



TFP *Newsletter*

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THE ANC AT A CROSSROADS

ANC president, Nelson Mandela, delivers the clenched fist salute at a labour meeting. With major divisions inside his organisation, such manifestations of unity and solidarity are deceiving. (Photo: *The Star*)



Almost everywhere news abounds that something is amiss in the African National Congress (ANC).

Indeed, gone are the euphoric days following its unbanning when victory seemed so close. Internal divisions, glaring contradictions and disagreements on strategy have transformed the ANC from a monolithic "liberation" movement to a fragmented Marxist alliance in danger of disintegration.

Today Mr Mandela and the left-wing movement are at a crossroads groping for a new strategy to effect the radical transformation of society they envision.

This *TFP Newsletter* looks into the deeper reasons behind the ANC's battle to remain afloat.



The ANC/SACP alliance followed a simple strategy for many years.

Anatomy of a Crisis

While Apartheid was still in force, the African National Congress/ South African Communist Party (ANC/ SACP) “people’s alliance” operated without major internal problems for decades due to a rather simple revolutionary strategy.

Basically, it consisted of a three-pronged strategy:

1) Fomenting the discontent of the non-White population who were suffering severe socio-economic, political and other disadvantages under Apartheid laws;

2) Manipulating this discontent by using a typical Leninist-style "front", in which the communists supplied the leadership, organisation and ideology while non-communists formed a soft undefined periphery which served as a facade, home for "fellow travellers" and way to deceive unwary anti-communists;

3) Gathering popular support by making empty and demagogic promises (not unlike those found in the Freedom Charter) such as "jobs for all", "the people shall govern", or "there shall be peace" with the intended implication that these promises would indeed be fulfilled as soon as South Africa became a politically-centralised state based on the Soviet model.

Using this simple three-pronged strategy, and counting on the manifestations of support (or even complicity) of religious and lay organisations at local and international levels, the ANC/SACP alliance survived for decades wait-

ing in the wings for the moment to seize power. Thus, it was able to project itself as a high-profile, anti-apartheid Marxist movement with tremendous international prestige.

A Movement without a Cause

Just when victory seemed possible, if not probable, two events jeopardised this strategy.

One of these events was the gradual demise of the complex framework of laws constituting Apartheid culminating with the measures taken in the wake of President de Klerk's 2 February 1990 speech.

It should be noted that the goal of guaranteeing the economic, social and cultural survival of any ethnic group can in itself be considered legitimate. However, in the case of Apartheid, this objective was attained by unjust means, instituting a body of laws of racist character with an artificial and totalitarian rigidity.

By its very nature, this legal system was doomed to self-destruction due to pressures by both the White and non-White sectors of society. This soon became increasingly obvious to the degree that better educated, more prosperous and dynamic sectors of the non-White population entered into the nation's intellectual, cultural, social and business life.

In fact, following the climate of change after the 1976 Soweto riots, Apartheid laws began to tumble, one after another.

Jo'burg buses
open to all
on Monday

By Cathy Thompson

[illegible][illegible]

PW scrapping separate amenities

By BRIAN STUART

CAPE TOWN. — The State President, M. P. W. Botha, has set the stage for the scrapping of the Separate Amenities Act and for some change to the Group Areas Act.

House of Representatives the previous day. Mr. Dole was interested and affirmative in responding to the question in the House Delegate.

He spoke of using Group Areas Act, which was Minister of Community Development's law. Mr. Dole declared that with the Indian community had a common nest to the sea.

TOP PAGE 2

'Movement away from apartheid'

By Maria Delaney 518

Government efforts to move away from apartheid advanced on four fronts recently, says the South African Institute of Race Research, a quarterly count-down of political reform.

Monitoring the period July to September 1987, the institute said the gradual dismantling of apartheid was a complex and tedious process.

- The missing colour bar was repaired
- Seven more business districts were opened for trading by all races, bringing the total in the country to 55
- A joint executive authority for KwaZulu Natal was estab-

THE CITIZEN

S/S Tuesday 11 August 1947

Repeal of Mine Act clause is a 'historic' move

THE repeal by Parliament of the scheduled mines and workers Act is an important and historic move.

It means that all men

on the industry are free to leave the Chamber of Mines.

