

# OAU conference

THE CAPE TIMES

# S Africa the key, says Nyerere

- 8 APR 1975

From JOHN WORRALL

**DAR ES SALAAM.** — In a clear and unmistakably hawkish directive to the OAU Council of Ministers meeting here yesterday, President Julius Nyerere said: "This conference is not going to make itself credible if it wastes too much time talking about talking to South Africa."

Opening the conference as leader of the host country, President Nyerere said: "Your conference will have been a success if it leaves South Africa in no doubt at all that we are still ready to use peaceful means to achieve independence in Rhodesia and Namibia, but if this is made impossible we shall resume and intensify the armed struggle."

The conference, he emphasized, was not about "so called dialogue or détente with South Africa. It was about the liberation of Southern Africa".

Their purpose was to make sure they were clear in their own minds about how they should proceed now after the successes of freedom fighters in Angola and Mozambique.

Once more he emphasized to the delegates that they should not allow



President Nyerere

the conference to "degenerate into a conference on détente or dialogue". They should now reiterate their determination to liberate Southern Africa.

"We should repeat," President Nyerere said, "that we are ready to back up talks between Vorster and Smith and the liberation movements concerned, and having done that, most of the time of this conference should be spent on discussing how to help the African National Council (of Rhodesia) and Swapo to strengthen their armed forces".

He added that neither the advocates of constitutional talks nor those of the armed struggle could make themselves credible without the existence of armed force.

"For constitutional talks can fail and an armed struggle requires an armed force. In any case both the ANC and Swapo will need those armed forces whether independence is achieved peacefully or violently."

President Nyerere emphasized the absolute key importance of South Africa in the whole question of Southern Africa.

"Whether we are talking about Rhodesia, Namibia or South Africa itself, the effective authority is South Africa."

This fact must be taken into serious account when Africa considers its future strategy. Africa's confrontation in Southern Africa now is basically with South Africa, that is South Africa's colonial power, in Namibia and to all intents and purposes in Rhodesia".

Africa's aim was to help the mass of the people of South Africa to free themselves from "a vicious oppression of apartheid and to demonstrate that racial-



ism is outlawed by the whole world."

President Nyerere was loudly applauded by the delegates and observers. Tomorrow the conference goes into private session when two key papers by Tanzania and Zambia will be debated.

## 'SA unchanged'

Replying to President Nyerere's address, the Kenyan Foreign minister, Dr Munyua Waiyaki, caused amusement when he said that the word détente was "neither African nor Afrikaner"

Neither understood it properly, but it has been taken to mean in South Africa that Africans would be controlled by Whites who would withhold majority and continue to impose apartheid.

Putting Kenya among the hawks in the détente issue, Dr Waiyaki said that there had been absolutely no change on Mr Vorster's part to suggest a change of attitude.

"South Africa should now start talking to the liberation groups through the OAU," he said.

The conference should call for a complete boycott of South Africa till Namibia, Rhodesia and South Africa itself were free.

When the Rev Ndabaningi Sithole, recently released from detention by Mr Smith, arrived at the hall yesterday he was given a hero's welcome by the delegates, who crowded round him, embraced him, and shook him by the hand.



# AFRICA BACKGROUND

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# Angola threat to peace effort

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*Rivalry between liberation movements continues to threaten the peace of Angola. If civil war comes it will disturb the whole of Central and Southern Africa, writes ANTHONY DELIUS.*

LONDON. — The prospects for achieving the peace that all Southern Africa needs are possibly even more threatened by recent faction-fighting in Angola than by the racial and tribal strains in Rhodesia.

Nothing indicates this more clearly than the descriptions of the main Angolan contestants as the "USA-backed" FNLA (National Front for the Liberation of Angola), and the "Marxist" MPLA (Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola). Neither of the descriptions is wholly accurate, but they are certainly ominous indicators of the forces that might come into play on the fringes of any civil war.

Even the role of the Portuguese is becoming suspect in international terms as the struggle to counter the growing communist influence in Lisbon grows sharper. The outbreak of the fighting in Luanda and nearby was to some extent, even if tenuously, related to moves to nationalize the Angolan banks in the wake of the nationalization of the Portuguese banks. The FNLA offered strong objections, while the MPLA had none at all. Now the head of the MPLA, Dr Aghostino Neto, has visited Portugal to appeal to parties of the further Left in Portuguese politics to support his cause and party in Angola.

