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LAST WHITE LANDMARK

The result of the last Whites-only Referendum of March 17 surprised large sections of the outside world, who had predicted a neck-and-neck race. President De Klerk had, since last year, carefully cultivated the fear for the extreme right, as organised in the Conservative Party and the Afrikaner Weerstandsbeweging. South Africans and the outside world were to be persuaded that in the transition to a democratic South Africa no alternative presented itself but De Klerk, who had to be considered as the only one who could stop a return to apartheid conditions, renewed isolation and civil war.

The prospect of a neck-and-neck race seemed to suggest that De Klerk gambled as he seemed to run the risk to loose this referendum. He would then have to step down and let the CP stop the transition process and return to pre-1990 days. However, there are sufficient indications that De Klerk did not so much take a risk as masterfully calculate the possibility of eliminating the political influence of the right-wing. (continued on page 2).

European Parliament

WAIT FOR RESULTS CODESA

During its February 1992 session, the European Parliament has adopted a resolution, welcoming the results of the CODESA meeting of December 1991, and requesting the EC governments and the European Commission 'not to take any new sanctions initiatives vis-a-vis South Africa until such time as agreement on the formation of an interim government is reached and the results of the working parties of CODESA are known.

The resolution requests the diplomatic recognition of the Interim Government as soon as it takes office, and subsequent upgrading of the EC Liaison Office in South Africa to the status of diplomatic mission, but the Commission should not 'take any initiative in this respect until such time as that government has been formed'. The Community was urged 'to examine how trade and cooperation may be formalized at the appropriate time with the emerging new South Africa and how the country may become a partner in a new initiative to promote cooperation and development in the Southern African region'.

During its plenary session in March, a few days before the referendum, the Parliament called on the white electorate of South Africa 'to show ... that they wish their country to play its full part in the growing international community of democratic nations'. On EC-South African relations, Parliament reaffirmed the positions taken in February and stressed that such a positive vote 'will open the possibility of the rapid removal of all further restrictions, other than the arms embargo, on normal relations between the EC, its member states and South Africa.

Denmark

Before the referendum the majority of Danish parliament had conditionally agreed to lifting the remaining economic sanctions, (trade, trade credits and new loans) 'if President de Klerk makes it clear that he considers the March 17 referendum as the final mandate which he seeks from the white population separately and that

at the same time he commits himself that the basis for continued negotiations on changing the South African constitution will be the CODESA Declaration of Intent, so that all racial division will be removed'.

After the positive result of the referendum, the parliamentary majority disagreed with government whether these conditions were met. The minister of foreign affairs lifted the sanctions nevertheless and parliament reluctantly accepted this as the alternative would have been toppling the government and new elections.

EC 1985 sanctions

The governments of the UK, Germany and Portugal (never strong supporters of sanctions anyway) were reported to be in favour of lifting remaining economic sanctions, such as the ban on the export of crude oil, the EC introduced in 1985.

Government and Parliament of the Netherlands have been more reluctant and agreed that first the new situation in South Africa has to be analysed and that moreover such initiatives are matters for the United Nations and the EC as a whole to deal with.

European Commissioner Mr. Andriessen, in charge of external relations, stated on February 13 that the sanctions which the EC jointly introduced in 1985 (crude oil exports, sales of computers to the SA army and police, nuclear relations), had been agreed by consensus and therefore can only be changed or lifted by consensus.

(more on EC and South Africa on back page)

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Referendum South Africa

(continued from front page)

An analysis of the preceding two white elections had already shown that until February 1990, the Conservative Party of Andries Treurnicht and other reactionary Afrikaner groups like the AWB would, between them, not be able to attract more than 33% of the white votes. Due to the political changes set in motion by the NP government, the extreme right wing saw its support increase to around 40%.

De Klerk was advised by his information service that he could count on 57% - 60% of the white votes, provided he did not wait much longer with a referendum. De Klerk realised that a more substantial referendum dealing with material constitutional changes, such as a one man one vote constitution, might shift the balance more in favour of the CP: possibly 50% or even more of the white votes. Therefore, De Klerk needed a definite pretext of organising a referendum before CODESA reached substantive agreement. The recent bye-election of Potchefstroom gave him that pretext. He is said to have purposely guaranteed the NP's defeat by means of announcing shortly before election-date an increase in the cost of white education.

