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CJIR
Catholic Institute for International Relations
London

SANCTIONS AGAINST SOUTH AFRICA

Briefing Paper October 1985

1. THE THEOLOGICAL CASE

The theological justification for sanctions rests on two pillars. The first is the moral inadmissability of profiting from, or bolstering up, great injustice (1). The system of apartheid, with its gross divergencies of wealth, of land, of productive assets and of income, focusses the benefits of the God-given resources of South Africa on a small, white minority. The system is such that these benefits are also available to foreign investors, whether by establishing a factory to

use black labour, or by lending money to the South African government whose ability to repay the debt rests on the same unjust economic system. Foreign investors, in a much clearer way than South Africans, have a choice about whether to take up this opportunity or not; it is a legitimate part of the church's social teaching to preach against such participation in injustice, the more so as the availability of foreign credit and technology eases the perpetuation of the system. A similar case applies to trade with South Africa.

The second argument for sanctions concerns the methods of fighting injustice. The doctrine of the just war provides guidelines for the use of force against gross injustice, in a calculation of the lesser of two evils. In a parallel way, the moral basis for economic sanctions is that their consequences would be less human suffering and disruption in South Africa than would otherwise occur, with the result that reconstruction would be less difficult and costly. This is something that requires analysis, both on the effect of sanctions and on the alternative.

Perhaps the strongest argument against the use of economic sanctions is that their widespread application against the widespread injustices in the world would cause a worldwide reaction of nations retreating into themselves, a breakdown in international communication, and serious economic decline. In other words, there is too much injustice to make the use of sanctions feasible. We have to live with each other. What then is the moral case for the church singling out South Africa? Firstly, the size and the systemic nature of injustice place it among the prime offenders in the world. Secondly, apartheid is a particular threat to the church, because it is justified explicitly in terms of Christian theology. Legalised injustice perpetuated in the name of christian civilisation makes it a theological issue, as a perversion of the gospel. Thirdly, in the same kind of clear realism required by just war theory, there is a real chance of success, as there is not against a super-power.

2. WOULD SANCTIONS WORK?

2.1 A range of sanctions

There are a wide range of possible economic measures - the issue is not either sanctions or no sanctions. The arms embargo has been in place since 1963, mandatory since 1977 - though much evaded. OPEC applied an oil embargo in 1973. President Reagan recently re-imposed President Carter's ban on computer sales, and added a ban on Krugerrands. Possible further sanctions divide into four types:

further bans on sales to South Africa, ranging from a tightened oil embargo, through particular types of machinery, to a complete halt.

measures against South African exports, ranging from individual consumer boycotts of South African citrus fruit, to a mandatory ban, and including co-ordinated action to force down the price of gold.

prohibition of new foreign investment, as Sweden has done since 1979, extended to all investment by foreign companies (that is, including that financed by re-invested profits generated in South Africa, which is the greater part), or still further to insist on withdrawal from the country.

prohibition of loans to South African companies (or just to the state).

Within these types, there are a plethora of instruments and combinations, and some additional measures such as a stop to air services or telecommunications. This range makes it difficult to assess the likely impact of sanctions, and it is important not to extrapolate from arguments about one measure (such as the cost of policing a trade boycott) to absolute statements on sanctions as a whole, as the British government for example has sometimes done. Nevertheless, some general points can be made.

2.2 Reading the signs of the times

The imposition of sanctions is sometimes portrayed as a trumpet blast that would bring down the walls of Jericho irrespective of the conditions inside the city. It is relatively easy to demonstrate, against such optimism, that banks could redirect their loans to South Africa through third countries; that a complete cessation of trade would require an internationally-agreed blockade costing hundreds of millions of dollars annually; that there is no previous historical example of a regime giving up power solely as a result of economic sanctions without an armed insurrection as well.

To this, two points need to be made. Firstly, it is indisputable that sanctions do have some effect. They raise the cost of continuing along present policies. Even if sanctions measures are evaded, they are evaded at a cost, as Ian Smith's Rhodesia discovered: imports and loans become more expensive, exports have to be sold at a discount, foreign technology and expertise are much harder to come by.

Secondly, things are different in a crisis. In a watershed article in August 1985, Ian Davidson, the Foreign Editor of the London Financial Times, rehearsed the arguments against sanctions and concluded:

There would be a strong case against sanctions if the situation inside South Africa were relatively calm and steady, with the government incontrovertibly in control of events; in such circumstances even a total naval blockade might not be enough to bring about political change. But these are not the circumstances in South Africa today - and it is becoming doubtful if they will ever obtain..... In these [present] circumstances, the argument that foreign sanctions can only be marginal (that is, ineffective) needs to be re-examined. For what is marginal in conditions of relative internal calm, may become critical in conditions of unrest and uncertainty.

Mr Davidson's point was that, in the present crisis, the South African government is wavering. The additional political impact of the West imposing sanctions stands a chance of shifting Pretoria in the

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direction of negotiation of rights with genuine black leaders. This would be the case almost irrespective of which sanctions measures were imposed.

The argument can be extended from the political to the economic. Sanctions are more likely to bite, in a crisis. Banks will not go to much trouble to evade bans on lending if they are already doubtful whether South Africa is a good risk. A great deal of economic life in a capitalist system depends on businessmen having confidence in the future. Manufacturers will not invest in new plant unless they are relatively sure of profitable returns. Above all, the financial system can rapidly break down if there is a loss of confidence. It took just a handful of American banks in August 1985 deciding not to renew their South African loans to cause a major run on the Rand and an unprecedented refusal to repay inter-bank loans on time. The underlying debt position of South Africa was in fact relatively healthy by Latin American standards - but the loss of confidence was decisive. The banks lost confidence because of the visible internal unrest in South Africa; a normal rescue by the international banking community was impossible because of the external political pressure against being seen to assist the apartheid regime. In other words, sanctions were applied, albeit in this case not through legislation, and were undoubtedly effective, because they added to internal pressure.

2.3 The purpose of sanctions

Just as there are a range of possible sanctions instruments, so there are a range of purposes for which sanctions could theoretically be applied. They could be tied to limited objectives - such as a withdrawal from Namibia, or an end to the pass laws. The history of sanctions elsewhere, exhaustively examined in a recent American study, shows as one might expect that such limited sanctions have been most effective where the objectives are not central to the survival of the government. In certain circumstances this approach is a real possibility. There is a very clear case in international law, for example, for sanctions aimed specifically at ending the illegal occupation of Namibia.

