiry into the allocation of secret energy funds. One striking effect was SASOL's complaint to the Media Council on the article's alleged 'malicious and distorted' content. Subsequently the Media Council negotiated an agreement between The Executive and SASOL. The outcome was a victory for SASOL: the magazine regretted any inference that SASOL would not be financially viable without support from government.

From the Media Council the Shipping Research Bureau received the following letter, dated 30 March 1992:

SASOL AND THE EXECUTIVE

Dear Editor

One of the basic principles of decent journalism is to offer individuals and bodies about whom articles are written the opportunity to comment on what is said about them.

Issue No 26 of your newsletter for the first quarter of 1992 contains references to this council which are totally erroneous.

Firstly, this council is described as 'a rather inappropriate forum to settle the issue between Sasol and The Executive'. One of this council's functions is to deal with inaccuracies in the media.

The Executive article concerned contained inaccuracies which were admitted by The Executive. The conciliation process to redress these inaccuracies resulted in a mutually agreed settlement which remedied the inaccuracies without faulting The Executive on the basic thrust of the original article.

Both parties agreed that the Petroleum Products Act was a hindrance to the free flow of information. This council has already previously made strong representations to Government for the repeal of this Act.

Secondly, there was no penalty exacted against The Executive and, most certainly, Sasol was in no position to execute a penalty through the instrumentation of this council.

Nor did The Executive have 'to give in and to settle on Sasol's terms'. The settlement was a negotiated one and The Executive took full part in the negotiation. In terms of the settlement, The Executive repeated its opposition to secrecy and to protective tariffs and The Executive's right to do so was conceded by Sasol.

This council has a high and unsullied reputation for achieving equitable settlements of complaints against the media and for protecting the freedom of the media by challenging unjustified restraints on the free flow of information.

I think you owe it to us and to your readers to correct the erroneous

impression created by your newsletter of our function and role in the Sasol/Executive matter. I think you owe it also to The Executive's editor to correct the impression that he in any way sacrificed his and his journal's independence and integrity. He certainly did not. He took part in the conciliation voluntarily. He had the integrity to admit the factual errors in The Executive article and he upheld the right to continue to question Sasol's activities where this appeared justified.

Sincere good wishes,

[R. C. Steyn]

CONCILIATOR/REGISTRAR

In reply the Shipping Research Bureau sent on 12 June 1992 this letter to the South African Media Council:

Dear Sir,

Freedom of the press not only means that one is able to publish information and opinion without any censorship, but also that a journalist is free to seek information. In South Africa seeking information on SASOL, in order to initiate a public debate on the allocation of billions of Rands of public money, has proven to be impossible. This was clearly shown by the 'agreement' negotiated by your Council between SASOL and The Executive: Information presented by The Executive was not seen as being based on facts, and SASOL's version – under legal protection of secrecy regulations – was allowed to prevail.

In South Africa your Council is not an independent self-regulating body of the press as it should be in a democratic society. It has come about through the recommendations of the so-called Steyn Commission of Inquiry into the Mass Media, appointed by President P.W. Botha in December 1979. That period was the start of the 'total onslaught' mentality of the apartheid regime. The secrecy provisions around South Africa's oil industry including SASOL were, and still are, an integral part of that mentality.

Your Council was designed as an instrument for implementing a National Party political philosophy that assigned a particular role to news media. A bizarre example of how your Council has been operating in recent years has been recorded by SAIRR's *Survey of Race Relations in South Africa*, 1984, on page 892: The SA Police complained to your Council that the *Pretoria News* ridiculed them by heading an editorial about their Namibian counterinsurgency team, KOEVOET, 'Mad Dogs?'. The editor, when hauled before the board, indicated that he was only questioning the abuse of power: 'When there is such a weight of accusation and allegation, the existence of the allegation itself is a fact which deserves comment.' However, your Council found the editorial based on facts that 'may or may not be true', and thus that it had violated clause three of the code of conduct, which requires comment to be based on 'truly stated facts'!

