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"Southern Africa's

Prospects for Peace: Peace on Whose Terms ?"

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'"He feel very strongly in South Africa, in government circles, that peace in Namibia...is the key to peace in southern Africa. But if Namibia is the key then we regard Mozambique as the door". Kobus Meiring. South African Deputy. Foreign Minister, Maputo. 31 May 1989.

The period since the second quarter of 1988 has seen some change in the content of South African policy towards Mozambique. Economic and diplomatic action has come to feature more prominently in the mix of tactics deployed by Pretoria in its policy towards Maputo, while official rhetoric now proclaims the major objective of that policy to be to assume a prominent role in re-constructing peace in a country devastated by Pretoria's own undeclared war of destabilisation. This is not the first time the Pretoria regime has adopted such an approach in its policy towards Mozambique. In the months immediately following the signing of the March 1984 Nkomati accord of "non-aggression and good neighbourliness", Pretoria's diplomats made a major effort to capitalise on their professed desire to inaugurate a new era of peaceful co-operation with Mozambique. On that occasion, however, Pretoria's peaceful pretensions were belied in practice. The regime systematically failed to implement the obligations it had itself accepted at Nkomati, namely, to refrain from any direct or indirect act of "violence, terrorism or aggression". South African Defence Force (SADF) support for the bandits of the so-called Mozambican National Resistance movement (MNR or Renamo) persisted as documents captured at MNR headquarters in 1985 proved beyond any reasonable doubt (1). Indeed, after mid-1985 even the pretension of having peaceful intentions towards Mozambique was jettisoned as apartheid strategists concentrated instead on projecting an image of unassailable strength accompanied, by a return to the pattern of escalating aggression and destabilisation which had become all too familiar in the period before Nkomati.

The question which immediately arises in view of that experience is what if anything is significantly different about the present so-called "Nkomati II" phase? Are circumstances now sufficiently different to make a serious withdrawal from destabilisation a realistic possibility, or is the experience of "Nkomati I" merely destined to be repeated? What, more generally, are the current objectives of Pretoria's policy towards Mozambique and what are the means through which it is now seeking to advance these objectives? What changes in the balance of forces lay behind the shifts in stance evident since the second quarter of 1988? Do these shifts represent strategic or tactical changes? What possibilities have been opened up by the emerging conjuncture for Mozambique to secure a measure of respite from destabilisation on terms which do not compromise its sovereignty and independence? The present chapter will attempt to contribute towards a debate on these crucial questions by analysing some of the major factors underlying the shift towards Pretoria's current stance towards Mozambique. It will argue that the basic factors behind Pretoria's current change of tack were not developments at the level of the subjective perceptions of Pretoria's decision-

makers, but profound changes in the objective circumstances within which decisions are made. Many of the most important -of these changes did not occur at the level of bilateral relations between Pretoria and Maputo, but they have nonetheless significantly affected the formulation and execution of South African policy towards Mozambique. On the basis of this analysis, the chapter will argue that the current shift in stance by the apartheid regime represents an attempt to adapt to profound "new realities" in the domestic, regional and international conjuncture. It will argue that the final shape of the new conjuncture has not yet not been determined but is still being forged in continuing struggle. Moreover, Mozambique and the other Frontline states are not mere passive forces, but are on the contrary actively engaged in struggles seeking to take advantage of the emerging conjuncture to advance important goals. The chapter will conclude by arguing that in this context there is no single inevitable future for the southern African region. Rather several possible futures exist. corresponding to some extent to the contradictory interests of the various protagonists. Which one materialises in practice will thus depend on the strategies and tactics deployed by the contending forces in the struggle for southern Africa in the period which lies ahead.

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Throughout the entire period since its independence in 1975, Mozambique has been a victim of various forms of South African aggression and destabilisation. Undeclared economic sanctions were imposed almost from the moment of independence. These led to sharp cutbacks both in migrant labour recruitment and South African traffic passing through the port of Maputo. Between 1981 and 1983, a number of direct acknowledged military attacks were carried out by units of the SADF. However, while all of this has been costly, the most persistent and damaging form of South African aggression has been that inflicted in the undeclared covert war waged by the SADF through its surrogate forces of the MNR. The MNR was established in 1974 by the Central Intelligence Organisation of the then Smith regime in Rhodesia. It was transferred shortly before Zimbabwean independence in 1980 to the SADF, where it has operated under the auspices of the Directorate of Military Intelligence (DMI) ever since. i

The report of the central committee of the Frelimo party presented to the fifth congress held in July 1989 estimated that a total of at least 700.000 people had died as a direct or indirect result of the bandit war. 2.4 million Mozambicans had been displaced from their homes and lands by the war and a total of 5,5 million reduced to dependence on food aid for survival. The war and sanctions imposed by Salisbury and Pretoria are estimated to have cost the country's economy at least \$ 15 billion, an amount equivalent to more than 3 times its total foreign debt (2).

Pretoria's destabilisation of Mozambique has to be understood in 2

the first instance against the background of the profound impact which the collapse of the Portuguese African empire and the subsequent independence of Mozambique and Angola had on the balance of forces in the southern African region (3). These developments fundamentally undermined the basis on which Pretoria's entire regional strategy had hitherto been constructed. Until the mid-1970s, Pretoria had relied on a ring of colonially ruled 'buffer states' to ensure that the impact of the gathering liberation struggle in southern Africa remained largely confined to regions far distant from its own borders and that regional territories continued to serve South African capitalism as labour reserves, markets and suppliers of specific services such as transport. '

The initial response of the then Vorster government to the new situation created by the defeat of Portuguese colonialism was vacillating and somewhat incoherent. Its half hearted detente initiative launched in an attempt to win allies or at least neutralise potential adversaries within the Organisation of African Unity (OAU) collapsed in 1976. partly as a result of the

debacle of the first major SADE invasion of Angola and partly in the wake of the brutal response to the Soweto uprising. Two years of virtual stagnation followed during which no important regional policy initiatives were taken.

This changed after P.w.Botha took over as prime minister in September 1978. The Botha regime, representing an alliance between the top military commanders and Afrikaner monopoly capital, set about reorganising and reformulating both domestic and regional policy in accordance with its well known 'Total Strategy' doctrine. At the level of regional strategy, the vague notion of establishing a 'constellation of southern African states' (Consas), which had first been put forward by Vorster in 1974, was substantially developed and defined as the ultimate objective of regional strategy. The overall aim of the Consas strategy was to create a South African-led alliance of 'moderate states of Southern Africa' united against a common Marxist onslaught' in circumstances in which they could not rely on the unqualified and unconditional support of the western powers. As apartheid policies were recognised as a barrier to the immediate establishment of formalised alliances with neighbouring states, preparatory action to generate a 'counter ideology to Marxism' in the region was deemed essential

The promotion of Joint economic projects with neighbouring states was to be one of two main prongs in a new regional offensive. The other was the luring of regional states into 'Non Aggression Pacts'. Through such action on the economic and security fronts, ties with neighbouring states were to be deepened and the objective basis created for what Foreign Minister R.F. Botha described as 'a common approach in the security field, the economic field and even the political field' (4).

In addition -to its direct impact on the regional plane, the promotion of Consas was to lead to the de facto international

recognition of South Africa as the 'regional power'. This would result in a general acknowledgment that southern Africa was a sphere of South African influence and this would reduce Pretoria's overall international isolation. Achieving these and other more immediate goals of regional policy - including inducing neighbouring states to withhold support from liberation movements, to maintain and deepen their economic ties with South Africa and modify their criticism of apartheid - was seen as requiring the application of a 'sophisticated' mix of economic, political/diplomatic and military tactics. There were to be both incentives and disincentives, but the well known formula of the time specified that the appropriate mix should be 80% political/economic/diplomatic and only 20% military action. In practice, however, after an initial abortive attempt from 1978 to 1980 to launch its Consas, Pretoria rapidly fell back on aggression as the main instrument of its regional policy.' Consas received a severe blow when Zimbabwe (which had been counted on as a ready adherent to Consas after being brought into an internationally recognised independence under a Mugabe/Smith regime) became independent instead under a Zanu-PF government. The Consas scheme suffered a further setback when all the independent states of the region associated themselves with the Southern African Development Coordination Conference (SADCC) whose central objective was to reduce the level of economic dependence of member states particularly, but not only, on South Africa.

