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Economic organizations in
sub-Saharan Africa part 1)

Denis Fair

Since the establishment of the Organization for African Unity (OAU) and the Economic Commission for Africa (ECA) in the 1960s, the goal of greater economic integration between the countries of the African region has been steadily promoted as a necessary element for their economic development. A number of intra-African or subregional groupings have subsequently been established in sub-Saharan Africa but it was not until the adoption of the Lagos Plan of Action in 1979 by the OAU that there emerged the first Continent-wide effort by Africans to forge a comprehensive unified approach to the economic development of the Continent.

Lagos Plan of Action (LPA)

The LPA was primarily aimed at African countries seeking greater economic independence through a philosophy of self-reliance and a reduction of dependence upon the countries of the developed world. One of the major means for achieving this was the promotion of greater subregional economic co-operation and through

this, ultimately, the establishment of an African Economic Community (AEC); or, as the ECA puts it, "efforts towards African economic integration must be pursued with renewed determination in order to create a continent-wide framework for the much needed economic co-operation for develop-

ment based on collective self-reliance".
More specifically, subregional

groupings are aimed at achieving greater intra-African co-operation in trade, in food production, in the development of energy sources and raw materials as well as achieving monetary co-operation. At an OAU-sponsored seminar in 1985 it was claimed that "step-by-step regional and subregional economic co-operation was the only viable and speedy way of achieving an African Economic Community by the year 2000".

In recent years regional (multilateral) organizations have proliferated in sub-Saharan Africa. In addition, there are numerous bilateral commissions covering a variety of topics such as co-operation on trade, mineral, energy and transport development, and on social and cultural matters.

Critics claim that their overlapping areas of interest and often similar objectives make for conflict and extravagance and hamper the attainment of desired development goals. Some groupings have been reasonably successful but many are still far from their stated goals. A brief survey of some of the more important, or better known, organizations follows in this and later issues of the Bulletin. French acronyms are given where applicable.

WEST AFRICA

Entente Council (Conseil de l'Entente)

The council was established in 1959 on the initiative of the Ivory Coast with Niger, Benin, Burkina Faso and Togo as the other members. Through a mutual aid and loan guarantee fund, the council has attempted to encourage trade between member states and to promote economic development and regional co-operation. Specific projects which have been supported and for which external funding

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Economic organizations in sub-Saharan Africa
Some African perceptions of change in South Africa
Babangida '24 another chance for Nigeria?

Kenya increases assistance to small operators

85
90
93
96
97

Verandering in Suid-Afrika: Verstedelikingsbeleid Bylaag 5

85

â\200\224 G ALIHOHLNVY VINHNOOD â\200\224 OXVLdI v NHN â\200\224 NOINN H3AIH ONVIN //////////

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Al Bulletin vol 26, no 6, 1986

ISSN 0001-981X

86

has been obtained, include a village water supply programme aimed at drilling 1 000 boreholes in each country over the next few years, food production projects and assistance in combating cattle disease. Although it is the oldest of the west African regional organizations, three of the member states do not border on the Ivory Coast and have stronger ties with Nigeria, thus giving the council rather less cohesion than is necessary for effective economic co-operation and integration.

West African Monetary Union (UMOA)

Established in 1962, the members are Benin, Burkina Faso, Ivory Coast, Mali, Niger, Senegal and Togo. They use a common central bank (BCEAO) and the CFA franc as a common currency. After a restructuring of the union in 1973, a west African development bank (BOAD) was established to help finance development projects which have regional significance.

West African Economic Community (CEAOQO)

Strongly supported by France, the establishment of the CEAO in 1973 was regarded as an attempt to counter the economic influence of Nigeria in west Africa. Member states, all former French colonies, are Burkina Faso, Ivory Coast, Mali, Mauritania, Niger, Senegal, Benin and Togo (population, 47 million). The main aim is economic integration through trade liberalization, in turn greatly aided by reliance on the CFA franc as a common currency. Trade between member states has increased considerably and a common market is aimed at by 1990. A regional co-operation tax, community development fund and a solidarity and intervention fund are sources for socio-economic projects and provide balancing and compensating mechanisms within the system as between the stronger and the weaker members. Projects which have been successfully completed include village water supply schemes, the use of renewable energy

resources, strengthening of the rail network, especially to land-locked states, and the establishment of technical training and research institutes. Considerable external funding has been obtained over the years. In view of its francophone background and franc zone commitment, the CEAO is regarded as possibly the most

cohesive of the African subregional groupings, but recently maladministration and corruption have severely threatened this cohesion. CEAEO states are also members of Ecowas.

Economic Community of
West African States
(Ecowas)

Although established in 1975, Ecowas did not become operational until 1980. All 16 west African states are members (population, 173 million). The main aims are to create a common market by the year 2000 with free trade, a common west African currency and external trade tariff, the total mobility of capital and labour, the promotion of resource use, the optimization of industrial location, the improvement of transport and communication links between member states, the harmonization of transport regulations and procedures and the establishment of a single community citizenship. Ecowas Bank and the west African clearing house (for the multilateral settlement of payments) provide trading advantages for most members. Some progress has been made on specific projects such as telecommunication linkages, but little has been made in meeting the major objectives. The organization is heterogeneous and unwieldy, comprising both Francophone and Anglophone states and different monetary zones. Few protocols have been ratified by members; border closures and the expulsion of illegal immigrants have hindered the free movement between states; weaker states fear domination by the stronger (e g, Nigeria) should all restrictions on inter-regional trade be removed. CEAEO will not merge with Ecowas, but affirms its membership of the latter and adherence to its principles.

Multinational Programming
and Operational Centre
(Mulpoc)

The centre was established in 1978 by the ECA. The representatives on its supervisory bodies are drawn from the countries adhering to Ecowas. The objective is primarily technical, i e, to assist countries with the implications and with the implementation of multi-national projects. A Mulpoc has been established also for central, southern and eastern Africa.

Mano River Union (MRU)

Established in 1973, the members are Sierra Leone and Liberia, joined by

Guinea in 1980 (population, 12 million). All are members of Ecowas and there is a co-operation agreement with CEA0. The aims are economic co-operation, the acceleration of economic growth and social progress. A customs union was established in 1981, allowing the liberalization of trade in goods of local origin. Trade between MRU members increased significantly. The Mano River bridge was completed in 1976, joining Sierra Leone and Liberia, and the Freetown-Monrovia highway commenced. The Mano River hydro-electric project has been investigated, postal arrangements have been harmonized, telecommunication links have been improved, agreements on agricultural production and marketing have been reached, and technical training institutes established. Considerable donor assistance has been obtained for feasibility studies and projects. However, since the death of President Tolbert (Liberia) in 1980 and of President TourÃ© (Guinea) in 1984, political relations have deteriorated and enthusiasm has faltered, worsened by the abortive coup in Liberia in 1985. No summit meeting has been held since 1983; all countries are in arrears with their dues; borders have been closed at times; and donors are withdrawing their investment pledges. Once regarded as a model of subregional collaboration, the MRU now faces a political and financial crisis.

ISSN 0001-981X = A1 Bulletin vol 26, no 6, 1986

Confederation of Senegambia

Established in 1982 after Senegal intervened to head off a coup attempt in The Gambia. The confederation's main institutions are the council of ministers (i.e., cabinet representatives from each country) and the parliament (representatives from each national assembly). Joint arrangements have been made for the part integration of the armed and security forces and on harmonizing policies in foreign relations and communications. Little progress has been made in establishing an economic and monetary union, although this would allow The Gambia's entry into UMOA and the use of the readily exchangeable CFA franc instead of the local currency. Factors not conducive to economic integration are the considerable differences in size, economic structure and political and cultural outlook between the two countries as well as their different patterns of foreign trade and protection. Problems also exist over The Gambia's current balance of payments crisis, over the movement of people and goods between the two countries and over smuggling, which is detrimental to Senegal's economy. Senegal's population numbers 6,5 million as against The Gambia's 0,7 million.

Senegal River Development Organization (OMVS)

Established in 1972. The members are Senegal, Mauritania and Mali. The population of the basin is 2 million. The major objective is to improve the use of the Senegal River and to reduce vulnerability to drought in the Sahel region. The scheme includes two main dams. They are the Diama, to be completed in 1986 and located near the mouth of the river in order to prevent the intrusion of sea water, to raise the level of the river for easier navigation, and to supply water for irrigation and domestic use; and the Manantali (in Mali) 800 km upstream to be completed in 1987/88. It will regulate the flow of the river, provide for hydro-

ISSN 0001-981X = Al Bulletin vol 26, no 6, 1986

electric power and irrigation. The total project, to be completed only after the year 2000, will treble the cultivated area and increase yields ten-fold. A large number of donor countries and international agencies are funding the project. Critics, however, point to the enormous cost, and question the project's overall viability, the ecological

and agricultural impact of large dams and large irrigation schemes, and the implications for 100 000 traditional farmers who will be displaced from their land.

Gambia River Development
Organization (GRDO or
OMVG)

Established in 1978. The members are Senegal and The Gambia, joined by Guinea in 1980 and Guinea-Bissau in 1983. The objective is the integrated development of the river basin, the organization being modelled on the lines of the OMVS. The project entails, first, the construction of a bridge-barrage to hold back sea water and to allow the expansion of rice production to eventual self-sufficiency, as well as to provide a more direct road link between northern and southern Senegal. Two other dams are planned up-river for electricity generation and irrigation. Investigations are underway with donor funding, but the cost of the bridge-barrage and the results of sociological and environmental studies which question its feasibility have deterred donors from making funds available for the commencement of even part one of the scheme.

Inter-State Committee to
Combat Drought in the Sahel
(CILSS)

Established in 1973. The members are Burkina Faso, Cape Verde, Chad, The Gambia, Mali, Mauritania, Niger and Senegal with Guinea Bissau joining in 1986 (population 36 million). It was established by the Sahel countries to develop a uniform socio-ecological strategy for countering the 20-year drought, the advance of the desert,

and famine. CILSS maintains close co-operation with the Sahel Club, an informal group of donor countries committed to studying and aiding this poorest of regions located on the margin of the Sahara Desert. Counter-measures are wide-ranging and include drought forecasting, water management, the construction of dams, wells and irrigation schemes, the improvement of agriculture, afforestation and food self-sufficiency. The physical problems of drought have been exacerbated by over-cultivation, over-grazing, deforestation, and a high rate of population growth. Strong emphasis is being given to a self-help approach and to local solutions to the region's problems, although continuing massive international aid is essential.

Niger Basin Authority (NBA)

Established in 1964 as the River Niger Basin Commission with nine members â\200\224 Nigeria, Niger, Guinea, Benin, Burkina Faso, Ivory Coast, Mali, Cameroon and Chad (withdrew 1979) â\200\224 and joined by Liberia, Sierra Leone, Togo and Chad in 1980 when the Niger Basin Authority was established. The aim is to promote the development of the basinâ\200\231s water resources for agriculture, navigation, hydro-electricity and water supply, and to protect human lives and property from drought and floods. The length of the river, the third longest in Africa, is 4 262 km and the area of the drainage basin is 2 million km². The authorityâ\200\231s achievements have been mainly in the form of investigations and research, e g, flood forecasting rather than concrete projects with the exception of the Niger-Benin bridge. A lack of political will, indifferent direction and financial problems have hampered the Authorityâ\200\231s work since its inception.

Liptako-Gourma Authority

With United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) encouragement, the authority was established in 1970 by Burkina Faso, Mali and Niger, all of which are members of the NBA. The

aim is to promote the integrated development of the resources of this agro-pastoral region, to monitor the problems of the Sahel, to fight drought and desertification and to promote a co-ordinated approach to sources of funding for the projects recommended.

Chad Basin Commission

Established in 1964, the members are Chad, Cameroon, Nigeria and Niger. It aims at the socio-economic integration of the basin through a common and coherent development plan. However, while progress has been made on numerous projects such as

road and telecommunications improvement, irrigation, well-drilling, farmer-training and studies on water resources and rinderpest control, it is claimed that the results achieved have fallen short of the original objectives of the commission. Drought is a major issue and at a joint summit with the NBA in 1985 the Chad Basin was declared a disaster zone and international aid for the victims was called for. Owing to civil unrest in Chad between 1978 and 1982, the commission did not meet and there has been some suspicion among members over the use of the basin's water for their individual benefit. The commission is investigating the possibility of enlarging the area of the basin covered by the original agree-

ment in order to control its waters more effectively.

West African Rice Development Association (WARDA)

Established in 1971, the association includes all but a few of the west African states. The aim is rice self-sufficiency through the adoption of rice varieties suited to local conditions, improved systems of production, storage, processing and marketing, and the establishment of research and training facilities. The extent of external funding has been very encouraging. (23/5/1986)

Some African perceptions of change in South Africa*

Herwig Rudolph

A manifestation of a moderate African opinion on events associated with the reform processes in the RSA has been absent in black African forums. Yet, there can be no doubt about the existence of a substantial reservoir of such opinion. It articulates

itself in informal discussions in virtually all parts of the continent and favours a peaceful and orderly transition towards a new South Africa.

While African moderates stress the need to involve all South Africans in a venture of such magnitude, they prefer the central sector of the political spectrum to determine South African history, rather than the radicals on the left and right. There are a number of reasons for the lack of a more forceful moderate input into African deliberations at the OAU and other international gatherings. Of these the most important is that until recently the moderates had no tangible evidence of

90

change in South Africa to enable them to justify constructive proposals and initiatives in emotionally charged environments. On the other hand, when such changes were indeed occurring in South Africa, their effect abroad were neutralized by what seemed to be political instability. Consequently, there were doubts over the SA government's ability to control the situation and the viability of the government's reform initiatives.

Throughout 1985 serious concern was expressed in politically moderate African circles about the effects on the economic and social fabric of southern Africa of the highly charged political climate in the region. For this reason, the action taken by certain Western banks against the RSA raised more concern than approval. If capitalist concerns abandoned South Africa, moderates argued, this would stimulate the growing polarization.

However, the progressive Africans maintained that African states exercised no influence on the financial measures of the banks whose motives remain highly suspect to Africans in general. They are not believed to be advancing the cause of African liberation.

Pyrrhic victories

Since the beginning of 1986, the growing fragmentation of the political left in South Africa, as well as the mounting differences between the country's whites, have been taken note of in informed circles throughout the continent. Moderate elements in the RSA might be encouraged by the general effect of this change in perception. The smoke of unrest in South Africa has focussed the attention of

African moderates on the reform

ISSN 0001-981X = A1 Bulletin vol 26, no 6, 1986

potential displayed by the centre of the political spectrum, i e the government and â\200\234â\200\234middle of the roadâ\200\231â\200\235 black groups.

