

LMM/007/0001/7

Ministerial Meeting of Political
Co-operation - Luxemburg
10 September 1985

10/09/85

BRIEFING NOTE

Community programme to counter the effects of Apartheid

Political background

The introduction by the Commission of a programme to strengthen Community assistance to organisations seeking to overcome apartheid by peaceful means and to victims of apartheid represents a significant political initiative for the Community. For large sections of the European public, such a programme would find full acceptability only if it is presented in form and substance as an integral part of an overall approach by the Community and its Member States which is seriously directed towards eliminating apartheid in South Africa. Conversely such a programme could encounter serious political difficulties if it were to appear or to become regarded as an excuse for not introducing other measures.

Principals of the programme

The following considerations are of particular relevance to the introduction of this programme.

Firstly, the programme should be firmly linked to the Community's long-standing opposition to the apartheid system, its concern for human rights and human dignity, and to the evolution of further policies designed to secure the elimination of apartheid.

Secondly, within South Africa, as in the case of the Community's recent programme in Poland, there should be a clear public association between the Community and those organisations (such as the churches and trade unions), which are seriously seeking to overcome apartheid by peaceful means and to succour the victims of the apartheid system.

Thirdly within Southern Africa, the Community should be aware that the pursuit of programmes and policies designed to counter the effects of apartheid could lead to counter-pressures from South Africa on neighbouring states in the SADCC group, all of whom are members of the Lomé III Convention (*).

(*) The nine member states of the Southern African Development Coordination Conference (SADCC) are Angola, Botswana, Lesotho, Mozambique, Malawi, Swaziland, Tanzania, Zambia and Zimbabwe

These pressures and the effects of the current crisis in the South African economy could have serious consequences for the SADCC states, which remain so far closely linked economically with South Africa in a wide range of sectors including transport, energy and essential supplies, together with fiscal and monetary arrangements and the employment of migrant labour forces. For this reason in any initiative on apartheid, the Community would have to underline its intention to give continuing support for the SADCC countries amidst the serious difficulties which they face during this period of change in South Africa.

Fourthly at an international level, in mounting its programme on apartheid, the Community should seek to consult with other countries, regional groupings and international organisations, engaged in comparable initiatives.

Structure and purposes of the programme

Against this general background it is suggested that the Commission should now consider introducing a substantial programme on apartheid, which would address itself both to emergency needs and to major economic and social priorities among black communities in South Africa and among South African refugees in neighbouring countries, bearing in mind the impact of the apartheid crisis on the economies of neighbouring SADCC states. Programmes of a relatively modest nature already undertaken by the Commission to counter the effects of apartheid are set out in Annex I.

Within South Africa

The Community's recent experience in mounting similar programmes in comparable political circumstances in Poland suggests that public bodies opposing the apartheid system such as the South African Bishops Conference, the South African Council of Churches and the South African trade union movement would have an important role to play as the Community's principal South African partners in a programme of this kind outside the governmental system.

In this context, it is envisaged that the Community, in co-operation with European NGO's, would, through these partners, provide assistance in the following areas:

Firstly, in the emergency field the Community programme would address itself immediately to the acute social welfare needs which have arisen as a result of the disturbances in the black townships for which the South African churches have established an emergency programme, and launched an international appeal.

Secondly, in regard to longer term programmes, the Commission could initiate immediate consultations with South African churches, trade unions and other non-governmental bodies opposed to apartheid on priorities in areas such as the following:

- assistance to communities which have been or may be subject to compulsory relocation under the Group Areas Act;
- the improvement and development of medical and social welfare services in black communities;
- the improvement and expansion of the educational system for South African blacks, particularly through community and multi-racial initiatives in schools, universities, adult literacy and vocational training;
- training programmes for black South Africans in EEC and ACP countries where there are problems in securing relevant educational qualifications in South Africa.

This type of approach has already been followed in South Africa by other donors including German, Netherlands and UK agencies as well as bodies such as the World Council of Churches, Misericordia, the International Labour Organisation and the International Confederation of Free Trade Unions. Their experience in South Africa will obviously have considerable relevance in making detailed arrangements for the establishment of a Community programme.

Outside South Africa

In the neighbouring SADCC countries, there are comparable areas where the Community could assist in supporting arrangements to counter the effects of apartheid. These include:

- educational, training and social welfare programmes for South African refugees from the apartheid system;
- welfare and reemployment programmes for migrant workers forced to return from South Africa to neighbouring countries;
- emergency programmes in neighbouring countries, resulting from South African pressures designed to counter international measures against apartheid.

4.

For programmes of this kind outside South Africa, the Community's partners would include church bodies, European NGO's, international agencies and ACP Governments.

Sources of Funding

If as seems necessary, a significant programme to counter the effects of apartheid is to be established by the Community in the above areas both within South Africa and in neighbouring states, then it would seem desirable that specific provision for this purpose should be made under a new budgetary line in the 1986 Community budget (see Annex 3 - Programme spécial d'action contre l'Apartheid - Les sources de financement). This budget line should be established in chapter 95, (circumstantial actions in favour of developing countries, and of third countries), which is the sole means of covering programmes at the same time in developing countries and third countries. In this regard it is suggested that a new article (no 953) should be introduced entitled special action in favour of populations which are victims of apartheid.