Shortly after the announcement of the surprise referendum strong forces rallied behind the yes-option. The Democratic Party decided to advise support for De Klerk, whereas the business community and the media also called for the yes-option. The ANC did, indeed, formally denounce the referendum as a racist instrument which gave the white minority once more a veto over the future of South Africa. According to last year's census the white minority is presently estimated at no more than 11% of the total population, and therefore theoretically 6% of the total population could have stopped the negotiations and reversed the transition back to apartheid.

Nevertheless, it was an open secret that the ANC trusted the referendum would finally clear the way for quick decisions within CODESA on a number of issues which had been stalled by the lack of a white mandate to continue with constitutional reforms. And the CP was strongly divided about participation.

An unexpected windfall for De Klerk was the successful participation of the Springboks in the Australian cricket tournament, for the first time after years of exclusion, which sport-mad South African whites have always deeply regretted. The right-wing opponents of De Klerk realised that most whites would not want to suffer from a sport-boycott again. Political analysts had moreover commented that the gains of the CP in the Potchefstroom bye-election had to be seen as protest votes against the economic deterioration. Those votes would, in their view, turn into yes votes at the referendum precisely because those protest voters realised that renewed sanctions would be disastrous for the economic and financial situation of the country.

De Klerk won the referendum with almost 70% of the white voters. He declared that the whites had written the last chapter of the book of apartheid that the whites had begun. Much to the annoyance of the democratic movement in South Africa, De Klerk once more could not bring himself to admit that apartheid is criminal and sinful. According to Archbishop Tutu, reconciliation can only work if and when De Klerk expresses regret about the suffering caused by apartheid - to be

followed by forgiveness and reparation for injustice. Instead, in an obvious attempt not to alienate the no-voters De Klerk maintained that apartheid was initially well-intended as a quest for justice.

The CP and the AWB, however, were furious and disappointed with the result. The extreme right-wing which had claimed to represent God's will, regretted the clear defeat and blamed this on a conspiracy of the media and the international world.

The AWB even announced a declaration of war, but AWB's leader Terreblanche, who has more than once declared war against the traitor De Klerk, is not considered as a serious threat to the safety of the state, as the right-wing extremist groups, even if they could overcome their differences, lack the command structure, the logistics and the armaments. Furthermore, it is believed, that the South African security forces have charted these groups in the minutest details and that, once the political decision is taken, these can be effectively silenced. Moreover, it may be assumed that most extreme-right-wing Afrikaners would lack the determination to actually wage this war against the state which they are bound to lose. Afrikaners have always been indoctrinated to obey the leaders of the 'Volk', and it will therefore be difficult to actually violently oppose massively the proven will of the majority of the whites.

Much more dangerous for a peaceful development and progress in CODESA is the continuation of the activities of the mysterious 'Third Force' which is thought to have secret networks in the SADF and SAP with considerable support, not only among the lower ranks, but also among higher officers who are still indignant about the demotion of General Malan and who oppose constitutional reforms. The Third Force may not necessarily envisage trying to take over state authority, but they can sabotage the transition and create upheaval and chaos by continuing terrorism in the townships, as has been the effective policy of the MNR in Mozambique. The Third Force, whose main aim is reputed to be the undermining of the credibility of the ANC as a mass movement representing the majority, is also documented to be involved in Inkatha-executed murderous sorties in the townships. Inkatha, part of which wanted to sign a pact with the AWB, is in a crisis with Buthelezi's leadership challenged, now that Washington has withdrawn support, on the advice of the US embassy in Pretoria.

The democratic movement continues therefore to demand that De Klerk will actively oppose the undermining of the ANC and finally restore order in the townships by tackling this Third Force, which has infiltrated the state organs and can be held co-responsible for the increasing political violence. Politically, the referendum was thought to have cleared the way for CODESA to establish an interim government council, which will then take control over security. However, a few days later, on 23 March, De Klerk announced his plan for interim councils with no more than advisory powers, and for the three-chamber parliament to maintain its veto right over decisions of CODESA. The reactions to De Klerk's policy were understandably furious, as a more cooperative stand had been expected.

