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FIRST SESSION OF THE FIFTH KWAZULU LEGISLATIVE ASSEMBLY

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BY -THE CHIEF MINISPEER

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Unfortunately so many in the outside world basically see the ANC Mission in exile's judgement that the politics of negotiation will never achieve anything worthwhile in South Africa as justified. They come to negative conclusions primarily because it is a matter of all eyes on Pretoria and all Pretoria watchers see is recalcitrance and an obdurate government that is not responding to internal and external pressure. They do not look at black politics other than the politics which protests against white recalcitrance.

The kind of work that we are doing in this House, Mr. Speaker, Honourable Members, is downgraded and in the climate that exists the UDF and COSATU merrily go about their way upstaging us because the outside world is looking at the wrong things in this country.

I have recently had again to remind the American government that its aid programmes to South Africa need re-examining. I would like to read into the record the Memorandum I presented to the American

Ambassador, H.E. Mr. Edmund Perkins on the 17th January this year in Ulundi.

MEMORANDUM FOR DISCUSSION WITH H.E. MR. E. PERKINS, UNITED STATES  
AMBASSADOR TO SOUTH AFRICA  
BY MANGOSUTHU G. BUTHELEZI, CHIEF MINISTER OF KWAZULU  
- AND PRESIDENT OF INKATHA  
ULUNDI. 17TH JANUARY 1989

I am very pleased to have this opportunity of comparing notes with you and conveying to you some of my deeper concerns about the

South African struggle for liberation and the role of the United

States in the background of that struggle.

The fact that you have come to Ulundi to see me is not gratifying because I expect people of your prominence playing roles as important as yours to be at my beck and call. It is gratifying because it indicates your personal interest in going to find out the facts of the matter for yourself. Your coming here is also a recognition that this place has to be visited because the role that we are playing in the South African struggle cannot be ignored.

I have in recent months, Mr. Ambassador, been feeling that there is something not quite right about the way in which the United States is attempting to assist in the South African struggle. You will undoubtedly have been informed that I have been somewhat critical of the kind of commitment and the kind of action the United States is taking with regard to the South African problem.

I must say at the outset of any further remarks that I really do

congratulate President Reagan and his Shultz/Crocker cutting edge

in Southern African diplomacy. I have always said that you can call "constructive engagement" by any name you will that a rose remains a rose by any name. The United States has been

constructive in the Angola/Namibia/SWAPO/ANC/MPLA and UNITA tangle. What emerged from what I see as a Chester Crocker stint of hard diplomatic labour promises to be good for the whole of Southern Africa. It has a sanity about it which rings true.

I make the point that the diplomacy at that Southern African level

is beginning to mean something because it actually affects people

on the ground. We are talking about the movement of tens of

thousands of troops; we are talking about cessation of the kind of hostilities which laid bare the ground before it. We are talking about negotiations which took nations into account, took leaders into account, took political organisations into account, took economics into account and did so in order to thrash out the politics of what ought to be.

I remark that the accord which is now so very nearly a fact emerged in a situation in which quite clearly nobody was going to win any battles if the accord was a step out of a stalemate situation in which force and counter-force and insurgency and counter-insurgency rocked back and forth achieving nothing other than the destruction

of the prospects of life around everybody.

In South Africa there is no stalemate situation. There is not a recognition on any side that the battle cannot be won. There is - to repeat what I have often said - nobody suing for peace.

Lancaster House-type negotiations are quite out of sight and Angola/Namibia type negotiations are quite out of sight for South Africa. Mr. Ambassador, I believe it is vitally important that we all understand the need to separate the kind of macro political role that the United States played in the Angola situation and the micro role it should be playing in South Africa today.

The ability of the United States to play the macro role which it should one day be playing when the time is ripe for it to play it, will depend on what the United States does now when that macro role

is just not possible. It is a wan hope that history will work in South and Southern Africa in such a way that all the United States has to do is to wait and its time to act decisively will come. That time will never come unless the right thing is done now.

There is much that needs to be done now and in broad terms much of what needs to be done now is to balance the influences which work to make the armed struggle legitimate and a violent victory inevitable. There has been an imbalance of inputs into the South African situation as the USSR and the whole socialist bloc pour millions of dollars into training for warfare and killing. Millions more are poured into creating the kind of circumstances in which those who support violence inside South Africa are provided with the maximum national and international financial and moral support.

Whether we are talking about the USSR money and materials, or we are talking about the USSR's diplomatic assistance; or whether we are talking about the millions that international ecumenical bodies and church groupings pour into efforts by organisations such as the UDF, COSATU and the SACC to promote the ANC, we are talking about reasons why the United States government is rather strangely at fault in refusing to back groupings like Inkatha. No, they say to me, you are a politician leading a political organisation, we cannot help you. The State Department actually throws mud on what I do in South Africa.

To your delicately attuned diplomatic ears that might sound

somewhat jarring. I do not mean to be jarring. I don't know if I should else to put it. I fight a comprehensive battle against apartheid. I fight on every possible front I can fight and I have chosen to fight with a sense of pragmatism which attempts to do that which can in fact be done. There always has been a desperate need to show that what should be done can be done. A long time ago I got sick and tired of excuses why what should be done can't be done and why one should start killing for political purposes.

