

natives, Indians, Afrikaner renegades and so on". If controlled by Calvinist Afrikaners, the state would then be used as an instrument of "moral good", to establish the perfect Christian national society.

L In these terms, the <sup>Dutch Reformed</sup> churches gave strong organised support to the various campaigns of the Broederbond in the 1930s and 1940s. Clergy played a vital role in the Broederbond attack on white trade unions (see p 000) at one stage a "Broad Church Committee" was set up to interfere directly in the affairs of the Garment Workers' Union - in the Economic Movement which sought to create a class of Afrikaner capitalists, and in the Broederbond's struggle for "Christian-national" education. Given the central role of the Churches in local Afrikaner communities, this political intervention by the DRC's was an important element in mobilising the class alliance of Afrikaans-speakers which put the Nationalist Party into power in May 1948.

#### The Churches under NP rule

L S.C. During the first twelve years of NP rule, the various DRC's were "almost constantly busy trying to interpret, formulate, justify, reconcile and pronounce on the matter of Apartheid and the Scriptures" as one Calvinist history put it. Their work provided the basis for the claim that Apartheid is a highly "moral" system. In a real sense, the Dutch Reformed Churches were the single most important publicist and apologist for Apartheid. <sup>Their</sup> Clergy also continued to play a central role in the Broederbond.

L However the growing mass struggles against and international censure of Apartheid had their effects on these churches and their theology. In December 1960, in the aftermath of the Sharpeville massacre, the World Council of Churches held a meeting at Cottesloe in Johannesburg with the eight affiliated South African Churches - which then included the NGK. NGK delegates concurred with a complex final resolution which in effect condemned Apartheid and declared that it had no Scriptural basis. The NP leadership under Dr. Verwoerd saw this as a serious challenge. The full weight of the Nationalist establishment was unleashed to bring the erring theologians into line. Verwoerd's major ally in this conflict was the then editor of the NGK newspaper, Dr. A.P. Treurnicht - later to split from the NP to form the Conservative party. His major critic was the then Moderator of the Transvaal NGK, S.C. Dr. Beyers Naude. The conflict was wide ranging. It covered both the "Scriptural basis" of Apartheid policy as well as the links between the churches and the Broederbond. The NHK felt compelled to set up internal commission



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However at this stage, the petty bourgeoisie was still a very minor force within a nationalist movement dominated by capitalist farmers. In June 1934, the Nationalist Party split. The majority faction representing capitalist farmers in the northern provinces, "fused" with the strongly pro-imperialist and pro-monopoly South African Party, now to form the United Party led by the former NP Prime Minister, General J.B.M. Hertzog (see entry 1900). The minority, representing capitalist farmers and small Afrikaner finance capitalists in the Cape, and the petty bourgeoisie and smaller farmers in the northern provinces, refused to join in "fusion" and formed the Gesuiwerde (purified) Nationalist Party, led by Dr. D.F. Malan.

In the northern provinces, the Gesuiwerde NP was extremely weak, particularly in the Transvaal. This reflected the isolation and disorganisation of the northern Afrikaner petty bourgeoisie. In this context, the extra-parliamentary and petty bourgeois Broederbond began to emerge as the dominant force in Northern Afrikaner nationalism. It reorganised and purged itself, and pursued three clear forms of activity which gave shape to the development of Afrikaner nationalism over the following two decades. Firstly, it engaged in substantial ideological debate, to redefine the ideology of Afrikaner nationalism. Refined through the prism of "Reformed" Calvinism, the emerging Broederbond ideology of "Christian-nationalism" embodied a rigid ethnic exclusivism, an anti-British republicanism and a growing concern with developing the principles of "Apartheid". Outside of the rarified intellectual debates through which this "Christian-nationalism" emerged, the Broederbond organised two broad social movements which gave this ideology a concrete class content, and gradually permeated it into the consciousness of Afrikaans-speakers of all classes. Beginning in 1934, the AB initiated a struggle to take over key unions in the white labour movement. Its expressed aim was to wean Afrikaner workers away from established trade unions and white labour based political organisations and ideologies of class in order to cultivate a mass base for northern Afrikaner nationalism. This was in keeping with a major tenet of its new ideology which argued that "British imperialism" had subjected Afrikaans-speakers of all classes to oppression and exploitation and that all Afrikaners had identical interests. Any ideology of class, but above all communism, was an ungodly attack on the "Afrikaner nation".

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L By 1980, however, <sup>the ASB</sup> ~~it~~ had made a sharp turn back to the far right. It rejected the idea of including blacks in the President's Council, and called for the "upholding" of the principle of homogeneity and differentiation". A considerable number of delegates walked out when the Congress was addressed by an <sup>Inkatha</sup> ~~ANC~~ Youth Brigade leader (see p 000) in conformity with the previous year's policy of "dialogue" with blacks.

In 1981, it was reported that the organisation had been penetrated by far-right terrorist groups, the Wit Kommando and Afrikaner Weerstand Beweging (see p 000 <sup>4</sup>), well known members of whom <sup>were</sup> prominent at the 1981 Congress. It is as yet unclear <sup>how 1982</sup> the formation of the Conservative Party ~~will~~ <sup>of</sup> will affect the line-up <sup>in</sup> the ASB.



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This analysis was given an even clearer class content in the "Afrikaner <sup>sc</sup> Economic Movement", organised jointly by the Broederbond and the Cape Life Assurance Company, SANLAM (see entry p 000 ). Its clearly stated aim was to transform "the Afrikaner" (i.e. the Afrikaner petty bourgeoisie) "from a spectator in the business life of the country", into the owners of capital and employers of labour. This attempt to generate a class of Afrikaner financial, industrial and commercial capitalists was to be built on the surplus profits of Afrikaner capitalist farmers, and the savings of Afrikaner workers and petty bourgeoisie. Its success thus depended on the mobilisation of an alliance of Afrikaners of all classes.

During the war, in the face of bitter and often violent struggles for dominance between the two Afrikaner nationalist political organisations, - the NP and the Nazi-inspired Ossawa Brandwag (Oxwagon Sentinels) - the Broederbond did succeed in organising an alliance of class forces within the various organs of the economic movement. This laid the basis for the Nationalist Party to organise these forces politically in 1948, and so come to power. But throughout this period, the AB had been involved in conflicts with the <sup>sc</sup> more capitalist oriented Afrikaner Nationalists in the Cape, who gave Afrikaner nationalism a much more openly capitalist interpretation.

#### The Broederbond under NP government

Once the Nationalist Party was in power, the relationship between it and the Broederbond changed. For the first ten years of NP rule, the Broederbond confined its role largely to providing support for the NP and remained outside of the party political sphere. The first two NP Prime Minister, D. F. Malan and J.G. Strijdom, were not leading Broederbond members and fought to keep it out of the growing internal conflicts within the NP. However, with the accession to the Prime Ministership of a <sup>longtime</sup> ~~leading~~ <sup>of the AB executive council</sup> member H.F. Verwoerd, in 1958, the relationship between the NP and the AB changed. Verwoerd's period of leadership 1958-66 saw intense class based conflicts within Afrikaner nationalism (see NP entry p 000 ). In these struggles, Verwoerd relied ~~very~~ heavily on the Broederbond, then under the leadership of Dr. P.J. Meyer, and used it ~~very~~ successfully against his major opponents in the Cape NP.

Most visibly, the Broederbond was the key mobilising organisation in the campaign 1958-60 to turn South Africa into a Republic - finally achieved in May 1961. Less visibly, it was used to check attempts by the Cape NP to effect minor <sup>so-called</sup> modifications in Apartheid policy, such as its proposal to include "coloured" MPs as "Coloured" representatives in Parliament. Although

"Reformers" gradually built up support among the membership. For a number of years however, they were blocked by a combination of bureaucratic manoeuvres and interventions in support of the existing leadership from the Chamber of Mines and the United Party government. After the leadership's clear capitulation to the Chamber of Mines over a wage claim in 1944 and a related scandal over misappropriation of funds, the "Reformers" campaign gathered momentum. By the end of the war it had become clear that they had won majority support among the MWU rank and file. The predominant feeling was summed up in the following quotation from the evidence of rank and file union members to a government commission of inquiry in 1946, which says as much about their position in the division of labour as it does about their alienation from the union's bureaucratic leadership: "Broederick (the then General Secretary) has no time for the members and treats them like kaffirs". The power of the "Reformers" was proved in <sup>widely</sup> supported though short lived strikes demanding elections in the union in 1946 and 1947. In 1948 after the Nationalist Party election victory the "Reformers" finally took over control of the union.

Under its new leadership the MWU generally acted as a loyalist organization within the Afrikaner Nationalist class alliance until the mid 1960s. It joined both the Coordinating Council and Confederation of Labour (see SACLA entry p 000). In return it secured a number of concessions including ~~these were~~ regular wage increases (though significantly the first of these was not received until after the rise in the gold price following the Sterling devaluation in 1949). Moreover under the 1956 Mines and Works Act the restriction of a number of tasks to "scheduled persons" only (i.e. whites with a blasting certificate) was entrenched.

However, despite the 'Reformers' campaign against corruption, <sup>this</sup> ~~had been corruption~~ did not disappear from the union's leadership under the "Reformers". Daan Ellis, <sup>sc.</sup> Leader of the "Reformers" and General Secretary of the union from 1948, was tried, convicted and sentenced to 18 months imprisonment for corruption in the early 50s. The sentence was overturned on a technicality on appeal and Ellis remained General Secretary until his death in 1963.

By the mid 1960s, however, class contradictions had begun to surface within the Afrikaner nationalist alliance and after 1965 the MWU became a major site of struggle <sup>between</sup> contending forces.

The union's present leadership came to power in these struggles.

In 1964 with the support of the Departments of Mines and of Labour the Chamber of Mines proposed a series of "experiments" in which African mine workers would be allowed to perform certain tasks previously performed exclusively by "scheduled" whites. Whites were to be compensated by being placed on a fixed monthly salary.



During the course of this crisis a new leadership emerged which seems to be trying to ~~adjust~~ the organization to the "new labour dispensation" and "modernize" its image. The 1982 president, Brian Currie, for example, declared that SACLA would from now on "react positively to the well intended and increasingly more urgent legislation which the worsening race relations of our country necessitates" whilst at the same time continuing to "guard the interests of white workers". The current General Secretary, Wessel Borman, of the SA Iron Steel and Allied Workers Union is also seen as a "moderate", his union being one of the key targets from which the MWU sought to poach members. The far right however, still remains a powerful force as evidenced by the fact that ~~the MWU general Secretary~~ ~~Arrie Paulus~~ was elected Vice Chairman at the 1982 Congress.

President 1982: Brian Currie (Attie Niewoudt to 1981);

General Secretary: Wessel Borman;

Vice Chairman: Arrie Paulus

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### General

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of Distributive Workers - with a combined membership of 11.000 left the Council.

Leadership: President: Ana Scheepers;

General Secretary: Arthur Grobelaar.

Other leading personalities: R. Kraft;

R. Scheepers;

- ✓ Lucy Mvubelo, General Secretary of National Union of Clothing Workers and leading spokesperson for "parallel unionism"

In July 1982 Grobelaar and Mvubelo became patrons of the Free Market Foundation (see entry p000 ).

#### TUCSA "parallel" unions

MIWUSA

Membership: approximately 32.000

Motor Industry Workers Union of South Africa;

ALWU

African Leather Workers Union - Transvaal;

ATEBWU

African Trunk and Box Workers Union;

GWU

Glass Workers Union;

SABEU

South African Bank Employees Union;

ATOBWU

African Tobacco Workers Union;

NUCW

National Union of Clothing Workers;

TWU

Textile Workers Union - Transvaal;

EEAWUA

Electrical and Allied Workers Union of South Africa;

ATWU

African Transport Workers Union;

NUEI<sup>and</sup>AW

National Union of Engineering, Industrial and Allied Workers.

