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FRELIMO and the

Mozambique Revolution

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The presentation of a fully adequate account of the nature of the Mozambique liberation struggle, and of the revolution which has sprung from that struggle, would be a major undertaking. It would require an

analysis of how the present situation has emerged from the complex his-

tory of the area. It would also require that the struggle in Mozambique be set clearly in its broader contextâ\200\224both the immediate context of the Southern African complex taken as a whole, as well as that of the world-wide balance of forces. And considerable attention would have to be paid to the logistics of the military confrontation and to a more precise delineation of the considerable progress being made in that sphere by Mozarabican freedom fighters. To present such an account is not the intention of this brief essay; its more modest objective s to attempt to learn something significant about Mozambique-by focusing on the recent development of the Mozambique liberation Front (FRELIMO), the movement which leads the resistance to Portuguese colonialism, This ls important because the politics of FRELIMO have been much misunderstood: as I shall argue, the leadership crisis which surfaced in FRELIMO after Mondlaneâ\200\231s untimely assassination in 1969 was a mark of the movementâ\200\231s growing strength, not of its weakness, as unsympathetic or uninformed observers have sometimes tended to assume. This focus is also imporrant because the developments which have taken place inside FRELIMOâ\200\224and, more broadly, within liberated Mozaribique as a wholeâ\200\224have implications which must be taken seriously by all who are committed to the liberation of Southern Africa.

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FRELIMO and the Mozambique Revolution

1. Nationalism and Revolution

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The denouement of the African nationalism w hich car T

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he late 1950s and early 1960s has almost lw ariably been a mere Afs
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canization of the existing colonial SUIUCTUSES. A {â\200\231tiSUnCt':Vf: Pmt::nl;;\ :â
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Africa which has served to choke off dc\rcl(,Â»;')mczâ\200\231;;p a:.taÂ\$7 mâ\200\230f;fi:
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productive forces and release human energies. The domesuc atiributes
of this syndrome are by now familiar: % i =
1. An educated clite, or petty bourgeoisie, â\200\230c..ozztmis the sâ\200\230arfiâ\200\230
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both to guarantee the neocolonial presence of ')ntCrI}iï-\202f!!;&(â\200\230?; gi)Ã©;t?h;;
and to gain privileged access to surpluses fqr ti)i;;}:sa lves. :".Aol ,(:rc ,:i(,;i,\
group overlaps with a class of conmwrcml fâ\200\234rlCZinâ\200\230S-\\ilo : :V;ng;r
within the middle levels of the private sector (the â\200\234commanding
heightsâ\200\235 being the preserve of rl'fe international glnrs:) A
2. The mass of the population s, at worst, 1':tlâ\200\230r0:u:u.. ?.m';:f iï-\201;;r.â\200
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best, demobilized and manipulated with the sideshow of tribal, com
al, Â¢ ligious competition. '
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designed as instruments to facilitate such repression an or 1P
tion in the interests of the newly dominant LhÂ°SLS . Â¢
4. Official ideologiesâ\200\224the vaguest of â\200\234x?zâ\200\230xr-im}:ï-\202xsrns, fhc
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ingless of â\200\234African E;()Ci:l!iSXI'S',â\200\224~SÂ£3rYâ\202¬ pm-narâ\200\230xiy o \r
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gitimatize just such exploiranve relations erlxxrx the system. S
" These results were already prefigured in the nationalist :nt).ch;â\200\230. F
themselves, as Fanon and Nyerere, among or}?crs, h:wf emph??fze; . {;i-
nonâ\200\231s analysis of â\200\234the pitfalls of national consciousness : and of ;oe â
\200\230(. (,â\200\224
cok)ni'l;ati(/)n" are, of course, well known..But Ny.'ererc s less familiar .a;?-
proach to this reality is almost equally instructive, for hf: su:'nmar;â\200\230izz
precisely those aspects of the inbcmance from (hcâ\200\230 nixrâ\200\230(;x?afxlstl ;;d;'rs
which have had negative implications for posrâ\200\224.u::lomal A rica: th t;w
who desired, first and foremost, to occupy t!â\200\230leâ\200\230{jnv;icgtd })()S%rxoylsï¬
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former exploiters; masses sufficiently cm_\fus?u %)y the mgl'eâ\200\230;xn,,,[3;_
nostrums of nationalism to see such Afrxcanl?a'râ\200\230mn.as a} mgr:sllciar; , -
complishment, and yet very soon to become dxsxllisusmï¬\201?â\200\230.f.yinf':; ra\;;: (;L
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political organizations too exclusively gc':zred to &â\200\230:\c straight o â\200\230
mands of nationalism and therefore destined to â\200\234lose support and . . .

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atrophyâ\200\235; ideologies which easily degenerated into
 erereâ\200\231s term) and mere black nationalisi, providin
 against the underlying structures of capitalist exploir
 aware of the ambiguities of nationalist assertion

achievements, Nyerere can only conclude:

â\200\234racialismâ\200\235 (N
 g no real defense
 ation. Being thus ag

as of lts very real

It is comparatively easy to get independence from

a colonial powerâ\200\224espe-
 cially one which claims to base its national mor

ality on the principles of
 free, and the task of the
 nationalist is simply to rouse the people to a confidence in their own power
 of protest. But to build the real freedom which soctalisin represents s a
 very different thing. It dernands a posttive understanding und positive ac-
 tiens, nor simply a rejection of colonialism and

I non-cooperation. Aud the anti-colonial struggle will almost certainly have
 intensified the difficulties.?

freedom and democracy. Everyone wants to be

a willingness o cooperate

Here and there in independent Africa steps are being taken to chal-
 lesige this pattern. In Tanzania, for example, Nyerere and his colleagues
 have made some real effort to break out of the impasse of
 nationalism and increasingly to expose and remedy the
 which are masked by this inheritance; it is a difficult Â¢
 well aware and as [have h

conventional
 contradictions
 ask, as Nyerere is
 ad occasion to document elsewhere,â\200\231 though it
 is not perhaps an impossible one. In any case, the prol
 mal Africa are not the iimmediate subject m
 focus is upon the nature of insurgent nat
 the struggle to liberate Mozambique. And here we enter a world very
 different from that described by Nyerere, whose descriptions
 applicable to most of the rest of Afvica. Of course, the struggle in Mo-
 zambique (as clsewhere in Southern Africa) is immediarely distin-
 guished by the nature of the colonial resistance to nationalist aspirations
 there, and by the strategies of sustained military confrontation which
 must, of necessity, be adopted. But this kind of struggle
 other processes which reshape the P

lems of post-colo-
 atter of this essay. Rather our
 ronalism as it finds expression in

are n fact

also detonates
attern of nationalism into a new
mold and dictate, in the nationalist phrase itself, an
social, economic, and political relationships in a fi
ls what is happening in Mozambique; the conventional denouement of
African nationalism becomes ncreasingly unthinkat

attempt o restructure
mdamental way. This

ole as more and more
fundamental choices are forced upon the people in the v

waging their struggle. The result, in all ikelihood, will be not merely
national liberation, but a social revolution.