I oppose apartheid every day of my life and I am astounded that all reality decrees that when I go to the United States I have to go prepared to defend not only my right to do what I am doing, but; to defend the prospects of what I am doing ever succeeding. I actually have to defend myself against attacks from eminent people and from high quarters in the United States. The absurdity of this situation must now actually be looked at.

South Africa is not another Angola, Mocambique or Zimbabwe. The armed struggle, or perhaps more correctly the so-called armed struggle, has endured now since the early 1960's. It has been going on for a quarter of a century of attempting to win by war. Every effort was supported by massive international aid. The best advice that Moscow, Havana, Hanoi and other places could give was given for this mere quarter of a century. The most updated training was provided; arms and ammunition were provided and operational support was provided by neighbouring and other African States. All this

and today the infrastructure of South Africa in all its entirety is

entirely intact and functioning normally.

It was quite clear to me by the 1970's that a hope of a Frelimo-type victory in South Africa could be discounted. I therefore deliberately set myself the task of establishing a non-violent front to oppose apartheid. What I did, I did with deliberation. What I did did not result from Åcrambling somehow amongst others to do what I could to become important. I have always had the guts to say what should be done because it is the correct thing to do, whether 'it was popular or not. I have not watered down what I think ought to be done in order to gain acclaim or curry favour in one or another quarter.

I oppose apartheid here in Ulundi and I am castigated for doing so by scores of high-ranking Americans and I am shunned by officials of the State Department when it comes to any practical aid in opposition to apartheid. As a pragmatist I know that how we go about eradicating apartheid will determine the kind of future we are going to have. Above all else, I know that I will fail in all my major objectives unless I ensure that they are achieved by ordinary people. I rely on ordinary people. I give them a democratic organisation. I take my instructions from Inkatha as a people's organisation in which the people elect leaders of Vtheir choice to pursue objectives of their choice.

Because I am people-orientated I am aware that people have to (live to struggle. I know that it is those who have nothing to hope for

and nothing to live for who can be most dragooned or persuaded

into the armed struggle. Beyond all other knowledge, there is the knowledge that an armed struggle in South Africa will only produce an endless cycle of revolution and counter-revolution. My people-orientated thinking tells me that I must continue developing constituency politics.

I do so here in Ulundi; I do so in Inkatha; I do so in the KwaZulu Legislative Assembly. For years I have been working very hard in developing constituency support across all racial divisions. I not only have to oppose the grand design of apartheid here in Ulundi by blocking a continuing concerted effort by Pretoria to make us walk the Transkei, Bophuthatswana, Venda, Ciskei route, but I have also to daily do battle wherever battle can be done to gain what can be gained by opposing apartheid at every practical level. This means that there are dozens and dozens of issues with which I have to grapple every day.

Amongst other things I do is to ensure that the best that can be done is done to bring the ordinary black man and woman ever further into the central cash economy to give them an ever fairer share of their slice of the fiscus. I struggle here at Ulundi for greater allocations for essential services and I ally what I do at this level with doing what can be done to develop small black businesses and to ensure that the informal sector of KwaZulu not only grows but grows in such a way that individual businessmen and businesswoman can move into the formal economic sector.

For this I established the KwaZulu Finance and Investment



Corporation to be what it is today. It is an instrument ' of liberation. Yet, Mr. Ambassador, your government under President Reagan was dominated by the forces which led the KFC to be listed as a parastatal organisation in South Africa. This surely is a world gone mad. It is surely like the American world gone mad. How can anybody by any stretch of the imagination say that the KFC is supporting apartheid? It is no more than an instrument of development in this part of South Africa.

I could talk at length about numerous small issues. I am today, however, confining myself to the broad sweep of my concerns about the United States' involvement in South Africa. I share with you the bewilderment of one who watches probably one of the most successful Presidents this century has seen in the United States being opposed and hamstrung by what really amounts to the backroom boys and girls of American politics. Is this really American democracy at work when Democrats fight Republicans and are gleeful when in doing so they embarrass the President of the United States as he attempts to discharge American obligations in South and Southern Africa. :

The whole vendetta against President Reagan had nothing to do with the merits of his constructive engagement policy. Opposition to constructive engagement policy was President-bashing for the sake of President-bashing. The President-bashers of the United States did not stop in opposing constructive engagement. They worked

behind the scenes in a myriad of committees which excel in American

back-scratching as Democrats lined up Democrat 'support and attempted to make inroads into Republican solidarity.

I can say all this, Mr. Ambassador, and I can say it freely because you know that I believe that the United States is the world's leading democracy and that my own dream for South and Southern Africa is dictated to me by the history of prudence and common sense which fashioned the Great American Dream. I share so much in common with the best that there is in American thinking about democracy. I am not an American-basher. I speak to you as a friend and I speak as one who has had legitimate hopes of help which has not been forthcoming.

I am aware that you, Sir, and particularly your Consuls-General and your Consular staff, will say that America never involves itself in direct support for any political organisation. You and your staff must maintain that the United States will not interfere in the internal affairs of South Africa which is regarded as a friendly country.