#### SOUTH AFRICAN CONFEDERATION OF LABOUR (SACLA) (3)

Confederation of exclusively white unions which seeks to "guard" the sectional interests of white labour. The Confederation (or SACLA as it now prefers to style itself) has traditionally taken a strong pro-Apartheid stance, favouring job colour bars and opposing any form of trade union organization among blacks. The introduction of the Wiehahn legislation has thrown SACLA into a crisis. As a result of disaffiliations, membership fell from 22 unions with 179.700 members in 1980 to 14 unions with about 100.000 members in 1982. SACLA unions are based

In 1962 in the face of growing hostility from the International Labour Organisation, TUCSA attempted to improve its image by permitting "properly constituted" African unions to affiliate to it. By 1965 eight former FOFATUSA unions with a total membership of 2.000 (0,004<sup>percent</sup>) of the African industrial workforce) had joined.

At its 1968 conference, however, TUCSA reversed this position and excluded its handful of African associates. This was intended to ward off threats of disaffiliation from certain racist unions in the railways (which disaffiliated anyway). Again in 1970, faced with threatened disaffiliations from racist unions of mine officials TUCSA declared its firm opposition to proposals to modify job colour bar regulations in the Bantustans.

Current attempts by TUCSA to organise "parallel" unions date back to 1972 when the first signs of increased black worker militancy became apparant. There were strong differences at the 1972 TUCSA conference over the organisation of black workers. A delegate from the Boilermakers' Society asked: "Has anybody spoken to an African about trade unionism? He does not know what you're talking about. If you take those in Zululand, where they still walk about only with the bottom covered, they don't know what a trade union means". However at the 1972 conference TUCSA urged its individual affiliates to take steps to "establish parallel union organisations, for African workers" (which were, however, not permitted to affiliate to TUCSA itself until 1974). In a public speech delivered in 1974 General Secretary Arthur Grobelaar, declared that if African unions were not placed under the "responsible" control of registered unions "not only will the Government be brought to its knees, but our present way of life will be destroyed". Independent black unions, he went on were "a wonderful tailor-made device for the enemies of our way of life". As open trade unions have expanded, TUCSA "parallels" with the aid and encouragement of <sup>some</sup> employers have redoubled their efforts. This has particularly been the case since 1979 when TUCSA resolved to enter into direct competition with <sup>democratic</sup> ~~open~~ unions for membership.

Typically TUCSA "parallels" appeal to African workers by offering a "non-political" form of trade unionism which does not risk hostility from the state. They supported the Wiehahn Legislation of 1979 and rapidly applied for registration, regarding this as providing them with an opportunity to win membership away from <sup>democratic</sup> ~~open~~ unions which remained unregistered. Internally, TUCSA "parallels" like their "parent" unions, <sup>tend</sup> ~~used~~ to be run from the top and have weak shop floor organisation. Many of the general secretaries are direct appointees of the "parent" union. In some cases indeed the General Secretary of the "parent" union doubles as General Secretary of the "parallels".



Council. In 1931 it reconstituted itself as the South African Trades and Labour Council (SATLC), which remained the most important coordinating body until 1954 (see chart pp 000 ).

The penetration by Afrikaner Nationalism 1934-1948.

The other major development giving the present day 'white labour movement' its specific character was its penetration 1934-1948 by front organisations of the Afrikaner Broederbond, particularly the Nasionale Raad van Trusteers (National Council of Trustees).

This was initiated in 1934 for two related major reasons. The extreme political isolation of the Afrikaner petty bourgeoisie in the Transvaal after 1934 necessitated the development of a mass base. In the words of the key Broederbond trade union organiser, until the petty bourgeois Broederbond began to organise Afrikaner labour, "Afrikaner nationalism stared death in the face". Secondly, the attempt of this Afrikaner petty bourgeoisie organised in the Broederbond to transform itself into a capitalist class through the 'Afrikaner economic movement', depended heavily on its ability to mobilise the savings of Afrikaner wage earners to finance their various projects (see p 000 ).

The Broederbond penetration of the white labour movement sought to win Afrikaner wage earners away from existing trades unions and into "Christian National" trades unions organised and controlled by itself. In 1934 it set up the first "Christian National" union in the railways, Spoorbond. In 1937 the Broederbond began a protracted struggle with the leaderships of other unions, particularly the Mine Workers Union and the Garment Workers Union, for control over these organisations with largely Afrikaner memberships.

During and after the Second World War the 'Christian National' trade union movement achieved a number of successes. It forced the railways administration to recognise Spoorbond in 1942, and captured control of the Mine Workers Union in 1948, whilst its The Blankewerkersbeskermingbond (White Workers Protection Society), formed in 1944, succeeded in recruiting white workers in various other sectors.

A number of factors underlay this success. First was the failure of existing bureaucratic union leaderships to represent the interests of their members and the increasingly visible corruption of officials in some unions.

POLSTU (Political Students Organisation)

WNY

"Verligte" student organisation formed by former ASB members opposed to the latter's sharp turn to the right at its 1980 congress (see ASB entry). Among its leaders are a number of personalities prominent ~~among~~ <sup>in</sup> the ASB leadership during its "verligte" phase, including ~~Thomson Elloff, ASB president in 1979.~~

POLSTU describes itself as a non-racial organisation, with the sole qualifications for membership being "Christianity and a loyalty to South Africa...". It also advocated the implementation of a number of ~~"liberal"~~ <sup>"moderate"</sup> reforms to create a society in which "all people in South Africa" would have "equal economic and social opportunities, an equal political decision making right and free association". Like a number of earlier "moderate" student organisations, POLSTU sees itself as a centrist organisation whose role is to provide a political home for the "silent majority" of (white) students not seen to be catered for by the two "extremist" white student organisations, NUSAS and the ASB (see pp 000 and 000 respectively).

~~Is that~~ Whereas most of Polstu's now defunct centrist predecessors were formed by groups to the right of NUSAS on English speaking campuses, POLSTU was formed by verligtes on Afrikaans speaking campuses as a reflection of the wider crisis of Afrikaner nationalist ideology. Its positions, although somewhat more verligte than those of the P.W. Botha faction of the Nationalist Party, are basically located within the same ideological framework as the latter's "Total Strategy". For that reason POLSTU has received a certain amount of support from "verligte" Nationalists generally. For example, Die Transvaler newspaper suggested in a 1980 editorial that <sup>POLSTU</sup> ~~it~~ was "exactly what students needed" and that it might generate more "political energy" than the whole ASB congress.

POLSTU appears to have a fair measure of support on Afrikaans campuses, though it <sup>has</sup> failed to win endorsement either by Student Councils or mass meetings on any Afrikaans campus. It also seems to have some support among certain 'liberal' (as distinct from 'radical') members of the University of the Witwatersrand Students' Representative Council. The 1981-2 President of NUSAS, ~~Donny~~ <sup>John</sup> ~~Deane~~ <sup>Deane</sup>, claimed that his organisation had "fairly close working relationships" with POLSTU on those select issues in which POLSTU's aims and activities were compatible with the demands of "a broad democratic movement".

It has also sought to cooperate with NUSAS on certain issues.



the then leader of the Cape NP, Dr. E. Dönges had long been an important Broederbond figure, this conflict between the Cape NP leadership and the dominant Verwoerd/Meyer faction in the Broederbond 1960-66, ~~had the effect~~ of further weakening the influence of the AB vis-a-vis the ~~party in the~~ Cape. NP

With the assassination of Verwoerd in September 1966, the factional conflict in the Afrikaner nationalist class alliance burst open into bitter struggles between the so-called verligtes <sup>(moderates)</sup> and verkramptes <sup>(reactionaries)</sup>. This essentially pitted groups identified with the interests of emerging Afrikaner monopoly capital on the one hand against the petty bourgeoisie, small farmers and white labour on the other (see p 000). The verkramptes tried to use the AB, as their major vehicle to attack verligtes. However, in a long struggle, verligtes won the support of centrist elements around Vorster. This alliance captured control of the AB then used it to purge the verkramptes both from the NP in 1969, and for those who joined the newly-formed Herstigste Nasionale Party, (see entry p 000), from the Broederbond itself in 1972.

ss. The Pro-Vorster, centrist group totally dominated the Broederbond 1970-76. During this period it was converted into a tame support organisation for Vorster's policies. However the intensification of the mass challenge to the Apartheid state after 1972 and the growing economic crisis after 1975 resulted in a major crisis for the NP, for its dominant Vorster faction and for the capitalist class as a whole. This reopened severe conflict between class forces within the Afrikaner nationalist alliance over the types of policies necessary to deal with the crisis. These ~~grouping~~ conflicts partly gave rise to the "Muldergate" scandal and the consequent election of P.W. Botha as NP leader and Prime Minister in 1978. (see p 000).

The adoption of the Total Strategy by the ~~"far-right"~~ Botha regime further intensified these struggles (see p 000). In 1979, in an attempt to weaken the influence of the opposition to his policies within the Broederbond, Botha appointed its then Chairman (and leading Botha supporter) Dr. Gerrit Viljoen to the Cabinet. However this move backfired as it enabled the far right to recapture control of the leadership structures of the Broederbond. Under its new Chairman, Prof. Carel Boshoff, the Broederbond became a major vehicle of far-right opposition to the Botha regime. Its long-standing policy of exclusive support for the NP was abandoned, and various organisations, including Aksie Eie Toekoms were formed within the Broederbond. Acting through its acknowledged "public arm", the FAK, the Broederbond convened <sup>a</sup> "Volkskongress" (congress of the Afrikaner volk) in early 1982, which resoundingly rejected the recommendation <sup>by the government appointed de Lange Commission</sup> for a modification of Apartheid in education. This was widely seen as a triumph for the right.

The Broederbond is organised into "divisions" of between five and fifty members. These meet regularly to "discuss everything to do with Afrikaners, particularly economic affairs". An Executive Council acts as the directing body of the organisation, and is elected at an annual congress. Nobody can apply to join the organisation. New members are recruited by existing members, and all new recruits are thoroughly discussed by all the divisions. In this sense the AB is a self-chosen elite, ~~with~~ which exercises enormous influence through its network of members. It also has a "youth" organisation for under 35-year olds, called the Ruiterwag (Horseguards) with nearly 5.000 members. It is clear Broederbond policy to infiltrate its members into all key organisations in "national life", where they are expected to pursue AB policies. This has led to frequent (but not necessarily correct) allegations, that the Broederbond is South Africa's "secret government". It does however clearly exercise an enormous influence through this extensive membership network. Today it has approximately 12.000 members, including almost every member of the South African Cabinet, Senior state bureaucrats, military officers and businessmen.

#### The first 30 years

The Broederbond was formed in Johannesburg in June 1918, by a small group of clerks and clergy, to "promote the interests of the Afrikaner nation". It argued that "politically and economically the Afrikaner has been reduced to a slave in the land of his birth" by British imperialist domination, and involved itself mainly in cultural work and the promotion of the Afrikaans language. Although it became a secret organisation in 1921, throughout the 1920s it remained a small and generally insignificant group. As an almost exclusively urban petty bourgeois organisation confined in the period to the Transvaal, where Afrikaner nationalism was then dominated by emerging capitalist farmers and was heavily rural in its concerns and orientation, the AB had no clear conception of its role. It experienced great difficulty in maintaining a stable, disciplined membership.