The ANC, once regarded by black Africa as the only acceptable alternative to white rule, is now perceived to be on the fragmented left of the spectrum. The frequently heard question, â\200\234â\200\234Will President Botha continue to dismantle apartheid despite the infighting among black groups?â\200\235, reveals not only reservations about the ability of radical groups to contribute meaningfully to the process of reform, but also an appreciation of the SA government's role as the prime initiator of reform. These moves towards reform, undertaken against a background of serious domestic difficulties, have not escaped the attention of African moderates and have won greater acceptance among them for the Afrikaner as a â\200\234â\200\230white tribeâ\200\231" of Africa.

Moderate opinion has never concealed a grudging admiration of this (albeit misled) â\200\234â\200\230tribeâ\200\231â\200\231. It is precisely this opinion which refuses to countenance the elimination of the whites by those radical forces that march to drum beats from beyond Africaâ\200\231s shores. Africans have become aware that the acclaimed â\200\234â\200\234victories" of external liberation movements have usually revealed themselves as Pyrrhic and detrimental to the orderly socio-economic advancement of the peoples concerned. Meaningful co-operation between black Africa and South African whites on a basis of equality is regarded by the majority of African moderates to be vastly more conducive to their self-esteem than a â\200\234â\200\230defeatâ\200\231â\200\235 of the whites in a racial conflagration.

Although African moderates want to see the ANC participating in negotiations with the SA government, they tend to have reservations about the ANC's attitude that the only purpose of negotiations should be the total transfer of power on the part of the present government. Other misgivings about the ANC are based on the movement's ideological affiliation with the communist bloc. The Soviet Union and its African surrogate governments, it is frequently argued, have been responsible for the destruction of several national economies and their political actions have tended to

ISSN 0001-981X = Al Bulletin vol 26, no 6, 1986

perpetuate fratricidal conflicts in Africa.

Mandela

Such reservations are virtually absent as far as the person of Nelson Mandela is concerned. For most conservative black observers in Africa, Mandela has been absent from the political scene for too long to be tarnished by the communist brush. As he has fought such apartheid excesses as the pass book system, why is he not released now that the pass laws have been abandoned within the context of a much wider reform strategy?, it is being asked. The radical fragmentation of the political left in South Africa is often ascribed to the absence of Mandela's reputed moderating influence.

While opinions differ widely in African capitals about the impact of Mandela's release in the reform initiatives, unanimity exists about the need to release him. Most moderate thinkers expect Mandela to assume the role of a Martin Luther King in South Africa by exerting a statesmanlike, intellectually convincing and a genuine dialogue and peace-oriented influence within a highly complex situation of change. The more radical elements believe that Mandela will become an Aquino of South Africa, if not an Avyatolla Khomeni, who will unite the country's black masses irrespective of their tribal or ethnic affiliations. They expect Mandela to overrule present reform endeavours by imposing his own dictates upon an increasingly fluid political situation.

Radical opinion argues, not without cynicism, that for once the Western media can be expected to act in the 'real' interests of Africa. Being generally 'geared' in favour of Mandela and unable to 'sell' a rational analysis, the Western press is expected to render a valuable contribution in helping to erode the argumentative base of the moderate centre once Mandela has been released.

African opinion remains sharply divided about the conditionality of Mandela's release. Radicals demand an immediate and unconditional freeing. Moderates tend to agree that an

atmosphere of crisis and violence cannot be conducive to a peaceful solution of South Africa's domestic problems and that the participants in the vital reform negotiations should refrain from threatening each other with force of arms. Moderates thus remain receptive to the argument that after nearly two years of chaos in many of the

countryâ\200\231s townships, the South African government cannot be expected to voluntarily introduce a further element of potential violence to the scene. Once meaningful negotiations (with the ANC participating) are seen to commence in South Africa, moderate African leaders can be expected to apply pressure on the ANC to refrain from violence and to contribute to the process of peaceful change.

Clearly, the number of those Africans who advocate a negotiated change in South Africa has not been diminished by the township unrest. But the violence is causing increasing concern and confusion among African political observers who cannot associate black-on-black violence with the quest for liberation. As such, the violence is seen increasingly in isolation of the reform process.

There is another deep divide between those African political analysts who remain convinced that time is on the side of the revolutionaries and those who expect the centrist leaders of all colours in South Africa to become increasingly assertive, despite the violence. The supporters of the Avyatolla scenario expect the release of Nelson Mandela to fundamentally transform the political atmosphere in South Africa with profound effects on such issues as the Namibia question, the Nkomati Accord and South Africaâ\200\231s relations with her neighbours. It is from this quarter that Swapo is advised not to over-exert itself during the next 12 to 24 months against an increasingly confident SWA Territorial Force and Transitional Government of National Unity (TGNU) in Windhoek. The release of the ANC leader, according to radical opinion, will provide Swapo with much needed psychological advantage.

The moderate viewpoint, on the other hand, still expects the political centre to become the catalyst of

change, provided that violence is contained and, even more important, that the majority of black South Africans gain confidence in and lend support to what the centre is doing. In these quarters there is not much trust in the ANC beyond the contribution Mandela might be able to render as a black leader of stature to the process of change. After his eventual departure from the political scene, the ANC is expected to encounter growing domestic problems and the need for increasingly repressive measures. Not without justification do many francophone and other pro-Western African leaders point to their record of reconciliation among different tribes and ethnic minorities in their own countries. Misgivings therefore exist about the lack of cognizance given by radical groups in South Africa to the country's multi-cultural character. Repressive political measures against minorities, it

apartheid power-sharing system in South Africa. This would also be detrimental to national development and the socio-economic advancement of southern Africa as a whole.

Conclusion

One of the consequences of Africa's deepening economic malaise has been a growing recognition of the need to retain, if not to increase, the role of white expertise. In the case of South Africa, that expertise is perceived to be centred on the white tribe whose task it now has become to find a workable and generally acceptable accommodation with the black peoples of the country. Thus, a negotiated eradication of apartheid and its replacement with new political, social and economic structures which are acceptable to the majority of South

moderates, rather than a victory for the ANC at any cost.

Provided moderate leaders of all population groups in South Africa find a communality of purpose and act jointly and decisively for the creation of a new order, that reservoir of pragmatic opinion in the rest of the continent might, conceivably, accept meaningful changes in South Africa, even if these changes are the result of deliberations from which a fragmented

and radical left has absented themselves of their own accord.
(1/6/86)

*(From visits to seven African states in 1985 as well as from discussions with

nationals in 11 African countries during
May 1986, the writer has compiled this

is believed, would impose severe Africans, remain the overriding report on Africa's
divided viewpoints
operational constraints upon a post- priorities with black African on developments in South
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MAPS OF AFRICA

A series of large format (approximately
500 x 450 mm) colour maps denoting
political boundaries, towns, major roads
and railways and topography (in the case
of individual countries) are available for
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ISSN 0001-981X = Al Bulletin vol 26, no 6, 1986

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Change in South Africa :
Urbanization policies
Verandering in Suid-Afrika :
Verstedelikingsbeleid

Contents
inhoud

1 Die Witskrif oor Verstedeliking : 'n opsomming 2
André Wilsenach

2 Instromingsbeheer afgeskaf 6
André Wilsenach

3 Orderly urbanization : into the unknown 9
Frik de Beer

Supplement to Al Bulletin vol 26, no 6, 1986 ISSN 0001-981X = Al Bulletin vol 26, no 6, 1986 1

Witskrif oor Verstedeliking : 'n
opsomming

André Wilsenach

Die Witskrif oor Verstedeliking
wat in April vanjaar deur die Departement Staatkundige Ontwikkeling en Beplanning vrygestel is, volg op die aanbevelings van die Presidentsraad se verslag oor 'n verstedelikingstrategie vir die RSA. Die primêre doel van die Witskrif is om die regering se beleid tot v verstedeliking in Suid-Afrika (TBVC-lande ingesluit) te stel, en 'n strategie aan te kondig waarvolgens die maatskaplike, ekonomiese en fisiese vraagstukke wat op verstedeliking kan volg, in die toekoms gehanteer kan word.

Bevindinge van die
Presidentsraad

Die verslag van die Presidentsraad kom kortliks tot die gevolgtrekking dat 'n toename in die stedelike bevolking van 'n land aanvanklik toegeskryf kan word aan die invloed van mense vanuit die landelike gebiede na die stede. Met verloop van tyd speel verstedeliking 'n al hoe kleiner rol in die toename van stedelike bevolking, en word dié rol oorgeneem deur natuurlike bevolkingsaanwas. Hierdie patroon is reeds in Suid-Afrika (BLS-lande ingesluit) waarneembaar, wat beteken dat beheermaatreëls om stedelike groei te beperk, met verloop van tyd 'n al hoe geringer effek op die toename van stedelike bevolking sal hê.

Voorts is daar bevind dat ekonomiese oorwegings die hooforsaak van migrasie na die stede is, swart bevolkingsgroepe die verstedelikingproses domineer, die daarstel van 'n verstedelikingstrategie primêr die owerheid se verantwoordelikheid is, verstedeliking positief benut kan word om die lewenspeil en lewenskwaliteit van mense te verhoog, en dat geen enkele maatregel of stel maatreëls mense kan verhoed om te verstedelik nie.

2 ISSN 0001-981X = Al Bulletin vol 26, no 6, 1986

Op grond van hierdie bevindinge het die Presidentsraad aanbeveel dat instellingsbeheermaatreëls in die RSA afgeskaf en deur 'n strategie vir ordelike verstedeliking vervang word.

Regeringsbeleid

Die mate waartoe die regering die aanbevelings van die Presidentsraad aanvaar het moet gesien word binne

die breÃ© algemene beleidsraamwerk van die regering. Vir die doeleindes van hierdie opsomming word spesifiek gelet op die beleidsraamwerk to v verstedeliking as sodanig, en waarin daar aanvaar is dat:

- verstedeliking 'n onafwendbare fase in die ontwikkelingsgang van lande en volke is;
- die owerheid die reg het van en verantwoordelik is vir die beplanning en stimulering van konstruktiewe verstedeliking;
- vryheid van beweging na en binne stedelike gebiede op 'n nie-diskriminerende basis vir alle burgers van die RSA geld;
- eie woongebiede vir die onderskeie bevolkingsgroepe in dorpe en stede gehandhaaf moet word;
- voldoende grond en gebiede waar mense hulle in groepverband kan vestig, en waar handels-, nywerheids-, en maatskaplike ontwikkeling kan plaasvind vroegtydig gevind moet word;
- individue en groepe soms sal moet verhuis ter verbetering van hul eie lewensomstandighede, en dat daar in belang van beplande ontwikkeling altyd met sulke individue en groepe onderhandel sal word;
- 'n meer gebalanseerde verspreiding van mense en ekonomiese aktiwiteite bevorder moet word;
- 'n streeksgedifferensieerde benadering in die beplanning en bestuur van verstedeliking noodsaaklik is;
- verbruikers vir dienste en fasiliteite moet betaal;
- die individu die reg het om binne sy vermoÃ© eie huisvesting te bekom;
- standarde en regulasies vir behuising, fisiese infrastruktuur en maatskaplike dienste aangepas behoort te word om verband te hou met die land en die mense se vermoÃ©ns wat daarby betrokke is;
- plaaslike bestuursinstellings vir alle gemeenskappe ingestel moet word;
- die maksimale devolusie van bevoegdhede en verantwoordelikhede, die desentralisasie van administrasie tot op alle bestuursvlakke noodsaaklik is;

- algemene ekonomiese beleid-rigtings in alle aspekte van verstedeliking in ag geneem moet word; en

- algemene maatskaplike beleid-rigtings in alle aspekte van verstedeliking in ag geneem word.

Verstedelikingstrategie

Die verslag van die Presidentsraad formuleer nie 'n verstedelikingstrategie nie, maar volstaan met riglyne en voorstelle wat verder uitgebou moet word. Na oorweging van die riglyne, aanbevelings en voorstelle blyk die regering egter oortuig te wees van die noodsaaklikheid van 'n strategie om die maatskaplike, ekonomiese en fisiese voordele wat die verstedelikingproses bied tot die maksimum te benut en die uitdagings daarvan so doeltreffend moontlik te hanteer. Dit het gelei tot die aanvaarding van 'n verstedelikingstrategie vir Suid-Afrika gegrond op die volgende standpunte:

- die verstedelikingstrategie, vanweë die komplekse aard daarvan, is 'n samevoeging en koördinerende van verskeie strategieë wat deur die openbare en privaatsektor vir bepaalde werksterreine of geografiese gebiede opgestel is;

Supplement to Al Bulletin vol 26, no 6, 1986

- die verstedelikingstrategie ontwikkelingsgerig moet wees en ingestel word op ekonomiese groei en werkverskaffing;
- die verstedelikingstrategie 'n integrale deel van die algemene regeeringsbeleid moet vorm;
- die verstedelikingstrategie 'n onderdeel moet vorm van die breër nasionale sosio-ekonomiese ontwikkelingsplan;
- die verstedelikingsbeleid erkenning moet verleen aan maatskaplike en ekonomiese interafhanklikheid tussen state in Suider-Afrika; en
- gemeenskapsbetrokkenheid en onderhandelinge met leiers op alle vlakke 'n noodsaaklike voorvereiste is vir die suksesvolle implementering van die verstedelikingstrategie.

Afgesien van die regering se standpunte mbt 'n verstedelikingstrategie is die Witskrif ook duidelik oor die doelstellings wat die regering nastreef by die implementering van 'n verstedelikingstrategie. Dit kom neer op:

- die verwydering van diskriminerende en negatiewe maatreëls tov verstedelikingsaangeleenthede, met erkenning van burgerlike vryhede en regte;
- die bevordering van 'n gebalanseerde ontwikkeling tussen landelike en stedelike gebiede;
- die voorkoming van oormatige konsentrasie van bevolking en ekonomiese aktiwiteite in die groot stedelike sentra;
- die sinvolle akkommodasie van stedelike groei;
- die hantering en bekamping van ongewenste verskynsels soos armoede, werkloosheid en agteruitgang van die bodem;
- die daarstelling van 'n werkverskaffingstrategie;
- die daarstelling van 'n doeltreffende stedelike grondbesitbeleid;
- die doeltreffende bestuur stedelike sentra;
- die versterking van plaaslike owerhede en die bevordering van hul ekonomiese selfstandigheid;

- die verhoging van kundigheid, vaardigheid en doeltreffendheid van plaaslike owerheidsamptenare;

- die instelling en uitbouing van gesamentlike dienslewering op

van

IE Supplement to Al Bulletin vol 26, no 6, 1986

metropolitaanse en streeksgrondslag;

- die ontwikkeling en vestiging van 'n stedelike hiërargie;

- die voorkoming en verligting van probleme wat verband hou met vervoer, besoedeling en bewaring van die natuurlike omgewing in die sentrale sakegebiede;

- die bevordering van gemeenskapsontwikkeling;

- die bevordering van maatskaplike ontwikkeling in die algemeen;

- die koördinering en monitor van optrede mbt die verstedelikingsprosesse.