Today, however, apartheid itself is the major concern. Above all, it is the major concern of South Africans, who are setting the agenda through student protests, civic associations, trade unions, the United Democratic Front, and many other manifestations. In South Africa's present turmoil, it would be very wrong to see sanctions as the only factor determining the direction of change. It would be quite unrealistic - as well as morally dubious - for the outside world to think that it can chart South Africa's future alone. Sanctions rather would lend weight to the more general South African movement for an end to apartheid. In these conditions, too precise objectives for sanctions would in all probability be overtaken by events.

In line with this thinking, the background paper to the June 1985 meeting of the South African Council of Churches, from which stemmed a call for sanctions, proposed that the campaign for economic pressure to be exerted on the Republic of South Africa should have two objectives: (i) to exert pressure on the government of South Africa to accept the inevitability of fundamental change, and (ii) to promote shifts in the economy which prepare the way for more sharing in economic relationships.

2.4 Retreat into the laager ?

Many have argued that sanctions would not succeed in changing government policy, because under pressure the government will retreat into a laager and refuse any concessions. The Financial Times article quoted above had one answer, admitting that 'the odds are heavily against the whites ever voluntarily agreeing to surrender their monopoly of political power to the blacks...But Western governments need to consider whether, for the sake of the white South Africans as well as for the blacks, their intervention may improve the odds of a better outcome.' The financial crisis of August and September 1985 proved that the government could not ignore international economic squeezes, as the Governor of the Reserve Bank shuttled desperately round Western capitals; the subsequent announcements about citizenship and amending influx control were partly aimed at restoring business confidence.

This example also illustrates the fallacy of seeing sanctions as the only pressure that the government is responding to, for the announcements of possible reforms were also aimed at quelling domestic unrest. The decision about whether or not to retreat into a laager will be largely taken on domestic considerations, and if the situation is sufficiently threatening, negotiation may seem the only possible way out. Perhaps the present government may never recognise that, but sanctions need not be supposed to work only through the present government: economic pressures also influence the business community, in particular, which has now recognised in its preparedness to meet the ANC that change must come. A new coalition of forces could arise which sweeps aside the present government.

A related argument against sanctions is that South Africa might be able to prevent serious sanctions because of the damage that would be done to wider Western interests. In practice, however, the West is much less dependent on South Africa than is often claimed. Again the London Financial Times (4 Sept 1985) has shown that the West could rapidly find alternative supplies for minerals: only for platinum and vanadium would there be even temporary difficulties. In the longer term, the West is unlikely to worry about losing South African supplies, even from an unfriendly regime, because South Africa needs the revenue from mineral exports and because the West is the only realistic market. Likewise, only a few Western companies (mostly in Britain) are so dependent their presence in South Africa to be more than inconvenienced by retaliatory bans on repatriating their South African profits; they are more likely to be concerned, in the current crisis, with ensuring their future under the range of possible new governments than with open collaboration with a beleaguered apartheid state.

3. THE EFFECT ON BLACK PEOPLE

Some opponents of sanctions manage to believe both that sanctions would not damage the economy (citing the success of ARMSCOR in the face of the arms embargo), and that they would cause major suffering. This is implausible. Serious sanctions would clearly have an effect on the whole population of South Africa, white and black. The extent of suffering would depend on which sanctions measures were imposed, how effectively they took hold, and how long they were applied before change was achieved. As a result, any estimate of the number of people affected depends heavily on the underlying assumptions.

For example, the present measures before the US Congress would at most only stop new investment, and so would not affect existing jobs directly. If all American-owned factories closed down, between 70 000 and 150 000 workers (2% of the black workforce) might be affected. At one extreme is a much quoted estimate by Arnt Spandau that a 20% fall in exports would put 340 000 black and 90 000 white workers out of a job. His figure is so high because he assumes that the employers affected by loss of exports simply dismiss a fixed proportion of workers, without examining possible alternative markets for their goods or redeployment of their workforce. At the other extreme are those who think there would be no effect at all because the mere threat of serious sanctions would be enough to achieve the necessary change (2).

Against this suffering has to be set, first, the willingness of people to suffer. The trend of opinion polls, and the pronouncements of black leaders, are not unanimous but increasingly confirm a willingness to see sanctions imposed (3). The South African Council of Churches passed a Resolution in June 1985 resolving 'to express our belief that disinvestment and similar economic sanctions are now called for as a peaceful and effective means of putting pressure on the South African government to bring about the fundamental changes this country needs.' More directly, the extraordinary extent and tenacity of consumer boycotts by township residents indicates a preparedness to sacrifice economic well-being for the chance of change.

Secondly, the suffering caused by sanctions has to be set against the

suffering caused by the alternative. The extent of poverty in the bantustans, the lack of a just wage for many, the millions without jobs, the denial of political rights, the abuses of human rights have been repeatedly denounced by the church. The end of apartheid will not inaugurate a land flowing with milk and honey, but it is surely a prerequisite for fundamental improvements in human dignity and prosperity.

Even restricting the argument to the number of people put out of work, it is important to look at what would happen in the long term if current trends continue. The kind of economic development that is now under way in South Africa is steadily increasing the number of unemployed. In 1982 80 000 black workers lost their jobs with a further 200 000 new young people entering the labour market for the first time and unable to find work. This trend occurs because the new machinery installed in agriculture, mines and industry requires relatively few workers. But this is not inevitable: an economic policy that was not bound by apartheid could create more jobs, both by encouraging labour-intensive kinds of production, and above all by redistributing productive assets to release the potential of the black majority (4).

4. EFFECT ON NEIGHBOURING STATES

In a similar way, the suffering caused to neighbouring states has to be set against the suffering caused by continuation of the present situation. The Southern African Development Coordination Conference (SADOC) which links Angola, Botswana, Lesotho, Malawi, Mozambique, Swaziland, Tanzania, Zambia and Zimbabwe, is concerned with long-term, economic issues, and has repeatedly said that it is not against anybody including South Africa. In a sober memorandum of July 1985, however, SADOC calculated that in the five years since 1980 South African actions had cost them no less than ten billion dollars. This is more than all the foreign aid received by the SADOC states or one-third of all SADOC exports in the same period.

The memorandum went on to compare this with the costs of sanctions:

Those opposed to sanctions argue that they will hurt the neighbouring states. Undoubtedly this is true. But if it accelerated the ending of apartheid, it would be well worth the additional cost.

The country most seriously affected by sanctions would be Lesotho, which is completely surrounded by South Africa. Nevertheless, the king of Lesotho, His Majesty Moshoeshoe II, told the 9 August SADC Summit meeting:

The effects of sanctions are very clear to us, and they will call for great sacrifices among our peoples. We cannot stand against the sanctions campaign; thus we call upon the rest of the world that as it exercises what it feels to be a moral obligation, it should be cognisant that we are not a party to apartheid. We therefore strongly elicit the international community to increase support to SADC states so as to cushion the indirect effects of sanctions.