I hear you people saying these things and I listen attentively. I hope you will listen attentively and hear me say that I just do not believe all this talk about why Inkatha cannot be given direct support by the State Department. There are dozens of humanitarian projects in KwaZulu which could be supported and should be supported. Not only do we not get support as a political organisation, but the humanitarian projects which take place under

Inkatha's encouragement and under KwaZulu's guidance, are denied

support.

Mr. Ambassador, I say some things that are important which are at  
 â\200\230times just not heard. It is important for the United States to  
 understand that I am not a by-product of chance circumstances and I  
 have not simply squeezed myself into the South African political  
 scene where this is possible. My approach has been much more  
 positive and indeed creative. Where there was not a mass  
 democratic organisation in South Africa in the 1970's, I set about  
 establishing a membership-based organisation. I deliberately moved  
 in to take charge of the KwaZulu Legislative Assembly to turn the  
 Assembly and its procedures into Å© battleground for the elimination  
 of apartheid. I have worked hard at deliberately establishing  
 Black, White, Indian and Coloured constituency support. I have  
 deliberately gone about establishing a multi;strategy approach of  
 my own in which I can serve the interests of individuals, groups  
 and communities to the extent that they can be served while at the  
 same time we struggle against apartheid. .

My choice to return to KwaZulu and to take up my hereditary  
 chieftainship was a deliberate choice after a lot of Å«consultation.  
 I am not here doing what I am doing because somehow thing; turned  
 out like that. I am not trapped by any circumstances and I serve  
 the options I have chosen to serve. I emphasise these things  
 because I am criticised as a victim of the system and I am regarded  
 by many as having been swallowed by the system. When the time

comes to move definitively I will be able to do so because I have

built up mass backing which would permit me to make the moves that the people want me to make when they want me to make them.

I have in fact paid dearly for putting the people first. I am owned by no ideological masters. I do not bow and scrape to gain the kind of public applause which celebrity leaders and self-appointed leaders so thrive on. I have probably been more consistent in my commitment to ideals and more consistent in employing the means most appropriate to achieve the ideals I have set myself. I do not chop and change and I am no fly-by-night leader. This is not a song of self-esteem. It is simply a preparatory statement made before I ask the question: "What now needs to be done before you, Mr. Ambassador, and I can stand and say this is what we are doing together with the backing of the United States Government?"

\_\_\_\_\_ Dismissed by

It is vitally important that we continue making our voice heard and that we continue with every effort to make Americans and Europeans understand the South African situation better. It is tragic that in conveying the realities of this country we have to fight our way past people like Dr. Allan Boesak who has become one of the arch exponents of the brand of black politics which thrashes about in desperation because they too see no hope. I never cease to be astounded by this man. In January this year he was again at it in the United States addressing a conference of the leaders of seven black churches representing 19 million African Americans.

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Quite unbelievably he backed his calls for stronger sanctions against South Africa by saying that it was sanctions that brought about the Namibian/Angolan settlement. Archbishop Tutu said: "One of the clearest results of the sanctions that have been put in place is what we see now in the peace process in Angola." I could not believe my eyes when I read these words. He said: "The pressure of sanctions forced them [the South African Government] to the negotiating table" and he stressed "If that is true for Angola

and Namibia it must also be true for South Africa."

He said there were three basic reasons for South Africa agreeing to go to negotiation on the Namibian/Angolan issue. Firstly he said there was joint pressure for the first time from the United States, the Soviet Union and the United Nations. Secondly he said costs of maintaining a military presence in Namibia and Angola were escalating, and thirdly he said that there was a slowing of the growth of the South African economy with a consequent reduction in

the government's ability to pay for increased military costs

because of Western sanctions.

Archbishop Tutu went on to say: "If we would have the sanctions we had asked for disinvestment would not even be necessary. It could change the situation quite dramatically in a very short time." He appealed to the West to cut oil supplies and air links with South

Africa and asked that the financial burden on the South African

economy be increased by <calling for the repayment of all  
outstanding debts.

Dr. Boesak feeds the negative views of democratic opposition to apartheid in this country. At the press conference which closed this conference of black Ministers, he said that after the banning of every major anti-apartheid organisation and the recent verdict in the Delmas trial "There is nothing that we can do now in South Africa in any non-violent way that you in the United States of America would regard as a basic normal constitutional right without the possibility of people being charged with treason and jailed." |

Last year a delegation representing the Southern Africa Catholic Bishops Conference and the South African Council of Churches went to Europe to lobby European churches and governments. They called fap=

- First, in the diplomatic sphere, we propose the following;
- European missions in South Africa should be reduced and downgraded;
- Visa requirements should be tightened for South Africans visiting the EEC countries;

â\200\224 The staff of South Africa's Embassies and Consulates should be significantly reduced.

- Second, pressures on trade, finance and lines of communications should be intensified;
- Europe should embargo the import of South African coal;
- Europe's banks should be stopped from renewing South Africa's loans and no new lending finance should be granted;

Direct flights to South Africa should end: South African Airways should be denied landing rights in Europe and European

Airlines should be obliged to fly to neighbouring states in Southern Africa.

