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ACTION TO END APARTHEID
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ACTION TO DEVELOP A NON-RACIAL DEMOCRATIC SOCIETY

There is no question of the need to embark upon processes that could successfully end apartheid, whilst simultaneously contributing to the development of an effective non-racial democratic society.

This automatically necessitates at least a two-fold approach.

The tradition of anti-apartheid resistance, important as it has been, has created an environment in which individuals, constituencies and organizations are defined by what they are against, rather than what they are for. There is great clarity on resistance strategies and actions, eg. sanctions, boycott, strike action, stay-aways, defiance campaigns, etc.

There is not a similar clarity on what one is for. Future vision of South Africa is often characterized by ideologically based dogma and strategy, with little demonstrable and practical action plans on how to transform the present political order through attractive forces as opposed to pressure forces. This lack of constructive pro-non-racial transformation activity, as opposed to anti-apartheid action, is insufficient to mobilize and maintain constructive transformation.

None of this necessarily implies that resistance strategies should or could be relinquished in the short and even medium term. There can be no question of the moral and political validity and contribution intended in the 1989 Defiance Campaign. It has seen demonstrable success such as the recent announcement by the State President, FW de Klerk, that beaches will be open to all. The Campaign has however, at the same time often reinforced fears and uncertainties that exist in the White community. The tension between actions and campaigns against apartheid and the capacity to win over Whites to the cause of non-racialism must be carefully measured. This requires a shift in emphasis and nature of strategies employed.

Change and transformation of any system has historically always required pressure and discomfort. South Africa will

similarly not change without pressure. It is however crucial that resistance and pressure tactics do not contribute to destroying or inhibiting the achievement of an effective transformed society. Little will have been gained if, after fundamental transformation of the present political order, South Africa has deteriorated into a socio-political and economic wasteland.

Stated differently it would be inappropriate to wait for transformation before powerful and constructive strategies are also developed and initiated.

Reference to a real-life situation may serve to offer greater clarity. This reference is by design sensitive and controversial - but then again any change normally at least initially appears controversial.

At present the interaction between labour and business is characterized by mass united and national action. Bans on overtime, national stay-aways, etc. do not in any way attempt to differentiate between progressive and reactive businesses. In fact businesses that are striving to take a more progressive stance are often hardest hit by such national action. At the same time businesses that take reactive and authoritarian action in the short term often appear to experience less turmoil. Whilst this is readily understandable from a developmental point of view, it is not effective in consolidating increasing progressive support amongst business.

The managing and mobilization of transformation requires more than just pressure and resistance strategies. It also requires an attractive and rewarding alternative. Pressure and pain without alternative options will mainly create counter-resistance, frustration and fear. None of these are necessarily conducive to optimum transformation.

In keeping with the abovementioned example it would be necessary to seriously consider alternative rewarding options for progressive businesses. This may require that Trade Unions and progressive businesses jointly develop guidelines and parameters against which business' track record in change can be evaluated. The aim would be to differentiate between businesses who record demonstrable visible actions in support of transformation to non-racial democracy, and those businesses who essentially support the maintenance of the status quo.

This specific example may be full of difficulties and contradictions. This would however not be different for any other transformation strategies with a specific pro-non-racial gearing.

Any successful mass action which hopes to mobilize the broadest possible spectrum of South Africans, Black and White, will have to also develop strategies and actions that differ from traditional anti-apartheid and resistance positions. This will obviously not be an easy or simple task, but it will have to be forged in the heat of dialogue, debate and consultation. Failure to do so may very well find South Africa achieving its inevitable transformation by getting rid of the old and having nothing effective and strong with which to replace it.

The processes that led to the Broederstroom Encounter between 37 senior MDM representatives and 40 senior business leaders and academics was an attempt at setting transformation geared processes in motion. The CBM's presence at the Conference for a Democratic Future is yet another step in the difficult but essential exploration and definition of constructive transformation actions. Success will however depend upon a much more concrete development and pursuit of an array of transformation strategies developed through consultation and negotiation between parties who have traditionally maintained adversarial relationships with one another. Initially such parties may differ on 95% of issues, and agree on only 5%. The 5% must then be seized and built upon in a continuous expansion of united constructive action to realize South Africa's true potential as a non-racial democratic society.