The abandonment of a republican programme by the Nationalist Party in 1928 began the process of transformation of the AB into the vanguard organisation of Afrikaner nationalism through its self-conception as "the silent moving force in the life of the Afrikaner community". It extended its membership to the three other provinces, and set out to capture control of all existing Afrikaner organisations. This was largely achieved through the establishment of its self-acknowledged "public front" in 1928 when the Broederbond formed the Federasie van Afrikaanse Kultuurverenigings (Federation of Afrikaner Cultural Association; FAK - see entry p 000 ).



ness of all ethnic nationalities, and a notion of the organic solidarity of the "divinely created" Afrikaner volk - elected by God to fulfill a "unique calling" in Africa. In the 1930s the unity of this "divinely created" Afrikaner volk was wrecked by severe class divisions. The <sup>Dutch Reformed</sup> ideologists of the period launched a full scale assault on notions of class struggle and the threat of "communism". In the words of one: "In the cities black and white live together. There is no chance of moral development. Where is our <sup>religion</sup> ~~religion~~ and our love for the nation? We reject our own people and they shy from our religion... The people are easily exploited. They have but one ideal, bread alone is necessary for life, they know not religious and ethnic feeling". This gave rise to what was termed "the Calvinist conception of labour" with a central task to "combat the devouring cancer of class divisions and incorporate every [Afrikaner] worker as an inseparable part of the body of the volk". This was complemented by a strong insistence on class harmony within the volk, a notion which was used to justify Afrikaner capitalism in biblical parables: "Christ loved the wealthy youth who was a capitalist. The Master had no objection to his capital, but to the purposeless and fruitless way he used it. Christ would have him use his capital to help the poor. Service was the great stipulation the Master laid down for Capital".

These theological notions of an organically united and separate volk, bestowed with a divine "calling" and destined to develop economic control over South Africa, likewise gave rise to the theological justification for Apartheid. An official Broederbond paper prepared for the 1944 Volkskongres on the "Racial Question" by the Professor of Theology at Potchefstroom University ~~the~~ "~~religious basis~~" made clear the "biblical basis" of Apartheid. The book of Genesis, Chapter 11, indicated that after the Tower of Babel incident God had imposed a separate existence on nations and divided and distributed them over the face of the earth. Further "proof" was found in an interpretation of Deuteronomy 32:8 "When the Most High gave the nations their inheritance when he divided the sons of man, He fixed their bounds according to the numbers and sons of God". Acts 17:26 put the matter beyond doubt: "From one single stock He not only created the whole human race so that they could occupy the entire earth, but He declared how long each nation should flourish and what the boundaries of its territory should be". Moreover God had established a hierarchy of nations in which each had its place and destiny. Some nations were intended to be subordinated to, and serve others.

This "Christian-national" vision had then to be sanctified in state power. In the words of another theologian: "The Afrikaner Capitalist can only find power in cooperation with other Christian ethnic fellows because our existence as a people was threatened in various ways by imperialists, Jews, coloureds,

new organisation - the Afrikaans-Nasionale Studentebond (ANS - Afrikaner national Students league) was formed.

During the war years the ANS played an important role in factional conflicts within Afrikaner nationalism, identifying with the terrorist and openly pro-Nazi Ossewabrandwag (Ox-wagon Sentinels). When the Nationalist Party of Malan which favoured a parliamentary struggle and a less fervent pro-Nazi stance broke with the Ossewabrandwag in 1941, the ANS provide the Ossewabrandwag with its major public platform. The ANS paper, Wapenskou (Show of Weapons) became its chief mouthpiece.

L The <sup>ANS's</sup> ~~ANNS~~ clear identification with the losing faction led to post-war intervention by the Broederbond and Nationalist Party to restructure the organisation. In 1948 after the NP election victory, Malan called for an end to factional conflicts within Afrikaner nationalism behind his slogan "Bring together those who belong together because of their inner convictions". The ANS was dissolved and the present Afrikaner Studentebond (ASB) formed.

L By 1955 the ASB had succeeded in affiliating all Afrikaans language institutions of higher education. For most of the 50s and early 60s <sup>it</sup> slavishly reflected the current line of the Nationalist Party. With the escalation of struggles within the Afrikaner nationalist alliance between "verligtes" and "verkramptes" (see p 000), the position of the ASB became more complex, reflecting the contradictory position of and pressures on the intellectuals of Afrikaner nationalism.

L In 1968 Stellenbosh University, with its links to Afrikaner monopoly capital and the Cape <sup>Nationalist</sup> Party and its consequent verligte reputation, disaffiliated, accusing the ASB leadership of being "verkramptes". When the Herstigste Nasionale Party was formed in 1969 (see p 000) many ASB leaders were thought to be sympathetic, but in the end the Bond remained within the ambit of the Nationalist Party.

For a short time after, P.W. Botha's election as premier in 1978, the ASB seemed to be moving in a more "verligte" direction. Its 1979 Congress condemned attempts to break up the Crossroads "squatter" settlement. <sup>(see p 000)</sup> It also called for Afrikaans children to be taught to "respect blacks" and published a study defining racism as "a sinful egoistical attitude of racial superiority and prejudice which can take the form of discrimination and Apartheid". <sup>It also</sup> discussed admitting <sup>so-called</sup> coloureds as ASB members.



of professional negotiators distanced from rank and file memberships. Over this period power within unions passed decisively to bureaucratic leaderships with the effect that rank and file union memberships became in effect isolated <sup>and</sup> ~~and~~ disorganised.

For a short period, this disorganization manifested itself in reduction of union membership. ~~Official statistics show a fall~~ from 67.200 in 1926 to 58.400 in 1927, ~~in the membership of registered unions.~~

Such extreme disorganization however, did not last long. By 1929 the union membership had risen again to 69.900. This occurred partly because capitalists began to see advantages in bureaucratised unions and began to assist in union recruitment through check-off facilities and "closed shop" agreements. As the 1935 Industrial Legislation Commission explained:

" In these days when the employees in a single workshop often number many hundreds, the arrangement of individual contracts of service would present many administrative difficulties and for this reason alone many employers have adopted the policy of encouraging their employees to link up with unions... The better type of employer also appreciates the fact that well organised and disciplined trade unions can do much to reduce evasion of industrial legislation by ...less reputable [competitors]."

Hereafter disorganization and isolation manifested themselves not in reduced union membership but in, widespread apathy on the part of rank and file memberships.

This was the real and lasting impact of the Industrial Conciliation Act and the system it established. It made available to white wage earners certain significant economic concessions, including job colour bars. At the same time, however, it extracted from the white labour movement a fundamental political concession for the benefit of the capitalist class - its disorganisation as a militant social force potentially capable of threatening the rule of capital. The "historic <sup>C</sup> compromise" between capital and white labour enshrined in <sup>this</sup> ~~the 1924~~ Act ensured the decisive dominance within white labour organisations from then onwards of forces broadly supportive of the capitalist state. It effectively transformed white trade unions from organisations which had posed certain problems for capitalist rule, into supportive apparatuses of the bourgeois state.

At the formal organizational level the period following the 1922 strike saw the Department of Labour taking the initiative in forming a new federation to replace the disbanded SAIF. In 1925 the South African Association of Employees Organisations was formed, later called the South African Trades Union

would be to ~~delimit~~ limit the struggles of white wage earners to forms which did not threaten the fundamental interests of the state or capitalist class. This would be achieved in part by making available certain concessions through institutionalised bargaining in bureaucratic structures and in part by prohibiting other forms of organisation or struggle.

In the period prior to 1922 however, attempts to institutionalise the struggles of white trades unions were only partially successful. In the Transvaal a 1909 Act suspended the right to strike and provided for the establishment of "conciliation boards" to settle disputes involving non-African "employees". In 1914 a bill was introduced in parliament, but not enacted, which would have provided for the registration of unions and the establishment of permanently existing "conciliation boards". More important during this period were the establishment in particular sectors of non statutory apparatuses such as "Conciliation Boards" and "Boards of Reference" in the mining industry, and an "Industrial Council" in the printing industry.

While a number of these bodies were functioning by 1920<sup>and</sup> were seen as having a significant effect in reducing strikes, the institutionalisation of the "white labour movement" remained incomplete. The contradictions between mining capital and white labour during this period as well as the growing white unemployment, limited the degree of "acceptance" on the part of white wage earners of bourgeois ideological apparatuses. This meant, in particular, that their effects on unions remained limited and white labour remained an organised and militant social force. This situation only changed after the 1922 General Strike and armed uprising on the Rand.

#### The 1922 Strike and the 1924 Industrial Conciliation Act.

The strike of 1922 was the largest and most militant action ever taken by white labour in South Africa. It erupted after mining capital broke a job colour bar agreement in an attempt to reduce its wage costs in the face of a sharply falling gold prices. The strike affected the whole of the mining industry of the Witwatersrand. After it became apparent that the situation was deadlocked, armed strike commandoes, incorporating a number of unemployed "poor whites" as well as striking miners, occupied the Witwatersrand. The government declared martial law and despatched troops to the area. A five day armed struggle ensued. Several people were killed and hundreds injured. Several hundred strikers were subsequently arrested and subjected to penalties ranging from fines and imprisonment to (in four cases) death.



This was particularly important in the take over of the Mine Workers Union. Secondly, the existing unions failed to organise large numbers of semi-skilled white industrial workers (mainly Afrikaners) who entered employment during the period of industrial expansion after 1933. Thirdly, the employment for the first time on a significant scale of black workers as industrial operatives created a number of conflicts between industrial capital and less skilled white workers over the racial allocation of jobs. These intensified with the development of monopoly capitalist relations of production in manufacturing (which implied the "deskilling" of many jobs) in the post war period and provided a particularly fertile ground for the Nationalists to build up support by promising a comprehensive system of "job reservation".

The support built up by Afrikaner Nationalists among white wage earners was of decisive importance in enabling the Nationalist Party to come to power in 1948. In the 1948 elections the party won eight "traditionally labour" seats in the Witwatersrand and five more in Pretoria. It ~~parliamentary~~ came to power with an overall parliamentary majority of only five seats (see NP entry p 000 ).

The Nationalist Party penetration of the white labour movement also had important effects on the organisational structure of the latter. In 1947, five right wing unions withdrew from the Trades and Labour Council in protest at the support given by the TLC leadership to the Smuts government's bill ~~(in fact a measure designed to place the African trade unions under firm state control)~~, to recognise African trade unions under a tightly controlled industrial relations system. To the TLC right wing, support for this Bill (which fell far short of previous TLC policy that all unions should be able to register under the <sup>Industrial Conciliation</sup> ~~W.C.~~ Act), implied supporting African trade unionism at the expense of white workers.

S.C. The TLC right wing now joined "Christian National" unions which had never affiliated to form a new federation, the Coordinating Council of Trades Unions - the third registered trade union federation then in existence and the only <sup>one</sup> explicitly supporting the NP. (see chart p 000).

#### Developments 1948-1979

This period saw the penetration of monopoly capitalist relations of production in the manufacturing sector, the consolidation of monopoly capi-

" Up until 1927 we refused to have Indians in the typographical union. They then commenced negotiations separately and practically eliminated the European printer from Natal. We then took them into our union to stop that. The result is that I suppose one could count the number of skilled Indian printers in Natal on the fingers of one hand. They have been almost eliminated. That happened because we took them into the union"

Or as another former TUCSA leader, Tom Murray, put it:

" TUCSA demands equal pay for equal work but does not support the major demands of all non-white workers, that they should have equal opportunities was well".