If such a Community programme is to have a significant impact within South Africa and internationally it would seem desirable that resources provided should be commensurate with the social and economic needs resulting from the current apartheid crisis in South Africa, and fully comparable with those provided by other major agencies. In this context and having regard to the precedents established in the Community's recent programme in Poland, it is suggested that an initial provision of some 35 Mecu should be sought for this new programme in the 1986 budget.

This proposal would not preclude provision being made for certain immediate needs under lines 941 and 950 in the 1985 budget, which relate specifically to co-financing with European NGO's and emergency aids. Under these budget lines some limited means could be made available to help fund urgent programmes within the next several months.

TR/ecg
22 August 1985BRIEFING NOTE ON COMMISSION POLICY FOR
SOUTH AFRICAMEASURES TAKEN1. Humanitarian aid for victims of apartheid

Between 1979 and the present the Commission has financed emergency aid actions totalling ECU 13,750,000 for refugees in Angola, Zambia, Mozambique and Zimbabwe.

2. Aid to anti-apartheid organisations and movements

1) The Commission cofinances several projects which address within their broad scope also to the various aspects of South Africa and the apartheid policy. The Commission's contribution totals around 275,000 ECU to the six current programmes.

2) The projects are being carried out by NGO's in the Netherlands, Belgium, France, United Kingdom, Denmark and Germany. The target groups include youth groups, schools, opinion leaders, MEPs and sportsmen.

The activities embrace

- forthcoming international conference in the Hague (12-14 September 1985)
- documentation Centre
- school workpacks, courses and books
- meetings for the general public,
- special dossier on Europe and Southern Africa for elections to the European Parliament,
- NGO Conference on the role of SADCC

3. Aid to the Southern Africa Cooperation Development Conference (SADCC) States

Between 1980 and the present under the LOME II Convention, food aid, other Commission Budget, and EIB programmes more than ECU 1,000 million has been made available in development aid to the ten SADCC states through European Community institutions.

The Commission has also financed technical assistance support for the SADCC Secretariat.

4. Scholarships and education programmes

The Commission has assisted in the financing of education programmes for refugees of South Africa and Namibia. Furthermore the Commission cofinances the production and distribution of information material concerning refugees from South Africa and Namibia. In the programmes decided between 1981 and 1983 the Commission contribution totalled around ECU 420,000.

The Commission has provided about ECU 3,000,000 in support of the UN Institute for Namibia in Lusaka.

5. Visits and contacts (trades unions, etc.)

DG I competence ?

MEASURES ENVISAGED

In future the Commission envisages to continue and reinforce the measures already taken in particular to:

- expand further financial and technical support for scholarships and for refugees from South Africa and Namibia; and
- continue discussions and cofinancing with non-governmental organisations working in the region.

Already under the LOME II Convention which comes into force from early 1986 some ECU 886 millions development aid funding has been made available to the ten SADC states for programming over the period 1986 to 1990. This does not include probable emergency aid, food aid, and other thematic actions and funding which may become available in that period.

The Commission continues to make clear and public its total disapproval of the apartheid system in South Africa and its support for the EEC Member States in the framework of political cooperation to end the emergency situation and to liberate all those who are detained as a result of these measures (See Press Release attached).

cc: DG I
Mr. BLONK
Mr. SCOTT

Vital transport links

Two-edged sword to Pretoria sanctions

By Nicholas Ashford, Diplomatic Correspondent

Goods trains can be seen each day trundling across Beit Bridge between South Africa and Zimbabwe, carrying food, machinery and minerals across the political divide separating black and white Africa. During the same 24-hour period, up to 50 scheduled passenger flights will fly between airports in South Africa and 16 independent African states. These transport links symbolize the economic interdependence which ties seven black African states tightly (and a number of others more loosely) to South Africa, whose political system they abhor and with which only one - Malawi - has full diplomatic relations. The economies of Botswana, Lesotho, Swaziland, Mozambique, Zimbabwe, Malawi and Zambia are so intertwined with South Africa that economic sanctions against the white-minority Government in Pretoria would also have a severe impact on them. They would not only be directly hit by such sanctions, as Zambia and Mozambique were during the 1970s by the Rhodesian embargo, but would also face possible retaliatory action by South Africa. On July 29 President Botha warned that South Africa would deny neighbouring black states access to its transport and communications network, cut trade with them and expel about 1,500,000 migrant workers if sanctions were imposed against his country. It is widely accepted that such a move would have a devastating effect on the economies of the seven nations concerned. All make extensive use of South African railways, and harbours for their imports and exports; South Africa is their biggest trading partner (apart from Zambia), and for four of them - remittances from migrant workers - form a significant proportion of their foreign exchange earnings. Retaliatory action by South Africa, however, would be a two-edged sword. Who, for instance, would mine South Africa's gold and other minerals if migrant workers, who form the bulk of the mine labour force, were expelled? The denial of transport links to the seven neighbouring states would cost South Africa millions of pounds a year in lost rail and port revenues, and although exports to black Africa (worth about £270 million during the first half of the year) would be cut, the loss of

Continued on page

THE TIMES

5 SEPT

Sanctions retaliation a two-edged sword

Continued from page 1.

account for only about 7 per cent of South Africa's total, they have proved recently to be the fastest-growing export sector.