Mass action to destroy apartheid must be supplemented by mass action to build an effective non-racial democratic political-economy. As the process gained momentum, resistance based strategies should be reduced, and constructive progressive strategies should be expanded. This is not merely a play on words. The former focusses on getting rid of the past and present, but does not guarantee or visualize future geared action. The latter also acknowledges the need of getting rid of apartheid, but focusses both on leading people away from the past, and engaging in demonstrable actions that serve to lay the foundations for an effective transformed society.

The challenge for the Conference for a Democratic Future, and all other initiatives geared towards the constructive

transformation of the current political order is to explore processes of unifying intent which could effectively serve to bridge the polarization characterizing not only the Black : White political spectrum, but also the power interest within the Black political spectrum.

It is a time for creating a new vision of the transformed society, and initiating the thousands of tangible and achievable actions that will serve as steps towards a non-racial democratic South Africa.

NEGOTIATING SOUTH AFRICA'S FUTURE

There is an obvious need for transformation of the present political order, to one which has the support and trust of the majority of South Africans, Black and White.

The declaration of the OAU adhoc committee on Southern Africa provides a constructive point of departure for an approach to the question of negotiation. With certain conditions it could be supported by the CBM as its approach to negotiations.

With the exception of qualifying certain statements made in the OAU document, and with particular reference to certain strategic approaches such as sanctions in the Section Program of Action (which are not substantive to the question of the overall approach to negotiations), the substance and spirit of the approach to negotiations serves as a constructive contribution and potential point of departure, namely:

- * The support for a political settlement
- * The creation of a non-racial, democratic South Africa
- * Support for a bill of rights
- * Support for an independent judiciary
- * The creation of a climate for these negotiations to take place (the release of political prisoners, unbanning organisations, ending the emergency) and freeing the political process
- * The negotiation of a new constitution on the basis of free and fair elections for all
- * The mechanism of an interim government to oversee the process of transition
- * The ending of armed hostilities.

Interim Government:

With reference to the proposed mechanism of an interim Government this is understood to be a desirable outcome of an earlier negotiations phase encompassing the disenfranchised parties. During the earlier phase they would have had to state their approach and demands to the Government regarding the formulation of a new constitutional framework. The interim Government's role would be to oversee the effective management of the transition period while the new Government is elected and entrenched. CBM is of the opinion that the proposal of an interim Government needs to be carefully considered and evaluated. If this refers to a nationally elected body, with the specific intent of governing the country whilst formulating the new constitution as a precursor to the election of a new Government, then it has to be questioned whether this is a feasible alternative. It is doubtful that the current Government would seriously consider such a "Governing Partnership". If alternatively this refers to a constituent assembly with the particular focus on negotiation a new constitution, whilst the Government of the day continues as the functional national authority, then it does offer great potential for further exploration.

Sanctions:

CBM views the necessity of embarking upon processes that would lead to negotiations as a matter of national priority. Its view on sanctions is however that this approach is contributing to a somewhat frightening erosion of South Africa's industrial and technological base. This is addressed in further detail in the position on sanctions.

It is CBM's contention that as the process unfolds serious consideration must be given to the lifting of sanctions and appeal for international investment. As detailed in the position on sanctions this should be a matter of the most urgent priority.

Violence & Creating a Conducive Environment for Negotiations:

Two sets of dynamics related to the release of political

prisoners, the lifting of the State of Emergency and the ending of hostilities, are retarding the capacity to seriously consider embarking upon negotiations. Firstly, the disconcerting use of violence, and some would claim intimidation, that is often present during periods of industrial dispute is creating tensions which make it very difficult to consolidate support for negotiations. It is understood that the Trade Unions often feel and claim that they do not perpetrate violence, and that they are the victims of violence. Whilst there are certainly examples of use of State security apparatus during times of industrial dispute, these do not account for all of the actions of violence.

Aligned to this concern is the use of violence between rival power groups as manifest in the Natal violence and other areas. Again many arguments can be offered to substantiate the often conflicting claims of adversarial parties. This does not negate the fact that violence often characterizes intergroup rivalry. The absence of democratic processes and instruments clearly aggravate this situation, but cannot be used to excuse it. It is not enough to only call for an ending of armed hostilities. There also has to be a call for an ending of the use of violence during times of dispute, whether in the workplace or between rival power groups.

A Framework for Negotiations Processes:

The approach to negotiations as outlined below has the distinct advantage of creating benchmarks and parameters against which both negotiations and progress towards the desired state of the "New Society" could be evaluated.