## Favour alleged

Dr Neto has also declared that the Portuguese authorities in Angola have tended to favour the other two parties, the FNLA and UNITA, in the government of Angola and the ordering of affairs. The three liberation parties and the Portuguese decided to share the provisional government running up to complete independence in November this year.

UNITA and the FNLA made their co-operation conditional on the removal of the former High Commissioner, Admiral Rosa



The MPLA leader Dr Neto . . . shopping for arms?

Coutinho, who had very strong Left-wing sympathies. The other two parties found him far too partial to the MPLA. So Gen Antonio Silva Cardoso, presumably an officer of less Leftward views, was sent out in the Admiral's place. Now the

MPLA is accusing the General of partiality to the other parties, and it will be interesting to see how Lisbon reacts to this complaint.

Nobody can mistake the growing nervousness of the situation as all three parties and the Portuguese themselves juggle for position. The Portuguese have 25 000 troops with which to attempt to impose their will in the last resort. It is any man's guess how effective these troops would be if the situation worsened. The Angolan parties are each committed to putting 500 of their own former guerilla forces under Portuguese command — and removing their other guerillas from the capital, Luanda.

At the moment of writing the guerilla patrols of the FNLA and MPLA are still roaming the streets of Luanda, and only the UNITA forces are combining with the Portuguese to keep law and order, in spite of the recent agreement to end the fighting. After the Portuguese the FNLA are the most heavily armed of the

fighting men. The visit of Dr Neto abroad may not have been so much to search for peace as to search for arms to make up the disparity. The general picture hardly encourages hopes for any lasting peace in Angola.

The temptation to use their advantage in weapons against their main rivals must be strong among the FNLA. In addition the MPLA is in poor shape, and one of its factions led by Daniel Chipenda has to all intents and purposes crossed to the FNLA, and also has its headquarters in

Kinshasa, in neighbouring Zaire. It seems pretty certain that the latest troubles were begun by the FNLA, who took advantage of some cat-calling by MPLA trainee guerillas to test out their superiority in arms.

If the FNLA has any intention to seize armed control of a large part of Angola before the Portuguese leave, the leader, Holden Roberto, has three main problems to consider. First of all, has he sufficient weapons and armed men to establish control without a long wasting fight, amounting to civil war? Secondly, might he not provoke the strong Marxist element in Portugal's military controllers to put their forces in Angola strongly behind the "Marxist" MPLA? Finally, how far can his main backer, President Mobutu of Zaire, be seen by other African leaders to be supporting and encouraging him?

## Lisbon's aim

There could be some uncertainty in the minds of both President Mobutu and Roberto about which way the Portuguese would employ their armed forces. However strong the FNLA forces are and however well supplied their bases inside Zaire, the idea of taking on the Portuguese, the MPLA and maybe UNITA must make them hesitate. On the other hand Portuguese political confusions could make the High Commissioner's interventions very feeble and indecisive. The reigning idea in Lisbon is to get out of Africa and not become further involved

in local blood-letting. So Holden Roberto and his backers may judge that a take-over bid should come sooner than later, when the MPLA is better armed and better organized to resist, even without Portuguese aid.

Then again the Organization for African Unity has never liked Roberto, in spite of his long connection with President Mobutu, and the OAU Liberation Committee infinitely prefer Dr Neto and the MPLA. But in considering the line-up of African leaders in the OAU and outside it, President Mobutu may consider that the OAU itself seems to be on the verge of greater confusion and ineffectiveness than it has ever known, under the chairmanship of President Amin of Uganda. He could conclude that to have a

decisive influence in the disposal of the oil of the Cabinda and northern Angola through his friend and brother-in-law Roberto would bring greater real power than keeping in with the OAU.

Watching this balance of forces and the temptations, the astute Jonas Savimbi, of the UNITA group, has kept himself beautifully in the middle, observing agreements both with his rivals and the Portuguese impeccably. He has declared with all of them that Cabinda is part of Angola. He seems to have been the only leader to turn out with Portuguese troops to restore law and order, and must have increased his popular authority. He declares that he is not politically as pragmatic as FNLA, nor as rigidly socialist as the MPLA. He, too, in his own way is playing for the same high stakes as the others, the ultimate control of independent Angola.