THE repeal by Parliament of the scheduled person definition in the Mines and Works Act is an important and historic move, the president of the Chamber of Mines, Mr. Bas Stoenkamp, said yesterday.

means that all new training will now become attainable for everyone who the state to reach the required levels of proficiency.

Legally imposed racial discrimination has been removed from the books. For many years

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Historic

Apartheid laws tumbled, one after another.

The other event was the collapse of the Soviet communist regime. This was actually the fruit of an internal necessity of communism itself, since Marxist theory foresees that the Marxist State (or the "dictatorship of the proletariat") is a mere transitional phase, preparing for much more radical forms of communism like self-managing socialism and eco-socialism.

With the disintegration of Apartheid and the collapse of the Soviet regime, the "people's alliance" faced a double vacuum. It became a movement without a cause.

On one hand, the media image of the alliance was based on the idea that it would end Apartheid. However, with Apartheid's end, the alliance was deprived of its main battle flag which was also its easiest way to recruit and motivate.

On the other hand, the alliance had long promoted the idea that its socialist/communist ideology would allow Blacks to enjoy the same level of prosperity as the White population.

With the fall of the Berlin Wall, it became patent that this was an illusion.

Everyone saw that communism brings disaster (a fact that is inevitable since it denies private property and free enterprise). Amidst the ruins of the ex-Iron Curtain countries and the socialist or communist regimes in Ethiopia, Tanzania, Angola, Mozambique, Zambia, and to a lesser degree, Zimbabwe, the public saw not a worker's paradise but only destitution and starving multitudes.

The outdated ANC

The problem was further aggravated by the fact that many ANC followers were indoctrinated with outdated Marxist notions.

Throughout its long history, the ANC leadership made no secret of its admiration of communist dictatorships. Winnie Mandela, for example, claimed that "in Soviet Russia a truly popular form of government has turned from a dream to a reality" (*The African Communist*, 4th quarter, 1986).

In fact, "Comrade" Mandela and most ANC leaders were formed in an ideological school characterised by revolutionary dogmatism in which Marxist myths are regarded as scientific laws.

A typical example is the Marxist theory of class struggle, which is based on the very simplistic "oppressors-oppressed" division of society. Using this "law of history", ANC militants stubbornly and erroneously applied the class struggle theory to the relationship between the white minority and black majority in South Africa.

This school also held that the Soviet Union, employing the system of a unitary and strongly centralised State, was able to overcome the ethnic, cultural and religious rivalries among the various peoples in the vast Soviet empire. The ANC was led to believe the same system could be employed in South Africa. Subsequent events



With the fall of the Berlin Wall, the sinister reality of communism was laid bare to the world.

however have shown that Soviet "unity" existed solely on the surface, kept in place only at the point of the bayonet.

From euphoria to impasse.

With this background, a curious transformation has taken place since the unbannings and amnesties granted by the government.

When Mr Mandela and other alliance leaders were freed, the sensation among the Left was one of euphoria and exhilaration. In their revolutionary candour, they seemed to think that the "path to power" was free of obstacles, and they were but one step short of their goal. All over the country, the sentiment was of a "rising tide of liberation".

The initial euphoria was short-lived.

Whereas the alliance did adopt "the seizure of power" as a rallying cry to replace resistance to Apartheid, the ANC simply did not respond to post-Soviet realities.

As a result of the breakdown of the Soviet Union, a model was needed to replace that of the highly-centralised State. Ignoring the fact that such a power structure is not able to cope with existing ethnic-cultural-regional diversities, the ANC, however, remains committed to a "unitary South African State" in which all power is derived from a central government. Regional and local authority would be subservient to the central government on all major issues.

Likewise, the evident failure of socialist/communist economic theories called for a major policy revision. The ANC did not break its alliance with the SACP, nor abandon the socialist and confiscatory reforms (especially land and business reforms), which along with nationalisation, are major components in ANC/SACP economic policy.

Instead of adapting its strategy to new national and international circumstances, the ANC has taken an increasingly rudderless course disputed

"Instead of adapting its strategy to new realities, the ANC has taken an increasingly rudderless course"



Violence and intimidation overshadow promises of peace and prosperity.

between those who want immediate power and those who see a need to negotiate. Disagreements and irreconcilable divisions have arisen over how to resolve major problems.