In advancing towards and embarking upon negotiations it is necessary to caution against an ideologically based positional bargaining process in which preformatted ideological systems are viewed as the desired end result. International experience has shown that any ideologically and dogma based approaches to societal structuring fail. This is equally true for an intransigent clinging to racially or ethnically defined group rights on the one hand, and centrist controlled socialist positions on the other. Successful societies have on the other hand relied upon the pursuit and development of pragmatic responses to achieving desired outcomes, rather than relying upon rigid ideology and preformatted solutions.

The real danger exists that South Africa's polarized society could become trapped in an essentially adversarial negotiations process in which there is a futile attempt to find a "midway compromise" between two mutually exclusive positions. There is simply no midway between a racial and a non-racial system.

International and local experience has furthermore demonstrated that it is virtually impossible to achieve transformation of the status quo in systems caught up in a process of transition, unless there is a clear understanding of the desired end result, and the shortfall that exists. Conversely it is impossible to use the existing system as the point of departure, and to try to argue from there if the existing system bares no relationship to the fundamental requirements of the future system. This is undoubtedly the case in South Africa.

It is therefore necessary to give serious consideration to the development of a "values driven negotiation process" in which the values for societal excellence are stated. These benchmarks for societal excellence should focus on:

- a) The requirements for an optimum political system that would be trusted and endorsed by the broadest possible spectrum of South Africans.
- b) The structures required for the development of an effective and growth orientated political-economy, with particular reference to wealth creation and just distribution of wealth.
- c) The development of community structures and systems which would facilitate optimum participation in the political system and capacity to participate in both the growth and fruits of the political economy.

These three interdependent societal factors, namely political-economic and community values and structures, form an intergrated and mutually dependent system. The one is only as strong as all others, and all others are only as effective as the weakest. They all have to be strategically aligned and complementary to achieve societal effectiveness. It is for instance impossible to develop political enfranchisement and democracy if the economy is characterized by racial domination and autocratic control. Equally it is not possible to have a flexible and effective

political system operating together with an inflexible and centrally controlled economic system or vice versa.

Without going into any definitive detail within this context, this suggests a three-phased pre-negotiations and negotiations approach.

Define a Vision of Societal Effectiveness:

Firstly, it is necessary to define a vision of societal effectiveness and excellence. Whilst it is necessary to acknowledge that there are probably no readily transferable models from other countries, there are nonetheless distinct lessons to be learnt from developments in other countries during this century. Centrally planned economies have for instance failed, whilst ideologically based socio-political structures have equally resulted in societal disruption. The events in Eastern Europe, USSR, China and Southern Africa offer a wealth of information on how not to achieve societal effectiveness. This vision of societal effectiveness would obviously have to incorporate the inevitabilities of South Africa's future, namely:

- a) A rapidly urbanizing society that will not be able to rely upon a significant rural subsistence economy.
- b) The real need for strong industrialization and investment to develop the urban centres in order to cope with population demographics.
- c) The inevitable reality of a non-racial majority system in which the majority of the Government will be Black.
- d) The need for educational and housing strategies which can effectively serve the requirements of an industrialized society.
- e) South Africa's total interdependence with the international economic community, and therefore need to have powerful international links.
- f) South Africa's obvious position as a regional power, and driving force for regional transformation to an effective and interdependent political-economy for Southern Africa.

Determine the Inadequacies of the Existing System:

Secondly, it becomes necessary to do a "gap-analysis" to determine the discrepancy and shortfalls between the desired societal effectiveness and the status quo. The gap analysis in turn can only be established if the status quo is commonly understood and acknowledged. This would require definition of a variety of issues, with particular reference to:

- a) The nature of the economic crisis, focussing on inability for sustained industrialization and growth; negative productivity; very low gross domestic product growth; investment patterns; etc.
- b) The nature of racial domination, focussing on inequities of wealth distribution; capital ownership; access to property, credit, and land; etc.
- c) The structural discrimination and inadequacies of education, housing and transport.
- d) The "Africanization" of business, civil service, South African Police and South African Defence Force, focussing on bridging education; affirmative action; performance management; etc.

Negotiate and Implement Programmes of Pragmatic Transitional Action:

Thirdly, once the vision and the gap analysis have been determined, it becomes possible to embark upon a constructive negotiation on how to best effect the transition from the status quo to the desired transformed society.

