

Southern African States

Minimum Assistance for A.N.C.

1. The ANC proceeds from the premise that the Governments, political parties and the peoples of the independent states of Southern Africa have at all times firmly supported the liberation struggle led by the ANC in South Africa, not only because it is part of the struggle for the total liberation of Africa, but also and especially because the success and the victory of that struggle would without doubt serve the interests of peace, security and progress for the whole region of Southern Africa.
2. We recognise the limitations to the manner and measure of assistance each country can in practice offer. This applies particularly to those countries which share borders with South Africa.
3. The ANC has over the years sought to give expression to its awareness of these limitations. Indeed, we have on occasion been commended on our sensitivity to the security dangers threatening neighbouring countries in face of the continuing struggle in South Africa. On the other hand, however, some are condemning the ANC for placing the security of independent countries above the demands of a vigorous armed assault on the Pretoria regime.
4. We hold to the view that there is an objective limit to the level of support the ANC can expect, but we feel that that limit is not such as to exclude any form of assistance whatsoever. We set out below some examples of a minimum level^{of} support and assistance which would fulfil each element in our strategy by way of political, diplomatic, material and even military support, and thus make a significant contribution to the rapid development of the South African struggle:

a) Diplomatic Mission

It is desirable that in all the countries in the region we should be allowed to maintain a diplomatic mission whose tasks would be:

- to maintain contact with the government;
- to maintain contact with the general public;
- to maintain contact with the ruling party and other mass organisations;
- to carry out mass information work in these countries through the mass media and by means of public meetings as well as printed and other material issued by the ANC;

b) Additional ANC Presence in the Frontline and other Southern African States

The Pretoria regime has banned the ANC in South Africa but has failed to prevent its presence in the country. Lately the regime has sought to have the ANC banned in African sovereign states - again with little success. We feel that this presence should be enhanced by granting residence permits to persons recommended by the ANC - in addition to those attached to the diplomatic mission. Such persons would be allowed, and assisted, to obtain employment with the Government, Churches, hospitals etc. or to engage in commerce and establish business enterprises, or be admitted to the country's educational institutions.

The presence of such persons in the country would make it unnecessary, as indeed it is undesirable, for such a country to support and assist our struggle by committing its ^{own} _A nationals.

c) Assistance for Armed Struggle

The ANC has consistently held to the position that support for armed struggle by countries sharing borders with South Africa cannot take the form of providing military bases. We endorse the position that none of these countries is currently in a position to permit its territory to be used for launching attacks on South Africa.

We consider this position as being quite different from a declaration to actively assist the South African regime in its fight against the ANC.

The struggle to destroy the apartheid system is a struggle of Africa. To reach South Africa we cannot avoid travelling across African territory. In doing so we must studiously avoid embarrassing or compromising the countries affected by our movement or otherwise jeopardising their security.

Recognition of the vital importance of armed struggle coupled with an acknowledgement of the need for cadres presently outside South Africa to return to the front of struggle constitutes, for the ANC, the very least that each country can do by way of support for the military component of our strategy of struggle.

d) Radio Broadcasts

Radio propaganda is of crucial importance in the work of mass mobilisation. The Frontline States could help further in this regard by:

- where necessary, increasing broadcasting times where we already enjoy this facility;
- granting this facility where none exists; or
- otherwise taking our material to relay without allocating broadcasting time specifically to us;
- permitting us to monitor South African radio broadcasts from their territory.