

SOUTH AFRICA: PERSPECTIVES ON THE POLITICAL SITUATION

1. INTRODUCTION

The advent of the 1990's heralded the beginning of a decade of both political and economic restructuring. The crisis in Eastern Europe and the resultant change in the relations between world powers brought the issue of a negotiated resolution of regional conflicts to the fore. In this context, South Africa was not to be treated as an exception. Significantly, these developments also exerted new pressures on the South African white minority government to fall in line with the emerging international "culture" of multi-party democracy.

In South Africa, the February 1990 statement of President F W de Klerk heralded the dawn of a new era. The government, not of its own accord, for the first time acknowledged/admitted that the policy of apartheid was no longer workable. Its policies of repression had failed completely and had to be scrapped. A wide range of these policies and laws were from then on repealed, the ANC and other anti-apartheid organisations were unbanned and Nelson Mandela and other political prisoners were released. All these actions were meant to create a climate conducive to genuine negotiations leading to a new socio-political and economic order in South Africa.

These developments brought about a euphoric atmosphere both in South Africa and abroad. The whole world was on its toes to witness South Africans of all races, sexes and creeds coming together, for the first time, to bury the apartheid South Africa and deliver a new democratic South Africa. On the contrary, the process of a negotiated settlement has not been orderly and speedily as widely expected. It is fraught with difficulties and uncertainties. At the same time, the socio-economic fabric in the country is deteriorating characterised by rampant chaos and general political violence at a scale never seen or experienced before.

The government is still commanding vast state and other military resources to deal with and put a stop to this situation. To many, the government is not doing enough. Hence, this is viewed or analysed, rightfully so, as the government's deliberate quest to undermine and weaken the ANC and other democratic forces who are at pains to strengthen the peace process in our country. All things being equal, the ANC stands committed to negotiations in order to produce an early, lasting and peaceful settlement in South

Africa. In other words, put simply, solving the violence therefore depends on a speedy democratic settlement.

In order to appreciate the problems and difficulties impeding the process of a speedy democratic settlement, it is of great importance to first grapple with the political situation obtaining in South Africa. Only then does it become possible to adopt an overall strategy to encourage and support the ANC vis-a-vis the negotiation process now underway in South Africa. The strategy envisaged should be such that it helps towards the reduction, if not the elimination of the scourge of political violence gripping the country. At the same time, such a strategy should be geared towards contributing to the mammoth task of social and economic reconstruction of South Africa, thus underpinning the political process being negotiated.

2. TOWARD A NEGOTIATED SETTLEMENT BACKGROUND AND LEGAL CHANGES

Talks on the resolution of regional conflicts began in the latter part of the 1980s. As already stated, these developments came about as a result of the crisis in Eastern Europe and the resultant change in the relations between the world powers. In the Southern Africa region the world witnessed the withdrawal of South Africa and Cuban troops from Angola and the granting of independence to Namibia.

Around the same period, after a crisis in the Nationalist Party (NP) F W de Klerk took over as State President after P W Botha. President de Klerk took the reigns of government at the time when the 1985, July state of emergency was in force. He extended the state of emergency for a further year from June 1989, and also restated the NP commitment to the concept of separate racial representation in Parliament. Nevertheless, domestic and international pressures (including boycotts and widespread civil disobedience and sanctions) mounted. And after a series of discussions with the still imprisoned Nelson Mandela, President de Klerk in a historic speech on 02 February 1990 announced the unbanning of the ANC and other anti-apartheid organisations.

A few days later, on 11 February, Nelson Mandela was released, and de Klerk announced in March of the same year that all remaining apartheid laws would be repealed. In May, the first formal talks between the government and the ANC began, and in the Groote Schuur and Pretoria Minutes, procedures were established for the granting of amnesty and the release of political prisoners. The government also promised to review all security laws, and the ANC suspended its armed struggle. Both parties confirmed their interest in moving as speedily as possible towards a negotiated settlement.

Negotiations, Talk about Talks, as they were referred to then, progressed slowly until early 1991, when the ANC proposed an all party conference to discuss negotiations and hammer out constitutional principles. Subsequently, all main apartheid laws were repealed. These included the Group Areas Act of 1966, the Black Land Acts of 1913 and 1936 and the Population Registration Act of 1950. Government ministers admitted for the first time that apartheid was unworkable and that it was an experiment that had gone wrong. However, no apologies to the victims of apartheid were given, and the NP retains the reins of government until this date.