They made this Â«call in May 1988 and in July 1988 the European

Economic Community adopted a resolution in which it:

"Recalls its resolution of 10 July 1986 adopted by a very broad majority which called on the Member States to impose economic sanctions and to ban:

imports of coal from South Africa;

new loans to the South African Government ;

new IMF loans to the South African Government;

imports of farm produce from South Africa:

imports of mineral products; and also calls for:

the suspension of air links with South Africa:

the downgrading of the Member States; diplomatic

representation in Pretoria to the lowest level possible;

Wherever I went in the world I found that I could not escape the responsibility of countering the call for disinvestment which some South Africans are making. Wherever I went the disinvestment question was a contentious political issue in the local politics of the country concerned. I found no place where there is total solidarity either for or against disinvestment. One can safely say that as a general rule it is the opposition parties to ruling parties in Europe and North America which drag disinvestment and

apartheid in their local political arenas as they try to score

points off the party in power.

I also found that within â\200\230every party, whether it is the opposition party or whether it is the party in power, there are divided

opinions. The disinvestment debate still rages on. Those campaigning for disinvestment actually campaign more for the viewpoints of donor countries and non-governmental organisations in them than they campaign for Black South Africans even if they

campaign in the name of Black South Africans.

The protest voice in West European and North American countries takes up the national issues of the different countries concerned and mixes them with issues from around the world to create a repertoire of criticism of the government in power. Further a kind of back-scratching exercise is involved. It is embarrassing to ask opposition parties and groupings to take action based on agreement with the Government of the day. Blacks campaigning for disinvestment must paint themselves as kith and kin of opposition

groupings no matter how much they distort South African realities

in order to do so.

When I go abroad and unashamedly speak the truth and tell the world what the world needs to know rather than what it wants to know, I lose friends. But Mr. Speaker, Honourable Members, I am not in political business to be popular either at home or abroad. I am in politics to serve the people and to do what is right. I have lost a great many friends in Europe and America because I have had to

tell them they are woefully wrong and are damaging our cause.

As onerous as the amount of travelling I have to do is, it really

is necessary and I believe, Mr. Speaker, Honourable Members, that



the various trips I have done over the years have accumulated advantages which will become ever more relevant as time passes.

You will remember that towards the end of the Assembly Session in June last year, I had to go to Portugal to present a paper to a conference organised by the Institute of Political Studies and while I was there I had the opportunity to have discussions with the President of Portugal Dr. Mario Soares and the Prime Minister Dr. Cavaco e Silva. I also had discussions with Dr. F. do Amaral Chairman of the Christian Democratic Party, Mr. Dias Loureiro Secretary-General of the Social Democratic Party and Mr. Joao Soares of the Socialist Party. In addition to these political leaders I had rounds of discussions with the Secretary of State for

Foreign Affairs Dr. Durao Barroso, the Parliamentary Commission for Foreign Affairs.

I had therefore the opportunity in meeting with important leaders and opinion-makers to present a balanced picture of South Africa in which black politics was alive, working and campaigning against apartheid in the sure knowledge of success. I concentrated on putting the message across that there was a lot that was being done and could yet be done to oppose apartheid and to bring about a new order of things through non-violent means. Inevitably the question of disinvestment came up again and again and it was against the

background of what I was saying that I could argue rather cogently that disinvestment was against the interests of Blacks in this

country.

I have no doubt whatsoever that my visit helped consolidate the sensible position that the Portuguese had always adopted at EEC level. They understand the message that the destruction of the South African . economy would be criminal and that no political motivation for doing so could be acceptable. The Portuguese know Mocambique and Angola and they now have to deal with the consequences of broken economies in liberated countfies. It is important that I carry the message of Black South Africa to the outside world. Going to Portugal was breaking new ground because I had never been there before.

In July 11 last year Mrs. Margaret Thatcher the Prime Minister of Great Britain asked me to come to London and brief her on the South African situation. Mrs. Thatcher is emerging as one of the world beaters when it comes to political leadership. She has, as a friend put it, "done all her domestic work" and is now turning more and more attention to the international situation. Each year she has to face unrealistic demands at Commonwealth meetings she attends and she takes the trouble to inform herself on what

actually is taking place in South Africa before she does so.

This was the second occasion on which I have had the opportunity of briefing her on South Africa and as always I found her informed and upright in her moral commitment to do what is right . for/ South

Africans rather than what is expedient in international politics. Again I had the opportunity of presenting a picture of South Africa in which black politics was alive and working for the kind of reform that the whole world is hoping for. I presented Mrs. Thatcher with a plan of action and I think it is important for Members to know what I am saying on behalf of Black South Africans and, Mr. Speaker, what I tell the world my colleagues in the KwaZulu Legislative Assembly are thinking and doing. Mr. Speaker, Honorable Members, I would like to read an extract from the document I presented to Mrs. Thatcher.