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FRELIMO and the Mozambique Revolution 381

2. The Logic of Protracted Struggle

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arcas of Mozambique). Inside F RELIMO there has bee e
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Sl v intransicent about integrating themselves efiec
ave often been equally intransigent @ Ity e =
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Africa. Such reactionary members of the { Beli
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And they have been joined by others who saw inde pe p :
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â\200\234the consolidation of their own perso See
group in action in the new Mo;/:ambxqm.x > dbfrorn o
i The mass of the Mozambican population has su}f:r.crl]c } Jcmi.izÃ© L

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the same disabilities, for revolutionary purposcls,' \l\{ lc e
ic . . J d parochialism, for ex: :
African peasantry generally: a profoun : â\200\230
African peasantry Â¢ | â\200\230 e R
n only Slowly dawning awareness of the broader meaning OlonpaiiSlTâ\200\230
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don. Of course, the particularly brutal nature of Pormguacs;as =
ovcxz rile centuries, and of the repression of recent)f eirs, i
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exploitation more graphic than in many other.pardts o e
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. danger that resistance to a vaguely pe |)
e l ist expression remains real. Moreover,
on a merely ethnic or regionalist express ol
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Mozambique has been no exception to the rulc.thar to a Sig v
e icity in Africa springs from the manipui
gree the politicization of ethnicity n o sies
(E(mï¬\201 of opportunistic elements of the leadership who
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bourgeoisie can seek to instrumentalize and demobi ize the el
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ervice of its own self-aggrandizement. In fact, 2 liberatio
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can provide its own particular variation on this theme. FRELIMO's experience demonstrates that such elements will find themselves much more at ease with the intra-elite infighting of exile politics than with trusting their political fates to the less predictable and less easily controlled will of the newly mobilized masses in the liberated areas. The military line of such a group parallels this preference; when combined with nostalgia for the relatively easy ride to power of petty-bourgeois leaderships elsewhere in Africa, the basic distrust of the masses and of a genuine release of energies leads to a putschist approach to the necessary armed confrontation with intransigent colonialism. Finally, a familiar ideological construct locks all these components into place: thus certain elements within FRELIMO have advanced a nationalism which asks no basic structural questions about the nature of the society being brought into being, and a racialist which ignores the broader meaning of exploitation in the interests of a mere Africanization of existing structures.

From the point of view of conservative members of the petty-bour-

geois leadership of the Mozambican independence struggle there has been just one flaw in all this: in the context of a genuine liberation struggle this kind of nationalism, quite literally, does not work as it did for African leadership groups elsewhere on the continent. On the contrary, for such a struggle to be waged successfully the energies of the masses must be released in a new way, the leadership must link its fortunes to the masses more effectively, and the imperialist enemy must be defined and confronted more meaningfully. In fact, once set in motion the reality of protracted struggle has increasingly imposed its own logic upon the Mozambican liberation movement,

What are the crucial dimensions of this logic of protracted struggle in Mozambique? We will sketch them only briefly here, though they are attested to in the publications of FRELIMO and, even more convincingly perhaps, in the eyewitness accounts of a number of visitors to the liberated areas of Mozambique in recent years.* Most important has been the need to close the gap between the leadership's potential elite and the mass of the peasantry, the need to evolve methods of work which render the contradiction between these two elements non-antagonistic and which promise to resolve it in a cumulatively progressive manner. ; :

A number of items are relevant here. First, given the fact of Portuguese reprisals and its calculated destruction of much of the established

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FRELIMO and the Mozambique Revolution 383

' jal life in its military hold
- infrastructure of economic and social life in areas where its military
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instituts have had to be
has faltered, entirely new institutions and programs have been
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begun in the liberated areas in the spheres of health, education, trade,
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and the like. Even day-to-day village life has been reorganized to
endow it with a new life.

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fages were regrouped in more sheltered areas to minimize the GAnEers Â«
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direct attack, great efforts being made to render agriculrural cuvi .1,1
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FRELIMO combatants must be able to move freely from \;.m;:, t{mt â\200\231
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hus had to become the military unitsâ\200\231 active partners in st lgg : e
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existence of a secure military backdrop for penetration furt ier ZOL -
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become imperative, so the | e - o

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iho: d the front linesâ\200\224this ln spire of the Â¢
actual militia behind the i : ; e
represented by 2 continuing shortage of firearms. A gromng/;) .m;d
' l et 8 of -es has begun to be effected as
evidence suggests that each of these advances has begun to be efie =
At b j its military e. T 3 ortan
FRELIMO has consolidated its military advance. The most imp .
oarini i llv clear: that such advances involve
implication of such a pattern is equaily Â¢ car: that s e
thing much more than â\200\234a rejection of colonialism and a wl mbfnc
e on.â\200\235 â\200\234ONtrs demand from
to cooperate in non-cooperation.â\200\235 On the contrary, _they, ;ielrriu e
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the people â\200\234a positive understanding and positve acâ\200\230uons. Â¢ Ki '

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Secondly, such a struggle has forced a deeperung of natuonat Â¢ .f

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sciousness. What has been stared carlier concerning the madu;u,}g o
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that national consciousness is unimportant: quite rhv. Opposite 18 â\200\230

:] cential for self-defeating divisiveness inherent in
As noted, there is a potential for se atng d s s
the realities of ethnic and cultural diversity which characterx;c â\200\230 ',,1

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African territory. In addition, one of the main msErumcnts (;x c?;c: :
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'\$1 ot least in Portuguese Africa, was to divide and ruleâ\200\235 by
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means of intensifying such divisions. Under S

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achieved national identity represents a considerable acconl]p {skml .
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is therefore particularly important to affirm .that a strugg cl o
Mozambique actually deepens the meaning of such a nationa lb : H} ,m

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does not in any way by-pass It. Cadres and guerrillas must be ab

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move casily into regions very far from their homes; tribesmen in

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gion must continue [o appreciate that theirs ls an inv olvcment s
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jong-range, territory-wide struggle even after their own lmmÂ\$. jate g s
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graphical corner has been liberated; others, beyond the front hines, .

