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REPORT OF MEETING BETWEEN COSAIU AND
COMMUNITY BASED ORGANISATIONS
REPORT ON GROUP DISCUSSIONS

:1. REPORT

BUILDING THE MASS DEMOCRATIC MOVEMENT UNDER CONDITIONSh
REPRESSION

A
Repression and reform must be seen as part of one strategy that is aimed at smashing democratic mass organisation and co-opting certain sections of the oppressed.

1.1 What are the objectives of repression?

(a) To reverse the gains of the Mass Democratic Movement.

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(b)' To weaken and smash our structures.

(c) To reduce the space for mass action.

(d) To make it difficult for organisations and activists to consult and communicate with the masses.

(e) To re-impose structures of control like the Black local authorities.

(f) To create the space for a reformist option.

(g) To create the space for the imperialist interventions.

(h) To ensure the long term survival of capitalism and present political power relations.

17:2 FORMS OF REPRESSION

It has taken the following forms.

t

(a) The imposition of the State of Emergency.

(b) The increasing use of vigilantes and death squads to disorganise and eliminate our activists.

- (c) Military occupation of our townships and schools and increasing police harassment of our activists and prohibition of meetings.
- (d) Media restrictions and news black out.
- (e) Economic strategies such as privatisation, deregulation, decentralisation, and the Labour Relations Act.

These strategies are being co-ordinated through the - JMC's.

1.3 WE SHOULD:

a. Deepen the ideological understanding of the MDM.

i. Develop a clear ideology. .

ii Develop ideological cohesion in an environment of open and free debate and democratic discussion.

iii Intensify our political education in order to develop a common understanding of our political positions e.g the Freedom Charter, the Constitutional guidelines and Socialism at a mass level and as part of our on-going mass struggles.

b. Re-build our organisational structures. A //

c. Build mass campaigns.

d. Develop an activists policy to ensure greater political discipline in our ranks.

e. Have effective communication with the masses and build internal democracy in our structures that are operating under conditions of repression.

f. Develop a progressive leadership style.

ft a g. Develop an overall programme for the MDM.

h. Develop strategic thinking at all levels of our organisations.

; FURTHER POINTS ON BUILDING MASS CAMPAIGNS

w a. To recognise the relationship between building organisation and building campaigns.

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tb. Campaign should be seen as part of our-on-going process of struggle.

c. Campaigns should be used to deepen organisation, ideological understanding, and to destabilise the ruling class.

d. We must ensure the capacity to take and implement campaigns.

e. There should be proper evaluation of our campaigns on an on-going basis.

f. Ensure thorough consultations and involvement of the masses in the campaigns.

9. We should use campaigns and strengthen the political coherence of the masses.

. h. It is important to organise people around their local and regional problems and link this to the national and international political situation.

1.4 WHAT ARE THE MAIN CAMPAIGNS OF THE MDM AT THE PRESENT MOMENT

a. Peace among the people in Natal

b. Building the anti-apartheid coalition

c. Campaign against repression

1. The Labour Relations Act

2. The State of Emergency

3. Campaign against apartheid hangings

d. Release of political prisoners

e. The campaign against all bodies of minority

1', rule.

1.5 CO-ORDINATION

Co-ordinating Committees consisting of representatives from the different organisations must be set up at a local, regional and national level. The constitutional structures of our

tr. Vorganisations must delegate smaller working groups to co-ordinate specific campaigns.

REPORI 2 NEGOTIATIONS

.1' ATTITUDE AND POSITIQN ON NEQQTIAEIONS

a. Our strategic objective is the transfer of power to the masses of our people. There are different paths

(i) Seizure in a classical revolutionary Sense.

(ii) Via negotiations.

b. The MDM does not have in-principle objection to negotiations.

UNDER WHAT CONDITIONS WOULD WE CONSIDER NEGOTIATING AND WITH WHAT OBJECTIVE?

a. CONDITION

There must exist conditions within which the Democratic Movement is able to organise and mobilise freely.

b. OBJECTIVES:

Ushering in national democracy and setting the scene for an advance to socialism.

We acknowledge that negotiated settlements involve compromises and we need to ensure that the balance of forces on the ground are such that it rules out possibilities on compromising our ultimate objectives.

IN THE EVENT OF NEGOTIATIONS MATERIALISING WHAT IS THE ROLE OF MASS DEMOCRATIC MOVEMENT ?

Our role is at all times to organise and mobilise the broadest possible number of people into the struggle for democracy.

Should negotiations materialise, our role will be to mobilise and organise the broadest possible number of people to support our negotiating positions.

HOW SHOULD WE RESPOND TO IMPERIALIST ATTEMPTS TO PROMOTE NEGOTIATIONS:

The imperialists should not be treated as a homogeneous bloc. Whilst their ultimate objective is to preserve the "Free enterprise" system, they have different paths to that goal. We might have to find the most relevant contradictions amongst them which we can use to isolate the most reactionary sections of imperialism.

The democratic movement has never opposed genuine negotiations but the conditions for a permanent and lasting peace must be created.

WHY ARE THE IMPERIALISTS PROMOTING NEGOTIATIONS AT THIS POINT?

a. They are responding to the advances made by the Democratic Movement that include the growth of the Anti Apartheid Movements in the imperialist countries.

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b. They are unsure of the ability of the regime to safeguard their interests.

REPORT 3 - THE CONSTITUTIONAL GUIDELINES

The discussion on the constitutional guidelines should not be seen as separate from our on-going mass struggles. The constitution of a future South Africa is dependent on the balance of forces at the point of transition and this is dependent upon the extent to which we build the working class in our country. Various ideas were put forward as to - how we could begin to take up the debates around the constitutional guidelines e.g that workers should begin looking at demands around a Workers Charter, Women around the Women's Charter education around the Education Charter etc.

Our approach to the guidelines should be campaign . orientated. We need to focus on developing media and education in our ranks that promote rigorous debate on the constitutional guidelines. To achieve this we need to set up a joint working group.

GROUP 4 - DISCUSSION ON ORGANISING IN THE WHITE COMMUNITY

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ORGANISING THE WHITE COMMUNITY

GENERAL DISCUSSION

a. The peculiarities within Coloured, Indian and white communities must be taken into account. '

b. Parliamentary politics is entrenched in the white community and this presents difficulties in i . establishing democratic organisations.

c. White workers are privileged but have an objective interest in the overthrow of apartheid to which they must be made conscious of.

d. There is crisis facing alliance between state and capital. There is fragmentation within business community with some sections seeking relationship with MDM but for their own interests of furthering capitalism. Our task to prevent capital determining political terrain. We must isolate the most reactionary sections of the ruling bloc inside and outside parliamenti

e This must be done within the context of understanding imperialists' manoeuvres and not allowing our long term objectives to be compromised.'

f. Majority of whites including white workers have benefited from and bolstered apartheid

B. WHITE WORKERS

a. The general crisis of the apartheid state is causing change in political allegiance away from Nat to the C.P. although some are identifying themselves with majority of workers.

b. We must organise white workers around the specific grievances and develop programmes which are built around these by drawing them into our unions and also developing tactical alliances with white unions . .

c. While there are prospects of drawing in white workers around short-term material interests, there are limitations around drawing them in around our long term political interests. We should not be over optimistic. White workers are not a primary force for change

Task of organising whites falls on the whole democratic movement, not just white democrats. The democratic organisations in the MDM must inform the perceptions of peripheral organisations. We must ' stress the importance of popularising our principle of non racialism. The MDM must create forums for debate around issues facing those working in the white community.

Although there is limited potential we must draw as many as possible into the MDM. . .

C. QEMQBAELQ EABEX

DP has vested interests in maintaining capitalism. D.P. - borne of the deepening crisis in South Africa. The MDM must reiterate on the illegitimacy of parliament and thus cannot remain silent on the formation of DP. We must pose challenges to the DP to address the basic demands of our ' people, State of Emergency, military conscription dismantling of apartheid etc. Within white politics - power does not lie with parliament but in the security management committees. The centre of power in South Africa lies in the hands of the democratic movement.

IDASA is not part of the MDM but not exactly the same as DP. We must ensure that the activities and platforms they engage in serve the interests of the MDM. While Idasa is not less commitment to capitalism and free enterprise than DP it does have a role to play in exposing whites to views of the oppressed. It must not replace democratic formations in white community.

D. Business confidence has been shaken by mass struggles resulting in sections of the liberal bourgeoisie seeking a relationship with the MDM. The long term interests of liberal bourgeoisie is fundamentally different to the interests of the MDM. We need to identify minimum demands on which they might agree with us. Their primary concern is to discuss future security in a future post apartheid system. We must pressurise them to act on immediate problems e.g LRA conscription State of Emergency. A formal alliance with the MDM is inappropriate.

ANTI-APARTHEID COALITION

BEEQBES.

Why is it possible to have a anti-apartheid coalition?

Conditions have changed because of our mass struggles that have begun to fragment the social base of the ruling bloc and resulted in a number of groups and organisations that have created what we define today as the forces of social change. The following is the way in which the group conceptualise forces for social change.

- a. The Mass Democratic movement. _
- b. Forces who are opposed to apartheid and are pro-MDM.
- c. Forces that are opposed to apartheid and are neither opposed nor pro MDM. i
- d. Forces which are ready to break with apartheid but . whose long term interests are not with the MDM.
- e. Forces that are opposed to apartheid but also_ opposed to the MDM.

These forces can be divided into two broad categories:

A\$. 1. Some of these forces we will take actions with on specific issues. These are _ organisations usually with a mass base.

2. ' Same of these forces we can agree with on a minimum programme of democratic demands. In relating to these forces we should recognise 2 that they may be regional, local and i national differences which means that at times we can relate to them nationally and not regionally or vice-versa.

WHAT IS THE UNIFYING PERSPECTIVE OF THE AAC

1. Commitment to a democratic South Africa based on one person one vote.
2. Unity and organisation against repression.
3. Freedom of association.
4. Freedom of speech.
5. The release of political prisoners.

REPORT 2 - WHAT ARE THE OBJECTIVES OF THE AAC

1. To organise and mobilise the widest possible range of anti-apartheid forces in action against apartheid.
2. To spread the influence of the Mtfto widest possible sections of our country.

/

3. To isolate the reactionary core of apartheid.

REPORT 3 - WHAT FORCES CAN BE CONSIDERED AND WHAT IS THE NATURE OF THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN THESE FORCES

The group felt that minimum demands need to be identified. The process of consultation would have to be discussed fully within our ranks and can also take place with forces who are close to us. The AAC should be seen not as a permanent structure but a tactical alliance around minimum demands. The convening process must be more effective and a bigger group involving those organisations most actively opposed to apartheid should be set up.

REPORT - 4 WHAT IS THE PROCESS TOWARDS THE AAC _ .

We should have an extensive process of consultations. We need to set up joint seminars at a local, regional and national level and make sure that there is effective feedback to our constituencies. A discussion paper should be drafted for this purpose. A distinction must be made between a core and other anti-apartheid forces.

By mid year we should have set up a national convening structure that is broader than Cosatu and UDF. Such a committee should be set up before a public announcement is made. The process should ensure that no divisions are caused in our own ranks. To this extent we must not be too hasty and should be clear about our overall programme.

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CUIQRENT CONDI'rIONS

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knowing how to assess accurately the strengths and
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vtctory. Understanding and knowing how to assess our own forces and their
position in the field 0! struggle means that we possess another v
Understanding and
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condition for victory. This discussion paper is an attempt to get to grips
with the present conjuncture. It is an endeavor to correctly grasp the
political moment so as to inject into the arena of struggle a decisive push that
will bring liberation day near. 4

In the past few years the political situation in Southern Africa in general and
South Africa in particular. has been In a state of flux.

and the position and pnsturn of the different
The balance of forces
actors in thn pnlitico-military
tidld are changing with such rapidity that the need to constantly a
assess. analyse and re-evaluate the situation is always imperative.

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OBJECTIVE CONDITIONS

A. INTERNA TIONAL AND SOU THERN AFRICAN SI TUA TION

The Southern African situation can be summed up into four major areas.
Firetiy the battle of Culto Cuinavaie has changed the political and military map
of the region. .

Fidel Castro said that the history of Southern Africa will he written before
and'nft'er Cuito Cuhlavale. What this means is that the battle of Cuito
Culnavale is awatershed in terms of tilting the military scales to the side of
the frontline countries. For years South Africa has been dictating terms to
her nelghbours because of Its military dominance.

Cuinavale has brought about the following scenario:

The defeat at Culto

The myth of South Africa's invincibiility has been squashed

. South Africa was forced to negotiate and agree to Implement the U.N.'s
resolution 435 and consequently Namibian Independence.

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3. Seri s schisms are coming to the fore within the ruling bloc and within
th lonallst Party

4. A significant number of white people are beginning to queetlon the
morality of detendlng apartheid

5. The morale of those who fight for freedom In South Afrlce an& the
black population In general has been tremendously raised.

6. There are contradictions between the military and the foreign affairs.

7.

purchasing some of the most sophisticated fighter p
down the echelons of apartheid edifice.

in Botswana

lanes has sent cold shivers

The arrests of South Afrlcen eoente

and Zimbabwe le also a blow to South Africa's wer-mongering.

'e Inability to bring about fer-

reachlng changes In the country. Their diplomatic adventures have not won
them any new friends.

Fourthly. the move to lessen economic dependence on South A

(rice eeeme to be

progressing.

. The more the ANC'e eteture end

influence grows. the more South Africa's legitimacy ls eroded.

B. E CONOH! C SA NC TIONS

One of the most potent weapons by the internetio

nai community eoeinet

apartheid has been the sanctions campaign.

Sanctions hit both the ruling

group and the ruling class where it hurts most - in their pockets. The Mess
Democratic Movement needs to comprehend fully this area of our struggle.

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The brief points touched below are inadequate, but could serve as a point of departure in our discussion of the issue.

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We usually talk about capital Investment which takes different forms:

I. Investment of physical assets

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This means that the investor brings into the country the capital for the establishment and building of factories. This form of investment will obviously create jobs.

ii. Financial investment

This may be in the form of loans to banks, government and multinationals. This kind of investment does not necessarily create jobs. The recipients may use the money for projects that do not create jobs. The government may use the money for military and other repressive measures.

iii. Investment for Technological advancement

In this case the investor will use the capital to replace obsolete equipment with technologically advanced equipment. Capital could also be used to replace workers with machines and robots. Clearly, this means that workers will lose their jobs. More and more employers have resorted to this measure to cut down in the long run on costs. We should remember that machines don't go on strike.

Different forms of sanctions

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Sanctions may take the following forms:

1. Trade embargo

2. Disinvestment

3 Divestment

Trade embargo

This is a situation where South Africa's goods are prevented from entering or being sold in countries abroad. The trade unions have been the most reliable on this campaign. Most countries are unwilling to embark on a trade embargo.

If, for instance, gold which has been keeping the South African economy afloat, was to be embargoed, there will be a severe economic and political ramifications in this country.

Disinvestment

Sanctions have mostly taken the form of disinvestment. This is a situation where investors withdrew their capital and technological know-how from a country. The American people, through their congress, have been the most persistent and consistent of disinvestors. They have, at every turn fought with the republican administration which always tries to demerit to prop up the apartheid regime. As a result most disinvestment has been from the American firms.

Divestment

This is a situation where the investors sell their investments to local business people. Some investors use local front companies to stay in the country, while pretending to have disinvested.

We must strengthen sanctions

For us to help bring the day of liberation closer, and minimize a blood-bath in this country, we should strengthen and expand the sanction campaign. This should not be misconstrued to mean that we are trying to elevate the international struggle to a higher level than the other pillars. On the contrary, we see the international struggle not in isolation from the other areas but as part and parcel and as a significant way of putting pressure on the ruling bloc to abandon apartheid. It is not enough to always expect that we support sanctions because we are prepared to suffer for our freedom. While this is true, it is not necessarily the main reason for our support of

sanctions. We support sanctions because we know that they weaken the state's resources to an extent that ripe conditions are created for a decisive blow that will throw apartheid into the ash-heap of history for ever.

C. S 7/1 TE OF ORGANISATION

The objective conditions in South Africa are ripe for a great leap forward. To elucidate this point, we should look into the mood of the masses, state of our organisations, the conditions within the living community, the middle ground forces, as well as the international situation.

At the time of our banning last year, we summed up our organisational capacity in the following way:

Firstly, there are areas where our structures have been completely wiped out. These areas, particularly in remote and small towns, did not have the necessary organisational infrastructures to withstand heavy repression. The jailing and driving out, in some areas, of the most experienced and dedicated cadres created conditions where our structures collapsed. In these areas the system managed to re-install their structures which were crushed during the 1984- 1986 period.

Secondly there are areas where our organisations have been weakened but are still in existence. The state has re-introduced their structures but are unable to assume dominance. In some of these areas there are massive upgrading schemes through which the state hopes to tilt the balance of power in its favour. But this has failed because our people see upgrading schemes as a victory for our struggles of the past few years. So, instead of giving credit to the state and its functionaries, they see this as positive results of struggle and sacrifice. It is important to note that in situations of this nature, the state may manage to win support if we don't constantly highlight the fact that upgrading schemes are a victory for the people.

Thirdly, there are areas which became stronger during the State of Emergency. This was possible because our organisations embarked on sustained campaigns like rent boycotts even under heavy repression.

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The situation, as observed in last year February, is still prevalent today. Summarising the national situation based on the above analysis and also because of last year's successful campaigns, we can conclude that the repressive strategy of the state has failed to resolve the situation to the regime's favour. Our people have refused to shift their political support away from the Mass Democratic Movement. This was clearly demonstrated by last year's stayaways and the low percentage polls in the October 26 elections. Having said the above, it is imperative to point out that while we have survived the heavy onslaught of the state, our organisational capacity particularly to co-ordinate, embark and sustain campaigns, has been weakened. This situation was gradually becoming worrying after the February 1988 bannings, but it became acute towards the end of the year. Added to this, is the declaration of the UDF as an affected organisation which has had a debilitating effect on our ability to co-ordinate and launch campaigns. What is facing us today is the need to adapt to repressive conditions. This means we should have the ability to combine semi-underground activity and above-board work. The need to adopt a semi-underground posture should not be divorced from the need to fight at all times for legal space. Coupled with this is the fact that because a significant number of our structures as well as the UDF itself cannot receive funds on account of the bannings, we should seek creative ways of overcoming this serious obstacle.

I believe we have the will and the character to survive this repressive onslaught. We should be mindful of the fact that we have faced similar situations in the past (though of different proportions).

In August 1984 when the state acted against us, co-ordination at a national level was destabilised. But that was for a brief period. Soon after that, co-ordination was re-established, and we were able to have a successful national conference in April 1985 - Just eight months later.

Soon after the conference there was another clampdown in May 1985 when people like Terror, Pope and Moss were detained. Later in July-August many more NEC members were detained including the National chairperson and

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others. Once again. co-ordination was disrupted. However. by the end of 1985, we had re-grouped and were able to convene the inaugural conference of the National Education Crisis Committee and our structures at the local level were able to co-ordinate campaigns.

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So. we can say that we have had numerous occasions when the democratic movement was attacked at both regional and national levels and on each occasion we recovered. it is this experience which makes one optimistic about the future.

D. MASS DEMOCRATIC MOVEMENT

in order to evaluate the Mass Democratic Movement, we need to define the Mass Democratic Movement, what comprises its perspectives and content and what style of leadership guides it.

i. What is the Mass Democratic Movement?

it is a movement with a mass approach to issues and is manifested through organised formations.

Over the past six years or so important national formations emerged - formations which have an organised grassroots membership and are therefore mass in character. These include the UDF, Cosatu and the National Education Crisis Committee (NECOC). The South African Council of churches has begun to participate in mass campaigns with the above formations.

These organisations are guided by the concept of unity in action. There are many other groupings which are responsive to the programme of the mass democratic movement and act in unity within its broad perspective. There are also a diversity of forces that come under MDM's influence but are not necessarily under its discipline.

The organisations within the MDM interact with each other in a hundred and one formal and informal ways. For many grassroots members of these organisations. there is little difference between one or the other. However.

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what is of greater significance is the growing commonality in the strategies and tactics of these structures. The origins of this can be traced back to the Campaign for National United Action launched in September 1986 by Coetzee, um: and the NECC. i

ii. What is the perspective of the MDM?

The perspective of the MDM is a non-racial democratic and united South Africa. This perspective is both an expression of the grievance of the masses which propel them to action as well as an expression of the solution to the problem that gives rise to these grievances.

III. What is the content of the MDM?

The content of the MDM is to give the broad working masses of our people control over their daily lives. This is accurately expressed in the first clause of the Freedom Charter: The People Shall Govern. This means that our people must participate in all areas of their lives, be it schools, factories, townships, regional structures, national structures, etc. We already see the manifestation of people governing themselves through street. block and area committees as well as shop steward councils. Thus. ensuring that the working masses are the dominant and determinant force in our struggle is the content of the MDM.

IV. What is the style of the MDM leadership?

The MDM is a movement which is guided by a collective rather than an individual style of leadership. The leadership should always be democratic and accountable to its constituency in particular. and the working masses in general. It is the leadership which participates and engages in campaigns and action with the masses against oppression and exploitation.

v. Interim assessment of the MDM

While in the past few years the Mass Democratic Movement consisted of the UDF and trade unions, today the situation has changed drastically. The Mass Democratic Movement has grown tremendously since the state of emergency

war. declared. the churches. which some lewtyears ago were ieluctant m m: .. up political issues (save lor a few priests) have now taken a dellant stand against apartheid to an extent that we believe they have reach point of no lntm m

Some organisations like the CTPSA. Tasa. Inyandza and others have adopted the Freedom Charter and are working closely with us. Others like Lawyers for Human Rights. South African Soccer Association; National Soccer Assocletlon. Black Management Forum. Sebswa and many more. see themselves as allies of the Mass Democratic Movement. V

More mlddle-ground constltuencles, groups and orgenlsations have either moved closer to or joined the Mass Democratic Movement In the past two years than In earlier years. Groups llke Naicoc, which was a breeding'ground for town councillors and other collaborators, are today close allies of the MDM. The politics of the Mass Democratlcl Movement have spread far and wide. eBantustan leaders such as Mopell of Qwa-Qwa and Ramodike of Lebowa are making the demands of the Mass Democratlcl Movement 3 pre-condition for participation in the Natlonal Council. Some parliamentarians are also taking In a nutshell. the chipping away of many theii-pue from our structures.

The important elements from the edifice of the regime to our side is growing. ranks of those who are fighting for freedom has increased. It is important to note that in all these developments both the Front's affiliates and Cosatu have played a crucial role and in the process won themselves the mantle of centrality In the antl-apartheid struggle.

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E. THE STAIE

The South African guvernmnt has since 1985 abandoned relorln in favour of The aim oi thestate is to crush opposition and create a political This

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wasteland where there will be no voice of the mass democratic movement. ls clearly demonstrated by what ls called the low intensity cnnflict rm-auluuuns to the

The state ls also bogged down by indecision. lacl' .4 uulit.....

problem and divisions wlthin Its ranks. These divlsions are a result of pressures of the struggle both locally and internationally.

resolutions. The lnuuuuutm. .,

mllltery lntellllgeneyd police organs means that declslone mu Wm.

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take crucial declslone ol' the country. This hu caused urloue rlfte between those who have been entrenched In the em. Securly Council Ind thou outside It.

More and more whites are Ioslng confldence In perllementary polltlce because the legltlmecy of parllament has been eroded by the fact that the major declslon making process has been shlfte to the State Securly Council. In eddtlon whltes are using the MDM as a reference polnt because of Its Influence and clear vlslon of the future.

At the level of the oppressed people, the local organs of the State Securly Councils vlz. Joint Management Securly Councille (JMsc'e) have trled to lnfltrate, coerce and smash popular organlsatlone. This has been euccmful In some areas, but e failure In others.

The reasons why the JMSC's have failed In a number of areas are:

- For JMSC's to be effectlve, they need elpt of resources - the government ls unable to provide those resources.
- JMSC's need widespread support of the people to be able to lnfltrate and dlsrupt orgenlsetlons. Thle ls very tl'fflcult In areas where organlsations are strong and entrenched.
- JMSC's may be effectlve if the llvlng standards of the people Improve. This ls unllkely In the present economlc clmmete.
- People are reluctant to be Involved In government structures. glven the 1984 - 86 period.

The state's attempt to wln the support of the people through puppet structures has felled. The Netlonel Council is e non-starter. Further, the 10

representatlvee 6f whlte people are not the one. who w

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state is unable to come up with any meaningful reforms because the backlash from the white electorate. but most importantly. because the cling to old racist stereotypes.