"In theory - and by historical precedent as well - there comes a point where the national systems and structures become vulnerable to the extent that they are dependent on the interests of this upwardly mobile group. It is then likely that the forces in power will opt for negotiating a future system in which they relinquish control in exchange for being allowed "player" status in the new system. Otherwise the forces in power will arrive at a point where they are rendered ineffective by logistics and are in danger of being altogether undermined.

To translate these theories into a plan of action requires identification of the issues which need to be addressed. These may then be listed as objectives and a feasible plan of action drawn for the objectives.

A suggested list of objectives:

- a) Economic upliftment of Blacks.
- b) Greatly increased educational opportunities for Blacks.
- c) Promotion of the black family model.
- d) Social integration of all South Africa's race groups.
- e) A redistribution of wealth.
- f) The elimination of racial discrimination.
- g) Stimulation of job creation.
- h) Elimination of the exploitation of labour.
- i) Protests against apartheid.
- j) Enhancement of the quality of life for Blacks.
- k) The encouragement of industrial decentralisation to stimulate economic growth in rural communities.

To achieve these objectives, two plans of action could be considered. '

We need a plan of action which addresses all the stated objectives in feasible terms and takes into account the likely foreign policy actions of countries which would wish to support the principles

contained in such a plan. It also considers the likely economic effects on the entire sub-continent. It considers practicalities regarding implementation, the mechanics of control, the likely

attitudes of the South African Government and the plan's probable

acceptability to other major players such as foreign and local business.

The Conditional Trade/Investment Strategy offers substantial benefit to all major participants including the currently disadvantaged peoples of South Africa, overseas investors, foreign governments, the South African business community and, indeed, all the peoples of sub-Saharan Africa.

â\200\230Conditional Trade/Investment prescribed action for all firms operating in South Africa (foreign and local), requiring them to accept certain practices which, if accepted on a large scale, should provide the driving force behind the desired transition of society. Conditional Trade/Investment goes far beyond the Sullivan

Code in content and in implication - though there are conceptual parallels.

Finer details of the plan are open to further debate as to how maximum effect can be achieved. The Strategy, as itemised, should therefore be seen in a broad context with the emphasis on its value as a viable, integrated and solid strategy which, with further imaginative input, could be brought to fruition.

#### Outline of Conditional Trade/Investment Commitments

##### a) Education:

(i) Employers to offer literacy and basic skills programmes to all black employees. This addresses the need of those generations who, through lack of basic formal education, find themselves disadvantaged.

(ii) Employers to run modern world orientation education for employees and their families. This could be by video showings on such topics as: How to use the legal

system/how to plan personal finances/ personal health care/ the importance of education/ the role of the trade unions...etc

- b)
- c)
- d)
- e)

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(iii) Employers to offer subsidised education to a certain number of children (two, for the sake of argument) of

every black employee with more than a stipulated minimum period of service.

(iv) Employers to introduce strategic staff training with a view to promotion of black skills on the factory floor and the integration of Blacks in the upper strata of the corporate hierarchy.

(v) Employers to offer university/college bursaries to a selection of deserving black individuals.

#### Economic upliftment:

(i) Employers to pay all employees equal wages for comparable work.

(ii) Employers to at least meet predetermined minimum wage levels for workers, especially those <classified as industrial labour.

(iii) Employers to consider productivity and initiative-linked incentive pay schemes.

(iv) Employers to conform to stringent criteria that discourage retrenchment.

#### Employee relations:

(i) Employers to encourage racial mixing by initiating social gatherings and sports activities among staff.

(ii) Employers to insist on courtesy codes in all employee interaction.

(iii) Employers to encourage a constructive labour union involvement, to advance labour interests.

#### Working conditions:

(i) Employers to enforce non-segregation of races in any part of the working environment. :

(ii) Employers to comply with predetermined conditions at the workplace - especially on the factory floor.

#### Transport:

Employers to take sympathetic action in respect of the commuting difficulties experienced by many employees.

Housing:

(ii)

(iii)

Social

{

Employers to introduce revolving loan schemes to assist employees with their housing requirements.

Employers to offer a regular clinic facility to black employees and their families.

Employers to encourage black employees to join established medical aid scheme.

Employers to provide disability-type insurance for employees.

Employers to join together in sponsoring social/sports facilities in black townships - especially facilities for the youth.

Redistribution of wealth:

Â\$d)

Firms to do business wherever possible with small black businessmen, including the informal sector.

Employers to negotiate share ownership schemes for black employees.

Many of the practices mentioned above amount to a redistribution of the firm's profits for the upgrading of Blacks.

Job creation/protection:

(i)

Llly

(iii)

See i (i) above.

Major firms to consider the franchising of production processes to black entrepreneurs.

Employers to wuse excess profits to create new ventures instead of buying out competing firms and rationalising activities at the cost of jobs.

(iv) Firms to consider the employment of venture capital in rural industrial development programmes.

k) Political change policy:

(i) Employers to bring pressure to bear on the Government to rescind apartheid legislation.

(ii) Employers to encourage the Government to work toward a democracy based on full participation by all South Africans.