These reverses to Pretoria's efforts to re-mould regional relations precipitated a second phase of South African action in the region lasting roughly from mid-1980 until the end of 1981. This period saw the application of destabilisation tactics in a fairly generalised and indiscriminate manner. Direct military action or the threat of such action was applied against a number of regional states. This was also the period in which surrogate force activity - by Unita in Angola, the "Lesotho Liberation Army" (LLA) in Lesotho and MNR in Mozambique - became a serious menace. At the same time, the first major attempts were made to apply economic 'techniques of coercion'.

This phase of generalised and indiscriminate destabilisation gave way to a third phase lasting from the early part of 1982 until the signing of the Nkomati Accord in March 1984. This can be identified as a phase of intensified and more selective destabilisation. During it some attempt appears to have been made by Pretoria to categorise regional states and direct different tactics towards them. On the one hand, there were the more conservative states, such as Swaziland and Malawi, seen as potential collaborators. These were offered a range of economic and other incentives to encourage them to 'cooperate' with South Africa. On the other hand, there were those states seen 'either as the most vulnerable or as Pretoria's principal adversaries in the region. States in this category included Lesotho, Angola and Mozambique.

As far as Mozambique was concerned, the country provided political support to the ANC and allowed ANC members to reside in the country (although bases as such were never established). It was an influential member of the Front Line States alliance, and one of the prime movers of SADCC. Its ports and railways offered the only realistic alternative to continued dependence on South African transport facilities for many of the SADCC states. It maintained friendly relations with the socialist countries, and was itself ruled by a party committed to bringing about a process of socialist transformation. It thus represented a barrier to a number of Pretoria's regional policy objectives, as well as posing a direct ideological challenge and potential alternative to apartheid capitalism. ' -

With the turn to destabilisation tactics, Mozambique was rapidly singled out as a prime target. It was subjected to a number of direct attacks by SADF units - the first being the raid against ANC residences in Matola in January 1981. Members of the SADF were also implicated in clandestine acts of sabotage against strategic transport installations. At the same time a number of 'economic disincentives' were applied against the country. For

example, a partial economic boycott was imposed against the port of Maputo and South African traffic in 1983 fell to half that of 1982 and only 16 per cent of the level of 1973 (5). The principal vehicle of South African destabilisation was, however, its sponsorship of the MNR. MNR action increased after the movement was taken over by the SADF in 1980 and escalated particularly rapidly during 1982 and 1983. Official sources estimate that by the end of 1983, 140 villages, 840 schools, 900 rural shops and over 200 public health installations had been destroyed. The total cost of this destruction was put at US \$ 3,8 billion (6). The factors leading to the signing of the Nkomati accord in March 1984 have been analysed elsewhere and need not be examined in any detail here (7). Mozambique was clearly seeking some respite from the damaging assault, while Pretoria found itself under growing pressure from the major western powers who feared that further escalations of "cross border violence" could lead to increasing Soviet involvement in the region. As indicated earlier, for a relatively short time after the signing in March 1984 of the Nkomati accord, Pretoria did attempt to project an image of having peaceful intentions towards Mozambique. A Joint Security Commission, established in terms of the accord, met regularly until its suspension in October 1985. There were also negotiations about aspects of bilateral economic relations, which led to agreements on Cahora Bassa tariffs, fishing and certain forms of cooperation in the spheres of transport and migrant labour recruitment but no agreements to return to the pre-independence status quo in these areas nor any major new investments by South African capital (8). The Accord did not, however, lead to a cessation of SADF involvement with the MNR armed bandits. The Gorongosa documents, captured during a combined Zimbabwean-Mozambican operation, against MNR headquarters provided irrefutable proof that the SADE had

continued to provide the MNR with arms and equipment as well as leadership, training and advice after Nkomati. Even South African foreign minister, R.F. Botha, admitted that the documents provided evidence of what he called "technical violations" of the accord (9).

Various hypotheses emerged to explain this non-compliance with the obligations accepted by Pretoria at Nkomati. Some analysts focussed on divisions between different forces within the apartheid state. According to this view, the SADF never accepted the necessity for any strategic shift after Nkomati while the civilian politicians and diplomats did. The accord, accordingly, became a matter of disagreement and struggle between different forces within the state and wider ruling class. On the one side stood the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (supported by 'economic interests') favouring an approach relying on diplomacy and economic leverage. On the other side, was the SADF wedded to 'quick fix' military solutions. There is some evidence which does, indeed, tend to support the view that there was not unanimity about the accord within the Pretoria regime. The 'Gorongosa documents' appear to confirm that Foreign Minister R.F. Botha was mistrusted by military personnel. He was not briefed about the visit to Gorongosa of his own Deputy Minister, Louis Nel, military personnel were quoted in the documents describing him as a 'traitor', a 'Soviet nark' and a stooge of Chester Crocker. and conversations he held with the MNR delegation Just before the October 1984 'Pretoria declaration' talks were bugged by the SADF (10).

However, while acknowledging all this, it is necessary to avoid the kind of oversimplification which tends to reduce the explanation for continued destabilisation to the domination of military 'hawks' over Foreign affairs 'doves'. In the first place, such explanations exaggerate the differences, which have always existed and continue to exist within clear limits. Secondly, such approaches place insufficient weight on the necessity to locate any analysis of struggle between advocates of different options within the apartheid state in the context of a prior analysis of the objective limits and possibilities on particular options imposed by developments in the struggles between the apartheid regime and its regional and domestic adversaries.

The non-implementation by Pretoria of the obligations it accepted at Nkomati thus needs to be examined. in the first instance, in the context of the progress made in attempts to capitalise on the accord to advance specific objectives. With the benefit of hindsight, it is now clear that while Mozambique signed the Nkomati Accord in the hope of reducing the level of conflict in the region and establishing a pattern of regional relations based on the norms of international law, Pretoria's strategists saw it in a wholly different light. For them it was a tactical device to advance specific goals defined in the stalled Consas initiative. More precisely, it appears that Pretoria's strategists hoped that through Nkomati they could:

- t achieve a reduction in the level of armed struggle and mass action inside South Africa (by depriving the ANC of its alleged bases in Mozambique);
- t broker a 'power sharing' settlement which would place the MNR in a subordinate but influential role in government in Mozambique and allow Pretoria to gain credibility as the 'peacemaker' in the region;
- t pressure other regional states into signing security pacts as a first step towards a generalised acceptance of Pretoria's hegemony in the region;
- t significantly reduce the level of international isolation based on de facto acknowledgment of South Africa's position as the 'regional power' and the gateway for foreign investment throughout the region.

Although Pretoria did appear to be making some headway in advancing these goals during the first few months after Nkomati, any such gains were rapidly undermined by developments in the struggle inside South Africa, particularly in the period after the Vaal Triangle uprising of September/October 1984. Mass

action, which had been expected to dampen down after Nkomati, in fact began to escalate in the last quarter of 1984, while the influence and prestige of the ANC grew visibly. Instead of becoming less isolated internationally. the consequent deepening of the crisis of the apartheid system led the regime to become more isolated. At the same time, increasing evidence of continuing South African support for armed banditry in Mozambique undermined the credibility of Pretoria's claims to have peaceful intentions to its neighbours, while other states resisted pressures and overtures for them to enter into similar non-aggression agreements.

It has been suggested elsewhere (11) that Pretoria's failure to capitalise on the Nkomati Accord in these ways, at the same time as advancing mass struggle inside South Africa was deepening the crisis of apartheid, were major factors behind the steady drift back towards the escalating and less concealed (if not openly acknowledged) destabilisation, which became particularly evident in the period after the SADF raid against Oll installations in the Cabinda province of Angola in May 1985. Under these circumstances, Pretoria's strategists increasingly saw themselves as having little to gain by attempting to put forward an (in fact tarnished) image of having peaceful intentions in the region. It suited them instead to project an image of ruthless, unassailable strength.