This automatically brings to bare the question regarding a transitional process as part and parcel of negotiations. It is denying the reality of the South African circumstances to hope for some "big bang" theory of societal transformation and transfer of power. There obviously is some point at which the society moves from a minority racially dominated system to a majority non-racial system. This transformation will however be achieved either through primarily destructive power mechanisms, or preferably constructive and

rejuvenating transitional processes.

The balance of power in South Africa has all the characteristics for entrenching an erosive stalemate with the potential of laying the society and political-economy to waste. On the one hand there exists the State who controls the most powerful military force in Africa, and probably the southern hemisphere. On the other hand there is the vast majority of South Africans with the increasing consumer and labour power to paralyze the economy in the long term.

South Africa's past has been characterized by primarily adversarial and antagonistic conflict as a means of bringing pressure to bare on the current system. This has undoubtedly had some effect. There is however a point in time when continued reliance upon and application of pressure tactics no longer fulfill a constructive change purpose, but rather starts destroying the base of the future transformed society. This requires the continuous reassessment of pressure tactics, and the willingness to halt them as soon as they have served their purpose. This applies in equal measure to the often oppressive State strategies and policies, and to the resistance strategies such as sanctions and industrial unrest.

A crucial pre-requisite for negotiations is acknowledging this stalemate and its destructive capacity. This has to go hand in hand with the acknowledgement of the need for and pursuit of non-adversarial approaches to transition as an integral part of transformation.

This three phased approach to negotiations is not meant to represent a clinical chronological process with distinct cut-off points. The phases will in reality overlap and operate in parallel. The fundamental challenge is to replace traditional adversarial and positional negotiations with a values-driven negotiations approach.

This reliance on and use of firstly developing a unifying vision of societal excellence, secondly determining the gap between the vision and the existing system, and finally negotiating and implementing a driven and pragmatic transition process probably offers the greatest opportunity for creating perspectives of unifying intent and overcoming the potential debilitating polarization and conflict facing South Africa.

SANCTIONS

There is a powerful case to be made in support of sanctions whilst there is a perceived or real deadlock on issues pertaining to negotiations, human rights, justice and equality.

In the virtual total absence of political rights and capacity to mobilize popular support through internationally accepted political instruments such as universal franchise, sanctions become both understandable and defensible. Sanctions have also undoubtedly contributed to loosening up the political intransigence of the Apartheid-State, whilst also creating pressure which has served to motivate the need for fundamental reassessment and change of the current political order.

The question now has to be raised whether in fact sanctions have not served their purpose, and whether continued adherence to sanctions may very well contribute to the destruction rather than achievement of the transformed society.

Two major factors will determine the effectiveness and success of a transformed political-economy in South Africa.

South Africa is an Industrialized Society:

South Africa's economic well being relies primarily on an extractive forestry and mining sector, and an industrialized production and manufacturing sector. This forms the basis for wealth creation and therefore wealth distribution. The services sector (banking, retailing, distribution, etc.) are lower contributors to growth in gross domestic product. The powerful economies in the world, including the Newly Industrialized Countries, have been characterized by particularly strong industrialized production and manufacturing sectors. The inability of any country to grasp the opportunities of industrialization and to develop long term growth through further industrialization linked to leading sector growth, has conversely led to lower growth patterns and general societal impoverishment.

South Africa is an Urbanized Society:

South Africa is already an urbanized society, with approximately 90% of Whites and 50% of Blacks living in urban areas. By the year 2000 it is estimated that in excess of 70% of the entire population will be urbanized. We therefore do not have the capacity of relying upon a rural subsistence economy. Stated briefly it is possible to sustain a very large population in a rural agrarian society with relatively inexpensive investment in better farming practices, irrigation, crop rotation and fertilization. This is not possible in an urban society. It is impossible for a community to "live off the land" in Johannesburg, Durban, Soweto, Mamelodi, etc.

These dual forces of industrialization and urbanization have significant implications for South Africa in the short, medium and long term. These implications must be considered when developing any change strategy, and particularly when evaluating strategies with potential medium and long term destructive effects, such as sanctions.


1. South Africa's capacity to create and distribute wealth is directly linked to its ability to enhance both labour and capital productivity

FACT: Over the past ten years labour productivity has increased by less than 20%, at the time when South Africa's major trading partners have recorded labour productivity gains between 40% and 90%.

