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APARTHEID - A THREAT TO AFRICA'S SURVIVAL

â– by

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(Note: The Unit on Apartheid was established in the Secretariat of the

United Nations, in pursuance of General Assembly resolution 2l41j- A (XX I) of

26 October 1966, to deal exclusively vith the policies of apartheid. in constillation

with the Special Committee on Apartheid, in order that maximum publicit y may be given

to the evils of those policies. Among the functions of the Unit is the preparation

and publication of studies, notes and documents on apartheid.

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This issue - published in response to the request by the Special Committ ee

that the Unit publicize the activities of the movement of the oppressed people

of South Africa - contains the text (slightly condensed) of an address delivered

by Mr. Oliver Tambo under the auspices of the Nigerian National Commit tee on

Apartheid on March 18, 1971.

This address was one of the activities organized by the National Committ ee

for the week-long observance of the International Day for the Elimination of

Racial Discrimination. This Committee - with Dr. L.A. Fabunmi, Director-General

of the Nigerian Institute of International Affairs, as Chairman - includes prominent Nigerians and has been actively/ publicizing the evils and dan gers

of apartheid.

Mr. Oliver Tambo, nov Acting President of the African National Congress of

South Africa, has been a leader in the struggle against racism in South Africa for

over a quarter of a century. He was one of the accused in the Treason Tri al of

1956 and has been subjected to banning orders. He left South Africa afte

r the

Sharpeville massacre of i960, at the request of the A.N.C., to lead its external mission. He became Acting President of the A.N.C. after the death of Chi ef Lutuli in 1967.

The views expressed in the article are those of the author.)

â- **All material in these notes and documents may be freely reprinted.-Acknowledgement, together with a copy of the publication containing the reprint, would be appreciated.

APARTHEID - A THREAT TO AFRICA'S SURVIVAL

South Africa's strategy of creating client states

The strategic objective of the South African racists with regard to the African continent is both short-term and long-term. It is to create client states among the independent African countries, with the aim of cutting off the South African national liberation movement from all source s of assistance; to compel such client states actively to participate in campaigns aimed at our destruction and the destruction of the faith of our

oppressed and revolutionary people in the inevitability of liberation; and to ensure the preservation of apartheid by destroying the African National

Congress (ANC), the decisive force on whose shoulders falls the task of liberating the African people of South Africa.

The strategy of creating client states is further aimed at cutting short Africa's strivings to establish for herself an independent and equal position in the world's economy and the international political system; at using these client states against other African states; and, ultimately,, at maintaining Africa as South Africa's exclusive political and economic preserve. In this connexion, special mention should be made of the attempt of the South African regime to establish a so-called "Southern African Common Ilarket". A white South African ap61ogist of apartheid has 'wiiyterf:

"If allowed to proceed unhindered, developments in this area could lead to the creation of a new multinational giant, the Europe of. Africa, which will one day exercise a profound influence on developments in Africa, if not in the world."

The centre of gravity of this combination would be the white South Africa n

minority regime.

I/hite South Africa uses many and diverse means in the attempt to fulfil her objectives. To begin with, South Africa is economically the most powerful country in Africa. On the other hand, the peoples of Africa, especially in the sub-Saharan part, on the basis of continental comparison s, /

have the lowest standard of living in the world. The South African racistsj

seek to exploit this situation to their advantage.

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.Trade relations, to make Africa dependent

In the first instance, they seek to expand trade relations with the rest of Africa. South Africa's exports to Africa more than doubled between

the years 1964 and 1968, while her imports from Africa grew by about a third.

Me need to draw attention to two points regarding these trade relations. First, relative to the rest of the continent, South Africa in the period mentioned - and, I am certain, up to the present - enjoyed a favourable

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balance of payments. This, of course, necessitates that the African countries must find foreign exchange to settle their debts. South Africa takes advantage of this situation by offering credits to these countries to buy South African goods. The African countries are then faced with the task of periodically servicing their debt to South Africa.

Second, South Africa uses Africa as*her market for manufactured goods.