In any case, the need to end the political violence is increasingly recognised as the topmost priority before any other changes can be agreed upon.

UNITED NATIONS SITUATION REPORT ON EMERGENCY RELIEF OPERATIONS IN ANGOLA, JANUARY 1992 (excerpt)

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Current situation:

1. Heavy rainfall throughout interior, combined with improved access, led to increased projection of crop productions, up 15% from over last year. Excessive rains may have damaged harvest in Kuando Kubango province, however.
2. Donor response to emergency appeals for SRPA-II and for aid to Demobilising Soldiers significantly improved, especially with regard to food aid. Non-food sectors are still underfunded.
3. Government managed to bring together many of opposition groups for discussion of political future of Angola.
4. Violence committed by soldiers or bandits in numerous municipalities (Menongue, Luena, Kuito, Andulo, Quilengues) has renewed problem of overland travel. Security situation worsened throughout Angola, including continued rise in lawlessness in Luanda first reported in October-November 1991 situation report.
5. Extension of national administration encountering obstacles in several provinces (Huila, Uige, Bie, Moxico, Kwanza Sul) from civilians opposed to government authorities in some municipalities. Establishment of parallel structures in certain provinces by UNITA elements causing fracturing of social services especially in health sector.
6. Disturbing evidence of separatist attitudes surfaced in Lunda Norte and continued in Cabinda.

Donor Response:

7. WFP agreed to provide 64,814 mt of food aid for SRPA-II from the international emergency food reserve, along with concomitant funds for internal transport, storage and handling. WFP expects to replace stocks with pledges from international donor community in response to the appeal.
8. USA pledged significant level of support for both SRPA-II and Special Programme for Assistance to Demobilising Soldiers, including 20,000 mt food assistance, one million meals-ready-to-eat, US\$ 2 million in non-food aid through UNICEF and WFP/UNILOG, US\$ 500,000 for the Emergency Coordination Unit and support to Non-Governmental Organisations.
9. EEC pledged ECU 2.5 million in non-food aid to SRPA-II through UNICEF, UNHCR and various NGOs including Médecins Sans Frontières (MSF) of Belgium, Spain and France. For demobilising soldiers, EEC pledged 14,230 mt of rice, beans and oil, valued at ECU 9 million. In addition, EEC providing ECU 681,000 worth of oil and milk powder through European NGO OIKOS. To complement these commodities, GOA and EEC agreed to release NKZ 145 million in counterpart funds for the local purchase of dried fish and salt through WFP/UNILOG.

POLITICAL/ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENTS

10. A multi-party meeting which brought together representatives of almost all Angolan political forces dominated political events during January. Participants held discussions in Luanda and covered a wide range of issues, chief of these being definition of the right of Angolans to vote in September 1992 general elections, including those who will be registered abroad. UNITA stayed away from the meeting.
11. Angola received visits from several foreign dignitaries. The Spanish head of government, Mr. Felipe Gonzalez, came to Luanda on 27 January to strengthen bilateral ties with signing of cooperation agreement. Spain granted US\$ 380 million primarily to open credit lines and revamp private sector.
12. Another important cooperation agreement was signed in Luanda when South African Foreign Minister Pik Botha visited Angola. South Africa intends to cooperate with Angola in agriculture, transport and communications. The governments agreed to exchange business representations in respective capitals. Pretoria will assist in demobilization of troops and will train Angolans in clearing mines, as well as providing the required equipment.
13. During recent visit to Luanda, Italian Foreign Minister Giovanni de Michelis said his government intends to expand its presence in Angola, particularly in petroleum industry. Italy earmarked US\$ 440 million for investment in several sectors.



*AWEPAA Lisbon
Conference on
Angola, Feb. 1992*

*Left to right: EC
Commissioner Marin,
AWEPAA President
Scholten
Angolan Minister
Lopo do Nascimento
Foto: Pieter Boersma*

PEACE PROCESS

17. Process of extending national administration has been hindered in several provinces by civilian demonstrations against government representatives. Although UNITA officially recognised sovereignty of central government throughout Angolan territory in November 1991, UNITA representatives maintain *de facto* control of some municipal governments and services in many provinces.