As far as Mozambique was concerned the period between mid-1985 and early 1988. began with a major escalation of bandit assaults from bases in Malawi, which had been reinforced by the SADF's covert support network after Nkomati (12). The apparent aim of this stepped up bandit assault in the centre-north was to cut the

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country in two along the Zambezi river. When the government of President Samora Machel responded by turning to its allies in the Frontline states for military support and formulating a counter-strategy which included exerting pressure on Malawi, relations with Pretoria .became extremely tense. On October 8 1986, less than three weeks after President Machel threatened to take action against Malawi (including stationing missiles along the frontier), a ban on recruitment of Mozambican migrant workers was announced by Pretoria (13). Less than a week later, on 'October 13, a Mozambican government communique said that security forces had been placed on full alert after receiving information from sources in South Africa that plans were afoot to launch raids against Maputo city (14). Six days later, President Machel and a number of top officials died in a plane crash on South African territory. Few in Mozambique believed that in such a climate this could have been a mere accident. The report of the central committee to the Frelimo party's fifth congress in July 1989, reaffirmed the party's rejection of the conclusions of the South African inquiry that the cause of the crash was "pilot error". The central committee report referred to a point established in the official tri-partite inquiry that the plane had veered off course in response to a signal from a directional beacon located neither in Mozambique nor in Swaziland (15). It is strongly suspected that this was a "false beam" put in place with the deliberate intention of luring the aircraft off course.

The death of President Machel, although causing some delay, did not in the end prevent the government offensive in the centre-north from going ahead. Late 1986 and early 1987 saw the re-taking of a number of bandit positions in Zambezia province, while Malawi was cadoled into reducing, if not altogether abandoning, its support for the MNR. In apparent response to these reverses, a new wave of bandit actions began to be launched from about April 1987 in the southern provinces of the country. A feature of these assaults was that they involved large groups. of several hundred, well armed bandits infiltrating directly across the South African border. There were numerous indications of SADE involvement in this assault, including testimonies of captured and surrendering bandits and sightings of aircraft, ships and submarines. The remains of a parachute used to drop supplies to bandits was also discovered in the vicinity of Homoine Just after a major massacre in July 1987. The initial objective of this assault on the south appeared to be to occupy a corridor along Gaza and Inhambane provinces from the South African border to the sea and thereby achieve the objective thwarted by the government offensive in the centre-north of cutting the country in two. When this failed bandit squads turned to attacks on civilian road and rail traffic to and from Maputo city and on inhabitants of small towns. The aim here appeared to be twofold: first, to cut off Maputo city from the rest of the country and, second, to prOvoke an increased flow of displaced people into the city in order to overstretch its resources. At least 1.000 civilians were murdered between June 1987 and January 1988 in this assault which included, inter alia. such notorious massacres as those at Homoine (where 424 were killed on July 18 1987), Manjacaze (where 92 died on August 10) and Taninga/Maluane (where 349 bus passengers were killed in two separate incidents in October and November 1987) (16).

The period immediately pre-ceding the current "Nkomati II" phase can thus be identified as the second major wave of South African destabilisation against Mozambique: the first being that which took place between late 1981 and the eve of Nkomati. What is more, as late as February 1988, senior South African officials appeared to be signaling their intention to escalate this assault even further. Referring particularly to Mozambique and Zimbabwe, Foreign Minister R.F.Botha told reporters gathered at the site of a rocket attack near Messina, "We will no longer urge .or encourage them to attend regional peace conferences. They can 'go their own why...the South African government has had enough. We reserve the right to act as we see fit" (17).

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Developments at the level of the subjective intentions of Pretoria's decision-makers thus had very little to do with the change in course towards Mozambique and the southern African region generally. As late as February 1988, even reputed "doves" within the regime were signalling their intention to continue escalating aggression and destabilisation at least as far as Mozambique and Zimbabwe were concerned. In March of the same year, the SADF launched its last major offensive in the Angolan campaign which began in July 1987 with an attack on the town of Cuemba in Bie province (18). What fundamentally lay behind the partial back down from escalating regional aggression in the phase which began in the second quarter of 1988, were not in any fundamental sense changes at the subjective level, but at the level of the objective circumstances within which decisions were made. By the second quarter of 1988, Pretoria's decision-makers found themselves confronting important "new realities" in the regional, international and domestic terrains of struggle which compelled even the most ardent protagonists of destabilisation to contemplate some adjustments whether they liked it or not. The most decisive of the emerging "new realities" on the regional terrain were, clearly, those created by the outcome of military conflicts in southern Angola. The details need not concern us here. It is sufficient merely to note that the train of events which culminated in several failed attempts to dislodge Cuban and Angolan troops from positions around Cuito Cuanavale began when the SADF launched a major new incursion into southern Angola in July 1987. Although the initial objective of this operation codenamed "Modular" was to prevent Angolan government forces from recapturing the town of Mavinga from Unita, it rapidly became transformed into an attempt to enlarge the SADF "control zone" in southern Angola. It has been suggested that Pretoria's strategists hoped to establish SADF control in the whole of the area bordered by the Benguela railway line in the north and the Cubango river in the west - nearly a quarter of the country. Had

this been achieved it would have laid the basis for proclaiming Unita as the "alternative government" of Angola - a move which was confidently expected to lead to increased United States involvement and support (19). In the event, however, the SADF encountered staunch resistance by Angolan and Cuban forces stationed around the town of Cuito Cuanavale. In an attempt to overcome this resistance, "Operation Modular" was followed in mid-December by "Operation Hooper". At least 3.000 official SADF troops were deployed in these operations alongside larger numbers of South West African Territory Force (SWATE) and Unita surrogate forces. The SADF also brought in the most modern and sophisticated equipment lavavailable to lit - modified Mirage aircraft, G - 5 artillery weapons and, for the first -time in Angola. Olifant tanks. Despite this the SADF could not defeat the Angolan and Cuban forces, who both held Cuito Cuanavale and moved south towards the Namibian border. A Cuban publication has aptly described Cuito Cuanavale as "South Africa's Waterloo" (20). Not only did the battles around this town prevent the SADE from achieving its specific objectives in southern Angola. they also forced the Pretoria regime to confront the reality of a major shift in the military balance of forces in south western Africa. Cuito Cuanavale had smashed the myth of SADF invincibility. It also exposed important windows of vulnerability in the apartheid war machine. The South African Air Force found itself unable to penetrate Angolan and Cuban radar/missile defences in Cuito Cuanavale. Its equipment was technologically inadequate (partly due to the cumulative effects of the arms embargo) and, faced with modern Soviet.equipment brought into the frontline by the Cubans. the SADF rapidly lost the air superiority it had previously counted on. The Angolan/Cuban air strike on the Calueque dam in June 1988 also showed up important deficiencies in SADF air defences. In addition to the vulnerabilities in terms of. equipment, Cuito Cuanavale revealed a major vulnerability in relation to personnel. A plan but forward to take the town by infantry invasion was rejected because it was estimated thatl it would have cost 300 white conscript lives. A loss of this magnitude in these circumstances was deemed unacceptable, thus highlighting a previously untested political constraint on the SADF (21). Most directly the shifts in the military balance brought about by Cuito Cuanavale led to the initiation in May 1988 of the first of several rounds of negotiations on Angola/Namibia. Pretoria would clearly have preferred to confine the agenda of these to the modalities of a troop withdrawal from Angola and a non-aggression pact with Angola. Angola and Cuba, however. refused. Turning the linkage doctrine developed by Chester Crocker and eagerly endorsed by the Pretoria regime on its head. they insisted that any discussion of an SADF withdrawal be linked to an agreement on Namibian independence. The outcome is well known. In December 1988, an agreement was signed providing for United Nations Security Council Resolution 435 on independence for Namibia to begin to be implemented in April 1989.