"The ANC-led alliance has not developed an adequate strategy for struggle in the post-February 1990 situation," writes ANC executive committee member Jeremy Cronin in his 1992 paper "The Boat, the Tap and the Leipzig Way". "In place of a single clear strategy there have been several inadequate and conflicting approaches. These approaches have not themselves ever been fully elaborated for the new situation."

The situation has become so embarrassing for the ANC that it has degenerated into an open fight of internal factions. Political analyst, Prof. Walsh, asserts: "Clearly there is a fight for the soul of the ANC between the pragmatists and the radicals" (*The Citizen*, 4/8/92).

A tarnished image

The consequences of these internal struggles have extended beyond the movement's ranks and are now eroding the organisation's cherished public image.

Since February 1990, a series of revelations about ANC actions and policies have damaged the movement's credibility and called into question its ability to govern. Disturbing signs of

intolerance and violent intimidation are constantly surfacing, thereby sowing serious misgivings and fears about an ANC future.

Such revelations and strong-arm tactics have done much to tarnish the ANC's romantic image as a band of selfless idealistic revolutionaries. Even ardent ANC supporters are starting to ask embarrassing questions.

Suffice it to mention just a few of many cases.

* There has been an avalanche of denunciations by former ANC members regarding the illegal jailings, torture, and killings carried out at ANC training camps in neighbouring African countries. These denunciations come from the very victims or witnesses of these abuses and incriminate top ANC or SACP leaders.

Even the ANC top executive realised that it would lose less by recognising the existence of these crimes than by maintaining silence. In mid-1992, the ANC formed its own investigating committee about the issue. In October, an ashamed Mr Mandela had to publicly admit the veracity of the accusations but without implicating any individuals.

* Intimidation is still practiced by pro-ANC elements who continue to terrorise the townships in the most pure Leninist style. In August, SACP chief Chris Hani recognised that many of the so-called "self-defence units" set up by the ANC around Johannesburg are operating out of control. Many returned exiles have reportedly used these units to carry out vehicle hijackings, extortion and crime.

* In a remarkably frank assessment of the current situation in the MK, Chris Hani admitted that rumblings of discontent in the ranks of Umkhonto we Sizwe have "the potential to explode" (*The Weekly Mail*, 13-19 Nov. 92).

* Despite protestations that the "armed struggle is over", ANC weapons have been secretly stockpiled in Angola in violation of various peace accords. According to the *Sunday Times*, there is

ANC camps: "a litany of unbridled and sustained horror"

ANC abuse of dissidents can no longer be hidden. Impartial groups and even frequent supporters of the ANC are now breaking the silence and calling for action against those responsible.

Among the most scathing denunciations was an Amnesty International document released last November which condemned as "unjustifiable" the torture and executions practiced by the ANC.

"It shows too that this pattern of gross abuse was allowed to go unchecked for many years, not only by the ANC's leadership in exile but also by the governments of the African Frontline states," commented the human rights organisation (*The Citizen*, 28/11/92). It urged that these ANC officials be brought to justice

and never be allowed to hold positions of authority.

Black Sash president Jenny de Tolly has also called upon the ANC to identify and act against members responsible for the killing of colleagues in ANC camps between 1976 and 1990. "If the allegations are correct, the ANC cannot escape responsibility for the actions of its officers," declared Mrs de Tolly (*The Star*, 14/5/92).


The South African Council of Churches (SACC) affirmed that it was "shocked and grieved" to hear how detainees were tortured, abused, humiliated and brutalised in ANC detention camps. The church body said that it hoped "urgent and immediate attention will be given to iden-

tifying and naming those responsible" (*The Citizen*, 21/10/92). At the same time, the SACC commended the ANC for the "courage" it displayed by investigating its own camps...

According to a 1993 independent report commissioned by the International Freedom Foundation, accounts about what happened in ANC camps were "a litany of unbridled and sustained horror". The controversial Douglas Commission report named 14 ANC and SACP leaders, including members of the ANC's national executive committee, as directly or indirectly accountable. Among those implicated were Oliver Tambo, Chris Hani, Joe Modise, Jacob Zuma, Alfred Nzo and Joe Slovo (*The Star*, 14/1/93).

a 27 000-ton stockpile of ANC weapons in Angola. An inventory was signed by the ANC's ordnance officer in Luanda. The commander of the organisation's military wing, Joe Modise, confirmed to the English magazine *Southscan* (19/6/92) that the ANC "had military stores in Angola, ranging from armoured personnel carriers and light battle tanks to rocket launchers and anti-aircraft guns". This confirmation left ANC spokesman, Carl Niehaus, very much ill-at-ease since previously he had denied the accusations (*The Citizen*, 8/1/92).