Migrasiebeheer

Met betrekking tot binnelandse migrasiebeheer het die regering na deeglike oorweging van die Presidentsraad se argumente vir en teen die afskaffing van instromingsbeheer, in die lig van sy standpunt dat basiese regte beskerm moet word, en dat diskriminasie op grond van ras of kleur nie aanvaarbaar is nie, besluit om:

- instromingsbeheer af te skaf en die moontlike implikasies daarvan te verreken in 'n strategie vir beplande, positiewe verstedeliking; en

- prioriteitsaandag te skenk aan die uitreiking van eenvormige identiteitsdokumente.

Wat internasionale migrasiebeheer betref geld die bestaande reëls en regulasies nog steeds. Vreemdelinge sal hanteer word volgens die bepalings van die Republiek se wette, daar sal omgesien word na die belange van vreemdelingwerkers vanuit die buurstate, en ooreenkomste wat in die verlede met buurstate gesluit is m b t die hantering van vreemdelinge geld nog steeds. Indien onderhandelinge tussen die RSA en die TBVC-lande daartoe sou lei dat TBVC-regerings Suid-Afrikaanse burgerskap aan huile

burgers sou verleen, sal dit wel 'n invloed hê op die bestaande ooreenkomste met TBVC-state oor die migrasie van hulle burgers oor die gemeenskaplike grense. Dit sal egter die enigste verandering wees m b t internasionale migrasiebeheerooreenkomste.

Ten einde ongewenste maatskaplike toestande a g v die direkte opheffing van instromingsbeheermaatreëls te verhoed het die Presidentsraad aanbeveel dat â\200\230â\200\230bewoningâ\200\235â\200\231 aangewend moet word as 'n doelbewuste maatreël om ordelike verstedeliking te bevorder in toestande van snelle verstedeliking. Dit impliseer dat nuwe aankomelinge in stedelike gebiede oor goedgekeurde verblyf/-persele moet beskik. Hierdie goedgekeurde verblyf sluit kortliks enige vorm van behuising en huisvesting op grond of geboue in wat vir behuisingsdoeleindes goedgekeur is, en wat nie strydig is met wette of regulasies nie. Die vereiste wat dus gestel word kom daarop neer dat mense nie toegelaat kan word om op grond van algemeen beskaafde norme op enige plek in â\200\230'n stad of dorp te woon nie. Die regering se standpunt in die verband is egter dat indien die vereiste letterlik toegepas word dit strydig sou wees met die beginsel van bewegingsvryheid wat reeds aanvaar is. 'n â\200\234â\200\234Goedgekeurde perseelâ\200\235 sal daarom voortaan dui op â\200\230n bepaalde identifiseerbare gedeelte grond wat deur â\200\230n owerheidsinstansie vir bewoningsdoeleindes geïdentifiseer en

goedgekeur is, en wat vir aankoop en registrasie opgemeet is of kan word.

Met betrekking tot die bestaande wetgewing beveel die Presidentsraad aan dat Wet 52 van 1951 hersien moet word om toestande van grootskaalse vestiging op ongewenste plekke te voorkom en te beheer, ascok om dit te kanaliseer na waar die nodige geriewe/werksgeleenthede bestaan. In hierdie verband is die regering se standpunt dat plakkery 'n onwettige besetting van grond/geboue vir bewoningsdoeleindes is. Die aanbevole wetwysigings deur die Presidentsraad in hierdie verband word egter aanvaar, terwyl die hantering van plakkery deur owerhede op die tweede en derde vlak verder ondersoek moet word. Ander aanbevelings wat in hierdie verband aanvaar is impliseer dat maatreëls t o v stedelike ontwikkeling en bewoningstoestande deur die betrokke plaaslike owerhede, ook swart plaaslike owerhede, toegepas

word om ordelike stedelike leef-
toestande te verseker.

ISSN 0001-981X = A1 Bulletin vol 26, no 6, 1986 3

Ekonomiese en ruimtelike ordening van verstedeliking

In hierdie gedeelte van die Witskrif word besondere aandag geskenk aan die ekonomiese en ruimtelike ordening van verstedeliking, die seleksie en aanwys van grond, stadsbeplanning en dorpstigting, vervoer, grondgebruik en -beheer. Dit is duidelik dat die regering erkenning gee aan die maatskaplike, fisiese en ekonomiese wisselwerking wat tussen die bestaande metropolitaanse en landelike gebiede bestaan. Daarby ook die rol wat verstedeliking t o v ekonomiese groei, werkskepping en die verhoging van lewenskwaliteit speel.

In hierdie verband sal dit van groot belang wees dat die Departement Staatkundige Ontwikkeling en Beplanning die afhandeling van die Nasionale Streeksontwikkelingsplan sal bespoedig. Die regering stel dit duidelik dat ten einde erkenning te verleen aan die eiesoortige omstandighede wat daar in die verskillende dele van die land bestaan, daar â\200\230n eiesoortige benadering tot verstedeliking binne die onderskeie ontwikkelingsstreke gevolg sal moet word, waarin onderskei word tussen bepaalde streke of sub-streke. Erkenning word verleen aan gemeenskapsbetrokkenheid by die formulering en implementering van 'n stedelike en landelike ontwikkelingsbeleid. Die besondere rol wat nywerheidsontwikkeling t o v verstedeliking kan vervul word ook erken.

Op grond van die voorafgaande beklemtoon die Witskrif die potensiaal waarvoor metropolitaanse gebiede beskik tov werkskepping in die sekondêre sektor. Daar moet voortgegaan word met die beskikbaarstelling van nywerheidsgrond by die erkende dekonsentrasiepunte, asook

met die finansiële aanspoeringsmaatreëls wat tans daar van toepassing is. Ander ekonomiese

sektore, met inbegrip van handel en toerisme, dra ook by tot verstedeliking en die skepping van werksgeleenthede. Die regering erken ook dat inter- en intrastedelike vervoer 'n integrale deel van enige verstedelikingstrategie uitmaak, en dat vervoer â\200\230'n belangrike rol kan speel om geordende verstedeliking te bewerkstellig. Die rol

4 ISSN 0001-981X = Al Bulletin vol 26, no 6, 1986

wat gekoördineerde grondgebruiksbeplanning in verstedeliking

kan speel is belangrik.

Besondere aandag moet verleen word aan die planmatige uitbouing en ontwikkeling van metropolitaanse gebiede wat aan die grootste verstedelikingsdruk blootgestel is, maar wat ook oor die grootste vermoë beskik om die lewensvooruitsigte van die gemeenskap te verhoog. 'n Breër streeksbenadering tot metropolitaanse gebiede, wat oor staatsgrense heen strek, klem op hierargiese verwantskappe wat daar tussen metropolitaanse komponente bestaan en die bevordering van ordelike dekonsentrasie van stedelike funksies, is enkele van die riglyne wat die regering in dié verband neerlê.

Beter grondbenutting moet bevorder word en 'n aantal riglyne word in hierdie verband neergelê, wat daarop neerkom dat:

- volwaardige dorpe wat vir alle sektore voorsiening maak, tot stand gebring word;

- omgewingsoorwegings meer sensitief moet wees;

- lewensvatbare gemeenskappe tot stand gebring moet word;

- die verwantskap tussen grondgebruik en vervoerbeplanning beklemtoon moet word; en

- woondigdhede nog verhoog moet word.

Besondere klem word ook geplaas op metodes om pendeltye van werkers, veral swartes, te verkort. Hier is die regering van mening dat daar indringend gekyk sal moet word na voersubsidies, regulasies wat busroetes onnodig lank maak, plasing van termini en haltes, beter kodrdineering van vervoermodusse en beter massavervoerstelsels vir metropolitaanse gebiede.

Landelike ontwikkeling is 'n belangrike element van geordende verstedeliking. Daar sal daarom voortgegaan word om organisasies wat gemeenskapontwikkeling op plase bevorder te ondersteun en riglyne neer te lê ten einde alle fasette van landelike ontwikkeling doeltreffend aan te spreek.

Die noodsaaklikheid vir stadsbeplanning-, stadshernuwings- en dorpstigtingsmetodes om planmatige

verstedeliking te bevorder word erken,

terwyl voortgesette navorsing t o v alle aspekte van verstedeliking as 'n noodsaaklikheid gestel word.

Ekonomiese ontwikkeling

Daar was reeds vir 'n geruime tyd spesifieke pogings van owerheidskant om die rol van die kleinsakesektor te bevorder ten einde die werkverskaf-fingspotensiaal van die ekonomie te verhoog. Die aanvaarding van die nuwe Streeksnywerheidsontwikkelingstrategie in 1982, die stigting van die Kleinsake-ontwikkelingskorporasie en die Witskrif oor 'n strategie vir die skepping van werksgeleenthede is 'n bevestiging van die erns waarmee die regering poog om die werkverskaf-fingspotensiaal van die ekonomie te verhoog.

Oorweging word geskenk aan spesiale statutêre meganismes om deregulering toe te pas. Die regering neem dus kennis van die feit dat deregulering belangrike implikasies vir die verstedelikingsbeleid en -strategie kan hê.

Administrasie van ontwikkeling, standarde en behuising

Die regering het reeds opdrag gegee dat die breë behuisingsbeleid op 'n gekoördineerde grondslag deur alle instellings uitgevoer moet word. Met die oog hierop moet owerheidsinstansies, behuisingsdepartemente, administrasies en plaaslike owerhede toestande skep waardeur die privaatsektor, individue, werkgewers en andere aangemoedig sal word om 'n groot bydrae tot behuising te maak.

Die regering aanvaar as beleid dat eiendomsreg en die besit van 'n woonplek vir lede van alle gemeenskappe binne hulle vermoëns bevorder moet word. Met hierdie doel voor oë moet alle betrokke owerheidsinstellings verskillende vorms van huiseienaarskap vir alle sektore van die mark ontwerp, aanbied en bevorder; realistiese standarde, goedkoper en meer effektiewe boumetodes toegepas word; en die finansiële vermoëns van alle betrokkenes in ag geneem word.

Die regering aanvaar die beginsel dat behuisingsvoorsiening die verantwoordelikheid is van die individu, die werkgewer, die privaatsektor en ander sektore en by absolute uitsondering die owerheidsektor ten opsigte van minderbevoorregtes, maar met inagneming van gepaste standaarde. Plaaslike owerhede is verantwoordelik vir die toepassing van maatreëls tot stedelike ontwikkeling en bewoningstoestande en om te sorg dat dit ordelik plaasvind. Die beginsel dat noodsaaklike openbare geriewe vir alle bevolkingsgroepe in alle dorpe moet bestaan word ook aanvaar.

Finansiering

Die regering aanvaar as beleid dat alle moontlike bronne van finansiering ontgin en as prioriteit vir die verkryging van grond en stadsontwikkeling benut moet word; dat die behoeftes vir dorpen stadsbeplanning en grondverkryging hoër prioriteit behoort te geniet by die bepaling van oorhoofse bestedingsriglyne; dat dienste en behuising wat deur die staat voorsien word op 'n verhalingsbasis verskaf moet word; en dat eiendomsbelasting in alle swart dorpe op markwaarde van die betrokke eiendom gebaseer word.

Plaaslike owerhede

Die doeltreffende funksionering van plaaslike owerhede is van die uiterste belang. Besondere klem sal daarom gelê moet word om die duplikasie van bepaalde dienste te vermy en om plaaslike owerheidsinstellings vir alle bevolkingsgroepe in selfstandige en gelykwaardige plaaslike owerhede te omskep. Die regering het reeds stappe geneem vir die skepping van plaaslike owerhede met regspossoonlikheid en finale besluitnemingsbevoegdheid; die voorsiening en opleiding van personeel en finansiële ondersteuning aan plaaslike owerhede wat nie selfonderhoudend is nie. Dit word bevestig dat die heffing en die vordering van huur- en diensgelde vir alle gemeenskappe op dieselfde grondslag moet geskied.

(5] Supplement to Al Bulletin vol 26, no 6, 1986

Maatskaplike ontwikkeling

Die tydigse voorsiening van vol-doende skole, gesondheidsdienste, ontspanningsfasiliteite, welsynsdienste, adviesdienste en fasiliteite vir kultuurbeoefening is noodsaaklik vir die gesonde funksionering van enige gemeenskap.

Gemeenskapsontwikkeling as sodanig word deur die regering as baie belangrik beskou. Die groot verskeidenheid van optredes wat tot die ontwikkeling en gevolglike verhoging van die lewenskwaliteit van plaaslike gemeenskappe moet bydra, is die owerheid se verantwoordelikheid en berus by verskeie staatsdepartemente.

Die regering staan voorts baie sterk daarop dat gemeenskapsontwikkeling 'n omvattende proses is wat op die aktiewe deelname van die gemeenskappe en hulle lede self berus, vanaf behoeftebepaling, beplanning en organisering van projekte tot sover as die uitvoering en evaluering daarvan. Gemeenskapsontwikkeling kan beslis in die akkulturasie en aanpassing van nuwe stedelinge in die stedelike omgewings 'n besondere rol vir stedelike gemeenskappe speel, maar moet eweneens 'n besondere rol in landelike gemeenskappe vervul.

Maatskaplike welsynsdienste kan 'n belangrike rol in die bevordering van 'n positiewe verstedelikingstrategie speel. Die daarstel van maatskaplike welsynstrukture en -dienste bevorder die gesonde funksionering van individue, gesinne en gemeenskappe. Die regering is ook daarvan oortuig dat dienste op maatskaplike gebied onder groter druk sal kom namate verstedeliking toeneem en dat daar voortaan besondere aandag gegee sal moet word aan die kwaliiteit van dienslewering aan veral swart gemeenskappe. Maatskaplike werk by skole asook werknemersbystandsprogramme word as van die uiterste belang beskou.