While the battles at Cuito Cuanavale undoubtedly produced the  
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most decisive of the emerging "new realities" at the regional level, developments on other fronts of regional destabilisation also had a significant impact. In the case of the bandit assault on Mozambique, Pretoria's known involvement with the MNR began to threaten to increase its international isolation. The extreme brutality of MNR actions. highlighted by the well publicised massacres at Homoine, Mandacaze and Tanninga/Maluane, greatly undercut whatever international support the bandit assault might otherwise have mobilised. Despite the fact that the basic technique of covert war was undoubtedly partly modeled on the "Reagan doctrine", the brutality of the MNR assault, in the context of active diplomacy by the Mozambican government, Aled even the US administration to distance itself from it. Ate an emergency aid donors' conference held in Maputo in April 1988," a Deputy Assistant Secretary of State, Roy Stacy, accused the MNR of "one of the most brutal holocausts against ordinary human beings since World War Two" (22). A report commissioned by the US

State Department estimated that MNR had been responsible for the deaths of at least 100.000 civilians. This report, written by Robert Gersony, was based on interviews with 200 informants in Mozambique and neighbouring countries. Gersony's informants reported that they themselves had witnessed 600 murders - by shooting, knife/axe/bayonet killings, burning alive, beating to death, asphyxiation, starvation and drowning. 91% of those interviewed had "very negative" and a further 5% "somewhat negative" perceptions of the MNR, compared to 7% "very negative" and 10% "somewhat negative" perceptions of Frelimo government troops (23). While most official US and other western public statements refrained from direct accusations against Pretoria, denunciations of armed banditry in Mozambique were accompanied by a less public diplomatic process in which, among other things, South African officials were informed that continued involvement in such atrocities would result in increasing international isolation and could even fuel pressure for sanctions (24). Also of some significance in this regard was the failure a number of hit and run raids against anti-apartheid activists in neighbouring countries. A network of suspected South African agents was uncovered after a bomb blast outside an alleged ANC residence in Bulawayo in January 1988. 17 people were detained after this incident and three (Kevin Woods, Michael Smith and Phillip Coanayo) were later sentenced to death for murder. Two members of the SADF were convicted of assault and sentenced to ten years imprisonment and eight strokes of the cane after being captured during a bungled raid in Botswana in June 1988, and another alleged agent (Charles Dennis Beahan) was handed over by Botswana to Zimbabwe when he attempted to flee at about the same time. The latter incidents were described in one newspaper article written at the time as "two minor SADF disasters which compounded the major one at Cuito Cuanavale" (25). Among other things, the bungled raid in Botswana (in which a policeman was injured) reinforced calls in the United States for South Africa to be declared a "terrorist state" (26)..

At the same time as the emergence of these "new realities" on the

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regional terrain, it also became apparent that important changes at the wider international level would have a significant impact on "regional conflicts" including those in southern Africa. The events in Angola, in particular, highlighted the importance of the changes in "superpower" relations which had occurred since the adoption of the policies of glasnost, perestroika and "new thinking" by the Soviet Union. This is not the place to enter into any extensive discussion of these questions. It is sufficient for present purposes merely to note that Soviet Union's increasing commitment to seeking "political solutions" to "regional conflicts" and its growing involvement in a dialogue with the United States on such issues clearly significantly influenced the attitude of both "super powers" towards events at Cuito Cuanavale. On the one hand, Pretoria found the United States less receptive than it might have been in the past to appeals for support based on the fact that its forces were confronting an ally of the Soviet Union and adversary of the US, Cuba. On the other hand, the Soviet Union became increasingly accessible both in specific negotiations over south western Africa and in a broader dialogue over the future of the region. Another set of "new realities" impinging with increasing severity were those deriving from the impact of international isolation on the South African economy. By the late 1980s, it was becoming increasingly apparent that the apartheid economy, trapped in a quagmire of chronic low growth and stagnation since the mid-1970s, was also threatened with a debt repayment crisis of major proportions. Total foreign debt in mid-1989 stood at \$ 21 billion. Under normal circumstances this would not be an excessive burden for an economy the size of South Africa's. But the circumstances confronting the apartheid economy were far from normal. A combination of a generalised lack of confidence on the part of foreign investors and creditors and financial sanctions had led to South Africa's effective exclusion from the "normal" facilities of international financial markets. Since the time of the "debt standstill" crisis in 1985 in particular, Pretoria had faced severe restrictions in gaining access to new loans or extending credits which would previously have been routinely "rolled over". The net impact of this was that Pretoria found itself obliged to repay a significant portion of outstanding debt it had previously counted on renewing. At the same time, the economy had to sustain a number of costly disinvestments. Official estimates put the total capital outflow between 1985 and 1988 at \$ 11 billion (or about R 25 billion) (27). Although all debts falling had been repaid, the repayment schedule threatened to become increasingly taxing. Of the \$ 21 billion total debt, \$ 9 billion had been rescheduled in a "debt standstill" agreement negotiated with creditors in 1986. This agreement provided for about \$ 1,4 billion to be repaid in various tranches between July 1987 and June 1990. However, in addition to this amount, between \$ 3 and \$ 4 billion of the \$ 12 billion outside the "standstill net" would be due for repayment in 1990 and 1991, unless creditors could be persuaded to agree to a rescheduling (28). By 1988, the potential seriousness of this situation had come to be widely recognised. The impossibility of sustaining even modest

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growth under such circumstances became starkly apparent in the third quarter of the year, when the monetary authorities found themselves compelled to intervene to abort the 3,2% "mini boom" in order to guarantee a sufficiently large surplus on the current account of the balance of payments to enable the build up of sufficient reserves to meet the potentially punishing repayment schedules in the years ahead (29).

In addition to all of this, the regime had, finally, to confront the reality of its continuing failure to produce a viable political solution to the crisis of apartheid. The "total strategy" adopted by the Botha regime when it took power in 1978, was implicitly recognised even by state strategists to have collapsed during the period of escalating mass action between September 1984 and June 1986. The most direct and immediate response of the regime to the deepening crisis of this period was

of course to intensify repression under the cover of the nation-wide state of emergency imposed in June 1986. However, the deepening crisis also gave rise to a significant reformulation of the political component of state strategy within the institutions of the National Security Management System. The "total strategy" doctrine associated with the French general, Andre Beufre, fell out of favour, as strategists turned instead to the prescriptions about "Winning Hearts and Minds (WHAM) in a "counter revolutionary war" enunciated by such writers as the US colonel, J.J. McCuen. The essential distinction between "total strategy" and NHAM was that whereas the former had sought to "restructure access points to political society", WHAM emphasised "recasting the foundations of civil society" (30). Both aimed to produce black allies for the beleaguered racist minority regime, but while "total strategy" had concentrated on trying to draw certain categories of "useful blacks" into subordinate "power sharing" structures of government, WHAM emphasised attempting to buy support through targeted material concessions. Operating within the framework of McCuen's prescriptions about seizing the initiative and turning on its head the logic of evolution of the revolutionary struggle, "upgrading" programmes were embarked upon in selected "oilspot" townships. The setback inflicted on militaristic prescriptions in Angola did not automatically rebound on the essentially militaristic NHAM policies. However, the period since Cuito Cuanavale and more particularly since the October 1988 municipal elections (which saw a miniscule turnout by black voters) has seen a growing implicit recognition that while repression might have prevented a defeat, WHAM was certainly not going to produce a victory (31). One commentator writing in 1989, observed that despite their rhetoric, security officials "no longer really believe they could 'buy off' large sections of the black population" (32). WHAM, in short, had become a technique of containment, control and neutralisation, rather than the basis of a resolution of the continuing crisis of apartheid.

By mid-1988 it had become clear that the above described "new realities" had congealed to produce a new objective regional terrain of struggle, which could no longer be ignored. The

military option in Angola had become extremely costly in military, political and economic terms. Pretoria's known involvement with MNR banditry in Mozambique was threatening to become costly diplomatically and ideologically. Raids against neighbouring states were going wrong. Agents and even official SADF members were being captured and all of this was threatening to increase South Africa's international isolation at precisely a moment when economic pressures dictated the necessity for a major effort to reduce this isolation. Finally, the regime needed space, time and a degree of legitimacy to tackle the question of how to proceed with domestic restructuring given the growing recognition that WHAM would not produce a viable solution to the continuing crisis of apartheid. While there was obviously not unanimity about all aspects, the impact of these events was such that by the second quarter of 1988, even the most hardline militarists within the regime were compelled to contemplate the need for some adaptation to them.

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Although most of the above described 'new realities' can be recognised as setbacks or at least barriers to Pretoria's militarism, it is necessary to recognise that they did not constitute decisive defeats. Even in Angola, as the chief Cuban negotiator, Jorge Risquet, repeatedly pointed out, both sides could have continued fighting, albeit at an increasingly high cost in human and material terms (33). On the other fronts too, the impediments to continuing to escalate regional destabilisation were far from overwhelming. It was not therefore a question of Pretoria simply surrendering, but of adapting its policies to take account of changes brought about by the 'new realities'. It has, moreover, become increasingly apparent that this adaptation has not been simply defensive. The changes in circumstances on the regional and international terrains are not all negative from Pretoria's point of view. They do in fact open up a number of possibilities for Pretoria to advance important regional policy goals through diplomatic and economic action. There is considerable sympathy among western powers with many of Pretoria's long standing economic and diplomatic regional ambitions. A number of the Frontline states are adopting a pragmatic approach in the hope that by making available some economic and diplomatic openings destabilisation can be kept at bay. Thus, while the new conjuncture implies some losses for Pretoria - notably, a withdrawal of the SADF from Angola; probable independence for Namibia; and a scaling down, if not cessation, of certain forms of destabilisation against Mozambique and other Frontline states - it has also opened up the prospect to Pretoria of making certain gains through economic and diplomatic counter-offensive action.