* In addition to stockpiling weapons, the ANC recently acknowledged that it is training soldiers in Uganda. South African Police believe that more than 4 600 Umkhonto we Sizwe (MK) cadres are training abroad in Uganda, Tanzania, Egypt and India. These include a number of children of school-going age. Recruits have been sent out of the country legally on the basis that they are to receive "education" abroad (*The Citizen*, 5/12/92).



"Armed action is suspended completely," reassures ANC secretary-general Cyril Ramaphosa who also claims the ANC has no hidden agenda (*The Citizen*, 30/11/92).

* The ANC/SACP leadership has suffered criticism on all sides by those who see the frustrated march on Bisho in the Ciskei as a political move in which rank and file followers were sacrificed as cannon fodder. The senseless action claimed 29 lives.

* The ANC's supposed commitment to democracy is seriously questioned by incidents of disruption of the democratic process. At the Democratic Party's national congress in Johannesburg in November, many delegates from new Black branches complained of "intimidation by rival parties especially the ANC" (*The Argus*, 16/11/92). A December 14 meeting by the DP in Khayelitsha, Cape Town was disrupted by ANC militants including senior members of the Western Cape organisation (*The Citizen*, 16/12/92). No disciplinary action was taken by the ANC.

* Arrogance and intolerance are tarnishing the ANC's image not only among Blacks but also among Whites. For example, the move to prevent the singing of the national anthem "Die Stem" at Ellis Park in the rugby game against New Zealand went sour for the ANC. Even Whites of British descent spontaneously joined in singing "ons vir jou Suid Afrika".

A Nation Held Ransom

In addition to strong-arm tactics, the ANC's constantly-evolving economic policies have been a veritable Sword of Damocles hanging over the heads of South African business and foreign investment.

At the end of 1991, Mr Mandela affirmed that the ANC "would nationalise mines and financial institutions because there was no other way" (*The Star*, 10/10/91).

However, by the beginning of 1992, due to the "hostility and concern of businessmen towards

ANC ECONOMIC POLICY: KEY PHRASES

*Democratising the economy.

*Redistribution of wealth.

*Land reform.

*New systems of taxation.

*Public works and employment creation programmes.

*Nationalisation.

The Johannesburg Stock Exchange: Can South African industry plan ahead with the Sword of Damocles of nationalisation over its head?

nationalisation" which he encountered during his trip to Europe, he "promised a comprehensive rethink on nationalisation" (*The Star*, 17/2/92).

A month later, Mr Mandela assured the public that the "ANC had no ideological attachment to nationalisation", yet he reaffirmed that "nationalisation remained the official policy" of the movement (*The Star*, 21/3/92).

In April, the ANC published a document called "Draft Guidelines for a Post-Apartheid Economy". The plan adopts what it calls a "mixed economy" policy and declares it does not affiliate itself to "any rigid ideological structure". However, in practice, despite qualifiers which vow respect for private property and free enterprise, the document calls for "increasing public sector economic activity through, for example, nationalisation". Moreover, it proposes "establishing new public corporations" and to implant "a progressive tax structure" to finance "the redistribution of wealth" (*The Citizen*, 29/4/92).

"...the ANC is increasingly being perceived as interested only in obtaining political power for itself while doing very little about day-to-day problems of the masses"

In June, the ANC drew up a new document titled "Ready to Govern: ANC Policy Guidelines for a New South Africa". However, like the former document, it also has references to increased public sector activities, nationalisation processes, and land reform as a means to redistribute the wealth.

While such documents clearly adhere to socialistic reforms, ANC leaders have been careful not to broadcast such intentions. Laurence Harris, a Marxist economist and ANC consultant notes the irony that would see alliance leaders carefully avoiding mention of socialism and that cornerstone of the Freedom Charter, nationalisation, for fear of discomfiting big business (*The Weekly Mail*, 21-27 Aug. 92).

"mass action" were weak, and in many cases even pitifully insignificant.

The June 16 Soweto Day launching called for some 70 rallies nationwide with a hoped-for attendance of one million people. Only 80 000 showed up at the various rallies countrywide. Nearly 50 rallies were cancelled for lack of interest.