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Part III: Case Studies

see that the struggle in the far north is more

the Portuguese would have them believe it to be. Such a nationalist

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then for the most militant line among the Mozambicans
responded with alacrity to this imperative; they have

firm about distinguishing revolutionary nation
look-alikes, and communicating this distinction to the populace,
To do this is also to deprive the
petty bourgeoisie of one of their trumpcardsâ\200\224their m

nic consciousness under the very umbrella of a vague and sloganized na-

tionalism. Moreover the elite, qua elite, has been undermined in other
ways by the dynamics of the struggle. Thus both the carving out of lib-
erated areas and the concomitant involvement of the populace introduce
dimensions which slowly but surely displace the world of exile politics.
Those politicians who have based their power upon links with the notg-
bles of host governments or with fellow exiles in Dar es Salaam and
Lusaka must transform their practice
to others more closely linked to novel political forces within the contes-
ted territory itself. The military also yields to th
fare. A military apparatus depend

or find their preeminence passing

is logic of guerrilla war-

A UPON IS ties to a mass base must
develop methods of work which ensure
provides leadership and raises the level of consciousness of the masses;
those who cannot make the transition to being members of a real peo-
pleâ\200\231s army are quickly spotted. As a direct result, the style and commit-
ment which characterize cadres, rather than mere functionaries, become
the order of the day both in the political and the military spheres,

In Mozambique, FRELIMO has slowly adjusted to these imperatives,
though not without certain very real difficulties and tensions to which
we will return in the following section. As it has done so, its further
practice has tended both to consolidate these advances and even to push
their logic further. If the people have, in effect, demanded a
than functionaries (and new exploiters) from a move
claim to their â\200\234positive understanding and positive
movement has taken concrete steps to forestal
ation. As a line, we have seen this to involve
tions of nationalism, It has also me:

â\200\234 its popular touch eâ\200\234ven while it

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ment which lays

â\200\234 actions,â\200\235 So too the

Lits own possible degener-
a deepening of the connora-

Its conscious assault on the seeds of

privilegeâ\200\224an assault most dramatically exemplified in the restructuring

FRELIMO and the Mozambique Revolution 3

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 f the educational system. After dismal experience with the i-201; }s(t fer(;i
 - tã\200\230ef Juasi-liberated secondary school system at the Mozam l h
 e - S;{aarn the new school at Bagamoyo (in Tanzania) has
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 ;mressive as the Bagamoyo experiment (if equally l(.f); â\200\230;esc,ribca e
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 - o Jhere have also begun te be quite scuã\200\224consã\200\230:t,ã\200\230;ous y â\200\230
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 the solution being coi!m,mcvã\200\230 Vguzloi, = he beginnings of some coop-
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 fieldsã\200\235). Finally, and fundamentally, thg l:};srxr'\klltlozfaj u{ e
 â\200\234participation and genuine self-assertion by the mass of the populati
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38
6 Part III: Case Studies

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. B â\200\230 Â¢ d Â¢e that in vio-
' tonalist struggle will be carried tl h to its â\200\234logi :

il o ed through to lts â\200\234logicalâ\200\235

These, then, are - :
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i mae ()bvioâ\200\230l~]}c f>y a nu{hber of close observers of Mo-
of the liberated urcaÃ© woulllb yâ\200\231, urther first-hand observation of the life
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3. The Politics of FRELIMO

It will now be appare ; ionshi
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FRELIMO and the Mozambique Revolution 387

where, as in Mozambique, the logic of the struggleâ\200\224of mass-line poli-
 tics, social reconstruction, protracted warfareâ\200\224imposes itself upon a
 growing number of the petty bourgeoisic, who feel no other choice is
 open to them but to commit â\200\234suicide as a class in order to be reborn as
 revolutionary workers, completely identified with the deepest aspira-
 tions of the people to which they belong.â\200\235 7 Simultaneously, that group
 consolidates this advance organizationally and ideologically and is thus
 able to give further shape and direction to the positive forces unleashed
 by revolutionary struggle. Such a reciprocal process can then become a
 self-reinforcing one.

This advanced stage is not reached easily. For a- movement like
 FRELIMO s, in reality, two entities for much of the early period of its
 existence: a conventional nationalist movement frustrated in achieving
 any easy transiion to power, and a revolutionary movement struggling
 to be born. In the shortrun, this dichotomy between the two finds con-
 crete expression in a struggle within the petty bourgeoisie, increasingly
 pitting those who arÂç and those who are not prepared to make the tran-
 Gition to revolurionary practice against one another. Of course, as the
 struggle develops, and in the longer run, the masses themselves come to
 an ever greater degree to be the arbiters of this conflict; this too is one of
 the â\200\234benefitsâ\200\235 of the horrors of guerrilla warfare. We shall see that both
 of these latter aspects have been present in Mozambique and that the po-
 litical patrerns of Mozambique and of RELIMO reflect them clearly.

Ironically, the seeds of the subsequent division within the nationalist
 forces were already present at the very first moment of effective unity,
 the founding of FRELIMO in June 1962. The convention which
 brought together the then existing nationalist groupingsâ\200\224â\200\224â\200\224MANU,
 UDENAMO, UNAMIâ\200\224was a reluctant marriage in many respects, in
 part the result of demands made by younger militants with more recent
 activist experience within Mozambique itself, in part of pressures from
 the Tanzanian government, host to several of these organizations. In-

deed, it was the younger group which took the major initiative in draft-
ing an initial and already quite progressive program for the new front in
September 1962, at the very moment when the established organiza-
tions were hesitating to place even their existing material possessions in
a common pool for the benefit of the new movement. Small wonder
that, as FRELIMO has recently admitted, the causes which kept these
organizations separate in the past namely, tribalism, regionalism, lack

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of a clear and detailed set of goals and of agreed and relevant strategies continued to exist and that the early days of FRELIMO were marred by mutual recriminations, expulsion, withdrawal, as between exile politicians who refused to give up the dead, futile in-fighting of an irrelevant brand of nationalist politics.