In fact, many sanctions would in themselves have remarkably little effect on neighbouring states, provided that South Africa continued to allow them access to transport routes, as is their right as landlocked states under international law. The potential damage to neighbouring states would come if South Africa retaliated by closing railway lines and stepping up sabotage on alternative routes to the sea. Such retaliation (including Mr Botha's threatened expulsion of migrant workers) would itself have repercussions on the South African production and exports to the region, but certainly could be more damaging to the neighbours.

Above all the neighbouring states are clear that they do not want their suffering to be used as an excuse by the rest of the world to duck moral obligations. Rather, they hope that the rest of the world would be prepared to assist them ward off the more drastic effects of any South African retaliation.

5. CONCLUSION

It would seem that:

- (a) There is a strong moral case for sanctions if they can effectively bring closer an end to apartheid.
- (b) There is a good chance in the present circumstances that sanctions would be effective, as additional pressure.
- (c) The undoubted cost of major sanctions to black South Africans and to neighbouring states has to be balanced against the higher cost to them of the present system.

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we are deeply conscious of our responsibility as leaders of the church to give moral guidance and to play our part in attempting to arrest the rapidly escalating violence in our country.

while still open to dialogue, we see no choice but to envisage forms of non-violent action such as passive resistance, boycott and economic pressure to move our country away from its present state of racial conflict and set it firmly on the road to justice and full participation of all its inhabitants in the structures of government. We reaffirm our total abhorrence of the system of apartheid which is directly opposed to the teaching of Christ and the god-given dignity of every human being and is the greatest single obstacle to peace in our land.

resolution 1.

resolution 2

resolution 3.

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The imposition of economic sanctions on South Africa is sometimes portrayed as the trumpet blast that will bring down the walls of the apartheid state. So long as that state remained strong, this seemed an implausible picture. But today South Africa is in crisis at all levels of its apartheid society. What might have proved marginal during the relative stability of the 1960s has become potentially critical under the conditions of unrest and crisis of 1984-85. This *Comment* analyses the situation and argues that the time is ripe for sanctions to be imposed.

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
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COMMENT

Sanctions against South Africa



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GS/85/287

R E S O L U T I O N S

PASSED AT THE

23RD ASSEMBLY : 87TH MEETING OF THE COUNCIL

25th to 27th November 1985

2. DIVISION OF INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS

A. South Africa

1. The Assembly:

convinced that it is immoral to profit from investment in the gravely unjust system of apartheid, a system falsely claiming to safeguard Christian values, and

conscious that a radical transformation of society is longed for by those on whom the indignity, injustice and violence of apartheid are inflicted, and

aware that the policy of 'constructive engagement' has not contributed to the participation of black South Africans in the government of their country:

reaffirms the BCC's policy (November 1979) that 'progressive disengagement from the economy of South Africa is the appropriate basic approach for churches to adopt until all the people share equally in the exercise of political power';

requests member churches to urge their financial authorities to cease, where they have not already done so, to invest in companies which have a substantial stake in the South African economy; and

calls on all Christian people to identify personally with the peaceful struggle against apartheid by refusing to buy or sell South African products.

2. The Assembly:

- i. commends the report prepared by the British Churches' delegation to South Africa;+
- ii. gives thanks that an increasing number of church people in South Africa are working for justice; and
- iii. urges Christians to pray for all the people of South Africa and for a more just political order;
- iv. accepts that the report's analysis of the racial and political situation in South Africa demands that all the people should participate in decisions about their future through their own acknowledged leaders.

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Noting the June 1985 resolution of the SACC which expresses the belief that 'disinvestment and similar economic sanctions are now called for as a peaceful and effective means of putting pressure on the South African government to bring about the fundamental changes this country needs',

- v. resolves that, given the deepening crisis in South Africa and the Christian duty to promote its just resolution, BCC policy will be strong advocacy of and full support for carefully targetted sanctions;*

* 'carefully targetted sanctions' may be understood in terms of the Appendix

- vi. calls on the Executive Committee and the member churches of the Council to maintain active dialogue with HMG in pursuance of the common objective of promoting the end of apartheid.

APPENDIX

- I. The following are sanction measures re-affirmed or agreed by the ten European Community Ministers and Spain and Portugal in September 1985.

- a) A rigorously controlled embargo on imports and exports of arms and para-military equipment from and to the RSA.
- b) Refusal to co-operate in the military sphere.
- c) Recall of military attaches accredited to the RSA, and refusal to grant accreditation to military attaches from the RSA.
- d) Discouraging cultural and scientific agreements except where these contribute towards the ending of apartheid or have no possible role in supporting it; and freezing of official contacts and international agreements in the sporting and security spheres.
- e) Cessation of oil exports to the RSA.
- f) Cessation of exports of sensitive equipment destined for the police and armed forces of the RSA.
- g) Pronibition of all new collaboration in the nuclear sector.

- II. Further types of sanctions are listed below. Various nations have voluntarily chosen to impose some of these measures:

- a) Further bans on trade with and the export of goods to South Africa, especially of a high-technology nature.
- b) Bans on imports from South Africa, such as individual and company consumer boycotts of the produce of RSA, government boycotts of wine and agricultural products, and a ban on the importing of Krugerrands.
- c) Bans on new foreign investment in subsidiary companies operating in RSA; bans on re-investment of profits generated in South Africa.
- d) Bans on loans to South African companies, banks and state institutions.
- e) Bans on communication networks, from transport (such as cutting air links by withdrawing landing rights) to telecommunication systems.

+ The report will be published by the BCC under the title 'Whose Rubicon?'. Expected publication date: January 1986. price £2.95. Available from BCC Publications.



WHOSE RUBICON?

Report of a Visit to
South Africa by Representatives
of the British Churches

SEPTEMBER 1985

I. PRINCIPAL CONCLUSIONS

Our visit to South Africa has convinced us that the situation has radically changed since the beginning of this year - not merely intensified, but moved into an entirely new phase. The real initiative has passed to the black population, despite its weakness, while the institutions of power, for all their massive strength, can do no more than react ever more violently to each fresh development.