Some of the most readily discernible goals which Pretoria appears to be set on advancing in its current regional counter-offensive can be listed as follows:

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1. It would like to secure greater access to regional markets for South African commodities. ensure participation by South African capital in selected projects in the region. and open up more "facilities" for sanctions busting.

- 2.. It would like to see a multi-lateral summit involving itself and a number of the Frontline states endorsing a comprehensive regional security agreement based on the following principles:  
"t That countries do not interfere in the domestic affairs of others;

- t That alien forces are not utilised in southern Africa for military purposes; . \_

- t e That countries do not accommodate international terror organisations which act against other countries" (34). '

3. It would like to gain acceptance for the notion that South VAfrica has a "constructive role" in the region and use this as a weapon in its campaign to reduce its international isolation.

There are a number of aspects to this. Considerable importance is clearly attached to achieving a greater level of diplomatic acceptance. This was evident in the blatant attempts to manipulate involvement in negotiation over regional issues to

gain access to African and international diplomatic circles. However, an increasingly important additional dimension has been the economic. A major effort is underway to promote the idea that South Africa is willing and able to play a major role in "re-stabilising" the southern African region. In May 1989, foreign minister, R.F. Botha called for a "Marshall Plan for Southern Africa" in which South Africa would provide the management expertise and technology, while the west provided finance (35). A major objective behind all of this is clearly to use professed desires to become involved in the region as a means of re-establishing access to international financial institutions. Pretoria's "development plans" for the region have thus been widely canvassed among neighbouring states. western governments and international financiers in an explicit attempt to persuade these forces to use their influence to reduce the restrictions imposed on South Africa in this regard (36).

4. The Pretoria regime would like to gain international and regional endorsement for a modified version of its "reform" programme. This is a dimension which has emerged most clearly in the period since February 1989, when F.N.de Klerk took over as National party leader, although its basic context is the growing perception that both "total strategy" and WHAM have failed. While all the implications of the new "approach are not yet fully clear, its thrust appears to be to try to substitute the domestic legitimacy, which it is increasingly recognised will not be won directly. with- a degree of regional and international endorsement. One of the aims of the many diplomatic forays undertaken by de Klerk has thus been to try to "sell" a programme broadly on the lines of the National party's five year "action plan" to regional states and important forces in the broader international community in the apparent hope that these would then use their influence to cajole the ANC and the mass

democratic movement inside South Africa into accepting a deal based on racial "group" representation and minority vetoes (37). In addition to these objectives a number of more defensive goals can also be identified. They include:

t Ensuring through control or manipulation of the transition process that an independent Namibia does not pose any serious challenge to South Africa's regional interests.

t Using whatever opportunities may arise to trade off concessions 'to regional states against demands for more restrictions against the ANC presence' in their countries.

An examination of these goals of current South African regional policy shows that they do not envisage only economic and diplomatic gains; there are also clear security objectives. Immediately these seek to accompany the abandonment of the "forward defence" posture, implied by a withdrawal from Angola and Namibia, with a reinforcement and tightening of security demands vis a vis other regional states. In a more general sense, the above list can be seen as wholly compatible with the approach defined in the Botha regime's original strategy to build a "Constellation of Southern African States" through promoting security and economic cooperation as a step towards political acceptance and even cooperation. What has changed if anything is that the ultimate hegemonic objectives of this policy are no longer openly proclaimed. In this respect policy makers appear to have heeded the remarks of an influential academic, who in September 1987 advised that:

"South Africa's grand design for a Constellation of Southern African States (Consas) and a regional anti-communist defence alliance has proved Utopian. Its main effect has been to convince neighbouring states that the Republic was scheming to turn them into economic and political satellites. In response they formed in 1980 the Southern African Development Coordination Conference (SADCC) with the express purpose of lessening economic dependence on South Africa. The SADCC also provided a welcome operating basis for Western powers anxious to be seen as contributing towards the 'ending of apartheid' as well as aiding African development, while at the same time promoting their own commercial interests...South African policy-makers have put the cart before the horse by propagating the Consas objective instead of quietly but systematically working towards the goal of closer regional association. Until such time as South Africa's internal political development has gained wider international acceptance, its foremost objective in Africa should be to promote to the greatest possible extent economic and technical interaction with nearby countries" (38).

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4. Ezetozia's strategy towards Mozambique

As far as specific policy towards Mozambique is concerned, the first concrete signs of some shift emerged towards the end April 1988. On the 27th of that month, the Mozambican minister of cooperation, Jacinto Veloso, travelled to Cape Town to discuss, with South African state officials, including State President P.H.Botha, the possibility of "reviving" the stalled Nkomati accord. This was not the first time Veloso had travelled to South Africa on a similar mission. In August 1987, shortly before the Homoine massacre, Veloso held a meeting in Cape Town with a South African delegation, which included foreign minister, R.F.Botha, law and order minister, (Adriaan Vlok, and senior military commanders. That meeting had led to an agreement to establish a "Joint working group" to "analyse and provide solutions to problems which had resulted in the non-fulfillment of the Nkomati accord" (39). A month later the "Joint liaison committee" (JLC), as it was then called, was convened to discuss security matters. In November 1987, officials from the South African and Mozambican electricity corporations held their first meeting to discuss the possibility of cooperating in the repair of sabotaged Cahora Bassa powerlines (40). Despite these developments, however, Pretoria's attitude in the period prior to April 1988 remained decidedly lukewarm. In particular, South African military



personnel failed to attend meetings of the Joint liaison committee, which was in fact only convened once more after the first meeting - five months later in January 1988 (41). After the April 1988 meeting, however; a distinct change in stance became evident, resulting to date in, inter alia, the following developments: h

t SADF personnel began to attend JLC meetings and in July 1988 the Joint Security Commission (JSC), suspended since the discovery of the Gorongosa documents, was reconvened. The JSC has subsequently met at regular intervals with delegations led at army commander level.

t In September 1988. President Chissano and P.W.Botha held a summit meeting at the Cahora Bassa dam site in Songo.

'8 In the same month, a tri-partite agreement was signed under which South Africa, Mozambique and Portugal agreed to act 'together to repair sabotaged powerlines. This was followed in November and December by the handing over by South Africa of two consignments of non-lethal military equipment for use \_by a special squad of Mozambican troops formed to protect the line (42).

8 In December 1988 a Joint Cooperation and Development Committee was formed to develop bi-lateral economic relations in the fields of transport, trade, agriculture, labour and tourism (43)

t In February 1989 discussions were held on the initiative of R.F.Botha about a possible South African role in a diplomatic initiative to end the bandit war.

t In July 1969 President Chissano received the new leader of South Africa's governing National Party, F.W. de Klerk. Concomitant with these developments, indications have emerged of some fairly serious interest on the part of South African capital in becoming involved in certain activities in Mozambique. During the period since April 1988: Premier Milling became involved in a Joint poultry venture. South African Breweries provided some funding to support the rehabilitation of the match factory, owned by the company before independence. The South African Pulp and Paper Industries (SAPPI), controlled by the SANLAM conglomerate, initiated a feasibility study into a possible forestry project in Maputo province. Karos hotels entered into negotiations over a management contract for Maputo's Polana hotel. Pepkor announced that it plans to open stores in Mozambique. And the Anglo American Corporation said that it was considering several possible investments in Mozambique; including in the Pande natural gas field, and in cashew nut factories which the corporation owned before independence (44).

All of this has been accompanied by a rhetoric which proclaims the goal of South African policy to be to cooperate in bringing peace and development to Mozambique (45).

None of this has, however, led to any reduction in the level of MNR assaults. On the contrary, the war has continued to take its grim toll with castrations and attacks on emergency food supplies. Joining the long list of MNR atrocities (46). Indeed, new developments on the diplomatic or economic front have often seemed to provoke an escalation of bandit attacks. The official opening by R.F. Botha of the new South African Trade Mission building in Maputo in October 1988 was, for example, followed by a renewed series of attacks on powerlines and the railway linking Maputo to South Africa (47). While the September 1988 agreement on Cahora Bassa was followed by the sabotage of an additional 600 pylons (48).