. r.. HIE ECONOMY

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The South African economy is shrinking. This is firstly because of the amount of money spent on the war in Namibia and Angola, the destabilisation campaign of the frontline states. as well as the overspending on the SADF and general repression. Secondly, the overspending of the bureaucracy. with every sector like education, welfare, etc. having 13 departments encompassing the bantustans as well as the tri-cameral parliament. Thirdly, sanctions are beginning to have a devastating effect on the economy. The South African government and their supporters seem to be running out of steam in trying to stem the tide of sanctions. At the moment, the state is desperately trying to negotiate the re-scheduling of loans which expires next year. This is a very sensitive area for the regime. because if anything goes wrong inside the country, like a hunger striker dying in detention, the international community may be unsympathetic to their request for re-scheduling the loans.

G. STRATEGIC INITIATIVE

Those objective conditions are not taking place in a vacuum, nor did they arise on their own. They are a result of our struggles and sacrifices. The net result of these struggles and sacrifices is that the strategic initiative has shifted to the liberation movement. But we need to explain what we mean by the concept strategic initiative.

By strategic initiative I understand the terms or terrain of activity and struggle and the course of events which are determined by a broad programme, framework or theoretical thinking. initiative in this sense is different from a campaign. A campaign becomes a tool for realising the strategic initiative. I will give examples to clarify this point. in South Africa the strategic initiative has for hundreds of years been in the hands of the colonialists. When the National Party took power in 1948, they inherited that initiative from their predecessors.

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In the 50's, 60's and better part of the 70's the Verwoerdian approach was the framework which dictated the course of events. In other words the Verwoerdian approach was the form which the strategic initiative took. Concretely, this meant the establishment of the bantustans, the promulgation of the Bantu Education Act, Immorality Act and a host of other racist laws. These issues were the terrain of struggle - which was chosen by the state. The response of our organisations was largely determined by what the state was doing within their breed programme.

When PW Botha took over, the strategic initiative took the form of a reform process. This approach has dictated the terms of struggle till 1984. The terrain of struggle, most campaigns and the formation of the UDF itself, were largely shaped by the reform politics of the National Party. However, from the beginning of the 80's the National Party's monopoly of the strategic initiative was beginning to be challenged by the liberation movement. In 1985 the initiative was grabbed by the liberation movement. Now, the big question is what is meant by this? This means that from 1985 the course of events in this country or the terrain of struggle and activity have been largely determined by the concept of a non-racial, democratic and united South Africa. This is concretely manifested through the struggle in the 1980's. The struggle for community control of schools, the fight against dummy institutions and for their replacement with people's structures like block and street committees, as well as the struggle against puppet unions and the emergence of democratic ones. i.e. the living embodiment of the demand for people to govern themselves.

These demands, were accompanied by the highest level of unrest ever seen in South Africa and, as we said, it was at this juncture that the strategic initiative shifted from the NP to the liberation movement.

To the demand and the struggle for adequate housing and the proper maintenance of the townships, the government and big business were responding with the upgrading of townships and other measures. To the struggle for democratic structures at the township level, they have responded by attempts to revamp the town council. To the demand for people to

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govern. the state responded by comingt up with the idea of a National Council 2. Anti- ar
theld malltton t
and the October elections. So the g'overnment ls forced do certain things " 6
t because 0' "'9 programme and the pressures 0' "'9 liner. "'Wement- Our efforts to Isola
te and neutralise the most dangerous elements wlthln the
them are many other exmunles of South Africans responding to theI Initiatives ruling bloc
need to contlnue. We should evaluate efforts made last year to
uhlhu liberation muvmm-nt. The many treks tn the MIC. the mnwhnq interest unite all the a
ntl-aparthold forces. and on the beets of that. continue Hlth
lntthe Freedom Charter by a cross-section of South Africans and the positive that process
. The AAC ls part of our on-golng struggle and must bed he
response to the Anti-Apartheid Conference initiative _indicate who dictates the Incorpora
ted Into our daily campalngs.
terms of activity.

3. Campaign against repression

The mistake which we otten commit typo try to assess the strategic initiative
in terms of what the UDF and Cosatu'have done In a matter of months. The a. Unite against
Labour Relations Amendment Act
fact that we failed to perform certain tasks at a particular moment. does not
necessarily change the fact that our orientation and objectives are dictating The resolut
ions taken at the Workers Summit In March must be made known
the terms of struggle at this particular historical phase. within the ranks of the MDM. A
ll ectlvls ts need to be part of the effort. to
unite workers and fight against the Labour Reletlone Amendment Act.
We must also nnt make the mistake of reducing strategic initiative to a
campaign. Campaigns are Important for a movement to keep the strategic b. Organise agains
t the State of Emergency
Initiative to itself. but the twn are not synonymous.
The recent hunger strike has shown that our determinatlon can brlng about
MSKS FACING HIE MASS DEMOCRATIC MOVEMENT the necessary changes In this country. The MDM m
ust take up the fight
against the SOE. Detnlnees have done their bit. now Is the time for the rest
In the '35! few years the MOM has made many important advances- As we of us to engage the
state on this Issue. Most of our able and experienced
have shown. the size and Influence of the MDM has grown tremendOUS'Y- We " activists are
under severe restrictlone and therefore we muet launch a
need to take up more campaigns to keep the pressure on the regime. We campaign to have re
strictions removed.
should identify tasks whigh are appropriate for local, regional and national '
situations. Conditions at the local and regional level will determine the tasks C. Mobil/
se against apartheid hangings
lacing us. As the national level we have Identified the following tasks:
A slgnlflcant number of our ectlvls ts are on death row at the moment. These
1. Peace among our people in Natal are the young patriots who fearlessly took on the migh
t. of the epurtheld
regime. They have been sentenced to hang because of thelr love for a free,
We must spare no effort in achieving peace In Natal. Many lives have been non-raclal, dem
ocratic South Africa. A dlverslty of forces must be mobilised
lost. Every patriot should 'seek ways of stopping the fighting in that region- Into a mov
ement against apartheid hangings. A concerted International
this task is not facing the Deonle of Natal Alone. but all the DEOD'G Of this campalgn sh
ould be launched to save these patriots. Ways Ineed to be sought
country. Let us build a movement for peice In Natal. to strengthen the Save the Patrlote
Campaign. We must no let them hang.

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4. Release of Political Prisoners

Our struggles, campaigns and pressures have pushed the state to a point where it has released some of our leaders and is about to release 12 more.

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Having pushed the state so far, we seem to be lacking ideas of how to utilise their releases to the benefit of our struggle. Mbeki, Gwala, Mandela, Sisulu and the others are not the leaders of the MDM alone, but of all the people of South Africa. We need, therefore, to involve people from all walks of life to be part of a campaign for the release and welcoming of our leaders. This campaign must build structures at all levels - local, regional and national.

5. Struggle against bodies of minority rule

The struggle against the bodies of minority rule has strengthened most of our structures, particularly at the local level. The state had hoped to use the October Elections to revamp the ailing puppet bodies - but it was a big flop. Our propaganda needs to make it clear to every resident in the townships that upgrading schemes are a result of our struggles and therefore a victory for the people. We should further ensure that we don't lose the initiative on the question of the rent boycott, especially in Soweto and the Vaal areas, where town councils are trying to use our demands to gain popularity.

6. Build local campaigns

There are many local issues around which we can build campaigns. In the Transvaal, the fight against petty apartheid should be strengthened. The struggle against removals is another area of struggle where our people have shown determination. We need to find new ways of organising the rural areas to ensure the building of strong structures that will withstand heavy repression. Let us reorganise our structures, rebuild our street, bloc and area committees, strengthen our shop steward councils and restructure our students democratic societies.

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CONCLUSION

The balance of forces is now in our favour. Conditions are ripe for a qualitative advance, which means that the time has come for an all round onslaught on all aspects of oppression and exploitation. The campaign we have identified above, as well as strong, democratic, grassroots structures can ensure that we don't lose the strategic initiative. We must always be mindful of the fact that the state and the imperialists will try to regain the initiative. In order to take a great leap forward, we will have to install discipline within our ranks, build ideological cohesion and develop a democratic leadership style appropriate to our structures.

The interaction between the different components of the MDM, should be turned into a true fighting alliance, guided by unity in action, as well as spreading our political and moral influence to all sections of our people.

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0 NATIONAL CULTURAL FLIBERATION MOVEMENT

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Ref. 3 2434 i . ' '

Hessrs. A. Gumede, M. Morobe, - . - ilst June 1989

E. Barayi and J. Naidoo '

c/o COSATU Head Office ' V

P.O. Box 1019

Johannesburg

2000

FAX NO: __Q11_;g_3_4-6528

Gentlemen,

Thank you ggntiemen for your further letter of the lat June on tho
question 0: the meeting we both agree is necessary. 2 5- . -

I did state at KwaMakhuta that we needed to talk about the lpeace
ptocees and everyone who dies is a.dramatic reason why we should do
so with the greatest possible speed. .

In inviting you gentlemen to Ulundi I was inviting you to come and
have preliminary discussions about a peace conference where the
question of a neutral venue would be important. I ifail to .
understand .why Ulundi is net.acceptable as.a venue for this first -
meeting. It isnot a peace conference as such.. 0 -- '

Mr. Gumede, we must now break this impasse. The Central Committee
of Inkatha is meeting on Saturday 3rd June. You are invited to
address . .9 central committee on this issue of the need for at
venue at er than Ulundi. I do_not mind if you bring Mt; Bhrayi
With you. Nor do I mind in fact whethet'you, Mr. Barayi, come and
bring Mr. Gumade with you 'or whether you come on your 'own.

Whatever your internal protocols are, we need to table :this
question of a venue. ' - 2

It must obviously be very important to you, gentlemen, because you
are holding up all discussions which could bring about a. peace
gonferenoe by your refusal to accept an invitation which I extonded
a you. . . ::

ECU BY:CDSQTHU HO ; 1- 6-39 5:23PM : - 9 3353 74EBTB a 27113346523:# 2
JUN 211 '89 17:13 KNQ-ZULU GOVT.ULUNDI ,, p_2

I continue labouring for peace and it would be nice if I could feel that a joint commitment to establish peace could be made by all of us. I gain absolutely nothing politically by your coming or not coming to Ulundi. Inkatha's power base and it as a constituency is in no way affected by whether or not you accept my invitation. What is at stake is the maximum effort we should be making to bring about peace as a common commitment by our three organisations. You will be received in Ulundi with all the etiquette and dignity you could wish for, Mr. Gumede and Mr. Barayi. I am sure that if you came and discussed the matter we somehow between us could break this impasse and get a roundtable discussion going about the need for a peace conference. ' - ?'

Thank you gentlemen for your attention. I do hope you will now respond positively so that we can put the matter to rest.
yours sincerely,

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CHIEF MINISTER, KWAZULU '

PRESIDENT OF INKATHA

PRESS STATEMENT

1/1/97

Jabu Ndlovu died in the early hours of

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comment as follows

morning in Pietermaritzburg. One thousand three hundred people have died in Pietermaritzburg so far. The death of Comrade Jabu Ndlovu, the two other members of his family, is a further tragic and farcical statement on the death and the killings in Natal.

The death of Comrade Jabu, her husband and daughter took place in circumstances that show to what extent Law and order has been allowed to collapse in Natal.

153: Ndlovu was a senior shop steward of HUMSO in

Pretoria. She was active in COSATU Local in

the community affairs of Imbali. She had been threatened

that however she was brave enough to represent the

the community at a press conference in Johannesburg

where COSATU made very serious allegations related to the

2 case concerning the death of Thulani Ngcobo and his

1:

action has been taken against Thulani Ngcobo and the

Director of Police continues to obscure the unacceptable

conduct of his police force and such warlords by making

these allegations against COSATU and the UDF. 1/1/97 ? : u : % - V

9th 30th midnight on Sunday 21st May "Jabu Ndlovu's home"

was attacked and burnt to the ground. Her husband and

daughter died. She was critically injured. and her 13 year

old daughter and 20 year old nephew received serious burn

wounds. 1

COSATU alleged that Thulani Ngcobo and other unidentified

elements were implicated in the attack. What steps have

the police taken to prevent such attacks and to identify

the attackers. These questions are critical in view of

the allegations made 1st March this year by COSATU on the

role of the police in vigilante violence in Imbali.

This situation is intolerable. The matter is made even

worse when death threats made to local chiefs prevented

Jabu and her husband from being buried in their ancestral

home in the Pietermaritzburg hills.

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We also note that the police immediately tried to place

restrictions on the funeral of Jabu's husband and

daughter but placed no such restrictions the week before

on the funeral of the notorious Mphumalange warlord

Nkheli.

These events have finally frustrated the beable or
Pietermaritzburg to the extent that they believe an effective
protest has to be made to bring home to
everyone that Violence must stop.

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A peaceful protest action will commence in
Pietermaritzburg on the 5th June and will continue to the
7th June. The community makes the following calls:

x The killings of our D&ODLE must stop.

t The police misconduct must stop.

3 There must be an independent commission of enquiry. -139
the role of the police in Pietermaritzburg.

We are the right to bury our dead without fear at

c

k The restrictions on ex-detainees must be lifted in
order to ensure their safety.

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We fully support these demands and sympathise with the
people of Pietermaritzburg. The failure of the police,
army and courts to have any impact on these political
killings has inevitably driven the people of
Pietermaritzburg to take protest action. The vulnerable
position of detainees because of their known location and
fixed reporting times is a very serious matter; Many
lives are at stake. i -

The need for peace in Natal is absolutely vital. We have
once again communicated to Chief Minister Euthulezi the
need for a Peace Conference and an effective peace
process. The constituencies of COSATU/UDF and Inkatha
have to be drawn into this process and that is why a
neutral venue is needed. The political recognition of
Ulundi cannot be allowed to delay a peace process. What
is essential is the recognition by all concerned of the
critical necessity for a peace process.

COSATU and NUMSA have also communicated to the British
TUC and many unions and local councils in Britain who met
Comrade Jabu on a recent trip she undertook to the UK.
She led a choir to the United Kingdom as part of the
BTR-Sarmcol campaign. Her warm and active personality
made a lasting personal impression on many in the UK.
We have asked the British unions to take supportive
action in our demands for peace in Natal.

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6!): Float
Nation! Amman House
Cm. Rissik & Andaman SB.
JOHANNESBURG zoo:
P.O. Box 1019.1hb. 2000
Tel: (011) t92-IMO/1/2/3/4/5
Telex: #51728
Fax: 834-6528

PRESS STATEMENT ZSMAY 1989

RE: MPOPHOMENI INTERDICT AGAINST MINISTER OF LAW AND ORDER
AND OTHERS

'NUMSA, a CCSATU affiliate, has obtained a final interdict restraining members of the SA Police from assaulting or harassing residents of Mpopphomeni township. This followed an attack on that community by vigilantes from a neighbouring area, actively a risted by the SAP.

This case is significant in that the whole Mpopphomeni community are protected by the interdict which was granted by the Natal Provincial Division of the Supreme Court. But the significance of the interdict goes beyond the fact that the court has protected a whole community. More importantly, a community has had to seek protection 2593 the EOEEEE- We find it disturbing, and reflective of the occurrences in Natal in general, that a community has to approach a court for protection from those who should be protecting it. The order issued by the Supreme Court is the clearest confirmation of our allegation that the police are abusing their position to collude with the vigilante rlords.

COSATU believes that it is more important than ever before that an independent Commission of Enquiry be established to investigate the role of the police in the Natal violence. No amount of parliamentary smears against CCSATU and the UDF will detract from the fact that the Courts have blamed Minister Vlck's police for the violence, not COSATU and the GDP. If Minister Vlok is genuinely committed to ending the conflict in Natal, he could find no better place to start looking than his own forces, instead of trying to undermine our peace initiatives.

ISSUED BY: Jay Naidoo

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PORT ELIZABETH EMPANGENI RAILS DALBRIDGE KIMBEKLEY EVANDER PRBTOXIA VEIEENIGINO a Wily Si
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he rejection by Messrs Vlok and RW.
Botha of an investigation into the
violence in the Pietermaritzburg area
smacks of high-handed intolerance. The
Minister of Law and Order has made up
his mind about the causes of the violence.
pinning it on "revolutionary agents of the
ANC/SACP alliance" when in fact there
is a mountain of evidence - in sworn affi-
davits, court documents and witness ac-
counts - that others have been the ag-
gressors in many cases. Mr Vlok's
partisan pronouncements could easily
upset the delicate climate in which Inha-
tha leaders and those from the UDF and
Cosatu - with the blessing of the ANC #
are trying to stop the killings. By blaming
the UDF and Cosatu the minister is sid-
ing with one party against another when
what is required is for the two to come to-
gether. Given that "comrades" are de-
tained with more frequency than their
Inkatha counterparts. Mr Vlok's speech
will add fuel to rumours of official collu-
sion with Inkatha, which will not do that
. organisation any good.

It is mind-boggling that a minister can
stand up in Parliament and say there is
no question of a breakdown of law and
order in the area when there have been
more than 5 000 violent incidents in the
last 21 years - many of them murders -
and only a handful of convictions. People
are being killed almost daily and the per-
petrators are not being brought to book
having lost faith in ordinary policing, cit-
izens seek protection from the courts -
and still they are murdered. Is this law
and order?

The over-riding impression is that the
minister does not have a firm grasp of the
realities in this area. despite having con-
trol over information which is denied
others because of the emergency regula-
tions; There is indeed a need for an
inquiry, not by his department but by an
independent body which could. inter
alia, establish why some people do not
want to uncover the truth about what is
going on in and around Pietermaritzburg. _ e '

i ,
if THERE is one thing that is as
painfully ongoing as the bloody
violence in black townships
Where lies truth?

around Durban and Pieter- _
maritzburg it is the steady
stream of accusations about who
is responsible for it all.

.' In spite of Tuesday's insis-
tence in Parliament by the Min-
ister of Law and Order, Mr

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Tuynhuys Tuynhuys

Kaapstad . Cape Town

2 May 1989

Chief Mhlabunzima Maphumulo

C/o Attorneys P N Stilwell Mason Weinberg

P O BOX 100

PIETERMARITZBURG

3200

Dear Chief

I have received your petition asking for a commission to be appointed to enquire into the continuing violence in and around Pietermaritzburg in an effort to bring an end to the present state of affairs.

I have studied your petition and also referred it to my Cabinet. From the start of the violence but more and more so as the situation grew worse, the Government has been concerned and distressed by what was happening and by the suffering of the people in the affected areas. We therefore have sympathetic understanding for your own concern and distress and appreciate the information, views and suggestions contained in your petition.

In your petition you refer to various efforts that have been made by a variety of concerned people to bring the violence to an end. All have failed. Apart from the normal peacekeeping functions of the different state agencies, the Government also instituted a number of special measures. Amongst others special police units were deployed. Provision was also made for additional courts and prosecuting capabilities so that whatever prosecutions became possible, could proceed without delay. The fact is, however, that the situation was, and still is, so fraught with danger that witnesses are not prepared to come forward. The primary need is therefore the

stabilisation of the situation and a return to normality in which the culprits can be brought before the courts and in which the courts can then be left to pronounce upon the guilt or otherwise of any particular person or party. While the violently disturbed situation continues, a commission of enquiry will, like the courts, be unable to investigate and to judge through a lack of witnesses prepared to testify. A commission cannot, in our view, solve the problem; on the contrary, it may become an additional cause for dispute, thus delaying a solution. I will therefore decide upon the necessity for a commission of enquiry once the violence has been arrested and normality has returned.

To this end, the Minister of Law and Order has decided that extraordinarily drastic action can no longer be avoided. A general of the South African Police has been placed in charge of the total police involvement. He will coordinate and direct all police actions in unrest-infected areas and will be assisted by a brigadier in charge of operations. More men and equipment will be placed in the areas; this includes more vehicles and semi-permanent police stations spread over a wider area. If necessary the defence force will also be called in.

Additional teams of experienced detectives are being assembled to attend to the complaints of the inhabitants. Security police branches are being strengthened and preventative security measures will be intensified. Enough prosecutors and courts will be available to accommodate any increase in solved criminal cases submitted for prosecution. '

In conclusion, the Government is determined to bring the situation under control. There is, however, no guarantee that similar situations will not flare up again as long as there are organisations acting in terms of a deliberate policy of political violence and terrorism. Until all the groupings on the South African political scene commit themselves to peaceful negotiation, there will be no peace. May I ask you and those that supported you in your petition (which I appreciate) to please also assist by calling upon and demanding of the ANC (which remains the main organisation committed to violence by policy pronouncements) that it should abandon violence and terrorism and commit itself to peaceful negotiation on our political future with all the other parties.

Yours sincerely

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P W BOTHA

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CONGRESS OF SOUTH AFRICAN TRADE UNIONS \$53573
.FRESS STATEMENT. 18 MAY 1989
RE: CHIEF MINISTER BUTHELEZI' S REJECTION OF DURBAN AS A VENUE_
FOR THE PEACE TALKS

Chief Minister Buthelezi today nctified us of his rejection of
Cc
venue for Saturdays peace talks. The Chief Minister remains
OSATU and UDF affiliates offer to meet in Durban as a neutral
insistent that the peace talks be held in Ulundi, rather than
at a mutually acceptable venue.
We are naturally disappointed that the Chief Minister is not
prepared to meet us in a neutral, mutually acceptable venue.
This is particularly so in the light of the fact that it is
universally accepted practice that in such situations of talks
to end hostilities, the venue of such talks should be mutually
.cc-eptable and reflect the preparedness to compromise by parties
on both sides. Indeed, the Inkatha Central Committee appeared to
accept this principle in its Resolution of April 29 when it
called on the leadership of the UDF, COSATU & the ANC to meet
Inkatha at afemutually acceptable venue'. We for our part were i?-
not insistent on Durban as a venue, but were prepared to settle
for any mutually acceptable venue.
Nevertheless we do not believe that this is the end of the read W
for the peace initiative in Natal.Too much is at stake to aling
this obstacle to derail the process. We will continue to explore
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every possible avenue to resolve this temporary deadlock. The lives of our people are at stake. We dare not fail. We appeal even at this late stage to Chief Minister Buthelezi and Inkatha to meet us half way, thereby allowing Saturdays critical meeting to go ahead. In the meantime, we shall continue to press ahead with peace initiatives to end the violence in Natal.

Issued by: Jay Naidoo (COSATU)

Murphy Morobe (UDF affiliates)

DATE: 1989 MAY 18

ATT : SAPA RE-PR WIRE SERVICE

ALL PRESS

PRESS STATEMENT BY COSATU / UDF AFFILIATES ISSUED
ON THE 17TH MAY 1989 IN DURBAN.

1. MEETING BETWEEN UDF / CDSATU AND INKATHA

COSATU AND UDF AFFILIATES MET IN DURBAN FOR AN URGENT
MEETING TO CONSIDER OUR RESPONSE TO THE INSISTENCE OF
INKATHA TO HOLD THE JOINT MEETING OF THE 20TH MAY IN
ULUNDI.

REGRETTABLY WE ARE UNABLE TO AGREE TO THE PROPOSAL
OF SUCH A MEETING TAKING PLACE IN ULUNDI. WE BELIEVE
THAT IT IS ESSENTIAL THAT A NON CONTROVERSIAL AND
NEUTRAL VENUE BE FOUND. WE HAVE INDICATED THAT WE
ARE PREPARED TO MEET IN ANY VENUE IN DURBAN OR ANY
OTHER MUTUALLY ACCEPTABLE VENUE.

WE BELIEVE FURTHER THAT IF ALL PARTIES ARE SERIOUS
ABOUT THE PEACE PROCESS - AND WE CERTAINLY ARE - THEN
WE WILL NOT LET THE ISSUE OF A VENUE DEGENERATE INTO
AN INSURMOUNTABLE OBSTACLE THAT CREATES ANY FURTHER
DELAY TO THIS MEETING.

ISSUED BY JAY NAIDOO(COSATU) AND MURPHEY MUROBE(UDF AFFILIATES).

018 01 01

INKATHA IYENKLILLIL'EKO YESIZWE

Prilmnf

Ummpmw "KwaPhindangone" RNIKEEHSW.

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3865 XXXXXXXXX

Raf: ' 2410 18th May 1989

Mossro. E. Borayi. President of COSAIU

A. Gumado; President o: the GDP

J. Noidoo, General Secretary of COSAIU

. and M; Morobu: Publicity Secretary

c/o COSATU Hood of fioo;

P.o. Box 1019

JOHANNESBURG .