SOUTHERN AFRICA SLIDES TOWARDS FAMINE - INTERNATIONAL ACTION REQUIRED

Drought is destroying the staple maize crop across the continent but aid has not yet begun to flow. Southern Africa is parched. The rains have failed and temperatures have soared. From Angola on the Atlantic to Mozambique on the Indian Ocean, more than 100 million people are living in a landscape where foodstocks are drastically shrinking. International action is so far very limited. The vast refugee camps and skeletal children which have awakened world sympathy for the Horn of Africa are not a feature of the southern droughtlands - or not yet. 'It shouldn't have to become a famine for people to act,' an aid agency official warns.

Efforts at political change - in South Africa, Angola, Zambia and Mozambique - could all be set back by the serious hardship that is, inexorably, coming. 'Yet there is no big mobilisation by the West to support this political transition,' the aid official says. 'It is better to prevent the collapse of countries, as is being done with aid to Eastern Europe, and we should be applying the same rule to Africa.'

The drought's regional impact is exacerbated by the fact that the two most abundant food producers, Zimbabwe and South Africa, are among the worst hit, no longer able to export surpluses of the staple maize to surrounding states. Last month the Southern Africa Development Co-ordination Conference (SADCC) spoke of 8 million tonnes of grain imports being needed to sustain the 11 drought states; now the talk is of 11-12 million. These expensive, long-distance imports will consume plenty of scarce hard currency.

Since early January scarcely a drop has fallen on southern, central and parts of eastern Zambia - the main maize growing areas, which had expected to export for the first time in years after promises of market reforms. Only the north seems largely unaffected. Entire rivers have vanished, dams and municipal reservoirs are drying up, and water tables are sinking. Electricity rationing is likely in Zambia. Some Zimbabwean towns have already started rationing water. Harare's water has acquired a peculiar smell and taste as weed-killing chemicals and algae have become more concentrated in the dwindling supplies of Lake Chivero.

Zambia estimates the drought has reduced its maize crop by 80 per cent. It will need to import 800,000 tonnes - 'probably more,' says Guy Scott, minister of agriculture. The country needs \$300 million for the grain imports and drought relief. Zimbabwe will have to import 2 million tonnes at a cost of about \$450 million. South Africa is having to import at least 3 million tonnes of maize to meet its own needs after losing nearly half the crop.

Mozambique doubly hard hit by war and drought

The Limpopo River is so low that the Limpopo irrigation scheme, the largest in Mozambique, can supply

water to no more than a third of the 10,000 acres, mostly planted with rice, that usually benefit from it. Conditions are similar everywhere in Mozambique south of the Zambezi River. Food aid is needed urgently 'to avoid large numbers of deaths,' Jacinto Veloso, the co-operation minister, said. The southern Mozambican province of Gaza has declared a state of emergency: its maize crop is almost totally lost. Officials had hoped for a harvest of 17,000 tonnes. Now they expect 400. A moderated food surplus in three northern provinces cannot compensate.

Mozambique's food situation was already precarious, largely because the war waged by rebels of the South African-backed Mozambique National Resistance has shattered the country's agricultural, transport and trading systems and displaced perhaps 3.5 million peasants from their homes.

The country will have to import 1 million tonnes of grain; but even if the money and supplies can be found, fears are growing about 'food security' here and in Angola, where the north and central plateaux have seen good crops badly damaged by heavy rains while drought has hit the south.

Banditry is widespread in both countries and moving large amounts of food aid into interior areas is hazardous. Mozambican rebels near Catandica recently killed 36 people and destroyed eight lorries from a food convoy returning from the central province of Manica. In Zambia the problem will be preventing food being smuggled to Zaire, where it commands a high price.