2.1 Political Players

The political landscape of South Africa is complex. Said bluntly, South Africa is a heterogeneous country, comprising of different racial groupings of varying levels of both economic and political development. Politically, South Africa is characterised by pronounced levels of ideological divisions cutting across racial and ethnic lines. On this score, any assessment of relative strength in terms of popular support is difficult due to the lack of reliable, independent opinion polls. By and large, the overall situation is extremely fluid and subject to change as well as manipulation.

Nevertheless, the two major actors are undoubtedly the ANC and the NP. The ANC played a dominant role during the whole of the liberation struggle. It can count on the support from the overwhelming majority of urban blacks and probably at least half of the rural black vote once an election date has been set. The support to the ANC from the so-called coloureds and Asians is also of some great significance, but white support is somewhat minimal.

The Conservative Party (CP) which is the official opposition party in Parliament has about 41 of the seats. The CP is playing an important role on the far right of the political spectrum together with the declared extreme right wingers like the Herstige National Party (NP) and the Afrikaner Weerstandsbeweging (AWB). On the other hand the Pan Africanist Congress (PAC) and the Azanian People's Organisation (AZAPO) both take stands which are to the extreme left of the ANC.

Reference must also be made to the Inkatha Freedom Party (IFP) which has recently transformed itself into a multi-racial party on the foundation of the Inkatha movement in 1990. The Inkatha, which is led by the chief minister of the homeland of KwaZulu, Chief Mangosuthu Buthelezi, has its headquarters in Ulundi and is strongly Zulu-ethnic in nature. It constantly claims to have substantial backing in the black electorate, and clearly wishes to play a role as "third" party alongside the ANC and the NP. Most indications are, however, that the overall support for the IFP is in the region of more or less 5%.

Many observers, both domestic and international, do see the IFP as a willing instrument for reaction in the country to destabilise the black population so as to further entrench white domination and rule. The so called Inkathagate scandal, disclosed in 1991, and which involved secret government funding of the IFP, using the police and defence force personnel as conduits, is certainly one indication that the IFP may not be as legitimate and genuine as it claims to be. This incident not only led to a government reshuffle but also did much to damage the image of the IFP. On the other hand, contrary to the minor parties and administrations in the other homelands, such as Bophuthatswana, Ciskei, Transkei, Venda and so forth, which maintain a temporary presence on the political arena for the time being, the IFP may be capable of capturing a more permanent position in the political landscape of South Africa.

Flowing from the above, suffice it is to argue that being general is likely to misconstrue the situation as of now. It would be true to state that in essence there are two sides or camps which need to negotiate the settlement for a new constitutional order. The main sides referred to here are:-

1. on the one hand are all the parties, elements and structures which have benefitted from the government for the past two or more decades. It therefore, stands to reason that this camp is led by the Nationalist Party;
2. on the other side are all the national, local, community and other democratic organisations which have been waging an anti-apartheid struggle for a number of years and whose objectives match with those of the ANC. It therefore, stands to reason that this camp is led by the ANC.

It is however, important to point out here that of the parties, elements and structures which benefitted from the apartheid political setting, the Democratic Party, the Transkei² nominally independent government, the Labour Party and certain influential individuals, have pulled out of this club. Most of them are moving closer to the left and are now speaking the ANC's language. It is therefore fair to argue that during the period of negotiations there are bound to be a number of shifts and balances between the camps led by the NP and the ANC as the major actors.

2.2 Convention for a Democratic South Africa (CODESA)

The long awaited multi-party forum on the future of South Africa got underway in December 1991, when the Convention for a Democratic South Africa (CODESA) initiated its deliberations. At this forum 19 delegations converged. These included the ANC and the SACP, the government, a separate delegation from the NP, four other parliamentary parties such as the Labour Party, the Solidarity Party and the National People's Party, the IFP as well as other parties or administrations from all the nine nominally independent homelands and an Indian Congress delegation comprising of both the Natal and Transvaal Indian Congresses.