2000.

FAX NO: 011-834-6528

Gentlemen.

I acanWledg' receipt 01 Your faxed iotto: ditod '''' the 17th of may "m-If 1989. A . I .

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W; 18th May'1989

I have no intention of going to Durban or anywhere else - in order to fulfil your wish to meet me. This was not meant to be a Peace Conference in any sense. Where the question of 'mutually acceptable arrangements' could arise. I am sorry about this but this is where the matter rests at present. I promise in the meantime to consult with my colleagues in the Central Committee of Inkatha and members of the KwaZulu Legislative Assembly, as to whether in principle they would countenance that I should move out of where I am located to: such an initial meeting requested by yourselves. Mostly because you could "write pages" as you put it. as to "why you are not in favour of Ullundi as a venue at this stage." 7, g, -

.a;

You state that you trust that I understand your concern on this matter. I just want to put it on record that I do not understand your concern in the least. '

Yours sincerely,

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Preaiacn: o! Iniatna and ' ' 'M

Chief Minister of KwaZulu;

F vine-w

17 MAI 1989

ATTENTION . DR M.G. BUTHELEZI

"KWAPHINDANGENE "

P.O. BOX L

HAHLABATHINI

3865

Dear Dr Mangosuthu G.Buthelezi

Your letter of the 13th May has been given very serious consideration by us.

While appreciating why you will insist on a meeting in ULUNDI, we remain unconvinced that ULUNDI is necessarily the best venue for all parties concerned. We remain steadfast in our initial suggestion that a venue for such important deliberations as we think we are to be engaged in, has to be mutually acceptable to all. '

It is certainly not necessary for us to come to ULUNDI in order to prove our bona fides to anybody. We believe that the fact that we have not shied away from our responsibility in accepting the need for a meeting between ourselves is sufficient proof of our bona fides.

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Yours sincerely,

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P O Box 1
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PRESS STATEMENT 1255589

INVITATION BY COSAIUZUDF AFFILIATES FOR.A HEETING WITH INKAIHA
COSATU and the UDF affiliates have been and are of the view that
direct discussions between the respective parties are a
necessity if the peace process is to be facilitated. It was in
this spirit that we proposed a face to face meeting with Chief
Minister Buthelezi as a matter of urgency.

We have received a response to our invitation from the Chief
Minister. Having consulted our respective organisations, we have
agreed to accept the suggestion that we meet on May 20th. This
has been communicated to Chief Minister Buthelezi, and we have
already begun the process pf preparing.for the May 20th meeting,
a meeting on which we place the highest priority.

The only detail which remains to be ironed out is the venue.
Although the Chief Minister proposed Ulundi, our organisations
felt that a more neutral venue such as Durban would be suitable
for this critical joint meeting. It appears at this stage that
both sides are seriously committed to the meeting and we don't
foresee that the venue question should create any problems. At
last it seems as if the initiative for peace in Natal is firmly
on the road.

Issued by: Jay Naidoo
Murphy Morobe

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Workers fight back!

Smash the new LRA and its attack on workers

The cheap labour system is attacking workers like never before. The government and the bosses have passed a new LRA to smash our militant trade unions. They want tame trade unions which do not defend workers rights.

The bosses continue to use the Act to:

i sue our unions for damages

i: interdict our legitimate industrial action

Vk lockout our members

i' curtail our right to strike

at undermine job security

Workers reject the new LRA!

The Workers Summit held on the 4/ 5 March rejected the new LRA.

Build the campaign against the LRA!

i COSATU/NACTU and independent unions have submitted the demands to all employers in the country

Vk These demands will be negotiated at a national level with the organisations we have written to.

at These demands will be submitted at a factory level for information only.

i Co-ordinating committees of NACTU/COSATU and independent unions must be set up in every region and local.

Vk Joint shopsteward councils and rallies must be held at a regional and local level.

i Pamphlets, stickers and posters must be distributed widely.

Timetable

1st June

Submit demands to SACCOLA, SA Agricultural Union and the state departments of the public sector.

1 30th June

If no progress is made then we will be in dispute with the above employers.

1-10 July

Views of workers will be canvassed nationally on what action should be taken.

4/5 August

2nd Workers Summit

- To review activities and decide what action we should take.

- To complete the agenda of the 1st Workers Summit

Call to all people!

We call on 'all workers, churches and community organisations to fully support our campaign against this anti-worker law.

Issued by: COSATU/NAC'IU and Independent Unions

1st June 1989

TO: SACCOLA

Dear Sir

RE: LABOUR RELATIONS ACT (LEA)

We represent the affiliates of the Congress of South African Trade Unions, the National Council of Trade Unions and several Independent Unions. As you are aware we the above trade unions remain opposed to the new Labour Relations Act.

We table the following demands to establish the democratic rights of all South African workers irrespective of race, sex, or marital status. These rights are namely:

1. The right of all workers to form and belong to trade unions of their own choice.
2. All workers presently excluded from the Labour Relations Act, including farmworkers, domestic workers, forestry workers and all public sector workers, must be covered by the LRA.
3. The scrapping of all sections of labour legislation that undermine our right to job security and our endeavours to establish a democratic trade union movement free of racism and minority union rights.
4. The entrenchment of:
 - 4.1 the right to strike and to engage in sympathy strikes.
 - 4.2 the right to picket.
 - 4.3 no dismissal without a fair and valid reason and without following a fair procedure.
 - 4.4 the duty to recognise and bargain with majority unions.
 - 4.5 retrenchment should be negotiated with representative unions and will include the LIFO system.
 - 4.6 An understanding that no employer will use the provisions of legislation of any homeland to refuse recognition to a union which has majority representation in its establishment in that homeland.

Motivation for these demands is contained in our Statement of Case submitted to SACCOLA in July 1988 and in our representations to the Standing Committee.

The meeting of the Workers Summit held on the 4th and 5th March 1989 and attended by Nactu affiliates, Coatu affiliates and several Independent trade unions resolved to submit these demands to yourselves and expect a joint response from yourselves.

If within 30 days you refuse to meet and make positive progress towards meeting these demands then He will be compelled to consider ourselves in a national dispute with yourselves. We await your urgent response.

/s/6.,__

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IDOO (COSATU)

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S MUFAMADI (COSATU) C NGC (NACTU)

- a. S A Agricultural Union
- b. SATS
- c. Department of Health & Welfare
- d. Department of Posts & Telecommunication
- e. Department of Education
- f. Privatization and Administration
9. Constitutional Planning
- h. Commission of Administration

REPORT ON MEETING WITH NACTU AND INDEPENDENT UNIONS ON 31/05/89
SECRETARIAT, NUMSA, NUM, CCAWUSA, POTWA, CWIU, PPWAWU, NACTU.
INDEPENDENT UNIONS: SAGWU, SUBMAWU, OVGWU, EWU, NUBAWU.
LETTER OF DEMAND FINALISED - ENCLOSE.
. TO BE SIGNED BY: NACTU / COSATU ON BEHALF OF INDEPENDENT UNIONS,
NACTU AND COSATU AFFILIATES.
. SUBMITTED TO:
SACCULA, SA AGRICULTURAL UNIONS, DEPARTMENTS OF EDUCATION, HEALTH
AND WELFARE, POST 1 TELECOMMUNICATIONS, PRIVITIZATION AND
ADMINISTRATION, CONSTITUTIONAL PLANNING AND THE COMMISSION OF
ADMINISTRATION.
THE GENERAL SECRETARIES WERE MANDATED TO INVESTIGATE WHAT
GOVERNMENT DEPARTMENTS INVOLVED IN THE PUBLIC SECTOR.
DATE OF SUBMISSION:
1ST JUNE - 1989.
NEGOTIATIONS:
SHOULD TAKE PLACE IN A JOINT NATIONAL FORUM.
DISPUTE:
IF NOT POSITIVE PROGRESS MADE THEN A DISPUTE WILL BE DECLARED
ON 30TH JUNE.
BALLOT:
NACTU RAISED CERTAIN ORGANISATIONAL PROBLEMS ABOUT A BALLOT.
SUGGESTED NATIONAL MEETING COULD BE HELD TO DETERMINE FEELING
OF WORKERS.
COSATU MAINTAINED THAT BALLOT WAS AN IMPORTANT WAY OF MOBILISING
OUR MEMBERS.
IT WAS DECIDED TO FINALISE THIS MATTER IN THE NEXT MEETING. WE
WOULD ALSO NEED MORE TIME FOR A BALLOT. '
CAMPAIGN:
9.1. LETTERS OF DEMAND TO BE SUBMITTED BY SHOPSTEWARDS TO ALL
MANAGEMENTS FOR INFORMATION.
9.2. REGIONAL AND LOCAL RALLIES MUST BE HELD.
9.3. PAMPHLET TO BE PRODUCED. ONE SIDE WILL HAVE THE LETTER OF
DEMAND AND THE OTHER SIDE DETAILS OF THE CAMPAIGN.
015 01 04

9.4.
9.5.
9-6.
9.7.
9.8.
9.9.

STICKER AND POSTER WAS APPROVED.

THE CU-ORDINATING COMMITTEE MUST BRIEF COMMUNITY BASE ORGANISATIONS AT A NATIONAL LEVEL.

THE CO-ORDINATING COMMITTEES MUST BE SET UP AT A LOCAL AND REGIONAL LEVEL. THESE COMMITTEES WILL CO-URDINATE THE RALLIES, CONVENE JOINT SHOPSTEWARD COUNCILS AND CO-ORDINATE ALL ACTIVITY OF THIS CAMPAIGN.

ALL AFFILIATES AND OTHER STRUCTURES TO ENSURE THAT THIS ISSUE IS ON THEIR AGENDA OF ALL MEETINGS.

A CALL MUST BE MADE TO ALL ORGANISATIONS, CHURCHES TO SUPPORT THIS CAMPAIGN.

COSTS OF MEDIA WILL BE COVERED. 50 / 50 BASIS BY COSATU AND NACTU.

10 WORKERS SUMMIT:

DATE FIXED ON THE 5/6 AGUST.

AGEND A - REVIEW AND DECIDE FUTURE ACTION
- COMPLETE AGENDA OF 1ST SUMMIT

11 NEXT MEETING:

COSATU HEAD OFFICE - 9TH JUNE 1989 - 09H30.

015 01 05

PRESS STATEMENT FROM COSATU NACTU AND INDEPENDENT UNIONS
ON CAMPAIGN AGAINST LABOUR RELATIONS ACT JUNE 1 1989

Following on from the Workers Summit on 4-5 March this year, COSATU, NACTU and several independent unions have agreed on a programme of action against the Labour Relations Act (LRA). Today (June 1) we have submitted letters of demand (attached) to the main employer associations and government departments. In brief, the letters of demand are aimed at securing the democratic rights of workers which are violated by the LRA. Those sections of the Act which violate these rights must be scrapped, workers rights must be entrenched, and the transformed Act must be extended to cover all workers currently excluded from protection of labour legislation. Failing changes in the Act, we are saying that all employers must bind themselves to recognise the fundamental rights of workers, regardless of the provisions of the Act.

The rights which workers are demanding are set out in the letters of demand. These are no more or no less than the fundamental trade union rights which are universally recognised and institutionalised in international forums such as the ILO. Continued denial of these rights can only lead to heightened conflict with the workers and trade unions of our country. If there is no indication of progress towards meeting these demands by June 30, we consider ourselves in dispute with the main employer bodies in this country. No worker in South Africa, and therefore no employer, is unaffected by the provisions of the LRA. We therefore expect all employers to put pressure on their employer associations to deal responsibly with our demands.

We will not be tabling our demands with individual employers. However, our shop stewards will be submitting the letters of demand to all managements for their information, so that they are fully briefed about the procedures we are embarking on. We expect negotiations to take place with employers at a national level in a joint national forum of trade unions and employer associations.

COSATU NACTU and independent unions will be reporting back to our membership and local and regional rallies will be held throughout the country. These will be co-ordinated through joint co-ordinating committees at factory, local and regional levels. We call on all workers, churches and community based " organisations to fully support our campaign against this anti-worker law. Action around the LRA will culminate in a second Workers Summit on 5 and 6 August.

ISSUED BY: JAE NAIDOO (COSATU)
PIROSHAW CAMAY (NACTU)

DATE:

1989 MAY 17

FROM: INFORMATION DEPARTMENT

COSATU HEAD OFFICE

ATT : ALL AFFILIATES / REGIONs / BRANCHES / LOCALS ETC.

3.

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T0 PAINT A FALSE PICTURE OF THIS REALITY. ONE AREA WHERE A FALSE PICTURE IS BEING PAINTED IS THE AREA OF INFLATION AND THE COST OF LIVING. WHILE STATE PROPAGANDA ATTEMPTS TO CLAIM THAT THE RATE OF INFLATION IS NOW ABOUT 13PERCENT A YEAR, WE KNOW THAT THE REALITY IS VERY DIFFERENT.

NOW AN EXPERT IN APPLIED MATHEMATICS, DR. KARL POSEL, HAS CONFIRMED WHAT WE ALREADY KNEW: THAT INFLATION IS MORE THAN DOUBLE WHAT THE STATE SAYS IT IS. DR. POSEL ESTIMATED THAT INFLATION IS RUNNING AT 31PERCENT, AS OPPOSED TO THE 13,8PERCENT QUOTED BY THE OFFICIAL CONSUMER PRICE INDEX (CPI). FOR EXAMPLE, DR. POSEL ESTIMATES THAT THE INCREASE IN FOOD PRICES IS 10PERCENT A QUARTER OR 40PERCENT A YEAR.

BIG BUSINESS USE THE OFFICIAL CPI FIGURE AS A BASIS FOR DETERMINING WAGE INCREASES. "THIS MEANS IT IS IMPOSSIBLE FOR THE NORMAL WAGE-EARNER EVER TO CATCH UP WITH INFLATION." (STAR 7/5/89)

SOME MAJOR PRICE INCREASES SINCE THE BEGINNING OF THE YEAR.

JANUARY: THERE WAS A 10PERCENT INCREASE IN THE PRICE OF FUEL.

THIS LED TO INCREASES IN THE PRICE OF CONSUMER GOODS AND TRANSPORT. TRAIN FARES WENT UP MORE THAN 7PERCENT. THERE WAS ALSO A RISE IN THE PRICE OF ELECTRICITY.

MARCH: GST WAS INCREASED FROM 12PERCENT TO 15PERCENT, A 3PERCENT INCREASE (GIVING THE REGIME R16,3 BILLION OF ITS INCOME).

THERE WAS ALSO AN INCREASE IN THE PRICE OF MILK.

P_

APRIL: THERE WAS AN INCREASE IN THE PRICE OF BREAD AND MAIZE OF JUST UNDER 10PERCENT. THE PRICE OF PETROL WENT UP AGAIN. TRAIN FARES WENT UP 20PERCENT.

MAY: THERE WAS A RISE IN INTEREST RATES AND THE COSTS OF HIRE PURCHASE, LEAVING PEOPLE WITH EVEN LESS MONEY TO BUY OTHER NECESSITIES.

6. ATTACKS ON NEIGHBOURING STATES

This federation noting:

1.

That South Africa is the last bastion of white rule in Africa.

That the South African State is a major destabilising force in the sub-continent.

That the South African State has continued to pursue unprovoked aggression on the neighbouring States.

That the people attacked in these countries are the families, children and friends of our members.

That these aggressive acts on the workers and their families_ in - neighbouring countries are of concern to all workers internationally.

Therefore resolves:

That the federation develops relations with fraternal federations in Southern Africa so as to resist these attacks of aggression.

That a unity of understanding, purpose and action of Southern African workers is necessary and a prerequisite of broader freedoms in the sub-continent. Only such relations and actions can resist the Apartheid regime's ipollcies and the pernicious practices of multinational corporations.

That the federation vigorously highlight the atrocities of the South African Regime and take appropriate action.

1985/1986

7.

SANCTIONS

This Congress notihg that:

South Africa is the last bastion of racism and the last outpost of white minority rule.

The apartheid regime has maintained its rule through violence, repression and the mass detentions of the oppressed people.

The South African Government continues to remain intransigent in its racist, anti-democratic and anti-worker policies and practices and thus refuses to dismantle. Apartheid and to release political prisoners and move towards a democratic society.

Sanctions and DlsInvestment have become the major form international pressure against the South African racist regime.

That the regime and their imperialist backers will attempt to divert the brunt of sanctions and disinvestment onto the workers.

The capitalists have been supportive of the apartheid regime's policies and remain the State's most trusted partner in maintaining oppression and exploitation.

That selective sanctions packages as currently applied will not be effective against capital or the State; that they cause serious regional unemployment and that they often serve the interests of the imperialist states rather than the South African working class; that without the participation of the working class and its allies in the struggle sanctions themselves will not bring about fundamental change.

The organised working class in South Africa have not had control of sanctions campaigns. V

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And

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Therefore resolves to support the call for:

Comprehensive and mandatory sanctions which are the only_ sanctions
assist in
South

which are likely to bring effective pressure which will
bringing about a non-violent. truly democratic and non-racial
Africa.

in addition to the above:

That COSATU's contribution to the direction of this
support the call for:

campaign is to

2.1 the stopping of loans and credit to the South African State.

South African business. municipalities and bantustans;

2.2 diplomatic isolation;

2.3 the stopping of South African tourists,
officials travelling abroad;

2.4 the stopping of South Africans emigrating abroad;

2.6 the withdrawal of South African Airways landing and airspace
rights; i

2.7 a stop to South African capital being invested abroad;

2.8 the effective and comprehensive implementation of the United
Nations arms embargo;

2.9 a stop to the South African
skilled workers overseas;

2.10 a stop to sporting groups and individuals visiting and playing
in South Africa and South African sporting groups going abroad.
businessmen and State

state and business recruiting

To politically conscientise our members in COSATU regarding the
content of this resolution, the possible effects of sanctions.
disinvestment and the other measures called for.

To call for mandatory and comprehensive sanctions against the South
African backed UNLTA and MNR bandits and in particular in respect of
military equipment.

5.

tl, . 15

To call for material support to be given to the frontline states in a
manner that will not increase their dependence on the. international
community.

1987

DISINVESTMENT

This Congress noting that:

The system of oppression and exploitation is effectively being
supported by the policy of apartheid. '

The South African government is not committed to abolishing
oppression. exploitation and apartheid from which the vast majority
of South Africans suffer.

All companies have benefited from the system of apartheid oppression
and capitalist exploitation. '

Disinvestment as is currently being carried out by multinational
companies amounts to nothing more than corporate camouflage which
often allows these companies to increase their support for the South
African regime.

And believing:

L

That only a replacement of the present government by a democratic
government supported by the majority of the people of South 'Africa
can eradicate the system of oppression, exploitation and apartheid
and replace it with a system of justice and equality based on a
universal franchise. '

That effective economic pressure is essential to bring about such a

transition in a peaceful manner. with the least pain and suffering by the people who are already having to endure extreme suffering.

Therefore resolves:

1. To ensure that the social wealth of South Africa remains the property of the people of South Africa for the benefit of all and further commit ourselves to the principle of international working class solidarity action as the most powerful form of solidarity action with . our struggle. OUR VICTORY WILL BE THEIR VICTORY.
2. To support effective pressure on the South African political and economic system so as to bring about peaceful change in South African society.
3. To encourage and participate in unity with other workers so as to strengthen the position and role of workers as pressures for change are increased.
4. To participate in campaigns to strengthen the association between South African workers' organisations and their international counterparts.
5. To ensure that where disinvestment takes place companies must give COSATU notice of their intention to pull out of South Africa so that bona fide negotiations can take place.

1987

9. BANTUSTANS

CONGRESS Noting:

That the bantustan system was imposed on the African people, against their will. with a view to thwarting the just struggle for One Person One Vote in a 'unitary South Africa. .

1.7

That various bantustan administrations have practised extreme forms of oppression against the oppressed people - including trade unions.

Noting in particular:

The banning of SAAWU in the Ciskei- the banning of all unions in the Boputhatswana bantustan and the killing of trade unionists and other democrats by tribally based organisations.

Hereby resolves that:

1. The bantustan system be totally rejected and that the Federation struggle - together with other democratic forces - for the .creation of a democratic and unitary South Africa.
2. We shall not hesitate to exercise our right to organise in plants based within the bantustans and that we are fully prepared to defend ourselves against repression by whatever effective means at our disposal.
3. That we are completely and absolutely opposed to the super-exploitation occurring in these areas and declare our commitment to reject the idea and practice of workers receiving less wages and worse conditions of work.
4. That we express our solidarity with those communities around Durban and elsewhere who are struggling against being incorporated into the bantustans. L

1985/1986

COSATU STATEMENT ON CHAMBER OF MINES SURVEY 18/5/89

One doesn't have to look too far to establish that the so-called survey of attitudes to sanctions and disinvestment is anything but an objective scientific survey designed to truly reflect the feelings of the people of this country. Expert advice which we have sought is of the view that the survey was heavily loaded and transparently rigged to come out with the conclusions desired by its sponsors.

The reason for this becomes clear if we look at the source, the target and the timing of the report. The source of the report was none other than the Chamber of Mines, the architect of the cheap labour system, the compounds and migrant labour, who profess to be concerned about the welfare of blacks now that sanctions loom large.

The target of the report is all those democratic forces opposed to apartheid who are calling for effective international action to end the system under which we all suffer. The timing of the report is to coincide with the visit of anti apartheid church leaders to America, to try and suggest that they speak for no-one but themselves. .

The bias and cynicism of this report by the Chamber of Mines is so transparent that it should fool no-one. We suggest that if they are truly concerned about the plight of the workers, then they should pay mine workers a living wage and abolish the feudal conditions on the mines.

Issued by: Jay Naidoo

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tambo,.ppnnkling at tho d 06 tua days of talk: with
Nigeria's military"gavornqont, san sanctions only tend to force
South Africa ta mgku ravarhs in the apartheid system. Tambo said
the ANC'B 99:1 l! to dostAoy apartheid, the systSM'undar which
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"The tandlncy 15 thltisnnctions aorvg as a manna to bring
South Africa to th- nudott ting tabla rather than getting it to
.-abandon the aparthtnd syn m," Tambo told rapertars.
He said thl ANC, tho_m in black natianalist guerrtIla gruup
seeking to uvorthruw"uhitdvminorlty rulp, plans a new
international clmpnign J'dhtcH seeks to lift pressure on South
Africa, 13ft sanctgonu and certainly not-tu impusa Further
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ANC-SANCTIONG

JOHANNESBURG MAY 25 SAPA'AP

THE AFRICAN NATIONAL CONGRESS HEADQUARTERS IS UNAWARE OF ANY
CHANGE IN THE ORGANISATION'S POLICY ON ECONOMIC SANCTIONS AGAINST
SOUTH AFRICA AND IS TRYING TO REACH A SENIOR OFFICIAL TO CLARIFY
COMMENTS HE MADE ON THE SUBJECT, A SPOKESMAN SAID WEDNESDAY.

THE OFFICIAL TOLD REPORTERS IN LAGOS, NIGERIA ON TUESDAY THAT
THE ANC DRAWS A NEW INTERNATIONAL CAMPAIGN "WHICH SEEKS TO LIFT
PRESSURE ON SOUTH AFRICA, LIFT SANCTIONS AND CERTAINLY NOT TO
IMPOSE FURTHER SANCTIONS."

HE DID NOT ELABORATE ON THE NEW CAMPAIGN EXCEPT TO SAY THAT THE
FOCUS OF THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY SHOULD BE "GETTING THE
APARTHEID SYSTEM DESTROYED" QUOTE? 'MAN GETTING "PEOPLE .IT
AROUND THE TABLE." HE SAID, "THE TOWNSHIPS IS THAT SANCTIONS-JS SE91
AS A MEANS TO BRING SOUTH AFRICA TO THE INTERNATIONAL TABLE THAT
THAN GETTING TO THE APARTHEID SYSTEM.

A SPOKESMAN AT ANC HEADQUARTERS IN LUSAKA, SAID WEDNESDAY, "AS
FAIR AS I'M AWARE THERE HAS NOT BEEN ANY CHANGE," AND SUGGESTED
THAT THE OFFICIAL MAY HAVE BEEN REMARKING ABOUT "SOMETHING THAT
WAS ON HIS MIND."