Black South Africans are no longer prepared to accept 'solutions' imposed, or even proposed, by others. They feel they have waited too long for a change of heart in the white population of the Republic as a whole, or for effectual intervention by governments or businesses outside. They have learned to mistrust any dependence upon the wisdom or goodwill of others, though they remain extraordinarily open and welcoming towards any individual with courage and compassion enough to share their struggle. They still hope for a unitary, non-racial nation, and the great majority of them would prefer to achieve it by non-violent means, though they believe the use of violence is justified by their circumstances.

So any reform or constitutional change originated by the present Government of South Africa would be unacceptable to the black population in general, however ameliorative or far-reaching it might be. Any consultation or any form of power-sharing in which the black participants were selected by the whites would be equally unacceptable. Any new constitution devised and proposed by intermediaries in Britain or elsewhere would be rejected no less by Blacks than by Whites. For their demand is quite simply a genuine and substantial participation through freely chosen and trusted representatives in framing a new constitution to establish a more just, democratic and unified society. It is this will to share in decision-making that is symbolized in the demand for the release of Nelson Mandela.

But it is precisely this change which the South African Government and its supporters are unwilling, and perhaps unable, to contemplate. The essence of apartheid is not separate seats and entrances, nor even separate townships or separate school systems, all of which can be subject to reform, but the ingrained assumption that Blacks must remain subservient, at best to white paternalism, or at worst to white tyranny. We can see no hope of stability in South Africa until those who hold power concede the right of any of the inhabitants of the Republic, of whatever colour, to organize opposition to the status quo and press for change, within the normal bounds of legitimacy in a civilized democratic state. Up to the present the evidence suggests that those who hold power are incapable of admitting that right. Whenever the legitimate non-violent dissent of Blacks, Coloured or Indians has achieved any strength and coherence, instead of being heard it has been maligned as treasonable or communist, its organization banned, its leaders detained or eliminated, and its active following harassed with

shocking brutality. It was inevitable that this repression of opposition should issue in an escalation of violence, the involvement of the armed forces and ultimately in civil war.

The tragic element in this history is the failure of a white population that see themselves as honourable, humane and freedom-loving to recognise the cruel injustice being perpetrated on their behalf and to find it intolerable. Many of them dislike the more rigorous instances of apartheid and hope for some amelioration, but few, even today, have any awareness of the pain and despair which the system inflicts. There have been prophets enough, crying in the wilderness, but for the most part the response remains the same: 'What they say cannot be true; they are repeating the lies put about by the enemies of our country.' The only answer to this is: 'Go to the townships, the resettlement areas, the advice centres for the families of detainees, and see for yourselves.' And this they find very difficult to do. One is chillingly reminded of the decent citizens of Germany in the 1930's. And it has to be said that now, as then, the Churches and their clergy, with many heroic exceptions, have not been assiduous enough in opening the minds of their membership to the realities surrounding them.

In the name of reconciliation they have avoided taking sides, even when such avoidance became a betrayal of the truth. There is grave need for a Confessing Church to emerge among the white congregations in South Africa, and indeed it is already appearing there; the unanimity of the Roman Catholic Bishops and the theological challenge of the recent 'Kairos' document are signs of its coming to birth. There is no less need for a Confessing Church movement in Britain if our people are to be ready for the moral and spiritual testing which the struggle in South Africa is bringing upon us.

The immediate practical issue before our nation is whether to join others in bringing economic pressures to bear upon the South African Government. Britain has a particular responsibility to decide this question aright because of the high level of her trade with, and investment in, the Republic. And, since right decisions are not made from false assumptions, we must first abandon two familiar arguments that are not supported by the facts. The policy of 'constructive engagement' has had no effect upon the crucial injustice of the situation, namely the rejection of an authentic black participation in decision-making. Secondly, the great majority of Blacks, well aware of the new hardships they will suffer as a result of disinvestment, would nevertheless welcome it as a sign of commitment to their cause. If that commitment is lacking, our application of economic pressure will be an empty show, and this may explain the faintly sceptical tone in which black people responded when we sought their opinion. They would welcome an effective augmentation of their own efforts, but they are not now expecting the struggle to be resolved by forces outside South Africa. On the other hand, the extreme sensitivity of the South African Government on this issue and the recent determined reactions from big business give good grounds for hoping that selective and specific economic pressure by Britain might hasten the day of

radical change and reduce the period of bloody conflict. A total application of sanctions has elsewhere proved to be too blunt and faulty an instrument to achieve a calculated result. But a ban on all new investment, selective disinvestment especially in the field of high technology, a boycott of South African exports and, above all, a withdrawal of loan facilities by banks, following the example of Chase Manhattan, might achieve notable results if applied with the declared end of bringing the Government of the Republic to negotiate a radically new constitution with the authentic leadership of the various population groups.

A more far reaching change of attitude is urgently required, however, of the people of Britain which goes beyond the tactics we may employ, and may need to precede them. For forty years or more voices have been raised in South Africa pleading for more decisive intervention to end oppression. We have lived in the belief that, while time was perhaps running out, someone, if not ourselves, would act to avert disaster. But the clock does not forever stand at five minutes to midnight. The crisis that has overtaken South Africa in this year signals the beginning of a day of judgement. It is not merely that pent-up forces have started to boil over; the terms of the confrontation are quite different. One might say that those who have for so long asked to be heard have now withdrawn from communication and committed themselves to action and suffering.

It is a change that needs to be understood theologically. Familiarity with the Bible throws up a number of frightening images - the last of Moses' many attempts to move the heart of Pharaoh: 'I will see thy face again no more' - Jesus' silence before Pilate. It has all been said. The case stands. Events take over from decisions already made. There are no more choices, but the secrets of all hearts are revealed through the inescapable question: Whose side are you on? That is the 'trial by ordeal' to which we ask in the Lord's Prayer that we may never come. But come we must, once in a while, just as Jesus had to. As individuals, and even more, perhaps, as nations, we are brought to test - 'If thou hadst known in this day, even thou, the things which belong unto peace.' As conflict intensifies in South Africa and violence escalates, shall this nation remember that an oppressed people, who sought for many decades to forgo violence, is resisting tyranny, or shall we line up in the last resort with those of our own colour and culture? Will British bankers and businessmen continue, as some have now begun, to throw their weight on the side of equity for the sake of stability, or, as they learn that the traditional values of all black Africans tend towards a corporate economy akin to socialism, will their fight be only to preserve western capitalism?

We have seen, therefore, that, in regard to the crisis in South Africa, the most urgent responsibility of the Churches in Britain is to educate their own constituencies so as to bring about that changed understanding, that 'repentance', which is needed to make them ready for the moral and spiritual testing which the struggle in South Africa is bringing upon our nation. As part of this educative process we must be prepared to use the catalyst of a campaign for

more effective economic pressure upon the South African Government and more substantial support of the agencies of liberation in that land. But in that case it will be even more important to enhance the awareness and responsible action of church members towards the victims of poverty, racial tension and escalating violence in our own cities.