FACT: At the same time capital productivity- ie. the capacity to utilize capital investment in machinery, buildings etc. - has declined by as much as 3% per annum.

FACT: Overall productivity - ie. the combination of labour and capital productivity - has declined by an average of just more than 2% per annum over the past ten years.

(see figure 1)





2. The capacity to distribute wealth is directly linked to the capacity to create wealth through sustained economic growth.

FACT: South Africa's gross domestic product per capita (GDP/C) has declined over the past fifteen years. In effect the economic cake is shrinking. (see figure 2.1 & 2.2)

FACT: Wealth distribution can only take place effectively if the economic cake is increased substantially.


FACT: International experience has proved conclusively that any attempt at punitive redistribution of the current economic cake contributes to lower GDP/C. Growth focussed economic policies must be given preference over distributive policies.





3. South Africa's future capacity to generate and distribute wealth is dependent upon its ability to rejuvenate the process of industrialization, and to structurally realign the economy to ensure less reliance upon mining and agriculture as the driving forces of the economy. This must be accompanied by increased investment in productive industrial capital investment as the mainstay of adding value to primary resources and job creation.


FACT: South Africa's role as the major gold producer in the world, and the reliance upon gold as the primary source of foreign revenue and basis for economic growth, has changed significantly. Whereas South Africa produced +/- 80% of the free world's gold output two decades ago, this has now declined to approximately 50%. South Africa's reliance upon gold as the saviour of the economy is therefore rapidly declined. This necessitates intensified industrialization.
(see figure 3)



FACT: Industrialization necessitates medium to long term fixed investment in the productive manufacturing sectors. This in turn requires investor confidence which can only be developed if the investors have confidence and faith in the stability of the political-economy. South Africa's gross domestic fixed investment has shown exactly the opposite to that which is necessary for sustained industrialization and growth.


(see figure 4)

GROSS DOMESTIC FIXED INVESTMENT (AT CONSTANT 1985 PRICES)



FACT: Economic strength and growth is dependent upon the capacity to move from primary and extractive sectors, to industrialized sectors and finally technological sectors. International trends show how reliance on primary and extractive sectors and inability to advance to later phases in the "technological revolution" virtually ensures ultimate economic decline.

(see figure 5)



FACT: The capacity to initiate and sustain industrialized growth is dependent upon technological capacity. Already South Africa has to pay a premium of in excess of 100% compared to Japan, and in excess of 80% compared to West Germany for similar capital investments. This severely retards South Africa's capacity to become competitive on the international market, and further reduces capital productivity. This is further aggravated by the flight of capital over the past decade. It is estimated that it could cost as much as 600% more to reinvest in lost capital of the early 80's.

FACT: The cost of capital, combined with lack of investor confidence is retarding present and future capital investment which is crucial to

industrialization and economic growth. This is creating a situation in which the future industrial capacity of South Africa may be severely retarded, to a point where the rejuvenation of industrialization may take several decades. Already capital investment costs have in many instances increased by as much as 300% over the past five years. This could double and double yet again by the year 2000.

FACT: South Africa is experiencing and arrested industrialization process due to lack of investor confidence, declining gross fixed domestic investment, flight of capital, cost of capital investment, lack of supportive human resources with technological skills, general inability to utilize capital productively, and inability to readily access international markets due to embargoes.

4. The inability to rely upon a subsistence economy of any significant magnitude, together with urbanization places great pressure on the need for job creation. This job creation cannot depend only upon the so-called informal sector, but must be driven primarily through growth based upon strong sustained industrialization.

FACT: An estimated 4 million people are already unemployed, and at current growth rates this could grow to 10 million by the year 2000.

CONCLUSION:

Sanctions have served some purpose, but now run the real risk of creating a variety of factors which could make it virtually impossible for any future Government to rely upon a stable and effective political-economy.

As the technological and industrial capacity of South Africa erodes, so the attraction of investing in the country declines, which in turn contributes to the technological and industrial impoverishment of the economy.

South Africa faces the very real risk that within ten to twenty years it could be faced with a scenario in which:

- a) 80%+ of the population is urbanized.
- b) 40% - 50% of the population is unemployed.
- c) The cost of industrial and technological investment has become so prohibitive that it effectively prevents growth in domestic fixed investment.
- d) GDP/C has declined to point of reducing South Africa to an impoverished nation.

In such a very probable society it would become virtually impossible to sustain a democratic political dispensation. The Government of the day will simply not have the capacity to fulfill the social and economic aspirations of the majority of South Africans.