On 25 July, for example, a planned march of 70 000 on Pretoria was called off when only 500 people turned up.

Intimidation notwithstanding, similar results were recorded in subsequent events in which plans to occupy city centres, hold general strikes and deliver memorandums failed to attract the masses. Only concerted efforts by the ANC to bus in support for its August rallies in Pretoria and Cape Town succeeded in mustering a decent showing.


The failure of the "mass action" to attract the masses indicates that there is much less support for the ANC than is popularly believed.

Even those who did attend the demonstrations and stayaways cannot be considered bedrock supporters of the ANC. Given the longstanding climate of violence and intimidation surrounding such events, most political analysts agree that the stayaways and strikes were not indicative of real support for the ANC. "You have to ask, is the strike a result of mass action, or mass intimidation?" said political consultant Wim Booysse (*The Citizen*, 4/8/92).

As mass strikes and stayaways increasingly disrupt their lives and income, many Blacks are reticent to participate in such actions and do not share unconditionally the power policies of those that appear to dominate the ANC.

Even the ANC itself has been forced to admit its shortcomings. The article "Where have all the masses gone?" published in the ANC journal

The ANC designated 1991 as the year of transfer of power "to the people".



An Unpopular Popular Movement

Finally, there are indications that poorly-disguised authoritarian policies are alienating the ANC from the support that it enjoyed when its leader was freed from prison.

A most expressive example of this was the "rolling mass action" initiated by the alliance in June to sweep the government from power. In terms of popular mobilisation, the results of the

RUMBLINGS OF A CRISIS

The media image of the ANC as a united liberation movement is often not accurate. Perhaps the best sources for judging are those in the ANC.

Lazarus Mawela of the Thembisa ANC writes in *Mayibuye* (June 1992) that structural problems concerning the role of branches have led to undemocratic practices

by leadership. He also cites cases of misuse of power.

The 1992 Secretariat Report on the Annual Conference of the ANC's Border Region states:

"Despite claims that we are one of the best organised regions, we need to reflect honestly and admit that many of our branches have not been operating effectively and that

many of them are not functioning. Many general meetings are not well attended, in many branches, executives are not meeting regularly and when they do meet, very often, they do not quorate [sic!]. We also find that in many areas, our branches are standing aloof from tackling the day-to-day socio-economic hardships faced by our people."

Mayibuye (October 1991) points out that ordinary people are no longer central to ANC thinking and that mobilisation by decree has become the operating norm. It further states that the ANC is increasingly being perceived as interested only in obtaining political power for itself while doing very little about day-to-day problems of the masses.

In fact, membership figures are down to 500 000 from over 700 000 in 1991 (*Freedom Bulletin*, Vol. 6, No. 7, 1992). This is a far cry from the two million members targeted by the organisation after its unbanning. Such sagging membership figures are just one more indication that ANC support nationwide is decreasing and is no longer as unconditional as before.

Indeed, not even Mr Mandela himself is exempt from criticism and image problems. There are suggestions unofficially circulating which recommend Mr Mandela be sidelined given his waning popularity. The Mandela myth, built at such great cost, is beginning to crumble.

Clarity amidst Ambiguity

The image of the ANC in the public mind can be confusing. On one hand there is the "peaceful" ANC that secretly stockpiles weapons and trains armies; on another, the "democratic" ANC that intimidates and disrupts political meetings. A "free market" ANC speaks of redistribution of wealth and nationalisation.

Amidst the confusion and ambiguity, there is only one thing that is clear: **Neither Mr Mandela nor the ANC has given the public any unequivocal sign that it has abandoned the revolutionary ideology that transformed it into a strategic ally of communism and that its followers put into practice in the townships.**

Weighing the Options

The ANC now finds itself at an impasse from which it can only emerge by choosing between what appear to be two difficult options.

On one hand, it could officially adopt a policy of radicalism, coherent with its past revolutionary ideological line, which had transformed it into a characteristic "fellow traveller" of communism.

In this case, the ANC would continue to lose support from large sectors of South African public opinion who reject radical communism and its totalitarian aspects.

On the other hand, it could officially renounce its past ideological approach and transform itself into a political party like any other.