Internally, TUCSA maintains a highly bureaucratic ~~top-down~~ form of organisation dominated by white officials despite its majority black membership. Negotiations are carried out by full time officials in statutory bodies with no direct involvement of the workers themselves. TUCSA unions characteristically have little shop floor organization, the role of members being more or less confined to the payment of dues.

#### TUCSA and African Workers

TUCSA's position on the question of African trade unionism has passed through several phases. In 1954 when TUCSA was formed it limited its membership to unions registrable under the Industrial Conciliation Act, i.e. it specifically excluded unions which had African members.

This represented a change from the position of the former Trades and Labour Council. The TLC had formally permitted unions including African members to affiliate, but often only accepted them in practice on the basis of less than full membership so as not to challenge the hegemony of racist unions within the Council. TUCSA argued that its position on the question of African membership was purely tactical, intended to avoid an onslaught on it by the state then vigorously pursuing its policy of "bleeding" African trades unions. TUCSA, however, did nothing to assist unions with African members resisting that onslaught. That was left as the sole task of SACTU, which TUCSA opposed from the outset.

Only in 1959, under pressure from the International Confederation of Free Trades Unions (ICFTU) which feared that "moderate" trade unionism would lose ground among African workers, did TUCSA modify this position. It agreed to establish a separate African federation under its tutelage - the Federation of Free African Trades Unions (FOFATUSA). However, few steps were taken to actually organise and recruit. FOFATUSA's total membership remained derisory throughout its existence.



In short, TUCSA "parallels" are not genuine independent organisations of the African working class but subsidiaries of organisations supportive of the capitalist system and racially exclusive form of state.

Their role in the class struggle is to attempt to reduce class antagonisms and win support for the institutions of the <sup>official</sup> industrial conciliation system ~~Financial Mail~~ ~~and through this for South African capitalism.~~ In fact, even the pro-monopoly capitalist Financial Mail once ironically remarked <sup>1977</sup> "When is a union not a union? - When it's a TUCSA parallel".

In the prevailing climate of worker militancy, TUCSA "parallels" have not fared particularly well in open battles to poach membership from other unions. For example the Genral Workers Union staved off an attempt to recruit its membership in the Cape Town docks (see entry p000). This has led TUCSA to resort to other tactics to maintain its position. One of these has involved entering into closed shop agreements with certain employers in effect compelling its African employees to join the TUCSA parallel.

On these and other key questions, a definite rightward drift has been noticeable within TUCSA in recent years. This is partly due to the influence of a number of former SACLA affiliates which have joined TUCSA following the crisis in SACLA (see p000). One indication emerged at TUCSA's <sup>1982</sup> conference when a number of delegates called for all unions to be forced to register - an even harder position than that currently taken by the Department of Manpower Utilisation.

The wave of detentions of trade unionists and death in detention of Dr. Neil Aggett in February 1982 provided another clear indication of TUCSA's position. The TUCSA leadership declined to condemn either, refusing even to describe Aggett as a trade unionist. General Secretary, Grobbelaar, reportedly issued a circular stating that "the council could not support the campaign against detention without trial ... TUCSA could not subscribe to any attempts which seek the abolition of all laws in respect of detention, since this would imply that TUCSA sought the abolition of the rule of just law". Later attempts to get TUCSA to condemn the continued detention of Thozamile Gqwetha and Sam Kikine of SAAWU (see entry p000) brought forth the comment from TUCSA president, Ana Scheepers, that TUCSA would not speak out on behalf of people "we hardly know or do not know at all". Widely condemned by other unionists, such positions have opened up certain contradictions within TUCSA itself. One prominent organizer of Lucy Mvubelo's National Union of Clothing Workers immediatly resigned in protest over the position taken over Neil Aggett, and later in the year two affiliates - the National Union of Commercial, Catering and Allied Workers and the National Union

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MINE WORKERS UNION (MWU) (4)

One of the most extreme racist unions, militantly opposed to any relaxation of job reservation and to any form of trade union organization by black workers. Following the Wiehahn Legislation the MWU has tried to assume a vanguard role in the organization of resistance to changes which it sees as undermining the position of white labour.

It is currently a member of SACL A (having rejoined in 1980 after disaffiliating in 1979) but is trying to recruit members in the iron and steel and other industries at the expense of other SACL A affiliates. This is explained by its General Secretary, Arrie Paulus, as follows: "We feel that there are so few unions remaining in SA which are prepared to fight for the white workers that the time has arrived for a union to come to the fore and form a white force to care for the interests of whites. Most unions are now going multiracial and we feel there must be a home for the whites". At the end of 1981 the MWU had about 18,000 exclusively white, and predominantly Afrikaans-speaking, members.

The Mine Workers Union was formed early in this century as an industrial union open to all white employees in the mining industry. It differed from other existing mining unions (which together with the MWU constituted the Mining Unions Joint Committee) in that the others were craft unions restricted to white employees in specific crafts or trades. Over the years, as a result of the process of deskilling and transforming white craft jobs into supervisory jobs (see p 000), the MWU emerged as the largest mining union. Its membership was drawn from the relatively large number of white supervisors with few formal skills but who possessed "certificates of competency" or "blasting certificates" (available only to whites and the key to the operation of the system of job colour bars in the mining industry). After the 1907 strike, which saw the first large influx of Afrikaners into the mining industry, the MWU acquired an increasingly large Afrikaner membership. By the 1930s Afrikaners constituted the majority of its members.

During the first quarter of the century the MWU was an important (though not always leading force in the struggles between mining capital and white labour which culminated in the strikes of 1907 and 1913 and the "Rand Revolt" of 1922, (see p 000). After the 1922 strike the MWU, like the other mining unions, came to be incorporated into a highly centralised and bureaucratic industrial relations system, one even more bureaucratic than those established in other industries under

the 1924 Industrial Conciliation Act (see p ). Following a recommendation of the 1922 Mining Industry Board, all forms of recognition of local representatives (shaft stewards) were withdrawn. Negotiations were restricted to bargaining between union officials and representatives of the Chambers of Mines over defined questions - wages, job colour bars and mining regulations. This, plus the granting of an important concession over job colour bars - statutory protection for the then existing positions of whites in the industry's division of labour - had the effect over time of demobilising the rank and file membership and bringing about a high degree of separation between union officials and the membership.

sc. During the 1930s and 1940s the "Christian National" trade unionists of the Afrikaner Broederbond launched a powerful attempt to capture control of the MWU (see p 000 ).

As the largest single union of white wage earners, and a crucial prop in the structure of the South Africa Labour Party, the MWU was the central strategic target of the Broederbond. A number of factors made it vulnerable to such attacks. Most central was the contradictory class position of MWU members as both supervisory but also to some extent productive workers. In the words of the official Broederbond history of this struggle, MWU members "are not only workers" - they are also bosses". Nevertheless MWU members occupied the least privileged and lower paid places open to whites in the mining industry. Its membership was predominantly Afrikaans, speaking and as such <sup>discriminated</sup> ~~discriminated~~ against by the highly exclusivist craft mining unions.

The other critical factor was the highly bureaucratic and unrepresentative character of the union by the 1930s, which was further consolidated in response to the Broederbond assault.

The Broederbond formed an "Afrikaner Union of Mineworkers" in 1935 and the MWU finally persuaded the Chamber of Mines to conclude a closed-shop agreement with it. This agreement bound the MWU to enforce industrial docility on its members and thereafter the union became in effect the policeman of the Chamber of Mines. The major function of its increasingly corrupt leadership was to restrict wage demands and maintain industrial discipline. Following this closed-shop agreement the Christian - nationalists fought to wrest control of the MWU from its existing leadership. Labelling themselves "Reformers" they took maximum advantage of the increasingly bureaucratic, authoritarian and corrupt character of the MWU leadership, and, in effect, began to pursue the economic functions of the union - by fighting for pension entitlements, workmens' compensation payments etc. In the 1940s the



was opposed because the TUCSA leadership, like many capitalist employers, felt it might "damage industry". However, this was a far less serious concern for the TUCSA leadership as evidenced by the fact that it offered at one point to withdraw its opposition to statutory job reservation in return for the removal of clauses prohibiting "mixed unions".

The dominant forces within both the TLC and the (WPF) which combined to form TUCSA in 1954 were "old guard" trade union bureaucrats nurtured by the post 1924 industrial conciliation system (see p000). The extreme right wing forces within the registered trade union movement had split away in 1948 to form the Coordinating Council of Trades Unions (see p000). The left wing was badly weakened by the assault launched by the Nationalist regime under the Suppression of Communism Act and eventually left to join SACTU, formed in 1955 (see p 000).

The basic character of TUCSA's main aims and policy directions emerges from its constitution which commits the organisation "... to oppose communism in all its forms, to resist actively all attempts by any political party to exploit the Trade Union movement for political ends, and to actively promote a free trade union movement for the benefit of the South African economy". TUCSA has always actively opposed worker's organisations linked to the national liberation struggle, notably SACTU. Through its "parallel unions it is now attempting to poach members from the more independent and militant open trade unions. Its leaders have also frequently expressed their support for the maintenance of capitalism and white political domination in South Africa and have actively opposed calls for sanctions against the Apartheid regime.

Unlike the other union groupings listed in this chapter, TUCSA affiliated unions include over 170,000 coloured and Asian workers (who have always been allowed to join registered unions and in fact, under the 1956 Industrial Conciliation Act, could join "mixed" unions if these were formed before 1956). Persons of coloured and Asian origin constituted the majority of TUCSA's 252,734 members in 1980.

TUCSA's large coloured and Asian membership is frequently cited in claims that it is a progressive organisation. In reality, however, the position and particular interests of its minority white membership has always been dominant within TUCSA. Indeed coloured and Asian members were admitted in the first place precisely to prevent them "undercutting" white workers. This was stated with remarkable frankness by TUCSA's long-term President, Tom Rutherford, who in the 1960s argued in favour of admitting coloured and Asian workers in the following terms:

~~telion in~~ all sectors (with the partial exception of agriculture) and the interpenetration of monopoly capitals between sectors (see pp 000 ). It produced a greater concentration of production and a reorganization of labour processes which created an increased demand for technical, supervisory and clerical labour. The period after the Second World War saw a rapid "promotion" of whites from semi-skilled manual employment to fill these positions. This was supported and encouraged by government policy. Moreover until the crisis of the mid-1970s this was a period of rising wage levels for white wage earners. Equally important, it saw a sharp widening of the gap between white and black wages.

These changes form the general context within which organizational developments within the registered trade union movement in the Apartheid period have to be seen. The major events, briefly, were as follows:

In 1950, the Nationalist Party government enacted the Suppression of Communism Act. Within three years 33 left-wing trade unionists were removed from office under its provisions. This finally broke the vestigial left opposition within the SATLC, allowing the leadership to abandon all commitment to the demands of the black majority of the working class.

In 1954 ~~the~~ <sup>the bill was</sup> published providing for statutory job reservation. The opposition to the bill led to the merger of the Western Province Federation of Trade Unions and TLC in 1954. The new body was originally known as the S.A. Trade Union Congress, later changing its name to the Trade Union Council of South Africa (TUCSA - see entry p 000). For many years TUCSA was only open to unions "registrable under the I.C. Act", that is to say it specifically excluded Africans.

~~In 1954 a bill was published providing for statutory job reservation.~~ When the I.C. Amendment Act was eventually passed in 1956 a group of 12 TUCSA unions to the right of the leadership split ~~to~~ <sup>to</sup> form ~~(SACTU)~~ the South African Federation of Trades Unions. At this point three federations existed in addition to SACTU, formed in 1955 and based mainly on African workers excluded by all other federations. (see SACTU entry p 000).



