

11/2007/2007/11

The emergency meeting in New York next Wednesday to discuss possible UN involve-

In letter to UN Secretary-General Dr  
Boutros Boutros Ghali on Wednesday, Foreign

Just said Boutros-Ghali had not decided to send Vance to the country as it was not clear if "all parties" in South Africa agreed on such a mission.

Sawyer 10/1/92

# Here, FW, is the case against the state

## Wait and see as KZP gets control

By LENA SLACHMULDER

NATAL unrest monitors have reacted with alarm to moves which will increase the role of the kwaZulu Police (KZP) in controlling unrest.

From July 1, the South African Police stopped using Internal Stability Unit (ISU) members in kwaZulu unless specifically called in by the KZP district commissioner.

The chairman of the Natal-kwaZulu regional dispute resolution committee, MC Pretorius, said the move was a matter of "restructuring command".

Pretorius said that as the KZP held the major responsibility for areas under its jurisdiction, it would feel compelled to act in a more responsible manner. "Unfortunately, we'll only be able to tell if it doesn't work by counting the deaths," he said.

The ANC representative on the Unkazi dispute resolution committee, Felix Dlamini, said local unrest monitors doubted that the KZP could be trusted to act more responsibly if given more reins.

Complaining that the decision had not been discussed with local peace structures, Dlamini said it had put the brakes on progress towards joint SAP-KZP policing in Unkazi. SAP patrols around troubled shack settlements in Unkazi had fostered a climate of peace, while joint patrols in the township over the Easter weekend had greatly improved residents' perceptions of the security forces.

"The decision is discouraging in the face of increasing violence," said Democratic Party unrest monitor Ray Alcala. "We have used the ISU in great extent, and have been very impressed with them recently."

The move follows the release of a scathing report by the Legal Resources Centre and the Human Rights Commission, which paints a picture of deteriorating KZP control and shows out of the force by commissioning staff in the past six months.

Despite protestations of innocence by FW de Klerk and cabinet members, persistent doubts linger about state involvement in the violence.

By PHILIPPA GARNON

THE government had taken "numerous concrete steps" to stop political violence, had given the police more money and more men, had backed the National Peace Committee and launched the Goldstone Commission and was "irrevocably committed" to a peaceful solution of South Africa's problems, President FW de Klerk told the nation last week.

Just how credible is his posture of hurt innocence? How are South Africans to view the claims — made repeatedly over the months — of the government's clean record on the violence and a determination to eradicate it?

In an interim report on the Boipatong massacre last week, Mr Justice Richard Goldstone said he had found no evidence that the government and high-ranking members in the security forces had been directly implicated in political violence.


But the issue, as the African National Congress pointed out, is broader than this. "Culpability extends to acts of commission and omission," it said.

Judge Goldstone himself hints at official foot-dragging. In his report he complains of several instances where the authorities have ignored his recommendations, among them that the hotels be secured, policed and upgraded; and that 32 Battalion should not be deployed in a peacekeeping role.

Both the International Commission of Jurists and Amnesty International have blamed the government for not taking sufficient steps, with the latter noting a "failure to bring to justice all but a tiny proportion of those involved in human rights violations."

However, justified it may be, the strong impression is created that the government and its security arms are being kept off the hook than to get to the bottom of claims of their complicity in or inaction on violence.

Lack of action is only part of the problem. Active steps taken by the government, such as legislative amend-



Blood on the tracks... Train attacks have claimed many lives in the tide of violence sweeping South Africa. Photo: PETER NICOLAO

ments on the carrying of cultural weapons and, more recently, giving more powers to the homeland police, have, in the opinion of many, served to fuel the violence.

To judge by government rhetoric, the National Party under De Klerk is a different party from that of 1978, and has no responsibility for the latter's systematic use of violence as an instrument of policy. But the cabinet, including General Magnus Malan, Roelf Meyer, Leon Wabane and Adrian Vlok, who also served under Botha — is glibly disavowing himself from the Civil Co-ope-

ration Bureau (CCB) and police hit squads based at Vlakplaas?

The refusal to disband the special forces, the insistence on using controversial forces such as former members of Koevoet, and the continuation of covert operations only reinforces public suspicion.