The Declaration of Intent calling for a unitary South Africa with a common citizenship was signed by all parties excluding the IFP and the Boputhatswana representatives. The reason for their not signing was based on the grounds that the Declaration excluded a federal or confederal political dispensation. A number of other parties decided to stay out of the convention either because they would not share a platform with the ANC, COSATU and SACP alliance or because

they could not cooperate with an illegitimate government. The parties referred to above include the CP, HNP, AWB, PAC and AZAPO.

Despite this impasse, the deliberations took off as planned. A number of decisions were taken on the basis of the principle of sufficient consensus. Delegates at CODESA were split up into five working groups with the following tasks:-

1. political prisoners, return of exiles, emergency and security measures, discriminatory laws, violence and the fostering of the spirit of tolerance among political parties;
2. constitutional principles;
3. transitional arrangements (i.e. an interim government);
4. the future of the TBVC states; and
5. the monitoring of the work of the other four groups and the setting up of time frames within which CODESA should operate.

During the life-span of CODESA, considerable progress was made and in early 1992 hopes for an early settlement were high. The working groups reached agreement on a wide range of important issues including in particular the establishment of a Transitional Executive Council (TEC). The TEC would in effect in a first transitional phase put the present government under joint administration, and supervise the preparation of the first democratic elections.

It was against this promising background and difficulties in a by-election in Potchefstroom in February 1992 where the CP defeated the NP candidate that the referendum of 17 March 1992 was called. President de Klerk went back to the white electorate to confirm his mandate to proceed with the negotiations. He received a renewed mandate. However, rather than speeding up the process of the negotiations, the NP became more confident and intransigent, hence, at the CODESA II seating in the middle of May, a deadlock became evident. The deadlock came about as a result of the question on percentages for the approval of the Constitution. The ANC wanted a two-thirds majority (which the South African government had accepted as reasonable in the case of Namibia). At Codesa, the NP demanded and got acceptance of a 75% majority. In addition the NP demanded a 75% majority on all of the individual articles concerning

the dissolution of power to regional authorities. This, the ANC-led camp could not accept; thus the Codesa II collapsed.

As Codesa was crumbling, negotiations gave way to mistrust. The ANC could not accept the government's inability to accept the logical consequences of democracy as it is universally recognised. And after the Boipatong massacre on 17 June where 42 innocent people were cold bloodedly killed, the ANC decided to pull out of the negotiations.

The ANC lacked the option of calling a referendum as had been the case with the government after the Potchestroom by-election. Mass action was resorted to as the only available option to make some impression on the government and the NP. Eventually the ANC came up with a list of 14 demands relating to violence and negotiations. Further to this, the ANC called for the involvement of the United Nations and an international inquiry into the question of violence.

Suffice it is to conclude by mentioning that the important progress made at Codesa was unfortunately halted. However, following certain positive responses by the government to the ANC's 14 demands such as the prohibition on the public display of traditional weapons, releasing political prisoners, etc, bilateral discussions between the government and the ANC have paved the way for the resumption of formal negotiations.

3. VIOLENCE

During the period from 1985 - 1989, at a time when the state of emergency was declared by the government, it is reported that about 5 200 lives were lost as a result of political violence. Political violence has been endemic in Natal, Inkatha's strongest power base, since 1985. This province alone, according to the South African Institute of Race Relations, accounted for over 90% of all deaths caused by violence in 1989. In 1990, just at the unbanning of the ANC and other political organizations, the spate of violence spread to the Witwatersrand as the Inkatha became more and more active in this part of the country. In the whole of Transvaal the number of fatalities increased from at least 54 in 1989 to over 1 500 in 1990. Simultaneously, the number of deaths escalated critically in Natal. Almost 3 700 were recorded as political victims in 1990 with 90% of the deaths occurring in Natal and Transvaal. In 1991 the number of deaths due to

violence decreased slightly to some 2 600, but the death toll increased again in the beginning of 1992, including the victims of the Boipatong massacre, who contributed directly to the demise of Codesa.