Nor has what is euphemistically described as "the pattern of support" from South Africa been broken. A long list of former MNR bandits surrendering to the authorities under the government's amnesty law have spoken of air and sea drops of arms and ammunition, of South African military personnel operating with armed bandits and of forced recruitment by security personnel inside South Africa all continuing well into 1989 (49). The US Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs, Herman Cohen, spoke in June 1989 of continuing evidence "that a certain amount of assistance is coming into Mozambique for Renamo from South Africa" (50). And the Soviet ambassador to Maputo, Nikolai Dybenko, said that proof of South African violations of the Nkomati accord was presented to R.F. Botha by the Soviet deputy foreign minister, Anatoly Adamishin, when the two men met in Maputo in March 1989 (51).

At most, the period since April 1988 has seen some reduction in

scale accompanied by a major effort to better conceal continuing South African involvement with armed banditry in Mozambique. In July 1988, for example, a new communications network for the bandits was installed with the well publicised support of "private" sympathisers in the USA. Although this system was set up with the knowledge and support of SADF officials (who at the very least authorised the flight), it by-passes the well known communications traffic to and from Phalaborwa, thus giving Pretoria's officials greater "plausible deniability" (52). Several explanations have been advanced to explain this continuing "pattern of support" from South Africa. Some have argued that it represents, essentially the unofficial and unauthorised actions of "rogue elements", particularly within the Portuguese community resident in South Africa. Lt Gen A.J. 'Kat' Liebenberg, the chief of the South African army and leader of Pretoria's delegation to meetings of the Joint Security Commission, has, however, ruled this out as a serious possibility, in the process shooting himself in the foot. In a newspaper interview published in June 1989, Liebenberg after routinely denying that the SADF was in any way involved, went on to say that he did not think that any individual or civilian

organisation in South Africa would have the capacity to smuggle arms into Mozambique on the scale required by the MNR (53). Liebenberg undoubtedly has a point, but this then leaves open the question how to explain the support for armed banditry from South African territory which sources as diverse as former bandits, the US state department and the Soviet foreign ministry all agree persists. While there are some indications that differences within the regime and the continued commitment of some militaristic "factions" to destabilising Mozambique are part of the story. it has also been suggested that an analogy with the "good guy/bad guy" technique of prisoner interrogation may be relevant in this respect (54). A leaked "highly confidential" manual on interrogation techniques used by the SADF confirms that this approach, also known as the "Mutt and Jeff" or "friend and foe" method, is indeed a favoured technique (55). It involves displaying "opposite personalities and attitudes towards the subject". The first interrogator is hostile. the second appears sympathetic in an attempt to generate feelings of gratitude and rapport. The aim of both, of course. is to break the subject. Whether consciously intended as such or not, Pretoria's stance towards Mozambique in the period since Cuito Cuanavale could be seen as having many similar features. The "good guys" of 'the - foreign ministry and business hold out the prospects of investment, peace and cooperation. The "bad guys" of the SADF make it impossible for Mozambique to benefit from this until it further adapts itself to Pretoria's designs. What then does Pretoria hope to achieve in its current policy towards Mozambique ? The quotation from Kobus Meiring at the beginning of this chapter indicates that Mozambique is seen as having a central role in Pretoria's schemes. Some of the specific goals it would want to achieve can readily be discerned from the list of more general regional policy objectives outlined above.

First, Pretoria would like to gain greater access to the Mozambican market for South African commodities and ensure that South African capital has a significant stake in selected projects in Mozambique. As indicated earlier, there is without doubt a greater real interest on the part of South African capital in becoming involved in Mozambique in the present "Nkomati II" phase than there was during "Nkomati I". This undoubtedly derives to a considerable extent from the fact that Mozambique has since January 1987 been following an IMF-backed "Economic Rehabilitation Programme" (ERP) (56). Not only has this led to a number of policy changes, including "privatisation", which would be regarded as having created a more favourable "investment climate", there has also been a significant inflow of project aid thus opening up of many more possibilities for profitable involvement.

Second, Pretoria would like the growing involvement of South African capital in Mozambique to contribute towards reducing its international isolation. Such involvement has, indeed, already featured prominently in propaganda aimed at securing debt re-negotiations or persuading western financiers that South Africa is a natural partner in "development projects" in the region ( 7). '

Third, Pretoria would like Mozambique, which already has a non-aggression pact with it, to not only participate in but also to mobilise support among other independent states for a regional security conference.

Fourth, Pretoria would like to win Mozambique's acceptance for its current "reform" programme. de Klerk's "five year" plan was discussed at some length during the meeting with President-Chissano in July as was R.F. Botha's "Marshall plan" (58).

Fifth, Pretoria would evidently like Mozambique to further restrict the already depleted "ANC presence" in the country.

Beyond all of this, however, lies what is probably viewed as the ultimate prize. Having encountered the "new reality" that continued involvement with armed banditry in Mozambique is likely to become increasingly costly in diplomatic and ideological terms, Pretoria has now indicated that it would like to assume a prominent, high profile role in brokering a peace settlement in the country. While there is unlikely to be unanimity on this point, the current dominant position within the regime appears to be that destabilisation has achieved all it can or at any rate that there is now more to gain from being involved in "bringing peace" to Mozambique. More specifically, it would appear from the few indications that are available that Pretoria would want a settlement in Mozambique to:

1. guarantee an irreversible shift away from socialist policies or positions of hostility towards South Africa's domestic or regional policies;

2. enhance Pretoria's claims to recognition both as the "regional power" and as an indispensable force in "re-stabilising" the region.

To achieve these goals it would not be in Pretoria's interests unilaterally to abandon destabilisation at this stage. Its influence with the MNR is its trump card in staking a claim to play a prominent role in facilitating a negotiated end to the war, but if its involvement were too blatant it would lose credibility both with Maputo and other external "interested parties". While there is little certainty or hard evidence on this point, such considerations would point logically to a pattern of involvement with armed banditry very similar to that which has in fact been observed in the period since Cuito Cuanavale.

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While Pretoria clearly has its regional policy ambitions, the Frontline states also have their own agenda. The independent states of the region have not been passive forces. On the contrary, their actions have been of critical importance in creating many of the "new realities" leading to the emergence of a new regional conducture in 1988. This is most apparent in the case of Angola. but Mozambican diplomacy as well as resistance to

armed banditry on the ground were also major factors in creating the climate which raised the potential diplomatic and ideological costs to Pretoria of continuing its involvement with armed banditry. Moreover, the Frontline states remain active forces, both jointly and severally. In a general sense, the major goal of the Frontline states in the emerging conjuncture can be identified as seeking to push the processes set in train in Angola in the direction of a more generalised withdrawal from destabilisation in order to secure their independence and create conditions for economic development. Since apartheid continues to be recognised as the root cause of instability in the region, there has also been considerable interest in exploring to what extent the new conjuncture has opened up some prospect of ending apartheid through negotiation.

In the specific case of Mozambique, the new conjuncture has been seen as creating propitious circumstances for a major new initiative aimed at ending the bandit war on terms which do not compromise the country's sovereignty and independence. This has involved action on a number of fronts. First, there 'has been intense' diplomatic activity aimed at consolidating pressure on Pretoria to cut its support with armed banditry and abide by the obligations it accepted at Nkomati. Most of the above described developments leading to the revival of the Joint Security Commission thus followed initiatives by Mozambique. Complementing these have been several initiatives directed at Mozambicans involved in armed banditry. In December 1987, the People's Assembly passed a law offering an amnesty to any armed bandit surrendering to the authorities. This was renewed for a further year in December 1988, at which time it was announced that 3.000 former bandits had surrendered to the authorities under its terms (59). In 1988 and 1989, indirect contacts were established with

the HNR, mainly through church groups. All of this culminated in July 1989 in a public announcement by President Chissano that his government ' would be prepared to hold direct talks with the MNR bandits without a prior cease fire provided that the MNR accepted certain principles. The 12 point document in which these are elaborated argues that a cessation of "all acts of terrorism and banditry" is the essential first step to normalising life in the country. It refers to an "ongoing process of creating conditions for normalisation of the lives of all Mozambicans through policy making based on consultation, debate and consensus" and says that "the objective of dialogue" should be "to clarify these positions and to give guarantees of participation to all individuals including those up to this point involved in violent acts. of destabilisation". The document insists that political ' or constitutional change can occur "only on the basis of a broad participation of all citizens" and says that it is "unacceptable and undemocratic for any group to use violence or intimidation to impose its views on society" (60).