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Churches (85)

The Dutch Reformed Church has a Commission for Liaison with the authorities. This Commission recently held penetrating interviews with ministers on matters pertaining to their portfolios.

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Here follows a sort summary of these interviews with the subjects discussed.

Min Chris Heunis (Political Development)

Talks with him dealt with:

1. The relation between and the calling of church and state in ordinary and extraordinary circumstances.
2. Guarantees for the maintenance of Christian values which are contained in the preamble of our constitution and the implementation of those Christian values.
3. The concept of justice now and in future.
4. Citizenship and human rights.
5. The calling of the church to create a spiritual basis for development in this country.
6. the task of the church in reconciliation.
7. The present situation of unrest.
8. the future possibilities for continuing the talks between church and state.
9. The proposed expansion of democracy, participation in the process of decision.
10. The future of the urban blacks in the new constitutional dispensation.

Min Barend du Plessis (Finance)

The role of the churches was discussed in depth with him especially in view of disinvestment, boycotts and sanctions against South Africa abroad and the responsibilities of the church in this country concerning such a campaign.

Min Stoffel Botha (Manpower)

Lengthy talks were held with him concerning:

1. The implications of the revocation of the law prohibiting mixed marriages and article 16 of the immorality act for marriage officers.
2. The experience and report often received from visitors from abroad that they experience an irritating delay with regard to their requests for visas.

Min Louis le Grance (Law and Order)

The following were discussed:

1. The power granted to the security forces in the state of emergency.
2. The allegations of abuse of these powers.
3. The part the security forces can and ought to play in the present situation to bring about defusion and not to cause enmity.
4. Alleged torture during interrogation.
5. Detention without trial.
6. Control of the reports of the media especially in the state of emergency.

Min Magnus Malan (Defence)

The following were discussed with him:

1. The meaningful employment of chaplains who undergo military training.
2. The part played at present by certain churches and church organisations called the "End Conscription Campaign". This organisation exerts itself in the so-called support of those who do not want to undergo military training. From this follows the standpoint expressed by the Dutch Reformed Church on this matter and which will certainly be repeated in public.

Min Gerrit Viljoen (Co-operation, Development and Education)

The following were discussed with him:

1. Bottle-necks caused by the resettlement of people, — which has given rise to much criticism against South Africa both internally and abroad.
2. The new policy of orderly urbanisation.
3. The achievement of parity in education i.e. white and non-white education, — the initiatives and the necessity thereof.
4. Pass laws, the right of possession and housing.

The talks with the different ministers were based on the following

points of departure:

1. The state alone cannot be held responsible for all abuses resulting from a given political system.
2. The calling of a Christian state always to act according to scriptural norms namely love of God and one's fellow man as the rule of public practise of justice.
3. The responsibility of the state to maintain public order in such a way that the judicial interest of all the different groups be harmonised.
4. That no injustice should take place in the implementation of the country's policy and in the practise of the laws of the country.
5. That mutual understanding and appreciation should be practised by meaningful dialogue and collective planning.
6. Seeing that the christian has to apply the principles of the Kingdom of God also in the political field, he also has to enjoy the freedom to practice political thought and action in a responsible way in the light of God's Word.
7. The acknowledgement of human rights coupled to responsibility and the fact that rights and privileges should not be withheld when there is a legitimate claim to them.
8. The enduring task of intercession in prayer by the church for the powers that be.
9. The primary task of the church consisting inter alia, of preaching the Word of God and equipping its members for their service in all spheres of life, i.e. to mould them to apply the principles of the Kingdom of God in social and political spheres.
10. That the church in the performance of its calling may not further or hide behind popular opinions (which cannot be scripturally defended), but to help to correct such structures.

From this it is clear that the Dutch Reformed Church is truly concerned about the present situation and that the burning problems of the day do not pass unnoticed, but that it fulfills its calling of critical witness and in other ways towards the authorities in a meaningful way.

Pastoral letter of the Plenary Executive (To the church members and office bearers of the DRC)

When the fully attended Plenary Executive met in Pretoria on 16 and 17 October for its general biannual meeting, it was under the shadow of the continuing state of emergency and the particular tensions and trends that our country and church are experiencing. The riots and uncertainty which we experience politically, socially, culturally and economically, also find their precipitation in the life of our church. It gave rise to widely divergent views and convictions among our members. Different points of view are accepted and different things are accentuated. The result inter alia is that group formation originated in our church which does not foretell well for unity and solidarity in the foreseeable future and for the General Synod in 1986. It seems as if some believe that they alone are called to present the solutions for the problems of South Africa and in respect of the unity of the churches.

The question came to the fore: What is the role the DRC can play in the situation? The Plenary Executive took note of the fact that our church and its office-bearers progressively become the target of criticism and even unfeeling condemnation — not only from other sources but also from our own church circles.

The authority and influence of the church are queried and the voice of the church concerning South African problems is labeled as irrelevant. The reason for this is apparently that the finding of the DRC do not support the popular current views of the group of South Africans who propagate those views and want them put into practice. The DRC is mercilessly placed in the dock and held responsible for almost everything that is wrong in South Africa. All sorts of demands are made to the church about confession of guilt for injustice, unrighteousness and maladjustments present in South Africa.

Furthermore many of our members seem to have the impression that the Plenary Executive is unable to administer the matters of the church and the problems concerning church relations satisfactorily. As a matter of fact the Plenary Executive takes note that some members do identify themselves with the broad course of

the church and submit to it. The Plenary Executive does not feel happy about it. We live in a time in which authority in all spheres — that also of the church — is scaled down and criticised. Our church members therefore live in a time of confusion and uncertainty. There are winds that jerk and pluck at the church. Questions arise: "What is going on in the DRC?" "Where are we going?" From correspondence in our ecclesiastical and secular media and mutual conversations it is clear that a feeling of frustration, dismay and impotence overtakes many of our members. The Plenary Executive has taken note of all these things and is naturally grateful to great numbers of our members and office-bearers who calmly proceed to fulfil their duty as Christians and Church people on whose loyalty the church may depend.

For these reasons and under these circumstances the Plenary Executive finds it necessary to direct this pastoral letter to the congregations of the DRC to make known that it is continuing with the work entrusted to it. It is further our wish to make known with what we are busy and how we believe our members and office-bearers have to behave in these times of crisis. The Plenary Executive realises that possibly in the past it did not sufficiently inform its members and the general public of its ongoing activities and church guidance. Hence the impression was possibly created that the Plenary Executive does not exactly perform a meaningful function and that recognition of its guidance need to be considered important.