If, for instance, we take three categories of South African exports, namely

chemicals, machinery and transport equipment, and miscellaneous manufactured

goods,' we find that by 1968 Africa was taking 75 per cent of South Africa

total exports in these categories. ~0n the other "Hand, in the same year, Africa exported-to Soutli" Africa only about 1.5 per cent of South Africa's requirements of goods in these categories. This means that South Africa maintains the classical trade relations between n.n impeFf alTfrh-^mHvfe rv^.nd

its" colonies! The African countries serve South Africa as sources for che

raw materials and marketsffor her expensive manufactured goods.

In all, these trade relations increase Africa's dependence on South Africa and help maintain the African economies at a low level of develop ment.

The South African racists further strive to entrench these trade relations by signing agreements, binding on both signatories for an agreed period, as

they have done in the case ojfTliuLawiT

Aid -and investment to entrench dependence,

In the second instance, the South African policy of aid and investment has also been clesigned to entrench these tendencies of perpetual dependence.

Funds exported by South Africa-go first to the development of raw material

extraction and secondly to the development of the infrastructure.

South Africa already has large investments in mining in all the countries of southern Africa. Her companies have reached even as far north as Mauretania where, in co-operation with French capital, South African mo ney

and technique is used in the mining of copper. South African companies are already prospecting for bauxite and other minerals, in Malawi. Newspaper

reports have also stated that South African companies, again in -co-oper ation

IS with French capital, are investigating mining possibilities in Malagasy.

South Africa, again 'in co-operation with France, is wooing Mauritius^and dangling the prospect of big loans and investments before the Mauritian

Government. Mr. Sean Gervasi, aYi economist at Oxford University, has stated:

"Total (South African) investments in Africa were in the hundreds of millions at the beginning of the 1960s.

They have probably more than doubled since then."

I have said that South Africa is helping with the financing of the infrastructure in some of these countries. Currently, of course, the most notable of such projects is the Cabora Bassa Scheme in Mozambiqu e^fHich,',

is not only largely South African-financed and designed to ge'nerat'e electricity

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for a host of countries in the area, including Mozambique, Angola sand M alawi.

But the Governments of Zambia and Tanzania have both condemned the scheme and

taken steps to preclude any Zambian or Tanzanian participation in the scheme.

South Africa also lent Malawi £6 million (US\$16.8 million) for the construction of a railway line terminating at Port Nacala in Mozambique. She is building an important road through Namibia to Angol a's

seaport, Luanda, and a gas pipeline from Mozambique to South Africa. Further.

she has signed an agreement with Malagasy* to open an air route between the

tiro countries, as well as maintain and fly Malagasy's aircraft on that route. If I may quote Sean Gervasi again:

"All these changes create new links which are essentially

ones of dependence for those with whom South Africa deals."

And, let me add, dependence means absence of independence.

Apartheid needs expansion

It is necessary to point out that the economic processes I have just described, dealing With South Africa's external economic relations, are organically linked with apartheid in so far as it is an internal, South African system of economic relations. As a system, one of whose central features is the super-exploitation of the African people, apartheid results in certain economic consequences.

One of these is that since the earnings of the African majority are kept at the bar§ minimum level, the internal market for industrial•goo ds is

extremely limited. This is particularly important in the situation which obtains today wherein manufacturing contributes more to the gross domes tic

product than mining and agriculture.

Mining and agriculture have, of course, been traditionally exportoriented. A limited home market was therefore of no material significance

to their development. The contrary is however the case with regard to manufacturing. The restricted nature of the home market acts as a fetter on the developmentT'oF th I s~sFctor'. Hencs~idre'"Tl5'ce^slty for South

Africa to find external markets for her manufactured goods.

The second of these economic consequences is that very low wagds mean very high profit rates. South Africa, therefore, generates the bulk of her investment funds internally In T9697~f5r~ijTs^ance, the ratio oi1 net capitaX'Ttow-frorir-the-restr-of the world to gross domestic investment

was only 3*2 per cent. Over a period of time, however, the influx of capital from abroad adds up to large amounts. In the period from 1956 to

1968, direct investment from abroad alone amounted to about two billion d ollars.