Transportation nightmare

The biggest fear almost everywhere is that transportation networks will be incapable of handling the amounts of grain imports needed. 'The region's transport system has never experienced this kind of traffic,' Guy Scott says. 'It's a logistical nightmare.' Inefficient ports, poor roads and railways, and ageing lorry fleets typify many of the drought-hit states. The system will be strained from every direction. Namibia has lost 80 per cent of its maize crop; Lesotho expects to produce only 45,000 tonnes of maize, against the normal harvest of 120,000 tonnes, and is bracing itself for rocketing prices; Malawi - which has to feed some 1.2 million Mozambican refugees as well as its own people - is likely to produce 700,000 tonnes of maize, less than half the usual. Even Tanzania and Botswana, where the rains began adequately, have gone dry since January.

The drought's impact reaches far beyond the vital maize crop. Cash crops such as tobacco, cotton and sugar have also been hit, reducing the ability to pay for food imports. Poultry and livestock are dying in the intense heat. Veterinarians in Zimbabwe say at least 90,000 cattle have died of starvation since December. Swaziland is slaughtering its herds.

EC AID PACKAGE FOR NAMIBIA

After months of preparation the European Commission has agreed on an aid package of 10 million ECU while preparations are being made to finalise another agreement worth 51 million ECU. In signing the first agreement, the EC delegate Luis Moreno stressed 'the utmost importance that the EC places on providing support ... to the rural communal areas'. The programme covers aid to veterinary services, farm colleges, development brigades, resettlement schemes, educational curriculum development, technical assistance and training in fisheries and a fund for small projects. It is an interim agreement until the full National Indicative Programme of a further 51 million ECU for five years under the Lomé IV Convention is signed in the coming weeks.

In addition, because the EC has granted Namibia 'least developed country' status, it is eligible for extra grants under the Stabex (commodities) and Sysmin (mining) accords. This has led to the Namibian government asking the EC for a US\$66 million loan under the Sysmin agreement. The aim of this loan is to diversify the Namibian mining sector away from its heavy dependence on uranium. Over the last five years taxes and export earnings from the Rössing uranium mine have dropped dramatically and hundreds of workers have been dismissed. One of the major projects to be financed under this loan will be the treating of mineral wastes and the extraction of copper, zinc, lead and other metals from them.

SPAIN ACTS ON ILLEGAL FISHING

The Spanish government has taken action against one of the boats found illegally fishing off the Namibian coast. This followed a call by EC Vice-President Manuel Marin at a conference in Spain for an end to all illegal fishing (see AWEPA News Bulletin, Jan/Feb. 1992). This and the arrest and confiscation of eight Spanish boats by the Namibian authorities meant that both the EC and the Namibian government were seen to be acting strongly to curb illegal fishing, but many Namibians were still waiting for action to be taken by the Spanish government itself against boats reported to have been illegally fishing in Namibian waters.

In February the Spanish Ambassador in Windhoek, Carlos de Boado, announced that fines totalling R700.000 (± ECU 200.000) had been imposed by the Spanish government on the owner, captain and representative of the Hermanos Garrido, which was spotted illegally fishing in Namibian waters last August. Ambassador de Boado said he had informed his government in Madrid about the presence of the boat in

Namibian waters, after which it had been summoned back to Spain where its documents were inspected by the local authorities. Because the books had not been kept in a regular way and the boat had left Spain without the necessary clearance, a heavy fine was imposed. The fine was not the result of illegal fishing in Namibia's Exclusive Economic Zone, as the Namibian authorities had not provided any proof of this, according to the Spanish ambassador. But the Spanish government has now shown its willingness to act and this, combined with the attitude of the European Commission and the actions taken by the Namibian government, should act as a strong deterrent against further large-scale illegal fishing.

WALVIS BAY DEVELOPMENTS

The Namibian government has expressed its concern about recent developments in Walvis Bay. Last year the South African and Namibian governments agreed that a joint administration should be set up for the disputed harbour area until the South Africans withdrew their administration and the enclave was reintegrated into Namibia. All matters pertaining to Walvis Bay were to be dealt with by a joint technical committee, which last met in December 1991. However, in mid-February the South African administration in Walvis Bay unilaterally called a meeting of the white, coloured and black town councils in the town. At this meeting, which was attended by 65 councillors, new South African legislation allowing for the setting up of a single municipality was discussed. The Namibian Foreign Minister, Theo-Ben Gurirab, accused the South African government of breaking the 'letter and spirit' of the earlier negotiations. He protested against this unilateral action taken by South Africa to change the status of Walvis Bay prior to the setting up of a joint administration.