Commenting on the police deployment of ex-Koevoet fighters, Judge Goldstone said that if they were involved in violence, their "infamous reputation" could only cause further distrust and suspicion of the security forces.

In assessing the government's

record, the following must be taken into account:

● Not a single person has been convicted in connection with the 49 massacres which have occurred over the past two years in the Transvaal. (See accompanying story.)

● Ironically, the Trust Feeds massacre of December 1988 stands out as the major instance where the convictions have been secured. Those convicted were politicians.

● A secret document released by Transkei military leader Major-General Bantu Holomisa in May this year directly implicates the State Security Council (SSC) and South African Defence Force in the murder in 1985 of four Eastern Cape activists, including Mathew Goniwe. The document is a message from SADF Military Intelligence Chief General CP van der Westhuizen (then a brigadier) proposing to the SSC the "urgent removal from society" of Goniwe. De Klerk, denying the cabinet or the SSC ever planned or sanctioned murder, ordered the reopening of the inquest. No move has been made to suspend Van der Westhuizen from his position.

● No move has been made to suspend head of the SAP forensic laboratories, General Lothar Neethling, after a supreme court civil case finding in January last year that his involvement in the poisoning of activists was, on the balance of probabilities, true.

● Despite a Harms Commission finding implicating several CCB members in political violence, none has been charged. At least 20 CCB members, and probably many more, remain on the SADF payroll.

● In February *The Weekly Mail* published allegations made by "Black Car" vigilantes in Wasmelon that local white policemen based at nearby Ermelo police station had encouraged and actively helped them destabilise the community. To *The Weekly Mail's* knowledge, the policemen concerned have not been suspended. The Goldstone Commission is currently hearing evidence on these allegations.

● In an official operation in 1985, the SADF gave military training in Unkazi to 1000 men, who were later absorbed into the kwaZulu Police (KZP). In sworn affidavits, several of the trainees claimed to have been trained in offensive warfare. Until all the trainees have subsequently been implicated in the Natal violence.

● No action has been taken to rein in the KZP, which is indicted in a lengthy Legal Resources Centre (LRC) and Human Rights Commission report, backed by legal documents, listing incidences of KZP partiality in the Natal violence and citing the KZP as an obstacle to peace in Natal.

The powers of the KZP in unrest situations have in fact been strengthened. In terms of a July 1 policy decision, the police's Internal Stability Unit will only act on unrest in kwaZulu if called on to do so by the KZP district commissioner.

● Government amendments to the Dangerous Weapons Act, the Natal Code on Zulu Law and other by-law have generated extensive confusion and made weapons bare almost unenforceable, say human rights organisations.

● A *Weekly Mail* investigation this year revealed the use of extra-legal methods — including systematic use of false vehicle registration plates, some belonging to bona fide individuals and companies — to cover a police operation in the Vaa.

● Affidavits to the orchestration of violence, amongst them allegations still under investigation by the Goldstone Commission.

## No convictions on carnage

Weekly Mail Reporter

NOBODY has been convicted in connection with the more than 40 massacres on the Reef over the past two years, in which at least 1 200 people have died.

"Massacre" has been defined according to the Human Rights Commission's criterion of a mass killing claiming the lives of at least 10 people. This definition excludes the conviction of a man involved in the 1991 Braamfontein train attack, in which two people died.

Prior to the Boipatong massacre, 45 arrests had been made in connection with five massacres, according to police figures. Trials of some of these suspects are still in progress.

Last week John Zakwe, one of five men accused of slaughtering 13 mourners at an Alexandra night vigil in March 1991, was acquitted on grounds of insufficient evidence.

This came hard on the heels of the acquittal of seven alleged Inkatha Freedom Party men on murder charges in connection with the Sebokeng night vigil massacre of January last year, in which 38 people died.

W Schultz dealt the South African Police a tongue-lashing, saying they should have tried harder to find incriminating evidence.

The SAP's credibility crisis in the townships had led to a situation where lawyers had

to take over the job of the police, ensuring that witnesses went to court, providing them with "safe houses" and persuading them to testify. He commissioned a lawyer representing one of the families affected by the Sebokeng slaughter.