THE SPOKESMAN SAID ANC HEADQUARTERS HAD BEEN UNABLE TO CONTACT
THE OFFICIAL IN NIGERIA. "I'LL NOT CERTAINLY THAT HE COULD HAVE SAID
THAT," THE SPOKESMAN SAID. HE SAID HE WAS AFRAID TO COMMENT
BECAUSE IT "WOULD MAKE IT SEEM AS IF THERE ARE DIFFERENT OPINIONS
WITHIN THE ANC." H

ANGLICAN ARCHBISHOP DESMOND TUTU AND WORLD ALLIANCE OF VETERANS
CHURCHES PRESIDENT ALLAN BOESAK HERE IN WASHINGTON, D.C. LAST WEEK
URGING THE U.S. GOVERNMENT TO INCREASE ECONOMIC SANCTIONS AGAINST
SOUTH AFRICA.

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STATEMENT TO LA TIMES

COSATU'S POLICY ON DISINVESTMENT 19/5/89

COSATU'S view is that disinvestment by multinational corporations is a result of the worldwide campaign against apartheid and against all forms of collaboration with the South African regime. Insofar as this is the cause of any particular disinvestment, we regard it as a victory for all anti apartheid forces.

However, COSATU and it's affiliates have been saying for some time that the wealth of the multinationals has been built on the back of SA's cheap labour system. The multinationals therefore owe an enormous debt to the workers and people of South Africa. At the very least COSATU and its affiliates are demanding that foreign companies negotiate the terms under which they disinvest.

These negotiations should be with the affected trade union and workers, not the local companies who they are entering into deals with. They should not use alleged "disinvestment", which we in fact regard as corporate camouflage, to defraud the workers, as they are doing at Mobil.

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NUMSA PRESS RELEASE

DT: 16 MAY 1989

RE: BTR DUNLOP S.A. OPERATIONS

NUMSA WISHES TO CORRECT THE MISLEADING ARTICLE CARRIED BY THE BUSINESS DAY (15 MAY 1989) AND BY OTHER MEDIA WHICH CLAIMED THAT NUMSA HAD CALLED ON BTR TO STAY IN SOUTH AFRICA.

THIS IS NOT THE CASE. AT THE PRESS CONFERENCE HELD AFTER THE BTR UK AGM ON 12 MAY 1989 NUMSA REPRESENTATIVES CLEARLY OUTLINED THE UNION'S CAMPAIGN AGAINST BTR AND ITS DEMAND THAT THE COMPANY SHOULD SETTLE THE SARMCOL STRIKE (PARTICULARLY IN THE LIGHT OF THE RECENT SUPREME COURT JUDGEMENT AGAINST THE COMPANY AND THE INDUSTRIAL COURT). IT WAS FURTHER CLEARLY STATED THAT NUMSA'S CAMPAIGN HAD THE FULL SUPPORT OF THE BRITISH TUC AND THE ANTI APARTHEID MOVEMENT. THE UNION NOTES WITH CONCERN THAT CERTAIN NEWSPAPERS HAVE APPARENTLY DELIBERATELY MISINTERPRETED WHAT WAS ACTUALLY SAID AT THE PRESS CONFERENCE. THE UNION WISHES TO MAKE IT UNAMBIGUOUSLY CLEAR THAT IT WILL NOT BE USED AS A POLITICAL FOOTBALL TO BOLSTER ANY ANTI-SANCTIONS LOBBY.

NUMSA REMAINS FULLY COMMITTED TO CDSATU'S BROAD POLICY ON SANCTIONS. A COPY OF NUMSA'S OPEN LETTER TO SHAREHOLDERS (DISTRIBUTED AT THE AGM) IS ATTACHED HERETO.

TLX ENDS.

025 14 01

National Union of Metalworkers of South Africa
(Registered under the Labour Relations Act 1956, as amended)
National Acceptances House PO. Box 260483
1st Floor Excom 2023
.3 Rissik Street Tel: 832-2030/ 9
Johannesburg Tlx451926
1001 Fax838-4092

THE BTR SHRHCOL DISPUTE

Last year this time we were treated to a feast of propaganda and untruths in a document entitled "ETR gaanggLLnggg DISEHIE ; IHE EEQL lggug'. while NUMSh recognises the right of BTR to put its case and its Side of the story this should be done in an honest manner which is not purposely designed to mislead the public. .

It would be tedious to correct each of the company's assertions in detail. Many in any event rely on the findings of the industrial court which have already been discredited by the Supreme Court review initiated by NUHSA.

Locally we have repeatedly requested BTR Sernool to settle this matter either by investigation or by referral to a Jointly agreed arbitrator in whom both parties could have the utmost confidence. These approaches have constantly been refused by the company when we believe it is intent on forcing the union into submission through lack of available funds for legal actions.

If BTR Sarnool is to have its way in keeping this dispute subject to ongoing legal action it will take many years until this matter is finally settled. Even then, the final determination would only reflect the views of the South African courts which operate against the background of conservative labour legislation as well as statutory and informal racial discrimination. , .

The reality we face in South Africa is, tragically, that every year that passes brings with it more suffering and deaths. Strike leaders have been murdered by Inkatha troops, other strikers and members of the community have been killed by the South African police and now reports have emerged indicating that certain of the company's current 'employees' have joined in attacks on the communities surrounding Houick.

NUHSA has for its part tried every possible means to resolve this dispute. we have renewed unconditional negotiations under a neutral chairperson. This has been rejected. We have raised the matter at the EEG and have 3 findings in the union's favour. The company has refused to abide by this finding. We have a Supreme Court judgement setting aside the Industrial Court decision in favour of the company on the grounds of bias. The company has appealed to the Appellate Division against the Supreme Court ruling. we have proposed arbitration and mediation. Both have been refused by the company. We have attempted to raise this issue as other BTR plants. The company approached the courts to prevent this matter being discussed at other plants. We have attended two local shareholders meetings to raise questions relating to the dispute. These questions have never been answered -

..,

the last annual shareholders meeting was closed after less than 15
minutes!

The conclusion to the company's pamphlet for last year: 'In the
U.K. concluded with a 50 year old (51) quotation from
... 'M- 91 Man; Eng: mm in: Emma; um where we were
told inter alia that

... the history of strike: shows that whether
the grievance be remedied or not, lose,
unavoidable lose. is inflicted upon those
least able to afford it: the whole community is
made to suffer ... (however) ... the
prohibition is not yet excoriated from men.
British legislators: have been compelled to
recognise the 'right to strike'..."

we reject with utter contempt the insinuation that we or the British
workers are in any respect: "primitive". we avoid strike action
wherever possible but where we have no other routes to follow and are
confronted with total intransigence based on precepts derived from
the time of the British Empire then strike action becomes necessary.
his

1: the right generally recognised as fundamental in capitalist
societies. South Africa is an exception we knew, but so too is it the
only country which practices statutory racial oppression. We make no
The real question: are whether the action was justified in the
circumstances? whether the union acted unfairly before, during and
after the strike? Whether the union did infringe on demands which
abrogated the fundamental right to work.

It presents the general/nationalist, x3111;1x on one of these questions
has been made by the EEC which decided in favour of the union. The
union refuse: to accept this finding and prefers to drag the issue
their jurisdiction.

13. is that a matter which BTR UK (PLO) can wash its hands of. We re-
iterate that every year more and more people are being killed as
this dilapidated drege on. This has got to be brought to an end swiftly
and decisively.

Once again therefore NUHSA calls on BTR UK (PLC) to ensure that this
matter is referred to a mutually agreed independent arbitrator
operating on the basis of agreed terms of reference to determine the
questions raised here. The union and its members will accept any
consequent decision as final and binding. It is prepared to attend
such an arbitration either in South Africa or in the U.K.

we call on the employer: of the BTR U.K. (PLO) to support this
request. The killings and deaths must end. Justice must be seen to be
done.

N BARBER

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SANCTIONS AND DIS INVESTMENT

An overwhelming majority of South Africans - black and white - are opposed to sanctions and disinvestment.

This is the finding of a survey commissioned by the Chamber of Mines and conducted by the Gallup Organisation and Markinor.

Titled "The Voice of the South African People", the survey is the largest of its kind ever conducted and it shows that most South Africans oppose sanctions and boycotts - even if such measures cause the South African Government to step down within five years.

Speaking at a news conference in Johannesburg today, the President of the Chamber of Mines, Mr Colin Fenton, said the results of the poll were a forceful vindication of the anti-sanctions policy pursued by the British Prime Minister, Mrs Margaret Thatcher, and other world leaders who had resisted calls to impose an embargo on South Africa.

Outlining the Chamber's reasons for commissioning the survey, Mr Fenton said although previous polls conducted on the subject had shown South Africans were opposed to sanctions, there remained a credible and vociferous black leadership corps which consistently presented a contrary view. Among them was Archbishop Desmond Tutu, Nobel Peace Prize winner.

"Because they enjoy considerable stature, the views

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Public Affairs and Communications Department

Chamber of Mines

After office hours

5 Hollard Street John Imrie: 646-2357

Johannesburg 2001 Telephone: 838-8211

Peter Bunkell: 88612892

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expressed by these spokesmen have been widely accepted by a broad range of influential people in the international community. They have provided substantive grist to the mill of those individualsh institutions and governments which favour the imposition of sanctions as a means of effecting political change in South Africa.

"That there are South Africans - black and white - who favour sanctions and disinvestment, we do not dispute. But we now feel we can say with absolute authority that they are a minority."

Mr Fenton added that the results of the survey left Archbishop Tutu and his fellow supporters of sanctions without a popular base to endorse their claims.

"We now ask the world to take note of the voice of the South African people."

South Africans yet render no guarantees for the demolition of the apartheid edifice.

Co-sponsored by Assocom, FCI, the Afrikaanse Handelsinstituut and the American Chamber of Commerce in South Africa, the survey canvased the opinions of 2 192 South Africans - 1 400 of them black. The results represent the views of people living in cities, small towns, villages, remote rural areas and 200 squatters.

The main findings to emerge from the poll were that both blacks (85 percent) and whites (89 percent) rejected the After office hours

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idea of disinvestment. White opposition to sanctions was even higher (95 percent) while 82 percent of blacks said no to sanctions.

people who specifically identified themselves as followers of Archbishop Tutu, also rejected sanctions and disinvestment. Of the people questioned who said they were Anglicans, 70 percent were opposed to sanctions and 76 percent to disinvestment.

It was also found that disinvestment, although regarded as being capable of hurting the South African Government, would also harm the interests of ordinary blacks. It was perceived as not being capable of making an impact on the policy of apartheid.

Hence, it became evident that more blacks had a negative view of disinvesting companies than the number of those who admired the decision. Disinvestment or disengagement were not seen as practices which won friends among rank-and-file blacks.

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15 May 1989

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u_bjic Affairs and Communications Department

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CHAMBER OF MINES' NEWSLETTER
SERVING SOUTH AFRICA'S PRIVATE SECTOR MINING INDUSTRY
MARCH/MAY 1989

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SANCTIONS: 80% OPPOSE

An overwhelming majority of South Africans - black and white - are opposed to sanctions and disinvestment. This is the finding of a survey conducted by the Gallup Organisation. Commissioned by the Chamber of Mines and co-sponsored by the Association of Chambers of Commerce and Industry of SA, the Afrikaanse Handelsinstituut, the SA Federated Chamber of Industries and the American Chamber of Commerce in SA, the survey is the most comprehensive of its kind undertaken in South Africa. More than 80 percent of the 2 192 people interviewed, including 1 600 blacks, said they believed sanctions and disinvestment were a bad idea. The following is an analysis of black attitudes to key issues.

The attitudes of black people in South Africa are particularly relevant to the issue of sanctions and disinvestment as a strategy to end apartheid. Very prominent political leadership, such as the ANC and Archbishop Desmond Tutu have called for sanctions against South Africa. South African trade union organisations representing blacks have also come out in support of economic pressures against South Africa. although they have been less willing to endorse a loss of jobs and employment benefits as a result of sanctions and disinvestment.

When challenged on the issue of economic hardship for poor people in South Africa as a result of sanctions, some supporters of sanctions have claimed that black people in South Africa would be willing to endure additional hardship as part of international action against apartheid. Others have argued that since many legitimate leaders of blacks support sanctions, their followers will support or at least accept the strategy.

Against these arguments there have been claims by black leaders who oppose sanctions. such as Chief Buthelezi. that since blacks would be most affected by any loss of employment and a slowdown of economic growth, they do not and could not be expected to support sanctions and disinvestment.

Hence. claims and counter-claims on behalf of blacks in South Africa are made by those who support or disinvestment. On the other hand, another study by the London Sunday Times and two studies by Orkin of the Community Agency for Social Enquiry have concluded that most blacks support sanctions and disinvestment

In the latter two studies these strategies, as described in the questions were linked to the ANC, Archbishop Tutu and the trade unions, or else were linked to particular results like releasing political prisoners or the end of the apartheid government.

There has been quite heated

ALL BLACKS

Sanctions: Good or bad idea?

oppose sanctions as a strategy to
oppose apartheid.

A number of studies have been
conducted in the past which have
given rise to great controversy. Since
1984, two studies by Prof. Schlemmer
of the University of Natal, three studies
by the Human Sciences Research
Council. one study by the London
Sunday Times. one very recent study
by the Independent newspaper and
the independent Television Network in
the UK. and large specialised studies
among coal miners and fruit industry
workers have revealed majorities of
blacks opposed to sanctions and
Chamber of Mines' Newsletter March/May 1989 1 , ..

Disinvestment: Good or bad idea?

disagreement about what all these
results mean. Protagonists in the
debate on sanctions have tended to
support the surveys which have best
measured up to their views.

The most recent Gallup Poll of
South African blacks is the largest yet
conducted. It is based on a nation.
wide stratified and representative
sample of 1 400 blacks. which
included people living in cities. small
towns, villages and rural areas, and
also covered an additional sample of
200 squatters or informal shack
dwellers living near cities. A larger
variety of questions on sanctions and

dismvestment was included than in any previous studies. It has addressed most of the arguments and counter-arguments in the sanctions debate in simple, carefully-phrased questions posed by trained black interviewers in the language of choice of the subjects. The study was personally supervised by a senior Gallup staff member from the USA and the interview schedule was designed by Gallup staff in the USA.

All races were covered in the research, but this analysis covers those South Africans most likely to support sanctions: the blacks (ie South Africans of African descent). Major findings are briefly reviewed in the assessment which follows. (The detailed wording of survey questions referred to in text - eg (1) - is on page 8).

1 Perception of general problems

Subjects were asked to identify three major problems facing people in

TABLE A

1 lay

Unequal pay and serious problems

probing!

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Total sample ., 57%

Shack dwellers and squatters - 63% South Africa). Blacks gave a large variety of answers, most of them critical of the political and economic system but 57 percent of blacks spontaneously identified employment and lack of job opportunities as serious problems. The differences between sub-samples are shown in Table A.

When asked specifically about three most serious problems as far as work is concerned, low or unequal salaries and wages was the predominant answer (67 percent) but here again lack of job opportunities or retrenchment was mentioned by more than 20 percent in the sample as a whole.

Some 11 percent of the adult respondents were out of work and looking for a job; a figure which rose to no less than 41 percent among squatters. These results leave little doubt as to the salience of the issue of employment opportunity among blacks in South Africa.

2 Attitudes to assistance or support from abroad

Early in the interview, subjects were asked for their spontaneous reactions to the question of what "people overseas should do to help black introduction to questions about disinvestment which described it as people in South Africa" (13). In the sample as a whole, a pattern of answers emerged among the 91 per.

cent of blacks who felt that help from overseas was needed (see Table 8). whether or not "overseas companies should leave South Africa and go back to their own country overseas as a protest against apartheid" will. The subjects were asked whether such

TABLE B

Overseas help needed to:

Provide or improve education

Various suggestions for investment or creation of employment

Improve salaries, working conditions or quality of jobs

Housing assistance

General financial or welfare assistance

Establishment of community facilities (various)

Practical training

Political intervention

Among the residual answers not

included in the listing above, less than

one percent of blacks spontaneously

mentioned a need for sanctions or

disinvestment while some three

percent specifically criticised

disinvestment or sanctions.

disinvestment was a "good idea" or a

"bad idea" and overall, 14 percent felt

TABLE C

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Disinvestment a b

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Overall sample

Squatters (:1.

Post-school education

3 Specific attitudes to

disinvestment

Among the overall sample. only

56 percent of subjects had heard of

the words "disinvestment" or

"disengagement". Hence the

interviewers gave a standard

that it was a good idea. 85 percent

thought it a bad idea and one percent

TABLE D Percentage Choice:

Overall Sample

Overseas companies should leave South Africa

because this is a good way to fight apartheid.

The South African government does not want

overseas companies to leave and will be persuaded

to end apartheid if these companies do leave

Overseas companies should not leave South Africa

because this is not a good way to fight apartheid.

The South African government will not be persuaded

to end apartheid and many South Africans, including

blacks will lose their jobs

Don't know 1%

Among sub-samples, the proportions endorsing disinvestment were:

Patten: of support for disinvestment

Overall 1 6%

Squatters 1 8%

Post-school education 36%

were not sure. A selection of proportions of sub-samples which thought it was a bad idea is shown in Table C.

When asked for reasons for disinvestment being a bad idea, most subjects referred to the danger of loss of jobs, damage to the economy and to investment, impediments to new ideas, products and technology. a loss of good quality job opportunities and to the fact that it would not get rid of apartheid in any event.

The simple choice given above was followed by a more detailed question in which more information was given. The two choices and the results for blacks in the overall sample were as indicated in Table D.

Among the 16 percent overall who endorsed disinvestment, a follow-up question (5a) revealed that half felt that blacks would "only suffer a little but it would help them politically", and the other half considered that blacks would "suffer a great deal" for political gains. Hence, by no means all the people endorsing disinvestment anticipated severe privations in the process.

These results suggest a widespread mobilisation of sentiment against disinvestment. The reasons become clear if the results of further probes are assessed. A range of questions were asked, the wording and results of which are presented in Table E.

These results provide a fairly rounded picture of the motives of the majority opposing disinvestment. American Disinvestment is perceived to have a positive or benign effect and to provide opportunity. Its withdrawal is seen to hurt the South African government but also to harm the economy and the interests of ordinary blacks. Most important, disinvestment is not seen as capable of making a decisive impact on the policy of apartheid: only 16 percent expected disinvestment to be very successful. Hence, more blacks have a negative view of disinvesting companies than the number of those who admire the decision. Disinvestment or disengagement is not a policy which wins friends among rank-and-file blacks.

In 1984, Schlemmer found that more black workers preferred the possibility of working for an overseas company than for a South African company. In the current poll, 64 percent of black subjects preferred a South African company and 32 percent an overseas company. They were

TABLE E

"Do . . . American companies in SA help to make the government change away from apartheid or is apartheid strengthened if they work in SA?"

Help change away 58%

No effect/don't know 34%
 Apartheid strengthened 8% x
 "American business help: to continue racial segregation and
 discrimination in SA":
 Agree - 1 7%
 Disagree 58%
 Don't know 25%
 "American business contributes to a higher standard of living for
 blacks"
 Agree . I i l iv . i 78%
 Disagree ' . 8%
 Don't know _ ' 15%
 "American business provides black workers with good jobs which
 would not otherwise exist"
 Agree '_ . 73%
 Disagree . . . , .. 1 0%
 Don't know 17%
 ' ; , 35, ...
 'fAmeltican business contributes.
 o the misuse of black workers"
 af-f'w' g. 5' . _ _ .
 . ; . l American companies withdrew from South frlca, would it
 seriously hurt, hurt only a little, or have no effect on the strength of
 w;
 Seriously hurt SA goVemment
 No effect/don't . .
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 ii Merican cominies disinvested; ow sueeeessfu
 this would be in bringing an end to apartheid?
 x,
 Very successful ' ' 12'!
 Somewhat successful
 Don't know . ; " . ' ,
 Not at all successful ' -. - 37%
 "Would ending American business in SA have a good effect or a bad
 effect on the lives of SA black: or would lt have no effect . . .7"
 Bad effect 75%
 Good effect . 10%
 No effect/don't know - . 15%
 "Do you think ending American business in SA would seriously hurt
 the economy of SA, hurt it only a little or have no effect?
 Hurt seriously 73%
 Hurt a little I 6%
 No effect/don't know ..: . 1 1%
 . . . has the fact that some American companies have 'gone away
 from South Africa left you with a better or a worse opinion of these
 companies . . .7" '
 Worse opinion ' .. 48%
 Better opinion . 14%
 No effect/don't know 37%
 Chamber of Mines' Newsletter March/May 1989 3 ..

asked to give their own reasons for the choice. (61 No less than 33 percent of respondents mentioned the insecurity and other uncertainties associated with disinvestment as being some of the "bad things" about working for an overseas company.

4 Reactions to sanctions

Attitudes to sanctions are also subject to the uncertainty which stems from the fact that there is no vernacular word for sanctions and many blacks have not heard of the specific English term. Some 68 percent of the overall sample were familiar with the term _ and, as expected, there were strong correlations between knowledge of the word and education, age, gender and income. Hence the term was explained in a standard way to all respondents as follows: "Some people in America and other overseas countries want their governments to persuade the South African government to change the political system in this country. The way they want to do this is to ban and boycott all South African products - ie they want to stop overseas countries from trading with South Africa. This is called sanctions."

Subjects were asked "Do you believe that sanctions are a good or a bad idea?". For the results of the overall sample and certain sub-groups, see Table F.

Among those who supported sanctions the reasons were generally the obvious arguments that pressure would bring policy change or punish the government or whites. The reasons for opposing sanctions were equally obvious, relating to jobs, the standard of living of blacks, fear of damage to the economy, concern loss of technology and new products. etc.

The interviews then proceeded to suggest certain hypothetical results for sanctions: ie, "causing the government to resign in, say, five years' time"(8). With this suggestion. the responses to three alternatives were as in Table G.

One notes that even with this presumably attractive suggestion, a majority still opposes sanctions. One should realise, furthermore, that the suggestion that sanctions could topple the government is very hypothetical indeed. Other results show that only 20 percent of blacks think that sanctions are likely to be "very successful" in achieving results. Hence, the suggestion that this strategy could, in fact, topple the government.

TABLE F

Sanctions a:

Overall

Under 34 years

Over 50 years

Post school education

Unemployed

Previously knew of sanctions

Had not heard of sanctions

Sanctions likely to succeed (7)

Sanctions likely to fail (7)

TABLE G

Good idea

0/0

16

19

10

28

IS

19

9

27

4

Bad idea

%

82

80

87

72

83

Don't know

80

87

72

95

If sanctions would topple government in five years . . .

Three alternatives i

.i.-i-'. _ .T

Would support all sahctions

Would support those which would not harm sub ect

Would oppose sanctions .

TABLE" '

is.

If sanctions would topple government would you:

(post-school education only)

Support all sanctions

Support sanctions not personally harmful

Oppose sanctions

Don't know

while being hypothetically attractive to some, is not likely to be a real motivation for sanctions in the black population.

Further questions were posed (9)

and (I 0) which suggested job losses

(with and without the government

hypothetically resigning). Opposition

to sanctions in these items rose to over

65 percent (with the government

assumed to resign) and over 75

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percent (with personal job loss

suggested).

The social sub-group most

sympathetic to sanctions is that

composed of people with post-school

qualifications. Among this group

(sample size 84 and just over live

percent of the population) the results

on the item which assumed that the

government would resign were as in

Table H.

x

Even in this group. then, only slightly over one-third supports unconditional sanctions. One of the arguments used by sanctions campaigners was put to the respondents: "Some groups say that blacks are prepared to suffer and risk losing their jobs while sanctions and boycotts are used against South Africa". Respondent reactions were as in Table 1.

The results, once again, are a very clear rejection of a familiar argument. This type of argument clearly has more support among more politicised, better-educated blacks with less to lose. Among the sub-group with post-school education the results were as in Table J.

Even in this small intellectual elite, there is by no means an overwhelming endorsement of the thesis that blacks are willing to suffer the privations brought about by sanctions.

We have outlined the reasons why there is general opposition to sanctions. There is also a political logic in the attitudes. Subjects were asked which of the following things the South African government would do in response to sanctions. and the results are given with the alternatives presented. Options from the interview schedule are slightly abridged. (See Table K and (I 1)).

Even among the much more pro-sanctions blacks with post-school education, only 18 percent thought that the government would abolish apartheid and five percent thought it would resign. Thus their more positive attitude to sanctions is generally not based on any anticipation of success - it is rather the result of the extreme anger of a frustrated intellectual elite.

5 Assessment

The results are quite clear. There is majority opposition among blacks to sanctions and disinvestment. The view is generally that overseas countries must invest in the country and assist black people to advance and enjoy greater economic development.