1/hat attracts such large funds is the factor of very low wages, and correspondingly, very high profit rates. During the years i960 to 1965, for example, returns on British investment in South Africa were consistent ly

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/ j. // '' "almost 50 per cent higher than those on the average British direct

investment overseas". The same can be said of United States investment s
Lin South Africa

Given the high savings rate in South Africa, the vast inflow of foreign capital and the restricted internal market, a situation arises in which South Africa finds herself burdened with an "embarrassment of r iches".

j1 She, therefore, exports her "excess" capital. Thus it is that South Africa 's
1 internal economic processes are organically linked with the external.

The super-exploitation of the Black people in .South Africa is at once the basis of the South African economy and the objective reason for South Africa's guest for external markets for her "excess" . capital. '

The externaj. relations are clearly the relations of domination and exploitation because, firstly, they are dictated by the objective requirements

of the most powerful economy on the African continent; and, secondly, because they are designed" and intended, to serve the exclusive econom ic and

political interests of the white South African racist minority and not those of the African people^inside or outside Africa. If we take the nature and duration of the economic relations between the United States and

South America as a timely parallel to South Africa's relations of domination

and exploitation in Africa, then we cannot possibly ignore the stern warning already sounded by the,French author, Dumont, that the objective

of the South African racist regime is to "South Americanize" Africa.

And God forbid that Africa, in whole or in part, should be surrendered to these heartless racists and condemned to such a horrifying disaster by any African leader or group of leaders.

Import of Black manpower

It is worth remembering that South Africa "imports" manpower from Africa. In mining alone, last year, Black workers from outside South Africa constituted JO per cent of the total African labour force. .This system of "importation" of M'rican labour, at highly exploitative wage rates, is as cruel as it is a criminal rape of Africa's manpower. The ygiuthjLs seized from developing African countries in its prime; it is used ,'flieFci3Tessly in the interests of South Africa's mining magnates; and it 'is then returned home a spent force, as poor as it had left and bringing no

/wealth for the development of its countries and peoples. As a system 'which "is leading away from industrialization and not towards it",' and which does not create job opportunities in the countries of origin, it. condemns not only the present, but also the future generations to depen

dence on South Africa. Small wonder that Zambia has decreed against Zambian s working in the South African mines.

I-lilitary strategy of the racist regime

Me are familiar with the definition of war as the continuation of I politics by oijher means. I have already said that South Africa's policy in

I ^Africa., is that of creating client states, of making Africa her owr|liphere ofi

[/ấ€¢political and economic domination./ The white man .in South Africa has~~been"J

I preparing and continues to~pTepare for war, for a continuation of his political policy by other means.

The racist regime's military strategy falls into two parts. Firstly, the regime has adopted a military posture aimed at keeping the white-dominated south of Africa intact, while simultaneously pushing the regime 's

military defence line far to the north, thus creating a system of buffer states around itself. Secondly, it has made preparations the independent~couritries to the north, in terms of what maintain military contacts with racist South Africa, call " anticipatory counter-attack" or "carrying the war Into enemy territory", to quote General Allon, Israel's Deputy Prime Minister. The parallels between Israel and South Africa are, of course, obvious. The difference, hot/ever, is that whereas Israel needed to go to war in order to capture a nd

occupy Arab territory, South Africa did not have to do so in the case of Namibia, which she now stubbornly refuses to relinquish despite the Unit ed

Nations decision terminating her mandate.,â— South Africa's military pre sence

in Zimbabwe, Mozambique and Angola is by agreement with the_sister colonial

and racist regimes of Portugal and Pvhodesia, member s-Wi-tff South'Mri ca, of

the economic, political, military and intelligence^Unlioly AllianceA Just as Israel has been conducting acts of aggression against the Arab countries,

using captured territory as her base, so will 'South^f-rica use her buffer states for "anticipatory counter-attack".

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She has furthermore built a major military base in the Caprivi Strip, in the northernmost tip of Namibia, one thousand miles from her own bor ders

with Namibia. From this base she can strike, quickly and suddenly, at //

countries far to her north,-jas^President"Kaunda-hp.s repeatedly warned.

Only last year, the world was infonaed^ylaZSouth African Cabinet Minister that the new airport be inn: built ii/ Llongwe, Malawi, would be open to aircraft

of-"thS^outh African Air ForceJ TheTlinister subsequently published a diplomatT^dTenrairbr tne statement.' But South Africa openly maintains a military attache's office in Malawi.

