

Operation Thunderstorm's Bloody Balance Sheet

by Billy van der Merwe, Jack Umshini Wkubhala, M. Opperskalski

Last summer, when *Top Secret* broke the story of the covert operative network *Operation Thunderstorm* in South Africa, it was clear to us that we had only described the tip of the iceberg. Since that time, the existence of *Operation Thunderstorm* has been confirmed by various newspapers in South Africa — in some cases, with reference to information published by *Top Secret*. The information we have received since then gives a precise insight into the structures and strategic planning of *Operation Thunderstorm*. Especially dramatic in view of the most recent events in South Africa is the fact that South African President de Klerk shares direct responsibility for its implementation. What is at stake is nothing less than retention of white power in South Africa!

Operation Thunderstorm was born in the summer of 1990, after the balance of power within the South African secret-service community — especially the balance between NIS and DMI — had clearly tipped in favor of the NIS. *Operation Thunderstorm* is headed by an ultra-secret team consisting of the top leadership of NIS and DMI. Officially it operates independently of the State Security Council and the official bureaucratic structures of NIS, DMI and the various special units of the police and the army (SADF). In terms of the division of labor, NIS is essentially in charge of formulating *Operation Thunderstorm's* political strategies and working out agreement with President de Klerk on both the strategic and the operational aspects. The military secret service DMI coordinates the „dirty tricks“, such as precisely targeted assassination attacks, mass terrorism, disinformation campaigns, etc., using the various special units of the police and the army. The task of NIS is to summarize these activities regularly — sometimes daily — in an intelligence briefing for President de Klerk personally and to make operative proposals to him. This briefing is brought to de Klerk's residence by a special courier — in the early morning, as a rule — signed by him, sometimes autographed, and sent back via the same courier to the Director of NIS. The appointment of Michael Louw as the new NIS chief at the beginning of this year guarantees continuity and cooperation between NIS and DMI. Louw was Assistant Director of NIS since January 1988 and had many years of experience at the DMI behind him when he came to NIS.

Alternatives to the ANC

The strategists of *Operation Thunderstorm* assume that by building up alliances for de Klerk's National Party and engaging in deliberate terrorism they will be able to politically outmaneuver the ANC. „Describing the core of *Operation Thunderstorm*, a senior official of the ANC Intelligence Department says: „Every plan and action — particularly on the question of violence — is aimed at weakening the ANC so that it is eventually forced into a constitutional coalition. At the heart of the plan is the NP (National Party — The authors) goal to be the main partner in a future government, controlling all levels of power — particularly the army, police and intelligence.“⁽¹⁾ These plans call for the systematic buildup of not only smaller groups and organizations but also the major partners of the white minority regime:

- Gatsha Buthelezi's *Inkatha Freedom Party*
- Lucas Mangope, the dictatorial ruler of the „homeland“ Bophuthatswana

— Oupa Gqozo, military dictator of the „homeland“ Ciskei.

The logistic framework on which these „partners“ are being built up are the secret services of the apartheid regime. We would like to document this general statement with the following concrete example. Until recently, the strongman in Buthelezi's „homeland“ of KwaZulu was General Jac Buchner. His background is as follows: once Chief of the Security Police in Durban, then active in the formation of the notorious CCBs and an officer of the DMI. Buchner functioned as an important „hinge“ between the white secret-service establishment and Buthelezi's IPP (*Inkatha Freedom Party*) for the buildup of the paramilitary *Inkatha* terrorist gangs and the suppression of ANC activities in KwaZulu. After his role was exposed by *Top Secret* and other publications, he was recalled to Pretoria, but he remains one of the manipulators of terrorist activities, using Pretoria as a base and pulling strings from the background. Among his closest co-workers are DMI officers Frans Verlous and Dewald Swart, who operate under the cover of two DMI-controlled firms, *Dynamic Teaching* and *Creed Consultants*. Among their responsibilities was the setting up of a training camp for *Inkatha* warriors, the *Mkize Training Camp*, near Ulundi in Buthelezi's „homeland“ KwaZulu.

