## e New Nork

The once-revered military $\hat{a}$ \200\231s unity and sense of  $\hat{A}$ © mission are crumbling.

gence, suspected of orchestrating covert actions, including political assassination, to undermine changes in racial policies and discredit Mr. de Klerkâ\200\231s black interlocutors, most notably the African National Congress of Nelson Mandela.: 4

In any event, the Defense Force, left without an external enemy to fight and facing pressure to cut its high costs, has been pared down. These days, said Helmut Heitman, a military specialist in Cape Town, the number of white conscripts forming the armyâ\200\231s core is down to around 20,000 from an average of 50,000 to 60,000 in the 1980â\200\231s.

While the military can in theory mobilize up to 200,000 trained reservists and local, white paramilitary groups known as commandoes, its permanent force of career soldiers, air force and naval personnel is only a modest 30,000, Mr. Heitman said.; "8

## A Hard-Line Group

Within those numbers, Mr. de Klerk a}:pears to have detected a core of officers whose ideology and style have their roots in the Botha era and whose | existence had long been suspected, Two years ago, an official inquiry

## discovered a covert military unit

icalled the Civil Cooperation Bureau, also accused of  $a\200\234$ dirty tricks. $a\200\235$  It was officially disbanded, but its members went u ed.)
The absence of prosecutions allowed accusations of malpractice against the mmm to flourish, said General Rogers, while the assertions were  $a\200\230a\200\230$ not being proven or disproven, the credibility 0 the defense force suffered terriyet, the latest move against dissident, right-wing officers has not eased the uncertainty, particularly since the names and purported crimes of the reged officers have not been fully

incided with

pu publicized.

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â\200\234Not all the officers know who is involved and that means that every officer in the South African Defense Force is worrying that he may be a possible victimâ\200\235 of the purge, Willie Snyman, military spokesman for the right-wing opposition Conservative Party, said. o #

One who has been identified is Gen.

Chris Thirion, deputy head of Military | who denied wrong-doing, |

Intelligence, saying in a published interview: â\200\230â\200\230After all the hours I have spent thinking about it, I cannot think of a single thing I did consciously to undermine the constitutional process.â\200\235â\200\231

 $\hat{a}\200\230$ In many ways, the existence of dissent in the military mirrors the profound chasm in white society between Mr. de Klerk and whites who feel his

changes are leading them on the oft-

forecast road to chaos and mayhem.  $\hat{A}$ «The Defense Force does represent a cross-section of white political feeling," $\hat{a}$ \200\235 said General Rogers, so that inevitably some of its members were sym-

pathetic to militant right-wm  ${\bf s}$ 

ments such as the neo-Nazi Afrika Resistance Movement at a time

the white right is seeking to  $a\200\230$ garner that, as tF reduced, a new army will be needed

support from the increasing nervousness of the white minority.

The South African leaderâ\200\231s announcement last Saturday after an internal investigation of the military co-

z series of attacks on white civilians in remote farming | areas  $\hat{a}\200\224$  ascribed to the shadowy Azanian People $\hat{a}\200\231$ s Liberation Army  $\hat{a}\200\224$  and continuing violent crime in the cities that have left many whites uncertain of their future and clamoring for a return to harsh measures.

. Special Powers  $lm_roked$  - Such is the authorities  $200\231$  concern over

the attacks that the Government today declared 23 5 in the Eastern Cape and Orange Free State where the attacks on whites occurred to be  $a^200^230a^200^230unrest areas$ ,  $a^200^235$  giving all security forces powers of search and arrest similar to a state of emergency. 22 :

 $\tilde{\ }$  The 23 places are mainly small, iso-Jated farming towns, | mentâ\200\231's move med designed as

that the authorities are doing something to protect them. .  $\{$  - But such is the of white nervousness  $\hat{a}\200\224$  Pro by attacks that

and the Govern-

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dogging the lives of many blacks  $a\200\224$  that high Government officials who voyaged to the remote Orange Free State town of Ficksburg today met with boos and heckling. y

â\200\234we are all insecure. We are all \_possible victims,â\200\235 the right-wing Citiizen newspaper said in an editorial to-â\200\230day, demanding the reinstatement of ithe death penalty.,
Yet, some military experts suspect â\200\230that, even if the army were called in to hunt down rural terrorists, the latest purge would hamper its ability to.fight a new insurgency. â\200\234You donâ\200\231t fight insurgencies by the rule-book, but after this purge, you are not going to get anybody whoâ\200\231t supported by the operations manual,â\200\235 Mr. Heitman said.