In another development, South Africa continued to reduce its military presence at the Rooikop Military Base at Walvis Bay. The Second South African Infantry Battalion was officially deactivated on 21 February. This follows the withdrawal of the 61st Mechanised Brigade in the middle of last year. South African military sources confirmed, however, that the Walvis Bay Military Area will remain active with Commando and Cadet detachments maintaining their presence in the enclave.

At the February meeting of the Liberation Committee of the Organization of African Unity in Tanzania, Namibia received strong backing from the OAU on the question of the reintegration of Walvis Bay. The meeting called for the immediate return of Walvis Bay and the offshore islands in accordance with UN Security Council Resolution 432 (1978). Meanwhile, white residents could vote in the South African Referendum of 17 March at local polling stations.

GOVERNMENT AND RENAMO AGREE ON ELECTIONS

After months without progress, the Rome talks on peace in Mozambique have achieved an important result on March 12 with the signing of Protocol no. 3, which establishes the basis for a new Electoral Law in Mozambique. The Electoral Law will be drawn up by the Government, in consultation with Renamo and with all the other political parties.

Apart from electoral guidelines, procedures and guarantees, the Protocol covers civil freedoms and the position of refugees and displaced persons.

The legislative and Presidential elections will be simultaneous, and should take place within a year of the signing of a General Peace Agreement. However, the Protocol adds that this timetable may be extended if it proves impossible to organise elections within a year. This is a concession to Renamo: the Government had wanted elections to be held as soon as possible.

The electoral system will be based on the principle of direct, equal, secret and personal vote.

The voting age is set at 18, and citizens over the age of 18 may be elected to the new Assembly. But this clause goes on to add that 'the parties agree, however, on the convenience of a transitional norm for the next elections raising this age limit to 25'. (It was Renamo that wanted to establish the age of 25 for candidates to the Assembly, on the grounds that younger citizens would not be 'mature' enough.) No-one may vote who is not registered. Thus, unlike the Zimbabwe independence election of 1980, the Government has committed itself to a massive, and logistically difficult, voter registration process. The two sides agreed 'to mobilise all Mozambican citizens over 18 years old to register and exercise their right to vote.'

The country's provinces constitute the electoral constituencies. The number of parliamentary seats for each constituency will be based on the size of the population.

For the legislative elections the Electoral Law shall establish a system based on the principle of proportional representation.

There will be a threshold for a party to gain representation in the new parliament, which is to be established in discussions with all political parties, and not just between the government and Renamo. This threshold shall be between 5 and 20 per cent of the votes. In practice, it is likely to be set at the lower end of this spectrum, since no party other than Renamo has expressed an interest in a high threshold. In fact Renamo had wanted 20%.

Parties can form coalitions before the election campaign officially starts and provided they present their lists with a single symbol.

As for the election of the President, the candidate who wins over 50 per cent of the votes cast shall be elected, and if necessary a second round of voting shall be held between the two candidates with most votes.

A National Electoral Commission is to be set up, composed of 'persons who, by their professional and personal characteristics, give guarantees of balance, objectivity and independence in relation to all political parties'. Renamo shall designate one third of the members of the commission. The commission will

organise and direct the electoral process, ensure that candidates are treated equally, and deal with any complaints about the fairness of the elections. The commission is to ensure that the subsidies and logistical support available for the election campaign are distributed, without discrimination, among the competing parties.

Under the protocol the Government pledges to assist Renamo obtain buildings and resources for its political activities in all provincial capitals and other places if possible, but within the limits of what may be available. No such promise of assistance is made for the other, non-violent opposition parties.

The Government will request support from the international community for the electoral process.

Refugees

The two sides promise to cooperate in the repatriation and reintegration of Mozambican refugees and displaced persons, as well as in the social integration of the war disabled. Assistance will be requested from the relevant United Nations agencies, and the International Committee of the Red Cross.