As indicated above, the aim of this initiative is to end the war on terms which do not compromise Mozambique's sovereignty and independence. The principles for dialogue thus specifically refrain from according the MNR any legitimacy as a political organisation. Government leaders continue to reject any form of "power sharing" with what continues to be seen as a tool of "external interests" and, although extensive discussions have been held with South African officials, Pretoria has not been invited to serve on the group of African mediator states appointed to facilitate the process (61).

It remains to be seen how far this approach will succeed. A church delegation led by Mozambique's cardinal, Alexandre dos Santos, formally presented the 12 point principles to an MNR delegation at a meeting held in Nairobi in early August 1989. The details of the outcome of this meeting have not been made public, but it is known that the MNR presented a 116 point document as an apparent response to the government's 12 point principles. The main features of the MNR document are a demand that all "foreign troops brought in by Frelimo" be withdrawn and that the MNR be recognised as "a political force active in the Mozambican political scene" (62). '

There are strong suspicions that the 16 point document was elaborated with considerable input from Pretoria. The demand for the withdrawal of foreign (essentially Zimbabwean) troops is seen as a possible manoeuvre to try to draw the Zimbabwean president, Robert Mugabe, into direct security discussions with Pretoria and thus break down his resistance to the idea of a multi-lateral security summit. More generally, the document is seen as a possible device to try to secure a more prominent direct role for Pretoria in the mediation process. At all events, any quick resolution of the conflict seems unlikely. As Cardinal dos Santos put it on his return from the talks in Nairobi, "...the path to peace- is naturally long. Problems are not resolved from one day to the next...The MNR says it wants peace and will work for  
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peace. So does the Mozambican government. But there will be difficulties in reaching agreement on several points" (63).

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Enough has already been said to indicate that the emerging new phase of regional struggle will both be complex and multifaceted in the sense that it will take place on a number of fronts. It is also likely, at least on some of these fronts and in the short term, that compromises rather than clear-cut victories and defeats will be the order of the day. The balance of forces which exists in southern Africa today points to no single inevitable future for the region. Several possible scenarios exist each favoured by different protagonists. Which of them materialises in practice will depend on the strategies pursued by the various domestic, regional and extra-regional forces involved.

The present chapter has argued that the new conjuncture which began to emerge in southern Africa in the second quarter of 1988 was the product fundamentally of important shifts in the balance of forces against apartheid South Africa, highlighted most

vividly by the military reverses inflicted on the SADF at Cuito Cuanavale. At the same time, the chapter has sought to caution against triumphalism. The apartheid leviathan has not yet been dealt a mortal blow. It remains a powerful economic and military force in the region. Moreover, the emerging new phase, involving as it does some element of dialogue with neighbouring states, opens up certain prospect for the regime to re-build its relations with its estranged western allies and reduce its international isolation. Not one but at least three and possibly more scenarios would appear to exist for the southern African region in the near future-(64).

1. The first of these would emerge if Pretoria succeeded in using the new diplomatic and economic openings secure a significant reduction in its international isolation and a degree of international endorsement for its "reformed apartheid" programme. If these major goals of its current policy were to be achieved, a greater convergence between South African and western policy could be expected around a project seeking to "re-stabilise" the region under South African hegemony.

At the economic level, this would probably imply more aid being increasingly channeled to projects which would tend to deepen, rather than lessen the dependence of the region on South Africa. At the security level, the emergence of such a scenario might initially imply some withdrawal from certain forms of destabilisation. However, since the crisis of apartheid would remain essentially unresolved, a strong impulse towards seeking to export the crisis of apartheid to the region would remain - especially, at moments when the domestic crisis of apartheid was felt most intensely. Any unilateral complete abandonment of armed banditry by South Africa would be extremely unlikely, although cycles of ups and downs in such support would be possible. A more

permanent reduction in the level of destabilisation would probably continue to depend on acceptance by a victim state of the 'Lesotho option' or 'Pax Pretorianai terms. That is to say a measure of peace (in the sense of absence of conflict) could be bought, but at the cost of significant concessions to Pretoria's demands. which would imply severe constraints on the capacity to assert real independence. This scenario, moreover. would imply the creation of relatively favourable conditions for the apartheid regime to acquire the resources to overcome its current military and financial vulnerabilities. The very factors which pressed it to back down from escalating aggression in 1988 would thus be undercut and a reversion to that path at any time would thus become once again a realistic option.

For Mozambique, the materialisation of such a scenario would probably mean confronting a stark choice between reaching an agreement with the MNR bandits on severely compromising terms or facing a continuation and perhaps even escalation of the bandit war.

2. The second possible scenario would result from an early collapse of Pretoria's current diplomatic/economic-orientated approach to the region. If this were to occur, and if there were not sufficient countervailing. pressure to render the costs prohibitive, a rapid return to the cycle of escalating regional aggression of the pre-1988 period could be expected. In this respect, "Nkomati II" would be destined to follow "Nkomati I" There could, however, be some changes in the selection of the major targets of destabilisation, with Zimbabwe and an independent Namibia coming in for more attention. For Mozambique, such a scenario would mean not only the continuation of the bandit war in its own territory, but also the possibility that Zimbabwe found itself so tied down by destabilisation at home that it was obliged to reduce its commitment to Mozambique.

3. A third possible scenario would materialise if the momentum of the developments which brought about the shift to the new conjuncture were to continue to have a restraining influence on militaristic aggression, while not capitulating to the economic and diplomatic based strategies of Pretoria or allowing apartheid to break out of its international isolation. Such an scenario would amount to keeping destabilisation at bay while simultaneously keeping apartheid weak. For the independent states of southern Africa as a whole, such a scenario would open up a certain space for the advance of SADCC projects currently blocked by destabilisation. It would also enable the liberation forces inside South Africa to derive maximum benefit from the new regional conjuncture, while minimising the openings created for the Pretoria regime to overcome its current economic and military vulnerabilities. Short of an end to apartheid, this would be the best scenario available to Mozambique to develop policies to end the war on terms which would not involve unacceptable concessions to the bandits or their external sponsors.

Identifying the latter as the optimum scenario from the

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standpoint of peace, independence and development in southern Africa 'is relatively straightforward. It is, however, an alternative calling for active and carefully formulated strategies both in the region and on the part of the international solidarity movement. Such strategies would need to be rooted in an approach which recognises that success depends on not allowing either Pretoria or its currently estranged western allies to seize the initiative. While some dialogue between regional states and Pretoria is inevitable, this should not be permitted to build legitimacy for the apartheid regime in international fora. Commitment to the SADCC perspective of reducing the historical ties of dependence of regional states on South Africa should be reFinforced and there should be no acceptance of the proposition that the "natural entree" into the region for .western governments and investors is through South Africa. Above all the central lesson of the transition to the emerging new conjuncture needs to be learnt: Pretoria's rulers changed course'not because they wanted to, but because objective pressures and constraints aware such that they had no other



realistic option. They must not be permitted to overcome the vulnerabilities which led to the present highly partial backdown from destabilisation. On the contrary the costs of continued South African involvement in destabilisation, which have in the past been minimal need to be raised to prohibitive levels as part of the overall campaign to end apartheid itself and lay a real basis for lasting peace and progress in southern Africa.