Companies that disinvest are seen as forsaking the black workers and communities. to the point that the public reputation of US companies has become extremely problematic.

The question is: are these results valid? A number of criticisms of such results are normally made. We will deal with a few of the major arguments. (The results quoted below are based on the main questions on support for or opposition to disinvestment and sanctions (I 2) and (4) -

Criticism I . "Are blacks not fearful of telling the truth?"

TABLE I

Prepared to suffer?
 Completely agree
 Mostly agree
 Mostly disagree
 Completely disagree
 Don't know

TABLE J

Completely/mostly agree
 Completely/mostly disagree
 Don't know -

;.', "t

l... ..

ot change

ntries but Vth

Will make a few small changes

Mil get rid of apartheid laws ,

Mil resign/handover power - 1;"

Don't know m - ' . i'

Blacks who say that they support the ANC are not fearful. The ANC is an illegal organisation in South Africa and to support it is a serious punishable offence. Yet 25 percent of the overall sample expressed support for the ANC and the proportion in urban areas was much higher. Despite this, no less than 65 percent of the hundreds of subjects who openly supported the ANC as their mst choice of leadership, opposed sanctions and 74 percent who mentioned the ANC as their second choice of political organisation, also opposed sanctions. The same patterns apply to items on disinvestment. There are no grounds for assuming that the results are meaningfully distorted by fear.

Criticism 2. "The mass of blacks are deprived of information on which to base an opinion. Members of black trade Chamber of Mines' Newsletter March/May 1989 5_ Prepared to suffer - (post school education only)

52%

46%

5 _ .?

unions are mobilised and politically betterinformed, and thus only they can reflect valid black views on sanctions." in the survey, the subjects were asked whether they belonged to trade unions. Those who did mainly belonged to Cosatu unions and Cosatu has endorsed sanctions. Among these trade union members in the sample, no less than 79 percent opposed sanctions and even more opposed disinvestment (8! percent).

Criticism 3. "Opinion polls are very general measures. A black leader like Archbishop Tutu who has a following of millions of black Anglicans (Episcopalians), knows his followers and he supports sanctions and disinvestment with that knowledge." Subjects in the no Page 9!

MN

A GRAPHIC REPRESENTATION OF MAJOR FINDINGS

N

' ALL BLACKS

Sanctions: Good or bad idea? Disinvestment: Good or bad idea?

Bad Idea

.52 w

SOUTH AFRICAN BLACKS: DISINVESTMENT "A GOOD IDEA"

SOUTH AFRICAN BLACKS: ECONOMIC PRESSURE ON SA,

SUPPORT FOR OPTIONS

0;

Chamber of Mines' Newsletter March/ May 1989

Raises Black
standard of living
176 %

Continues
disarmament
17 91:

SOUTH AFRICAN BLACKS: SANCTIONS "A GOOD IDEA"
BLACK SOUTH AFRICANS: FORM OF INTERNATIONAL ASSISTANCE
DESIRED (PERCENT)

Sanctions/
diarmament (I a
Pharmaceuticals p! eOnNor M-sre-H lbrv "306

THE MARKINGR PGLL:

DETAILS OF QUESTIONS ASKED ..

INTRODUCTION: I am from Markinor, a market research 8. SHOW CARD: If sanctions and boycotts caused the South company. We are doing a survey for a company which African Government to resign in, say 5 years time. would

studies people and their views about life, and events that are you: READ OUT

taking place both here and overseas. What you say Will be i. Support all sanctions and boycotts

completely secret. Only we know what each person says, ii. Support sanctions and boycotts which do not harm you

and we do not write down your name. We take all the personally

answers to our offices where we add the results all together iii. Oppose all sanctions and boycotts

so that we will know how different groups of people feel iv. Uncertain/ don't know and think.

. 9. SHOW CARD: If sanctions and boycotts caused many

1. ALL GROUPS: LET US BEGIN: What would you say are the people to lose their jobs, and also caused the South African

three most serious problems that people in South Africa have Government to resign after 5 years, would you: READ OUT

to face these days? i. Support all sanctions and boycotts

ii. .Support sanctions and boycotts which do not harm you

2. What would you say are the three most serious problems personally

that people have to face where their work is concerned? iii. Oppose all sanctions and boycotts

iv. Uncertain/ don't know

3. QUESTION: These days, the political and economic ---_--_

situation in South Africa is much discussed by politicians in 10. Suppose you personally lost your job because of

America and other overseas countries. Many of them want sanctions and boycotts, would you support or oppose such

to do things to help black people in South Africa. Do you sanctions and boycotts?

think these countries should or should not help black people i. Support

in South Africa? ii. Oppose

'Should tShould not iii. Uncertain/ don't know

33. if the answer is SHOULD: What things should overseas

people do to help black people in South Africa? I I . Different people have different views about what the

South African Government does and will do about sanctions.

. There has also been some talk as to whether overseas When I have read these views will you please tell me which

companies should leave South Africa and go back to their one you think is most likely to happen? READ OUT

own country overseas, as a protest against apartheid. The i. The SA Government will criticize overseas countries that

words used to describe overseas companies leaving South introduce sanctions but will not change what it does

Africa are disinvestment or disengagement. Have you ever inside South Africa.

heard of these words, disinvestment or disengagement? ii. The Government will make a few small changes in its

'Yes 'No policy.

iii. The Government will get rid of all apartheid laws.

5. QUESTION: Do you personally think disengagement or iv. The Government will resign and hand over to another

disinvestment - that is overseas companies leaving South government. , ..

Africa - is a good idea or a bad idea? i .. \$,

i 'Good idea . 'Bad idea I '1 2. QUESTION: Some people in America and other overseas

- "t . a . '- ' '- ' v - . ' countries want their governments to persuade the South

5a. If answer is 'good idea': Here are some other opinions 1w: 5., African government to change the political system in this

on the problem. Mth which of these do you agree most? V ; . f_ 3 'country. The way they want to do this is to ban and boycott

READ OUT ' ' all South African products. i.e. they want to stop overseas

i. if overseas companies leave South Africa, blacks will only countries from trading with South Africa. This is called

suffer a little but it will help them politically sanctions. '

ii. If overseas companies leave South Africa, blacks will-- - Have you heard of sanctions ?

suffer a great deal but it will help them politically tYes 'No A - 4-

' Do you believe that sanctions are a good idea or a bad idea?

6. QUESTION: As you may know, many companies in South 'Good idea 'Bad idea

Africa are owned by South Africans. but others are American- , owned companies. British-owned, or they may be owned by I 3. SHOW CARD: Which of these le

aders or organisations. e other country like Germany or Japan. if you could do you think, want sanctions and disi

nvestment. and which case, in what kind of company would you like to work - a ones do not want sanctions and d

isinvestment? Or 'do you South African or an overseas company? 1F OVERSEAS: Which not know? READ OUT

country overseas?

The ANC - African National Congress

The UDF - United Democratic Front

The AWB - Afrikaanse Weerstandsbeweging

The ZCC - Zion Christian Church

State President - P.W. Botha

Archbishop Tutu of the Anglican Church

Mrs Helen Suzman - Progressive Federal Party

'South African company '

"Overseas company

'NAME OF OVERSEAS COUNTRY

6a. Thinking specifically of overseas companies operating in

South Africa, what wouIH you say are the good things about The Rev. Allan Hendriclcse - L eader of the Labour Party

working for an overseas company? PROBE FULLY The Rev. Allan Boesak of the Dutch Reformed Mission

6!). And what are the bad things about working for an Church

overseas company operating in South Africa: PROBE FULLY . Dr. M. G. Buthelezi - Chief Min ister of KwaZulu

. COSATU - Congress of South African Trade Unions

9993?.U'PWN?

0

—.

—.

7. SHOW CARD: If the United States Government decided 12, NUM _ National Union of Mine Wo rkers

0" sanctions and boycotts against the South African 13. NAFCOC - National African Federat ed Chambers of

Government, how successful do you think this would be in Commerce.

changing the apartheid policies of South Africa: Would it be:

READ OUT

I. Very successful

11. Somewhat successful

Iii. Not at all successful

iv. Don't know

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(from page 5!

study were asked what religious denomination they Deiongea to and they were also given an opportunity to name Archbishop Tutu as a leader. The proportions opposing sanctions among those subjects who were Anglicans and those who supported Tutu as a leader were as indicated in Table L.

The criticism thus is flawed. The followers of Archbishop Tutu and Anglicans generally are slightly more likely to support sanctions than black people in general; but that support is far short of a majority.

Criticism 4. "Most of the blacks polled are relatively privileged. Sanctions would be supported by those blacks in utter poverty, or those, who live in the homelands, those who are

TABLE L

Anglicans

Followers of Archbishop Tutu

TABLE M

Overall

Rural homeland blacks

Shack dwellers/squatters

unemployed or those who live in

shack settlements." In the survey

there were sub-samples representing

the very poor the rural' homeland

blacks, the unemployed and the

squatters. For the results on the two

issues of sanctions and disinvestment.

see Table M.

If anything, the TEJECUOH of economic sanctions may be higher among blacks living in relative poverty than in the black sample as a whole. There was also no significant difference in attitudes between those respondents who had heard of sanctions and those for whom the term was unfamiliar. Both groups strongly rejected sanctions and disinvestment. Whatever slight differences may have been probably due to level of education.

Opposing Opposing

Sanctions Disinvestment

70% 76%

67% 72%

Opposing Opposing

Sanctions Disinvestment

82% 84%

87% 87%

75% 79%

Household income less than R200 (\$75) pm. 87% 86%

Unemployed job-seekers

6. Conclusions

83% 85%

These results make it quite clear that in the results of the current, very comprehensive Gallup poll, there is no substantial category of grassroots South African blacks who have a majority in support of the spokesmen who endorse sanctions. In fact, subjects were questioned about what they thought the viewpoints on sanctions were of 11 South African political and economic/social leaders (13). Less than one-third (31 percent) knew the correct opinion stance of six leaders or more out of 11. The relationship between the opinion of leaders

for or against sanctions. and the knowledge of these positions among the grass-roots is very tenuous indeed.

The results of this survey, in fact, do reveal why the impression is gained that so many South African blacks support sanctions and disinvestment. Among the people with more than school education (ie many of them graduates) roughly half support sanctions and almost one-third are even prepared to support sanctions which cause hardship and unemployment. These are the articulate and audible people who are highly politicised and who give tangible support to spokesmen who plead for sanctions. Their viewpoints are understandable in view of their frustrations. They are not materially deprived but feel deprived of status and dignity. The results make it quite clear, however, that they do not remotely speak for the masses of South African blacks.

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SUMMARY OF MN

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Overall opinion of all population groups concerning the policies of sanctions and disinvestment

South Africans overwhelmingly believe that sanctions (84 percent) and disinvestment (85 percent) are bad ideas.

Blacks and whites are equally likely to think disinvestment (89 percent of whites and 85 percent of blacks) is a bad idea. But whites voice stronger opposition to the idea of sanctions (95 percent) than do black South Africans (82 percent).

The possibility that sanctions and disinvestment will lead to higher unemployment is the reason most frequently given for thinking such policies are a bad idea.

Among the 14 percent of blacks who think disinvestment is a good idea, one-third (35 percent) say they think so because disinvestment may help get rid of apartheid. Another 21 percent say disinvestment will put pressure on the government to bring about changes faster, and 13 percent say disinvestment will make South Africa more self-sufficient.

Among the 16 percent of blacks who think sanctions are a good idea, 35 percent say that such a policy puts pressure on their government to abolish apartheid. Another 18 percent say sanctions will bring change more quickly, 10 percent think sanctions will make all race groups suffer together, and eight percent say that sanctions will make South Africa more self-sufficient.

While 83 percent think sanctions are generally a bad idea, six in 10 South Africans, including 78 percent of whites and 58 percent of blacks, oppose all sanctions conditioned on the possibility that such policies would cause the South African Government to step down within five years.

Thirty-one percent support sanctions to some degree given the assumption that the government will resign as a consequence. This includes 16 percent who would support all sanctions and 16 percent who would support only sanctions that do not harm them personally.

While six in 10 (60 percent) think disinvestment will seriously hurt the strength of the South African Government, this view is most prevalent among blacks (69 percent).

Whites are more likely to think Chamber of Mines' Newsletter March/May 1989 disinvestment will effect the strength of the government only a little (42 percent) or not at all (37 percent). A near majority (48 percent), regardless of race, have a worse

opinion of American companies that have left their country. Majorities of South Africans believe American business activity: a) contributes to a higher standard of living for black South Africans (78 percent); b) provides black workers with good jobs that would not otherwise exist (74 percent); c) does not contribute to the misuse of black workers (60 percent); d) does not help to continue racial segregation and discrimination (58 percent);

Problems faced by South Africans
In open-ended or free-response questions, South Africans were asked to discuss what they think are the three most serious problems that people face in their country generally and the work-place specifically. In a third open-ended question, respondents were asked what changes they would like to see in the life and work of people like themselves.

Unemployment is most often cited by South Africans as being one of the most serious problems that people in their country face. Overall, half (49 percent) of the South Africans surveyed name unemployment, while 23 percent cite apartheid or racial discrimination and 19 percent say housing is one of the most serious problems.

There are, however, significant differences in the perception of how important various problems are according to the race of the respondent. Non-white South Africans are much more concerned than whites about matters of day-to-day living such as unemployment, housing, and education. A majority of non-whites (55 percent) name unemployment as one of the most serious problems for South Africans. This is the problem named by the largest proportion of the non-white population. Only 13 percent of whites said unemployment is one of the most serious problems. Blacks (33 percent) are generally more supportive than Whites

(12 percent) of sanctions that would result in the government reynning. Given a more stringent condition that ilmany people would lose their jobs," more than two-thirds (69 percent) would oppose all sanctions. Ninety per cent of whites and nearly two-thirds (65 percent) of blacks hold this view.

Given the possibility the respondent might lose his or her own job because of sanctions. more than three-quarters (including 93 percent of whites and 76 percent of blacks) would oppose these policies. But 14 percent of blacks say they would support sanctionsand boycotts even under these conditions of personal hardship.

' Only one-quarter (25 percent(of South Africans. regardless of race. agree that non-whites are "prepared to suffer and to risk losing their jobs while sanctions and boycotts are used against South Africa".

More than three-quarters (79 percent) of South Africans think their government will make only a few small changes (43 percent) or no changes in policy (36 percent) in response to sanctions imposed by other countries.

Only 16 percent believe sanctions will lead the government to end apartheid.

Half (50 percent; of all South Africans believe that sanctions imposed by the US against South Africa would be at least somewhat successful in forcing changes to South Africa's apartheid policies.

Blacks (20 percent) are particularly likely compared to whites (two percent) to think that sanctions would be very successful in changing apartheid. Only 28 percent of blacks think sanctions would not be successful at all. A majority of whites (57 percent), on the other hand, believe sanctions will not succeed in changing apartheid.

Opinion regarding disinvestment Eighty-three percent think overseas companies should not leave South Africa because this is not a good way to tight apartheid. Sixteen per cent believe companies should disinvest because the South AfricaTi _

Government does not want companies to leave and will be persuaded to end apartheid if they do. Eighteen per cent of blacks compared to only seven per cent of whites agree that disinvestment will force an end to apartheid.

South Africans who believe that disinvestment will force their government to abandon apartheid are almost evenly divided between those who think blacks will suffer only a little (53 percent; as a consequence and those who think they will suffer a

great deal (47 percent).

A near majority (47 percent) think disinvestment by American companies would be very successful (16 percent) or somewhat successful (31 percent) as a policy to bring an end to apartheid, but 37 percent think disinvestment will not be at all successful.

Whites (64 percent) are twice as likely as blacks (32 percent) to believe that disinvestment will not succeed in forcing an end to apartheid.

Eighteen percent of blacks believe disinvestment could be very successful in bringing an end to apartheid. Only two percent of whites hold this opinion.

Role of American companies

A substantial majority (58 percent) of South Africans (including 51 percent of whites and 59 percent of blacks) think that American companies in South Africa can help make the government change away from apartheid.

Three-quarters (75 percent) of South Africans (including 84 percent of whites and 73 percent of blacks) believe ending American business operations in South Africa would have a bad effect on the lives of blacks in that country.

Nearly three-quarters (73 percent) think that ending American business operations would seriously hurt the South African economy. But this view is more prevalent among blacks (77 percent) than among whites (50 percent). Forty-five percent of whites think such action by American companies will hurt their economy only a little.

There is a less dramatic but still significant distinction in opinions by blacks compared to whites over the degree to which apartheid and racial discrimination are considered among the most serious problems facing the nation. One-third of whites (32 percent) cite apartheid as a serious problem. This is the problem singled out by the largest proportion of the white population. While more than one in five (21 percent) of blacks agree, this is a much smaller proportion than the 55 percent who name unemployment.

More than one in five non-whites (21 percent) also name housing as a serious problem compared to only six percent of whites. And 15 percent of non-whites say low education standards are a problem compared to five percent of whites who say the same thing.

While whites most frequently cite apartheid as a serious problem, the matter that is of major concern to the second largest proportion of whites is inflation (cited by 26 percent).

In the work-place. the major problem for all South Africans. cited by 56 percent. is the level of pay. While blacks and whites agree that low pay is a major problem. a substantial majority (59 percent) of blacks single out low pay. Only one-third (34 percent) of whites Cite low levels of compensation as a major problem.

Whites also name lack of communication between employer and employee (15 percent), poorly qualified or trained workers (14 percent), a lack of good jobs (13 percent), and a lack of job satisfaction (one percent) as being major problems associated with work.

Blacks, on the other hand, are more likely than whites to say that racial discrimination (16 percent), jobs that are reserved for whites only (11 percent), a lack of equal pay for equal jobs (11 percent), poor benefits (11 percent), and poor treatment by whites (11 percent) are the major problems confronted in the work-place.

The changes South Africans would like to see most in their lives and their work are:

'an end to apartheid - 25 percent:

thigher salaries - 24 percent:

'newly created jobs - 14 percent:

'equal pay for equal employment - 12 percent:

'a better relationship between races.

- nine percent;

'improved education - nine percent:

'no job reservation - seven percent:

'better housing - seven percent.

While approximately equal proportions of whites and blacks express the desire for better race relations, blacks are significantly more likely than whites to name such concerns as ending apartheid (27 percent v 11 percent), new job creation (15 percent v three percent), and equal pay (14 percent v two percent) as changes they would like to see.

Ninety-one per cent of blacks think that other countries should assist the black people of South Africa, but that view is shared by only two-thirds (68 percent) of the white population. Onethird (32 percent) of whites think foreign countries should not help blacks in South Africa.

Among those who think foreign countries should assist blacks, forms of assistance most frequently named are:

'provide jobs - 19 percent:

'build new businesses or factories - 16 percent:

'provide education - 15 percent:

'build schools - 13 percent:

'help abolish apartheid -12 per-

cent:

'build housing - 10 percent.

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A SOUTH AFRICAN
MINING INDUSTRY
PERSPECTIVE ON THE
SANCTIONS ISSUE

Tom Main, Chief Executive of the Chamber of Mines, comments. The policies of successive South African governments have caused outrage internationally and a search for a means, short of warfare, to force abandonment of those policies.

Various approaches have been adopted with mixed results:
i' Ostracism in the form of cultural and sporting isolation has largely succeeded in the removal of discrimination based on colour from South Africa's playing fields, theatres and professional associations and societies:

ii' Economic sanctions by a number of countries, precipitated by the United States Comprehensive Anti-Apartheid Act of 1986, have not significantly affected the economy although causing a degree of unemployment:

iii' Disinvestment or the withdrawal of foreign investment on the other hand has meant the withdrawal of foreign influence. the transfer of assets to South African interests and the stimulation of a go-it-alone climate of opinion domestically;

iv' More importantly, loss of confidence by overseas investors and the consequent failure of South Africa to attract development capital has severely contracted prospects for economic growth, virtually halted the reform process and produced a spectre of mass long-term black impoverishment.

It is against this background that pressure is mounting on the major Western powers to apply full and comprehensive economic sanctions against the Republic of South Africa. This is particularly so with the United States where the Reagan Administration's policy of constructive engagement has been deemed to have failed, although in truth it was never properly implemented and thus never really tested.

The premise of those who support a sanctions strategy is that faced with the discomforts of a devastated economy, whites will be persuaded to give up power in the short, medium or long term, and that is the preferable (moral) alternative to having to achieve this goal through a bloody revolution or full-scale racial war.

A cynical variation of this is that the ensuing impoverishment will in fact hasten racial confrontation and revolution.

Both these premises and their underlying assumptions need to be

examined.

The key assumptions made by proponents of sanctions are:

t That comprehensive economic sanctions can be efficiently imposed:
" That they would then achieve the political goal of a transfer of power:
t That the cost of sanctions in terms of human suffering is acceptable because the blacks of South Africa are prepared to make this sacrifice:

' That there is no acceptable alternative solution to South Africa's problems.

I can perhaps address some of these issues best from the perspective of my own industry, the mining industry, which has been the flywheel of South Africa's economy since the end of the last century and remains so today.

The "efficiency" of sanctions Without wishing to issue any challenges I must point out the obvious: that if ever sanctions were to succeed against South Africa they would need to be applied efficiently in the first instance to the country's minerals, some 90 per cent of which by value are exported and are thus on the face of it highly vulnerable to trade embargoes.

The mining industry: key place in the economy is illustrated by the fact that mineral earnings represent 56 per cent of total South African foreign exchange earnings, and that mining accounts directly for more than 12 per cent of the gross domestic product. and directly and indirectly for up to 24 per cent of the national wealth.

Yet despite trade embargoes on certain of our mineral products by some major countries the results thus far have not been very successful. indeed, in the face of much publicised sanctions imposed upon coal (our second most valuable mineral export) 12 Chamber of Mines' Newsletter March/May 1989 by the United States. France and Denmark and the non-renewal of contracts by a major importer such as Japan, South Africa's coal exports of about 42 million tons last year were the second highest ever. And this was achieved in an overtraded international coal market.

Without going into detail there were of course a number of factors, some of which may not endure, which assisted South Africa's coal exporters, and individual mines have in fact been affected by sanctions with consequent serious job losses. But overall the coal industry has displayed remarkable resilience in coping with the situation.

Another significant revenue-earner facing embargo has been uranium which like coal is subject to long-term contracts. South Africa has lost certain

outlets and this, coupled with an international market which has been deteriorating for a considerable time, poses a serious threat to the industry from the early W905. However, South African uranium is a by-product of the gold mines and, except in the case of some marginal mines, production can be switched off and resumed as has been done in the past in response to market conditions - without drastic consequences.

Sanctions could conceivably cause some disruption and inconvenience to South Africa's principal mining export, gold, but an effective embargo is highly improbable as it is a low-volume, high-value, easily transportable commodity and is universally sought after for a variety of purposes.

While it might be theoretically possible by analysis to identify gold by country of origin the logistics of such an exercise would make it impractical.

As for any attempt to get at South Africa by driving down the gold price, the repercussions on the world's central banks and other major gold producing countries would rule this out.

Finally and however unlikely, if any real threat was perceived to the supply of gold from South Africa, which is still the major Western producer, it would serve also to drive up the price - thus weighing against any lost sales.

Broadly similar considerations apply to two other principal commodities, diamonds and platinum.

The platinum group metals are especially well hedged against sanctions in that they, together with vanadium, chrome and manganese are vital to modern industrial economies. South Africa is in most cases the key supplier, with the Soviet Union being virtually the only significant alternative source.

Even the Comprehensive Anti-Apartheid Act of 1986 was not

MM

sufficiently comprehensive to include in its provisions an embargo on these strategic minerals. This is not surprising in the light of numerous US Administration and Congressional studies on the likely effects on the US of a cut-off of these minerals. The most well-known study, by the US Bureau of Mines, estimates that the cumulative direct economic cost to the US of an embargo on six SA strategic minerals in the first five years would amount to US\$9.25 billion or US\$1.85 billion annually.

In June last year in testimony to the US Senate Foreign Relations Committee. Deputy Secretary of State John C Whitehead stated: "Given South Africa's proven capacity for trade realignment and diversion and its still untested capacity for full-scale sanctions busting, we estimate that even reasonably well-enforced comprehensive UN sanctions would cut total export receipts by something less than 25 per cent".

Some calculations as to the effects on other Western countries of cutting commercial links with South Africa have been made, by for example the Institute for European Economic Studies. the French Ecole Supérieure de Commerce. the Fachhochschule of West Germany and the United Kingdom/South Africa Trade Association.