But SAP media liaison officer Captain Eugene Opperman has accused the media and political organisations of hindering police investigations.

Media allegations about the Boipatong massacre, for example, had made potential witnesses "confused, angry and even more emotionally charged," he said, stressing that the African National Congress had instructed residents not to communicate with the police.

Giving further details of progress made in investigating the massacres on the Reef, a police spokesman said:

● The attorney general had temporarily withdrawn charges against five people arrested in connection with a Johannesburg train attack two years ago which claimed the lives of 15 people.

● Twelve people arrested in connection with the May 1990 Swankville massacre — in which 24 people died — had all been released on bail.

● Twelve people had appeared in court in connection with the deaths of 11 people at the Chendor courtyard, on the West Rand, on August 21 last year.

Stat 10/7/92

The weapons are lobbyists and affluent pressure groups, reports Hugh Robertson

# ANC-IFP clash in US too



**I**F SOUTH Africans were a tri-De awed by the \$700 000 (almost R2 million) annual fee which the ANC contracted to pay its chief United States lobbyist, Walter Fauntroy, (a contract now apparently frozen after an initial payment of \$250 000 and a disappointing return on the investment), they might be thunder-struck to learn that this is but small change in a continuing and often shadowy battle for influence in the US between political rivals who confronted one another in Co-Desa.

Almost as the ANC was parting company with Mr Fauntroy, for instance, an American industrialist was making available a substantially larger sum to pay for repairs to the tattered image of the Inkatha Freedom Party in the US.

According to the buzz, the money was an extravagant personal gesture by the industrialist who is a personal friend of Chief Mangosuthu Buthelezi. He has asked one of the more accomplished Washington firms of

image launderers, Sawyer-Miller, to do the job.

At the same time, an affluent group of rightists who raise funds for Inkatha, the South African Educational Foundation, expanded from its California base to set up office in Washington with a permanent director and lobbyist.

Also on the side of Inkatha are a panoply of conservative groups with extensive business connections and who have been involved, at least partially, in promoting Inkatha and Chief Buthelezi in the past.

Among them are the Jefferson Educational Foundation (reputedly with more than 18 000 sponsors in big business), which among other things pays for visits to South Africa by mainly conservative Republicans, and the Cato Foundation and Heritage Foundation, both of which eagerly seek out Chief Buthelezi as a speaker.

On the ANC side there are several equally influential groups — chief among them the Africa Fund, which has some astute financial advisers and lobbyists raising money for the organisa-

tion, and its parent body, the American Committee on Africa.

There is also the Mandela Freedom Fund and the spattering efforts of TransAfrica which, among its projects, finances visits to South Africa by black Americans who devoutly support the ANC.

Relegated to the sidelines in the mounting battle between the ANC and Inkatha for money and influence in the US is the South African embassy which, on the initiative of ambassador Harry Schwarz, has dramatically cut back on the lobbyists who did virtually all the embassy's networking in the heyday of Piet Koornhof.

Instead, the embassy has mounted its own staff public relations and lobbying drive which is the envy of just about the entire diplomatic corps. The results are impressive — Mr Schwarz gets more exposure in the US media than any other diplomat in Washington, and the embassy now has cordial contact with politicians, businessmen and bankers who would not have been seen anywhere near a South African diplo-

mat only a year ago.

But the real tussle remains that between the ANC and Inkatha — and it is turning thoroughly nasty, with many aspects seeming to impinge on their rivalry at home.

Last month, during a fundraising and image-building visit to the US, for instance, Chief Buthelezi faced — for the first time — an orchestrated campaign of obstruction at the hands of the ANC's US allies. They claimed victory when he abruptly cut short his visit and flew home, allegedly seething. But Chief Buthelezi insisted that the ANC's plans for mass action prompted his early departure.

Either way, he faced a drubbing in the US — and a promise of more of the same if he comes back. Organisers of the campaign telephoned as many of the Americans he was scheduled to visit as they could reach, and appealed to them not to see Chief Buthelezi.

According to one account in the Miami Herald, seven of the 11 appointments he had scheduled in the area were cancelled. Later, the mayors of New York, Atlanta and Miami confirmed that they

would not be seeing him.