At its latest meeting the Plenary Executive again prayerfully devoted attention to a great number of matters which are important to our church, our ecclesiastical relations and our country. From the nature of the size of the agenda it is impossible to give details. We can only mention a few of the subjects discussed and thereby content ourselves. They include: a) the decision in connection with the suspension of membership of the Reformed Ecumenical Synod; b) our standpoint concerning the day of prayer on 9 October which was determined by the meeting at Pietermaritzburg; (c) revision of the psalm book; d) meeting with the Interim commission of the Reformed Ecumenical

Synod in March 1986; e) suggested inter-church conference with the Orthodox Presbyterian Church in America; f) report on a Reformed ecumenical conference in Edinburgh; g) arrangements for the General Synod of 1986; h) deed of agreement with the DR Missionary Church; i) continued discourse with the Executive Church Councils of the DRC family; j) meeting of the Federal Council of the DR Churches in 1986; k) continued research on missionary matters by ISWEN; l) emergency aid fund for riot victims; m) actions by a few leaders in the DR Missionary Church about which the DRC is unhappy; n) historical commemorations in 1988 of the Great Trek; Diaz feast and arrival of the Huguenots; o) state of emergency and violence in South Africa; p) group formation in the DRC; q) financial distress and unemployment; r) discussions with heads of State Departments on a large variety of matters; s) report of the Chaplain Commission of the General Executive Church Commission; t) report on the work of the Commission revising "Ras, Volk en nasie"; u) report of the Commission giving guidance on the authority and use of Scripture; v) work of the Inter-church Commission (relations with the Gereformeerde Church and the Hervormde Church); etc, etc.

To our members it will be clear that the Plenary Executive is indeed continually busy handling matters which in a wide field are of essential importance to our church. Our members and office-bearers can feel assured that the Plenary Executive considers it as its calling to handle matters that come its way with great responsibility and care and with prayerful veneration to God.

Aware of the fact that the public action of a few leaders in the DR Missionary Church, as reported in the public media, appeared shocking to our church members and leaders of the DRC and became an embarrassment of our church, and the fact that fitting church discipline is still, in our opinion, not forthcoming, all of which raised serious questions in the minds of our members.

The Plenary Executive is also concerned that these developments may further harm the already stiff relations between our church and DR Missionary Church. It is not imaginary that it unfortunately harms the missionary cause. Without wishing to interfere with the matters of the DR Missionary Church, the Plenary Executive in this respect wishes to voice the distress in the hearts of the members of our own church.

It remains the conviction of the Plenary Executive that mutual relations between church members and office-bearers of the DRC and those in the DRC family must be improved and enlarged. Hence the Plenary Executive wishes in the light of this need of reflection and communication on matters of current interest to call upon church meetings to create opportunities thereto so that these discussions can take place in ecclesiastical structures. Opportunities for prayers for peace and better relations are especially necessary.

The Plenary Executive wishes to point out that from time to time it has discussions with the heads of state departments by means of its Commission for Liaison with the Authorities on matters which it believes lie in the way of the church and the state. The Plenary Executive in this respect again extends an invitation to representatives of the DRC family that we together approach the Government in order to address representations which are in the interest of our members.

By means of this pastoral letter the Plenary Executive wishes to assure the broad mass of our church who loyally proceed on the road of the DRC of our gratitude and appreciation. Their support and loyalty are a source of encouragement. They are assured that the Plenary Executive in great dependence and with the light they possess, strive to continue to point out the course and that it herein is humbly dependent on the continual intercession of all our members and office-bearers.

In conclusion the Plenary Executive deems it necessary to make a serious appeal to all our members and office-bearers to give the church their support and loyalty to remember their church in their prayers, especially in these times of crisis and disrupted circumstances which we experience. It is our prayer that the God of mercy will soon grant calm, peace, relief in the drought-stricken areas and

economic prosperity. Above all, it is our prayer that our members will take their personal spiritual life and the education of our families according to the guidelines of God's Word seriously. The Plenary Executive earnestly requests our members and office-bearers not to take part in polarising formation of groups, as Reforum, Bible and Nation (Bybel en Volk) and similar organisations which came about beside the church. In the past the church in our country experienced crises. We overcame them by prayer and the grace of God and survived. We believe that this will also be the case in the present crises. Let us trust our God in this, because it is He who preserves His church.

The serious intercession in prayer of our whole church is requested for the very important General Synod which DV will be held in Cape Town from 14 to 25 October 1986.

(Aus: DRC - News,
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July - Dec. 85)

Last week's church meeting in Harare was widely condemned in South Africa ... and widely misunderstood. Here HENNIE SERFONTEIN reports on the substance of the meeting and its implications

THE Harare document is the toughest programme of action against apartheid and the Pretoria government ever accepted by the official leaderships of churches in and outside South Africa.

In South Africa itself it is bound to:

- Intensify ongoing and escalating church-state conflict in the country.

- Cause greater tension and friction between black and white Christians inside the mainstream anti-apartheid multiracial English language churches and between the South African Council of Churches (SACC) and some of its member churches.

And internationally it has committed the main Western churches, albeitly reluctantly on the part of some, to intensify the pressure on their respective governments to work for South Africa's total political, economic and cultural isolation.

The Harare Declaration is not one made by the WCC itself. The WCC as such is already notorious for its outspoken condemnation of the South African Government, and its commitment since 1971 to the so-called Programme to Combat Racism (PCR) — a specific programme of action.

But many of its western member churches do not fully support it, or support it only lukewarmly. And no South African church nor the SACC has yet accepted it.

The Harare Consultation was organised by the WCC at the specific initiative of Dr Beyers Naude, the SACC general secretary. But in the first place it was a meeting primarily of church leaders from South Africa, Africa and the Western world officially representing their churches.

In the case of South Africa, two representations of the recently established influential Black Ecumenical Church Leaders Consultation (BECLC) were also admitted after their recent condemnation of the "white controlled" leadership of the SACC and its member churches.

The Harare Declaration *inter alia* called on churches in and outside South Africa to support:

- The call of "immediate and comprehensive sanctions against South Africa".

- The "recent developments within the trade union movement for a united front against apartheid".

- Movements working for the liberation of their country.

It is a revolutionary step. Because no South African church has yet taken any such decision. And it was only in June this year that the SACC at its annual conference had unequivocally supported sanctions — something it has never done before, because there is uncertainty about whether it is legal in terms of the Internal Security laws.