6

CHAPTER: POLITICAL ORGANISATIONS OF THE NATIONAL LIBERATION MOVEMENT

- ~~Contents~~
- The African National Congress of South Africa - ANC (SA)
  - The South African Communist Party
  - Political Organisations Based on the Indian Community - South African Indian Congress; Natal Indian Congress; Transvaal and Natal anti-SA; Indian Council Committees.
  - The Pan Africanist Congress of Azania (PAC)
  - The Black Congress Movement (BCM)
  - The Azanian Peoples Organisation (AZAPO)
  - The South African Youth Revolutionary Council (SAYRC)
  - The Unity Movement of South Africa (UMSA)
  - Appendix: The Freedom Charter
  - Bibliographical Note.

NB: This chapter includes entries on all non-tribalist <sup>and non-</sup> ~~or~~ collaboratio-  
nist political organisations which themselves claim to play a role  
in the national liberation struggle. The inclusion of any parti-  
cular organisation does not necessarily, imply that the authors of this  
book accept their claim to be a force in this struggle.

1925

Formation under tutelage of Dept. of Labour of S.A. Association of Employees Organisations, later known as S.A. Trades Union Council.

Western Province Federation stays out of SATUC.

1931

SATUC reconstituted as S.A. Trades and Labour Council.

W.P. Federation stays out of SATLC

1934-6

see

Formation by members of Broederbond and Nationalist Party of "Christian National" trade union movement. Set up Nasionale Raad van Trusteers, Spoorbond on the railways and began protracted struggle to gain control of Mine Workers Union and Garment Workers union.

1944

1947

Right wing of SATLC splits away in opposition to Smuts Bill on African trades unions.

Formation of Blankewerkers w beskermingsbond (white workers protection society).

see

1948

"Christian National" faction gains control of Mine workers union which leaves SATLC to join Coordinating Council

Formation of Coordinating Council of Trades Unions

1954

SATLC and W.P.Fed. unite to form Trade Union Council of South Africa (TUCSA). Move prompted by fears that prohibition of "mixed unions" would allow "undercutting" of whites by coloureds. Left wing forms SACTU on anti-capitalist platform (see p 96)

Nationalist regime introduces Bill to amend IC Act to allow for statutory job reservation and prohibit "mixed" i.e. white/coloured unions.

I.C. Act in force. Strikes by white wage earners decline. Industrial Council system established.

I.C. Act in force



With the publication of the Wiehahn reports the MWU took the lead in organizing a campaign within SACLA to resist all proposed modifications to job colour bars and the industrial <sup>relations</sup> system. When this failed to generate a sufficiently "strong" response from the SACLA leadership (see SACLA entry), <sup>the</sup> MWU resigned from the Confederation calling on other like-minded unions to join it in a new coordinating body.

When this failed to attract sufficient support, the MWU reaffiliated to SACLA in 1980. However, in the same year it sought and obtained permission from the registrar of trades unions to recruit members outside the Mining industry. It is currently concentrating its efforts on the iron and steel industries where it is in direct competition with another SACLA affiliate, the SA Iron and Steel and Allied Industries Union.

Within the mining industry itself, where Wiehahn recommended that job colour bars should only be abolished by consensus, the MWU continues to take a hard line. Its congresses have repeatedly pledged the union to "... do everything to prevent a black obtaining a blasting certificate in white SA".

On broader political questions although the MWU and its officers have studiously refrained from making any open affiliations, they have clearly shown their sympathies for parties of the far right particularly the HNP (see p 000 ). Paulus for example, spoke at a number of HNP rallies during the 1981 election campaign.

President: Cor de Jager;

General Secretary: P.J. (Arrie) Paulus.

mainly on non-salaried employees of central, provincial and local government, employees of state corporations (such as SATS, SASOL, ISCOR) and employees in the mining industry.

P SACLA was formed in September 1957, in an attempt to merge the three then existing federations which excluded African workers, namely TUCSA, the South African Federation of Trade Unions and the Coordinating Council of South African Trades Unions - as well as the Federal Consultative Council of S.A. Railways and Harbours Staff Associations. TUCSA, however, withdrew a year later (see TUCSA entry p000).

X The leading force within the Confederation has undoubtedly been the Coordinating Council of S.A. Trade Unions which maintains <sup>its</sup> separate organisational existence within the Confederation. The Coordinating Council was formed in Sc. June 1948 with the objective of uniting the "Christian National" trades unions formed by the Broederbond in the 1930s and the 1940s together with a number of right wing unions which broke away from the Trades and Labour Council in 1947 (see p000). From 1948 to the early 70s relations between the Coordinating Council and SACLA on the one hand and the Nationalist Party leadership and the Department of Labour on the other, were extremely cordial. The Confederation's views were widely canvassed by state and <sup>NP</sup> officials. There were numerous instances of state interventions to secure concessions over wages, job colour bars, etc., In return SACLA loyally supported the struggles of other class forces represented in the Nationalist Party.

X More recently, however, this cosy relationship has been placed under strain as a result of the capitalist ruling class's need to respond to the challenge of the popular masses, and in particular the growing militancy of the black working class. The state's eventual response as recommended by the Wiehahn Commission is summarised pp000. SACLA's position on Wiehahn was that it opposed all proposals to modify job reservation legislation and <sup>to</sup> admit unions including African members to statutory bodies.

Former SACLA president, Attie Niewoudt, was a member of the Wiehahn Commission and issued an extreme reactionary minority report. He argued, inter alia, that: "Black workers be prohibited from joining any trade union in South Africa, whether such a union is registered or not". This he justified on the grounds that "The racial composition of the labour force in many undertakings, industries trades and occupations in South Africa is such that the workers who at present enjoy trade union rights would be swamped by force of numbers should blacks be admitted to the trade union movement". On job reservation he argued in favour



II OTHER CLASS ORGANISATIONS:THE AFRIKANER BROEDERBOND (Afrikaner Brotherhood) (5)

A clandestine and highly exclusive Afrikaner nationalist organization. The Broederbond seeks to act as the "war council" for the entire Afrikaner nationalist movement, and coordinate and direct the policies and activities of all Afrikaner political, cultural, ideological, economic and religious organisations.

The Afrikaner Broederbond (AB) was for many years the central organising body of Afrikaner nationalism. Its activities were vital in laying the basis for the coming to power of the Nationalist Party (NP) in the 1948 election. It was the Broederbond which, in the mid 1940s and through the "Afrikaner Economic Movement", first organised the alliance of class forces which the NP was only able to mobilise politically in 1948.

For much of its history however, the Broederbond was a predominantly petty bourgeois organisations, which fought for this class's conceptions of Afrikaner nationalism, the Afrikaner "volk" and "its" interests. It also always had far stronger roots and influence in the two northern provinces of the Transvaal and Orange Free State, than in the Cape Province to the south. This reflects the different class basis of "northern" and "southern" Afrikaner nationalism. Until ~~very~~ recently, the former remained dominated by the petty bourgeoisie, largely through the Broederbond, itself, while the latter was largely led by ~~monopoly~~ capitalist forces, mainly through the Cape Nationalist Party (see NP entry p000). <sup>TP</sup> The AB played, and continues to play a central role in the conflicts between the various class forces organised in the Afrikaner nationalist alliance. These have often tended to take the form of struggles between the northern-based, petty bourgeois Broederbond and the Cape NP. In the struggles between "conservative" and "reformist" factions in the NP after 1978, a new Broederbond leadership under Professor Carel Boshoff reversed its longstanding policy of exclusive support for the NP in 1981. It was reported that the formation of a far-right opposition party known as Aksie Eie Toekoms (Action Own Future) took place within the AB itself (see p000). <sup>S</sup> The 1982 split in the NP, and formation of the Conservative Party by former AB Chairman Dr. Andries Treurnicht have clearly have an impact on the Broederbond. Recent press report suggest that a struggle for control of the AB is underway.

The split in the NP in early 1982 and the formation of the Conservative Party by former AB Chairman, Andries Treurnicht, has led to a sharp struggle for control of the Broederbond. Whilst it is still too early to say which faction is dominant, it does appear that the majority favour remaining within the NP, whilst not necessarily supporting the Botha faction.

FEDERASIE VAN AFRIKAANSE KULTUURVERENIGINGS (Federation of Afrikaans Cultural Associations - FAK)<sup>(6)</sup>

The leading and acknowledged "public arm" of the secret Afrikaner Broederbond (see entry p. 000) the FAK seeks to provide "direction" and "central guidance" to all Afrikaans cultural organisations, and to prevent the emergence of a state of "cultural chaos". Today nearly 3.000 cultural, religious, educational and other groupings of various types are affiliated to it.

The FAK was formed in 1929 by the Broederbond, and has functioned ever since as its public front. During the 1930s and 1940s when vigorous ideological and strategic divisions existed within Afrikaner nationalist politics, through the FAK the Broederbond was gradually able to assume a large measure of control over the organised development of Afrikaner culture and guide it along chosen paths. This was crucial to the victory of the Nationalist Party in the elections of 1948.

Particularly important in this regard were three sustained campaigns organised by the FAK. The "economic movement" after 1939 sought to create a class of Afrikaner capitalists on the basis of the surplus profits of Afrikaner farmers and the savings of Afrikaner workers and petty bourgeoisie. In the process, through the FAK subsidiary, the Reddingsdaadbond (Rescue Action Society), the FAK and Broederbond were able to weld together an alliance of Afrikaans-speakers of all classes. This laid the basis for the political organisation of this alliance by the Nationalist Party after 1945. Secondly, the FAK's Institute for Christian National Education likewise won much support from Afrikaners of all classes. Its activities were important in undermining the then predominant "South Africanist" ideology amongst Afrikaans speakers, and its replacement by an ethnically exclusive form of Afrikaner nationalism.



SABRA (South African Bureau for Racial Affairs) (8)

A Broederbond-influenced, pro-Apartheid grouping of "experts" in "race relations" which played an important role in formulating and propagating an intellectually "respectable" version of Apartheid theory. It is now a leading verkrampte group.

SABRA was established by the Broederbond in 1947 as an alternative to the liberal South African Institute of Race Relations. <sup>(see p 000)</sup> It drew together Broederbond academic theoreticians of Apartheid and the theoreticians in the Nationalist Party itself to hammer out a broad policy framework for the Afrikaner nationalist movement.

During the 1950s, SABRA offered broad intellectual support to the ruling Nationalist Party. However, with the accession to power of Dr. Hendrik Verwoerd in 1958, the new Prime Minister began to express reservations about the "flabby" and allegedly "still liberal-influenced" thinking of the SABRA establishment. In 1960, the year in which the Afrikaner nationalist establishment was temporarily divided over what course to follow against the mass liberation struggle, (i.e. whether to make concessions as argued by the Acting-Prime Minister Paul Sauer, or intensified repression as was the Verwoerd line), the Verwoerd faction engineered a Broederbond purge of the SABRA leadership. This purge of SABRA was strongly opposed by leading elements in the Cape NP. They accused Verwoerd of <sup>SABRA</sup> turning ~~it~~ into a third-class organisation, the sole purpose of which was to act an exuberant exponent of government policy" rather than a "serious scientific body". The new SABRA establishment replied that the part of SABRA "destroyed by Dr. Verwoerd needed to be destroyed because it had fallen under the leftist-radical influence of the South African Institute of Race Relations".