The initial attempts to build up Buthelezi's *Inkatha* as an alternative to the ANC go back to the beginning of the Seventies. According to statements made by former South African secret-service official Martin Dolinsek,⁽²⁾ BOSS, the NIS's predecessor organisation, made contact with Buthelezi's office in 1974 for this purpose. At this point the North American secret service CIA was also approached and asked to create international prestige for Buthelezi.⁽⁴⁾

Ciskei's military dictator Oupa Gqozo seized power in March 1990 with the approval of DMI and SADF. Almost the entire officer corps of his army (*Ciskei Defence Force (CDF)*) and his secret service is white and controlled by the DMI. According to statements made by the former CDF Colonel Gert Hugo, it were precisely these DMI advisors who made Gqozo a fanatical opponent of the ANC by giving him forged reports on alleged ANC-guided plans to overthrow him.⁽⁵⁾

In December 1990, members of the *Ciskei Security Council* met on Gqozo's farm near King William's Town. Present at this meeting were DMI officers Anton Nieuwoudt and Clive Brink. Both are also leading figures in the DMI front organisation *International Researchers (IR)*, which functions more or less as the Ciskei's secret service. Anton Nieuwoudt, together with Jac Buchner, was one of the organizers of a secret training course for *Inkatha* warriors in the Caprivi Strip in northern Namibia on the border with Angola. Both DMI men proposed to the *Security Council* members attending the meeting that a political party be founded in order to give military dictator Gqozo a political base and at the same time open a new, political front against the ANC. Thus was born the *African Democratic Movement (ADM)*, whose current Secretary General, Basie Oosthuizen, is also a DMI officer. Oosthuizen was already active in the past on behalf of another DMI front organization, *Dynamic Teaching*, which organised anti-Communist and anti-ANC training programs in black townships.

The „homeland“ of Bophuthatswana is also in the tight grip of the South African secret services. Its so-called president, the dictatorially ruling Lucas Mangope, is nothing more than a compliant figurehead of the white minority regime. The

actual control over this homeland is essentially wielded by two persons: Minister of Defense Rowan Cronje, who received plaudits for his services in Ian Smith's Rhodesia, and Minister of Manpower Steven Soodi Cronje, at least, is a DMI officer.

Many agents of the old CCB structures, which have officially been disbanded, have been accommodated in the armies or secret services of these „homelands“ controlled by the apartheid regime. Others are active in various DMI front organisations and firms. This reorganisation of the CCBs in another form was guided by the DMI, whose agents Louis Pasch and Jaap Kuhn played a leading role in this operation. All of this is a crucial mechanism in the functioning of *Operation Thunderstorm*.

The Ciskei-Massacre + *Operation Thunderstorm*

The escalating spiral of violence and deliberate terrorism in South Africa is an indispensable component of *Operation Thunderstorm*. The way it functions can be clearly observed in the massacre of peaceful ANC demonstrators on 7 September in Ciskei. The ANC had called for mass demonstrations and actions throughout the country, including Ciskei. On 5/6 September, secret-service informants within the ANC organisers had handed over to their commanding officers detailed reports on the status of the preparations for the planned demonstration in the Ciskei. On Sunday, 6 September, the office of DMI chief General van der Westhuizen sent an order to the commanding officer of the Ciskei Defense Force (CDF) and DMI officer Brigadier Marius Oelschig to use force and „all necessary means“ to break up the ANC demonstration. The order emphasized that it had received a green light from the „highest authority“; this is most probably a reference to the ultra-secret team of *Operation Thunderstorm*. Those who carried out this order on the spot and finally gave the order to shoot at the peaceful demonstrators also came from the DMI: Chief of Staff Operations Colonel Horst Schubesberger and Colonel Jaco Roussoaw.

On 6 September a second order left van der Westhuizen's office; this one, with similar contents, went to Rowan Cronje in Bophuthatswana. The office of the DMI chief warned him of planned ANC actions in Mangope's „homeland“ and also gave the order to use „all necessary means“, with the approval of the „highest authority“. Thus the massacre in the Ciskei permits us to trace the command structures of *Operation Thunderstorm*.

The Political Aims of the Bloodbath

The political aims which the white minority regime linked with the massacre are described in a secret NIS paper written only a few days after the bloodbath of Bisho, about whose contents *Top Secret* has been informed. According to this paper, the aims of the NIS strategists can be described as follows:

1) Both nationally and internationally the massacre was meant to serve as a „warning to the ANC leadership to cease the mass actions“ organised by it (quoted from the NIS paper). In particular, it was meant to make it clear that the regime in Pretoria is not prepared to abandon its allies, which are dependent on it, in the „homelands“ created by it. In this way the ANC is to be forced back at gunpoint to the negotiation table.