Fortunately, the most obviously opportunist and irrelevant elements

were the ones who split off, reconstituting in the process many of the organizations which had gone to make up FRELIMO, as well as several more. From this bewildering array of micro-parties there eventually emerged a second front, COREMO, based in Lusaka, which has been distinguished since its inception by its token membership and its almost total lack of activity. Not surprisingly, it has never been granted recognition as a meaningful liberation movement by the OAU Liberation Committee. On the other hand, FRELIMO, under the leadership of Eduardo Mondlane a returned Mozambican academic of some distinction who was elected at the first congress as president primarily with the support of the younger, more militant elements referred to above, managed to strengthen its position, as much as a result of the various defections which characterized the first few years as in spite of them. By September 1964, when its first military units crossed the Ruvuma from Tanzania, FRELIMO was ready to launch armed struggle; the socio-military process described in the preceding section was thus set in motion. :

The least adaptable elements within the original nationalist coalition had been cast aside, but this did not by any means ensure clear sailing for FRELIMO. In fact, the struggle within the petty bourgeoisie merely became more subtle in the succeeding period as, from 1964 to 1969, a fresh wave of tension built up. As hinted earlier, one aspect of this centered on the question of education broadly conceived, and particularly on the role of the proto-elite within the institutions of a free Mozambique. Confrontation with overseas graduates arose early and led, among other things, to the movement's instructing certain sources of American-based scholarships to cut off support for Mozambicans who were proceeding to second and third degrees; it was hoped in this way to force skilled nationals back into the struggle, after mere persuasion had failed. Such exemplary initiatives were not particularly successful, but it is the fact of these and other initiatives having been launched which helps account for the (quite unrepresentative) hostility of many

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FRELIMO and the Mozambique Revolution 389

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elitist Mozambicans in the United States toward the FRELIMO leader

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(English being, in effect, the language of scholarships!) and, m)aâ\200\230n p .
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Secretary of the Province and a member of the Central Committee) But the limitations of his particular kind of leadership so;)n rc\X' fâ\200\230Llâ\200\230{)i .themselves: such leadership was self-serving economically, divisive U!_u ically, incoherent militarily Â¢ reflecting, in short, a style â\200\231and subsfzx(:wm very much after the fashion exemplified by regional political â\200\234barom"fc a country like Kenya. Most negatively, he sought to turn the new comrj mercial structures of the liberated areas to his own use, skimming off large sgrpluseÂ\$ for himself a_ml his immediate supporters. As he came undcr.mcreasmg pressure from FRELIMO leaders, and from more committed militants within his own area, he quite predictably began to play the tribal card, seeking to crystallize â\200\234Makonde consâ\200\231cim' lsnccssâ\200\235 around his own person. He also actively sought support for his intrigue among certain of the less progressive but strategically placed elements in the I;'mz'.mian leadership. By 1968 he was even p/rcparcd to make an (abortive) bid for separatist independence for his province, to actively sabotage FRELIMOâ\200\231s military efforts,'Â® and, when finally balked 'm()i] expelled from the movement in early 1969, to go over to the Portugtlesc and make public pronouncements on their behalf, It is important to note that long_bc?brc this latter move it was perfectly clear thar K:lv;mdmnc; had foffexted any claim to Cï-\202{ })yihg popular support, even among his own tribesmen. Just as the logic of the struggle had transcended Gwen-jere anq his elitism, so too it was moving beyond the familiar p(;!iricoc economic royalism and Africanized exploitation of such men as K:iv~ andame and others.

By 196? the existence of two different â\200\234lines,â\200\235 as FRELIMO periodicals came increasingly to refer to the elements of contestation within the movement, was readily apparent. But the final scenes of this particular phase.of the Mozambican drama were not to be acted out until after the assassination of Mondlane in February 1969. It is impossible to say what the pattern of FRELIMOâ\200\231s development might have been had that assassination, by an unknown hand, not occurredâ\200\224probably much the same, with minor variations. What is clear, however, is that Mondlaneâ\200\231s role had been crucial to guaranteeing the kind of shift within FRELIMO and .within liberated Mozambique which was taking place during his pr;sxdencyf. If Gwenjere, Kavandame, and (as we shall see shortly) yâ\200\231ltâ\200\230c-.Prscicierxt Uria Simango represented a wholly petty-bourgeois natlopahsm, and if a handful of others represented a quite dcvdo;;Cd revolutionary position from a very early date, then Mondlane stood closer to

FRELIMO and the Mozambique Revolution 391

the center of the FRELIMO political spectrum. And, so situated, he came to epitomize those absolutely crucial members of the Mozambican petty bourgeoisie who were prepared to accept more and more of â\200\234the logic of protracted struggle,â\200\235 to contemplate â\200\234committing suicideâ\200\235 n the interest of a revolutionary politics.

Thus it was impossible to talk with Mondlane, or to hear him speak over the years, without observing the growth of his own understanding and practice. Some observers have insisted, nonetheless, that aspects of his accustomed life style and political approach would have imposed a severe limitation upon how far he could have continued ro move in this direction. Again, it is unnecessary to speculate about such matters. The fact remains that by using his powerful presence within the movement to guarantee the necessary minimum of organizational unity, while also swimming with â\200\230the tide of revolutionary nationalism and accepting more and more its logic, he did preside over the build-up of the prerequisites for further progress. By the time of his death the struggle was sufficiently advanced to have shifted the center of political gravity to

within the territory. The Second Congress, held, significantly, inside the liberated areas in 1968, had already moved to increase markedly the presence in the Central Committee of direct representatives from the political and military institutions of the interior. The new mass basis of Mozambican politics was beginning, strikingly, to assert itself. Similarly, a cadre of revolutionary petty bourgeois, adapting, like Mondlane, and often even less equivocally, to the new imperatives had by then emerged within the political and military spheres and could hope to consolidate its hold on the leadership positions. In fact, Samora Machel, who was to become president in 1970, can be seen as being fully representative of this group. When the showdown came inside FRELIMO, as it inevitably had to after the cancelling out of Mondlane's dominant role, it was these popular and progressive forces which were able to carry the day.