These together with official government estimates indicate that aside from the effects on more than a million British subjects living in South Africa. the severance of trade ties would mean the loss of between 120 000 and 250 000 jobs in the United Kingdom alone and some 500 000 jobs in all Western countries.

Given all this, what should not be lost sight of is the fact that South Africa itself has been preparing for the possibility of sanctions for a considerable time and is ready to cope with them.

it has. with the major exception of oil, all the key raw materials required to maintain its domestic industries. it has spent vast sums over a considerable period in stockpiling oil and other strategic items, in establishing plants for the commercial production of oil from its own coal resources and in making itself virtually self-sufficient in arms production. it is not self-interest however but realism that has been the basis of the anti-sanctions stance of the Thatcher and Kohl governments and the Reagan and Bush Administrations. They do not believe that sanctions will achieve their end but sense instead that they will in fact be

counterproductive to achieving political resolution in South Africa. They recognise too that the resistance of South Africa itself and the Willingness of other countries to pay merely lip service to any embargo on trade with the Republic will undermine any attempt to successfully internationalise such action. And finally they recoil from being pressured into a futile symbolic protest that will cause immense misery to the blacks of South Africa.

To sum up: the first supposmon, that comprehensive economic sanctions can be efficiently applied against South Africa. is not supported by the facts, though some further attrition could be achieved.

The political goal of sanctions The supporters of sanctions, while presuming that the black people of South Africa are willing to endure the privations of sanctions do not. however, seem to pause to consider the other side of the coin: that a sufficient body of whites may be even more willing or determined to make sacrifices to maintain their position in the political structure and the economy and that they are by far the better positioned to do so.

A recent study on this subject is Economics in a Revolutionary Society: Sanctions and the Transformation of South Africa, by Dr Ronald Bethlehem, Economics

Consultant to one of South Africa's leading mining groups. He states: "if the carrying capacity of the economy is weakened by sanctions, the more probable outcome is not that existing income and wealth will be shared more equally but rather that surplus labour will be discarded, condemning those retrenched to the indignity of worklessness and extreme hardship.

"It is, however, by no means certain that this, over an extended period of time, would reduce (the black population's) political patience with the existing social order in South Africa and provoke them to overthrow it. its effect could be just the opposite because deprivation might also weaken morale and the process of adjustment in the sanctions afflicted economy would draw other blacks increasingly into (the white camp for) a sharing of those benefits that were available for distribution".

Dr Bethlehem points out that sanctions on South African goods and the denial of access to foreign savings for investment in South Africa means that economic growth is stifled and real growth is impossible.

And because of the composition of the labour force and the changing demography within South Africa it is the black population that is suffering

and will suffer the most.

This is because the highly-skilled Chamber of Mines' Newsletter March/May 1989 white population is less likely to endure adcecl unemployment In an economy wnich still has a shortage of skills. The largely unskilled black section is, conversely, more likely to be retrenched as economic activity is restricted.

The South African mining industry well illustrates this. it is one of the largest employers in the country, with a workforce of threequarters of a million people. 90 per cent of whom are unskilled and semi-skilled blacks who are in oversupply. The skilled represent 10 per cent. a group who are in short supply in all sectors of the economy. They are mainly white but include a growing number of blacks. When mines are obliged to curtail activities, retrenchment is in the order of unskilled, followed by semiskilled. with the skilled workers being absorbed elsewhere in the industry or another sector of the economy.

Dr Bethlehem points out that the . black population is growmg at a rate of nearly three per cent per annum and is fast being urbanised. Together these two factors mean that the number of new black recruits to the job market is growing at a rate in excess of three per cent per annum - much faster than the white sector which is already urbanised and is not growing.

In the absence of economic growth it is those new black recruits to the labour market who would be most affected, and it has been estimated that two million jobs would be lost to them if sanctions were sufficiently tightened.

in addition, the redistribution of income in favour of the black sector. which has characterised recent years, is likely to be reversed. This is again because the white community already. suffering from a brain drain because of political uncertainty, will find its skills being sought at a premium.

The point then is that sanctions. while having the propensity to do a great deal of damage to the black population, will inflict relatively little harm on their real target. the whites - and this in itself must logically render sanctions ineffective as a means of persuading whites to make political and other adaptions.

However, John Kane-Berman, Director of the liberal South African Institute of Race Relations. considers economic effects on blacks to be the single most important strategic objection to sanctions.

The result. he argues. would be a slowing down of the pace at which the balance of power would shift in

favour of black people, thus
undermining the most important non-
violent weapon they have had at their
disposal, their labour power.
(Continued over page)

There is another way in which sanctions are misdirected. They are aimed at the most enlightened sector of the economy, the business sector, which has led the way in removing discrimination from the workplace, facilitating the economic empowerment of blacks, and challenging apartheid on a number of fronts, including freedom of expression and the rule of law. The mining industry in particular was the most influential voice in the recommendations of the Wiehahn Commission of inquiry into South Africa's labour legislation which culminated in the removal of discrimination from the country's labour law and the granting of statutory recognition to trade unions for black workers.

As a consequence of these actions mining employers through their association, the Chamber of Mines of South Africa, negotiate as equals across the table with what is how the single largest and most powerful trade union in Africa, the National Union of Mineworkers.

The Chamber of Mines also successfully took on the task of persuading the trade unions representing conservative white workers to accept changes in work practices to free the industry of de facto as opposed de jure discrimination.

Let us for a moment hypothesise that in the medium to long-term South Africa's economy did become reduced to the state where whites also began to suffer serious economic deprivation.

The most probable consequence is that they would ensure the election of ?,_

Apartheid has caused international outrage and a search for peaceful means to force its abandonment. Pressure is now mounting on the West to apply full and comprehensive economic sanctions, particularly in the United States where an erratically applied policy of constructive engagement has been deemed to have failed.

Key assumptions by proponents of sanctions are that 1a) they can be efficiently imposed 1b) they would then achieve a transfer of power (c) necessary suffering is acceptable a right-wing government to redress their lot. if necessary through the transfer of wealth from other groups in the form of expenditure on special welfare and employment programmes.

Any expectation that such a scenario would hasten a revolution could prove a grave miscalculation, isolated and with their physical

security threatened, the whites would still command considerable military power. Even the Zulu leader Chief Buthelezi, who heads the largest single population group in the country. some six million Zulus, bluntly states that blacks would face an unequal contest in such a situation.

A more probable scenario perhaps would be retention of sufficient power by the white group to ensure its physical and economic security, coupled with a drawn-out series of concessions aimed at co-opting sections of the black population who perceive that they have more to lose in a racial war.

Whichever way one looks at it, however, sanctions are unlikely to achieve the political goal of a transfer of power.

The black sacrifice to sanction: The supporters of sanctions, themselves far removed from the scene of attrition, readily accept that their chosen strategy will cause human misery to the people of South Africa, and in fact this is one of their objectives. They justify their stance on the grounds that the black people of South Africa whom they seek to help are ready and eager to endure such misery.

AN EXECUTIVE

SUMMARY

because SA blacks are prepared to make this sacrifice (cl) there is no better solution.

Do sanctions work?

Key to the SA economy and the success or failure of sanctions are mineral exports. So far results of existing embargoes by some major countries have not been very successful.

Coal exports last year were the second highest ever - though individual mines have been affected
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My own industry, mining, last year employed over 50 000 black workers With an estimated 3.8 million dependents in the rural areas throughout Southern Africa who rely on in excess of R5 billion annually in wages earned on the mines for their survival. Bearing in mind that 90 per cent by value of South Africa's minerals are exported, then sanctions, if fully successful, would in theory leave the overwhelming majority of these almost four million people with virtually no other means of subsistence.

To put another perspective on it. mine earnings equate to more than 40 per cent of the gross national product of Lesotho and 21 per cent of that of the Transkei.

The numbers may be smaller in

other sectors of the South African economy, such as the fruit and vegetable, sugar and manufacturing export industries. but the human misery of unemployment would hardly be less. Faced with the reality of such a scenario it is doubtful if any proponents of sanctions could justify their case. Some argue in private that it would not come to that - that whites would be sufficiently intimidated by the fear of sanctions or by demonstrations of their effects to make the desired political and other concessions. But they continue to assert that blacks will be prepared to suffer any consequences if the worst happens.

The view that blacks are willing and eager to endure loss of incomes with all that this entails is encouraged by a number of black South African spokesmen, such as Archbishop Tutu and various trade union leaders. and jobs lost. The uranium market has been deteriorating for some time. but as a by-product of gold its production - can be switched off and resumed without drastic consequences. Gold itself - the principal export - is a low volume. high value, easily transportable commodity, universally sought after. Any perceived threat from sanctions would conversely drive up the price.

The platinum group metals, together with vanadium, chrome and manganese are vital to modern industrial economies and in most cases the Soviet Union is the only significant alternative source.

Official studies indicate that an embargo on South Africa strategic minerals would cost the United States \$1.85 billion annually, and that even well enforced sanctions would cut South Africa exports by less than ' - 25 percent. The severance of trade ties would mean the loss of up to

The tactic is aimed at keeping up the pressure on white South Africans but it is having other serious consequences.

For one thing it has misled many overseas people in believing that sanctions are actually a workable proposition in terms of changing South African society.

For another it has contributed to a loss of confidence and cessation of loans to and new investment in South Africa that has already caused probably as much economic damage as sanctions are likely to achieve.

' Some of this is beginning to dawn on these black South African spokesmen and there are distinct signs of a shift away from earlier stances. with talk of "selective" instead of total sanctions.

Notably, too, black trade union leaders unless publicly challenged prefer to remain silent on the subject at home while making what they perceive to be the necessary mandatory noises abroad where they are not heard by an increasingly restive membership.

For the fact is that every scientific test of black opinion has showed conclusively that blacks who perceive the implications do not support economic sanctions as a method of ending apartheid.

A study among black South African coal miners commissioned by the German Africa Foundation in Bonn found that 70 per cent of 1 004 miners questioned opposed sanctions. This was only one of 14 polls analysed by the respected liberal Washington-based investor Responsibility Research Centre which concluded that collectively and 250 000 jobs in the United Kingdom and some 500 000 in all Western countries. e

A political aim it has been estimated that 2 million unskilled and semi-skilled jobs would be lost if sanctions were sufficiently tightened. in addition the redistribution of income in favour of the black sector, which has characterised recent years is likely to be reversed. This because the skilled minority (mainly white but including a growing number of blacks) will find its services sought at a premium. The result: the undermining of the most important non-violent weapon blacks have had at their disposal labour power.

There is another way in which sanctions are misdirected. They are aimed at the most enlightened sector of the economy, the business sector, which has led the way in pressing for individually they showed that ordinary blacks in South Africa do not support

the sanctions option.

Finally, if black South Africans really wanted sanctions imposed they have the power to see to it themselves by stopping work on a mass scale. But while there have been strikes against sanctions there has not been one in favour.

There can therefore be no Days for arguing that sanctions enjoy the support of black South Africans.

An acceptable alternative

If sanctions with their grave consequences for black South Africans are likely to prove counter-productive in achieving their political objective. is there a workable alternative?

Many white South Africans believe there is an alternative course to resolving South Africa's vexing social, economic and political problems.

There are encouraging positives to support this view. among them the fact that the South African Government appears to be turning its back on apartheid and is groping for an alternative course. This is evidenced by:

' Numerous reforms which have taken place under President P W Botha and above all by his willingness to break with his right wing on the fundamental issue of power-sharing:

" Recent indications by Acting State President Chris Heunis and new National Party leader F W de Klerk that they are prepared to pursue this course more aggressively, offering unconditional talks with black South African leaders:

' The greater sensitivity in handling reform, eliminating discrimination in the mining industry and elsewhere.

Black suffering

The view that blacks are willing and eager to endure loss of income with all that this entails is encouraged by a number of black South African spokesmen, such as Archbishop Tutu and various trade union leaders.

Faced with the reality of such a scenario in terms of human suffering on a wide scale, some argue in private that it would not come to that - but the tactic is to keep up the pressure on white South Africans.

For the fact is that every scientific test of black opinion has showed conclusively that blacks who perceive the implications do not support sanctions as a method of ending apartheid. If they really wanted sanctions imposed they have the power to see to it themselves by stopping work on a mass scale. attain particular goals.

politically sensitive domestic issues. such as the 'iSharpeville Six" and the hunger strikers released from detention;

' South Africa's withdrawal from the

Angolan conflict and Namibia and its renewed rapprochement with Mozambique:

It signs that given the right climate the black opposition, most notably the African National Congress, is willing to abandon violence in favour of a peaceful solution. '

Against this background it is not inconceivable that given the right pressures and the right circumstances white South Africans will over a reasonable period be persuaded to voluntarily make the fundamental adaptations needed.

Recent history is instructive in this respect and has been well summed up by Mr Kane-Berman and his team of researchers at the South African Institute of Race Relations.

They point out that considerable power has already been transferred to black South Africans as a result of their growing economic strength.

Mr Kane-Berman identifies this economic empowerment of blacks as one of the most striking developments in contemporary South Africa. Noting that ordinary black people are taking matters into their own hands and the very parliament from which they are excluded is having to catch up with their initiatives.

He goes on: "Blacks have given up begging for the repeal of racist laws and are now increasingly rendering them unworkable. They have the means to do so because they are accumulating economic leverage."

(To next page)

There are encouraging signs to support the view that there is a workable alternative to sanctions to bring about change.

The economic empowerment of blacks has been one of the striking developments in contemporary South Africa, and blacks are increasingly rendering racist laws unworkable. They have forced changes in pass laws, trade union legislation and the Group Areas Act.

Far from cutting off South Africa, the international community should be helping it prepare for a non-apartheid future by devoting extensive resources to education and training.

The first requirement is a tough analysis of the realities in terms of the practical possibilities and timescales for action including appropriate, but not counter-productive, pressures and. '

Most importantly, reward a response to the achievement or failure to

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Black economic empowerment has forced policy changes in pass laws and trade union legislation. It has broken down segregation in many other areas and has spawned a transport industry with an asset base of R3 billion as well as an annual turnover of R3 billion represented by the South African Black Taxi Association (SABTA) which, after the Government, is the country's biggest consumer of automotive products. Today there are more than 100 000 mm employing directly and indirectly at least 300 000 people. Imminent changes to the Group Areas Act are a further manifestation of economic empowerment as so-called "grey" areas develop in consequence of the desegregation of residential suburbs. What remains to be seen is when and how black economic power will be translated into political power. This is not an easy question but there are encouraging signs coming from Government. Mr Kane-Berman here also projects a positive line, contending that a process is underway whereby each concession leads to another. In this manner the process of erosion of physical apartheid could indeed spin off into the political field. Mr Kane-Berman cites the erosion of the Group Areas Act as an example of how blacks could get on to the voters' roll. As residential areas become increasingly desegregated, apartheid in local government will become more and more unworkable. He likens the process of change in South Africa to peeling an onion. The onion represents apartheid with so-called petty apartheid on the outer layers. As you peel off each layer you expose the one underneath eventually reaching the core and most important earthen statute. the Population Registration Act. It is black economic empowerment which has been instrumental in the removal of very many layers of the apartheid onion. In support of this analysis. Gavin Relly, Chairman of South Africa's largest mining group, Anglo American Corporation, contends that far from withdrawing from the country and imposing sanctions, the international community should be helping to prepare South Africans for full participation in a non-apartheid future by devoting extensive resources to education and training. Summing up the situation in a simple analogy, Mr Relly says that just as it will be impossible to convert a country to Christianity or any other religion by withdrawing the missionaries. so it will not be possible to eliminate discrimination by isolating

South Africa and withdrawing economic assistance.

The proponents of sanctions are clearly sincere in their efforts to assist South African blacks. But, in pursuing a policy of disinvestment, economic embargoes and withdrawal, they will impoverish the people they seek to assist. As Mr Kane-Berman has pointed out, they will deprive these people of their only effective weapon - their economic muscle.

In conclusion, the question may legitimately be asked: what can governments abroad do in present circumstances to hasten reform at the socio-political level. A programme which would be of considerable assistance could include the following:

' As a priority, abandonment of the vague parrot cry to "dismantle apartheid" in favour of a tough analysis of the realities in terms of practical possibilities and timescales for action, including appropriate, but not counterproductive pressures and, most importantly, rewards in response

The Chamber of Mines! South Africa dates from 1887, the year after gold was discovered on the Witwatersrand. It is an association of six major mining finance houses, 39 gold and 35 coal mines and 14 diamond, platinum, asbestos, manganese and copper mines.

The Chambers activities embrace: the engagement of black labour: the negotiation of labour matters, including minimum wage rates. It recognises trade unions and associations: the administration of miners training colleges, rescue training centres and the promotion of safety measures. The Mine Safety Division of the Chamber manages special medical facilities and the administration of pension and benefit funds for the industry: representing the industry in dealings with the government the carrying out of advanced technological research: the refining of gold and other metals: processing and marketing of uranium: the sale of Krugerrands.

Summary companies which conduct some of the above functions on behalf of the Chamber include The Employment Bureau of Africa (EBA); Nuclear Fuel Corporation of South Africa (Nufcor); the Rand Refinery and the Rand Mutual Assurance Company. to achievement or failure to attain particular goals:

' In particular, the identification of methods of assisting the process of change in ways that will not lead to reaction.

' An acceptance and acknowledgement that it is a rapidly expanding economy in South Africa that will encourage, and indeed force, the socio-political reforms sought by the rest of the world:

' Accordingly, urgently develop a programme for the economic upliftment of the whole population of South Africa which would include the encouragement of a massive inflow of funds into South Africa, particularly to finance housing developments, education and training, the informal

sector, small business development.
urbanisation, infrastructural
development, and general economic
activity;

t Encourage and support by
exchange programmes, financial
assistance and in other ways. the
efforts being made locally to develop
and inculcate a philosophy which
favours the development of
democratic institutions - such as the
black trade union movement - as well
as the free enterprise system:

' The urgent removal of existing
sanctions and disinvestment
legislation;

' The re-establishment of a capital
inflow into South Africa by banks and
other financial institutions and a roll-
over of existing debt to reverse the
extraordinary situation of a developing
country such as South Africa being
forced to export enormous quantities
of capital for the repayment of its
debts instead of using these funds for
internal developments: and

' A re-opening of access to the
international financial institutions for
loans to South Africa.

The chief day (0 day policymaking body of the
Chamber is the Executive Committee comprising: C T
Fenron. President of the Chamber and Deputy Chairman
and Managing Director, Gold Fields of South Africa: K W
Maxwell. Vice-President of the Chamber and Chairman
of the Gold and Uranium Division. Johannesburg
Consolidated Investment Company: C G Knows. Vice-
President of the Chamber and Chairman. Gold.
Platinum and Uranium Division. Rand Mines (Mining and
Smelting): D J Crowe. Executive Director of Mines, I.
Anglovaal Limited: E P Gush. Chairman, Gold and
Uranium Division. Anglo American Corporation: T I
Greenliam. Executive Director. Gencor: P R Janisch. Ilex
official. General Manager Coal and Base Metals. Gold
Fields of South Africa The senior Chamber officials
responsible for implementing policy are: T R N Main.
Chief Executive: J Liebenberg, Senior General Manager
External Relations: Dr. D L E Pollnow. SEHIO' General
Manager Health Care Services: Dr H Wagner. Senior
General Manager. Operations: E A M Holmes Senior
General Manager. Recruitment: General Manager.
Corporate Senate: (position vacant).

Mama! may be wand M, Med acknowledgment I: made to the Chamber of Mines of South Africa.
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DATE: 1989 MAY 30

FROM: COSATU HEAD OFFICE

THERE ARE NOW LESS THAN 50 PEOPLE DETAINED NATIONALLY UNDER THE STATE OF EMERGENCY. HOWEVER SOME OF THE PEOPLE WHO HAD BEEN RELEASED HAVE BEEN REDETAINED. IN ADDITION THERE ARE NUMEROUS COMRADES STILL BEING DETAINED UNDER THE INTERNAL SECURITY ACT AND UNDER BANTUSTAN LAWS.

COMRADES IN DETENTION CONTINUE TO EMBARK ON HUNGER STRIKE TO SECURE THEIR RELEASE. THOSE ON HUNGER STRIKE HAVE BEEN REMOVED TO GROOTVLEI PRISON IN BLOEMFONTEIN IN AN ATTEMPT TO BREAK THEIR ACTION. THOSE ON HUNGER STRIKE INCLUDE SOYCO'S GENERAL SECRETARY, RAPU MOLEKANE, BLOEMFONTEIN'S COSATU LOCAL CHAIRPERSON AND CCAWUSA'S VICE-CHAIR. IN A LETTER FROM PRISON THE COMRADES STATED: "PRISON UNDER THE EMERGENCY IS LIKE A GRAVE AND WE ARE SENTENCED TO A SLOW DEATH... THE ONLY OPTION LEFT IS THAT OF A HUNGER STRIKE."

POLICE STATIONS. ONE RESTRICTEE, CHRIS NTULI WAS KILLED BY VIGILANTES, AND OTHER RESTRICTEES FEAR FOR THEIR LIVES, AS THEY ARE SITTING DUCKS FOR APARTHEID ASSASSINS. MANY COMRADES ARE ASKING WHETHER RESTRICTED PEOPLE CAN AFFORD TO OBEY THEIR RESTRICTED ORDERS.

STATE OF EMERGENCY: THE STATE OF EMERGENCY IS DUE TO BE RENEWED ON THE 9TH JUNE. THE REGIME HAS BEEN COMING UNDER ENORMOUS PRESSURE, PARTICULARLY INTERNATIONALLY, TO LIFT THE STATE OF EMERGENCY. IN RECENT WEEKS THERE HAVE BEEN RUMOURS THAT THE STATE OF EMERGENCY WOULD BE LIFTED. THESE RUMOURS WERE STRENGTHENED WHEN STOFFEL VAN DER MERWE SAID THAT THE GOVERNMENT WAS CONSIDERING LIFTING THE EMERGENCY.

030 02 01

THE RUMOURS WERE SQUASHED LAST WEEK BY VLOK WHO SAID THAT "THE REVOLUTIONARY CLIMATE IS STILL UNACCEPTABLY HIGH". IT IS BELIEVED THAT THERE ARE DIVISIONS IN THE STATE OVER WHETHER TO KEEP THE STATE OF EMERGENCY OR NOT. AS IN PAST YEARS ORGANISATIONS ARE CALLING FOR THE STATE OF EMERGENCY TO BE LIFTED, INCLUDING THE RESTRICTIONS ON COSATU AND UDF AND OTHER ORGANISATIONS.

COMRADES ON DEATH ROW: THERE ARE OVER 60 PEOPLE ON DEATH ROW FOR POLITICALLY-RELATED OFFENCES. OF THESE, 30 FACE EXECUTION FOR THE ALLEGED KILLING OF POLICEMEN, INFORMERS AND COUNCILLORS. 11 FACE EXECUTION FOR ALLEGED STRIKE-RELATED KILLINGS. 6 MK CADRES FACE REFUSED TO PARTICIPATE IN THEIR OWN TRIAL. THE JUDGE WAS AGAINST PASSING THE DEATH SENTENCE BUT WAS FORCED TO DO SO BY HIS ASSESSORS. AN APPEAL HAS NOW BEEN LODGED. IN ADDITION AT LEAST 14 OF THE UPPINGTON 26 HAVE BEEN SENTENCED TO DEATH FOR THEIR ALLEGED ROLE IN THE KILLING OF A POLICEMAN. THE FATE OF THE OTHER 12 IS STILL TO BE DECIDED BY THE COURTS.

THE SAVE THE PATRIOTS CAMPAIGN HAS ACHIEVED SOME SUCCESSES RECENTLY. 10 COMRADES HAVE HAD THEIR DEATH SENTENCES COMMUTED BY THE STATE PRESIDENT OR SET ASIDE BY THE COURTS. OF THESE 10, 6 WERE COMPLETELY SET FREE. 2 MORE HAVE BEEN GIVEN TEMPORARY REPRIEVES. AND 4 OTHERS HAVE BEEN GIVEN THE RIGHT TO APPEAL AGAINST THEIR SENTENCE. THESE INCLUDE THE FOLLOWING COSATU MEMBERS:-

4 SARHWU WORKERS, JHB: GIVEN LEAVE TO APPEAL

4 TSWU MEMBERS, DURBAN: DEATH SENTENCES COMMUTED TO 18-20 YEARS

CCAWUSA'S WILLIAM NTOMBELA: DEATH SENTENCE COMMUTED TO 26 YEARS

CDE. MGEDEZI FROM NUM: DEATH SENTENCE COMMUTED TO 20 YEARS

HOWEVER, THE REMAINING COMRADES ON DEATH ROW CAN BE EXECUTED AT ANY TIME, AND OTHERS ARE JOINING THEM VIRTUALLY EVERY WEEK. THE BELIEF THAT POLITICAL EXECUTIONS HAVE STOPPED SINCE THE SHARPEVILLE SIX WERE REPRIEVED WAS SHATTERED LAST WEEK WHEN A FORMER SOSCD MEMBER ABRAHAM ROW. THEY HAVE ASKED FOR ORGANISATIONS TO DRAW UP PETITIONS TO CAMPAIGN AGAINST THE HANGINGS.