The belief that President Botha's threat of retaliation could hurt South Africa almost as much as its neighbours explains why, most black southern African leaders have not publicly opposed sanctions; in fact, many are in favour.

At a meeting of the leaders of the nine Southern African Development Co-ordination Conference (SADCC) nations in Arusha last month, even King Mshoeshe of Lesotho, the country most heavily dependent on South Africa, urged Western states not to hold back from sanctions for fear of damaging neighbouring states' economies.

Significantly, however, the summit did not produce a formal statement on sanctions, reflecting the political disparity within the SADCC, which was established in 1980 to find ways to lessen their economic dependence on South Africa.

Mr Robert Mugabe, Prime Minister of Zimbabwe, for instance, has advocated sanctions in principle, but insists that practical realities dictate that his landlocked nation could not impose them. President Machel of Mozambique has said he would vote in favour of sanctions only if the US and Britain did so as well.

The three countries with the closest economic ties with South Africa, which would be hardest hit by sanctions, are the former British protectorates of Lesotho, Botswana and Swaziland. All belong to the South African Customs Union, which was established in 1910.

The mountainous kingdom of Lesotho is encircled by South Africa and depends on the republic's road and rail network for all of its trade. South Africa provided 95 per cent of Lesotho's imports last year and, through the Customs Union, contributed 56 per cent of government revenues.

Lesotho also has the largest number of migrant workers in South Africa, 86 per cent of its wage labour force. Pretoria would only have to expel the 150,000 Lesotho nimeworkers to cripple that country's economy. The Customs Union also contributes heavily to government revenues of Botswana (37

per cent) and Swaziland (63 per cent).

Each gets about 90 per cent of its imports from South Africa and rely on the republic's transport system for most of its exports, though Botswana air freights its diamonds direct to Europe. Much foreign investment in the two countries comes from South Africa.

Zimbabwe, Zambia, and to a lesser extent Malawi, also rely on South African rail and road links. Their direct trade with South Africa ranges from 50 to 85 per cent.

Zimbabwe in particular has made a considerable effort since independence to reduce depen-

dence on South Africa by directing more of its trade through Mozambique.

Its traditional trading port, Beira, is badly silted and attempts to export direct through Maputo have been disrupted by Mozambican rebels.


In Mozambique's case, however, the boot is on the other foot to some degree as Maputo, the capital, serves as one of South Africa's major trading terminals. Mozambique also supplies the republic with considerable electricity from the Cahora Bassa hydro-electric complex. But Mozambique derives badly-needed hard currency from both activities.

One aspect of the sanctions debate often overlooked is the cost already borne by SADCC countries because of South Africa's policy of political and military disruption.

In a submission to a recent meeting of the Organization of African Unity, the SADCC secretariat put this at more than £700 million. SADCC countries are also having to bear the cost arising from South Africa's double-digit rate of inflation and the depreciating rand.

In the short-term and even in medium-term, however, SADCC countries would suffer most if sanctions were imposed on South Africa.

As M. Claude Cheysson, former French Foreign Minister and no friend of South Africa, warned the UN Committee on Apartheid last year: "History shows that an embargo has never succeeded against countries with natural resources, whereas the weaker neighbours who are affected by it suffer horribly."



The ports and the networks of roads and railways that create interdependence in southern Africa.

ECONOMIC DEPENDENCE ON SOUTH AFRICA

	Botswana	Lesotho	Swaziland	Malawi	Mozambique	Zimbabwe	Zambia
Trade							
Main partner	S. Africa	S. Africa	S. Africa	S. Africa	S. Africa	S. Africa	Britain
Exports to S. Africa	£36m (17%)	negligible	£42m (20%)	£9m (6%)	£9m (5%)	£76m (17%)	£3m (1%)
Imports from S. Africa	£393m (88%)	£286m (95%)	£286m (90%)	£64m (36%)	£59m (14%)	£130m (22%)	£64m (16%)
Migrant workers							
Number	29,169	150,422	13,418	30,603	59,391	16,965	-
% of wage labour force	23%	86%	15%	8%	20%	2%	-
Remittances	£21m	£99m	£9m	£11m	£43m	£20m	-
Tourism							
No. S. African tourists	150,000	over 50,000	50,000	25,000	negligible	63,000	banned
% of total	67%	70%	60%	39%	-	24%	-
South Africa supplies							
Electricity	19%	100%	50%	-	one third	1%	-
Oil	100%	100%	100%	70%	some	some	some
Food	most	most	some	some	some	some	some
Overseas trade via S. Africa	all	all	one third	some	-	two thirds	one third

Source: Third World Affairs.