Moreover, the conference did not merely accept a general statement asking for sanctions. In reply to questions from the Western churches, a BECLC spokesman spelled out a detailed 12-point sanctions plan and a three-point plan of action for churches.

This was unanimously accepted, significantly also by moderate black and white South Africans present. And this explanatory statement has now become part of the official resolutions of the conference.

These sanctions decisions will infuriate the government, and observers will be watching to see if it takes action against the churches or individual leaders.

The government is already infuriated that Naude and Bishop Desmond Tutu, who attended the Harare Consultation, had asked American banks not to renegotiate new loans unless the government resigned.

One of the bail conditions that Dr Allan Boesak, president of the World Alliance of Reformed Churches (WARC) must adhere to is that he may not in any speech advocate disinvestment. And he is a senior vice-president of the SACC now bound by the Harare decisions.

Intense debates can be expected in the multi-racial English language churches between black and white Christians. Although the moderate black and white leaders of the Catholic, Anglican, Methodist and Presbyterian churches did not speak out in public, in closed session they openly or tacitly accepted these "revolutionary" decisions.

There is already increasing tension between black and white Christians on a wide range of issues, with whites accusing the blacks of politicising the church. The Harare decisions are bound to lead to a new black-white confrontation which could seriously affect their unity.

Tutu reflected this inner conflict in these churches when he appealed for international financial assistance. "Because of my stand on disinvestment, white Anglicans are divesting their contributions to my diocese," he said.

There is no doubt that the Harare Declaration was a total victory for the black caucus in the South African churches and the BECLC, following the latter's recent moves in Durban, hitting out at white control.

In Harare, the voice of black South African Christians was heard loud and clear, both in the reports and in the subsequent Declaration.

They spoke forthrightly and with passion about the ongoing unrest and about the painful experiences of blacks at the hands of the authorities. And they made it clear that they felt the Kairos (moment of truth) for the church in South Africa had also come.

Where was the church in this crisis? Would it identify itself unequivocally with the oppressed and fellow black Christians? Were the questions raised?

They made it clear that they felt the time for Christian action had come. They were "sick and tired of pious resolutions" condemning apartheid.

BECLC representatives and black church leaders such as Dr K Mgoja, Rev Sol Jacob, Rev Stanley Mogoba and Rev Ernest Baartman, general secretary and president respectively of the Methodist Church, and Rev Blessing Finca, chairman of Abreksaa (Alliance of Black Reformed Christians in Southern Africa) played a crucial role in the public and private deliberations.

Equally significant was that the moderate black and white church leaders present openly or tacitly accepted the line taken by the black leaders.

The manner in which the six-point Harare Declaration was accepted reflected the mood of these black leaders.

WCC officials presented a four-page, 14-point

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wordy document as a draft declaration. Apart from wellknown generalities, it contained no specific programme of action.

The South Africans summarily rejected it and demanded a drafting committee which included some South Africans.

The Harare Declaration also gave official recognition to the controversial Kairos document, released 10 weeks ago by 150 black and white radical church ministers and members.

The document condemned both the "apartheid theology" and the "church theology" of the English language multiracial churches, making some scathing comments about the latter.

This document was officially ignored by the SACC Executive and all the church establishment.

The Harare Declaration is a far cry from the mild decision taken at the controversial Cottesloe WCC Consultation in 1960.

Whilst apartheid was then condemned, it merely asked for the abolition of pass laws, and the representation of coloureds by coloureds in parliament.

Those decisions ironically led to the resignation of two synods of the pro-apartheid Nederduitse Gereformeerde Kerk (NGK) from the WCC, because of its "political interference".

Significantly the issue of violence was not discussed at all at the conference.

When WCC general secretary Emilio Castro was asked about it, he said: "I have seen in the

cathedral next door commemoration scrolls for white Rhodesians who had fallen in the two World Wars and in the recent War of Independence. White western churches have not yet had any problems with the use of force or getting involved in wars."

He said the potential to use non-violent means to bring change in South Africa was still there and could be used to the maximum.

"But I cannot be the judge with regard to violence as I have not yet paid with my own blood. It is only by multiplying my efforts of solidarity with struggling South Africans that I can have the right to ask the Liberation Movement if they could consider alternative means."

Violence was therefore a theoretical issue that could not be raised as a stumbling block "to our confrontation of the real issue, apartheid," Castro said.

There was unanimity among the churchmen on the issue of sanctions.

"At the beginning, some friends from the west were afraid to talk about sanctions because they had been told that the price would be paid by the poor people in South Africa and by the neighbouring states."

But after the South African church leaders had clarified the situation by saying, "Don't worry about us, we will survive," clergymen from the West had given the issue a second thought, Castro said.

WEEKLY MAIL, Dezember 1985

"In the end, a beginning"

By HENNIE SERFONTEIN

FRIDAY, December 6, 1985 was a day fraught with symbolism in Harare.

Two simultaneous church events heralded two closely related developments: the final symbolic and irrevocable end of white domination in the old Rhodesia, and the beginning of the end of white domination in South Africa.

I am standing in front of the church conference hall of the impressive Anglican Church complex in the heart of Harare opposite Freedom Square, formerly Salisbury Square.

As the church clock strikes 11 times, a bell peals slowly and softly whilst the last strains of an old hymn is mournfully fading away from inside the huge granite church building 30m down the road.

Large groups of well dressed, mostly obviously affluent, elderly whites are streaming out of the church. Well-groomed women and men in sober dark suits gather on the pavement, in earnest conversation in lowered voices.

Next to the kerb is the large limousine of a funeral undertaker.

"People are slowly moving away. Coming past me is an elderly man holding his wife's hand, not speaking a word to each other. Gazing pensively ahead, obviously deeply upset.

I ask a middle-aged man passing by "who died?"

"Don't you know it is the burial of Boss Lilford," he reproached me, obviously mistaking me for a white Zimbabwean.

I then realised that the old white Rhodesian establishment had come to pay last respects to Boss Lilford, the legendary farmer millionaire, the powerful force behind Ian Smith and the Rhodesian front when UDI was declared in 1965. Throughout his life he was unwavering in his support for Smith and white domination, resisting majority rule all the way, never accepting the nonracial era of Mugabe.

A week before he was tragically murdered on his farm in apparently a purely criminal act.

In the days before the funeral the state-controlled "The Herald" had dozens of notices in the condolences column sympathising with his death. They came from the cattle ranch, racing and white political organisations, average whites, family and students.

These notices paid tribute to a "legend", a "true patriot", a "gentleman" praising him because: "You fought to the bitter end. So like you. Life is going to be very different."