In New York, where he addressed a luncheon sponsored by the presidents of major Jewish organisations, picketers paraded outside handing out leaflets denouncing Inkatha and Chief Buthelezi, and urging Jewish groups to challenge the decision to receive the Inkatha leader.

Some equally rough tactics come from the supporters of Inkatha. Among these are some Christian fundamentalist groups which raise money for Inkatha by portraying it as a Christian organisation standing virtually alone against a conspiracy of atheists and communists who, among other failings, have a predisposition for eating their victims after burning them alive.

Ghostly stuff it is, but it is put out in fundraising brochures which have been sent to some prominent Americans.

At this stage of the battle for influence, the ANC undeniably has the upper hand. It has the support of the major black American groups, of the congressional black caucus, and of most of the media.

Furthermore, rightly or wrongly, Inkatha has been more starkly identified in the US than it has been in South Africa as the perpetrator of most acts of violence.

In the battle for funds, the outcome may not be so clearly defined. While the ANC has a far larger official presence here — fully staffed offices in Washington and New York to Inkatha's part-time office in Atlanta — it probably cannot match Inkatha's contacts with big business and it suffers from its legacy of socialism and strident outbursts against free enterprise by some of its officials.

But the battle lines have been drawn, and many Africanists in the US are viewing it all with apprehension, fearing that much of the money and influence needed to sustain the feud in South Africa is being garnered here and that against all the efforts of its leaders and politicians, the US may become a part of the problem rather than the source and inspiration of its solution. □

● Hugh Robertson is The Star's Washington correspondent.

# No isolation, anarchy: FW

STELLENBOSCH. — The government would discharge its duty at all costs and not allow South Africa to slide back into isolation and helpless stagnation, State President De Klerk said at Stellenbosch last night.

Addressing the federal youth congress of the National Party in the HB Thom Theatre, he said the government would take new initiatives and would not tolerate anarchy.

"We face a few difficult weeks and a few difficult months," he said, referring to the negotiations crisis.

"But the government

will not sit in a corner, cry, worry and stagnate.

"We will discharge our duty at all costs. We will take new initiatives.

"We will not allow South Africa to slide back into isolation and helpless stagnation, nor will we tolerate anarchy," he said.

"We will make certain that we use every avenue to get negotiations back on track, to ensure progress and do our duty in ending violence and fighting radicalism"

He said the National Party government could look the world and all South Africans in the eye and say its hands are clean and that it would pursue anyone in or out

of uniform involved in violence.

TO PAGE 4

*Citizen*  
10/7/92

## 'No isolation, anarchy'

FROM PAGE 1

The government was faced with disruption allegedly justified by three great untruths — that it wanted to retain power at all costs; cling to a veto to undo democracy; and was a participant or passive onlooker in violence.

"These three lies will remain lies however much they are repeated," he said.

The Codesa negotiations was not tripped up by a few percentage points but by a long-planned campaign of disruption based on these three lies.

"They formed a basis of their (the ANC's) planned disruption and destabilisation of South Africa," he said.

"That is why we reject them and say 'come let us

talk about what is really important'."

Regarding the "first lie" that the government wanted to cling to power, he said: "No one realises better than I that it is in the best interests of South Africa to move to a fully representative government as soon as possible."

There was no truth in the charge that the NP wanted to cling to power. It did not cause delays at Codesa, but it was the SA Communist Party which had started long before the moves to scuttle the negotiations when talks had come within a hair's breadth of agreeing to a transitional government.

That transitional government could have been installed within months along with a transitional council which would have put the means in the hands of all the parties at

Codesa to ensure free and fair elections and to level the playing fields.

Equally, the notion of a White minority veto was nonsense.

"They are underestimating the NP's support. When we talk of 75 per cent majority we are not trying to safeguard the NP's position because we have more than 30 per cent support already.

"When we talk of increased majorities for amending the constitution we are in step with the rest of the world," he said. For instance, certain clauses in the US constitution required the agreement of 75 per cent of the federal states.

"The best chance for a constitution is if it starts out with overwhelming support from all the people it is intended to

Allegations of government complicity in violence was disproved by the fact that it was the government which took the initiative to call for a peace summit which was boycotted, but which resulted ultimately in the National Peace Accord and the appointment of the Goldstone Commission.