2) In terms of propaganda, the shots fired at Bisho were meant to put at least part of the blame for the bloodbath on „Communist elements within the ANC“ (quoted from the NIS paper). (Ronnie Kasrils' name has been repeatedly mentioned in this connection by the international media.) This is also a

chance, the paper continues, to insinuate that during the weeks since the CODESA talks were broken off, „Communists and other radical forces within the ANC have won the upper hand. Nelson Mandela is today only a figurehead whose influence on the organisation (the ANC — The authors) is dwindling. Here we (the apartheid regime — The authors) must repeatedly emphasize that we have no problems of any kind with the moderate forces within the ANC (...). On the contrary, we (the apartheid regime — The authors) must repeatedly emphasize that we can come to a peaceful agreement with these elements very quickly. It is the radicals and Communists who are blocking and sabotaging it, thus representing a danger for the moderates too. Our message must always be: the ANC must free itself of its Communist allies in order to be able to negotiate responsibly. This must also be understood at the international level in particular, so that the ANC leadership can be put under pressure on this issue at the international level too. At the same time, we (the apartheid regime — The authors) must increase the pressure by emphasizing that the reform process will continue even if the ANC should still refuse to resume negotiating with us. A situation must arise in which it looks to the ANC leadership as though it has only the option of continuing to negotiate and ceasing all mass actions or losing its connection with ongoing developments and thus losing the initiative. (...) Within the ANC there is already a climate of mistrust, mutual accusations and suspicions. We must continue to stir this up and exploit it thoroughly (...).“ (original quotation from the NIS paper)

Violence out of the Darkness

In addition to the clearly identifiable sources of violence (*Inkatha*, „homeland“ secret services etc.), other structures have been built up within the framework of *Operation Thunderstorm* in order to destabilize the ANC by force. One such element is the organized arming and formation of criminal gangs (e.g. the notorious *Amasinyora* in KwaMashu near Durban); another is the activities of small groups made up of former agents from the CCBs, as well as other special units.

As camouflage for their precisely targeted attacks, they use the changing code names of radical right-wing — often fictional — organizations. So far they have appeared under the following code names, among others: *White Wolves*, *Orde Boerevolk*, *Boere Republican Army*, *Pretoria Doerle Kommandos*. The aim of this strategy is to draw attention away from the true originators of the terrorism carried out within the framework of *Operation Thunderstorm*. Another method by which the same originators aim at the same goal is the apparently random massacres of civilians.

„*Operation Thunderstorm* aims to root the idea of „black-on-black violence“ in local and international public opinion. Random shootings, which appear not to be linked to any political rivalry, form part of this strategy. To confuse matters further, the professional hit-squads are provided with arms of Soviet origin — weapons previously associated with the ANC. The train and vigil massacres (...) are an example. All the murders were random and the police were quick to let that fact sink in. Of the structures used in *Operation Thunderstorm*, remnants of the CCB and others are supposed to act „independently“. (...) Then there are *Battalions 31 and 32* (mainly Angolan mercenaries), *Reece 5* (mainly Mozambiquans), *Koevoet* (Namibians), and *Reece 3* (former Rhodesians).

Training and support for elements within *Inkatha* and criminal gangs are crucial for the operation. *Inkathagato* and other revelations about the collaboration of DMI, CCB, *Inkatha* and the KwaZulu Police (...) are only the tip of the iceberg, says a security operative. Taxi wars in the Western

Cape, Transvaal and other areas also form part of this strategy." (7)

The organized climate of violence is having an effect. Nico Basson, formerly a DMI propaganda officer during the elections in Namibia, expressed it very cogently: „The message has reached Soweto: if you're for the ANC, you're risking your life. (...) Six months ago you could see people everywhere wearing ANC T-shirts, in front of some of the houses there were even ANC flags waving. All that has disappeared. A result of the intimidation campaign (...)” (8)

The Strategy of Infiltration

Another element of *Operation Thunderstorm* is the deliberate infiltration of the ANC (especially its military wing, the MK), the SACP, COSATU, PAC, and other democratic organizations. Agents within the structures of the democratic organizations carry out their missions in various ways: they are used when necessary as agents provocateurs, they inform the South African secret-service community about every step and every plan of their organizations, and they deliberately work within their organizations to incite and instigate internal conflicts.