The protocol stresses that refugees and displaced people lose none of their rights and freedoms as citizens by the fact of having abandoned their places of residence. Mozambican refugees will be allowed to reclaim their property, if it still exists. Fears had been expressed that such a clause might open the door to former settlers trying to grab houses, farms or factories they owned prior to independence. However, the specific reference to 'Mozambican' refugees makes it unlikely that any court would accept such a demand.

Freedoms

The protocol also contains sections on press freedom, the freedom of assembly and freedom of movement. These broadly repeat what is already enshrined in Mozambican law. But one change in the press law is needed if the protocol is to be implemented fully. The existing press law states that radio and television remain entirely in the public sector, whereas the protocol gives all citizens the right to set up not only publications, but also radio and TV stations. The

public media are to grant right of access, without discrimination, to all political parties. The election campaign rules should allow space in the public media, free of charge, to all competing parties.

The rights of assembly, association, demonstration and political propaganda are granted to all citizens, but these rights do not extend to 'illegal private paramilitary groups', nor to those 'who promote violence in any form, terrorism, racism or separatism'. The most controversial issue under discussion, namely the relation between constitutional amendment and the new parliament, is postponed for future discussion. Renamo had demanded that the future parliament amend the constitution as its top priority, while the Government retorted that the parliament is a sovereign body that should fix its own agenda.

(*) The full text of the protocol is available from AWEPA.

CHEMICAL ATTACK ON MOZAMBIKAN ARMY

Mozambican soldiers have given details of what the authorities believe was a chemical attack fired from the South African border area last week. Border guards reported that unidentified aircraft flew over the area just before the incident. The unprecedented attack followed the retaking by government troops of an important base of the Renamo rebels at Ngungwe, a mile from the border. In 1990 the Ngungwe base was captured by the government and held for a year. It provided evidence of continued South African logistical support from Renamo, channelled along a dirt road running over the border.

Evidence of the chemical attack was given to the South Africans last week when the Mozambique/South African Joint Security Commission met for the

first time in several months. The material is being analysed by the Mozambicans, the South Africans, and third parties. Sources at Maputo's military hospital said at least five government soldiers died and 10 were wounded. Survivors said a projectile exploded in the air, releasing a dense cloud of black smoke which provoked 'severe pain and irritation'. Second lieutenant Joaquim Jonasse said the projectile exploded between 150 and 250 feet above their heads. 'It became very hot. Some of us were going crazy,' he said. He said they felt severe chest pains, were tired and thirsty, and when they drank water the next morning some of them vomited. Others said they had difficulty in seeing, and one said he had vomited blood.

MAPUTO SUBURBS UNDER ATTACK

On 28 January, on the eve of the SADCC Conference attended by ministerial delegations from many donor countries, Renamo carried out raids against three Maputo suburbs, leaving at least 18 people dead. The three suburbs, Patrice Lumumba, Ndlavela and T-3, are less than ten kilometres north of the city centre. Local residents say that the same group was responsible for all three raids. The raiders killed most of their victims with clubs, knives and similar weapons. Among the 18 dead were an entire family of six people, including young children. The bandits were carrying guns, however, and fired shots when they were moving out of each of the suburbs they attacked. These suburbs, Ndlavela in particular, came under repeated attack in 1991. Ndlavela is largely inhabited by displaced people who have fled from the war-torn countryside. Local people have no doubt that the raiders are members of Renamo: some of those kidnapped on previous occasions had returned home after they were forced to carry loot to Renamo bases.

AWEPA International Conference

Post-Apartheid Regional Cooperation: International Support for Transforming Southern Africa

Gaborone, Botswana, 27-29 April 1992

Southern Africa has never known such rapid and fundamental change as at present. From one side of the region to the other, new policies, new constitutions, new regimes and new relations are being forged which will determine the course of development for the region into the next century. This conference offers a unique chance to be informed of current Southern African developments.

The programme for the conference includes an examination of the current situation in South Africa and the preparations for a democratic South Africa to join in the development integration plans of the SADCC (Southern African Development Coordination Conference)

members. Reports will also be given of fact-finding missions to Mozambique and refugee camps in its neighbouring countries, as part of an examination of refugee and children issues in Southern Africa. Other topics include Botswana's development, environmental issues in development, and preparations for multi-party elections in Angola.