Following this purge, SABRA became the major intellectual power base of the theoreticians of "pure Apartheid". The resolutions of its congresses regularly called for the speedy implementation of separate development (see p 000) and the reversal of the influx of blacks into the "white areas". It followed an extremely aggressive propaganda policy. In 1966 SABRA initiated an ongoing programme aimed at white high school students through conferences, congresses and visits to schools by SABRA officials. This programme covered aspects of Apartheid theory, "threats to South Africa" and the preparedness of youth to reject "foreign" ideologies. Its lecturers included Afrikaner aca-

## THE DUTCH REFORMED CHURCHES (7)

The term "Dutch Reformed Churches" (DRCs) refers collectively to the three major Afrikaner Calvinist Churches in South Africa. These are the Nederduitsche Gereformeerde Kerk (NGK - The Dutch Reformed Church), and the two smaller groups, the Gereformeerde Kerk (GK - Reformed Church) and Nederduitsche Hervormde Kerk (NHK - Dutch Reconstituted Church).

The NGK is often referred to as "The Nationalist Party at prayer".

This points to the fact firstly that most white Afrikaners belong to one of the DRCs and secondly that these three churches, but particularly the NGK and GK, played and continue to play, a vital role in the organisation of Afrikaner nationalism and the development of its "Christian nationalist" ideology and Apartheid policies. Very large numbers of the clergy of all three churches are members of the Broederbond (see p 000), leading to charges that the churches are controlled by this secret organisation.

At present these churches are deep in crisis.

ss. The history of the Dutch Reformed Churches in South Africa goes back to the first Dutch settlement at the Cape. The NGK was affiliated to the Reformed Church in Holland and only began to develop an autonomy in the 19th century. In 1857 it segregated its congregations. At the time however this may have been seen as a temporary <sup>retreat</sup> forced by "the weakness of some" of its adherents. The schism in the NGK, which finally produced the GK and NHK was largely the result of the importation of the theological disputes of Dutch Calvinism into the South African church. These boiled down to conflicts between an austere Calvinism based on a strict interpretation of the fundamentalist theses of the 1618 Synod of Dort on the one hand and an evangelical tendency which developed in Holland and South Africa on the other. In Holland, the former groups were led by a politician/theologian who was later to have great influence in the elaboration of Afrikaner nationalist ideology, Abraham Kuypers. In the latter half of the 19th century the South African kuyperians left the NGK, which was then under the domination of the powerful evangelist, Andrew Murray. This schism gave rise to the militantly kuyperian GK, whose members are sometimes known as "Doppers" (conservatives), and later, the NHK. Both the NHK and GK are largely, though not exclusively, based in the Transvaal, whilst the much larger NGK is virtually the "national" church of Afrikaans-speakers.



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These developments ~~which~~ reflect and express the collapse of the ideological cohesion of Afrikaner nationalism over the past decade. The result has been fairly profound crisis within the ORCs. In the post 1978 conflict within the NP, and its split in 1982, the churches have been deeply divided and unable to develop a coherent and unified position.

Often this has included fighting for job colour bars at the expense of black workers. In addition, since the 1920s they have generally acted in support of the racially exclusive form of state.

On the other side, there are the non-racial unions, based mainly on African workers, but which are generally open to and in many cases include members of other racial groups (see ~~discussed in~~ Chapter 7).

#### The origins of a racially divided Trade Union Movement

The origins of today's racially divided trade union movement must be traced back to two major factors:

- 1) The racial division of labour of South Africa capitalism.
- 2) The response of the state to the militant struggles waged by white labour during the early part of this century.

The particular conditions of accumulation in the gold mining industry 1886-1920, gave rise to a racial division of labour. This was analysed pp 000, and the analysis will not be restated here. However three consequences of racial division of labour need to be stressed. Firstly skilled and supervisory jobs were predominantly performed by whites, white less skilled work was done by ~~whites~~ <sup>blacks.</sup> Secondly <sup>the</sup> dependence of mining capital on ultra cheap black labour, excluded newly proletarianised whites from unskilled jobs. This resulted in large-scale white unemployment and exacerbated the so-called "poor white problem". Thirdly, <sup>there</sup> ~~they~~ developed a series of struggles in which capital progressively tried to reduce the role of skilled whites in production, mainly in order to reduce wage costs by substituting black workers for whites.

Such struggles were particularly intense in the mining industry during the first quarter of the century and in manufacturing with the development of monopoly capitalist production after the Second World War. Taken together, these three factors crucially influenced the emerging forms of trade unionism.

The first trade unions were formed in Cape Town by white printers and carpenters in 1881. More important however were unions formed by skilled white workers in the Witwatersrand mining industry after 1890. These early unions were characteristically craft unions, that is to say unions only open to workers in certain skilled trades and which acted principally to defend their members's monopoly right to perform certain tasks.

The specific context of the racial division of labour in South Africa led craft unions in the Transvaal to adopt racially discriminatory membership rules and to demand that certain tasks be reserved exclusively for whites.



During the first quarter of the twentieth century, conflicts between capital and white wage earners over the racial allocation of particular tasks, dominated the white trade union scene. Mining capital took the offensive and attempted to reorganise a number of labour processes previously performed by white skilled craftsmen into processes performed by a gang of black workers supervised by a white. Although this preserved the basic hierarchy of whites over blacks, it threatened the interests of white employees in two main ways. Firstly, such reorganisation laid off numbers of white labourers. Secondly, the "deskilling" inherent in the process threatened to undermine one of the most important levers which white <sup>labour</sup> ~~wage~~ earners possessed in wage bargaining, <sup>the</sup> the dependence of mining capital on their skills. At each stage therefore they resisted mining capital's attempts to reorganise labour processes along these lines. On three occasions - in 1907, 1913 and 1922 - conflicts over this question led to large scale strikes, the most important strikes involving white wage earners during this period.

The basic demand of white wage earners in 1907 and 1922, at least, was for the imposition or restoration of job colour bars. In 1922 for example, strikers marched behind the bizarre slogan "Workers of the World Fight and Unite for a White South Africa". But, the conflicts which were bitterly fought by a militant white trade union movement also had a definite anti-capitalist/socialist or at least social democratic content. Gradually there emerged within the white labour movement a current which identified the basic problems of white wage earners as deriving from the particular exploitative measures directed against black workers. Such a current was evident as a minority tendency within both the South African Industrial Federation (SAIF), the Transvaal trade union coordinating body formed in 1907, and the South African Labour Party until 1915 and thereafter in the International Socialist League and Communist Party (see p 300). It never emerged as the majority tendency within the white labour movement and links between white and black labour in struggle were always fraught with problems. However, it was by no means inevitable that it should have been eclipsed by the more reformist racist tendency in the movement. To understand why this occurred it is necessary to consider the second major factor - the response of the state to the struggles of white labour.

of the maintenance of the status quo and "dissent [ed] from the view [of other commissioners] that Blacks be indentured as apprentices in designated trades in white areas".

Since the passage of the Wiehahn legislation SACLA has been thrown into something of a crisis. Its former leadership under Niewoudt remained opposed to the Wiehahn measures but backed away from any campaign against them. This led to dissent from both its "far right" and "more moderate" sections.

In May 1979 SACLA held a series of meetings with the Minister of Labour over the Wiehahn Report, totally rejecting at the first meeting the majority recommendations. At the second meeting, however, the executive voted by 13 votes to 11 to accept the proposals with reservations. This led to a walk-out from the negotiations by the Mine Workers Union <sup>(MWU)</sup> ~~led by Morris Mants~~, the White Building Workers Union ~~led by Gert Beets~~ and the Transvaal Transport Workers Union ~~led by J.F. K...~~. The MWU subsequently <sup>resigned</sup> from SACLA and called on other disaffected unions to join it in a new organisation. When this appeal failed to attract sufficient support, however, the MWU later rejoined and continued its campaign within SACLA.

In 1980 the far right led by the MWU produced a report recommending that the Confederation reject the training of Africans as apprentices and demand the prohibition of all forms of trade union activity by blacks. In a setback for the far right, however, the SACLA Congress postponed a decision on the report referring it to individual unions, for discussion. The MWU's inability to advance its far right positions within the Confederation, has led it to recruiting members outside the mining industry in an attempt to set itself up as an effective force to resist what it sees as the "undermining" of the white worker (see MWU entry p 000).

On the other side, several "more moderate" unions have disaffiliated in recent years. Among these was the 42.000 strong SA Association of Municipal Employees, which resigned in 1980 unhappy at the Confederation's "increasing conflict with the government". A number of smaller unions resigned or were expelled in the same year because they had ceased to include clauses in their constitutions restricting membership to whites. In 1981 and 1982 several more unions left for similar reasons, including the Railways Artisans Staff Association ~~led by ...~~ ~~and the Boilermakers Union led by ...~~, both of which subsequently joined TUCSA.

According to the Financial Mail over the two year period to April 1982 SACLA lost 8 unions with a combined membership of at least 60.000.



and by an offer of improved working conditions. —————>

Although it was stated that there was no intention of appointing Africans to higher grades, it was clearly envisaged that the changes, if implemented in the industry generally, would involve ~~at~~ decrease in the number of "scheduled" persons <sup>employed</sup> ~~whites~~ employed.

By June 1965 these experiments <sup>were</sup> ~~which~~ in effect on 12 mines. They divided the MWJ. The then executive, led by General Secretary Eddie Grundling, were staunch "experimentalists". As Grundling put it: "I would rather have 9.000 persons with a reasonable wage than 16.000 persons dying from starvation". Yet a growing number of union "rebels" took the position that higher wages for some would not compensate for lay-offs of others and firmly opposed any change in job colour bar regulations.

The <sup>"rebels"</sup> ~~whites~~ turned for support and advice to Dr. 'Ras' Beyers, an extreme right wing lawyer and cattle rancher associated with the pro-Nazi Ossewa Brandwag during the Second World War (see p000) and by the mid 60s with the far right Republican Party. As it became clear that the "experimentalists" had the support of the Nationalist Party hierarchy, the "rebels" became more and more openly critical of government ministers whom they saw as allying with employers. In a notorious speech Beyers asked rhetorically: "How would the cabinet like it if we appointed a big fat semi-savage as a minister merely because it would cost the country less?".

After a number of manoeuvres by the "experimentalist" leadership reminiscent of those of the "Broderick clique" in the period before 1948, the "rebels" eventually captured control of the union in 1967. Fred Short became General Secretary and the present General Secretary P.J. (Arrie) Paulus was elected to the executive. On taking office, Short vowed to resist with all his might "the onslaught of kaffir", moor and Indian on the white working community". From then on the MWJ refused to countenance any further changes in job colour bars.

With the onset of the mid 70s crisis and in particular the resurgence of trade union organization among black workers and attempts by the capitalist ruling class to restructure the industrial relations system (see p000), the MWJ has attempted to lead organised resistance to these changes.

In 1979, shortly before the publication of the first Wiehahn report, the union became involved in an industry - wide strike after an attempt by the O'Kiep Copper Mine to employ 3 coloureds in vacant 'white' posts. However, despite much rhetoric about "Another 1922", the strike was rapidly defeated. Indeed the union failed even to secure the return of accumulated benefits withdrawn by management during the strike. Significantly, the hierarchy of the Nationalist Party backed the employers.


WHITE LABOUR UNION ORGANIZATIONS

Legislation

1880s / 90s Formation of first unions. Based mainly on white wage earners and generally of a 'craft' type dedicated to preserving the interests of skilled workers against "undercutting" by ~~an~~ unskilled workers. Often had ra-cist membership rules and called for job colour bars.


1907

Formation of South African Industrial Federation (SAIF)



1913

Formation of Cape Federation of Labour.



1922

Dissolution of SAIF following General Strike and Armed Revolt on the Rand.

1909

Passage of Transvaal Industrial Dispute Prevention Act. Set up negotiating machinery for disputes between employers and "employees" - the latter defined in the Act ~~also~~ as to exclude "pass bearing natives".