The group of whites eventually breaks up. Then Ian Smith and his wife move away, coming my way, walking very slowly. He is talking all the time.

Only 67, Smith looks a haggard, worn out old man, his face heavily lined, walking bent forward, visibly aged by the tension of the years.

Gone is the arrogance of the white supremacist who for 15 years defied the world, Africa and the majority of his fellow black Zimbabweans, who had predicted no majority rule in a 1 000 years.

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He and his wife takes a good three minutes to walk the length of the short block, followed by two heavily-built members of his now diminished parliamentary caucus.

At the end of the block he turns left, walking past a police barricade in the road next to parliament, which is on the other side of the Anglican Church complex.

A black policeman politely touches his cap in respect and half smiles in recognition, but Smith and his entourage do not notice.

I cannot but remain astonished at a sight I have seen before: Ian Smith walking unarmed in the streets of Harare, after a bloody war in which tens of thousands were killed, directly as a result of his intransigence and obsession about white rule and wanting "western Christian values".

And to be amazed about the idea of Smith sharing the same parliament as black nationalist leaders such as Mugabe, Nkomo and countless others — people who had spent more than a decade in security prisons because of their beliefs, losing the best years of their lives, with Mugabe refused permission to attend the funeral of his only child.

Yet I find myself in a strange way feeling sorry for Smith and his people mourning the death of one of their giants. For five years after independence they have not yet come to terms with the new Zimbabwe, are still hankering for the "good old days" and have no perception of how their racial prejudice have not only bedevilled their own country, but has directly caused conditions of chaos in a whole sub-continent.

But at the very moment that Lilford is making his departure, and the curtain comes down on white Rhodesia, in the hall a few yards behind me I can hear the excited voices of people participating in an intense debate. They are discussing a totally different future from what the Lilfords, Smiths and PW Bothas have in mind.

The occasion is the three day emergency

consultation organised by the World Council of Churches (WCC). The participants are the 85 church leaders and representatives of churches in South Africa, Africa and the western world. And the topic of discussion is the ongoing crisis in South Africa and the role that churches and Christians should play in such a situation.

The delegates are busy finalising the text of the historic six-point Harare Declaration which will be announced two hours later at a packed international press conference.

But at the roots of the Harare Declaration is a totally sincere and idealistic commitment to a nonracial, non-apartheid South Africa based on the principle of religion, justice and human rights. The black and white South African delegates are determined that the tragedy of the old Rhodesia of Lilford and Smith must be averted at all costs.

The venue of the consultation is in fact symbolic. Until 1980 Salisbury was the capital of the Rhodesia of Lilford and Smith, the citadel of white supremacy and racism.

Today, the new Harare provides the opportunity for a study of the relics of the past, of an object lesson of a policy and Massada mentality white South Africans ought to abandon at all costs.

Delegates were able to listen in fascination one afternoon to a detailed account of Dr Nathan Shamuyarira, the Information Minister, of the problems before, during and after the take over by the Zimbabwean leadership from the Rhodesian old guard.

All delegates were only too painfully aware about the many similarities between the Rhodesian disaster and the present course the South African government is embarked upon.

The unexpected presence at the consultation of nine Afrikaans and English-speaking students of the Universities of Stellenbosch and Cape Town, was in sharp contrast to the hardline, unyielding official

viewpoint of the Pretoria government.

On a fact-finding mission to study the situation in a nonracial Zimbabwe, and the role of churches, they were obviously not impressed by the furious attacks on the WCC and the liberation movements such as the ANC and PAC.

It was Lizl Kruger, a direct descendant of the legendary Boer President Paul Kruger, who informed the delegates about their frustrations as Christians "in the situation of social injustice that we are trapped in".

And in their lengthy hour-long talks with the ANC they revealed an approach which astonished the senior ANC representatives:

"These young white South Africans did not preach to us. Instead they humbly asked our advice on how we saw the future. And what peaceful political role they could play in view of the fact that both coloured and African young radicals in the Cape Peninsula are refusing to talk to them."

For these young whites the Harare consultation was clearly an eye opener. It gave them insights into a totally different South Africa, the world of black bitterness and frustration.

"And to think that we have had to travel to Harare to meet our fellow South Africans," one observed wryly.

One student, uncertain of himself and obviously wanting to make sure that in this liberated atmosphere of Harare he did not put a foot wrong, when attending a press conference of Bishop Tutu, asked him what he thought about certain aspects of "Comrade PW Botha's statements."

The presence of these young white students showed that the grip of the National Party government on the political thinking of the youth is slipping, and that there are some, perhaps still only a small number, who are determined that South Africa shall not go the way the Rhodesia of the Lilfords and Smiths did.

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press statement on reaction of the sacc to the speech of the state president at the opening of parliament 31 January 1986.

Chambers (11)

we note with satisfaction that the government has responded to the pressures from within south africa as well as from abroad as reflected in the announcement on parity in the provision of education for all the introduction of freehold title for blacks and of an i.d document for all citizens, and intention of removing existing influx control measures with a view to orderly urbanization.

we are gratified to note that certain general principles with regard to the future position of blacks have been stated or restated namely the government's acceptance of an undivided south africa and of one south african citizenship as well as the affirmation of the sovereignty of law. but we have to point out that it is meaningless to talk of equal education, without equal political rights, or title deeds without making land available. equally there is a serious contradiction in talking about an undivided south africa and at the same time of recognising and entrenching the position of minorities.

regrettably it is our impression that the government has failed to address the fundamental issue namely, the political rights of the 22 million blacks of south africa or otherwise the government is afraid to tackle the evil of apartheid at its roots. the creation of a national statutory council both regarding its composition and its purely advisory power, can in no way meet the political aspirations of the blacks

as regards the position of nelson mandela no indication or assurance has been given regarding his release. in fact he is being used as a pawn in a bargaining exercise between west and east and this will just add to the deep anger of the black community.

it fills us with sadness that there has been no dynamic statesmanship approach displayed by the state president neither a realistic political approach to meet the legitimate aspirations of the majority of the people of south africa. i believe the state president has lost his last chance to create a new future for the whole of south africa.

the reaction of governments of the west, especially great britain, usa, and west germany will in all probability be one of strong approval, support and earn applause only to experience at a later stage painful disillusionment, because the government did not consult with the people as people to determine their feelings.

beyers naude
general secretary
south african council of churches

31 january 1986

paragraph 4 4th and 5th line '' between west and east and this will just add to the deep anger of the black community''

message clearly received? ~~XXXXXXXXXXXX~~