"We have nothing to hide," he said.

Every abuse over the past 40 years occurred because the government had absolute power.

"The National Party has the courage to admit that it made big mistakes, but also had the courage to break with what was wrong."

He said it was "sheer nonsense" to say that because the government did

not want a winner-takes-all constitution it was undemocratic.

"We want to build a country which will be economically in step with what has succeeded elsewhere in the world.

"We are fighting against Marxist-Socialism because it only means bad news for all South Africans."

A balance had to be struck between the interests of those with much to lose and those with much to catch up on.


South Africa's biggest challenge was not a new constitution but to meet the ordinary aspirations of people.

"Those who want jobs, improvement in the quality of their lives and in their standard of education," he said.

—Sapa


# SHOCK!

## ANC chief signed away prisoners' freedom



HJ Coetsee of the government

Jacob Zuma of the ANC



### AGREEMENT BETWEEN THE GOVERNMENT OF THE REPUBLIC OF SOUTH AFRICA AND THE AFRICAN NATIONAL CONGRESS RELATIVE TO THE RELEASE OF PRISONERS

1. Whereas it is of importance to all parties concerned that the procedures, mechanisms and results relating to the release of prisoners and arising from the reports of the Working Groups established under the Groota Schuur and Pratoris Minutes, be accepted, therefore both parties agree that for the purpose of their mutual endeavours in regard to the release of prisoners, it is deemed that finality in the process has been reached today and that the results are accepted: Provided that in any case in which the Government advises that release is not warranted, this shall not infringe on the right of the individual to request further advice from the Advisory Committee. This, however, cannot be construed as extending or delaying the finality of this agreement.

HJ Coetsee  
The Government  
Date: 30/6/91

J Zuma  
The ANC  
Date: 30/6/91

**N**EW NATION is in possession of a document purportedly signed by the ANC in which the organisation effectively concedes that there are no more political prisoners held by the government.

By implication, the document diminishes the right of prisoners like Robert McBride to demand their release on the basis that they are being held for politically motivated crimes.

The ANC has not challenged the authenticity of the agreement.

The document was signed by the ANC's assistant secretary-general Jacob Zuma on June 30 last year during one of the bilateral talks between the ANC and the government.

#### Finality

Among other provisions, the agreement states that:

• Finality has been reached on the question of the release of political prisoners.

• In any case where the government rejects a prisoner's application for release, this shall not affect the rights of the individual prisoner to re-apply for release before an Advisory Committee.

Although the document in NEW NATION's possession bears the names of Zuma and justice minister, Kobie Coetsee, it does not have their hand written signatures.

ANC officials said they knew of the existence of the document but said its contents did not reflect the organisation's policy.

The organisation's lawyer, who has been dealing with the ques-

tion of political prisoners since the signing of the Groota Schuur Minute, Matthew Phasa, also disowned the contents of the document as ANC policy.

#### More prisoners

He said: "I can confirm that this is an authentic document, but as far as the ANC is concerned, there are still 450 prisoners in jail - 120 in Bophuthatswana alone.

"And I say this without passing judgment on my colleague (Zuma)."

Commenting on the document, ANC spokesperson, Gill Marcus, said the document was never placed before the organisation's National Executive Committee (NEC).

"The document has no standing in the ANC and if the government

wants to claim that we have accepted the agreement, people should ask themselves why we have insisted that there were still political prisoners long after the said agreement was reached," said Marcus.

Indeed, ANC president, Nelson Mandela, raised the issue of the release of all political prisoners during his address at last year's ANC national conference.

Mandela's address was made less than a week after the said agreement was signed.

#### Mistake

Zuma and Coetsee could not be reached for comment at the time of going to press. Marcus said Zuma - if he had indeed signed the agreement - could have mistaken an NEC proposal on the issue

for a mandate.

The question of the release of remaining political prisoners is one of the ANC's demands contained in the memorandum sent to the government two weeks ago.

Responding to the ANC's demand in this regard, National Party leader FW de Klerk said that the government maintained that it had fulfilled its obligations under the various agreements relating to the release of political prisoners.