In soverre dit gesondheidsaangeleenthede betref het die regering onderneem om, waar nodig, wetgewing te hersien om konstruktiewe verstedeliking te bevorder en dienste wat 'n invloed uitoefen op gesondheid van inwoners op 'n grondslag van toenemende gemeenskapverantwoordelikheid te

lewer. Die noodsaaklikheid dat bestaande standaarde gerasionaliseer en aangepas moet word om in die omstandighede van bepaalde stedelike gemeenskappe van toepassing te wees word erken. Gesondheidsregulasies sal voorts ook moet voldoen aan die behoeftes en vermoëns van plaaslike owerhede.

Wat mannekragontwikkeling as 'n onderdeel van maatskaplike ontwikkeling betref is daar reeds opdrag aan die betrokke staatsdepartemente gegee

om met die TBVC-state te onderhandel oor die wenslikheid daarvan om die toepaslike arbeidswetgewing van die onderskeie state tot 'n groter mate by mekaar te laat aanpas.

Kommunikasie

Aangesien die implementering van die regering se strategie vir verstedeliking 'n groot gedeelte van die bevolking sal raak, is daar besluit om 'n intensiewe en gekoördineerde interdepartementele inligtings- en voorligtingsprogram landwyd onder leiding van die Buro vir Inligting van stapel te stuur. Die doel hiervan sal hoofsaaklik wees om 'n klimaat te skep waarbinne die proses van verstedeliking planmatig kan verloop, te verseker dat daar geen verwarring of onduidelikhede is oor die implikasies van die verstedelikingstrategie nie; voornemende migrante in te lig oor huisvesting- en werkmoontlikhede, werkloosheidstoestande en die implikasies van migrasie na die stede. Die oogmerk van die voorligtingsveldtog is dus om die samewerking van die publiek te verhoog vir die suksesvolle implementering van genoemde strategie. Terselfdertyd sal daar ook 'n gekoördineerde voorligtingsprogram binne staatsdepartemente in werking gestel word om die amptenary in te lig oor die oogmerke van die verstedelikingstrategie, sodat dit eenvormig toegepas kan word.

Koördinasie

Die regering aanvaar dat die verstedelikingstrategie in wese 'n koördineringsstrategie van bestaande beleid

en optrede van die openbare sektor, privaatsektor en die betrokke gemeenskappe op die terrein van verstedeliking is. Die aanbeveling van die Presidentsraad, dat 'n Raad op Verstedeliking ingestel moet word, is egter nie deur die regering aanvaar nie. Daar is besluit dat die te stigte nie-statutêre behuisingsforum as 'n adviesliggaam benut sal word terwyl die Nasionale Streeksontwikkelingsadviesraad versoek word om spesiale aandag aan die prosesse van verstedeliking te gee en die regering daarvoor te adviseer.

Die implementering van die verstedelikingstrategie met spesifieke verwysing na die swart bevolkingsgroepe

Die Presidentsraad het geen spesifieke aanbevelings betreffende die implementering of uitvoering van die verstedelikingstrategie gemaak nie, behalwe dat die voorgestelde Raad op Verstedeliking 'n ondersoek moet doen na die moontlikheid van 'n verstedeli-

kingskorporasie. Die dringendheid van die aangeleentheid het daartoe gelei dat die regering besluit het om onverwyld voort te gaan met die inwerkingstelling van 'n stedelike ontwikkelingsplan vir swart dorpe en gemeenskappe. Die volgende riglyne word in ag geneem:

- In die beplanning en uitvoering van projekte sal sover moontlik van bestaande kundigheid, strukture en vermoëns in sowel die privaat as owerheidsektore gebruik gemaak word.

- Meganismes moet uitgewerk word waardeur die privaatsektor in staat gestel word om op 'n groter skaal as voorheen finansiële bronne beskikbaar te stel vir die doeleindes van die ontwikkeling van swart gemeenskappe.

- In die toekenning van kontrakte moet voorkeur verleen word aan die bevordering van swart entrepreneurskap en die skepping van werksgeleenthede.

- Die verstedelikingstrategie sal

toegepas moet word met die inagneming van die herstrukturering van owerheidstrukture op tweede en derde vlak, en die rol wat hierdie liggame kan vervul t o v koördinerings, kontrole en uitvoer van projekte.

- Die toekenning en aanwending van fondse (openbaar of privaat) moet ooreenkomstig 'n stelsel van prioriteitsbepaling in streeksverband geskied.
- Die Departement Staatskundige Ontwikkeling en Beplanning moet 'n sleutelrol vervul om die oorhoofse verstedelikingstrategie en ontwikkelingsprojekte wat daaruit voortvloei van sentrale owerheidskant te rig, te evalueer en te koordineer.
- Sover dit die koordinering van projekte in onafhanklike en self-regerende nasionale state betref, moet die Departemente van Buitelandse Sake en Ontwikkelingshulp, in oorleg met die betrokke regerings en staatsdepartemente, die nodige stappe neem om koördinering te bewerkstellig.

Instromingsbeheer afgeskaf

André Wilsenach

Die aankondiging deur die Staatspresident, mnr P W Botha, op 23 April 1986 dat instromingsbeheer en die paswetstelsel geheel-en-al afgeskaf word, en vervang word deur 'n "positiewe verstedelikingstrategie" wat die begin van 'n nuwe era in die verstedelikingsproses van swartes en die politieke geskiedenis van Suid-Afrika. Die afskaffing van alle instromingsbeheermaatregels, wat sedert 1909 die lewenswyses van honderdduisende stedelike swartes beïnvloed, volg op die onlangse aanbevelings van die Komitee vir Staatskundige

6 ISSN 0001-981X = Al Bulletin vol 26, no 6, 1986

Aangeleenthede in die Presidentsraad.

Die aanbevelings van die Presidentsraad het o a daarop neergekom dat instromingsbeheer, soos vervat in Wet 25 van 1945 in sy totaliteit afgeskaf word, en vervang word met 'n positiewe benadering tov swart verstedeliking. In kort beteken dit dat voldoende grond vir swart stedelike ontwikkeling beskikbaar gestel moet word, volle eiendomsreg aan alle swart gemeenskappe toegeken word, selfbouprojekte aangemoedig word, geordende plakkery 'n rol behoort te

speel in die verstedelikingsproses van swartes, bestaande plakkergebiede gewettig en opgegradeer behoort te word, seenvormige identiteitsdokumente vir alle Suid-Afrikaanse

burgers en die stimulerings van die informele sektor vir die verskaffing van stedelike behuising.

Ontwikkeling van instro-

mingsbeheer

Reeds voor Uniewording is daar van tyd tot tyd wetgewing aanvaar wat

Supplement to Al Bulletin vol 26, no 6, 1986

â\200\230n beperking op die beweging van swartes in â\200\234â\200\230blankeâ\200\231â\200\235 stedelike gebiede sou plaas. Die Urban Areas Native Pass Act 1909 is 'n voorbeeld van die tipe wetgewing wat swartes voortaan sou toelaat om op grond van hulle daaglikse arbeid tot stede en dorpe toegelaat te word. Dat hierdie swartes se verblyf egter net tydelik van aard sou wees, blyk duidelik uit die Naturelle (Stadsgebiede) Wet wat in 1923 aanvaar is, en waarvolgens swartes uitdruklik belet is om eiendom in blanke stede te besit. Die passtelsel sou ook voortaan streng toegepas word vir die doeleindes van kontrole oor die vloeï van swartes na die stede.

In 1945 is die 1923-wet en al die daaropvolgende amendemente en wet-wysigings wat betrekking gehad het op die posisie van die stedelike swarte verwang met Wet 25 van 1945, die Naturelle (Stadsgebiede) Konsolidasiewet. Hierdie wet het die grondslag gevorm vir die regulering van swartes se toegang tot stedelike en ander â\200\230â\200\230voorgeskreweâ\200\231â\200\231 gebiede. Besondere klem is veral geplaas op streng instromingsmaatreëls en die verwydering van â\200\234oortollige swartesâ\200\231â\200\231, d w s diegene wat ingevolge hierdie wet nie aan die voorgeskrewe vereistes voldoen het om tot 'n stedelike gebied toegang te verkry nie (bv artikel 10-regte). Vaste woonplekke en die beskikbaarheid van werkseleenthede sou voortaan as â\200\230n belangrike instrument dien om die vloei van swartes na die stede te beheer en te reguleer. Sedert die bewindsaanvaarding van die

Nasionale Party in 1948 is die bestaande wetgewing strenger en doeltref-

fender toegepas en aangevul met 'n menigte maatreëls om verstedeliking deur swartes te beperk. Daadwerklike stappe is geneem om bestaande krotbuurtes op te ruim en verdere plakkery te verhoed.

Effektiwiteit en relevansie

Dat die wette m b t die beheer van swart verstedeliking nie effektief daarin kon slaag om diegene te keer wat werklik na die metropolitaanse en ander stedelike gebiede vir arbeidsdoeleindes wou migreer nie, is reeds â\200\230n bekende feit. Die Stedelike

(5] Supplement to Al Bulletin vol 26, no 6, 1986

Stigting wys in hierdie verband daarop dat daar in 1981 sowat 160 000 swartes ingevolge die â\200\234paswetteâ\200\231â\200\235â\200\231 in hegtenis geneem is. Hierdie syfer het in 1982 toegeneem tot 206 000, 263 000 in

1983 en 240 000 in 1984. In effek het dit daarop neergekom dat een swarte elke 2 minute in hegtenis geneem is in-gevolge 'n paswetoortreding. Die sowat 2 miljoen onwettige plakkers wat tans om â\200\234â\200\230blankeâ\200\231â\200\235 stede en dorpe woonagtig is, dien as nog 'n bewys van die relatief min sukses wat daar tot dusver met instromingsbeheer behaal is. Kenners is dit ook eens dat heelwat van diegene wat wel na die stede wou migreer, met die hoop op â\200\230n beter toekoms, reeds daar is. (Kyk De Beer Orderly urbanization: [Into the unknown, in hierdie uitgawe.]

In soverre dit die relevansie van instromingsbeheer betref, is dit ook reeds vir 'n geruime tyd duidelik dat die resultate van instromingsbeheer nie verband hou met die aanvanklike motief, naamlik om swartes uit blanke jurisdiksiegebiede te hou en sodoende die ontvolking van die platteland te verhoed nie. Hierdie maatreÃs het trouens 'n aantal negatiewe implikasies vir die landelike gebiede tot gevolg gehad, wat destyds moeilik voorsien kon word, maar later groot ontevredenheid by swartes veroorsaak

het.
Drie fundamentele kwessies

betrokke by instromingsbeheer en die gepaardgaande woonbuurtskeiding kan uitgesonder word om te bepaal hoe relevant instromingsbeheer werklik tot die genoemde twee motiewe was. Die eerste kwessie hou verband met geografiese en ekonomiese mobiliteit. In 'n vryemarkstelsel impliseer dit dat "die werker vry behoort te wees om sy arbeid in enige mark te verkoopâ\200\235, dws waar hy meen hy die beste vergoeding sal ontvang. In die Suid-Afrikaanse konteks, waar instromingsbeheer gepoog het om die swartes in die relatiewe armer tuislande te hou, het die swart werker hom nie in â\200\230n posisie bevind waar hy om die â\200\234beste vergoedingâ\200\231â\200\231 kon meeding nie. Hier het ons eerder 'n geval van â\200\234minimum vergoedingâ\200\231â\200\235 gehad. 'n Voorbeeld hiervan is plakkersgemeenskappe wat telkens na opruiming weer terugkeer vanaf 'n situasie van â\200\234â\200\230geen vergoedingâ\200\231â\200\231 in die tuislande na â\200\230n

situasie van â\200\234â\200\234moontlike vergoedingâ\200\235 in die â\200\234blankeâ\200\231â\200\235 stede. Hierdie tipe beweging is 'n tendens dwarsdeur die ontwikkelende weÃreld. Dit is onvermydelik en geen wetgewing kon nog daarin slaag om dit te stuit nie.

Die tweede kwessie hang saam met sosiale mobiliteit en kan opgesom word deur die stelling dat â\200\234â\200\234die werker

vry behoort te wees om te woon waar hy dit kan bekostig. Hier is die opwaartse mobiliteit van die arbeider ter sprake. Onder normale omstandighede vind daar 'n natuurlike skeiding plaas na gelang van die status wat die werker by sy werk bereik. Hierdie skeiding manifesteer gewoonlik in woongebiede en vriendekringe. Waar instromingsbeheer toegepas word, tesame met woonbuurtskeiding, soos in Suid-Afrika, is daar feitlik geen sprake van 'n natuurlike skeiding nie. 'n Goeie voorbeeld hiervan sou wees: die swart toesighouer wat gedurende die dag dissiplinêre stappe moet neem teen 'n ondergeskikte en dan na-ure in dieselfde woonbuurt met hom moet saamleef as buurman. Die sielkundige uitwerking wat hierdie beperkte sosiale mobiliteit op die werker het, kan ook nie ontken word nie. Die feit dat daar geen geleenthede vir die werker is om sy omstandighede te verbeter nie, byvoorbeeld na 'n beter woning of 'n beter buurt, ontmoedig hom om sy sosiale posisie te verbeter.

Die derde, waarskynlik die belangrikste kwessie, hou verband met gesinsmobiliteit. Dit kan verduidelik word aan die hand van die stelling dat die werker vry behoort te wees om saam met sy familie te kan leef. Instromingsbeheer het tot dusver grootliks tot 'gevolg gehad dat baie getroude werkers in hostelle, weg van hulle gesinne woon. Afgesien van die sosiale bevrediging wat die werker ontneem word deur verlies van permanente kontak met sy gesin, lei dit ook tot talle maatskaplike probleme vir hom en sy afhanklikes. Hierdie probleme het gewoonlik 'n invloed op werksbevrediging en gevolglik ook op die werker se totale bevrediging.

Die afleiding wat hieruit gemaak kan word, is dat instromingsbeheer in 'n groot mate 'n teen-produktiewe beleid is. Die aanvanklike doel van instromingsbeheer, naamlik om

oorverstedeliking te verhoed, is nie efektief bereik nie. Ineendeel, dit het daartoe bygedra dat swartes die vryemarkstelsel begin wantrou het, dat opwaartse mobiliteit vir jare verhinder is en die gesinslewe van talle stedelike swartes verbrokkel het.

Wanopvattinge oor instromingsbeheer

word dikwels beweer dat instromingsbeheer die lewensgehalte van die stedelinge beskerm. Die feit is egter, omdat derduisende mense in weerwil van instromingsbeheer na die stede gekom het, dat die owerhede nog nooit geweet het presies hoeveel swartmense daar in stedelike gebiede woon nie. Gevolglik kon daar nie deeglik beplan word nie en het groot agterstande in die voorsiening van behuising, infrastruktuur en dienste ontstaan.