Thus for example, during the CODESA negotiations the strategists of *Operation Thunderstorm* were informed ahead of time about the most important tactical tricks of the ANC leadership. „During CODESA we knew exactly what these guys (the ANC — Ed.) were planning (...) Therefore de Klerk was able to react fast and precisely and the «timing» with our friends abroad was accurate,” one high-ranking NIS officer commented on the situation.

Another source of assistance are the so-called „friendly services” such as the North American CIA, the British MI6, and the German BND (which, incidentally, was still training South African secret-service agents at least until 1984; the reader can find two names of participants of these courses under the heading „Who's Who in South Africa's Security System”).

The relationship between the CIA and its South African counterpart is especially close, and has in fact taken on the characteristics of a strategic alliance. A person privy to internal information about this close cooperation at the higher level of the NIS told us the following: „Regular meetings take place between the top leadership of the NIS and the CIA, sometimes in South Africa and sometimes in Europe — the favorite Euro-

pean location is Germany — or the USA. Depending on the case, high-ranking DMI officers may also participate. On many strategic questions there is agreement between the two secret services, but in general one can observe a tendency in the CIA to place particular value on active political measures, e.g. the organisation of international disinformation campaigns against the ANC/SACP alliance or attempts to divide the ANC internally and thus weaken it. In the campaign to make de Klerk internationally acceptable, the CIA's services were especially significant for us — especially in Africa, where even presidents have at times been directly influenced by the CIA. We were repeatedly surprised by the detailed information the CIA had about internal processes within the ANC. We regularly received reports on them. We tried to analyze the nature of the source, in order to localize it if possible and if necessary to make it directly usable by ourselves. But we never received the true names of the source from the CIA, and we are still convinced today that the Americans haven't told us everything they know. However, after a long period of observation and analysis we've come to the conclusion that the CIA must have access to an ANC officer at the highest level, that there is apparently only a single source at this level, and that the information is not being tapped directly from South Africa — where we of course could learn something about it — but rather, apparently, from Europe ...”

In November 1991 reports were published about a scandal concerning the infiltration of the anti-apartheid forces. (9) The South African labor-union umbrella organization COSATU relieved Maxwell Xulu of his duties as President after the union members had found out that he had worked at least seven years for South Africa's security police. The labor unionists were able to report of at least 37 meetings between Maxwell Xulu and a certain Warrant Officer Brown from Division A2 of the security police. Xulu's particular significance for the South African secret-service community resulted from the leading role he played in the development of the strategic alliance between the ANC, the SACP, and the South African labor unions.

Another case is that of agent Patrick Hlongwane, alias Hlongwane, alias Harvey Maringa, born 16 September 1957. He worked as an agent for the security police at least since 1980, and was trained in at least five special courses (in 1980, 1983, 1985, and 1986) in secret-service technology, the use of various firearms, etc. „The ANC's Department of Intelligence and Security says that in October 1986 Hlongwane was sent to join the ANC in Botswana. He was instructed to phone 011-8255383 and ask for Warrant Officer van Dyk on his arrival. He reached Lusaka in January 1987. Since he was a well-known agent he was unable to maintain his legend and confessed his real identity to ANC security. As a result the ANC imprisoned him. Hlongwane's confession included the following:

- * in 1981 he joined the *Roots Movement*, a vigilante organization set up by the security police to divide the community and oppose the *PE Black Civic Organisation, Febeco*. He worked with a Colonel van Kouwen and Mzwandile Maqhina;
- * he went to Lesotho in 1982 to take photos of ANC houses in Maseru. In December of that year he took part in the brutal SADF Maseru raid in which 42 people were killed;
- * in 1984 he worked with the notorious PE security policeman, Tungata, and was involved in the bombing of a number of houses (...). Later he worked with vigilante leader Thamasanqa Linda, the «mayor», and killed several people (...)
- * because he was so discredited in the Eastern Cape, he was moved to Germiston in July 1985. He took part in the tracking and killing of Clement, an MK cadre active on the East Rand. During this period, he informed on George Mashele, the MK combatant killed by the police in Vosloorus in July this year.” (10)

Williamson „advises Chissano“

Craig Williamson, one of Pretoria's best known spies, has been working for some time as a political adviser to Mozambique's President Joaquim Chissano, according to a former fellow agent in South Africa's security services. It is not known if Williamson is still in the pay of the South African state. He has for some time been involved in a company called GMR, with connections in the Seychelles. He may not be the first erstwhile undercover operative Mozambique has used. Echel Roodie, former head of the department of information at the time of infogate, the information scandal in the late '70s, said at the beginning of last year he had been asked by Mozambique's government to „prepare a five year programme on how to build bridges to the West”. His blueprint had been approved by Chissano.