NOTE: THE STATEMENT OF THE DELMAS 4 AND PROFILES OF THE UPPINGTON COMRADES ARE AVAILABLE FROM HEAD OFFICE.

OTHER REPRESSION AGAINST COSATU:

BELOW IS AN INCOMPLETE LIST OF SOME OF THE ACTS OF REPRESSION EXPERIENCED BY COSATU AFFILIATES AND MEMBERS SINCE THE BEGINNING OF MAY. COMRADES SHOULD SEND ANY DETAILS OF REPRESSION TO HEAD OFFICE SO THAT WE CAN MONITOR AND PUBLICISE ACTS OF REPRESSION AGAINST THE FEDERATION.

030 02 02

ATH MAY: A NUMSA SHOP STEWARDS MEETING IN BENONI WAS DISRUPTED WHEN TEARGAS WAS FIRED INTO THE UNION OFFICES. DRAFT RESOLUTIONS FOR THE COMING NUMSA CONGRESS WENT MISSING FROM THE OFFICES AFTER THE POLICE HAD ENTERED TO INVESTIGATE.

16TH MAY: NEHAWU'S KIMBERLEY ORGANISER (ONIOUS DIKGETSI) HAD HIS HOUSE PETROL BOMBED AFTER RECEIVING A NUMBER OF DEATH THREATS. BEFORE THIS ATTACK, 4 'WIT WOLWE' VISITED HIS HOME, ASSAULTED HIS BROTHER AND WARNED THAT HE WOULD BE KILLED IF HE WORKED FOR THE ANC. PAMPHLETS SMEARING HIM WERE DISTRIBUTED IN KIMBERLEY A FEW WEEKS AGO.

21ST MAY: JABU NDLOVU, A NATAL DELEGATE TO THE NUMSA CONGRESS WAS ATTACKED AND INJURED BY VIGILANTES ON HER RETURN. DELEGATES HAD RETURNED EARLY TO NATAL BECAUSE THEY FEARED AN ATTACK. JABU AND HER 13 YEAR OLD DAUGHTER WERE SERIOUSLY INJURED AND ARE IN HOSPITAL. HER HUSBAND AND 20 YEAR OLD DAUGHTER WERE KILLED IN THE ATTACK.

22ND MAY: COSATU REGIONAL OFFICES IN THE EASTERN CAPE AND THE OFFICES OF 6 AFFILIATES ARE RAIDED. THE POLICE SEIZED HUNDREDS OF COPIES OF COSATU NEWS.

COSATU DELEGATES LEAVING FOR THE CULTURAL CONFERENCE IN HARARE ARE HARASSED. THE SARHWU DELEGATE IS DETAINED, BUT SUBSEQUENTLY RELEASED.

POLICE SEIZED 'ASAVE THE UPPINGTON 26" T-SHIRTS AT KIMBERLEY AIRPORT. A FEW DAYS LATER THEY AGAIN STOP MATERIAL, THIS TIME MEDIA, FROM REACHING THE COSATU NORTHERN CAPE OFFICE.

2. CONSTITUTIONAL GUIDELINES

ON THE CONSTITUTIONAL GUIDELINES OF THE ANC. THE WORKSHOP WAS A JOINT SEMINAR BETWEEN AFFILIATES OF COSATU AND THE UDF HELD ON MAY RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN CONSTITUTIONAL GUIDELINES (CG'S) AND FREEDOM CHARTER(FC):

1. CONSTITUTIONAL GUIDELINES MUST BE READ IN CONJUNCTION WITH FREEDOM CHARTER.-PTHE CG'S MUST NOT BE SEEN AS A SUBSTITUTE FOR THE FC.

2. FREEDOM CHARTER CONTAINS THE COMMON DEMANDS OR PROGRAMME OF ALL PATRIOTIC FORCES FOR A LIBERATED S.A.

3. THE CG'S LOOK AT THE MECHANISMS NEEDED TO IMPLEMENT THE DEMANDS CONTAINED IN FREEDOM CHARTER.

4. SOME ASPECT OF CG'S ARE OPEN ENDED TO ALLOW FOR INPUT FROM THE DEMOCRATIC FORCES.

030 02 03

COSATU STATEMENT ON THE ARREST OF DONSIE KHUMALO 1/6/89

In the dark hours of this morning Donsie Khumalo, the Regional Secretary of COSATU Northern Transvaal, was arrested and charged for breaking his state of emergency restriction orders. He has been denied bail and his case remanded to the 30th August. This follows his detention earlier this year and his life or death hunger strike together with fellow detainees demanding their freedom. On being released, Donsie found himself, as did his comrades, being placed in a new prison. Except this time prison was his own home and he was expected to be both prisoner and warder.

Donsie and his comrades found this situation totally intolerable and took refuge in the British Embassy in Pretoria. They demanded that the British Government use their influence to pressurise the SA government to lift the restrictions on themselves and all other detainees. Instead of responding positively, the British treated Donsie and the other comrades as if they were criminals. They were hounded out of the embassy into the clutches of the security police. They had vowed not to obey their restrictions, so the British took their actions knowing full well that it would result in harassment and ultimately jail for the people concerned.

COSATU condemns this hounding and harassment of former detainees. People who have spent months, sometimes years in detention are now being cruelly persecuted. Many restrictees have lost their jobs as a result of restrictions. Others cannot afford the transport to report at police stations, sometimes twice a day. Still others are being harassed and even attacked when they report at police stations. One restrictee, Chris Ntuli, was killed by apartheid vigilantes and other restrictees fear for their lives, as they are sitting ducks for apartheid assassins. Many of our people are asking whether restricted people can afford to obey their restrictions.

COSATU calls for all charges against restrictees to be dropped. If even PW Botha is questioning the wisdom of the emergency, who is able to justify this continued harassment of emergency detainees? The state of emergency must be lifted next week, and all restrictions on our people and organisations must be scrapped. We condemn the harassment of Donsie and other restrictees as an attempt to intimidate people into submission and to break the spirit of defiance which is building up. We call on all South Africans and all our international allies to support our demands. We hold Mrs. Thatcher jointly responsible with the South African government for the attacks on our organisations and leaders. We challenge her to prove us wrong by acting decisively to put pressure on the government to end the state of emergency and to drop charges against all restrictees.

ISSUED BY: JAE NAIDOO

POLITICAL IMPRISONMENT

HISTORY OF LEGISLATION USED TO CRIMINALISE POLITICAL ACTIVITY

USE OF THE COURTS

CATEGORIES OF POLITICAL TRIALS

STATISTICS OF POLITICAL PRISONERS

ORGANISATIONS CONCERNED WITH POLITICAL IMPRISONMENT

FUNCTIONS PERFORMED

A. HISTORY OF LEGISLATION USED TO CRIMINALISE POLITICAL ACTIVITY 1.

When the present government came into power in 1948, it adopted a policy of apartheid or separate development. Since then, it has consistently used parliament and the law courts to implement this policy and to stifle opposition to it.

This has involved the passing of laws which criminalise opposition, as well as using various methods of manipulating the law and the constitution to achieve their aims in the face of opposition.

One of the first steps that the new government took was to introduce the 'Suppression of Communism Act' under which the Communist Party of South Africa, until then a legal political party with representation in Parliament and in local government, was banned. The Act was so broadly worded that it also allowed the National Party to use it to brand any opposition to apartheid as 'communist'.

There followed a number of measures over subsequent years which entrenched the government's position and significantly increased their power to crush opposition with relative impunity.

X The Public Safety Act of 1953 allowed a state of emergency to be declared if public safety was deemed to be threatened by the activities or threatened actions of any persons.

The Unlawful Organisations Act became law in 1960 as a direct response to opposition activities of the ANC and the PAC, and gave the government the power to ban these organisations, their subsidiaries or any structure set up subsequently to carry out their activities.

3 The General Law Amendment Acts of 1962 and 1963 extended these powers to cover any organisation that the state deemed to be carrying on the work, directly or indirectly, of any organisation that had been declared unlawful.

X The affected Organisations Act allowed the government to step organisations from raising foreign funds to carry on their activities if it considered them to be acting on behalf of, or under the influence of, persons or bodies abroad.

X-The Internal Security Amendment Act of 1976 extended the state's power to ban organisations to those that it was satisfied were engaged in activities that endangered the security of the State or public order.

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X The Riotous Assemblies Act, which had first been introduced in 1914 to prohibit open-air gatherings deemed to be a danger to public safety, was amended a number of times, was re-enacted in 1956 and amended further since.

t The Riotous Assemblies and Suppression of Communism Amendment Act, enacted as Act 15 of 1954, allowed for the prohibition of public speaking by people who were listed or banned.

3 Under the Suppression of Communism Act, people could be 'listed' which meant that they could not be quoted and that the State could order them to resign from certain bodies and deny them the right to move freely outside a defined area.

l Under the Native Administration Act of 1956 (introduced as an amendment to an earlier Act as a direct result of court ruling freeing someone banished under this earlier Act), the State had the power to banish persons to whatever place in South Africa it deemed fit and to prevent them from leaving the said place.

m Support of any campaign against any law or the repeal or modification of any law was made an offence under the Criminal Law amendment Act of 1953. It also prohibited the collecting of funds to be used in support of such a campaign.

K Various laws were introduced extending powers to judges, magistrates and various armed forces including Railway Police to order or carry out searches of people and premises. The searches could be carried out without a warrant if necessary.

t The Defence Act and its various amendments have denied white conscripts the right to conscientious objection to military service. It is also deemed an offence for anyone to encourage anyone else, in any way whatsoever, to refuse to serve in the SADF.

t Trade unions are restricted by a number of specific laws which criminalise some actions normally associated with trade unions, such as strikes, as well as those actions that cross the dividing line between 'genuine' union work and political work. Most security legislation has been used at one time or another in an attempt to check the growing economic and political power of these structures.

X Various indemnity acts have been introduced to protect from prosecution any member of the armed forces who carries out any act in good faith under the authority of the Government with intent to restore public order, to suppress disorder or to terminate a state of emergency.

From the Official Secrets Act to the Publications and Entertainments Act, there are laws to prevent the printing and publication of certain material as well as the possession and distribution thereof.

K The so-called Sobukwe clause of the General Law amendment Act allowed the State to keep in prison a person whose sentence had been completed if it deemed the person to still be a danger and to not have repented.

In 1983, the Internal Security Act consolidated and replaced some earlier acts, further reducing the possibilities for organised opposition to apartheid.

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Since the 1985 State of Emergency, the State has moved quickly to protect itself from interventions by the courts and through various media regulations, to conceal its activities from the South African public and the world.

The above is a small sample of the plethora of laws and regulations which govern political activity in South Africa and which are used to good effect by the State to suppress opposition to its policies and practices. It is significant to note that in some cases, these laws do not specifically refer to political activity, nor, in others, do they refer to specific political allegiances. Nonetheless, these laws have been used, almost without exception, and usually unjustifiably, against opponents of apartheid and political groupings on the left, while right-wing violators have seldom been affected, even when the illegality of their activities has been blatant and obvious.

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B. USE OF THE COURTS

It is important to note that in most cases, it is the State's opinion which determines whether a person, organisation or activity needs to be acted against. Once this has happened, whether through banning or restriction, if the person or organisation contravenes whatever restrictions have been imposed, the courts are left to decide on their guilt. The decision of the court is not based on the justness of a particular law or statute. It has to decide whether an offence has been committed purely in terms of the law of the land.

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Thus, what seems a totally legitimate act - for example, that of reading a book espousing the principles and objectives of a political organisation - becomes a crime because the State has passed a law saying so.

It is also a fact of most security legislation in South Africa, that a person is guilty until proved innocent, in stark contrast to normal legal practice in other countries. This gives the State a free hand in suppressing opposition as they do not have to prove someone has broken the law in order to detain them or restrict their activities.

The State has consistently argued that there are no political prisoners in South Africa - that people have been imprisoned for 'breaking the law.' It thus attempts to legitimise its suppression of opposition by posturing as the upholders of the law. It is, however, the same State which has ignored the law when this has been expedient. In cases where the law did not favour a course that the State wanted to follow, the law was changed. When the courts handed down judgements, in terms of existing law, that overturned actions of the State, amendments were introduced which allowed the State to prevail. This cynicism, together with a concerted attempt to influence judges themselves to carry out the political will at the State in their judgements, means that the independence of the judiciary in South Africa is an illusion.

C. CATEGORIES OF POLITICAL TRIALS.:-

C.1. Accused engaged in Peaceful Opposition

- Possession or distribution of banned articles
- i(Furthering aims of banned organisations
- Breaking of banning orders
- Quoting listed persons
- itAttending unlawful gatherings
- Resisting removals
- Participation in, or calling for
- consumer boycotts
- educational boycotts
- rent boycotts
- stayaways, etc.
- "Treason" , "Subversion" , "Sedition"

C.2. Accused caught up in Political Unrest and involved in Unintentional Violence

- Public violence
- Arson
- Malicious damage to property
- iincitement:
- akIntimiditxmn
- Assault
- Murder

C.3 Accused engaged in Armed Struggle by choice

- Treason
- i:Terrorism
- Sabotage

D. STATISTICS OF POLITICAL PRISONERS

"Security" Prisoners (categories 1&3);..... /- 300

"Unrest" Prisoners (category 2).....:approx. 2 to 3 thousand

Awaiting-trial & on-trial Prisoners.....???

E. ORGANISATIONS CONCERNED WITH POLITICAL IMPRISONMENT

E.1 PUBLIC AWARENESS BODIES

NADEL

L.H.R.

HRC

Human Rights Trust (P.E.)

Civil Rights League (C.T.)

E.2 SUPPORT GROUPS

Save the Patriots Campaign

Delmas 2 Support Group

SARWHU 4

Dependents Conference (SACC)

International Commission of the Red Cross

NICRO

Prisoners & Ex-prisoners Support Committee

E.3 SERVICE GROUPS

NAMDA

SAHWCO

OASSA

Concerned Social Workers

F. FUNCTIONS PERFORMED

F.1 MONITORING AND PUBLICITY

hPublications, press articles, press statements

ePress conferences

itSeminars, public meetings, conferences

eTrial monitoring

P

F.2 SUPPORT WORK "

eAttendance at court

hMaterial and other support for

tawaiting-trial prisoners

hon-trial prisoners

econvicted prisoners

ereleased ex-prisoners

ethe families of above

In the last week, we have once
again witnessed the fall of the
State suppression legions and
powerful opposition in South Africa.
A number of prominent black lead-
ers have been detained in a crack-
down on the UDF and its affiliates.
And Ibo people are still in detention
under the security law.

The statement represents a tile-
counting lead to a onecon-
clusion- the Ibo panic measure
brought by the State to avoid death;
with the real issues.

The result at the time: a swoop on
UDF leaders led to a huge trial.
Mounting internal and external
W exam ban on Ind
detenuees have 'unofficially' made the
"trial" one of the most attentive
for the State.

A: we have found from our re-
search, more and more of the 69
detenuees are in fact being charged and
brought to trial here: mainly
no matter of laws with which to
charge those who oppose the poli-
tics of the State. In handling people
to that, the law must be applied: in de-
tention, the State is able to claim
that it is meeting the all the
"charge or release" of detention.

However, the fact that there are
only a handful of detainees in such
cases- must raise doubt about the
fact that these charges,

The treason must will take place
against a rather strange set of
circumstances. On the one hand, Mr P
W Botha has been making peace
statements: For example, there
have been offers for the release of
long-term political prisoners. There
has been talk of repealing certain
military charges and all the
military police demure.

unusually support an official
trend in Government persecution of
paternalistic systematic
use of a multi-racial vague
charge against those who have all-
the while been in the
military police force
to the fact that the law is
not

to attach a 'national' tag to
the military detention

to the fact that the military
detenuees are in a military
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to the fact that the military
"charge or release" of the
detenuees is a military
charge against those who have all-
the while been in the
military police force

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A forum (or bhch-whjte museum:
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OI the other hand. we know that
removal: have not ended. We know
that the State continue to hart:
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we find that whtle Mandela ie
attend treedom it he renouns vio-
lence. member: of the UDF working
tor peaceful change Ire jailecL
V'However. the torceI tor real
peaceful and democratic change are
growth; in strength and numbers.
Those awaiting trial represent dil-
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Front. lmmdded in 195:. has aver 600
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the UDF came together to net peaceful and democratic alternative: to the path of continued domination and conflict. In our view, it is primarily because the UDF and its affiliates do pose viable alternatives that the State is bringing its leaders to that.

The fact of 156 opposition leaders in the late '50s was no exception "s-rntt 2.; see 1135

OUR VIEW

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At that time than popular resistance to apartheid was clear (and peaceful) alternative posed by the ANC and the PAC. And as today, then were leaders of courage and calibre. For five years (from 1956 to 1961) the leader, whom the people loved, was effectively removed from political activity for the duration of the trial. He was acquitted.

Sharperille and the massive State repression of the W did not quell the inevitable opposition. Instead, the last one and a half decade have witnessed new organisation and resistance on all fronts: - labour, students, women, the church and community organisations. The massive boycott of the national parliamentary elections and the successful stayaway 11 November have demonstrated stronger alliance between all these groups.

Can we believe the Governing: It says it wants to talk to black leaders, but the leaders are detained? Can we believe that b Grange when he complained that the problem is the Eastern Cape and "lack of communication", but still meetings, mobility and activity?

Some of our leaders will be neutralised maybe (or long period: in the wake of the treason trial of 1985. Perhaps in this small way the State will meet it: end. But we know that this trial will only further demonstrate who the real leaders are: the people are.

It is also interesting to note that the only legal ground to use in I use involving the UDF upheld the view that the UDF was a lawful organisation with a lawful objective.

We would strongly argue that in 1983 not only the new single judge in a particular case, but that it is the new of a vast number of people and organisations working for democracy and just change in South Africa.

Political trials: extension of the detention system

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THE number of major treason trials in South Africa, coupled with the continuing state of emergency. raise major questions about basic human rights. visiting president of Yale University and professor of law. Prof Benno Schmidt, said yesterday).

Prof Schmidt is part of a monitoring group of prominent jurists and legal experts in America, monitoring the trial of trade unionist Moses Mnyekiso and four others charged with treason in the Rand Supreme Court. During his stay in South Africa. Prof Schmidt has met with the Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs, Mr Khusi K&f mon 31's SA breaku Cltlzen Reportexb 1" ing over the trial. Mr Justice Van der Walt and the Attorney-General of the Witwatersrand. Mr Klaus von Lieres und Wilkziu. Addressing a Press conference in Johannesburg. Prof Schmidt emphasised ' that he came to learn more about the trial and report back to the other nine members of the monitoring committee. and not to make snap judgments" about the case.

There is great interest in the Mnyekiso trial in America and in many other countries. It is being watched closely in legal circles, in trade unions, church groups. the human rights community and by the public. The Mnyekiso trial has raised questions about Mint constitutes treasonous behaviour in South Africa today. It is one of 21 number of major treason trials in South Africa which, along with the continuing state of emergency. raises major questions about basic human rights.

Many scholars and experts have asked: all the defendants did. in fact. commit the alleged actions in the indictment. would they have coln-

mitlerl treason hy the
norms of intermltional
law and by standards ap-
plied in other countries."
Prof Schmidt asked
what room was left for the
expression of peaceful op-
position by persons ex-
cluded from political par-
ticipation. if consumer
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organising: community
residents for the better-
ment of the Alexandra
In 1988, says US report
man rights
community and other
peaceful actions constitut-
ed treason in South Alri-
ca.

"There is great concern
in America about the
seemingly wide-spread
use of treason indictments
against opponents of the
government and its apart-
heid policies.

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"Our jurists committee
is asking. . . where the
line is between aacceptable
political dissent and trea-
sonous activity.
ttls the South African
Government. through
these treason prosecu-
tions and convictions,
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II trial
be considered legitimate
political dissent in the
context of international
legal norms?"
He said the outcome of
the Mayekiso case would
have "profound implica-
tions" for the defendants
and for t'the scope of
legitimate political activ-
ity in South Africa".
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MEMDRANDPUM UN CONSTITUTIONAL GUIDELINES

1. MOTIVATION:

Cosatu and UDF-affiliates resolved, among others, that there should be co-ordinated discussions at grassroots and all other levels. We must ensure through discussion and debate an understanding of the guidelines by the masses; so that they and the mass democratic movement may be able to relate them clearly and systematically to our vision of a non-racial and democratic South Africa. The mass democratic movement must find the means to promote this process - and to prevent it from being dominated by experts. X

2. AGREEMENTS:

X The use of questionnaires to gather data from the masses
X The setting up of a central data-bank/Information Centre
X Education programmes (including translations of the Guidelines and related reading matter) - 4
X Clear guidelines for grassroots discussion
X A feedback system for discussions and education
X A preparatory seminar for facilitators of the discussions and education programme
X Talks on the guidelines must be incorporated into public speeches and church sermons
X Space must be found in the progressive and commercial press for the guidelines
X Special publications must be prepared and widely distributed
X Debates on the guidelines and a future South Africa must be recorded and published
X Work on the guidelines should be done through organised collectives e. g. Media and Education Committees -
X The mass democratic movement must develop and be able to give its interpretation of the guidelines at different points of the process of discussion
X The mass democratic movement must be a point of reference for all those debating and discussing the guidelines
X The discussion of the guidelines must feed into the building of the Anti-Apartheid coalition

3. SUGGESTED QUESTIONS FOR DISCUSSION

A. What is our understanding of the guidelines and of their relationship to our vision of a non-racial democratic South Africa? How to...
B. What means/processes are most suitable for popular under-

Constitutional
Guidelines Seminar
17 May 1989

REPORT ON CONSTITUTIONAL GUIDELINES WORKSHOP 17 MAY 1989.

Agenda : see attached programme.

GrouptRepbrts

Group One

What

is the relationship between the Constitutional Guidelines and the Freedom Charter

- 1.
- 2.
- 10.
- 11.
- 12.
- 13.
- 14.

The Constitutional Guidelines is not a substitute for the Freedom Charter.

It lays a basis for a deeper understanding of the Freedom Charter,

It deals with the implementation of demands in Freedom Charter.

Some aspects of the Constitutional Guidelines are vague/open ended to allow for input from democratic forces

The Freedom Charter is more definite. It is a product of struggle.

The Freedom Charter is a common programme of all Anti Apartheid and patriotic forces.

The Freedom Charter is programmatic but not specific on the implementation of the demands.

The expectation of the drafters of the Constitutional Guidelines is that it must be read in conjunction with the Freedom Charter.

The Freedom Charter provides-a common perspective on our vision of the future.

Factors influencing Constitutional Guidelines include internal and international-factors.

There is a continuity between the Freedom Charter and the Constitutional Guidelines.

The Constitutional Guidelines are intended to galvanise and mobilise the masses.

The Constitutional Guidelines is an area of struggle of different forces, each giving different interpretation and content. Therefore the mass democratic movement needs to assume leadership.

The Constitutional Guidelines are initiating a process of developing consensus among a broad range of forces. This relates to the question of alliances.

Group Two

What is the distinction between the Constitutional Guidelines and a constitution

1.

S.A. is in a state of war, therefore the Constitutional Guidelines is not a constitution. A constitution can only be drawn up in an appropriate forum after a transfer of power.

The Constitutional guidelines are a build up to a future constitution and a foundation for a future constitution. It is a mobilising factor and propaganda tool for the demands of the people.

The Constitutional guidelines offers a forum to discuss the Freedom Charter and an opportunity for all forces to contribute to debate. '

A post apartheid constitution will depend on the balance of forces when we take power. The Constitutional guidelines does not only give us opportunity to discuss content but also how to build organisation now.

Group Three

The Relationship of the Constitutional Guidelines to our ongoing programme

1. Our overall aim is to eliminate apartheid and establish a society based on the Freedom Charter. In order to achieve this, we must:

rebuild structures/organisation

build the anti apartheid coalition

prepare for change especially negotiations

prepare for post apartheid South Africa.