To try and curb the escalation of violence, no effort has been spared. Consequently, in 1991 three major peace accords were signed to try to reverse the situation to normality. One of these efforts culminated in the signing of the historical National Peace Accord (NPA) between the ANC, the government, the IFP and other organisations. At the signing of the NPA all the signatories committed themselves and their organisations to the codes of conduct set out, such as the setting up of regional and local dispute resolution committees. The NPA also established a commission of enquiry regarding the prevention of public violence and intimidation. This aspect of the NPA resulted in the establishment of the Goldstone Commission, led by Judge Goldstone. Despite the unqualified respect which this commission has acquired due to its non-partisan work, the NPA has so far failed to achieve the objectives it was set up to achieve. The scale of violence continues unabated. This makes it appropriate for most observers to conclude that there are more issues or factors contributing to violence.

To actually pin down the causes of violence now gripping South Africa is a complex and daunting task. Hence, many experts view the inauguration of a transitional government before long, as the only panacea for this country. All things being equal, violence per se in South Africa takes on a variety of forms and shapes. These forms range from attacks on white businesses, policemen and soldiers as well as the black town councilors and black activists to conflicts between political organisations, taxi drivers and shack dwellers. Recently, violence has taken on an ethnic connotation with, for instance, the IFP accusing the ANC of being a "Xhosa-dominated" organisation inspired by their hatred for the Zulus. It would be a gross error to accept this accusation and misconstrue it as a particular expression of violence for a fundamental cause. It is, however, true that there is political rivalry between the ANC and the IFP, in particular since the IFP has been massively losing ground to the ANC, but real underlying causes or explanations of violence go much deeper and need to be properly understood if appropriate measures are to be employed or designed.

In searching for the fundamental causes of violence, focus must first be put on the economic and political imbalances created by apartheid. Social tensions and the escalation of crime to survive are a logical and an inevitable consequence of economic deprivation and competition over

scarce resources. The South African context has been characterised not only by the use of powers of the state for repressive purposes, but also by increasing unemployment and deteriorating economic problems.

The police and army were trained to act against black communities and also trained to exploit and manipulate the existing tensions. To this should be added the well documented criminal conduct by members of the South African Police (SAP) and the kwaZulu Police (ZP), which exacerbated the perception of so many South Africans that the government or its agents are active parties responsible for the violence.

In relation to the above the apartheid minority government deliberately created and maintained hit squads such as the Civil Cooperation Bureau (CCB) which is linked to the assassination of anti-apartheid activists like David Webster and many others not known. It also created other units like the Askaris (former Umkhonto Wesizwe soldiers) to assassinate those MK women and men infiltrated back into the country.

The government further played an important role in breaking down the structure of the family institution of the black community and in shaping and distorting the behaviour and settlement patterns through artificial spatial planning. To survive, large numbers of black migrants from rural areas were forced to reside as hostel-dwellers in single-sex hostels on the peripheries of the urban areas alongside urban people living more permanently in the formal townships and squatter camps. Hostile actions including murder, rape and other criminal offences find fertile ground to multiply.

As if the above were not enough, the IFP has actively tried to expand its influence in urban squatter areas as its traditional base in the rural areas started dwindling in the 1980s. Some squatters and criminal war-lords have perceived it to be in their interest to establish links with some of the many sectional and competing sections of the IFP and exploit the tensions between the migrants and the urbanised people in the Witwatersrand. The carrying of dangerous "traditional" weapons, which the IFP has insisted should continue to be allowed for cultural reasons, has created tensions, as such weapons have been used in inappropriate ways.

A final factor in violence, as was first identified by the ANC, is the so-called "third force", which is used to identify right wing groupings which have been and are still active in trying to destabilise or derail the peace process by maintaining the scourge of violence in the townships. It is still not quite clear who the third force actually comprise but there is certainly

evidence that members of the South African Defence Force (SADF) and the SAP have a hand in it. Moreover some understanding with the IFP would appear to have been established, and it certainly remains a fact.

What the above encapsulates in general is that the problem of violence is huge and linked or has its source in a number of reasons. For instance, competition for political, economic and social supremacy has led to polarisation within communities followed by intimidation with the resultant violence becoming the inevitable, creating a vicious cycle of revenge and counter-violence.