De Klerk said he, however, had agreed that a Codesa task group be appointed to consider the resumption of identification of politically motivated cases as well as the prisoners who had committed such offences.

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**B**oth President FW de Klerk and African National Congress leader Nelson Mandela have claimed democracy as their mistress, in the blizzard of words that has passed between the ANC and the National Party in the past weeks.

Perhaps the public can hardly help the fact that they do not share this avowed passion, or even understand what is going on.

The newspapers and political analysts don't always help. Almost to a man, they told us to ignore the harsh rhetoric of De Klerk's radio and television broadcast last Thursday night and read the fine print instead.

Embraced in the proposals were supposed to be concessions that in the long run could lure the ANC back to the negotiating table.

Alas, there was no such thing. De Klerk's updated proposals merely put flesh on the NP's constitutional plans and offered nothing significantly new since the deadlocked CODESA II talks.

They are proposals that would permanently entrench the NP in government, and provide the party with a veto on the constitution: the right to say when and if majority rule can come into being in South Africa.

In fact, in offering so little, in such a gung-ho manner, De Klerk's political body language was to tell the ANC to do its damndest.

The 70 percent special majority that is required to approve a final constitution, regarded as one of the NP's concessions, implies both the national assembly and the senate sitting together.

**W**hile the NP has agreed that the senate will be elected, it will not be by straight proportional representation and hence will have an inbuilt distortion.


Every region (and the regions will be based on the country's 10 development regions) will have an equal number of seats. The inevitable effect of equal weightage of all the regions will be to load the more rural, more conservative parts of the country with a disproportionately high representation in the senate.

Thus, the northern Cape with perhaps half a million voters will have a disproportionate number of seats in the PWV with, say, eight million voters. The ANC, with a hypothetical 70 percent support in the PWV, will earn the same number of seats with 5.6 million votes as the NP with 350 000 votes in the northern Cape.

Maybe there is a rationale for that in the final constitution as there is for the similar composition of the United States senate. But is it fair to incorporate its distortions into a constitution-making body that already has a threshold mark of 70 percent? It could mean that the mark is really closer to 75 percent.

The ANC and its allies would have to win more than 70 percent of the vote merely to achieve a final, democratic constitution at all. That is a tall order.

## What FW was really telling Mandela:



# Do your damndest!

*In his television address last week, FW de Klerk presented himself as the reasonable man. But beneath the benign tone lay a much harsher message*



By  
**PHILLIP VAN NIEKERK**

De Klerk's memorandum says that "for the interim substitution of the transitional constitution, a majority of 70 percent will be required and 75 percent for the Charter of Fundamental Rights".

The crucial point is that the memorandum mentions no deadlock-breaking mechanism, but only a threshold which a new constitution has to be agreed upon.

Instead De Klerk says: "If the transitional constitution has not been replaced within three years, a general election will be held in terms of the transitional constitution."

In a second general election the ANC, having been rendered impotent and unable to deliver by having to share power with the NP for three years, could fare even worse than in the first.

Thus, the ANC's worst fears of being trapped into legitimising an interim constitution that would remain the final constitution until such time as the NP decides it has had enough of power and agrees to relinquish its minority veto are confirmed.

Nothing is said in De Klerk's special annex on constitutional proposals about the composition of the government, the most controversial of the NP's interim constitutional proposals. Here one has to take a clue from an earlier part of the memorandum.

**N**ote the language in which De Klerk couches his proposals: "Universally acknowledged constitutional mechanisms like bi-cameralism, regional autonomy (federalism), effective proportional participation in government by all significant parties... serve precisely the purpose of curbing majority domination."

What this gobbledygook amounts to is that no single party can form a government. Any party with "substantial" support will automatically be part of the executive.

Behind the high-minded language of political science, De Klerk is attempting to do what the NP did in their previous failed experiments of

grand apartheid and the in-cameral parliament: to defy the arithmetic of democracy and to maintain minority control, all at vast expense to the country.

The effect of the NP's proposals is government as a permanent dictatorship of all the leading political parties. In short, you will not be able to vote it out of power, and there will be no opposition.