However, this would also provoke a loss of support since such a policy would necessarily disenchant the ANC's traditional rank and file built up over the years. It would also mean the loss of millions of rands from foreign donors and



governments who would be unwilling to support a political party.

In a word, it must choose between becoming a movement without a following or a following without a movement.

An ANC Sunset?

The ANC is indeed at a crossroads.

Should the ANC fail to change its ways there is a very real danger of its falling into decline. Stellenbosch University's Institute for Futures Research actually predicts such an eventuality citing internal divisions and the fact that the ANC would probably try in vain to carry out the SACP's "reformed" communist policies (*The Argus*, 7/11/92).

It could change its ideas and language. In fact, some figures are already questioning both the ANC's ideology and revolutionary methods.

This can be seen in Joe Slovo's "sunset clauses" which have touched off a heated debate inside the ANC. The proposals call for compulsory power-sharing for a fixed number of years following the adoption of a new constitution. Such measures would effectively lengthen the transition period.

While the "Slovo option" is a definite break from the all-or-nothing revolutionary tactics of the past, it fails to depart from the stated goal of effecting a radical transformation of South African society.

Given the ANC's inability to govern without White support and expertise and perhaps perceiving declining support, Slovo qualifies his plan as "principled compromises" which would later be a substantial foundation for further advance of their cause.

A debate about the proposals is raging between ANC members of all ideological hues. Some

Is Victory Certain? *The New Nation* published this victory celebration. Such declarations prompted the Young South Africans for a Christian Civilization-TFP to publish in 1987 the study "The New Nation and Liberation Theology" which asked how a newspaper belonging to the Catholic Bishops can openly favour communism.

"The ANC must choose between becoming a movement without a following or a following without a movement"

like Jeremy Cronin support the "Slovo option". Harsh criticism has come from the ANC's Pallo Jordan, Blade Nzimande and self-proclaimed Stalinist Harry Gwala, chairman of the ANC Natal Midlands section. It has been criticised by COSATU and rejected by the ANC's Western Cape region. Some hardline ANC militants in the field are reported to have called it "monstrous" (*Weekend Argus*, 7/11/92).

Regardless of the outcome, the discussion only serves to highlight the deep divisions within ANC ranks and the difficulties it faces in preserving unity. It might also explain the ANC's extreme efforts to hasten elections in 1993.

Ironically the organisation which appeared to be an unshakeable monolithic structure three years ago is now appearing as a sick body that is covered with rashes and wounds.

A Crumbling Myth

This real state of affairs inside the ANC appears to be the profound reason behind the gradual erosion of Mr Mandela's popularity.

With major dissensions in the ranks, a tarnished public image and sagging popular support, the ANC now finds itself in one of the most difficult situations in its over 80-year history.

In light of these unexpected developments, it is imperative that those in office and the public at large understand what is happening inside the ANC. At the same time, it is unlikely that the ANC's internal problems will improve and that while Mr Mandela is an indisputably important figure in the present national panorama, it must be realised that there is an ever-widening gap between his real importance and that accorded him by the media.

With so much confusion reigning all over the country, a lack of proper perspective inhibits efficient action.

That is why a realistic picture of the ANC is needed. For too long, the ANC has been portrayed as an overwhelmingly popular revolutionary movement with a socialist/communist agenda inevitably ordained to take power. The sheer size of the media image it projected was enough to discourage resistance to its Marxist programmes.

The picture just presented seeks to destroy this myth and raise a great hope among South Africans that will encourage successful anti-com-

munist action, aimed at preserving our Christian values.

With a proper perspective and articulate action, South Africa need not be condemned to implement Marxist economics nor follow the sad example of so many Iron Curtain countries who sought the same radical transformation of society based on class struggle.

What is needed

At the same time, a positive programme is needed. Undoubtedly the Black population desires and deserves more than a shot in the dark. It is proven that Marxist economics and terror tactics cannot create the necessary climate for true peace and prosperity.

What is needed is the preservation and promotion of a sound socio-economic system based on private property and free enterprise that will permit the Black population gradually yet quickly to attain the levels of education and prosperity enjoyed by Whites.

Provisions must be made to meet the legitimate concerns of the different ethnic groups inside the Black community so that they will be able to preserve wholesome cultural values and identities.

Efforts must also be made to ward off the factors of moral, social and religious decay that today threaten all sectors of society.

* * *

There is a final element that must be considered.