The result did not take place without a struggle, a struggle which racked FRELIMO in 1969. For the tendency toward conservative, petty-bourgeois nationalism ran right through the movement and very far up the apparatus. Indeed, it became increasingly clear that this tendency found its ultimate focus in no less important a personage than Reverend Uria Simango, the vice-president of FRELIMO under Mondlane. Simango, a powerful figure within FRELIMO from the outset (he was Mondlane's closest rival for the presidency in the earliest days, for ex-

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392 Part 111: Case Studies

392 Part 111: Case Studies

ample) staked out a position which consistently ultimated in a direct, tending to reduce the complex nature of the struggle: to its most baldly racial dimensions and the question of military tactics to its most adventurous (and self-defeating) formulae. Not surprisingly, it also began to be apparent in the last few years before Mondlane's death that Simango was giving tacit support to the (leftward) trends represented by both Gwenjere and Kavandame, despite his having taken an active hand in the Central Committee decisions which expelled them both; indeed, his involvement with Mozambique Institute students appears to have been particularly overt and was in any case only one of many indications of his identification with such elitist pretensions. Still other aspects of the syndrome of conventional nationalism were to characterize his position; in a quite predictable manner notably the use of ethnic and regional counters as a means of consolidating his power base. In this case

Almost from the very beginning of FRELIMO there had bc.cn comrades with . . . erroneous conceptions. Some of them had deserted in the course of the Revolution . . . Gradually, therefore, it was seen that â\200\234the Revolution itself ensures the rejection of the impure load it carries.â\200\235 But other elements remained among us carrying their mistaken ideas. It was on thg l?tâ\200\224ter that the last meeting of the Central Committee had a ~dccns.xve influence, bringing them back again to the revolutionary path. This action was the work of a group of comrades who had always kept themselves

FRELIMO and the Mozambique Revolution 393

faithful to the interests of the masses, respecting collective values and fighting individualism and personal ambition that foment opportunism,

~ comrades linked with the concrete reality and immersed in the realization of the principal tasks of the struggle.!

Yet, as very soon became apparent, what really happened was that âin that meeting we finally identified the existence of two ideological linesâ:

After this, the division became more acute. A struggle began between the groups representing the two lines. And all the problems, all the difficulties we have had since then are the result of this division.?

The stage had merely been set for the final act of the struggle for succession between these two tendencies.

As noted earlier, however, the die had been already cast. Samora, after all, represented the army, a powerful base in its own right, but all the more so when one considered that this was an army with an ever increasing number of the attributes of a people's military force and one rooted in a viral political process now established within Mozambique itself. Thus it was no accident that when Kavandame held back the Cabo Delgado delegation, a representative of his own cheque, to the FRELIMO Conference of 1969, Cabo Delgado was effectively represented by military delegates from that province; no accident, either, that it was the military, and not Kavandame, who could claim the effective allegiance of the people in Cabo Delgado, as events were to prove very soon thereafter. We have also observed the way in which the Central Committee, after the conference, reflected these new facts of political life in its composition. Simango himself must have realized that time was running out, that the days of exile politics and exile politicians, of nonrevolutionary nationalism and simple racist pieties, were drawing to a close. He chose to stake all on one last, desperate gamble: the publication of his document 'Gloomy Situation in FRELIMO.' 13

This text, a locus classicus for students of the disintegration of conventional African nationalism in the context of truly revolutionary conditions, made entirely clear what could only be suspected prior to its circulation. In addition to many shrill and reckless accusations of murder and assassination made against the Samora group, Simango's document publicly revealed the latter's close identification with each of those reactionary aspects of Mozambican nationalism against which the more progressive tendency of the leadership had set itself. The mobilization of

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tribal sentiment for factional advantage is one aspect of this. Simango's document several times manages to identify his opponents albeit misleadingly as 'southerners': 'Since 1966 there has been a rene'ncy' of a group, unfortunately composed of people from the south which included the late president of FRELIMO, to meet and take decisions by themselves and impose them on the people through maneuver.' Similarly, the attack on Janet Mondlane, which is also presented on a totally false picture of the degree of autonomy the Mozambique Institute has had from Central Committee scrutiny, comes across clearly as an attempt to substitute emotive and racial arguments for substantive arguments concerning policy. Equally significant are Simango's expressions of sympathy with elements which were, by the time of his document's publication, heavily discredited. Now for Simango, the participation of Father Gwendere in the Mozambique Institute problem and in other affairs of FRELIMO was an expression of sympathy and solidarity with his own people. 'Yer Simango had participated fully and without dissent in the decision to expel Gwendere from FRELIMO. Exactly the same was true for the case of Kavandame, but in his document Simango's picture of the Cabo Delgado situation is a blurred one, and Kavandame emerges as much sinned against as sinning. Needless to say, nothing is noted in his thesis about the economic aggrandizement and exploitation indulged in by the Kavandame group, though that had been the heart of the issue. In a parallel manner, other sections of the document seem quite specifically designed to flatter the elitist pretensions of the 'nationalist' group, in Tanzania and abroad; moreover, immediately after his subsequent expulsion from FRELIMO in December 1969, Simango wrote to Mozambican students in the United States assuring them that in any movement of his own which was subsequently established, their accomplishments would be scrupulously recognized. As noted above, FRELIMO responsables had suspected at the time that Simango was more linked with the initiatives of Gwendere and Kavandame than he had cared to state openly; now his declining fortunes had forced him to reveal his hand in an open bid for what remained of their constituencies. Predictably, this package was cemented ideologically: by means of the disarming rejection of the necessity for any ideological clarification:

There is a swing to say that we are divided on ideology. This can only mean difference on economic, religious, social policies (class), etc. I agree

FRELIMO and the Mozambique Revolution 395

that ideology is very important but it should never be considered as a uniting or dividing factor of the nationalist liberation force at this stage, if all agree and accept fundamental principles: (a) liberate Mozambique from the Portuguese colonial domination and (b) through the armed struggle.