Let us be practical for a minute. Would you like to see the combined arrogance of the NP, the ANC and the Inkatha Freedom Party carving up the spoils of office? Who will be outside the government, serving as a watchdog? The Black Sash?

Will an ANC member of the national assembly attack an ANC minister for a rise in the bread price? Or will his criticisms only be heard when an IFP minister raises the bread price? But what if the decision to raise the bread price was taken by the cabinet on the basis of consensus?

The ANC has acknowledged that a form of power-sharing, a government

of national unity, will have to be formed as a temporary first step in the socio-economic reconstruction of the country. The movement has also been open to discussion on the question of minority protections in the constitution and other democratic guarantees.

None of those questions can really be dealt with in a forthright way until the end product — majority rule — is guaranteed.

But there is something even more dangerous in the proposals.

While the day-to-day running of government will be a form of consensual government by cabinet, the constitution of the country, far from being a unifying force, is ultimately rendered the most divisive area in politics. It is the arena where political parties will squabble over power, attempting to overrule or resist the threshold of 70 percent.

This was less to do with political science than with a bad habit of messing with the constitution that the NP developed back in the 1950s, when they loaded the senate to disenfranchise the coloureds, and refined in the 1980s to bring in the perry-mandered tri-cameral parliament.

If one follows the proposals literally, the first election in this country will be fought over what kind of constitution we will have.

In Namibia, many South West Africa People's Organisation

(SWAPO) activists hoped that their party would not get the two-thirds needed in the November 1989 election to write the constitution on their own. They wanted the constitution to be as inclusive and non-controversial as possible, which it is, and which is why the Namibian transition has been relatively so easy.

One of the most disturbing features of the NP proposals is their slippery, eel-like quality. There is more in what they don't tell us than in what they do. But they tell us enough to be deeply bothered.

What is equally disturbing is the absence of voices, particularly from within the liberal press, raised against them. Instead, one has the sense that the ANC, by rejecting De Klerk's proposals, is being an unreasonable fellow traveller.

While liberals have fallen for yet another clever sleight of hand by De Klerk, the motherhood and melkiness concept in our politics is negotiations, not majority rule.

The desired outcome of the constitutional negotiations, in this perspective, is a compromise between the NP and the ANC, not a constitution that enshrines the will of the people.

Which raises the most dangerous facet of De Klerk's proposals. No matter how many eminent professors from Harvard tell us otherwise, there is ultimately only one explanation for the rejection of majority rule, and it is a racist one.

By CARMEL RICKARD

**SCORES** of hostel dwellers in the greater Durban area made their needs clear this week: they want swimming pools, more football fields, clinics and night school facilities. No one said a word about bulldozing or knocking down the hostels.

Representatives of five hostels and members of organisations in their immediate vicinity held an all-day workshop with officials of the Natal Provincial Administration (NPA) and planners involved in a R19-million upgrading project.

Sue Rubenstein, who works for a Johannesburg consultancy which since early 1990 has been conducting interviews with hostel residents on

## Hostel dwellers spell out their needs

the changes they favour, said some wanted to bring their families to the urban areas because this would save money and foster family life. Others wanted to leave their families in the rural areas as they feared the corrupting influence of the cities on their children. A third group wanted a range of other possibilities to be offered, like secure premises for temporary family visits. She pleaded that various options should be made available to suit the individuals concerned.

Rubenstein stressed that it was essential to "depoliticise" the

upgrading process. Her research had found that, since the violence began, hostel dwellers felt pressured by organisations into taking positions on the future of the hostels.

The chief director of the NPA's planning and development department, John Johnson, urged hostel dwellers and township organisations to put aside political differences so that work on upgrading the hostels could begin.

Johnson said more than R19-million had been allocated to Durban's five hostels by the government, while

another R10-million was to be spent on hostels elsewhere in Natal.

In sharp contrast to former years, the NPA is insisting that upgrading will begin only after "all those parties directly involved" have been consulted and have agreed on how the money will be spent.

Despite political divisions among the workshop's participants, group discussions produced a surprising degree of consensus.

A number of hostel dwellers said they were downcast at the lack of progress and that they believed offi-

cials were "dragging their feet" about getting the project started.

Several speakers said that developers involved in the upgrading project should employ people living in the hostels who have no work, instead of hiring "outsiders".