1914

Introduction, after 1913 ~~and 1914~~ strikes, of Industrial Disputes Prevention Bill. Passes through House of Assembly but is abandoned in Senate.

1924

Passage of Industrial Conciliation Act, which set up permanent negotiating machinery (Industrial Councils). Employers' organisations and trade unions, not including "pass bearing natives" as members, given representative status as Industrial Councils.

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These were:

TUCSA	34 unions	144.000 white, coloured and Asian members;
SA Federation of Trade Unions	12 unions	60.000 white members;
Coordinating Council of SA Trade Unions	13 unions	18.000 white members;

In 1957, with the encouragement of the Department of Labour, these three bodies joined together with the Federal Consultative Council of SA Railways and Harbours Staff Associations ~~in an attempt~~ to form one body, the South African Confederation of Labour. However, disputes between TUCSA and the by now firmly NP <sup>-oriented</sup> ~~oriented~~ leaders of the rest of the Confederation led to TUCSA's withdrawal in 1958.

Increasingly thereafter the Confederation came to be dominated by the leadership of the old Coordinating Council which still retained a separate organisational existence.

By the 1970s the relative positions of the two federations was as follows:

TUCSA	68 unions	166.881 white, coloured and Asian members
Confederation *	22 unions	179.000 white members
* (including Coordinating Council)	12 unions	28.000 white members)

#### Post Wiehahn Developments 1979

The publication of the first report of the Wiehahn Commission of Enquiry into labour legislation, which recommended the modification of job reservation and a policy geared to incorporating open trade unions into the existing bureaucratic industrial relations system (see pp 000), posed major questions for each of these registered union groupings.

TUCSA has attempted ~~attempting~~ to assert hegemony over the <sup>burgeoning</sup> ~~bourgeois~~ African trade union movement and in the process turn unions of African workers into tame replicas of itself (see TUCSA ~~entry~~ p 000).

The Confederation (or SACLA) was thrown into something of a crisis by the post Wiehahn legislation. Unable to satisfy either its more "moderate" wing (which wanted to avoid at all costs a clash with the Nationalist regi-

me) or its more extreme racist wing (which sought an all out struggle to prevent the end of statutory job reservation), SACLA has experienced a number of disaffiliations (see ~~84012~~ entry p 000).

In the early 1980s the balance within the white trade unions remains fluid. Yet in general they remain firmly allied to the capitalist class.

#### TRADE UNION COUNCIL OF SOUTH AFRICA (TUCSA) (2)

Federation of bureaucratic registered trades unions, strongly anti-communist and committed to the maintenance of capitalism in South Africa, but never aligned with any of the organizations of Afrikaner nationalism. In the post Wiehahn period the "multi-racial" TUCSA has come to play an important role in support of South African capitalism, functioning as a force attempting to reduce class antagonisms. Its "parallel union" policy, aims to recruit African workers into separate subsidiary organizations of non-African registered unions. It attempts to make its appeal by offering a "non-political" form of trade unionism which does not risk hostility from the state. After 1979 TUCSA "parallels" entered into direct competition for memberships with ~~open~~ <sup>democratic</sup> unions but in the prevailing climate of worker militancy, have generally not grown as fast as the latter. More recently, the TUCSA leadership refused to condemn the wave of detentions of trade unionists or the death in detention of Neil Aggett. This open collaborationist line created certain contradictions within the organization resulting in <sup>some</sup> ~~an increasing~~ defections.

#### Formation and Role

TUCSA was formed in October 1954 by the merger of the S.A. Trades and Labour Council and the Western Province Federation of Trades Unions (WPF). They were drawn together by the publication of the Industrial Conciliation Amendment Bill providing for:

- 1) The prohibition of "mixed" unions i.e. unions with white, coloured and Asian memberships;
- 2) for the implementation of statutory job reservation determinations after investigation by an Industrial Tribunal. These provisions were opposed not because the dominant forces within these organizations had any real intention of engaging in joint struggle with black workers, but because it was feared that the prohibition on "mixed" unions might lead to the "undermining" of "closed shop" agreements to the detriment of white workers. Statutory job reservation



The state and white labour 1900 - 1922: The "Poor White Problem"

One of the earliest forms of state intervention was in respect of the "poor white problem". The numbers of "poor whites" reached 106,518 (8% <sup>per cent</sup> of the white population) by 1916 and over 300,000 (17.5% <sup>per cent</sup>) by 1932. However, more important than the numbers affected were the effects which the "poor white problem" was seen to be having on the capitalist class' political interests.

Firstly, the existence of unemployed whites living in conditions of poverty and frequently in close proximity to blacks was seen as undermining attempts to inculcate the ideology of "white supremacy" among the black population.)

Secondly, the poor whites as a marginalized stratum frequently engaged in activities which <sup>induced blacks to</sup> infringed coercive regulations ~~applied to blacks~~. Most important was the large number of "poor whites" illegally selling liquor to blacks. Such sales were banned under laws intended to increase the productivity of African workers and facilitate the maintenance of control over them.

Thirdly, "poor whites" ~~were~~ <sup>supported</sup> sometimes ~~involved in~~ militant struggles by other whites against the capitalist class and the state.

Finally, given the weak numerical position of the capitalist class and the relative weakness of the repressive apparatuses in this period, the ruling class needed some degree of support from all other white classes in the society. The existence of poor whites weakened the capacity of the ideology of racism to rally that support both among the poor whites themselves and among the white wage earning classes in general.

The capitalist class <sup>thus</sup> considered "poor white problem" a definite threat. As the 1913 Select Committee on European Employment and Labour Conditions put ~~it~~ <sup>it</sup>:

"The magnitude of unemployment among Europeans in South Africa is possibly not greater than in other countries, but the danger posed is much greater because of the presence of the preponderating native population, and constitutes a real social threat... [Among the white unemployed <sup>there</sup>] is a depressing residue of incompetent and apathetic indigents: whose condition constitutes a real danger <sup>to</sup> society. These are persons who have entered into a corrupting and demoralising intercourse with non-Europeans, with harmful

I: COLLABORATIONIST LABOUR ORGANIZATIONS (1)Historical Introduction

There are few cases in history where a capitalist ruling class has been able to consolidate its rule without drawing a measure of active support from other classes in society. South Africa is certainly no such case. Under conditions of capital accumulation dependent on the imposition of highly exploitative and coercive measures against black workers and oppression of all blacks, capitalist rule was possible only with support by from other classes. Historically, <sup>these were</sup> the white petty bourgeoisie and white labour. However, this alliance between capital and other white classes did not develop automatically, nor even as an inevitable result of racist ideology. Rather it was formed historically, in and through processes of class struggle.

One critical aspect of this process was the incorporation of the major organisations of the "white labour movement", into a bureaucratic and regulated relationship with the state and capital. Over the course of this century, through complex processes of class struggle and a series of particular state interventions, the major trade unions of white wage earners were transformed. From once militant organizations which constituted a certain threat to capitalist rule they became bureaucratic organisations acting in a number of ways to support the rule of capital and thwart the challenge of the oppressed masses. More recently, as a result of the Botha regime's attempt to modify aspects of the Apartheid system (see p. 000), some strain has been placed on relationships between capital and white wage earners. This has not, however, yet resulted in any major section of the "white labour movement" withdrawing its overall support for the Apartheid system of capitalism based on racial oppression. More noticeable at this stage is an ultra reactionary response on the part of certain union groupings to all attempts to (relax partially) certain forms of job reservation and negotiate with unions of black workers.

As a result of these historical processes the South African trade union movement is currently divided into two distinct sections. On the one side are the sectionalist, and in some cases openly racist, unions, dealt with in this chapter. These are based mainly on white wage earners, but also to a lesser extent on a minority of more skilled coloured and Asian workers. Characteristically these unions have fought for sectional privileges for a minority of wage earners within the system.



L sc. to investigate Broederbond influence in <sup>its</sup> ~~the~~ Church. Finally, the AB and  
 h NP mainstream re-established control over the <sup>three</sup> churches. Naude and a number  
 of other clergy were eventually expelled from their churches, and set up  
 h the anti-Apartheid Christian Institute in 1963 <sup>itself banned in 1977.</sup>

These early conflicts presaged the ideological struggle within Afrikaner nation-  
 alism, waged between verkrampes and verligtes throughout the remainder  
 ss. of the 1960s (see p 000). Though the mainstream of these Churches continued  
 to follow the official line, a small number of clergy and individual members  
 of the ~~the churches~~ began to question both isolated aspects of Apartheid, par-  
 ticularly the migratory labour system, and the wider Apartheid system itself.  
 However they remained a very small minority within these churches.

An important aspect of these conflicts was the growing distance between the  
 h three major <sup>Dutch Reformed</sup> churches and their ~~so-called "daughter" churches~~ the various  
 separate churches for blacks set up by the rigidly segregated DRCs. Until  
 h the 1970s, these <sup>so-called</sup> "daughter" churches had been led by seconded clergy from  
 the "mother" churches and slavishly reproduced official rationalisations for  
 h h Apartheid. However, this <sup>produced</sup> rapidly shrinking congregations and <sup>a</sup> severe crisis  
 for these churches. In the 1970s a new aggressive black clergy cut the links  
 between the black reformed churches and the "mother" DRCs, and developed  
 c stringent criticisms of the alleged theological basis of Apartheid. Some of  
 the most militant Christian critics of Apartheid, such as the members of the  
 "Broederkring" (circle of Brothers), led by Dr. Allan Boesak, are drawn from  
 this newly emerging Black Reformed tradition. At the end of 1982 Boesak was  
 h elected as President of the World Council of Reformed Churches which strongly  
 condemned Apartheid as a heresy.

The 1960s and 1970s have seen the almost complete international isola-  
 tion of the DRCs. The NGK left the World Council of Churches in the 1960s  
 sc. objecting to its financial support for African Liberation Movements. More  
 significantly from its own point of view perhaps, various international  
 Calvinist groupings have consistently condemned their theological justifica-  
 tion of Apartheid, and the DRCs have <sup>now</sup> withdrawn from almost all international  
 connections.

The growing crisis of the South African state in the 1970s has led to attempts  
 within all these churches to condemn Apartheid. Relatively influential groups  
 such as the "Afrikaner Calvinistiese Beweging" (Afrikaner Calvinist Movement)  
 have strongly denounced Apartheid as "heretical". Powerful denunciations of  
 the role of the Broederbond have also recently been published by important  
 groups in the NGK.

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demics, state officials and Members of Parliament. The programme, basically conceived and designed by the Broederbond, operated in cooperation with a wide network of church, cultural and other organisations, ~~including the Afrikaner Studentebond, The Boerenvrou, the Transvaal Teachers' Union and the Co-ordinating Council of South African Trade Unions.~~

SABRA did not escape the extreme power struggles between verligtes and verkrampes which characterised Afrikaner nationalist politics in the mid-late 1960s (see p000 ). When verligtes captured control of the Broederbond in 1970, for a short period they also dominated SABRA. Professor Gerrit Viljoen became Chairman and the organisation began to distinguish between "crude apartheid" and "separate development". Under Prof. Viljoen was first worked out in SABRA the idea of "separate parliaments" later taken up in the "new constitutional dispensation" / <sup>proposed</sup> ~~worked out~~ by the President's Council (see p000).

However, by 1972 verkrampes were again a leading force in SABRA. Viljoen was replaced by Prof. Carel Boshoff as Chairman (Boshoff is the son-in-law of former Prime Minister H.F. Verwoerd). This provoked the resignation from SABRA of seven members of its Western Cape executive, including a former vice-Chairman. This group openly stated the new executive "represents an interpretation of policy direction so reactionary that it offers no perspective on the handling of the challenges which social and economic realities will present in the near future... it is not possible to accept a massive flow - back of Bantu to the homelands. They will always form a great part of the cities". When Viljoen himself became Broederbond Chairman in 1974, the verligtes were unable to recapture control of SABRA. It remained as a leading verkrampete voice under Boshoff - who replaced Viljoen as Broederbond Chairman when the former was appointed to the Cabinet in 1980.