Ifestern military support to South Africa

The logistic support for South Africa's military plans and activities /has come from Western Powers including, in particular,/^FranceT'and^Brit ain. '

/ In the matter of supply of arms to the murderous racists,/France has

/ behaved like a country of people accustomed to kill with blissful callous ness,

' people for whom the life of a Black man is something that is "neither her e nor there". In view of France's long history of non-racialism, the zeal and

zest with which she arms self-confessed killers and racists is difficult to explain. But what is even more surprising is the speechless silence of those Afri can,-State's 'Which have had the longest and-closest association

with France.'S Their silence is puzzling and mysterious.

President Kaunda led an OAU delegation to ask the French Government not

to smply^-weapons^to the racist murderers. But the^French people^, including

the^rench' workers'^ seem determined to arm Vorster and SmitFTto the t eeth-

Ifaat'~50T£KTT^rance 's interest be other than "to hamper the freedom and

independence of Africa and to compromise the liberation of the colonies on

the African continent", as President Selcou Toure has said of the recent aggression against Guinea? Or, in the words of Major-General Yakubu Gowon,

to help colonizing'.adventurers to organize attacks similar to that--aga±rrst~ >

Guinea against other independent African countries, "with a-^fiew to recolo nizing j j

Africa"? This, it seems, is what lies behind France's arrogant sale of arms j to 'South Africa and Britian's decision to resume the sale of arms.

The British Government,*fwhich created and maintains the racist regimes

in southern Africa, has had a great deal to say about its obligations to supply arms to South Africa under the-Simonstown Agreements.' It stress es the defence of sea routes against a Huppnsfiri Soviet. Nava.l threat._____B ut Mr.

' /. Heath's numerous statements or Tthis issue are significant for what they

carefully omit to mention. The African people's opposition to the sale of arms or to further strengthening of the South African regime even by ha If a frigate' is in regard to southern Africa and, consequently, the whole continent.

â- The Simonstown Agreements

The Simonstown Agreements do not relate to sea routes' only. They are,

first and foremost, agreements about southern Africa itself. An aidememoire sent by the South African Government to the British Government, dated May 20, 1970, states as follows:

"For their part, the South African Government have consistently viewed the exchange of letters of 30 June, 1955? in the context of the fundamentally important policy statement agreed on between the two Governments in the first paragraph of the Memorandum

of Understanding's.contained in the first of the letters. It was there agreed that southern Africa and the sea routes round southern Africa must be secured against aggression from without.

The fourth paragraph of the Understanding provides that in order to implement this policy the lines of communication and logistic support, in and around southern Africa must be adequately and securely defended."

As to whether the letters dated June 30, 1955? and referred to by the South African Government, are correct, we have it on the authority of the

Law Officers of the Crown for England and Vales that "these (Simonstow n)

Agreements are contained in exchanges of letters dated 30 June, 1955"*

The Simonstown Agreements are, therefore, not only about sea routes; they are also about the "security" of "southern Africa"; they are about "adequate and securely defended" "communication and logistic support in and

around southern Africa"; they are also about sea routes, not one sea route, around a number of countries which constitute southern Africa.

The Simonstown Agreements commit Britain to defend southern Africa jointly with South Africa against what the two parties may consider to be "aggression from without\ J.B. Vorster regards the armed struggle in Zimbabwe,, Angola and Mozambique as "aggression from without". Britain's

' stubborn decision -iso supply arms to South Africa may well turn out to be the

tip of a vast iceberg of joint activities relating to southern Africa.

lioi/ else are we to Explain the extraordinary timing of this decision, taken in the International Year for Action to Combat Racism and Racial Discrimination, when the race issue is mounting in Britain^when aparthei d

has been legalized in Rhodesia, and when apart^eij^jm' South Africa has reached

new heights? How are we to explain the fact that Hr. Heath decides to go

ahead with the supply of arras at the risk of destroying the Commonwealt

andj ruining Britain's relations with Africa? T.Jhat colossal plan is the delivery of seven helicopters a part of? I/hatever it is, the British Government, faced with a choice between the,requirements of a fascist w hite

regime and the will of hundreds of millions of people in Africa, in Britain and all over the world, has elected to stand in firm solidarity with the racists. As £o Britain's future role in the unfolding revolution in southern Africa, the writing is on the wall for all Africa to see.