Of course, many others who have continued to play an active role in the FRELIMO leadership would agree, up to a point, with this sentiment. They agree that it is premature to speak too overtly and aggressively about the tasks of socialist construction, they agree that a broad-based national liberation front characterizes the essential nature of the movement at the present time. But in Simango's case such sentiments have to be interpreted in the light of the particular kind of faction he was attempting to put together and of the particular kinds of quasi-class interests he was objectively representing. Only then can this kind of 'negative ideology' be understood for what it is in practice: a shield for the sorts of 'inter-national' exploitation, inimical to the further development of the struggle, which we have been describing.

It also represented an appeal to a particular kind of external constituency in Tanzania, and in Africa in general whose support Simango

now sought. There were elements within the Tanzanian leadership, for example, which could be attracted by this brand of anti-ideological (and effectively self-serving) black nationalism; indeed, such men had actually attempted to facilitate the strengthening of this sort of tendency within FRELIMO in the immediately preceding period. Simango may have hoped that similar elements, themselves more strongly entrenched in African countries other than Tanzania, would rally to the support of this kind of line. But Tanzania was the key, and there such leaders were being themselves outflanked by the development of Tanzania's own brand of socialism; with the issue already settled in that country, at least for the time being, Nyerere could make clear his unambiguous preference for the more progressive wing of FRELIMO. Moreover, the essential opportunism of Simango's own shifts of position soon became graphically apparent. By the time of his issuing a second, even more desperate, document at a meeting of the QAU Liberation Committee only a few months later Simango's description of the gloomy situation in FRELIMO had been turned more or less upside down. Whereas before it had been the Samora/dos Santos group which had been prematurely introducing the question of scientific socialism and capitalism in Mo-

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396 Part 111: Case Studies

zambiqueâ\200\235 (â\200\234Gloomy Situation in FRELIMO,â\200\235 p. 4), now the same site vice: â\200\234Talks about replacement of

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group stood accused of the oppo
people and necessity 10 purge the orga
were frequent. Precisely it is these peopl
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only speculate thae Simango, having failed in lan'/.
nationalist ploy, was now laying the basis for a possxblc_: (tl\()\xngl\ equally
unsuccessful) â\200\234ultra-leftâ\200\235 appeal to Chinese sources of aid.

For Simango, effectively blocked within FRELIMO by the strength
of the organization and the new reality of its popula'r character, :m.d de-
prived, as well, of any Tanzanian support, had in mind the launching of
a new movement; suspended from FRELIMO (November 1969), he

tried to mount just such an alternative. This in turn was the last straw
1970 he was ordered

for the Tanzanian authorities, and in February .
from the country. He drifted to Cairo, with occasional forays into Zam-
bia and the United States, and before long, like others before him who

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keep pace with the Mozambican revoilution, he had entered

could not :
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CORFEMO. From that resting place his ineffective smping
continued. . _ ' =

The volte-face of some of his closest confidants is even more striking.
Murupa, an erstwhile Central Committee member, went over to the
Portuguese side not long afterward, becoming in time a senior official in
the colonial apparatus with responsibility for implementing the strategic
hamlet program. To give him his due, Simango has to date publicly re-

sisted Portuguese blandishments designed to lure him to their side. But
the links which conti

aue to exist between him and Murupa, for exam-
ain unknown and, in any case, the objective result of his apos-

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' ngthen the ability of the Porruguese to confuse

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the issue at stake in Mozambique.
Fortunately, the creation of such a possibilit SCim
cant result of the series of events we have been tracing. More significant
is the fact that this process has, on balance, helped to strengthen the
ent. Indeed, FRELIMQOâ\200\231s own conclusion seems to be substan-

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tially accurate:

The spirit which prevailed at the latest meeting of the Central Committee

we have already reached an advanced phase in that process of
ship and revolu-

revealed that :

purifying our ranks. F'rankness reignedâ\200\224there was friend

FRELIMO and the Mozambique Revolution 397

tionary fraternity among all members. The climate that we felt was the re-
â\200\234sult of the ideological unity- that existed among us. For the first time in the
~history of FRELIMO, there were no discordant voices on the Central
Committee which were opposed to the revolutionary positions; it consti-
tuted a solid and united block.

We consider that a great victory has been achieved, one that must be
preserved and defended at all costs. The Central Committee itself recom-
mended continuous vigilance; in order that that vigilance may be
efficiently exercised, the Central Committee clarified certain concepts.
Thus, the Central Committee stressed its definition of the enemy. The
encmy has two faces: the principal and direct enemy, i.e., Portuguese colo-
nialism and imperialism, which are open enemies we confront daily in the
battlefield, and in relation to whom no doubt or confusion is possible. The
other face is that of the indirect or secondary enemy, who presents himself
under the cover of a nationalist and even a revolutionary, thus making it
difficult to identify him. The Central Committee reaffirmed thar the char-
acterization of the enemy for us will never be derived from color, national- |
ity, race, or religion. On the other hand, our enemy is that one who ex-
ploits or creates conditions for the exploitation of our people, whatever his
color, race, nationality, or religion.

Within the same intention of providing ideological weapons to our com-
rades so that they may be able to better defend our revolution, the Central
Committee defined the qualities which every FRELIMO militant must
build or develop in himself: continuously fighting ambition, opportunisin,
tribalis, and corruption. The existence of a high level of these qualities
will be the condition for a militant lo be appoinied for positions of respon-
sibility in our organization. . . .

Thus, a new period is being opened in the life of FRELIMO. We took
an important step forward in the consolidation of our unity, we elected a
truly revolutionary leadership, we clarified our political line, we came
nearer our final victory. '

. It may be that some potential contradictions remain beneath the surface.

The terms of the emerging idcology are sull left somewhat undefined.

â\200\234Exploitationâ\200\235 and â\200\234imperialismâ\200\235 characteristically join â
\200\234Portuguese co-
lonialismâ\200\235 and â\200\234ambition, opportunism, tribalism, and corruptionâ\200\235 i
n the

list of FRELIMO's enemies, but any public hint that the movement has
â\200\234socialistâ\200\235 intentions is systematically avoided. It is therefore possible
that there remains ground for tension within FRELIMO ranks between

~ the varying claims of â\200\234socialismâ\200\235 and â\200\234nationalismâ\200\235 (albe
it â\200\234revolution-

ary nationalismâ\200\235) at some subsequent stage of development, and particu-

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larly in the post-independence period. But even if this possibility exists, it is, for the time being, a fairly remote one. Moreover, all our evidence suggests that the trend of events may work, in the future as in the past, to resolve this potential contradiction and to fuse the meanings of socialism and revolutionary nationalism in Mozambique. For FRELIMO's practice continues to be an increasingly progressive one. And with the most overt sources of tension within the movement removed, the cadre who remain are primarily those who can be expected to move still further with the logic of protracted struggle. Mozambican advances since 1969 both in military terms and in terms of national reconstruction would seem to bear out this supposition in impressive fashion.