In the South African society where there is no open government nor free speech for the large majority of the people, your Council is not the layman's jury it pretends to be. Your Council does not have legal counsel available to those accused of improper behaviour. Instead, your Council has developed into a legal forum as if it was a

court of law. In the SASOL vs. The Executive case your Council ruled that The Executive had to have legal representation. Even if The Executive would have eventually won with legal representation, presumably at very high costs, these legal costs, which could have ended up in several hundred thousands of Rands, could never have been recovered. That is the very reason why The Executive was forced to agree with your settlement. The financial burden for a periodical like The Executive would simply become too high.

Your Council stipulates it is in favour of the repeal of the Petroleum Products Act which is still guarding the secrecy on South Africa's oil industry, but we believe that, if your Council would seriously condemn and defy that Act, it should take sides with The Executive's editor.

After all, the article's impact was not a precise presentation of financial figures which are almost impossible to detect due to secrecy provisions, but the plea for a public inquiry, for a public debate on South Africa's classified energy funds such as the Central Energy Fund, Equalisation Fund, Strategic Fuel Fund, and on such other secret bodies as Moss gas, SASOL and Soekor.

In the Auditor-General's report on Moss gas, the author, the US consultant Maurice Brooks, blames 'SASOL's obsession with secrecy' as a major reason for the Moss gas fiasco. Being the very product of the oil embargo, SASOL was built for strategic reasons only. SASOL can

only gain from secrecy. It is not in SASOL's interest to reveal what is the actual price of producing one barrel of synthetic crude oil.

Emphasising the extra costs of R22 billion between 1973 and 1984 to counter the oil embargo, former President P.W. Botha said in 1986 that the full story on how South Africa survived the worst days of the oil embargo crisis would still have to be told: *'We paid a price, which we are still suffering from today'*.

Through the 'negotiated agreement' between SASOL and The Executive your Council has not brought this full story nearer. Instead, your Council has forced The Executive to give in on SASOL's terms because the legal costs would become too high for The Executive, whereas the costs for cash-rich SASOL would have been no problem at all.

That is what we meant in our previous issue, when we qualified your Council as "a rather inappropriate forum to settle an issue like this". The right of exerting democratic control over public money inside a parastatal company like SASOL is not negotiable.

Sincerely yours,

Jaap Rodenburg,
Editor.

This newsletter is a publication of the Shipping Research Bureau. The Shipping Research Bureau was founded in 1980 by two Dutch non-governmental organisations, the Holland Committee on Southern Africa and the Working Group KAIROS (Christians against Apartheid). The Bureau conducts research and publishes reports on the ways in which South Africa tries to obtain its crude oil imports to encounter the embargo imposed by nearly all oil-exporting countries. Since 1989 the Shipping Research Bureau also monitors coal exports from South Africa in support of existing and future sanctions on South African coal. Material published, unless otherwise stated, does not necessarily represent the findings of the Shipping Research Bureau. In case material is derived from other publications, the main sources are listed. Any material in this newsletter may be freely re-published. Please acknowledge source.

The Shipping Research Bureau welcomes relevant information concerning oil supplies or suspected oil deliveries to South Africa, as well as information on coal exports. For information please contact the **Shipping Research Bureau, P.O. Box 11898, 1001 GW Amsterdam, the Netherlands. Phone + 31 20 6266073/6251300, Telex 10236 sanam nl, Telefax + 31 20 6220130.**

SUBSCRIPTION COUPON

Please return this form to the Circulation Manager, Shipping Research Bureau, P.O. Box 11898, 1001 GW Amsterdam, the Netherlands

Name

Address

Postal Code City

Country

The Newsletter on the Oil Embargo against South Africa is distributed free of charge. Gifts are welcome.

**How tankers come to South Africa in disguise:
The example of FORTUNESHIP L. as 'CELINA' and HÖEGH FOAM as 'MARY'**

It is common practice in South Africa that tankers discharge their oil in a very secretive manner. Information in shipping documents such as bills of lading and discharge certificates is altered in such a way that the tankers leave no trace of their calls at South African ports.*

Two examples of how captains (masters) are instructed by the shipping agent in Durban are presented below. The first is the text of part of a telex message to the captain of the tanker **FORTUNESHIP L.** (268,081 dwt) which sailed from Iran and discharged her crude oil cargo of 242,205 tons at the SBM (Single Mooring Buoy) off Durban on 10-12 August 1989. As shown in the instruction the tanker, owned by the London-based Greek shipping company G.P. Livanos, called at Durban under the code name '**CELINA**'. Ten days later, on 21 August 1989, the same ship called again at the SBM, this time under the name of 'JAGUAR' discharging 174,000 tons. The Shipping Research Bureau has identified six further deliveries by the FORTUNE-SHIP L.: in March 1985, July/August 1986, April 1987, May and November 1989 and December 1990.