The above suggestions have implications for the earnings of employer firms. They are asked to forfeit a percentage of profits. to meet the financial requirements of implementing these principles. Certain protagonists of Disinvestment might be

motivated by morality and altruism. The plan might appeal to others because it offers a stable environment in which they can continue to operate profitably. However the plan's success would depend on the number of subscribers. It clearly requires additional incentives which make it the natural course for the

business community to subscribe - and perhaps disincentives to resisting subscription.

Suggestions include:

A - Foreign companies in South Africa

1) Subscribers to have the blessing and encouragement of their own governments and be granted a degree of trade advantage.

(11) Subscribers are allowed to receive further investment from their foreign parent companies.

B - Local companies:

(i Foreign governments open their internal markets to the products of subscribers, where they compete on their own merits.

(ii) Foreign governments allow locally-based subscribers to import the latest technology and expertise. Previously embargoed raw materials are also made available to subscribing companies.

Cid i) International business forums are opened to participation by the staff of subscribing companies.

(iv) Advanced educational opportunities are made available by

foreign interests/governments to staff (and their families) of subscribing companies.

(v) Other restrictions against South Africans are lifted in respect of subscribing firms and their staff members.

(vi) Non-subscribing firms are disadvantaged by consumer resistance, staff dissatisfaction and ostracism by subscribing firms.

Attitude of the South African Government:

It is unlikely that the South African Government would intervene against the Strategy because:

a) It does not challenge its authority.

b) Its position against sanctions and disinvestment is close to the Government's own position.

c) It serves to stimulate the free market and benefit the economy as a whole.

d) Reduction of poverty would have a positive effect on problems in the black townships.

e) The stimulation of trade would favour South Africa's balance of payments.

Implementation and control:

A body would have to be established to evaluate applications for subscription to the plan and equate the practices to the particular firm's profitability and resources - the degree to which it can meet its requirements. Experts would have to devise appropriate formulas. Monitoring of individual firms' adherence to the

practices could be undertaken by any one of various organisations such as:

- \* A specially constituted "watchdog" body;

- \* The South African Institute of Chartered Accountants; or

- \* Specially trained shop stewards.

Other possible advantages:

The process could be the beginnings of a future integrated South African society, with the integration of cultural value systems and the ending of racial estrangement.

There would be immense implications for all the states of the sub-



continent of Southern Africa where there are such benefits to be had from co-operation.

The plan offers foreign countries the opportunity to make a positive foreign policy input to South Africa - as opposed to the negative input being urged on them by the sanctions/disinvestment lobby.

There would also be decided economic advantages to the international community in South Africa achieving a democratic liberation without the destruction of the economy.

The plan outlined strays into a number of political, social and economic minefields and is open to various criticisms. It must be emphasised therefore that the objectives and fundamental principles are intended simply to offer a framework for a viable alternate plan of action to disinvestment/sanctions. Debate should be encouraged, as should further development of the plan."

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Mr. Speaker, Honourable Members, you will remember that I reported to the Assembly on the proposed plan of action I presented to Foreign 'Ministers of the Commonwealth and Non-Aligned countries. In dealing with foreign governments I have always to fill a void which is created by the political demands of protest politicians. They want no outside involvement in South Africa because they are basically aiming to make South Africa ungovernable. They want the outside world to boycott South Africa, isolate our country

economically, socially and politically. They always tell the outside world what they can do to South Africa and not what they can do in it.

It is left to me to show the world that there are constructive roles to be played. In presenting the ideas I did present to Mrs.

Thatcher, I bridge the gap in the broad terms I used. If we build

power bases in this country which are going to have a lasting utility to the politics of non-violent change, we will be providing avenues of practical engagement for all nations of goodwill towards South Africa. Fertile South African politics creates fertile opportunities for wide-ranging action in which the outside world can play a constructive role.

It is total blindness to reality not to see that international aid at virtually a Marshall Aid level will be needed to make democracy really work and the economy really productive after a representative government has been established in this country. The great industrialised nations in the Western world should, I think, be engaged in assisting us bring about really meaningful change because we will be asking them to assist in making democracy work in what really is the foreseeable future.

We really do have a lot of work to do on this front. I raised this very question with Mr. C.J. Heunis the Minister of Constitutional Development and Planning when we met in January this year to talk about a joint statement. I taxed him with the lack of any response from the South African Government on the suggestions I had made over the years on what foreign countries ought to do. He did not respond then. On the 20th February, Mr. Heunis wrote to me in response to the questions I raised in January. He did not say very much in the few lines he wrote to me. Interestingly he said: "I cannot associate myself with, and I strongly take exception to,

your fundamental theme that the State President, by name, is the enemy; the more so when this theme is used in an address in a foreign country to a gathering of foreign ministers." He went on to say:

"About your call on Commonwealth countries to get involved in South Africa's internal situation and for the reconstitution of the EPG and a secretarial presence in South Africa, I am afraid that I cannot support you.

My Government is of the opinion that political progress in South Africa can only result from negotiations between South Africans inside South Africa. The responsibility to take part in the process lies squarely on the shoulders of South African leaders themselves. Whatever obstacles there may be, should be addressed amongst ourselves. The joint committee we have established is an effort in this direction.