But we must place it on record that the defence of southern Africa, and of the sea routes arofind it, is not the business of white minority settler regimes. It is the business of the Black people of Africa.

The Simonstown Agreements are about the Independent and sovereign people of Zambia, Botswana, Lesotho, Swaziland. If these agreements ar e valid, they are dangerous-. T/liaCTs more,~they offer some explanation f or

Britain's resolute-"'refusal to use force against rebel Smith. It is to hide their true content that the British Government has sought to present- the
Simonstown Agreements, concluded nearly sixteen years ago, as an an

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a Soviet naval threat, thus falling in line with South Africa's odt-repeated' defence of apartheid as being a bastion of Western defence againsyu c ommunism.

Diplomatic and political offensive

The former NATO Deputy Chief of Staff, and current Director of the French Institute of Strategic Studies, General Beaufre, sees the problem of setting up a "vast bloc in southern Africa", assured "not only of prosperity,

but also stability", as being "above all, to achieve the psychological conditions of friendly cohabitation...of different races". Beaufre goes on to say:

"A South African policy which does not disarm (the opposition to apartheid from the Third World)...by some well conceived reforms and by a big information effort, risks allowing a hostile atmosphere to build up and to harden".

South Africa had, of course, already understood the meaning of the French General's words very clearly while proceeding from the position that.

as South African Cabinet Minister Uys said, "the stronger we__are, the less

_they can touch us...". T|ie South African racists also knew that~strengtfT

alone is not"sufficient to ensure friendly cohabitation; and that there must also be a big information effort and the preparation of the psychological

conditions which will remove the opposition from the Third World. Hence it

is that South Africa launched a big diplomatic and political offensive, directed primarily at Africa. She says to Africa:

"We want to have good relations; we want to pursue ^

a policy of peaceful coexistence; we want fruitful co-operation with you on the basis of non-interference in the internal affairs V_ of one another's country."

Last year, Soutli Africa offered to conclude a non-aggression treaty with any country in Africa that so wished. In return South Africa offers to assist "in the development and prosperity of Africa", as Vorster put it. Vorster went on:

"Providence has been very good to us in Africa and we want to return to Africa something of this... This is the spirit that inspires us - and that is the spirit that will conquer Africa."

That ihdeed~'was the -^spirit that conquer-ed Malawi. ~^)

Not content with these overtures, SoutE~7Tfrica put out the idea of a dialogue. This idea was carried by the South African Foundation to Paris,

and thence to Africa.

1 have only a brief statement to make on the question of a dialogue, and I make it in the knowledge that I express the unanimous views of 18 mil/ieir'oppressed^Blacks in South Africa. The position is that we don't want a (dialoguejat this stage and we will not need one in the foreseeable future. We very much appreciate our brothers proposing a dialogue as a useful tactic. But now that they know the mind of the

oppressed on this question, we are confident that they will drop the idea.

I hope that this brief statement closes the issue of dialogue and that there will be no further reference to it hereafter.

South Africa's determination to win Africa for herself does not, of course, stop at the methods I have described. She is not loathe to interfe re

in various countries, using psychological warfare, terror and subversion.

She does not hesitate to help send that most brutal product of decadent Western society, mercenaries, to any country which seems to offer her a chance

of installing a government of hirelings and collaborators. Her intelligence service is world-wide and a growing network is spreading over the African

continent. Radio~SOTIth Africa and other agencies simultaneously conduct

a powerful propaganda campaign aimed at denigrating the OAU, belittling the

achievements .of the peoples of Africa, and exploiting the slightest difficulties in Africa to encourage the formation of unpatriotic groups and then to incite these groups into action.

Above all, with the loud trumpeting of South Africa's strength internally and her influence exterq^lly, and with sneers at Africa's weaknesses, she

tries to terrorize and demoralize the Governments and peoples of Africa, to

cow them into submission and compel their acceptance of economic, political

and other arrangements which, in their essence, would be what President

Sekou-..Tour£ has described as those "between the horse and its rider"

Allies of)the apartheid regime

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....--'^fhe struggle for Black majority rule in southern Africa is a struggle

not only in the interests of the freedom, 'independence and progress of al

the African peoples, but it also ohe waged in opposition to a powerful combinatioxL&f allies - the allies of Portugal, Rhodesia-andTacfist South Africa. In their continental strategy these allies realize that_South Africa is both their strength ancT~tEeir weakness, boti~tHeir"most powerful â— "single striking force arid "their most" important single vulnerable link.