The only possible supporting argument that can be made for sanctions is if it could be proved conclusively that sanctions would bring a rapid conclusion to the current polarization and conflict in South Africa, and lead to a short term (say less than two year) transition period.

A pro-sanctions argument at this stage would also have to be able to guarantee that the international community will rapidly reinvest in the "New Society". Historic experience has again shown that once investor confidence has been shaken, it takes many years and even decades for it to be restored. Zimbabwe is for instance still suffering the effects of sanctions introduced almost twenty years ago.

There is no evidence to suggest that it would be possible to achieve the type of surgical and momentous actions that could turn sanctions into an effective short term strategy. The only remote possibility of turning sanctions into such an instrument is if the world united to impose total financial sanctions, total embargoes on imports and exports, and is willing to sanction gold.

This would necessitate extreme measures, amounting to no less than a naval blockade around South Africa's coast, total restrictions on flights and shipping, and somehow closing the borders to Southern Africa. Even the most serious proponents of sanctions have not appeared to seriously believe that this is possible. Yet, anything less than this would merely mean that third parties would be enriched as they become alternative avenues for imports,

exports and undercover financing arrangements.

It appears that the only conclusion that can be reached is that sanctions are now creating a set of circumstances which, while undoubtedly creating pressure on the current system, are also contributing to economic erosion which will be felt for many decades to come.

The critical question that all proponents of sanctions must answer is whether they are willing to virtually guarantee the impoverishment of future generations, whilst making it extremely difficult for any Government to have the opportunity and ability to create and manage an effective, stable and prosperous political-economy. Alternatively it is necessary to openly state that such a future wasteland is accepted as an inevitable and expected consequence of change.

Given the above it is CBM's belief that sanctions must be seriously reconsidered, and that the time has come for the pursuit of alternative strategies which will not destroy our society for future generations.

THE EFFECT OF STRUCTURAL DISEMPOWERMENT ON NEGOTIATIONS

International specialists conclude that successful negotiation can only take place between relatively well balanced power groups. In the event of one group being substantially weaker than the other, a variety of power mechanisms and tactics will be utilized in an attempt to create a perceived power balance.

The years of State repression and discriminatory legislation have structurally disempowered Trade Unions, and other Black organizations.

The combination of political disempowerment through years of bannings, restrictions, mass detention have effectively served to eradicate or impoverish leadership structures. Any major organization or business has experienced how long it takes to grow effective managers. Imagine for instance if any company should be faced with a situation in which its entire senior management team is for some or other reason removed and has to be immediately replaced by lower level middle managers before they have been effectively mentored to fulfill the demands of the new position. Within six to twelve months these new senior managers are then for some or other reason removed and must be replaced by the supervisors of six to twelve months ago. Even before the supervisors have had the opportunity of being developed and mentored into their now senior managerial roles, they are removed and replaced by operators who only twenty-four months ago were in positions looking after only direct day-to-day operational needs and have never been exposed to the needs of leadership and strategic management required at senior levels. Could the company operate? Obviously not. This has been the type of structural disempowerment suffered by Trade Unions and Black organizations due to the years of incarceration of their leaders.

The political disempowerment has been accompanied by the social disempowerment wrought by Group Areas, Job Reservation, and forced removals. These laws have guaranteed a breaking down of the home unit, resulting in a situation where in most areas a large percentage and even majority of homes do not have the presence of the male adult head of the family. In urban cities such as Soweto close to 50% of male heads of the family are absent.

The environmental disempowerment and impoverishment suffered




by black South Africans over the past many decades has further contributed to an inability to fulfill the structural requirements of organizations such as Trade Unions, UDF, AZAPO, and even the ANC and PAC. Their entire environment mitigates against any development of skills, infrastructure, continuity of structures and leadership.

The third facet of the disempowerment is that of economic discrimination characterized by totally inadequate educational facilities for the black community. It has created leaders who have to rely primarily upon their own intuition and capacity to rise above the debilitating political, economic and social disempowerment. Those leaders who have had the privilege of a better education however in turn have to rely upon support staff, managers and leaders who have suffered such disempowerment.

This disempowerment as depicted in figure 6.1 has led to structural deficiencies as depicted in figure 6.2. It has created structures with depleted ranks in which there are undoubtedly some well equipped and competent leaders, but their efforts are diluted by people in positions who are not yet qualified to hold such positions, or alternatively positions are not filled.