The EPG was born out of a sanctions debate. I accept their bona fides but whenever foreign countries get involved, there will always be a wariness about whose interests they are pursuing. In international affairs goodwill and altruism play an insignificant role. Diplomatic endeavours are

overwhelmingly motivated by own interests. When foreign diplomats get involved in your and my business,

you can be sure that our interests (South Africa's interests)

will only be upheld as far as they coincide with the interests of the powers represented.

We ought to be able to do without them and thus ensure that only our own interests are being negotiated."

Mr. Speaker, Honourable Members, I so despair sometimes when I realise just how far we have to go before we can actually sit down and talk to white political leaders who are now in Government about things that really matter. Does Mr. Heunis really think that South Africa can paddle its own little canoe in the turbulent seas of the

world. If you are a White living in a suburb with a secure job, a

pension scheme and medical health scheme, you will more naturally find the prospect of foreign aid coming to South Africa unacceptable. You will want to buy what aid you need. If on the other hand, you are a black man living in a shanty town or a remote destitute rural area, and you know that your lot will not change and the lot of your children after you will not change either, you

will think very differently - you will want the aid.

If you are a white Cabinet Minister who has been part of a system which keeps the majority of Blacks at bay and which plans to continue enforcing a Group Areas Act, you will also be more, inclined to eschew the idea of foreign involvement in South Africa's domestic affairs. When, however, you are a leader like me who leads the destitute in the squatter areas and the rural areas, you have a different perspective. You know that only massive aid and massive involvement in the domestic affairs of South Africa will enable a government you will one day be in to succeed as it

attempts to make democracy meaningful to people in their daily lives.

Somehow we must strive to take white leaders and teach them how to feel at home in the medium of tomorrow's politics. I do not want to end up in a situation where I laugh doing what my white colleague in a Cabinet struggle to do. It is the kind of politics that we need to talk about as well as the kind of institutions that

we will have to develop.

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When I saw Mrs. Thatcher in London in July last year, I also had the opportunity of meeting with Mrs. Lynda Chalker, Minister of State in the Foreign and Commonwealth Office. She deals with European and Commonwealth governments who support sanctions against South Africa and I was pleased to have the opportunity in some small way of giving her a better perspective of South Africa. I argued that South Africa was not beyond redemption and while it is true that apartheid itself cannot be reformed, White South Africans can reform away from apartheid. I assured her that there were rising groundswell demands for the normalisation of South Africa as a modern, Western-type industrial democracy. That is the message that revolutionaries and confrontationist protest politicians try

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In August last year I went to the United States at the invitation of Donald M. Simmons of Cleveland, Ohio who wanted me to speak to black Americans and address them. It was one of those situations which showed the accumulative gains I mentioned earlier from the many times I travel abroad. It was my previous trips to Britain which finally led to the British Prime Minister inviting me to brief her on South Africa and my previous trips to the United States that resulted in President Reagan inviting me to see him and brief him. It was my previous trips to the United States which

gave rise to this black American invitation from Mr. Simmons.

I accepted the invitation with a mixture of gladness and some

misgivings because it is in black American politics: that the protest formulae or model arose in the black Civil Rights struggle in that country. Congressmen like Congressman Fauntroy, the Reverend Jesse Jackson and others get all excited about protest politics in South Africa because they believe we should be doing what black Americans did in their struggle. They are proud of what they did and think it would be good if we did the same. It does not make you very popular amongst them to tell them that their struggle suited their circumstances but does not suit our circumstances. It is particularly difficult when others go in front of you to pat Americans on the back on a South African search for money and acclaim. Every time I go to the United States I face the consequences of the campaigning of Dr. Boesak and Archbishop Tutu. My trip to Cleveland in Ohio to address black Americans was therefore important.

Inevitably also I got drawn into the sanctions debate and I had to tell black Americans that sanctions are controversial because people for or against them have taken sides as a consequence of their political convictions and where there is political controversy about other things there is also bound to be controversy about sanctions. I again painted a picture of South Africa which will be transformed by democratic forces now being mustered.

Later in August last year I travelled to Austria to deliver an

address to the Alpbach European Forum where I read a paper "The Black Struggle for Liberation and the Prospects for a Peaceful Solution ; for South Africa." I told delegates that the armed struggle had failed and it was up to those involved in the non-violent struggle for democracy in South Africa who were aiming to

force Whites to the negotiating table on whom South Africa would have to rely.

I also took the opportunity of meeting with Dr. Alois Mock Vice-Chancellor and Foreign Minister of Austria and with Mr. R. Niescher, the Mayor of Innsbruck. The outstanding thing from my point of view was that at this Conference I met with many leaders from different parts of the world whom Black South Africans never

get to meet.

It is precisely because revolutionaries do not want me to meet with people of this calibre that they are in part opposed to us attending international conferences. They do not want me to have the kind of first-hand discussions which then become possible. For example, during my trip to Portugal, I met General Olusegun

Obasanjo who made a number of very interesting remarks to me.