The conference will explore appropriate European policies for Southern Africa in the new era of regional peace and security. It is hosted by the National Assembly of Botswana and organised by AWEPA in cooperation with the African-European Institute.





Mr. Durão Barroso, dep.-min. for development cooperation, Portugal, and Mr. Lucio Lara, speaker of parliament, Angola, at the Lisbon Conference on Angola

Foto: Pieter Boersma

EC AGREES \$150m LOME FUNDS FOR ANGOLA

The European Commission and Angola signed a \$150 million Lomé-IV cooperation package in Luanda on February 3, setting post-war reconstruction as the top priority. The four-year National Indicative Programme aims to reintegrate one million mostly rural people displaced by war, and help demobilised soldiers. EC Development Commissioner Manuel Marin said the EC was particularly concerned to reintegrate former Unita rebels. The programme aims to restore rural life through environmental, agricultural and fishing projects, and develop communications and social services. Parts of the Benguela rail link may be restored to boost domestic traffic.

In addition, \$13 million will be provided by the European Investment Bank, also under the Lomé-IV convention. Angola will continue to receive emergency and food aid, which amounted to \$35m since last year's ceasefire.

SPAIN SEEKS TO BOOST LINKS WITH ANGOLA

Spanish prime minister Felipe Gonzalez said on January 27 in Luanda that 'democratic Angola' will become as privileged a partner for Spain as the Latin American countries which have signed treaties of friendship and cooperation. Spain is providing loans totalling around \$400 million. So far Spanish interests have mainly focussed on fisheries, under an agreement mostly of benefit to the Spanish fishing industry. This time, according to the Spanish daily *Diario 16*, Gonzalez is offering loans for the purchase of patrol boats by the Angolan Navy. It is not yet clear whether Spanish aid will be tied to the installation of democracy in Angola. Gonzalez did not meet UNITA leader Jonas Savimbi, who was in South Africa. Coinciding with the visit, 50 Spanish entrepreneurs from the trade, chemical, food industry and other circles also arrived. Last year, the trade volumes between the two countries stood at nearly \$200 million.

REMAINING WESTERN ECONOMIC SANCTIONS

With regard to sanctions, Western countries have reacted differently on political developments in South Africa of the last two years, which have culminated in the CODESA agreement of December 1991 and the positive outcome of the whites-only referendum of March 17, 1992. Policies varied from lifting (almost) all economic sanctions (USA, UK, Japan, Austria, now also Denmark), lifting part of the previous sanctions package (imports and new investments: European Community; trade, services and trade credits: Finland); to keeping (almost) all in place for the time being (No change: Norway and Sweden; air links and tourism: Commonwealth minus UK).

At the moment of writing (late March 1992) the most important Western economic sanctions, known to be still in place are the following:

new investments, loans	Commonwealth -1, Norway, Sweden, Finland, Iceland
trade credits	Commonwealth -1, Norway, Sweden, Iceland
export of crude oil, nuclear relations, sale of computers to SA army and police	European Community -2, Norway, Sweden, Iceland Commonwealth -1
all imports and exports	Norway, Sweden, Iceland
imports (coal, iron and steel, gold coins, agricultural products, uranium)	Commonwealth -1

Commonwealth -1 = excl. UK, incl. Canada, Australia, New Zealand

European Community -2 = incl. Belgium, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Portugal, Spain
= excl. UK, Denmark

EC representation in South Africa

Several AWEPA members have reported their political initiatives after our appeal, to ensure that the EC's technical office in South Africa will only be upgraded to a diplomatic representation after the establishment of a broadly supported interim government or transitional authority. Mr. Dhoore (Belgium), Mrs. Owen and Mr. Kitt (Ireland), Mrs. Err (Luxembourg) as well as the AWEPA group in the European Parliament asked parliamentary questions or introduced resolutions to this effect. In its February 12 resolution the European Parliament endorsed this position. European Commissioner Mr. Andriessen, in charge of external relations, stated that the Commission seriously considers to open an official delegation in South Africa, in the light of the political developments in this country and closely following the CODESA process. The governments of Belgium and Ireland had confirmed this earlier on, in slightly different wordings.