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11. R.Davies, "South African regional policy post-Nkomati: May 1985 to December 1986" in SARS (ed) S9nth\_Alegan\_ngJ:uL;4. Johannesburg, Ravan press, 1987.
12. See J.Hanlon. Bezgax;l9nx\_NelghhQuz5;..A2axtheid..29aez\_\_in SQnthezn\_Aiziga. London, Catholic Institute for International Relations and James Currey, 1986. p 241.
13. See The\_Qiizah 9/10/1986; Hssklx\_Mail 9-16/10/1986. uaticiae 9/10/1986. '
14. Nnjiglai 16/10/1986. The\_Qixizen published an article on the same day saying that the latest "intelligence" reaching South Africa indicated that President Machel and "ANC permanents" had taken refuge on Inhaca island !
15. EelatQz19\_d2\_Q9mlte.geniznl\_nn\_1\_99ngzesng. op cit. pp 19-24.
16. See AIM.LMazambique\_Eeun\_Aaencxl\_lnl9zmatign\_bulletin nos 129 26 - 136; April - November 1987.
17. Banngnt 21/2/1988.
18. See Centro de Eatudos Africanos, "'The Cuito Cuanavale Syndrome': Some notes on Pretoria'e Tactical and Strategic, Options after the Angolan Debacle", Maputo, Sennhenn\_luzigg Dgnnien, 40.200, October 1988 and J.Grest, "The South African Defence Force in Angola" in J.Gock and L.Nathan (ed), op cit.
19. "Pretoria'e newest homeland - 'Savimbistan1", Hark ln Ezggzean. 54, June-July 1988.
20. Briana. 191, August 1988.
21. See note 18. -
22. Quoted Haskll\_nnil 5-12/5/1988.
23. R. Gersony, "Summary of Mozambican Refugee Accounts of Principally Conflict-Related Experience in Mozambique: Report submitted to Ambassador Jonathan Moore, Director, Bureau for Refugee Programs and Dr Chester A Cracker, Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs by Robert Gersony, consultant to Bureau for Refugee Programs", Washington, Department of State, April 1988.
24. On this see Ngtigiaa 11/4/1988 (interview with. Chester Crocker), Egiigiaa 12/5/1988 (interview with Crocker's deputy, Charles Freeman). Keekll\_nnil 5-12/5/1988.
25. Heeklx\_nail 8-14/7/1988.
26. Wall 24-30/6/1988.
27. J.A.Lombard, "Recent South African Financial Trends and Policies: paper delivered at the South Africa House, London. by Prof J.A.Lombard, deputy governor of the South African Reserve Bank on 7 June 1989 at 18h00", mimeo.
28. H.Preece. "South Africa's narrowing economic scope". The Snnthezn\_Afzignn\_En9n2miat. February/March 1989-
29. For a development of these.points see. Centro de\_ Eetudos Africanos, "The 1989/90 South African Budget and the continuing

crisis of the apartheid economy", Maputo, Sguthezn\_\_\_\_Airiga  
Dneniez. 47.200. May 1989.

30. M.Swilling and H.Phillips, "State Power in the 19803: from  
'total strategy' to 'counter revolutionary warfare'" in J.Cock  
and L.Nathan, op cit, p 144.

31. Ibid. Pp 144-148.

32. A.Borraine, "Security Management Upgrading in the Black  
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Townships", W. 8. 1989. p 62.

33. See, for example. Sgnthsnan. 3.5, 28/9/1988.

34. Quoted Ihe\_5tar\_1lnIernettinnnl\_Aizmail\_Eeekl11 5/10/1988.

35. See Ihe\_5tan 3/5/1989 for a report on a speech by R.F.Botha :39 this theme to a conference on "South Africa and Europe after 2".

36. See, for example, Eeeklx\_uail 3-9/2/1989, 10-16/2/1989, 24/2-2/3/1989. .

37. See AHQ\_Neushxieings. 13. 26. 2/7/1989 for a summary of selected prees reports on the five year "action plan" adopted at. the National Party's extraordinary federal congress on June 29 1989. See Neu\_HaLl9n 7-13/7/1989 and Heeklx\_\_Mail 30/6e7/7/1989 for critical comments from the ANC, the mass democratic movement and other oppositional forces inside South Africa.

38. G.M.E. Leistner, "Whither South Africa ? The African perspective in foreign policy", Aizign\_lnnight, 18.1, 1988, p 2.

39. See Ihe\_guardian 7/8/1987.

40. See Nntinias 19/11/1987 and EBQ\_Snmnnrx\_gi\_KQ:ld\_\_Bzgdneests for transcription of a South African television interview with deputy ioreign minister. Kobue Meiring, on these talks.

41. See Hgtigiaa 16/1/1988 for a report on the meeting of the JLC on the previous day and ugtigins 28/4/1988 for a reference to Mozambiquets dissatisfaction with the non-attendance of "all components of the South African delegation" at JLC meetings - a reference to the military.

42. See NQLiQini 29/11/1988, 6/12/1988.

43. See HQtigiaa 24/2/1989 fer a report on the establishment of the formation of Joint sub-commissions of this committee which was constituted in December 1988.

44. A list of South African firms involved in Mozambique is included in a propaganda letter dated 12/4/1989 from the Permanent Representative of South Africa to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary General. See also Centro de Estudos Africanos. "Mozambique-South Africa Economic Relations since Nkomati Part III and Part IV", Maputo, Sgnlhexn\_Afzlgan\_\_Dgsaiezs 53.200 and 54.200. September and October 1989 (forthcoming).

45. At the summit meeting held at Songo, for example, P.W.Botha "reaffirmed his commitment to peace, stability and cooperation" (Enticing 13/9/1988). while F.W. de Klerk spoke of the "constructive role South Africa is prepared to play" during his meeting with President Chissano in July 1989 (N91131:: 20/7/1989). 28

46. See Ngigtiglna 27/5/1989 for a report on an attack in Inhambane province, during which the genital organs of 9 men were cut off and Hetigiaa 12/4/1989 and 14/4/1989 for reports on attacks on emergency supplies - the latter taking place despite the proclamation by the MNR of a one menth ceasefire in April to allow relief supplies to reach starving communities.

47. See ugzamhigneile. Maputo, AIM, no 149, December 1988 and no 151, February 1989.

48. Mgzgmhlgueiile, 151, February 1989. The President of the Mozambican People's Assembly accused SADF special forces of responsibility for this action pointing out that sabotaging so 'many pylons in such a short space of time was beyond the technical capacity of ordinary MNR bandits.

49. See Centro de Estudos Africanos, "Documented incidents of SADF action in Mozambique since the capture of Case Banana, Gorongosa: Parts III and IV", Maputo, Sgnthgxn\_\_Alxiga Dgsgiezs,46.200 and 49.200, April and July 1989, for a summary of a number of such testimonies made between November 1988 and June 1989.

50. Transcription of "Worldnet"'linkup radio programme 19/5/1989 in author's possession.

51. Hatinies 17/6/1989.

52. Three South Africa-based foreign Journalists travelled on the plane carrying the new equipment and were allowed to observe it being installed. See Aizign\_\_99niidentinl 9/9/1988 on this incident and Hen Igrk limes 31/7/1988 for perhaps the most informative of the articles written by the three Journalists.

53. Ihe\_5taz\_1lntexnntinnnl\_Aizmail\_Heeklxl 28/6/1989.

54. D.Martin and P.Johnson, "South Africa and its neighbours- the

Frontline states", draft study for the Commonwealth Committee of Foreign Ministers on Southern Africa, Harare, February 1989.

55. HeH\_NatiQn 30/6-6/7/1989.

56. Among the most comprehensive independent analyses of the ERP to have emerged to date are K.Hermele, *anntrix Bepgrt*; Mazamhigne, Stockholm, SIDA Planning Secretariat, 1988; O.Roesch, "Economic 'Reform in Hozambique Notes on Stabilization, War and Class Formation", mimeo, November 1988; M.Wuyts, "Economic Management and Adjustment policies in Mozambique", paper presented at United Nations Research Institute for Social Development conference on Economic Crisis and Third World Countries: Impact and Response, Kingston, Jamaica, April 1989.

57. See, inter alia, the letter cited in note 44 and the references in note 36 above plus "South Africa's Diplomatic Initiatives into Africa", insert by South African government in

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' : ' o e, Mbabane, April

1989. '

58. See Hgiiciaa 20/7/1989, The\_\_5saz\_\_Llnierna&ignn1\_\_Airmnil  
Kgnklxi 26/7/1989. v

59. AlM\_\_dg52aigh 20/12/1988 qudting figure given by President  
Chissano in his speech at the opening of Mozambiqueis People's  
Assembly.

60. The document, which had previously circulated anonymously in  
diplomatic circles, was made public by President Chissano at. a  
press conference on July 17, 1989, see EQLiQina 18/7/1969.

61. See uggiglna 28/7/1989 for a report of a speeeh by President  
Chissano at the Frelimo patty fifth congress reaffirming these  
positions.

62. Mimeograph document on Renamo letter head paper dated  
Nairobi, 15/8/1989. See also interview by Ken Vernon with MNR  
leader, Afonso Dlakham, published in The\_Sian 11/8/1989.

63; AlM\_d:anninh 12/8/1989.

64. These scenarios were developed Jointly with Thomas Ohlson,  
whose input is gratefully acknowledged.