Under Boshoff, SABRA has devoted much of its energies to secure the expulsion of "surplus" Africans from the cities, without which it sees "the survival of the White State" as impossible. In 1980 this was developed into a new schema entitled Project Orange, a plan to create an area in "white" South Africa from which blacks would be permanently excluded. Blacks, would only be allowed to "drive through" this "white homeland" and participate in congresses or send sports teams there. They would be forbidden to work or live there. This plan was described by Chairman Boshoff as providing "a secure base for whites in South Africa". SABRA has criticised the regime's



The development of ~~the~~ first mining, and later industrial and agricultural capitalism in South Africa after 1870 slowly broke up and transformed the rural communities on which these churches were based. These processes created a profound theological crisis for each of these churches, and <sup>eventually</sup> gave rise to new forms of class alliance which produced Afrikaner nationalism and the Nationalist Party. From the start, DRC clergy and the organised churches themselves played a crucial role in the ideological and organisational development of Afrikaner Nationalism. The very first genuinely Afrikaner nationalist organisation, Die Genootskap van Regte Afrikaners (the fellowship of genuine Afrikaners), was formed by one of the founders of the GK, dominee (reverend) S.J. du Toit and a number of other dominees in 1875. When the Nationalist Party itself was formed in 1914, it was dismissed by its Afrikaner opponents as "a bunch of Hollanders and Doppers". Clergy from the NGK played a crucial leadership role in the NP and other organs of Afrikaner Nationalism. Best known was perhaps Dr. D.F. Malan who resigned from the pulpit in 1915 to lead the Cape Nationalist Party. Likewise, after the formation of the secret Afrikaner Broederbond in 1918, <sup>Dutch Reformed</sup> ~~or~~ clergy were prominent as members and leaders.

#### The Churches and "Christian nationalist" ideology

The theological crisis and conflicts in Afrikaner Calvinism deepened in the 1920s and 1930s. One result was the growing influence of the Kuyperians, both through the officially "Kuyperian" GK, and through the development of a strong Kuyperian tendency within the NGK. This continuing theological crisis reflected the changes in the class alliances underpinning Afrikaner nationalism. Following growing conflicts in the Nationalist Party in the 1920s, and its split in 1934 (see entry p 000) a small group of largely GK theologians based at the GK University of Potchefstroom, began a detailed redefinition of Afrikaner nationalist ideology in terms of strict Kuyperian theology. In the early 1930s this group was the dominant force in the Afrikaner Broederbond. Through their journal Koers (Directions) were first worked out the key ideological concepts which later emerged as "Christian - nationalism". This group was actively assisted by other Kuyperians within the NGK (and the Broederbond) and came to collaborate with a non-Kuyperian "volkskerk" (peoples church) tendency in the NGK.

This form of Calvinism rested on the assumption that "God wills the differences between Nation and Nation. And He wills these because He has placed before each People a unique destiny, a unique calling", as Dr. D.F. Malan preached in 1911. True Christian duty lay in the fulfilling of this divinely ordained destiny. Out of this grew a theological concept of the immutable exclusive-

And thirdly, through a "people's (sic) congress on the racial question", the FAK played an important role in <sup>propagating</sup> ~~popularising~~ the Apartheid idea amongst Afrikaans speakers, and spreading its message through all cultural organisations.

Since 1948, the FAK has functioned to provide broad support to the policies of the Nationalist government, and to maintain on <sup>a</sup> ~~a~~ cultural front the alliance of Afrikaans-speaking class forces organised by the NP. In this regard it exercises great influence particularly over Afrikaner churches. The intense divisions within the ranks of the Nationalist Party and Broederbond after 1966 also affected the FAK. However as the main public front of the Broederbond, the FAK has followed its line and implemented in public the policies secretly arrived at in the Broederbond, (see entry p000 ).

Most recently the FAK organised a Volkskongress (peoples's (sic) - congress) on education, with the clear aim to counter moves to "reform" Apartheid in education. The congress firmly committed itself to the maintenance of Apartheid in Education. This was a clear intervention in the struggles in the Nationalist Party, in which the Broederbond leadership lined up against the Botha faction of the NP. The future policy direction of the FAK depend on the outcomes of struggles within the Broederbond.



1956

Some TUCSA right wing unions split over TUCSA's stand on ICA 1956. Form SA Federation of Unions.

Passage of IC Amendment Act incorporating above provisions.

1957

Formation of S.A Confederation of Labour (SACLA) attempt to unite all existing non African union federations. (Pro-Apartheid body). TUCSA leaves in 1958.

1958

TUCSA                      SACLA

1979

Mineworkers Union leaves SACLA accusing latter of "selling out" the white worker by not opposing Wiehahn more vigorously. Begins recruiting in iron and steel as well as mining industries.

Publication of Wiehahn Report and introduction of amending legislation (see pp 000 ).

1980

MMU rejoins SACLA after failing to attract other far right unions into a new federation. Continues to try to recruit outside of the mining industry.

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## CHAPTER 5:

ORGANIZATIONS OF CLASSES ALLIED TO THE CAPITALIST  
RULING CLASSI: Collaborationist Labour Organizations

- Historical Introduction
- Trade Union Council of South Africa (TUCSA)
- South Africa Confederation of Labour (SACLA)
- Mine Workers Union (MWU)
- Chart: White Labour Union Organisations

II: OTHER CLASS ORGANIZATIONS

- Introductory Note
- The Afrikaner Broederbond
- Federasie van Afrikaanse Kultuurverenigings (FAK)
- The Dutch Reformed Churches
- South African Bureau for Racial Affairs (SABRA)
- Afrikaner Studentedond
- POLSTU (Political Students Organization)

## III: Bibliographical Note



effects on both sections of the population".

<sup>Accordingly</sup>  
The state intervened to ensure the assignment of whites rather than blacks to specific jobs. Various state departments reserved particular unskilled positions in their departments exclusively for whites. Various attempts were, made to persuade or coerce private employers (outside the mining industry) to do the same, and schemes to resettle "poor whites" in the land as small capitalist farmers were implemented.

### The State and Trade Union Struggles by White Labour to 1922

The initial response of the capitalist state to strikes and trade union organisation by white wage earners had been directly repressive. Major strikes were met with the intervention of armed forces to break up pickets, defend strike breakers and disperse strike meetings <sup>and</sup> demonstrations, ~~and the like~~. In addition although trade unions were not prohibited, they <sup>were</sup> not recognised and every effort was made to encourage <sup>or</sup> persuade white wage earners not to join unions.

In the course of this period, however, it became apparent that such direct and blatant interventions by the state on the side of capital ~~involved in trade union struggles with white wage earners~~ threatened some of the broader political interests of the capitalist class. In the first place, such interventions did not actually succeed in preventing trade union combination or strikes by white wage earners.)

→ On the contrary, they often served to make unions and strikers more militant and anti-capitalist. Secondly, strikes by white wage earners were seen as encouraging African workers also to strike and, thirdly, the large scale deployment of armed force to control striking whites was seen as rendering the state vulnerable to an "uprising" by blacks.

Accordingly, during this period the capitalist class began to seek an alternative response to the struggles of white wage earners. This involved attempting to incorporate the white labour movement into a racially discriminatory "industrial relations system" - racially discriminatory at the insistence of capital so as not to serve as a stimulus to trade union organisation by black workers. The role of the industrial relations apparatuses

The 1922 Strike and "Rand Revolt" was both a major defeat for the militant wing of the white labour movement. It also indicated to the capitalist class the need to intensify its efforts to contain "white labour unrest" and in particular to incorporate the white trade unions into an effective industrial bargaining system. The strike's defeat led to the dissolution of the SAIF which had been taken over in the course of the strike by its more militant wing.

~~In the wake of the strike,~~ In 1923, the Smuts government introduced an Industrial Conciliation Bill. This provided for the suspension of the right to strike and the establishment of a highly bureaucratic system (the Industrial Council system) for employers and unions excluding "pass bearing natives". The bill was passed into law in 1924 in a revised form <sup>and</sup> has served as the statutory basis of the "industrial relations" system for non-African "employees" ever since.

The period following the passage of the Act saw an intense effort by the Nationalist-Labour Pact government elected in 1924 as well as the state in general to persuade or cajole unions into the system. The Pact regime simultaneously attempted to reinforce its credentials among white labour by extending and restructuring attempts to promote the employment of "poor whites" (under its so-called "civilized labour policy"). It further amended the Mines and Works Act to grant statutory protection to white miners in their existing places in the industry's division of labour. With a strong tradition of racist, reformist trade unionism already well established in the White labour movement and the left wing soundly defeated after 1922, the late 1920s and 1930s saw institutionalisation proceeding apace.

This immediately manifested itself in a sharp fall in the number of strikes by white wage earners and a steady rise in the numbers covered by the industrial conciliation machinery. By 1932 there were 41 Industrial Councils covering a total of 46.252 "employees", while the annual average number of whites on strike declined to 2.000 compared with an average of nearly 15.000 per year in the period 1910-1921 and 26 000 in 1922. But the institutionalisation of the white trade union movement had effects more profound than the mere reduction of strikes. ~~The incorporation of strikes.~~ The incorporation of white trade unions into the industrial conciliation system significantly affected the internal organisation of unions. The Industrial Council procedures were centralised, complex and bureaucratised. They thus favoured the formation within unions of a corps



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"constellation of states" programme on the grounds that it "would lead to economic and ultimately, political integration". The long-standing director of SABRA, Dr. C.J. Jooste <sup>was</sup> ~~has recently been~~ appointed editor of the Conservative Party Newspaper, "Die Patriot" <sup>in 1982</sup> (see p 000).

Chairman: - Professor Carel Boshoff.

AFRIKANER STUDENTEBOND (Afrikaner Students' league) (9)

Right wing and self-acknowledge "sectional student organisation" ~~formed~~ in 1948 and open only to Afrikaners who profess Protestant Christianity and identify with the "Christian-National" ideology of Afrikaner nationalism. All Afrikaans-language universities, except Stellenbosh, and almost all teacher training colleges are currently affiliated.

The ASB <sup>traces</sup> its origins back to the formation of the Studenten Werda Komitee in 1911, whose objectives were to promote the use of and "love for" the Afrikaans language among Afrikaans students. In 1916 the Komitee decided to broaden its objectives to include "championing" of Afrikaans culture", "the scientific development of its members" and "the promotion of general student interests". A new organisation, the Afrikaner Studentebond was formed.

With the formation in 1924 of The National Union of South African Students (NUSAS see p 000) the ASB, declined in significance. The Afrikaans universities affiliated to NUSAS in 1924 and remained in it until 1933. In that year, a proposal was made at the NUSAS congress to admit the black university college, Fort Hare. Although this was rejected ~~and~~ (Fort Hare was not admitted to NUSAS until 1945), the issue provided the Broederbond with an opportunity to agitate for a separate, partisan Afrikaner nationalist student organisation (see Broederbond entry p 000). In August 1933, led by P.J. Meyer (later Chairman of both the Broederbond and South African Broadcasting Corporation), all the Afrikaans centres, except Stellenbosh (which stayed in NUSAS until 1936) withdrew. Later in the year, according to the official folklore, after listening to "an inspiring" address on 'Nationalism as a Philosophy of Life' by the NP leader, D.F. Malan, a