But if the manoeuvring goes wrong and ends in civil war, the resulting fighting will disturb the whole of Central and Southern Africa. Neither the Russians nor the Americans, maybe neither the Europeans nor the Chinese as well, will be able to play an entirely passive role.




# Muller: I did not interfere

THE CAPE TIMES

- 8 APR 1975

Cape Times Political Staff

**THE MINISTER of Foreign Affairs, Dr Hilgard Muller, yesterday took the "strongest exception" to an allegation in Rhodesia that South Africa was interfering in Rhodesia's internal affairs.**



Dr Muller.

The allegation was made at the weekend in a Rhodesian Sunday newspaper by a Rhodesian Front Party backbencher, Mr Denis Fawcett Phillips, MP, following Dr Muller's sudden visit to Salisbury last week and the subsequent release of the Rev Ndabaningi Sithole.

Referring to the sudden release, the Hillside MP said: "We now know why the South African Foreign Minister, Dr Hilgard Muller, paid a sudden visit to Salisbury. No longer can South Africa claim that it does not interfere in the internal affairs of other nations."

Dr Muller's full statement said: "I take the strongest exception to the accusation that the South African Government is interfering in the internal affairs of Rhodesia."

"Such an allegation is completely unfounded, as the Rhodesian Prime Minister and members of his Government have themselves stated on a

number of occasions.

"During my talk with (the Rhodesian Prime Minister) Mr Smith last Thursday, I put the views of Mr Vorster and his Government to the Rhodesian Prime Minister and exchanged views with him.

## NO DEPARTURE

"This has regularly been done in the past — in fact, over a period of years, and what took place last week was no departure from the established practice or from South Africa's policy of non-interference in the domestic affairs of others.

"All decisions taken by Mr Smith and his colleagues are taken by themselves, and to suggest that they allowed the South African Government to prescribe to them what to do, is not only far-fetched, but also derogatory to the Rhodesian Prime Minister and his Government.

"It is for the Rhodesian Government itself to decide how best the interests of its people would be served," Dr Muller said.

Dr Muller's sharply worded denial comes at a time when many Rhodesians, particularly conservative Whites, believe that the South African Government is putting pressure on the Rhodesian Government in an effort to ensure the success of détente initiatives.



# The Cape Times

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TUESDAY, APRIL 8, 1975

## - 8 APR 1975 Fruits of détente

THE OAU meeting on Southern African detente has just begun and at the time of writing it was not clear what pattern was to emerge. Yet whatever is decided in Dar es Salaam, it is unlikely to be the end of the matter; and there are already positive signs that detente is producing some fruit. The reversal of the inept detention order on the Rev Ndaningi Sithole is the most dramatic sign. But also of possible significance is what appears to be a new tone in Mr Ian Smith's latest comments. He reportedly told young people at his old school on Saturday:

I think we must be prepared to accept, especially in the times we are going through and in the world in which we live, there are bound to be changes. There are emerging today African people . . . who are ready to take a lead in the political need of their people.

He urged Rhodesian Whites to treat these leaders on merit and to work together with them in the best interests of Rhodesia. These remarks are a far cry from previous categorical and *kragdadige* statements such as not accepting Black rule "in my lifetime". Whether it, in fact, heralds a new preparedness by Mr Smith to accept the inevitable about majority

rule, remains to be seen. But it shows welcome realism. At the same time, President Kaunda's courageous action in withdrawing recognition from splinter African nationalist groups in Zambia is equally encouraging. Mr Vorster has himself gone some way in paying the first minor instalments on the price of detente — for instance, in influencing Mr Smith to accept reality, in allowing new, open-ended initiatives in South West Africa and in relaxing some of the marginal racial rigidities of the South African system.

Yet, overall, South Africa still stands far from achieving meaningful internal detente, which involves sharing political power. Even if there were no external detente operation to spur things on, government by consent of the governed would have to be achieved in South Africa for the country to approach the 21st century peacefully. Mr Vorster has himself sketched the frightful consequences of a failure of detente. This is also appreciated by another key player in the internal drama, Chief Buthelezi. Speaking at Melmoth on the KwaZulu border at the weekend, he said: "Either we make detente work or we are all doomed to die together like fools."