As already asserted, the NPA which was set up to provide a structure for reducing and ultimately ending the violence has so far failed. One of its major problems has been the lack of its local and regional structures to operate effectively. In many instances, the problem is put squarely to the problem of inadequate resources, both human and material and the government is reluctant to provide them. The government further complicates things by not giving unlimited powers to the Goldstone Commission to investigate all the factors deemed contributing to the violence. A lot of records to be used as evidence get lost. This is viewed as the government's deliberate attempt to cover up its hidden hand in the violence. The government still remains supreme in that even the international monitors are restricted to investigate freely. They are to meet certain conditions laid down by the government.

What then follows from what has been outlined above is that in South Africa at this point in time it is not so much that information about the spate of violence is lacking. What is lacking, as many would agree, is effective and efficient national and international response. At the same time, extrapolating from the report, the rampant growth of political violence coupled with deliberate actions by the government to destabilise and weaken the ANC and other democratic structures has created an explosive and tense situation. It could be argued then that the government has the biggest share of the status quo. If this situation is not arrested and reversed it has a potential of leading South Africa into a disastrous situation. It is therefore, the responsibility of the international community to save this country and the whole Southern African region from slipping down to the unknown. Reference must be made to the situation obtaining in Angola. The white minority government, has to be pressurised to change its attitude once and for all in as far as the question of violence is concerned.

4.

PROSPECTS FOR THE FUTURE

The impasse in which South Africa found itself after the demise of CODESA was precarious in the true sense of the word. The convening in July 1992 of United Nations Security Council Meeting to review the situation in South Africa was a landmark. The recommendation by the political organisations for the involvement or intervention of the outside world in the South African situation has, to a certain extent, been fruitful. Their active role was seen in the work they did in ensuring that the two major players - the ANC and the government left their doors open for communication.

Subsequently, a series of bilateral talks between the ANC and the government were held after the 21 August 1992 to remove obstacles towards the resumption of the negotiation process. The record of understanding agreed to on 26 September 1992 by the two major actors emphasised that there was a dire need for a democratic constituent assembly. This was hailed as good news especially to those who desire an early resolution of the Southern African problems, in particular, since the record of understanding came into being immediately after the Bisho massacre, where 29 people were killed and hundreds injured, when the Ciskei Defence Force (CDF) opened fire on unarmed marchers organised by the ANC, SACP and COSATU alliance. The ANC and the government found common ground on a number of other matters such as the need for adequate deadlock breaking mechanisms. There would appear to exist a relatively high degree of common ground on the arrangements concerning an interim/transitional government of national unity. These are all positive moves or steps which are supported by the understanding between the two parties that there need not to be winners and losers and the two do need each other.

Nevertheless many issues remain unresolved and making simple predictions about South Africa is clearly not prudent. Constitutional differences such as those outlined above are yet to be thrashed out and the same goes for the widely antagonistic views on the climate for free political activity, the repressive security legislation, covert operations and special forces in the problem of violence. All these issues are interrelated and therefore impact on each other as well as on the timing of the transition. Other negative/destructive factors include the perceived need of some political leaders to play with a very high profile.

Recent disclosures in the media and through the Goldstone Commission have proven beyond doubt that there are elements in the state security forces which are pursuing a strategy of destabilisation of the ANC and other democratic forces. This is evident in the revelations on the Hammer Unit, the Badger Unit and various other military intelligence structures. These units or structures are linked to the mounting of a smear campaign to defame the ANC leaders, using murderers and other criminals as well as prostitutes. Other effort are being made to link the MK to the Irish Republican Army (IRA). The list stands out to be too long to be covered here.

Thus, during the recent bilaterals between the ANC the government, the former has sought to find ways of strengthening the flagging Peace Accord and committing all the stake holders to a more rigorous commitment to the peace process.

What can be safely said is that the political process evolving in South Africa is not going to be without hiccups and possibilities of revisiting the deadlocks experienced at CODESA. However, it is not the intention of the ANC to start painting a bleak picture about the negotiation process. No easy solution should be expected. The standpoint of the ANC is that the negotiation process must not fail. In this regard, much could be achieved if those elements related to organised political violence and crime could be controlled. By and large this will depend how soon a non-partisan police force, trusted by the majority of the people, can be put in place. Also, the way in which the major political actors choose to behave will also play a crucial role.