In September last year I again broke new ground when I had the opportunity of visiting Hong Kong where I addressed the Hong Kong General Chamber of Commerce. I also had the opportunity of addressing representatives of the media. Businessmen round the

world are obviously interested in South Africa as a possible area

in which they could invest. At the instigation of the ANC, confrontationist politicians in South Africa have on occasions

painted pictures of South Africa going up in smoke.

I had to correct these false impressions, while at the same time telling the world that there is a struggle taking place in South Africa and the going was really tough. I do not go overseas to curry favour with anybody, nor do I go overseas on propaganda missions. I go overseas to tell the truth about South Africa and to gather whatever support can be gathered for the politics which

will actually produce transformational forces in the country.

In November I again had to go back to Europe to deliver a paper at

a Symposium in Munich, West Germany, organised by the Hans Seidel

Foundation's Institute for Foreign Relations. The theme of my address was "From Confrontation to Dialogue - Efforts for Peace in Southern Africa." While I was in West Germany, I was afforded the

opportunity of again meeting with the Chancellor of the Federal Republic of Germany, Dr. Helmut Kohl. I also met Dr. H.C. Max Streibl Minister President of Bavaria. While I was in Germany I also called on the Konrad Adenauer Foundation. I also met the

Foreign Minister, Mr. Dieter Genscher.

I have always found a great deal of pragmatism in Germany and it has always been for me so strange that we get so little real

support from West German churches. They perhaps more than any



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other churches are enamoured with the SACC and the kind of protest politics in which the Naude/Tutu/Boesak trio perform so well. There seems to be more guilt about South Africa in West German minds and hearts and I - can only ascribe it to the German experience of Nazism and the felt need to institutionalise

atonement in one way or another.

I believe that in the end we will win back the friends that we have lost in the German churches because the German pragmatism which got on with the job of reconstructing Germany after the Second World

War demands that they become involved in things that work.

Mr. Speaker, Honourable Members, in January this year I had the great pleasure of delivering a sermon at the parish church of St. Michael's Cornhill at a City New Year Service. Members will remember that the term 'the City' does not refer to the City of London as a whole. It refers to a very distinctive part of London in which a galaxy of banking and financial stars work in streets of very elegant Elizabethan and even older buildings. The 'city' is indeed a very distinguished place and the New Year's service there

brought people together whose names are uttered with awe.

While I was in London I again had the opportunity of briefly talking to Mrs. Margaret Thatcher. I also saw Sir Geoffrey Howe, the Foreign Minister and Mrs. Lynda Chalker, Minister of State in the Foreign and Commonwealth Office. I again expressed the view at

these meetings that Britain had an honest broker's role to play and

that Mrs. Thatcher was eminently suited to play midwife to developments in the politics of negotiation in South Africa

about South Africa among the international community.

While in London for the few days that I was there, I did some important interviews with the media, such as for example following:

11 January 1989 BBC Radio - 'Focus on Africa'

11 January 1989 BBC Radio 4 - 'World Today'

12 January 1989 BBC Television - AM Breakfast Programme

13 January 1989 LBC - Independent Radio

13 January 1989 BBC Radio - '24 Hours'

15 January 1989 TV Channel 4 - 'The World This Week!'

This was most stimulating as I appeared on the last mentioned programme with a Chinese Political Analyst Mr. Shao Wenguang and

with Mr. Orlic the Editor of 'The Soviet Times'.

I noticed an eagerness on the part of the media, which was new, to talk to me. Previously some friends of ANC in Britain and North America have influenced the media not even to talk to us. I can attribute this new interest to the presence of our Representative in London, Mr. Ben Skosana, and the extent to which what Inkatha does here is becoming known world-wide. It is of course absolutely true that most of what is circulated in the world about us is

negative because of the multi-million dollar propaganda campaign

against us by the External Mission of ANC, the Anti-Apartheid

Movement in the West and the leadership of the UDF/COSATU when they travel abroad.

Then, Mr. Speaker, Honourable Members, in January I also had to go

to Switzerland to attend the annual meeting of the World Economic Forum where I read a paper "Politics and Economics in South Africa: A Black Viewpoint." Again I argued vehemently that it is not the armed struggle that will liberate South Africa in the first place, and in the second place even if the armed struggle ended up doing so, future governments would inherit an awesome legacy of hate.

Again, Mr. Speaker, Honourable Members, the remarkable thing about the Forum was the opportunity afforded me to meet with important people from different parts of the world, and included President Robert Mugabe of Zimbabwe, his two Ministers Dr. Bernard Chidzero, the Minister of Finance and Dr. Nathan Shamuyarira the Minister of Foreign Affairs; the Prime Minister of Portugal B. S. Cavaco; E. Sidiyas the Governor of California in the United States; Senator Bradley from New Jersey in the United States; the Foreign Minister of Germany Mr. Genscher; the Deputy Prime Minister of Indonesia Mr.

Ariston Chambati, and many others too numerous to include in this

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Face-to-face meetings are so important and it is on these trips to different parts of the world that I can spread our message and increase international pressure on Pretoria. The South African Government must know that really important people have begun to hear our voice and it is small wonder that the State President now so resents me politically and his Minister of Constitutional Development and Planning takes strong exception to what I say

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