4. Prospects

It can be concluded that the triumph of this line within FRELIMO both reflects the emergence of a popular base and a progressive infrastructure for the Mozambican liberation struggle and gives promise of further mobilizing and consolidating these crucial features. The positive impact of these developments upon the military struggle can scarcely be overemphasized. Experience elsewhere suggests that the sort of changes which are being firmed up politically and economically in northern Mozambique are the sine qua non of further advance. It is significant that in both 1970 and 1971 the Portuguese launched what were heralded, in advance, as final mop-up campaigns in Cabo Delgado and Niassa provinces, throwing vast numbers of soldiers and much matériel into the fray. On both occasions they were forced to draw back. Beyond the Zambezi in disarray, leaving only the few fortified posts which they already held and a population largely undismayed by the outburst of Portuguese terrorism and intimidation witnessed during the operations. A local population increasingly conscious, organized, and self-reliant also recruits many more full-time militants for further advance; the dramatic successes during the past two years in Tete, where guerrillas have pushed south of the Zambezi and into the vicinity of Cahora Bassa dam, are testimony to the accomplishments which lie behind. Moreover, such successes tend to have a snow-ball effect. Certainly, progressive forces in the world at large have come to recognize the vigor and commitment of FRELIMO's efforts ever more decisively. Thus the Chinese, somewhat loath in the past to commit themselves to movements

APPENDIX

FRELIMO and the Mozambique Revolution 399

which already enjoy Soviet and Eastern European assistance, have continued to intensify their support for FRELIMO and their overt manifestations of solidarity. Even liberal forces in the advanced capitalist world (e.g., the World Council of Churches, the governments of the Scandinavian countries) have had to come to terms with the reality of FRELIMO advance and begin to examine critically their previous indifference to, or even tacit support of, Portuguese colonialism.

Equally important, these developments in liberated Mozambique have slowly but surely begun to foreclose the possibility of a false decolonization along lines hitherto quite predictable in much of Africa. Nothing can be said with certainty in this respect, of course, but there can be little doubt that the process of continually weeding out from the leadership the least progressive of the petty bourgeoisie has done a great deal to en-

sure the continuity of the social revolution already in train in the liberated areas. Moreover, we have noted the extent to which the army, a threat to revolutionary decolonization even under conditions which seem quite promising, has also been linked with popular aspirations and activities in ways that differ markedly from the situation in Algeria, for example. Finally, to the (considerable) extent that the mass of the peasantry is becoming an organized and active ingredient in the decolonization equation under Mozambican conditions, this too is a surety of continuity; Museveni's findings as to the growing peasant understanding of the nature of imperialism and the increasingly progressive character of their identification with the Mozambican nation suggest attributes of consciousness that are not likely to be easily shed in the aftermath of colonialism.

Of course, there are vast stretches of Mozambique which have not been directly touched by the full logic of the liberated areas, including so large an urban conglomerate as Lourenco Marques, which is the home of a significant proletariat and of a potentially conservative African bureaucratic group whose fortunes have heretofore been linked to the Portuguese but whose skills may have to be accommodated, albeit with great caution, within an independent Mozambique. The timing and the terms of the full integration of such parts of the country into the Mozambican revolution will have their influence on the shape of the post-colonial nation. At the same time, it is apparent that FRELIMO is quite active clandestinely far beyond the front lines of its own military advance and the promise of the liberated areas is already well known and

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increasingly well understood in most parts of the counn'y.â\200\230:rhe time'xs long past, if it ever existed, when any safe and lnalxagcgl)lc neocolonial solutionâ\200\235 was a serious option for the Portuguese; the Iâ\200\230)ormgucsc, for very good reasons of their own,'Â¢ eschewed it at the Carllcst_ stages, and now FRELIMO, as we have seen, has long since outgrown it. Bur there are rame Mozambicaps; some of them, like szam'iamel and Murupa, have already been on display. Simangoâ\200\231s brand of nanonal?sm may eventually make him easy prey for slightly more subtle blandishments; thep COREMO, or some other structure altogether, COUIâ\200\230d .bccome the vehi- cle for a last, desperate, preemptive move by impcrmhsm as the Portu- guese falter even more dramatically. I REL'IM() would not be fooled by any such elevation of a Mozambican Hastings Banda.to formal author- ity; in all likelihood the movement would go on fighting. What the re- sponse of African states, even the most coinxâ\200\230tted of them, wou.ki b? to this kind of â\200\234victoryâ\200\235 for African nationalism is more prob!cmang. Cer- tainly supporters of Mozambican nationahgn would be wise to inform themselves of what is really at stake well in advance of such an even- anty.

ma\l(lc)t it must be emphasized that even this is not the most probable path of the continuing struggle in Mozambique; in fact, an cven more desper- ate, much less equivocal, confrontation scems to be' in fhe cards. As noted, the time may well be past when any very straightforward brand of â\200\234neocolonialismâ\200\231 is a live option there. Moreover, the responsc to the conflict inside Mozambique on the part of racist and i.mpcrmhst powers which lie beyond the territoryâ\200\231s borders scems increasingly 'lcss likely to be such a measured one. The possible contagion of I\i-\201oxzxmbicnn (as w.cll as Angolan) military success is sufficiently rhrcar(tfung to South Africa and Rhodesia to have already forced such actors to intervene more men- acingly: South African troops have been at the re;ady arounfi the Cabora Bassa dam site for months and Rhodesian soldiers and airplanes 'have been very active militarily in Tete Province, sogth of the Zambezi; the police and military commanders of the three white redoubts exchanged

regular visits most recently, South African mercenaries (with at Jeast .

tacit South African government connivance) were idcnrii-\201cd_ as carrying out defoliation missions over the fields of northern Mozambique.!\200\235 This trend is bound to continue. Nor has the existence of this broader {hreat to the whole of Southern Africa been overlooked by the forces of'mrer;- national capitalism, who have noted with alarrp thg xgtensxi-\201_catxon }(:) FRELIMOâ\200\231s revolutionary and anti-imperialist line (in itself vital to the

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FRELIMO and the Mozambique Revolution 401

movement's military success, as we have seen).!Â® The hardening Ameri- can position, first under Johnson arid later under Nixon, which culmina- ted in the Azores Agreement of 1971, has no doubt been partly a re- sponse to the specter of a future, FRELIMO-ruled, militant Mozambique (a Mozambique which gets some support, need one add,

from the â\200\234Communistsâ\200\235 !). Thus the increasingly successful Mozambican revolution is one of the chief sparks which is lighting the fuse for all of Southern Africa; in all probability, therefore, the struggle will be less easily compartmentalized along territorial lines in the future than it has been in the past. This fact does not make the liberation of Mozambique any less important in itself, of course, but it does widen the field of relevant considerations for both Mozambican revolutionaries and for their supporters abroad.