- Die argument dat Suid-Afrika se stede reeds te groot is hou ook nie water nie. Gemeet aan internasionale standaarde is Suid-Afrikaanse stede nog relatief klein. Dit is in elk geval veel duurder om dienste en infrastruktuur te desentraliseer as wat dit is om stede goed te beplan, te bestuur en te organiseer.

- Instroming het nie noodwendig onbeheerste piakkery tot gevolg nie. Die Presidentsraad se verslag wys oa daarop dat informele huisvesting eerder 'n deel van die oplossing van stedelike groei is as die probleem. Toestande in nuwe onbeheerde slumgemeenskappe word grootliks bepaal deur amp telike huisvestingsbeleid, dienste en sonering.

- Daar

Implikasies van afskaffing

In die lig van die voorafgaande,

8 ISSN 0001-981X = Al Bulletin vol 26, no 6, 1986

hou die regering se besluit om instromingsbeheer en die paswetstelsel af te skaf belangrike implikasies vir almal in Suid Afrika in. Vir die swart gemeenskappe in Suid-Afrika sal dit die voordeel inhou van groter geografiese en ekonomiese mobiliteit, terwyl daar ook nie meer langer d m v wetgewing inbreuk gemaak sal word op die gesinslewe van swartes nie. In soverre dit egter sosiale mobiliteit of opwaartse

mobilititeit betref, sal die behoeftes van swartes om op grond van hulle status en inkomste tussen verskillende woonbuurtes en sosiale kringe te differensieer, nie deur die afskaffing van instromingsbeheer geraak word nie. Daarom kan verwag word dat swartes teen hierdie agtergrond toenemende druk op die regering sal plaas om die Groepsgebiedewet ook af te skaf en sodoende genoemde behoefte ook te bevredig.

Uit â200\230'n beplanningsoogpunt gesien is daar genoeg rede om te glo dat Suid-Afrika kan ontkom aan die uiterste toestande van stedelike verval wat onder meer in sommige Afrikalande aangetref word. Daar sal egter in die nabye toekoms sekere eise aan die regering gestel word om sodanige situasie te vermy.

Die eerste hiervan hang saam met die feitlik onmiddellike beskikbaarheid van voldoende grond en noodsaaklike infrastruktuur en dienste vir swart stedeïike ontwikkeling.

Die tweede eis wat aan die regering gestel gaan word is om onrealistiese idees oor mooi huise vir almal te laat vaar. Konvensionele behuising met hoër standaarde bring hoër kostes mee, wat maklik kan aanleiding gee tot 'n situasie waar swartes nie die behuising wat verskaf word kan bekostig nie. Op hulle beurt sal swartes die idee van bekostigbare behuising moet aanvaar. In hierdie verband sal plakkerbhuising deur beide groepe aanvaar moet word as â200\230n vorm van huisvesting wat d m v opgrade-

ringsprogramme sal bydra om in 'n gedeelte van die vraag na stedelike behuising te voorsien.

Anders as die meeste ander Derde Weêreldlande, beskik Suid-Afrika oor 'n sterk nywerheidsbasis, die vermoë om werk te skep, die kundigheid om verstedeliking te hanteer, 'n goed ontwikkelde infrastruktuur asook 'n bestaande opvoedkundige infrastruktuur om die opvoedkundige peil van die migrante na die stede te verhoog. Dit maak dit wel moontlik om verstedeliking op 'n ordelike en positiewe wyse te laat geskied.

Slotsom

Die sukses al dan nie van â200\231â200\230n positiewe verstedelikingstrategie sal dus in â200\230n groot mate bepaal word deur die vermoë om voldoende grond beskikbaar te stel vir swart stedelike ontwikkeling, die nodige infrastruktuur

en dienste te voorsien en die moontlikheid vir bekostigbare behuising te verskaf. Daar word nou in 'n toenemende mate stemme gehoor vir die totstandkoming van 'n korporasie of buro wat verantwoordelik sal wees vir die hantering van die verstedelingsproses. So 'n korporasie sou vereis dat die private en openbare sektore ten nouste saamwerk. Genoeg mag, politieke gevoeligheid, swart betrokkenheid en deelname sal 'n voorvereistes wees vir die sukses daarvan. Dit sal die taak van so 'n korporasie wees om objektiewe ontledings te maak, geskikte grond te vind en 'n bydrae te maak tot die boubedryf d m v die verskaffing van kundigheid en die stimulering van die informele konstruksiesektor. Deur verder gebruik te maak van die kapitaal en mannekrag, wat voor die afskaffing van instromingsbeheer vir die implementering daarvan gebruik is, het die positiewe verstedelikingstrategie s00s beoog deur die regering, beslis 'n kans op sukses. (29/4/86)

Supplement to Al Bulletin vol 26, no 6, 1986

Orderly urbanization : into the

unknown

Old problems and new challenges in South Africa

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Introduction

The publication of the government's White Paper on Urbanization is an epitaph to influx control in South Africa. Its political significance apart, this move signifies the dawn of an era in which new challenges will have to be met by officials involved in the planning and regulation of urbanization and the provision of housing in South Africa. The White Paper seems to represent a genuine attempt by government to deregulate an area of our national life that has for decades been subject to strenuous government control. Smooth implementation of the proposed strategy of orderly urbanization can not be achieved, however, if the pitfalls inherent in the new proposals are not spelled out and corrective measures designed.

The White Paper is to be commended in that it attempts to address urbanization as an integrated process consisting of human, social and spatial factors. Too often in the past, development issues have been addressed sectorally, divided not only racially but also functionally, as if the development of education, health and other services can be isolated from each other. The objective of this article, however, is not to analyse the White Paper in all its facets and implications. The aim is to isolate one component in the overall design, namely that of 'ordered informal settlements' and to indicate some problems of implementing and administering a policy tolerating informal settlements.

In South Africa, as in the rest of the Third World the term informal set-

El Supplement to Al Bulletin vol 26, no 6, 1986

tlements (as opposed to illegal squatter settlements) has come to dominate the debate on the provision of low-cost housing to the poor. In this respect and with reference to the title of this article the White Paper addresses six themes that need to be elaborated.

These are as follows:

1 the unrestricted movement of peo-

ple;

2 planned urban land use and the development of informal settlements;

3 lowering of standards to provide the poor with access to affordable housing;

financing of low-cost housing;

5 devolution of power and responsibility of controlling squatting to second and third tier government;

6 the compassionate implementation of the urbanization strategy.

H

To place the above-mentioned themes in proper perspective, the general policy framework for urbanization, as proposed in the White Paper, should be briefly reviewed.

General policy framework for urbanization

According to the White Paper, urbanization should be viewed as an inevitable phase in the development of a country and should be harnessed as a positive force to increase the quality of

life of all communities. The emphasis on groups, however, and on the maintenance of existing measures enforcing group designated residential areas, whatever sense this may make in terms of government policy (and the current constitution), is bound to draw severe criticism from those lobbying for the right of free association in particular and from critics of the present reform initiatives in general. The White Paper's policy guideline permitting a non-discriminatory freedom of movement for RSA citizens both to and within urban areas is thus qualified by the broader group areas policy, which imposes limitations on the freedom (especially in choice of place of settlement), apparently allowed by the new approach to urbanization. Now it may seem that this point is peripheral to the question of the provision of low-cost housing, but, as will be argued later on, in fact it constitutes an obstacle to the implementation of the proposed urbanization strategy.

An important policy guideline in the White Paper is that the planning and management of urbanization should be handled on a regionally dif-

ferentiated basis. This point seems to indicate that a region like Kwazulu-Natal may, within certain limits, determine its own modus operandi in terms of urbanization. In view of present attempts to explore local options to second tier government, this stipulation provides for the accommodation of local conditions.

Against this general policy framework we should turn our attention to the provision of low-cost housing.

ISSN 0001-981X = Al Bulletin vol 26, no 6, 1986 9

Unrestricted movement

In view of the large number of laws and proclamations restricting the movement of blacks and particularly in view of the harshness of some of those measures, its repeal does constitute a major attempt at making the unrestricted movement of blacks possible. The repeal of sections 10, 11, 13 and 14 of Act 25 of 1945 makes it possible for many blacks to move about more freely. Likewise, the repeal of labour regulations affecting blacks (Proclamation R74 of 1968) and the Black Labour Act 67 of 1964 enables blacks freer movement and access to job opportunities. These are the major restrictive measures to be repealed, yet not the only ones. The repeal of some measures, specifically those dealing with labour matters, need still to be negotiated with governments of the national states. In the meantime the repeal of those measures would be in force in South Africa, excluding the national and independent states. Citizens from those states already living within the RSA would be exempt from the restrictions mentioned.

The repeal of influx control measures in white and urban areas will influence the provision of low-cost housing in various ways. Firstly, those people without section 10 rights but who are already residing in white urban areas may now compete lawfully for urban housing. During 1982, 175 705 persons were arrested in the major metropolitan areas for pass law offences, of which 142 067 (or 80 per cent) were convicted. In the western Cape the number of illegals had been estimated at 100 000 by August 1984, increasing by another 1 000 daily (SAIRR 1985: 349 352). As many as 20 per cent of the inhabitants of Kathlehong (east Rand) are estimated to be without section 10 rights. Although the figures are crude, they do indicate a potentially strong demand within the urban areas, for housing. On top of this hitherto covert demand for housing, by 1982 a conservatively estimated backlog of 168 000 houses existed in South African black urban areas, which implies a waiting list of those blacks in possession of section 10 rights (Knoetze 1983: 97).

To further complicate matters, 62 per cent of the 1,3 million black migrants in the common area indicated in surveys that they would prefer to have their families living with or near them. In addition more than 600 000 workers commute to work daily from their homes in the national states

{President's Council 1985: 149-150).

Many of these workers spend four to six hours a day in transit and many might prefer to find a residential plot nearer to their place of work. The Winterveld squatter settlement north-west of Pretoria has a population of between 300 000 and 500 000 (some estimates are even higher). Some of its inhabitants have been resettled from places like Lady Selborne in Pretoria, while many blacks use it as a bridgehead between their rural place of origin and urban employment opportunities. Undoubtedly many people in similar settlements would be tempted to find shelter nearer to places of employment in white urban areas.

Another category of potential migrants is those people from black spots and squatter settlements in white areas resettled in national states or on trust land adjoining national states. A case in point is the community at Steilloopdorp (near Potgietersrus) who were persuaded to leave their old settlements in Ellisras and Vaalwater. Despite the costs involved, part of the resettled group would prefer to start all over in an informal settlement to be nearer to their place of work and to enjoy a more stable family life.

One of the original aims of the influx control measures was to assist in turning the tide of black migration away from white urban areas. Instead of turning the tide, however, a barrier was erected which partially dammed up the steady flow of rural-urban migrants. With the abolition of influx control, an initial wave of people demanding housing and services may be expected in the urban areas. How well the government and its officials are geared towards meeting this challenge positively, will to a large extent determine the eventual success of the strategy of orderly urbanization. If order receives a disproportionate amount of attention in the implementation of the urbanization strategy, the

10 ISSN 0001-981X = Al Bulletin vol 26, no 6, 1986

aim of using urbanization as a positive impetus for development will be defeated.

Urban land use and informal settlements

The preceding section is an indication of the extent of the challenge facing the urbanization strategy.

As a policy guideline the White

Paper acknowledges the need for early identification of adequate land where people may settle and where industrial, commercial and social development may take place. To this end one of the aims of the urbanization policy is the creation of an efficient urban land policy in order to make provision and acquire enough land to meet the present backlog and future needs. The size of the problem becomes clear when some empirical data is considered. In Soweto alone an estimated 55 000 housing units have to be built between 1982 and 1987 just to cope with the backlog and new applications for housing. In order to do this an area of 2 000 ha land had to be purchased (Knoetze 1983:98). Developing this land on a site-and-service basis (at R5 000 a plot) means a capital outlay of R275 million, even without allowing for the purchase of the land.

The situation in Kathlehong (near Germiston) further highlights the challenge. Up to a few years ago this town with approximately 18 000 developed plots housed up to three times as many people as it was intended to house. Apart from the original house, plots contained an average of two additional shacks. In extreme cases, up to seven families are presently housed in five or six shacks on one plot. Almost 19 000 of these shacks have been removed since 1982 and their occupants settled in a site-and-service scheme within Kathlehong. More than 11 000 families still await settlement in a similar scheme. In addition to these 'tolerated squatters', a new squatter settlement has over the past few months sprung up on a piece of marshland adjoining Kathlehong. This settlement came into being virtually overnight in a manner reminiscent of the invasions experienced by Latin American cities.

Officials concerned with im-

Supplement to Al Bulletin vol 26, no 6, 1986

plementing the urbanization strategy will have to take cognizance not only of the increased demand for housing that may be expected, but also of the present backlog. If the policy is to succeed, enough land needs to be made available in good time to facilitate the initial wave of demands for housing that may be expected.

Lowering of standards

The White Paper lays down three important policy guidelines on standards and affordability of housing. First, it is recognized that standards and regulations in respect of housing, infrastructure and social services will have to be adapted and brought into line with the financial means of the country in general and that of individuals in particular. In the second place, the individual's right to affordable housing is recognized. In this respect the government confirms its obligation to create opportunities under which people's needs for housing can be met. The government limits its involvement, however, to those instances where individuals are not in a

position to accept full responsibility for

providing their own shelter. Finally, the White Paper states that social policies and practices should be adapted in order to meet the demands posed by urbanization.

The effect of lowered housing standards would first of all be the legalization of many hitherto unlawful dwellings. Under the new dispensation standards would be laid down in building and health regulations.

Regarding the administration of housing development and standards the White Paper acknowledges the need for community involvement in community development projects and encourages self-help schemes in the provision of housing. It adds that realistic standards should be set, taking into account the financial and technical means of specific groups. The intentions of the government as set out in the White Paper seem to correspond with the following sentiment expressed by John Turner (1968: 362):

...successful urban planning and low-income housing policies... depend on the alignment of government action with the priorities and forces of popular settlement.

(5] Supplement to Al Bulletin vol 26, no 6, 1986

At present, however, the position

is that government action dominates the low-income self-help housing scene. In the case of Kathlehong, for instance, an agreement is reached between the local urban authority and the individual shack-dweller who qualifies for settlement in a self-help scheme. According to this agreement a temporary shack may be erected on a site, but it has to be demolished once the new home is completed. On site the foundation is laid and a toilet installed by the local authority. A building loan of between R3 500 and R5 000 is granted and technical advice is provided free of charge. Repayment of the loan and service fees amount to between R60 and R70 per month. What actually happens in many instances is that once the new home has been completed, the occupier of the plot rents either the house or the shack to another family in need. In this way two families benefit from the services provided on one plot. By and large, officials look upon this practice with disapproval, and will choose to invoke a court order to enforce the agreement with the tenant/owner of the plot, rather than turn a blind eye.