96%X-36

2. The Constitutional guidelines can be used to further the above aims.

t rebuild organisation through developing an understanding of the guidelines and getting responses from our members.

't AAC : Constitutional guidelines allow us to reach out to other organisations which are not part of the democratic movement. It allows us to build unity and to help the mass democratic movement to retain leadership in the anti apartheid coalition.

t possible negotiations

Constitutional Guidelines can educate and strengthen leadership and organisation so that we have a strong hand in negotiations.

, t prepare for post apartheid South Africa build a new society now and use the constitutional guidelines as a basis to introduce practices contained in the guidelines.

Group Four

Constitutional guidelines and the transfer of power

1.

2.

There are two possibilities: seizure of power or negotiated settlement.

These options are not mutually exclusive. We should prepare for both options.

If we have a negotiated settlement there should be no compromise on key issues e.g. economic emancipation; i.e. nationalisation is central. We therefore need to encourage debates on this issue in our organisations now.

We should start debates on key issues especially economic emancipation to influence the balance of forces even if we a negotiated settlement is reached.

We need to strengthen the mass democratic movement and subjective elements in the situation which objectively is favourable.

Constitutional guidelines are not aimed to prepare people for negotiations, but for type of society wanted in future S.A. irrespective of the method by which we arrive there.

Constitutional guidelines should be used to arm the masses by exposing the weaknesses of the state e.g. tricameral system.

SESSION FOUR: SECTORS/THEMES

Group One: Women

1.

What changes should be made in post apartheid S.A.

t Women must be recognised as playing a productive role in the economy and as breadwinners in their own right.

t Wage discrimination should be abolished.

t The migrant labour system should be abolished. It has devastating effects especially on women who are trapped in subsistence farming in the rural areas.

t Parenting and childcare should not be regarded as women's sole responsibility.

t Women should have equal status in law. The present status of women as legal minors creates a power imbalance in relationships between men and women.

t The perception of women as subordinate and powerless needs to be changed. A great deal of the violence against women stems from this perception.

What problems and limitations will we encounter in achieving these objectives?

t Vested economic interests in keeping women in a subordinate position.

Cultural values - traditional and western.

Perceptions of gender roles.

Resistance from men and from women.

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How will we overcome these problems?

In Post apartheid South Africa where the state controls national resources, we will be able to implement:

t Legislation

t Affirmative action

t Education: - literacy programmes, education and training programmes for women.

- education for everyone, both men and women on gender roles.

w Development of an infrastructure of services that will release women to participate fully in society eg. creches, health care.

t deepening democracy

- especially at the level of local government/organs of people's power at local level. _

How can we strengthen our position or change the balance of forces in our favour?

t By undertaking projects around childcare and health.

t By promoting the participation of women in every aspect of struggle including levels of action as well as policy making, decisionmaking and strategising processes.

t our organisations should not indulge in tokenism:
we should build up women now to play their role
tcompetently and effectively.

5. What. do the constitutional guidelines say or not say about
transformation V

t The clause on women in the constitutional guidelines must
be read in conjunction with the women's charter.

t A positive point in the constitutional guidelines is on
affirmative action. '

t Clauses in the constitutional guidelines should be
expanded with special reference to women eg.

- land and economy: co-ops and subSistence farming

. - affects women directly.

- education : development of technical,

' scientific and managerial

skills, especially for black

people and women.

6. Why and how to use the guidelines

t we need to run an education campaign around gender issues
both for women and for men.

we need to open discussion and debate in our organisations
so as to promote an understanding of the changes we propose
to make in a post apartheid South Africa.

Group Two: Housing, Primary Health Care, Social Welfare Services

1. What changes would you want to achieve in the post apartheid
t'ociety?

The group endorsed the clause on housing in the Freedom
Charter.

2. What problems and limitations will we encounter in achieving
these objectives.

t We need to be clear that provision of services is the
responsibility of the state because the private sector
operates on profit motive.

t Resources may be a problem. If resources are nationalised it will be possible to redistribute resources where needed. This raises some questions about:

- t what to nationalise
- w distinguishing between nationalisation and , socialisation.
- t Capitalists will sabotage industries
- t We will need skills to run industries
- X The economy needs foreign technology
- t We must raise the level of understanding of people through education and through developing realistic expectations.
- t There is a danger of creating a counter revolutionary power through the way resources are allocated eg. to tribal groups, regions etc.
- t On health care, we need to look at:
 - medical skills
 - level of salaries
 - existing staff
 - medical aid
 - extent of privatisation
 - training of health care personnel; eg. in Cuba
 - training was linked to organisations of the masses; therefore organisations must be built up now.

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h All the above raised the question of alliances.

3. How to overcome these problems and strenggghen our position.

- t Build organisation now, deepen the crisis of the state build people's power.
- # Build consciousness now on the need to nationalise; link the question of political power to economic power.
- a Oppose privatisation of health including medical aid.
- X Strengthen class alliances eg. links with professional sectors with the aim of utilising their skills after liberation.

4. Hhat do the constitutional guidelines say or not say about transformation.

- w resources and skills are dealt with under the economy.
- x the constitutional guidelines say something about transformation as regards health, housing and welfare services; but it should be linked to the Freedom Charter. '

5. Why and how to use the constitutional guidelines.

t as an organising/mobilising tool

t in workshops

t in discussion

t to develop consciousness.

Group Three: ECONOMY

1 What changes would you want to achieve in the post apartheid society

Re-distribution of wealth

The state should plan and control the economy to serve the

needs of the people and to harness the full production

potential of the people, in terms of technology.

Land should be distributed amongst the people.

The migrant labour system should be abolished.

Abolition of child labour.

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2. What problems and limitations we will encounter in achieving these objectives.

Resistance by the present owners.

Limitation on productivity and skilled labour.

Meeting the expectations of the masses.

Weakness of the manufacturing sector, and the dependence of the economy on gold.

Counter revolutionary industrial sabotage.

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3. How will we overcome these problems

It depends on the nature of our take-over.

Build broad support to win over people nationally and internationally.

Strengthen and build progressive trade unions.

Organise the white community in order to prevent the flood of skilled labour.

Develop democracy in planning the economy of the country.

Ensure effective education of the people.

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4. What must we do to strengthen our position or change of forces in our favour?

1. We must win more people to our side eg. anti apartheid coalition.
 2. Within that we should explain our economic position.
 3. He should expose privatisation.
 4. We should organise the unemployed.
 5. We should organise the rural masses and politicise them.
 8. We should begin to put political economy on our agenda.
 7. There is a need to influence academics.
 8. We should strengthen working class leadership.
5. What do the constitutional guidelines say or do not say about transformation

The distribution of land is not fully explained in the constitutional guidelines.

Group Four: Education

1. What changes do we want to achieve in the post apartheid society

t The future education system should address key problems students face because of the apartheid education system.

t Education should be non racial, unitary, free and compulsory. ,

What problems we have now

1. Education should be able to change the minds of the people, to be able to eliminate problems created by apartheid.

Education should be based on the principle of non-racialism.

The content of education should reflect the struggle.

Education should equip people with skills to take power.

He should build on the role played by National Education Co-ordinating Committee and other organisations on the issue of People's Education.

Education should serve the needs of society.

Education should address the issue of breaking divisions between mental and manual labour.

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8. Education should develop the full creative potential of the whole society, community etc.

9. What changes can we make to equip adult illiterate people? '

- reg. Trade Union education discusses issues which are 1' practical like topical issues but do not address the question of literacy.

- The question of literacy should be addressed to empower people to relate/write history.

- The education issue goes together with the question of changing the whole society - and should be looked at more broadly. We should learn from the experience of other countries

- The state must re-address the imbalances created by apartheid. It should address formal and informal education. It should also address the problems of education in the rural areas.

Problems and limitations

Resources is going to be a problem. We are not only going to rely on the state but also on the structures we create now.

2. Shortage of schools, teachers and accumulation of illiteracy. There is going to be an imbalance in education. We should be aware of lowering standards, and there could be a problem of racial complexities caused by apartheid reaction to the non-racial policy.

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3. Education to be prioritised.

Resources should be decentralised to cover homelands areas.

Rebuild the parent/teacher structure to involve all sectors in addressing the problems experienced. _

3. The state must develop re-education campaigns, that is not to uplift black students to white education but to make a new non racial education system.

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How to strengthen our position and change the balance of forces in our favour.

1. The change of balance of power should start now:

empower people to take control.

people should start mobilising.

rebuild student organisations.

technical education initiated by companies should involve

unions and community organisations and private schools

should be under the democratic control of the mass

democratic movement.

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What do the guidelines say or not say about transformation?
The constitutional guidelines is not specific on education as compared to the Freedom Charter.

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Why and hgw to use the guidelines.
We should develop the guidelines further.
Education work has to be done to refine the education issue.
The constitutional guidelines lays the basis on education and brings the need for more in depth discussion on education.

SESSION SIX : FOLLOW UP ACTIVITIES.

1. Popularise the guidelines:

t within our own organisations.

W Great; Dppurtunitiea RE the maze democratic movement to meet, discuss and debate.

\$ \$egienul diaeuaaions.

h anti apartheid coalition.

2. Education must reach all layers eg

mass level.

h activist leadership layers.

use the constitutional guidelines as a reference point in relation to concrete struggles on the ground.

CONCLUSION

1 In principle we accept the need for a coordinating structufe.

2. COSATU Education should continue to play a coordinating role.

3. We should develop a media strategy.

4

We should have regional discussions. The coordinating structure should monitor progress. ,

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WORKING DOCUMENT FOR A
UNION HOUSING POLICY
5TH APRIL 1989

PREAMBLE

Apartheid policy and corporate practice has denied (black South Africans the right to live in areas of their choice. State policy, in line with the requirements of a forced labour economy, has impelled millions of people to live in hostels or urban townships as temporary sojourners, or in homelands. For decades Africans have been denied permanent residential status in the so-called "white" urban areas. These urban areas where blacks have been permitted to live have usually been far from industrial areas. This, in turn, has imposed a massive burden related to the cost of transport and increased travelling time to and from work. Low wages and inadequate spending by the state on black residential areas has ensured that houses built are small and poorly designed and finished. Furthermore, because of a hopelessly inadequate building programme, these areas are grossly overcrowded. The effects of overcrowding have been exacerbated by the poor services provided in black residential areas. Roads, electricity, water and sewerage are either non-existent or at very low levels of provision and maintenance.

The housing policies of the state and capital have ensured that class and racial divisions are reinforced by patterns of residence. Even within racially segregated residential areas, the state has attempted to increase divisions by forcing people into ethnically divided sections within black townships and hostels.

In the era of so-called "reform" the state has abandoned its previously acknowledged, albeit minimal, responsibility for providing housing to the private sector. The result of this has been a massive cut back in the provision of housing. It has also resulted in the provision of housing in a highly divisive manner. The private provision of housing means, in effect, that only a minority of the population will be housed. The private building sector is cashing in on the decades-long shortage of housing by providing housing at levels that fewer than 10% of the population can afford. They are being supported in this by the financial institutions which are refusing to grant loans of less than R30 000 and which are also insisting on levels of salary and security that are beyond the means of 90% of the population. Finally, it has become clear that the policies of the state, the financial institutions and companies are to refuse support for those forms of shelter, such as site-and-service schemes, which are within the means of the majority of South Africans.

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The divide-and-rule principles behind the privatisation of housing provision have clearly been rejected by the majority of South Africans. In the townships residents have refused to pay rent for 'inadequate housing and poor services in areas they did not originally choose to live in. In the so-called "white" areas, black people are defying the Group Areas legislation .by moving into flats and houses in contravention of the law. In all the major urban areas those without homes are reclaiming the land by setting up shack settlements in defiance of the local and national authorities. 3

1.6 In line with the above, the union movement needs to adopt a policy which will take into account the general wishes of union members and the community at large; which will give guidance to the struggles for shelter by the majority Of South AIPicans; and which will actively combat the divide and rule tactics being proposed by the current privatisation policy 0% the state and capital.

GENERAL POLICY PRINCIPLES

,_1 Housing should be the right of all citizens. It is the responsibility of the State to ensure that all citizens are housed.

In order to effectively respond to the privatisation strategy currently followed by capital and the state, the union movement needs to adopt a multi-pronged and co-ordinated campaign which would:

- i. set out long term demands upon the State to provide housing for all
- ii. set out intermediate demands which would recognise the divisions created by current state strategy, and the problem of lack of available resources to overcome the housing crisis.
- iii. ensure that housing policy does not increase the residential class divisions historically tcreated by -capital and the state
- iv. take policy which actively combats the residential dispersion of race and class by cutting across these barriers
- v. enter into discussions with the mass democratic movement in order to develop a housing policy which will cater for the needs of the entire population
- vi. enter into militant bargaining with capital and make demands on the state to achieve the affordable housing of the poor

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2.3

Union strategy should accordingly:

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ii.

iii.

iv.

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vii.

viii.

recognise the private formal housing sector as a reality

accept that the private sector will service this sector by providing higher cost and more luxurious houses to higher income employees

intervene where useful and desirable to attempt to

bring down the cost of houses in the formal sector

prioritise the provision of shelter to lower income employees

bring pressure to bear on all levels of the STATE

(national, provincial and local), on the FINANCIAL

INSTITUTIONS and on EMPLOYERS to facilitate the secure

settlement of the poor on land and under cover by:

a. demanding the widescale release of land at affordable rates

b. demanding the widespread release of land for site and service development

c. demanding financial assistance for low-income persons, irrespective of gender, with appropriately low levels of entry, and low levels of interest. An effective State subsidy scheme should be developed. Financial assistance should also not require high levels of security, and be available for a wide variety of shelter including site and service and incremental building. In addition company assistance must not be allowed to tie the worker to the job.

d. _ demanding the right of a person to settle 'where they wish. Tenure and finance should thus be available in all areas of South Africa. A campaign to remove all laws which infringe on the security of tenure e.g. the Land Act, the Group Areas Act, the Squatting Act, and any homeland legislation, should be embarked upon.

co-ordinate research and development within and outside the union in order to facilitate union campaigns in the areas noted above

co-ordinate financial resources available through union controlled pension and provident fund so as to

facilitate the financial requirements noted above

establish union-controlled advice centres which would

3.2

act both to advise individual workers and serve to organise workers around their housing needs in coalition with community organisations . consider the, possibility of establishing union controlled housing finance institutions and housing utility companies

enter into discussions with community organisations and Civics at local and regional level to develop and implement effective housing policy

POLICY GUIDELINES AND MODEL DEMANDS

LAND

- i.
- ii.
- iii.
- iv.

The STATE should abolish all legal restrictions on the legal ability of citizens to live where they want. This would involve the removal of all restrictive legislation inter alia:

The Land Act

The Group Areas Act

The Prevention of Illegal Squatting Act

Homeland legislation

The STATE should ensure that sufficient land is released in a planned manner for residential, social and economic purposes to accommodate the effective housing demand and the needs of the working class in particular.

Land released should be available for a wide variety of accommodation taking into account affordability levels in the general community. In particular land for the purposes of site and service development should be available in sufficient quantities.

Land released should be close to those areas where work and social and leisure facilities are available.

EMPLOYERS should be required to support the above demands to be made on the STATE at national, provincial and local levels.

AFFORDABILITY

- i.
- ii.

The STATE should control the cost of land designated for residential accommodation to ensure that it remains at affordable levels.

The STATE and EMPLOYERS should provide a subsidy to all those intending to provide shelter for themselves. The

iii.

iv.

vi.

subsidy should apply equally to all forms of shelter including: -

a. the purchase of land only

b. the purchase of a serviced site

c. the purchase of a formal house

d. rental accommodation in whatever form

, e. the incremental upgrading of accommodation

All subsidies should apply in both rural and urban areas (including the so-called homelands) '

Subsidy policy should in general prioritise the needs of the poor and should not discriminate against them

A clean wage policy should not allow employers to escape their responsibility to ensure housing at affordable levels

Finance provided via the STATE, EMPLOYERS and FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS should be required to provide finance which would:

a. facilitate small loans

b. require lower levels of security

c. finance all forms of shelter including sites, upgrading and incremental building

3.3 RENTAL ACCOMMODATION

i.

ii.

Accommodation for rental purposes must be given the same, or even greater priority than home ownership

The STATE must provide sufficient affordable accommodation for rental purposes

3.4 MIGRANT WORKERS

i-

Particular attention must be given to the needs of migrant workers:

a) All compounds should be abolished

b) BOTH the rental and home-ownership requirements of migrants who wish to retain their migrant status should be subsidised

c) Migrants who stay in the urban areas in single accommodation should be provided with decent, affordable accommodation

d) Companies should subsidise the housing needs of those migrants who choose to bring their families to town. Such subsidies should allow former migrant workers to live in acceptable conditions

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at affordable levels.

3.5 COMPANY HOUSING SCHEMES

1. Companies should be required to assist in the acquisition of land, the purchase of houses and the acquisition of rental accommodation

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ii. Companies should be required to subsidise workers to the extent that loans for any of the above become affordable. Subsidies should be available for all forms of shelter

iii. Housing assistance to a worker should be such that the house is not tied to the job. Registration of the shelter, bond etc should be in the name of the worker and all administration should be through a third party so that any relationship, including the subsidy, can continue if a worker leaves the company DP participates in any industrial action.

iv. Companies must accept responsibility for financing union appointed housing advice officers who would service a community as a whole, and not the particular workforce of a particular company.

v. Company housing assistance should not allow the development of company towns or suburbs

3.6 PROVIDENT AND PENSION FUNDS

1. Companies should not be permitted to replace retirement benefits with housing benefit funds. Companies should contribute both to a retirement and a separate housing benefit fund.

ii. The investment policy of pension and provident funds ' should:

a) make available finance at a reasonable cost to approved housing developers, builders etc.

b) facilitate housing assistance policies e.g. reverse annuities

c) support the establishment of progressive financing institutions such as small loans banks

d) attempt to influence the financing policies of the larger financial institutions by the selective placing of investment with those institutions who adopt progressive policies and by refusing to deal with institutions which refuse to do so

e) finance developments aimed at improving the general community

3.? CD-OPERATIVES

i. Unions should set up consumer co-operatives amongst 'those intending to purchase houses, plate or to build. These co-operetives will increase the buying power of buyers or builders as well as build organisation amongst homeowners and tenants.

ii. Unions should encourage the establishment of rbuilding CD-operatives to assist with the provision of Shelter at affordable rates, the creation 0? skills amongst the working class and to provide employment f0 unemployed workers. '

/hsing/cns-sem2.pol

DATE: 1989 JUNE 01
' FROM: JAY NAIDOO
GENERAL SECRETARY - COSATU
ATT : ALL COSATU AFFILIATES / REGIONS / LOCALS / BRANCHES ETC
REPORT ON THE CQSATU EXECUTIVE HELD ON 29/05/89 AT COSATU HEAD OFFICE
1. CREDENTIALS REPORT:
UNION: MEMBERSHIP: DELEGATES:
1 ACTWUSA 72 406. 145
2 CWIU 35 151 71
3 CAWU 21 000 42
4 NUM 212 000 424
5 NUMSA 188 013 377
6 T4GWU 23 182 47
7 PPWAWU 31 215 63
.8 POTWA 16 842 34
9 SADWU 14 525 30
10 CCAWUSA (PART) 26 988 54
11 SAMWU 23 638 48
12 NUWCC 25
TOTAL 664 960 1 343
13 CCAWUSA (PART)
14 SARHWU
15 NEHAWU
16 FAWU
17 GAWU
UNIONS (13 - 17) - DEADLINE FOR VERIFYING MEMBERSHIP IS THE 5TH JUNE.
TO BE SUBMITTED TO THE HEAD OFFICE.
GAWU GIVEN FULL STATUS ON THE BASIS THAT
. THERE WILL BE NO CHANGE FROM THE PRESENT DEADLINE FOR MERGER WITH
ACTWUSA. THE LATEST DATE IS 16TH SEPTEMBER.
- THE PROCESS OF MERGER TALKS MUST BE PURSUED VIGOROUSLY.
- THE DELEGATION WILL BE TREATED AS A SINGLE DELEGATION IN THE
TEXTILE, GARMENT AND LEATHER SECTOR.
- AFFILIATION FEES WILL BE PAID AS FROM JULY 15T, 1989 FOR THE
CLAIMED PAID UP MEMBERSHIP.
x 2. THEME: ?-
EDUCATE, CONSOLIDATE AND ADVANCE TO VICTORY.
3. RESOLUTIONS:
3.1. THE DEADLINE FOR THE SUBMISSION OF RESOLUTIONS IS THE
19TH JUNE 1989.
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2.
.3.

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THE RESOLUTION ON UNEMPLOYMENT WILL BE FINALISED AT A WORKSHOP ON THE 20TH JUNE.

A RESOLUTIONS COMMITTEE MADE UP OF CDES. CYRIL RAMAPHOSA, MOSES MAYEKISO, SIPHO KUBHEKA, JOHN COPELYN, JOHN ERENTZEN AND THE SECRETARIAT WAS APPOINTED. THIS COMMITTEE WILL COMPILE COMPOSITE RESOLUTIONS. IT WILL ALSO FUNCTION DURING CONGRESS.

AFFILIATES MUST KEEP RESOLUTIONS SHORT AND TO THE POINT.

- (DON3T OVERDO THE RHETORIC).

AREAS OF RESOLUTIONS

3.5.1. STRENGTHEN THE MDM:

- STRENGTHENING OF STRUCTURES - IN EACH SECTOR.
- STRENGTHENING CO-ORDINATION STRUCTURES.
- UNIFYING THE WORKING CLASS.

3.5.2. INTERNATIONAL:

- . SOTHERN AFRICAN UNION CO-OPERATION
- . NAMIBIA

SANCTIDNS / DISINVESTMENT

3.5.3. ORGANISATIONAL:

- . WORKERS SUMMIT
- . PRIVITIZATION

DEREGULATION

RELOCATION OF FACTORIES TO BANTUSTANS

CASUAL LABOUR

HOUSING

HEALTH 3 SAFETY

CULTURE / SPORT

WOMEN

- . EDUCATION - BUILDING MASS EDUCATION

3.5.4. POLITICAL:

- . ANTI APARTHEID COALITION
- . NEGOTIATIONS
- . UNBANNING THE ANC
- . RELEASE OF POLITICAL PRISONERS

END OF THE DEATH PENALTY

CAMPAIGN AGAINST REPRESSIDN

3.5.5. PEACE:

- . NATAL
- . ROLE OF VIGILANTE VIOLENCE

3.5.6. DEEPENING IDEOLOGICAL UNDERSTANDING:
CONSTITUTIONAL GUIDELINES AND THE FREEDOM
CHARTER

. UNDERSTANDING IMPERIALISM
THE STRUGGLE FOR SOCIALISM
DEVELOPING A LEADERSHIP CODE

3.5.7. CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENTS:

. INCREASE IN SUBSCRIPTIONS
. ROLE OF LOCALS

INCREASE IN OFFICE BEARERS

4. ANALYSIS OF THE CURRENT SITUATION:

THE ANALYSIS PRESENTED BY THE SECRETARIAT WAS ACCEPTED AS THE
GUIDELINE FOR THE SECRETARIAT REPORT AND FOR THE PREPARATION
OF RESOLUTIONS.

5. AGENDA:

5. 1. OPENING ADDRESS - CDE HARRY GWALA
5. 2. CREDENTIALS REPORT
5. 3. PRESIDENTS ADDRESS
5. 4. SPEAKER FROM NAMIBIA
5. 5. SPEAKER FROM MDM
5. 6. SHORT MESSAGE - CHURCH REPRESENTATIVE
5. 7. SECRETARIAT REPORT
5. 8. DISCUSSION ON SECRETARIAT REPORT
5. 9. CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENTS
- 5.10. RESOLUTIONS '
- 5.11. ELECTIONS
- 5.12. CLOSURE

6. INVITATIONS:

6. 1. NATIONAL CENTRES - AMERICA

AFRICA

' EUROPE

ASIA

6. 2. WFTU, ICFTU, CTUC, UATUU
6. 3. FRATERNAL ALLIES
6. 4. NACTU, INDEPENDENT UNIONS

7. CULTURE:

CULTURAL EVENING WILL PROBABLY BE HELD ON THE FIRST EVENING WITH_
A FULL CULTURAL DAY ON SATURDAY 15TH JULY.

8. REPORTS GIVEN ON THE NATAL SITUATION AND THE MEDIA COMMISSION.

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