TO : MASTER 'CELINA'
FM : WORLD WIDE MARITIME DBN [Durban]
03 AUG 89
REF : 2181

PLEASE ADVISE:

- 1) MASTERS FULL NAMES/ NUMBER OF CREW
- 2) B/L FIGS - PLS QUOTE API MT LT BBLs ONLY - NO CARGO NAMES TO BE MENTIONED [Bill of Lading figures, API gravity of oil, metric tons, long tons, barrels]
- 3) VESSELS PREFERRED DISCHARGE SEQUENCE
- 4) ALL VESSELS HUSBANDRY REQUIREMENTS
- 5) ETA [Expected Time of Arrival]

FYG PLSE NOTE:

111) CONFIDENTIALITY
AA COMMUNICATION:
IN ALL COMMUNICATIONS THE VESSELS NAME 'CELINA' SHOULD BE USED. THIS APPLIES TO TELEXES, CABLES AND VHF CALLS. FOR CABLES VIA S A COASTAL STATIONS, USE 'CELINA' AS VESSELS NAME AND CALL SIGN I.E.: 'CELINA/CELINA/DURBANRADIO...ETC'
DO NOT DISCLOSE VESSELS ACTUAL CALLSIGN TO COASTAL STATIONS WHEN REQUESTED TO DO SO. ALSO DO NOT SEND RADIOMARITIME DOCUMENTS (RETURNS) TO VSLs RADIOMARITIME ACCOUNTING AUTHORITY FOR CALLS MADE VIA SOUTH AFRICAN COASTAL STATIONS. AS FAR AS POSSIBLE VESSEL TO AVOID USE OF SOUTH AFRICAN COASTAL STATIONS.

BB DOCUMENTATION
ALL DOCS - NOR, SOF, PUMPING LOG ETC TO RECORD VESSELS NAME 'CELINA' AND PORT

SBM. VESSEL TO PROTEST AND REFUSE TO SIGN SURVEYOR DOCUMENTS WHICH BEAR ACTUAL DISPORT NAME AND STYLE.
[NOR: Notice Of Readiness, SOF: Statement Of Facts, Disport is port of discharge]

CC CLEARANCE/PRATIQUE.
PLS SEND PRATIQUE MESSAGE TO AGENTS TLX APPROX 72HRS PRIOR ARRIVAL. FOR CLEARANCE, FOUR CREWLISTS, BEARING VESSELS NAME 'CELINA' IS ALL THAT IS REQUIRED. (NIL CUSTOMS DECLARATION)

DD VESSELS NAME ON SHIPSIDE AND AFT. VESSEL NAME MUST BE OBSCURED/DELETED. THIS CAN EASILY BE DONE BY USING GREASE (MOBIL ARMA, USUALLY EMPLOYED FOR WIRE ROPES OR OPEN GEARS). A DEGREASER WILL EASILY REMOVE SAME AFTER DEPARTURE.
BRIDGE NAME BOARDS TO BE TAKEN DOWN.

EE STORES/HUSBANDRY/MAIL/SPARES. DO NOT ORDER FROM CHANDLER DIRECT. DO NOT TLX/FAX VARIOUS CHANDLERS FOR QUOTES. SHOULD YOU WISH TO ASK FOR QUOTES, PLS TLX/FAX DETAILS OF PROVISIONS REQUIRED TO AGENTS, AND THE QUOTES WILL THEN BE REQUESTED. ALTERNATIVELY, ADVISE AGENT OF THE NAME OF YOUR PREFERRED SUPPLIER. VIDEO EXCHANGE - NOT PERMITTED DUE TO VESSELS NAME RECORDED ON EXCHANGE DOCUMENTS.
SHORELEAVE - NIL SHORELEAVE PERMITTED (EXCEPT IN CASE OF MEDICAL EMERGENCY)