In this regard, it is promising that parties have agreed to the convening of a multi-party conference in order to take South Africa on the road to democracy. It does seem justified to be optimistic that a transitional arrangement could be in place some time around mid-1993, followed by democratic elections soon after. As far as the question of violence is concerned the only viable solution depends largely on a combination of economic growth and appropriate socio-economic policies to underpin the political milieu.

4.1 The Movement Forward

The deadlock at CODESA was most discouraging, but with hindsight it does appear logical, possibly even inevitable that negotiations were bound to encounter problems. The constituencies of the ANC, the NP and other various political groupings were indeed very far from each other.

Indeed, as a result of the deadlock encountered at CODESA, the way forward thereafter seemed obscured, patchy and disappointing for South Africans and the world at large. However, sense prevailed which resulted in the bilaterals between the ANC and the NP and between the NP and other parties like the IFP. Consequently, some progress has been made in the recent period. The 1993 calendar year is therefore, set to become one of the momentous years in the process of negotiations. The process of negotiations is being rekindled and there are promising signs of it being revived.

This is supported by the multi-party Negotiations Planning Conference which took place on 5 and 6 March 1993 with a view to the speedy resumption of a CODESA-type setting. The Negotiations Planning Conference is now widely perceived as an unqualified success event. Twenty-six (26) parties, administrations and organisations participated in the conference, including the PAC, the CP and the Afrikaner Volks Unie (AVU), which had not previously participated in Codesa. In addition, the ANC was successful in securing the attendance of traditional leaders from throughout South Africa, on a provincial basis.

Through the hard work and unqualified commitment and determination of all parties involved, the Conference achieved its basic objective which was the immediate resumption of multi-party negotiations.

All parties, with the exception of the CP, who abstained from the decision, unanimously agreed to resume multi-party negotiations.

The announcement that the multi-party forum shall be reconvened not later than 5 April is an indication of the urgency with which the Conference approached the looming crisis which faces all South Africans. This sense of urgency raises the hope that all parties and participants do indeed have the political will to place the interest of

our country above all else. The time for point scoring and mud-slinging by parties has no place in the recent period.

The urgency with which our country's problems have to be addressed demands that the achievements of past negotiations should serve as a constructive foundation for the resumed negotiations we are embarking upon now. In this regard, the ANC reaffirms its commitment to the scenario hammered out at CODESA. The ANC remains convinced that a democratically elected Constituent Assembly and the formation of an Interim Government of National Unity and Reconstruction is the surest way to achieve democracy in our country.

The ANC also firmly believes that the resumption of multi-party negotiations will further strengthen the peace process in our country.

Extrapolating from the above, the position of the ANC regarding the movement forward thus bringing about a democratic transition in South Africa, is that the process of negotiations continues uninterrupted. Our objective is the holding of free and fair elections of representatives who will draft and adopt a new constitution.

In this regard, the proposal of the ANC is as follows:-

The immediate result of the process of multi-negotiation must be the installation of the Transitional Executive Council (TEC), an Independent Electoral Commission and an Independent Media Commission.

The task of these structures will be to ensure that in the period leading up to the elections the playing field is levelled and that there is a climate conducive to free political activity.

The elections should lead to the installation of the Constituent Assembly whose task would be to draft and adopt the first democratic constitution and an Interim Government of National Unity.

It is likely that support could cease after the first General Election. Whilst this might be formally correct for the donors, the perception for the ANC and its millions of supporters could be one of neglect at the point of greatest need. This situation will create a feeling of despair which will develop as a result of the general crisis of expectation and thus exacerbate an extremely fragile and delicate situation.

The ANC appeals to its traditional supporters to maintain their support for an extended time until after the General Election. Even after this period the ANC, as the likely future government, will be expected to perform its leadership role in as far as the question of meeting the basic needs of the people.

Measures to satisfy basic needs can, in other words, in the South African context be justified not only on their own right, but also because they can help underpin social stability and longer term growth. The increasing emphasis on support to the development of democratic institutions and the attention to human rights, which is characterised in the donor community's support so far, is yet another reason why further assistance, at a much larger scale, would be justified.