What this example illustrates is that even lowered standards may still be too high for many people to afford. It also illustrates that a rudimentary free enterprise is present within these settlements. This viewpoint is further substantiated by the fact that many families operate small businesses from their houses (another facet of township life which goes against the grain for officialdom's Old Guard). Finally, this example illustrates the need for compassionate and flexible implementation of an urbanization policy aimed at the poor.

A fact that will have to be faced is that standards will not only have to be lowered but that they will also have to be applied flexibly. It should also be accepted that the upgrading of informal settlements is a process that takes time and is, in fact, never completed. An example from Latin America will illustrate this point. On the outskirts of Mexico City a settlement called Sector Popular was established illegally in 1947. Five years later the Mexican government expropriated the land and sold it back to the squatters, thus pro-

viding them with an incentive to improve their homes and the settlement at large. More than thirty years later an observer reported: 'Today the community gives the appearance of being fully consolidated with paved, lit streets and a wide range of commercial

and civic activitiesâ\200\235â\200\235 (Ward 1982: 178). What started as a badly drained settlement with flimsy provisional structures, evolved over many years through an alignment of government and local action, into an upgraded middle class neighbourhood.

The way in which the governmentâ\200\231s intentions with lowered standards and accommodation of the urban poor are operationalized will prove crucial to the success of the proposed strategy of orderly urbanization.

Financing

According to the White Paper the Department of Finance is charged with finding the resources from which long-term finance for low cost housing can be made available. As a point of departure it is stated that expenditure on housing and services should be recovered from the clients themselves. The establishment of a market-related land tax system is also under consideration. These guidelines would seem to indicate that the government is concentrating on catering for the needs of the higher, middle and lower-middle urban classes. The poor and absolutely poor seem not to be considered in this policy.

A common labourer or gardener would find it difficult to allocate as much as R70 (a half to one-third of his income) to housing alone. The unemployed, now so numerous in South Africaâ\200\231s urban areas, would find it impossible. These people, above all, would seem set to become the victims rather than the beneficiaries of the strategy of orderly urbanization. It is the employed labourer or artisan who would benefit from the type of self-help housing scheme offered in Kathlehong. In time he or she might even be able to pay a marginal land tax. Meanwhile the desperately poor already in our midst, whose ranks are bound to be swelled by further rural-

urban migration, will be left in a position of despair. It is those people who are going to rent a shack from a plot owner in a self-help scheme or, alternatively, are going to end up in squatter settlements on marshland and in unproclaimed areas. It is suggested here, that for them an absolutely low standard, basic infrastructure settlement should be created where they will be left with virtually absolute freedom to erect a shack and improve it over time. Those who fail to improve their lot will invariably return to their rural place of origin. Unless they can assure themselves of some kind of permanent income, no sort of building loan will benefit them.

The dilemma of the urban poor is highlighted by the experience of Swaziland's urban poor. Only 21 per cent of the low-income families (earning R160 per month and less) can afford site-and-service scheme housing at a cost of R3 000 (Wilsenach 1985: 65). It may be argued that wages in South Africa are higher, but so are building costs and standards. If the operationalized strategy of orderly urbanization fails to address the issue of the poor in our cities, the whole exercise will be self-defeating.

Devolution of power and
responsibility

Regarding the implementation of the urbanization strategy, two policy guidelines are laid down in the White Paper. First, all government institutions are instructed to implement the strategy in accordance with the White Paper. Secondly, it is intended to assist all local government authorities to become viable institutions, since the responsibility of managing the process of urbanization at a local level will eventually be devolved on such institutions. In emphasis of this point one of the particular aims of the urbanization strategy is said to be the strengthening of local government and the devolution of functions and responsibilities to the local level.

To understand what this would mean in practice, one needs to look at the viewpoints expressed in the White Paper on control over migration. In its

12 ISSN 0001-981X = Al Bulletin vol 26, no 6, 1986

report on an urbanization strategy for South Africa, the President's Council recommended that in order to be allowed to settle in a city, newly arrived migrants should be in possession of

approved accommodation or a plot. The White Paper rejects this recommendation as contrary to the principle of free movement, already accepted by the government. According to the government, it seems, informal housing structures on approved plots are accepted as lawful housing. This means that one may expect that government will control the pattern of settlement, yet allow the settler a much freer hand to build and improve a house according to his own choice and means than in the past. In this respect the President's Council recommended that accommodation be applied as a measure to ensure orderly urbanization. Accommodation is understood to mean existing houses, core and shell houses, boarding houses, hostels and

hotels, flats and informal housing structures.

The implementation of the

strategy of orderly urbanization would mainly depend on two control measures. On the one hand the development of new settlements would be controlled, and on the other, measures would be adopted to prevent overcrowding and unsatisfactory and unhygienic living conditions. To effect these control measures the President's Council recommended that the Prevention of Illegal Squatting Act 52 of 1951 be revised in order to prevent large-scale settlement in areas found to be unsuitable for settlement in terms of government policy. Control over squatting is viewed by the government as an 'own affair', and to this end investigations are being carried out on the enforcement of the above legislation by second and third tier government. Legislation dealing with slums (Act 76 of 1979) is to be reviewed as a measure to combat urban decay. The government is presently reviewing the Health Act 63 of 1977 as a measure to ensure satisfactory living conditions in informal settlements.

In terms of the government's stated intention of devolving more powers and responsibilities to local authorities, these authorities will be made responsible for the application of

those control measures. In fact, urban local authorities are already controlling squatting in their areas. In the eastern Cape the Kwanobuhle and the Uitenhage town councils brought court actions in order to remove a number of squatter families from Langa to Kwanobuhle on the grounds that the shacks 'were erected illegally and were posing a health hazard' (The

New Nation 24 Apr - 6 May 1986). For the time being squatting is a phenomenon mainly affecting black South Africans. It may be expected that white and other local authorities will deal harshly with black squatting in their areas of jurisdiction. On the other hand, local authorities in black areas would, because of the political risks involved, be unwilling to apply squatter control measures too stringently. Applying punitive squatter control measures would be the final death blow for these authorities. Whatever course they take, these authorities find themselves subject to retribution: from their local constituency if they apply punitive measures; from the central government should they fail to do so. Having pointed out the negative

_implications of too big an emphasis on

control, it needs to be said that no government may allow its citizens to live in hazardous conditions. Some standards need to be set and enforced. Where low-cost housing is concerned, the need to accommodate poor people and their aspirations and the need to ensure public safety, pose immense challenges. These will have to be met primarily by officials dealing directly with the public.

Compassionate implementation

According to the White Paper, the government intends to ensure that the urbanization policy is implemented uniformly and with compassion. This aim is to be achieved through an information programme directed at officials in all state departments. This intention is underscored by the directive stating that the enforcement of local ordinances should take into account the circumstances and means of the people affected.

Supplement to Al Bulletin vol 26, no 6, 1986

These stated intentions possibly provide the key to successful implementation of the urbanization strategy. It poses enormous challenges to the judgement and integrity of officials, not only to implement the policy justly, but also to gain the confidence of the people under their administration. As was indicated by the HSRC's Report on Intergroup Relations (HSRC 1985: 88-89), we have in South Africa a legacy of disturbed relations, particularly between blacks and whites as portrayed in the relationship between blacks and government officials. To overcome the effects of this will have to be one of the first objectives of a compassionate approach. Finally, in order to make a compassionate approach possible, government should be willing to be adaptive and to change those laws and regulations which hinder the meaningful application of compassionate administration.

Conclusion

As was mentioned in the introduction, this article makes no attempt at a comprehensive analysis of the White Paper on Urbanization. The focus is on the problem of housing the poor. The White Paper presents a much wider

[i-202 Supplement to Al Bulletin vol 26, no 6, 1986

policy exposition. It addresses some of the issues mentioned here in great detail; it also deals with economic development (e g the need for employment creation), social development and the co-ordination of policy implementation.

This article merely attempts to spell out some (though by no means all) of the difficulties obstructing the implementation of the urbanization strategy. Of some of these the government may be aware, others may not have occurred to it. One of the most encouraging statements in the White Paper is the government's acceptance of the need to elaborate on policy directives contained in the White Paper, and above all, its willingness to accept the fact that the policy may need continuous adaptation to changing demands and circumstances.

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ISSN 0001-981X = Al Bulletin vol 26, no 6, 1986 13

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The primary objective of this study is to analyse community development in a concise manner with comparative reference to rural animation, and with special focus on Bophuthatswana.

Chapter 1 (Development challenges and needs) is a review of development problems, challenges and needs of developing countries and of Bophuthatswana to gain perspective on the multi-faceted challenges confronting community development in these countries. This chapter also contains useful data on the economy, population, government and other aspects of Bophuthatswana.

The origins and expansion of community development and rural animation in particularly the former British and French dependencies since 1920 are discussed in chapter 2 (Community development and rural animation â\200\224 origins and aims). This chapter also presents an exposition of 11 composite aims of community development. The aims of rural animation are similarly analysed, as well as the concepts of community in the African context and development as composite foci of community development.

Chapter 3 (Methods and strategies) deals with at least 11 fields of activity and various practical techniques, as well as the role of government, leadership roles, voluntary organizations, co-ordination, financing and personnel. The same comparative approach with rural animation is employed.

Chapters 2 and 3 balance the theoretical aspects of the concepts and aims with the more practical aspects by means of deduced principles rather than through descriptive or illustrative exposition. Chapter 4 (Community development in Bophuthatswana) is a review of the background and recent application of community development since it was started in Bophuthatswana in 1979, including a brief evaluation. The information obtained through an empirical survey based upon 414 questionnaires and the findings thereon are also discussed and evaluated.

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16 ISSN 0001-981X = Al Bulletin vol 26, no 6, 1986 E] Supplement to Al Bulletin voi 26, no 6, 1986

Babangida â\200\224 another

chance for Nigeria?

Du Toit Malan

â\200\234\We are really determined to put the economy to rights.â\200\235â\200\231(Presiden
t Ibrahim Babangida)

Nigeria has once again reached a crossroad economically. The choice lies between continuing the downward spiral or meeting the preconditions for renewed development. Presently, the low oil price is threatening to undo any efforts to come to grips with the economic realities.

Nigeriaâ\200\231s per capita income is about 30 per cent lower than in 1978, with the Gross Domestic Product (GDP) having shrunk in five of the last seven years. The position can also be gauged by a debt service commitment projected by the government to reach 42 per cent of foreign exchange earnings in 1986 (a figure estimated to be significantly higher by other sources).

Furthermore, in line with the rest of Africa, Nigeria is having to cope with a population growth rate of more than 3 per cent per annum. This means that the economy needs to develop at a moderate pace just to maintain the present standard of living.

Other indicators of the economic situation are the 20 per cent decline in per capita food production since the 1970s, an estimated industrial capacity utilization of between 20 and 40 per cent, an expected inflation rate of more than 20 per cent for 1986 and an internal public debt figure of 43 billion naira, of which 91 per cent is due within the next two years. A key aspect of the internal public debt is the amount owed to banks and contractors. It has been calculated that the outstanding amount represents about 11 times the total equity of Nigeriaâ\200\231s commercial and merchant banks. The whole banking structure is threatened by this development.

Last, but not least, is the possibility of renewed political instability,

ISSN 0001-981X = A1 Bulletin vol 26, no 6, 1986

especially if a group of radical junior officers were to come to power. Rumours are that Babangidaâ\200\231s seizure of power was undertaken to pre-empt such an occurrence. The implementation of radical socialist policies, accompanied by a lack of legitimacy in the complex Nigerian situation, could

mean the end of any hopes for a short to medium term economic recovery.

Why the present situation?

Nigeria's unenviable economic position is the result of a number of contributing factors. Foremost was the unforeseen plunge in the oil price from a peak of \$40 per barrel to about \$15. This was accompanied by a fall in oil production from 2 million barrels per day in 1981 to about 1.4 million. The resultant fall in foreign exchange and government revenue showed the extent of the structural imbalance of the economy.

The inability of successive governments to diversify the economy away from its dependence on oil, is a major factor contributing to the severity of the economic deterioration. In the early 1980s oil accounted for more than 90 per cent of foreign exchange earnings and about 80 per cent of government revenue.

Inappropriate policies have led to several of the structural weaknesses:

(1) The over-valued domestic currency made non-oil exports uncompetitive on the world market, made food imports artificially cheap and so undermined the agricultural sector's external and internal markets. It also gave rise

(3)

to the widespread incidence of smuggling and a currency black market. Latest indications are that the naira is selling for one-fifth of its official value on the black market.

High effective protection for domestic industries, an abundance of foreign exchange and the artificial exchange rate, were the causes for the development of a high cost industrial sector with a high import input content. Due to the high cost structure, Nigerian industries became uncompetitive on the world market. Even within the ECOWAS grouping smaller countries, like the Ivory Coast and Senegal, were much more competitive with their manufacturing exports. The result was that manufacturing never managed even a one per cent contribution to Nigeria's foreign exchange earnings. The high import needs of the manufacturing sector meant that its performance was greatly

hampered as foreign exchange became scarce. All six vehicle assembly concerns had to cease operating owing to input shortages.

An over-emphasis on state involvement was also detrimental to the efficiency of the economy. With management and administrative capacity in short supply, it was positively harmful to allocate 86 per cent of investment funds to the public sector (as under the Fourth National Development Plan for 1981 to 1985). Endemic corruption (consistent indications are that a standard 10 per cent payment under the counter is

made when state contracts are allocated) aggravated the administrative constraints. Over-regulation is another aspect of state involvement that assumed serious proportions. It is quite peculiar that Nigeria with an open capitalist approach created state involvement in many important private business transactions. Import licences and the stipulations guiding the procurement of private tenure in agriculture are good examples. Although import licences had almost no effect on the importation of luxury goods, it delayed urgent inputs. The procurement of private land, a fundamental aspect of any capitalist economy, involves endless negotiations with local communities and state governments. If obtained, tenure tends to be insecure as it is usually subject to qualifications and can be revoked at any time by the local state governor.

All the eggs in one basket

Unrealistically optimistic assumptions about oil earnings, and undisciplined public expenditure also deepened the extent of the economic recession. An example is the assumptions underlying the Fourth National Development Plan mentioned above. It assumes a daily production level of 2,19 million barrels of oil at an average price of \$55 per barrel, while less than 1,4 million barrels at about \$30 per barrel were actually realized over the projected period. The resultant situation was exacerbated by the Nigerian governments' inability to keep within their own spending forecasts. In 1985 imports, for example, amount to more than double the figure forecast in the budget. The Economist Intelligence Unit commented that 'Nigerian budgets need to be treated with a degree of circumspection'. This problem is not confined to the central government. Heavy external debts were incurred by all 19 state governments, having totalled about \$8 000 million by March 1983.