There are times when Divine Providence calls upon individuals and nations to have faith despite overwhelming obstacles. Based on such faith, Gideon fought the Madianites, David confronted Goliath, and the early Christians overcame the might of the Roman Empire. These were situations which required a faith that moved mountains and inspired action that resulted in complete victory.

Doubtless, South Africa now faces economic, moral, and religious crises that are indeed overwhelming. Such obstacles require a corresponding confidence in God. And if our faith be strong, not only can He grant the means to overcome the immediate dangers we now face but He can triumph over the feeble efforts of men and provide that peace and harmony – until now so elusive – in a truly "new" South Africa.



The TFP on campaign: a proper perspective encourages efficient anti-communist action.

**"There are times
when Divine
Providence calls
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have faith"**

A NEW REGIONAL DISPENSATION

Technical Report

**A NEW REGIONAL
DISPENSATION
Technical Report**

PRIMARY CONSIDERATIONS

Regional functions

Fiscal Considerations

Constitutional Considerations

Delimitation of Regions

REGIONAL FUNCTIONS

It is suggested that the allocation of regional functions should be determined *inter alia* by the following considerations:

- In order to achieve regional autonomy, functions should be allocated in terms of the national Constitution, which should also prohibit withdrawal or amendment of regional functions without the consent of the regional legislatures.

- A sensible and practical vertical distribution of powers needs to be achieved.
- The authority of regions to exercise their functions should be supported by financial, economic and fiscal capability.
- The ability of regions to promote development should be enhanced to the maximum.
- A function should be performed at the lowest level at which it can be carried out most effectively (*subsidiarity*).

**FUNCTIONS OF
NATIONAL
GOVERNMENT**

Defence

National Security

Foreign Affairs

Constitutional
Planning

**FUNCTIONS OF
REGIONAL
GOVERNMENT**

Agriculture

Cultural Affairs

Education

Finance, Taxation
and Commerce

Health

Mining

Nature Conservation

Police

Roads

Water

Welfare

Local Government

FISCAL CONSIDERATIONS

- Due to its complexity, fiscal restructuring will have to be planned for and carried out over a period of time.
- Regional autonomy will be directly dependent upon the financial ability of a region. Therefore the allocation of functions must be accompanied by the allocation of sufficient sources of income.

- A region having less funds than others, should not have fewer functions or less autonomy.
- Since all regions cannot have equal economic strength, arrangements will have to be made to channel funds to less affluent regions (*financial transfers*).

- Objective financial norms should apply to financial transfers.
- Fiscal policy coordination will be necessary, but regions should have control over the level of taxation of their own sources of income.

CONSTITUTIONAL CONSIDERATIONS

It is suggested that the following propositions regarding regional constitutions are realistic and viable and that they should be considered in negotiations:

- Regions could be referred to as (autonomous) *Provinces*.
- Each Province should have its own constitution, drafted within an entrenched framework provided for in the national Constitution.

- The legislative power of a Province should be entrusted to a single-chamber Provincial Assembly.

- Where such need exists, special provision could be made for the representation of traditional institutions.

- Provincial Assemblies may effectively be elected proportionally from multi-member electoral districts.

- Electoral districts could correspond geographically to *development areas* within regions.
- Development should be promoted to the maximum in development areas.
- Development may be promoted and administered in the development areas by non-political councils constituted from community (including traditional) leadership.

- Provincial Cabinets should be established to exercise the executive power.
- The Provincial Assembly might elect a *premier* to chair the Provincial Cabinet.
- The Provincial Cabinets could be composed in proportion to party support in the legislatures.
- Two-thirds majority votes in the Cabinets should be sufficient for decision-making.

DELIMITATION OF REGIONS

Comparison of various published proposals provides many points of convergence.


The finalization of a delimitation should be the product of regional input.


The delimitation of regions should be based upon the consideration of a number of factors:


- Historic boundaries
- Constitutional and demographic realities
- Economic and developmental viability
- Cultural realities (eg language)
- Administrative considerations
- A realistic limitation of the number of regions


MAPS


- A Historic boundaries -
the Provinces
- B Development regions
- C Regional adaptation
(Ciskei incorporated)
- D Transkei incorporated
- E Regional adaptation
(Bophuthatswana incorporated)
- F Full reincorporation: a suggested point of departure for local, regional and national negotiations.














F