This has the dual effect of forcing more senior leaders and managers to fulfill tasks two, three and even five levels below those that they should be concentrating on. It forces the senior leaders of Trade Unions and federations with several hundred thousand members, to fulfill junior operational and supervisory tasks which should be delegated to people at local levels. The structural disempowerment forces these leaders to relinquish their strategic responsibility and to instead busy themselves with little other than pure maintenance tasks. The second factor that combines with this is the lack of mentoring and leadership development that takes place in such depleted structures. The leaders themselves are invariably very young. The senior leadership within the ranks of Trade Unions and mass organizations such as the UDF and AZAPO are seldom older than 35, averaging an age less than 40. They have achieved their positions in life due to personal capacity and ability, but without the nurturing and developmental necessity of mentorship and guidance gained from the experience of their predecessors.

These factors have all combined to create a structural vacuum as depicted in figure 6.3.



The Implications of Structural Disempowerment:

Disempowered structures and organizations are characterized by a series of dynamics which contribute to inhibiting or retarding negotiation capacity, namely:

1. Organizations rely primarily on exclusive and adversarial power tactics, rather than relying upon negotiations focussed on interdependent solutions.
2. Massive communication breakdowns developed, making it very difficult to communicate between levels within the structures.
3. Communication breakdowns breed rumours and development of grape vine communications.
4. Leaders lack the support of resources that are essential for analysing and evolving effective strategies.
5. Sheer time pressure on overburdened leadership breeds reactive crisis management, inhibiting the development of strategy.
6. Leadership has very little time to contemplate and respond to shifts in circumstances and the general environment. This develops apparent dogmatic and intransigent attitudes to change. In time it results in inflexibility.
7. Organizations respond very slowly to changed circumstances and challenges.
8. Leadership develops high levels of stress and tension, further aggravating crisis management and reactive responses.
9. It is very difficult to maintain effective contact with constituencies. This either complicates and lengthens communication processes, or results in the alienation of leaders and their constituencies from one another. It is a prime territory for resulting in the "Muzarewa Effect" in which the constituency shifts, leaving the leader effectively powerless.
10. It may in certain circumstances give rise to autocratic

leadership styles.

11. The inability to develop the flexibility required for effective strategic planning and strategic management results in dependence on ideologically based or dogmatic positions. The difficulty of communicating changes and shifts to the constituencies in such a way that they both understand and accept the need for changes in strategy and policy further entrenches reliance upon ideological and dogmatic positions.
12. Leaders at senior levels are incapable of fulfilling their true leadership and strategic responsibilities. They are forced to compensate for the inadequacies at levels below them. In effect it binds them to day-to-day operational activities in an essentially reactive mode.
13. It seriously inhibits the capacity to interact with other organizations. The time burdens on leadership makes them less accessible. They have little time to prepare or give serious attention to subtle shifts in moods, attitudes and positions.
14. Not only are the leaders invariably deprived of the guidance and skills of elder and more experienced mentors, they in turn are incapable of spending the necessary time to develop and transfer effective skills to lower levels within the structures.

It turns into a vicious self-perpetuating cycle. Because the leaders do not have the time or backup support to develop effective skills in support of themselves, they are continuously drawn downwards within the structures to handle crisis. Because they are involved in such day-to-day management, they do not have the time to delegate. Because skills are not being developed, there are very few people capable of fulfilling tasks effectively. And so the leaders remain trapped on a wild roller coaster ride of continuous activity supported primarily by their own reserves of energy, intuition and responsive capacity.

15. Ultimately it becomes too laborious and difficult to even contemplate change and responding to new challenges. It becomes much easier to either simply fade away, or to slip into the comfort of combat.

The challenge that faces visionary leadership in South Africa within business, is to embark upon processes which will lead to the strengthening of mass-based organizations.

At this historic juncture of South Africa's development, democracy will never be achieved unless the structures are developed which are capable of handling, developing and inculcating the difficult but crucial values of democracy and interdependence in a striving for transformation to a non-racial society.

It is a challenge that cannot tolerate that purity of ideological intent, nor the perpetuation of primarily adversarial relationships. The pursuit for democracy will create strange bedfellows, but to succeed the initial discomfort of exploring and entering into such relationships must be overcome by mass-based organizations specifically, and all participants and proponents of a non-racial democratic society.