Just as unsettling for white officers, though, is the prospect that political | change will inevitably lead to a restructuring of the military, which, unlike the police force, is predominantly a

\_ \_whlte,. institution.

 $\hat{a}\200\230$ African National Congress, Mr.  $\hat{a}\200\231$ k $\hat{a}\200\231$ s principle negotiating part- $\hat{a}\200\230$ a new order, has made clear

e white minorityâ\200\231s power is

incorporating the present Defense Force, and Umkhonto we Sizwe, the | Congressâ\200\231s own guerrilla wing. That, in

 $\hat{a}\200\234\hat{a}\200\234$ If there $\hat{a}\200\231$ s ?oing to be a purge in the future, it will be in Military Intelligence,  $\hat{a}\200\235$  said Siphiwe Nyanda, the Chief of Staff of Umkhonto we Sizwe, which means Spear of the Nation.

 $\hat{a}\200\234$ All the people who have this history, who were involved in destabilization, | peoPle  $\hat{a}\200\230$ who were involved in criminal activities, people who acted contrary to | i.r:sih\_x:uctgms will have to dealt with,  $\hat{a}\200\235$  he

barely compare in scale to thg violence

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Citizen Reporter
THE ANC has alleged
that South Africa has the
capacity to produce at
least 25 nuclear weapons
and has called on the government to stop â\200\234the policy of secrecyâ\200\235 regarding
nuclear weapons capabili-

In a statement issued

yesterday the ANC alleged that the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) has â\200\234de-termined that South Africa secretly produced several hundred kilograms of

High Ennched Uranium

â\200\234This hrge HEU in-

ventory indirectly confirms that South Africa

 $\hat{a}$ 200\234has an active and secret

nuclear development programme, since no South

C; ((â\200\235

\_ Pelindaba

African nuclear facility

requires uranium en-

riched to levels above 45

percent U-235, $\hat{a}$ \200\235 smd the \_ANC. :

The statement also alleged that IAEA inspec-

 $a\200\234$ tors recently visited  $a\200\234$ on

short notice $\hat{a}\200\235$  an abandoned facility near the

complex.

 $a\200\234$ They are said to have

found equipment used to ~work on the shape spherical fissile cores fora de- ped?

nuclear explosive vice,  $\hat{a}\200\235$  said the ANC.

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\hat{a}\200\234This site, known as
\hat{a}200\230Building 5 000\hat{a}\200\231, was long
- suspected by Western
governments as a nuclear_
a\200\230 development centre in the
1970s, \hat{a}\200\235 said the ANC. ..
The: ANC further ok
leged that an American
enrichment
of
_weapons
- now. To continue with -
- their policy of secrecy and
CIA report showed that
\hat{a}200\230Mr Jacobus de Villiers,
now chairman of the
Atomic = Energy Board
(AEB), had been \hat{a}\200\234direct-
ly involved in weapons
design work at the Pelin-
daba research centreâ\200\235, up -
to 1979.
-\hat{a}\200\234Is the De Klerk gov-
ernment deliberately con-
cealing the possession of  
weapons grade ma-
terialism?\hat{a}200\235\hat{a}\200\231 asked the
ANC. \hat{a}\200\234Has the weapons
_programme been stop-
f, â\200\231,
\hat{a}200\234The NP must declare
the extent of its nuclear
programme
: possnble nuclea:r threatâ\200\231
The South African
Government was hiding
behind their own inter-
pretation of a clause in
the Nuclear Proliferation
Treaty (NPT) by denying
-access to certain plants |
such as Valindaba be-
\hat{a}200\230cause they have been
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mothballed,
ANC.
\tilde{a} 200\234Furthermore,
said
the
to say
that the NPT does not re-
quire South Africa to re-
veal nuclear activities
prior to signing the agree-
ment is tantamount to a
confession of an ongoing
nuclear conspiracyâ\200\235. -
- The ANC declared its
opposition to the build-
ing, stockpiling and use of -
nuclear weapons, adding
2 'snch undeclared stocks
. should be a\200\234a\200\234taken up at an
early opportunity by the
transitional and interim
government\hat{a}\200\235.
\hat{a}\200\230. The AEB, wluch falls
! under the Department of
Mineral and Energy Af-
fairs, is closed until Janu-
ary 4, and no spokesman
will be available to reply
to the ANCâ\200\231s allegations
untll then
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South Africaâ\200\231s Armor Is Showing Signs of Tarnish By ALAN COWELL 7< $\hat{a}$ \200\230 ... 2 e 3 e