The democratisation process in South Africa will be vulnerable for quite some time, and continuity in supportive efforts is essential. Apartheid was set in concrete and pervaded the whole aspect of human life. As such it will not disappear overnight. Consequently, a new democratically elected government in South Africa will be faced with the daunting task of addressing the legacies of apartheid, which can be likened to a man-made disaster. Inequalities in income and economic opportunity are enormous, and the number of people in flagrant poverty and out of employment is disturbing. All available evidence demonstrates that a new democratically elected government will not be able to redress these imbalances on its own despite the availability of substantial domestic resources. Along the same vein it can be argued that the donor community has a moral duty and obligation to assist the mass democratic forces in assuming real power as opposed to only nominal influence in a society dominated by white economic interests.

2. Negotiations Administrators

The ANC needs negotiations administrators in all the regions who will link with the negotiations commission at head office. Their main task would be to ensure consultation with the people of South Africa, a practice which is vital for the ANC as it is seen as the torch bearer of democracy and representing the aspiration of all democrats in South Africa. The inability on the part of the ANC to consult and take along the mass of the people will have serious consequences as the democratisation process will not be appreciated. The other major activity would be the process of reporting back on a host of long and short term agreements which are amended frequently.

3. Research

Research is a component part of the negotiation process. Commissioned research would be done for negotiators on a number of issues like the role of hereditary rulers during negotiations and future government. Opinion surveys would have to be undertaken from time to time in order to gauge the state of opinion in relation to issues that are being negotiated.

4. Information and Publicity

The role of the ANC Information and Publicity Department has assumed a broader role because of the negotiations process. It spearheads the task of informing the South African community on the negotiations especially agreements between the ANC and the minority government over and above its tasks of formulation and dissemination of ANC policies. The department needs to create a capacity within the regions to handle media tasks like producing briefings, reports and arranging video/slide shows which will be disseminated amongst the community.

The department operates from a disadvantaged position as the mass media is still state controlled and manipulated. The major newspapers are controlled by two conglomerates, Argus and Nasionale Pers, both of which are not sympathetic to the ANC. If the process of democracy should succeed, there is need for an informed public that would be able to make informed choices. An

uninformed public is unable to participate fully in the political processes of the country.

5. Citizen Awareness Campaign

The forthcoming elections for an interim government of national unity followed by General Elections after a constitution has been drawn up will only have any meaning for the majority of the oppressed people of South Africa, who have been denied the vote for decades, if the ANC embarks on large scale voter education directed to all the people of South Africa.

This campaign is very different from the ANC election campaign directed to ANC supporters to vote for the ANC. As the ANC is seen as a torch bearer of democracy, it has the responsibility therefore, to educate the people on democratic principles like political tolerance and other complicated democratic concepts and institutions.

6. ANC External Offices

The international work of the ANC had been an important pillar of the struggle. It consolidated the internal struggle. Now that we are at the stage of negotiations these offices need to mobilize the international community towards ensuring that the South African regime does not subvert the process through its intransigence.

Policies on international relations for a new democratic South Africa need to be developed as South Africa's international isolation is lifted. The department of international affairs needs to prepare ground for South Africa's re-entry into the international United Nations fold and also into the sub-regional structures.

The other important aspects of international relations that the Department of International Affairs together with the external offices is currently embarking on is to mobilise for trade and investments when all sanctions are finally lifted. The existence of these offices abroad is then very vital for these tasks to be successful. The ANC makes a plea for support to our external offices, especially those in Africa, as the capacity to raise funds in those countries is non-existent.

7. **Women and Youth**

The ANC has the responsibility to develop and support the potential of two sections of the community, namely the youth and the women. Apartheid has been more vicious on these two sectors of the South African population.

The Youth League aims to build and strengthen the role of the youth in South Africa and in particular to restore the culture of learning which has been destroyed by apartheid.

The Women's League aims to build its organisational capacity and strengthen the position of women nationally during the transition.

8. **Transport**

Transport needs cannot be overemphasized due to the vastness of the country. The tasks outlined above requires the ability of the ANC to reach all the corners of the country and that depends on the transport capacity. Failure due to limited resources of this nature will lead to dissatisfaction in the fledgling democracy.



African National Congress

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XEROX TELECOPIER 7021