3. Implications for Metropolitan Radicals

This pattern of development in Mozambique has implications for the practice of progressives in the advanced capitalist countries. Since Southern Africa could become, from the mid-seventies, the sort of crucial zone of confrontation thar Southeast Asia has been since the mid-sixties, it is well to state these precisely, albeit too briefly, here.

1. Take, first, the case of the liberal sympathizer. We have seen the extent to which the Mozambican liberation struggle has given rise to a social revolution and an anti-imperialist movement. In Africa this is the

logic of genuine liberation. Yet if one reads between the lines of many

liberal treatises on Southern Africa, this is precisely the denouement that most liberals seek to avoid; too often they advise, say, American support for liberation before â\200\234extremistsâ\200\235 profit from a â\200\234deterioratingâ\200\235 situation.* Of course, most such spokesmen are in any case mere apologists for the corporate structure, but the most sincere (if confused) of them must be encouraged to face squarely the necessity of backing socialist and revolutionary solutions to liberation struggles. It seems inevitable that, as the Southern African situation escalates, FRELIMO will ind its aims and its accomplishments distorted in the Western press; a firm understanding of the realities of the anti-imperialist struggle may be some inoculation against any attendant hysteria. Liberals may also draw their own brand of solace from the fact that FRELIMO is not so â\200\234al; gnedâ\200\235 as the NLF/PRG and thar it sternly safeguards its independence from for-

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eign ideology and foreign influence. of any sort. But in 1970s, the
 aspects of the Vietnamese and Mozambican situations are similar. 1. The
 of all colors who seek some (n')ne?ustcncr) n?xiddle ground in
 Mozambique (as in Vietnam) will be objectively lending their support
 to the worst barbarisms of imperialism. .

2. A closely related point should also be considered by those who are
 sympathetic toward nationalist aspirations among contemporary African
 one thinks most immediately of black nationalism in the metropolises
 are, inevitably, deeply concerned with the South African situation; It
 is clear, for example, that in the United States the black community is
 becoming an increasingly vital force pressing for progressive social
 Southern Africa, one whose views and highly reactions must be taken
 into careful account in the strategic and tactical calculations of wielders
 of state and corporate power. But the relevance of the current note
 which must be sounded here is by no means confined to the black struggle.
 All those who commit themselves to the cause of African nationalism
 will have to make subtle discriminations in the course of their work;
 struggle, discriminations for which the analytical tools made available by
 a nationalist perspective pure and simple will not prove fully adequate;

It is true that a preemptive neocolonial solution may not be the
 most likely outcome of this phase of the Mozambican revolution, but
 is not beyond the realm of possibility. If this should happen, it would
 be tragic if many uncritical militants in the ranks of the Mozambican
 be caught with a Mozambican General (or even the Frelimo leadership
 ings Banda) on their hands and on their consciences. At the very least,
 can be safely predicted that the diverse brands of nationalism in
 Mozambique are to be played off against one another by the Portuguese
 their mentors in order to maximize confusion in the advanced capitalist
 centers. Careful scrutiny of the claims of movements will therefore be
 necessary, as well as an awareness that under African conditions the
 most black-sounding of nationalisms can become the most easily co-opted
 and the least serviceable to the mass of the African population. Not all

nationalisms are equivalent; it is the revolutionary nationalist movement
 like FRELIMO which guarantees that real freedom is to be achieved
 which Nyerere was referring at the outset of this paper. 4

3. However, as we have seen, the importance of these latter considerations
 should not at present be exaggerated. Even were the Portuguese to
 to become so inclined, they could not conjure away the fact that

LIMO already has more than 10,000 men under arms, is in effective control of vast tracts of territory, and is moving forward. Nor in the foreseeable future could imperialism really hope to breathe effective life into any shadowy, African-based hypothetical alternative to FRELIMO. Thus there is no need for any confusion as to where the responsibility of international socialists of all colors lies. '

The matter cannot be allowed merely to rest with this bland affirmation, however. The fact remains that the struggle in Mozambique must be granted a much higher priority by metropolitan activists than it has been heretofore. As noted, the Southern African apartheid regimes and many of their allies are aware that tension is beginning to escalate markedly within their gates; they will undoubtedly continue to act firmly and brutally. At the same time, the Left's response has been as yet scarcely an adequate one, in spite of the fact that revolutionary advances in Portuguese Africa are the major force which is placing the whole ugly question of Southern Africa ever more firmly on the historical agenda. Valuable time was lost in Vietnam five or ten years at least because the Left failed to take seriously what was happening there. The same thing must not be allowed to happen in South Africa in general, or in Mozambique in particular. To be sure, some progressive elements in the West are already engaged in concrete manifestations of solidarity. But it is imperative that many more international socialists treat this struggle with the seriousness it deserves.

Postscript, September 1972

Shortly after completing the preceding essay (in mid-1972) I was invited by FRELIMO to accompany a column of combatants on a march into the liberated areas of Tete Province. I was thus afforded the opportunity to spend sixteen days during the latter part of August 1972 observing at first hand some of the events and structures which I had been able to investigate up to then only from a distance. I hope to recount this experience at greater length elsewhere, but it seems relevant to note here that the evidence I was able to collect inside Mozambique bore out, even more fully than I had anticipated, the argument advanced in this paper. In addition, the recent announcement that in September FRELIMO opened up military activities in Manica and Sofala Province is further dramatic proof of continued FRELIMO success and of the con-

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