This, therefore, results in countries such as the United States, Britain, France, West Germany and others having African policies aimed simulta neously

at strengthening Africa's enemy, apartheid South Africa, and striving to fblunt and deflect Africa's offensive against the enemy in her m-idst. This I is a policy which necessarily means that Africa's own interests take a I secondary position in the diplomatic and political calculations of the Wes t.

Only a few days ago, Sir Seretse Khama, the President of Botswana, stated:

/ "Questions of aid and investment are important...

But the guts of the relationship between Africa and America is race, and hence southern Africa."

Africa cannot afford to entertain illusions on this score.

Already the West's approach to Africa is organized around the central iss ue

of the defence of the white-dominated South, its most important economic and

military base on the African continent. Africa, for her part, cannot'afford to deal with~tHe"question of southern Africa as if it were the last, and an incidental, point in the complex of her relations with the rest of the world. It seems clear to us that not until South Africa is free, not until this Western base for the r.ecolonization and domination of Africa is rooted out, will Africa's own unique and pressing problems of progress and consolidation of independence come into their arena.

Africa cannot simultaneously be really healthy and strong and continue to harbour in her body politic the cancerous growth that is At: nr the id ' South Africa and her allies in the white-dominated South.

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Support the liberation movement

What, then, is to be dfne?

If the South African racist regime appears to have embarked 011 an offensive against independent Africa, its'operations against the liberation movement in South Africa are intensive, and the persecution and torture of activists is ceaseless. And yet it is in South Africa that the struggle against the regime must be fought and won. The dominant role must of necessity be played by the Black masses; and they are responding

to their responsibilities.

The activities of the relatively few of them who are outside South Africa must be geared to the active support of the internal struggle which,

while it has not changed in content, has now clearly assumed the form of

a struggle by the Black people against their white oppressors and exploit ers

for the seizure of power and the repossession of their land. With the conquest of political power by the oppressed Blacks in South Africa, rac ism

will have been dealt a deadly blow.

But victory against a well-prepared, well-equipped, well-organized and determined enemy demands more than courage and a willingness to

sacrifice - none of which are lacking, as history shows. It also requires that support for the liberation movement in South Africa should receive a degree of priority that thec-ALIC/lj--i»st-on-the-.day..-the OAU was forme d - a .

^radoxi cal reality" - ' ~- -----»

The International Tear for Action to Combat Racism and Racial

Discrimination should certainly be the occasion fox' remedying a situation in which material support has progressively diminished as the demand for it has increased. Today this demand stands higher than at any previous time and suj>port stands at its lowest, be "that much harder", and will take us

We shall conquer still, but it will "that much longer", to fulfil our

tactical and strategic objectives. Our problems in this regard are bound to have an adverse effect on the pace of progress of the struggle in the rest of southern Africa.

African States must talce counteractions

With regard to the rest of Africa, it would seem that the "best form of defence against racist South Africa's onslaught is to go 011 the offensi ve

on a wide range of counteractions. In particular, countries committed to the defeat of white minority regimes should establish embassies in the

independent African States bordering on their territories and give full diplomatic, economic and material assistance to these States which will be the first victims of apartheid violence when the tide of revolution hits the shores of racism.

In this connexion it seems inevitable that Africa should begin now to build her mDJJuary-pG-we-r~as_an essential part of her developmen t programmes.

The idea of an^African High CommancfVay be- difficult of attainment. But

a beginning"must be^made~ancl is being made. In the meantime, Africa's youth

in each country should be prepared for service in the national armed forc es

of each State, which must be built to maximum strength.

Finally, apartheid is a threat to Africa's survival because, inter > alia, it feeds on with powerful We

1 and isitsustained by the nature of South Africa's relations stern countries. Africa should redefine her relations

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with these and other countries on the basis of their stand and their policies on issues central to the cause and destiny of Africa. Racism ranks high in the list of such issues.