JOHANNESBURG, Dec. 22 â\200\224 For much of Africaâ\200\231s modern history, the South African Defense Force stood as a symbol of white power, a continentâ\200\231s best-trained, best-equipped and most disciplined force, capable of projecting its power far beyond the countryâ\200\231s o frontiers. These days, its fortunes have never seemed so morose.

From its invasion of Angola in 1975  $\hat{a}\200\224$  when, with covert American backing, it came within striking distance of: Luanda, the capital  $\hat{a}\200\224$  to many other forays into neighboring countries, the South African military showed time and again that its forces could sweep north with relative impunity in pursuit of what its commanders termed a  $\hat{a}\200\230\hat{a}\200\230$ to-tal strategy $\hat{a}\200\231$ s will.

In a continent where armies are more usually associated with coups | and corruption, the South African force cast itself, somewhat incongruously, as being above the party politics of white supremacy.

Divisions in the Military

Yet, with the decision last weekend by President F. W. de Klerk to retire or suspend 23 officers, including six generals, accused of running covert \( \frac{200}{230\alpha} \) 200\230dirty tricks\( \frac{2}{200} \) 235 campaigns to frustrate political changes, the Defense Force has emerged as an institution as riven as any other by the strains and pressures forced upon the white minority by the halting process of fundamental political change.

Moreover, the purge by the South African leader has shaken the morale,. and possibly even the operational ef-' fectiveness, of a force whose role and prospects were anyhow in flux after the end of the Cold Warâ\200\231s African spin-\_ offs that enabled politicians and generals to cast themselves as crusaders against Soviet encroachment.]

 $a\200\234$ Without a doubt, there $a\200\231$ s going to be

shock and dismay with people realizing that this sort of thing has been going on in the defense force,  $\hat{a} \geq 00 \geq 35$  said a former Air Force commander, Gen. Bob Rogers, who is now, the military affairs spokes-

The fundamental change dvertaking South Africa has caught up with its Defense Force, once a symbol of white power on the continent. Without

external enemies to fight, the once-revered institution appears divided and its professionalism is in question. In Soweto, a soldier stood guard last May.

man of the small, relatively liberal opposition Democratic Party.  $\hat{a}\200\234$ And the action taken by the state President will shake them. $\hat{a}\200\235$ 

In some ways, though, the military has been undergoing a less obvious transformation for many years.

Militaryâ\200\231s Role Expands

For most of the 1980â\200\231s, under Mr. de Klerkâ\200\231s predecessor, P. W. Botha, the military assumed extensive political powers. A State Security Council bypassed the Cabinet and brought the generals into decision-making at: the highest level.

In every part of the country, similar regional and provincial forces performed the same function in pursuit of the so-called a\200\234total strategya\200\231a\200\231 a\200\224 a.concept that combined cautious political change with the urge to use the security forces to control every aspect of the environment in which change, however limited, was supposed to occur.

In the end, the strategy failed because. Mr. Bothaâ\200\231s proposed racial changes were so limited as to enrage the black majority, spurring a revolt that, in turn, brought emergency rule

inside the country and international
sanctions without. :

Additionally, in the late 1980â\200\231s, the South African Defense was forced to acknowledge the limits of its power to mold the region. A major battle against Cuban-backed forces at Cuito Cunevale in Angola ended in stalemate, forcing both the politicians and the generals to acknowledge that, as the world changed argund them, â\200\234total strategyâ\200\235â\200\231 had become too costly financially and | politically and, what'â\200\231s more, could be maintained only. at the expense of un-

" acceptably high white casualties.

Reshaping Secufity Forces = -Since then, Mr. de Klerk has moved against some of the so-called \*\( \frac{1}{200} \) 230securo-

cratsâ\200\231 left over from the Botha era. Earlier this year, e purged the police and last weekend moved against officers, particularly in Military Intelli-