FF LOADPORT DOCUMENTS:
ALL DOCUMENTS TO BE HANDED TO AGENT ONLY. THE SURVEYOR MAY REQUIRE TO SEE FOLLOWING DOCUMENTS:
-ULLAGE REPORTS
-OBQ/SLOP CERT
-VSLs EXPERIENCE FACTOR
-PROTESTS AFFECTING MEASUREMENT (FREE WATER, DIFF IN FIGS.ETC) ABOVE ONLY TO BE GIVEN WITH FOLL DELETED: 1) VESSELS NAME 2) LOADPORT NAME 3) CARGO NAME (USE GRADE A, GRADE B)

222) ETA:
PLEASE GIVE ALL ETA ADVICES FOR POSITION TWO MILES EAST OF SBM. IF VESSEL IS NOT BERTHING ON ARRIVAL, A RECOMMENDED ANCHORAGE POSITION WILL BE ADVISED.

[*] Cf. examples of forged customs stamps from various countries in SRB report, Fuel to Apartheid, 1990, pp. 3 and 39ff.]

The Norwegian bulk/oil carrier **HÖEGH FOAM** (78,571 dwt, flag Bahamas) arrived at the port of Durban on 4 October 1989. Being rather small, this vessel did not have to resort to the offshore oil buoy (SBM), as she could easily enter the harbour in order to discharge her cargo of 45,048 tons of motor gasoline and 15,093 tons of gasoil, loaded in Romania for **Marc Rich**. According to the Romanian sales contracts, the destination of the products was free 'with the exception of those countries embargoed by the United Nations' – sufficient reason to handle this delivery with the usual degree of confidentiality as witnessed by the following instruction the captain received a few days before arrival.

TO : MASTER MARY
FM : WORLD WIDE MARITIME DB

28 SEPT 89
REF : 2812

WE WISH TO ADVISE A FEW NOTES ON
CONFIDENTIAL PROCEDURE, WHICH PLEASE
CONFIRM / ADVISE IF ANY QUERIES:

1) ARRIVAL / FORMALITIES ONE HOUR PRIOR
TO ARRIVAL
AT PILOT STATION, PLEASE CALL 'DURBAN
HARBOUR RADIO' ON VHF16 ADVISING ETA.
VESSELS NAME 'MARY' ONLY TO BE USED.


DURBAN HARBOUR RADIO WILL ADVISE
PROSPECTS FOR PILOT. OFFICIALS: CUSTOMS
REQUIRES THE USUAL CREW DECLARATIONS,
CREWLISTS, ETC. PLEASE USE VESSELS NAME
'MARY' ON ALL FORMS. ADVISE THEM THAT
THE LAST PORT WAS HIGH SEAS.

2) LOADPORT DOCUMENTS: ALL, REPEAT ALL
LOADPORT DOCUMENTS SHOULD BE HANDED
TO THE AGENT (ADRIAN MAASDORP) ONLY.
THIS INCLUDES MASTER/SHIPS COPY. PLEASE
PREPARE ONE COPY OF DOCUMENTS TO BE
USED FOR URVEY/MEASUREMENT (ULLAGE
REPORT, TANK CLEANLINESS, APPLICABLE
PROTESTS, EXPERIENCE FACTOR, ETC) PLEASE
ENSURE THAT THESE DOCUMENTS (FOR
SURVEYORS USE) HAVE THE FOLLOWING INFO
DELETED/OBSCURED: AA LOADPORT BB
TERMINAL CC SHIPSNAME.
IT IS IMPORTANT THAT LOCAL SURVEYORS/
TERMINAL DO NOT ACQUIRE THIS INFO

WE WILL ASSIST WITH THE PREPARATION OF
SURVEYORS DOCS ON ARRIVAL, IF NECESSARY.

PLEASE CONFIRM AGREEABLE/IN ORDER

KIND REGARDS



After her call at Durban as 'MARY', the HÖEGH FOAM delivered South African coal in Belgium, and sailed on to Amsterdam, the Netherlands. Here she is shown while loading another cargo of 65,000 tons of gasoline for Marc Rich (6-10 November 1989), once again destined for delivery in South Africa.