The overall general impression gained is an economy with all its eggs in one basket. Now that basket is slipping out of hand.

94

Babangida's response

Babangida was initially in favour of negotiations with the International

Monetary Fund (IMF). In a novel attempt to increase the legitimacy of his government, he threw the issue open to public debate. The outcome of this was that the government broke off further negotiations with the IMF on a possible loan. The public support for this development was seen as a mandate for Babangida to make the necessary adjustments, including a wide range of austerity measures that called for severe sacrifices by the population.

The main thrust of Babangida's economic policy is contained in the 1986 budget. He put a 30 per cent limit on foreign exchange to be used for Nigeria's foreign debt service in 1986 and restructured the economy in line with the recommendations of the IMF. This included:

- (i) a number of export incentives;
- (i) a cut in petroleum product subsidies by 50 per cent to free funds for aiding food production and rural road construction. It was also done to cut domestic petroleum consumption in order to leave more for exports;

the reduction of subsidies to state enterprises and the privatization of some concerns;

a commitment to a realistic exchange rate to encourage

domestic output and exports. A two-tier exchange rate was in-

troduced in April. It is based on the accumulation of foreign exchange in domestic foreign exchange accounts that were estab-

lished in October 1985;

- (v) increased capital spending in the agricultural sector;

- (vi) increased credit to farmers;

- (vii) the banning of maize and rice imports to undercut the shift in consumption to these staples away from traditional crops;

- (viii) a commitment by the government to disengage from involvement in direct production and distribution of farm products;

a stipulation that no agricultural raw materials that can be produced internally be imported after a

(iii)

(iv)

(ix)

period of grace lasting years;

three

(x) the imposition of an import levy of 30 per cent on all goods (except those destined for eventual export) to finance most of the export promotion activities;

(xi) a decrease in the projected budget deficit; and

(xii) a commitment to reschedule some medium and long term debts to ensure that the foreign debt service remains within the announced 30 per cent limit.

The aim of the government as stated by the president was to obtain an eventual endorsement by the IMF of the country's economic policies. A formal agreement with the IMF was not envisaged, but the aim is to obtain informal approval so as to provide a positive climate for negotiations with Nigeria's creditors. This is evident from the fulfilment of most of the 17 IMF recommendations. The notable exception is the drastic IMF requirement of a 50 to 60 per cent devaluation of the naira. The initiation of the two-tier exchange system is a compromise measure in this regard.

A first step by Nigeria to start negotiations on the rescheduling of medium and long term debts was to ask Barclays Bank to co-ordinate a meeting with representatives of 20 creditor banks. Negotiations are expected to be drawn out and difficult, with much depending on the performance of the oil price and the attitude of the IMF. Another step was a proposed moratorium of repayments on \$7 000-million medium and long term loans owed to commercial banks (out of a total of \$12 000 million) for 90 days. This step was announced over the Easter weekend for immediate effect and has since been accepted by the banks.

Problems and prospects

Western commentatorsâ\200\231 main criticism of Babangidaâ\200\231s handling of the economy is the reluctance to implement a drastic de facto devaluation of the naira. This should improve opportunities for export growth and the environment in which negotiations on

ISSN 0001-981X = Al Bulletin vol 26, no 6, 1986

the rescheduling of foreign debts are taking place. Other possible benefits are the reduction in the need for bureaucratic controls of imports and the incidence of smuggling and corruption that follows from rationing (corruption is encouraged by the profitability of dishonesty).

The dominant problem is the further decline in oil prices since the adjustment programme was announced. (About \$15 per barrel against the \$20 assumed in the budget's 200\231s projections.) A sustained low oil price would be disastrous for meeting current debt service commitments, the achievement of a reasonable budget deficit, the reactivation of the industrial sector and eventual agreement with foreign creditors. It will, furthermore, make every economic decision much more difficult. According to analysts, an oil price of \$16 per barrel would leave Nigeria barely able to pay for the \$6 700 million imports projected in the 1986 budget. (Every time the oil price falls by one dollar the result is a \$400 million decline in foreign exchange receipts.) In the present situation there will be nothing left to pay the foreign debt bill estimated at around \$4 800 million. (This deduction was made on the assumption that Nigeria can find buyers for 1,5 million barrels of oil per day; a figure that may be realistic.)

Agreement with its foreign creditors is a prerequisite for renewed development. This will be critical for renewed access to credit, a necessity for the structural adjustments to be made in the economy. The recent Nigerian proposal for an immediate moratorium on repayments of \$7 billion medium and long term loans, owed to commercial banks, as well as the 30

per cent ceiling on foreign debt service commitments announced previously, can be seen as a measure to put pressure on the banks to reach some agreement on rescheduling. The only alternative would be to reschedule debts unilaterally. This will shock the confidence of the banking community in the security of future loans to Nigeria. Nigerian assets in the negotiation process will be the announced policy reforms, the short term nature of the debt problem (with the bulk having to be paid within the next three years) and the fact that the creditor banks need Nigeria for their own profitability.

The fourth problem hinges on the ability of the civil service to implement the number of quite radical policy ad-

justments announced by the government. An indifferent performance could effectively undermine all efforts to revamp the economy. Further problems are the effect of the new import levy and increases in domestic fuel prices on the inflation rate. This could become a major problem if the budget deficit should be significantly above that projected for 1986; a distinct possibility in the face of lower oil revenues and past government expenditure patterns. Then there is also the major question marks hanging over the domestic debt position and its likely effect on the Nigerian banking system. Lastly, there is the always present possibility of renewed political instability. Both issues have the potential to undermine all progress made in other

directions.

So what are the prospects for

Nigeria's economy? Its major assets are a government with the necessary political will and popularity to face up

to the economic realities confronting the country, the economic potential of its natural and human resources, an improved agricultural performance in 1985 (although a food deficit still exists), good prospects for its oil exports over the longer term, the biggest internal market in sub-Saharan Africa and the relatively short term nature of its foreign debt problem. Yet, the obstacles in the course of renewed economic development look ominous. Further developments in Nigeria, arguably one of the most important African states, could spell survival or doom for many of those involved in its economy. (7/6/1986)

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ISSN 0001-981X = Al Bulletin vol 26, no 6, 1986

Kenya increases assistance to
small operators

Denis Fair

In view of the South African government's encouragement of the Small Business Development Corporation and its support for the expansion of the informal sector as recommended in the President's Council report on an urbanization strategy for South Africa, recent policy changes in Kenya regarding the provision of services for small operators is of interest.

The Nairobi Weekly Review (28/3/1986) reports that the government has scrapped the idea of industrial estates through which resources had been spent on building factory sheds that are now lying idle. Instead of concentrating on building such sheds in urban areas, services would now be provided to small-scale entrepreneurs anywhere, depending on their demands. If a tinsmith in the rural areas requires to be supported in his workplace in his backyard, he will be assisted there. While the government recognizes that the new system will lead to increased infrastructural

96

costs, which, under the estates system, were shared by the owners of factory sheds on any estate, it has no option but to go ahead since the "estates" system had not proved feasible.

The Industrial and Commercial Development Corporation (ICDC), a credit institution, would be transformed into a specialized lending agency for small-scale industrialists and informal sector entrepreneurs, so that other lending bodies, such as the Industrial Development Bank, the Development Finance Company of Kenya and commercial banks could continue catering for large-scale industrialists. The government was compiling a schedule of commodities such as tools, which only small-scale informal sector operators will be licensed to manufacture.

These pronouncements underline the new emphasis the informal and small-scale sectors have assumed in Kenya's development planning. Since

the 1982 International Labour Organization report on Kenya, the government has recognized the potential of the informal sector and identified it in the development plans and other

policy documents as a sector whose development would aid in poverty alleviation. However, until recently, recognition of the sector had not gone beyond the planning stage when its activities received publicity following visits by the president to operators within the sector in Nairobi. In a new sessional (white) paper on economic management for renewed growth, the government has outlined specific measures which are to be taken to assist the sector. These include the provision of loans without collateral, urging government organizations, such as local government authorities, to put out to tender for small-scale artisans the making of such items as school uniforms and dustbins, and the provision of infrastructural facilities to entrepreneurs.

(See also 1985 Bulletin no 4 pp 45-46.)
(23/5/1986)

ISSN 0001-981X = A1 Bulletin vol 26, no 6, 1986

AFRICA MONITOR

APRIL-MAY 1986

Jenny Macgregor

EAST AFRICA

At the Entebbe summit meeting of east and central African heads of state held at the end of March in Uganda a call was made for greater regional co-operation, especially in respect of transport, research and trade. (SWB 22/3)

The commander-in-chief of the United States armed forces in the Pacific and Indian oceans visited Seychelles, Madagascar the Comoros and Réunion at the end of March. It is considered indicative of the Pentagon's increasing interest in the western part of the Indian Ocean. (ION 29/03)

Djibouti

China has rescheduled Djibouti's debts due for repayment in 1986 and accorded it a new loan of \$15 million to build a 10 000-seat stadium.

Ethiopia

The chairman of the Eritrean People's Liberation Front (EPLF) executive committee made a call on the Arab countries for political and material assistance in their fight against Ethiopia, who is preparing to launch its 10th military campaign by mobilizing 100 000 soldiers equipped with the most modern weapons and backed by about 4 000 Soviet military experts. The exiled former head of Ethiopia's relief and rehabilitation commission has told the New York Times that Ethiopia's agricultural policy (notably the collectivization of land) was just as responsible for widespread famine as the drought. (ION 24/05)

The EPLF also called on international and humanitarian organizations to intervene quickly to stop the war of extermination. (SWB 26/03, 30/4)

On 27 March Ethiopia's draft constitution was completed. The WPE (Workers Party of Ethiopia) central committee subsequently announced that the document is to be submitted for public discussion. Once debated by the people and improved as a result of their constructive opinions, it would be ready for its scientific historical mission. (SWB 2/04, 12/04)

Despite 1985 being a year of unprecedented famine, foreign currency reserves tripled over the 1984 figure of \$44,3 m. Tight import controls, a budget deficit cut and massive overseas food and material aid totalling \$1,1 billion contributed to the increase. (ION 12/04)

ISSN 0001-981X = Al Bulletin vol 26, no 6, 1986

The talks in Addis Ababa between the

foreign ministers of Somalia and Ethiopia on the subject of future relations between their two countries were a failure, with Ethiopia demanding that all claims to the Ogaden region be renounced. The possibility of future talks is now in question. (ION 17/05)

Kenya

A project costing \$56,06 million to improve the availability and quality of Kenya's educational system, and promote institutional development in the sector, is to receive a \$37,5 million International Development Association credit. Priority will be given to primary education, which will receive almost half the funds. (AED 22/03)

A government report has put population growth at 4,3 per cent annually, at which rate the projected population figure in the year 2000 of 35 million will be 78 per cent more than in 1984. A target growth rate of 5,6 per cent has been set for the next 15 years to try and accommodate the population explosion. (AED 29/03)

The political and social climate in Kenya has sharply deteriorated in recent weeks. Industrial strikes, student and teacher protests, and the arrest of prominent civilians have fueled political tensions. President Moi is also facing agitation from the newly formed political movement Mwakenya (Nationalist Union for the Liberation of Kenya), whose recruits are mainly from the Kikuyu, Kenya's principal ethnic group. During April, six people received prison sentences for actions related to the distribution of subversive publications of Mwakenya. Contradictory statements have been made by President Moi and the vice-president, Mwai Kibaki, the former labelling it a tribally based movement, while Kibaki told a rally it was foreign-backed. Observers have suggested that it is a revival of the former December 12 Movement which was linked in 1982 with the anti-imperialist and anti-American publication Pambana (ION 19/04, 26/04; SWB 11/04)

On 1 April President Moi carried out a partial reshuffle of his cabinet which essentially involved an exchange of the functions of several ministers. (SWB 1/03)

Mauritius

The Mauritian Socialist Movement (MSM), Prime Minister Jugnauth's party, elected a

15-member executive committee at a meeting of the movement's central committee on 15 March as part of the reorganization of the party, which is the principal component of the ruling coalition. The opening of parliament on 18 March was marked by a silent demonstration by MPs from the chief opposition party, MMM, against the prolonged suspension of their leader Paul Berenger and four of his fellow MPs. (ARB 15/04) On 22 April when the five MPs were allowed to resume their seats, the MMM propos-

ed a motion of censure against the government.
(ION 26/4) Prime Minister Anerood Jugnauth's government survived the censure motion, but with a weakened majority. (Only 36 of the 70 members voted against the censure motion.)
(ION 10/05)

As a result of the policy of export diversification and export promotion, the structure of the Mauritian economy has changed significantly during the past few years, agriculture's share of GDP declining from 15,3 per cent in 1982 to 13,7 per cent in 1985, while the share of the manufacturing section has risen from 15,6 per cent in 1982 to an estimated 17 per cent in 1985. (ARB 30/04)

Somalia

The Ministry of Information and National Guidance stated that 50 per cent of all livestock has died in Somalia's drought-stricken areas.
(SWB 22/03)

At the congress of the Somali Salvation Democratic Front held to elect a 43-member central committee, only 48 of the expected 129 delegates were present. Revealing the serious splits in the opposition group, delegations from some sectors either failed to attend or sent only token representation. (ION 5/04)

A Somali Islamic Movement announced its formation on 13 May, qualifying that its aims are the overthrow of the present regime and the installation of an Islamic state that is to implement Moslem Law in a moderate way. (ION 24/05)

Tanzania

Speaking on the new altered procedure for leadership changes, Chama Cha Mapinduzi (CCM) chairman, Mwalimu Nyerere stressed that the party would not permit life-long leadership of the party or government, adding that a pro-

gramme to revitalize party branches so as to enable the people to criticize and to remove from leadership those leaders who did not adhere to leadership guidelines and ideals, was being implemented. (SWB 26/03) During his tours around the country, criticism regarding the increasing bureaucracy of the CCM have reached Nyerere. (ION 26/04)

Fourteen men, including seven army officers, were freed after having been detained since 1983 in connection with a plot to overthrow the government. (The Citizen 7/04)

In a restructuring of state-owned industries, Tanzania Sisal Authority is to give up management of 22 of its 55 sisal estates nine of which will go to private Tanzanian interests. A similar restructuring of the state-owned industries which manage the tea and coffee plantations is expected. (ION 12/03)