Residents also said hostel rooms should not house more than three people and that more halls should be built for entertainment. Some suggested that if land was a problem, the developers should put up "12 stories" to accommodate more people.

The steering committee of the Natal Hostels Initiative, which organised this week's consultation, will meet later in the month to consider the proposals made during the workshop.

10/7/92

# De Klerk sets up fund to aid victims of violence

STATE President De Klerk has established a Social Relief Fund to assist victims of violence in unrest-stricken communities.

This was announced yesterday by Social Relief Fund board chairman, Dr Piet Koornhof.

The fund makes provision for short-term financial assistance to members of communities affected by the violence since April 1 this year.

Financial assistance will be made available to approved organisations or institutions to channel the funds, and not directly to individuals.

The board will not compensate victims in full for damage or loss, but will render ex gratia assistance in terms of urgent and basic necessities, such as food, clothing and blankets.

Organisations and institutions involved in social relief should apply on behalf of victims of the violence.

The board appealed to the public to make contributions to the fund, to Volkskas Bank (Pretoria branch) account number 000385069, or to the Secretary, Social Relief Fund, Private bag X828, Pretoria, 0001.

Application forms can also be obtained from the fund's secretary.

## Sympathy

The board conveyed its sympathy to the victims of violence and expressed the hope that the assistance would alleviate their situation. — Sapa.

# Pik, Mandela to attend UN meeting on S Africa

FOREIGN Affairs Minister, Mr Pik Botha, and ANC president, Mr Nelson Mandela, will attend the UN Security Council meeting on South Africa next Wednesday.

The government delegation will include the Director-General of Foreign Affairs, Dr Neil van Heerden, the Deputy Director-General for Multi-

lateral Affairs, Mr Jeremy Shearer, the Deputy Director-General for Africa, Mr Derek Auret, and other senior officials.

The Security Council has scheduled an emergency session to discuss a

possible UN role in South Africa. The Organisation of African Unity, which requested the meeting, is expected to send a delegation of nine Foreign Ministers.

Mr Botha said earlier

this week that the UN's goodwill mission to South Africa should be before the envisaged meeting of the Security Council.

## Letter

In a letter to UN Secretary-General, Mr Boutros Boutros-Ghali, Mr Botha said the mission, led by former US Secretary of State, Mr Cyrus Vance, should be enabled to advise Mr Boutros-Ghali and the Council on the factual situation in South Africa before the meeting, for a better-informed discussion.

The ANC broke off talks on a new constitution after the June 17 massacre of 45 people in Boipatong and said negotiations would not resume until "the government stopped the violence" and agreed to an interim administration.

State President De Klerk yesterday urged a resumption of talks, saying "in the final analysis we will have to return to the negotiating table".

Mr Mandela reiterated that constitutional negotiations with the government would not resume until the ANC's demands had been addressed.

Mr Boutros-Ghali proposed on Tuesday sending his personal representative, Mr Vance, on a good-offices mission to South Africa. Mr Mandela has not yet commented on the idea. — Sapa-AFP.

*Citizen*  
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## ANC chief signed away prisoners' freedom from pg 1

Codesa's Working Group 1, however, has been unable to assume responsibility over the matter since both the ANC and the government had been making public statements that agreement was in sight.

Commenting on the submission of re-applications, Phosa said this was not necessary in the sense that the list of political prisoners, which was submitted to the government was clear enough. "It is the government that is simply employing delaying tactics."

Phosa added: "When we entered into the Groote Schuur talks, we knew who were political prisoners and who were not, and our definition - which we reached with the government covers people like Robert McBride."

The demand for the release of all political prisoners dates back to the adoption of the Harare Declaration. Several international bodies adopted the declaration and have been making this demand as one that would need to be met before sanctions against South Africa could be lifted.

However, the ANC went ahead to talk to the government both at a bilateral level as well as at Codesa, arguing that the events of the Inkathagate scandal and the continuous allegations about security forces' involvement in the violence had taught the organisation that the only way to bring an end to that was to enter into intensive negotiations.

This would culminate in the establishment of an interim government which would have the powers to stop violence and corruption.

*Phation 10/7/92*