The 1986-7 Tanzanian budget shows an increase of \$440 million over the previous years, amounting to \$1,763 million for the financial year which begins in June. Tanzania needs \$1,2 billion in foreign aid in order to revive its economy. (ION 10/04)

Tanzania's prime minister, Joseph Warioba, has stated that the programme for reducing government expenditure had not been successful with 30 000 civil servants who should have been dismissed, still in state and civil employ. (ION 17/04)

Uganda

The capture on 29 March of Moyo and Arua (the last major centre in the hands of the former military regime) has brought to an end the war waged by President Museveni's National Resistance Movement (NRM) for the past five years. (SWB 31/03)

NRM advances in the north of Uganda resulted in the fleeing of over 20 000 civilians to Sudan and Zaire. The government in consultation with the UNHCR and the governments of Zaire and Sudan, is working out a programme for the repatriation of the Ugandan refugees from the two countries. (SWB 31/03; 2/05)

Pres Museveni has appointed a broad-based cabinet which includes three members of Milton Obote's UPC, a total of five members of ousted former head of state, Gen Tito Okello, as well as smaller groups and parties. He has also named most of the members of the 36-member National Resistance Council (NRC), which is predominantly southern based with a bias towards the NRM. The NRC will probably have more power than the cabinet. (AC vol 27, no 5, ARB 15/03)

Pres Museveni said in a proclamation on 18 February that his government was an interim one and would not hold power for more than four years. (ARB 15/03)

In a bid to stop the increase in smuggling since the overthrow of Tito Okello, Uganda closed its borders with Zaire on 5 May. (SWB 9/5)

Britain has announced a £1 million grant for emergency relief in response to a rehabilitation programme aimed at resettling war-displaced people of the Luwero Triangle. Italy is to grant \$30 million. (ARB 30/4)

98

Finance Minister Mr Mulema reported that Uganda's external debt has reached \$1 000 million. (AED 19/04)

In a major step towards reorganizing Uganda's coffee industry, the government announced its intention to re-introduce coffee auctions in Kampala for the first time since the 1960s. (AED 17/05)

CENTRAL AFRICA

Central African Republic

Head of State, Gen Andre Kolingba has announced that a new ruling party - Rassemblement Democratique Centraficain (ROC) - has been set up and a referendum on a revised constitution will be held. This is the second stage of his programme to democratize society by returning the country to civilian rule following the appointment of a mainly civilian cabinet in September 1985. (AED 17/05)

Congo

The Congolese budget is to be reduced by almost 50 per cent, an adjustment caused by the drastic fall in the price of oil and the low exchange rate of the American dollar. (ARB 30/04)

Sao Tome and Principe

Pres Manuel Pinta da Costa nominated a new government, which, according to observers, marks a further stage in opening up the country to improve relations with the West. (ARB 15/03)

Zaire

Following the handing over of the management of its national airline, Air Zaire, which is heavily in debt, to the French private airline UTA on 1 February, a dispute arose between Air Zaire and Belgian pilots laid off by the Zaire airline. This resulted in the seizure of an Air Zaire plane in Belgium. In retaliation Zairean authorities banned the Belgian airline Sabena and ended Air Zaire's flights to Belgium. (ARB 28/2; The Citizen 7/04) The Belgian Minister of Foreign Relations, Leo Tindemans, on a visit to Zaire in April, held talks with Zairean officials in a search for a solution to strained Belgian-Zairean relations. (SWB 29/04)

Zaire is to resume its participation in the OAU from which it was suspended on 12 November 1984, but not until the Saharan Arab Democratic Republic is no longer represented on the OAU's executive bodies. (SWB 16/04)

A report by Amnesty International asserting that opposition supporters had been tortured and killed, was condemned by the executive council of the ruling party (MPR). They in turn accused Amnesty International of using unreliable and unverified sources. (SWB 8/04) A

regional chairman of the MPR has spoken out against the proliferation of religious sects and denominational groups, whom he accused of subversive activities. He also attacked the behaviour of certain foreigners seeking to destabilize the country (SWB 1/04)

Zaire, which has an external debt of about \$4,5 bn, has obtained a general agreement from its main creditors and international financial institutions to help improve its economy after three years of severe austerity. The agreement covers all principal and interest falling due between April 1986 and March 1987, amounting to \$100 million. The debt has been rescheduled over 10 years, including four years' grace. (ARB 30/4; AED 24/05)

President Mobutu has reshuffled his cabinet for the third time since January 1985. The move, announced on 18 April, abolishes five ministries and drops 15 ministers. There are 10 new members in the 23-member cabinet. None of the essential ministries saw changes. (AED 26/04)

NORTH AFRICA

Algeria

Pres Benjeddid Chadli carried out three cabinet reshuffles in the space of 10 days during February. None of these reshuffles affected the essential ministries, but are thought to be a move towards greater unity in the face of economic pressures from falling oil prices. (ARB 15/03)

Benjeddid, embarked on an 'official friend-Iy' visit to the Soviet Union on 24 March. During his visit he signed a long-term programme of economic, commercial, scientific and technical co-operation between the two countries. (ARB 8/04)

Oil prices fell sharply after Opec ministers failed on 16 April to make any progress on cutting world supplies so as to support the shattered petroleum market. Prices plunged almost 15 per cent after two days of unsuccessful emergency talks by the 13 Opec nations. Prices were approaching the \$10 per barrel mark compared to almost \$30 per barrel in November last year. (The Star 17/4)

Sudan

The first free parliamentary elections in 18 years were held from 1 to 12 April. Intense north-south divisions caused postponement of elections in 37 of the 68 war-torn southern constituencies, making the elections a northern affair. More than 30 parties contested the elections. Half of the electorate were voting for the first time. Although there was no overall winner, the majority of the votes went to the traditional Umma Party (UP) and Democratic Unionist Party (DUP). Chairman of the Umma Party, Sadik al-Mahdi was elected prime minister and chairman of the Sudanese Council of Ministers on 6 May. Members of the Sudanese National Party and the Southern Alliance withdrew from the assembly's first session in protest at the

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suspected formation of a coalition government instead of government of national unity. Subsequent coalition talks and the allocation of cabinet posts resulted in heated disputes between the traditional Umma and Democratic Unionist parties. The new cabinet announced on 15 May is broad-based.

The possibility of achieving peace with John Garang's rebel Sudan People's Liberation Movement (SPLM), which controls much of the country's potentially most productive areas, has been seriously impeded by the shooting down on 18 May of an aircraft by the rebels, killing eight people, including a governor. (AED 29/03, 19/04, 24/05; SWB 8/05, 14/05; AC 23/04)

WEST AFRICA

At the end of the francophone West African Economic Community (CEAO) meeting held during March it was reported that the main achievements had been improved relations between member countries and renewed credibility for the organization as a whole. The conference adopted the setting up of a Regional Centre for Commercial Information and Documentation (CRIC) as a project. (SWB 1/04; AED 5/04)

Burkina Faso

The National Council of the Revolution (CNR) issued a statement that four political organizations had joined the CNR in a move seen as a striving for political and ideological unity. The four organizations are: The Military and Revolutionary Organization (OMR), the Union for the Revised Communist Struggle (ULCR), the Union of Burkinabe Communists (UCB) and the Burkinabe Communist Group (GCB). (SWB 21/05)

Ghana

The World Bank has arranged three credits totalling \$80.7 million for industrial development and port rehabilitation. Some \$40 million is for imports of raw materials and spare parts for the government's industrial adjustment programme. (AED 5/04)

In his Easter message to the Ghanaian nation Flt-Lt Jerry Rawlings made an impassioned call for a fight against widespread corruption and indiscipline. (SWB 4/04)

On 15 May the Ghanaian National Public Tribunal sentenced nine people to death by firing squad for charges of preparing to overthrow the military government (Provisional National Defence Council). (SWB 17/05)

Guinea

Senior Guinean officials and the Paris Club of 12 Western governments have reached agreement on rescheduling \$200 million in official external debt - about two-thirds of the total \$300 million arrears to official bilateral creditors. (AED

3/05)

ISSN 0001-981X = Al Bulletin vol 26, no 6, 1986

Ivory Coast

During an extraordinary session of parliament a modification of the Ivorian constitution, abolishing the post of first vice-president to the National Assembly, was made. As a result, the only person able to take over the functions of the presidency in the case of a power vacancy is the National Assembly president. (ARB 15/03)

Liberia

Economists dismissed Liberia's budget for January to June as unrealistic because revenue projections were unlikely to be realized and too little was set aside for debt servicing. Total government revenue estimated at \$148 million included a projected \$33,5 million in grants from the US Agency for International Development (USAID). (AED 22/03) USAID officials, considering the cutting of grants to Liberia because of its previous record of mismanagement, were surprised by the pledging of \$42,1 million by US Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs, Chester Crocker, in April. However, with a backlog of \$660 000 on previous US loans, Liberia will not receive the money unless it meets a whole range of conditions. (AED 26/04) The government has announced the partial or total privatization of 11 public corporations. The move is viewed as another bid to convince donors and the international financial community that Liberia will trim public spending to the minimum. (AED 5/04)

In early May USAID officials reported that Liberia has repaid all but \$32 000 of its arrears, thereby enhancing prospects for the resumption of US aid. (AED 17/05)

The United People's Party (UPP) is the latest to join the four-party grand coalition of opposition parties set up in March. (AED 19/04)

Nigeria

On 1 April the second tier foreign exchange market which is intended to provide market-related transactions by the holding of foreign exchange auctions at regular intervals, came into operation. (AED 12/03)

The All-Nigeria Conference on Foreign Policy, held during April, recommended that Nigeria should remain a secular state and should therefore not be a member of any international organization based on religion. The conference also agreed that Nigeria should not restore diplomatic relations with Israel. The conference transformed itself into what it called a Foreign Relations Council. (SWB 16/05)

Since the reopening of its borders Nigeria has reported an influx of people, many of whom have been staying beyond the stipulated 90 day

visitorsâ\200\231 limit. These visitors seriously aggravate Nigeriaâ\200\231s unemployment problems. Concern has also been expressed about the increase in smuggling. (SWB 24/04)

Senegal

The eighth tripartite meeting of the Senegal-Gambia-Guinea Bissau customs assistance agreement has approved several measures aimed at improving customs transactions between the

three states, thereby accepting the Ecowas document relating to the free movement of persons and goods between the Ecowas member states. (ARB 8/51)

Pres Abdou Diouf has called for the â\200\234â\200\234non-nuclearization of Africaâ\200\231â\200\235 and for the institution of a tax on the sums of money devoted to arms. (SWB 6/05)

Chad

The lull in hostilities in the 20-year old Chad war was broken after Libyan forces attacked government troops on 10 February. The country is split by the 16th parallel into the rebel-held northern Transitional Government of National Unity (GUNT). The southern section is held by the government of Pres Habre. A deployment of the French air force from its base in the Central African Republic attacked a vital runway in northern Chad on 16 February. (ARB 16/03)

Pres Habre carried out a sweeping government reshuffle on 23 March, broadening its political base and bringing into the cabinet several former political opponents. (AED 29/03)

Egypt

Egypt was rocked on 26 February by its worst outbreak of political violence since the assassination of Pres Sadat in 1981. The immediate cause of the rioting was said by officials to have been a (falsely) rumoured decision to increase the period of service for members of the forces by a year. The riots left 15 dead and 300 wounded as well as political casualties with the arrest of over 2 500 people. The minister of the interior and several senior officials in the armed forces were dismissed. It is believed that Egyptâ\200\231s deteriorating economic situation, which is aggravating widespread frustration and inequalities, is the underlying cause of the dissent. (ARB 15/03)

Libya

The United States launched a two-pronged air attack on Libya on 15 April, striking five strategic targets in retaliation for terrorist attacks in Europe. Two of Libyan leader Col Gaddafiâ\200\231s children were injured, and one was killed. The US indicated that one of their aims was to topple Gaddafi. The OAU immediately condemned the attack. Appeals by Gaddafi to â\200\234fellow Arabsâ\200\231â\200\231 to â\200\234liquidateâ\200\231â\200\235 US interests in the Middle

East have fallen on deaf ears (despite Arab countries' condemnation of the attacks), thereby revealing little interest in an alignment against the superpower. Likewise the Soviet bloc has been cautious in its support for Gaddafi. (The Star 15/04; BD 13/05)

Morocco

In a short ceremony on 3 March inside his vast palace at Marrakesh, King Hassan II celebrated the 25th anniversary of his enthronement. The following afternoon, 7 500 officials and notables from all over Morocco renewed their oaths of allegiance to the monarch. A number of distinguished foreign visitors were present, including King Juan Carlos of Spain. (AC 26/03)

1986/87 Zambian budget

Outline of the budget

Expenditure

â\200\224 Recurrent ZK4,556 m

â\200\224 Total ZK5,261 m (\$835 m)

Rise of 162% in real expenditure. Constitutional statutory allocation 456% of budget â\200\224 reflects heavier debt servicing.

Revenue

â\200\224 Internally generated revenue ZK3,472 m (\$551,1 m). Set to rise 139%.

â\200\224 External borrowings ZK1,619 m (\$257 m): to meet 90% of the deficit which is equal to 47% of the total revenue.

Budget deficit

â\200\224 ZK 1,789 m (\$284 m).

â\200\224 368% monetary increase over 1985 budget.

â\200\224 Budget deficit as percentage of GDP 33%.

1985

Inflation rate * 200%, GDP 3,4% growth in real terms.

References

28 February and 31 March 1986 ARB.

8 February 1986 AED.

April 1986 African Business.

February 1986 Standard Chartered Review.

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Highlights of the budget and structural changes

â\200\224 Sharp cuts in government subsidies and salary bills; subsidies to double to \$53 m.

â\200\224 Debt servicing expenditure increased threefold.

â\200\224 Income tax reductions; personal by 18%, company tax relief; tax policy changes benefiting the man in the street.

â\200\224 Drive to stimulate production and non-traditional exports.

â\200\224 Sharp devaluation of the kwacha with the introduction of foreign exchange auctions.â\200\231

â\200\224 Increased tariffs on some previously unaffected items.

â\200\224 Exchange rate and interest rate management.

Tone of budget

Finance Planning Minister:

A budget designed to stimulate growth, particularly in the non-mineral sector, but nevertheless one which forces the economy to live within its means and to set the stage for future growth. (ARB)

Observers:

A tight budget as evidenced by the high external borrowing figure. (SCR)

Policy changes reflect move to stabilize the economy and fight inflation. (SCR)

Fair and well balanced. (AED)

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