Source: *SouthScan*, London (Britain), 25. 9. 92

Patrick Dlongwana is a member of the group of agents and saboteurs paid by the apartheid regime who were imprisoned and then released by the ANC and have returned to South Africa. Whereas some of these persons have retreated into private life, Dlongwana, together with others, is continuing his activities on behalf of his secret-service employers. He is now one of those „witnesses“ who are handed around at the international level to support accusations of alleged torture and arbitrary imprisonment practices by the ANC. These activities are a part of *Operation Thunderstorm's* disinformation campaigns against the ANC whose aim is to damage the ANC's credibility within the country and abroad. Moreover, Dlongwana served the South African secret service DMI as a „witness“ whom it presented to the military dictator Gqozo a few days before the Bisho massacre in order to convince him that the ANC was planning a violent coup against him and that he therefore must react as forcefully as possible against ANC activities in his „homeland“. On the day of the massacre Dlongwana was seen at the side of Gqozo's „security“ forces, who were shooting at the demonstrators.

Only Cosmetic

In summary, one can only conclude that *Operation Thunderstorm* is still intact. President de Klerk's declaration that some of the special units will be disbanded is nothing but eyewash. All of the special-unit members who are affected will then receive South African citizenship — and in some cases be assigned new names that sound like Zulu or Xhosa names — and will be reassigned to other special units. In the police reform which was announced with much publicity by the regime, and which sent some police generals into early retirement, most of the police officers who were involved with „dirty tricks“ remained unaffected. All of these actions were aimed at reassuring international public opinion and regaining the initiative within the country.

However, the violence can be countered effectively only if the structures of *Operation Thunderstorm* are effectively

destroyed. This could be done only through a supervised disbanding of the military secret service DMI and a process for monitoring the NIS which is organised by all of the parties. But an essential part of such an action would be to record the documentary data concerning members of both secret services and the structures of their front organisations. Without international supervision, such monitoring and disbanding or restructuring of the special units of the police and the army will hardly be possible. If the minority regime in Pretoria does not consent to any of these steps, then each future action against violence which it announces will be a purely cosmetic remedy, and the negotiations for a democratic South Africa will run the risk of degenerating into a farce.

Sources:

(1) Mr. Billy van der Merwe is a pseudonym and stands for a high-ranking member of the South African secret-service community. Independently of him, Top Secret can count on other informants in the NIS, DMI, and the special units of the police. Mr. Jack Umshini Wkubhala is also a pseudonym for a person who has extensive knowledge about Inkatha and its close relationship with *Operation Thunderstorm*. We must assign pseudonyms to our informants for their protection.

(2) quoted from *Mayibuye* (official publication of the ANC), July 1992

(3) cf. *Die Tageszeitung* (Berlin/Germany), 3 August 1991

(4) cf. on CIA support for Inkatha, in more detail: *Top Secret*, No. 1 (summer), 1991

(5) cf. in more detail: *Weekly Mail* (South Africa), No. 35, 1992

(6) Certain names are cited at this point, which we will nonetheless not print, so as not to serve indirectly the divide-and-rule strategy of the apartheid regime.

(7) Quoted from: *Mayibuye* (official publication of the ANC), July 1992

(8) Quoted from: *Top Secret*, No. 1 (summer) 1991

(9) Cf. in detail: *SouthScan* (England), 15 November 91

(10) from: *Mayibuye*, September 1992

State's Secret Strategy uncovered (1)

Anti-ANC Spy Plan

Operation Springbok was calculated to force the ANC into some coalition with the National Party in a future government.

The ANC's decision to pull out of negotiations has prompted the state security apparatus to launch a massive data-gathering campaign on ANC leaders, particularly Umkonkato we Sizwe cadres.

New Nation's sources revealed that the exercise began this week in the eastern and northern areas of the country, where the government fears that members of the ANC will accommodate MK members when they infiltrate the country with military hardware from the neighboring states.

Recruited

State security apparatus have stepped up operations aimed at recruiting members of the ANC, the SA Communist Party, MK and other liberation movements. Those recruited will be used for intelligence gathering, and later used to sow confusion among their organisations in order to create conditions of a split, the sources said.

The reports were confirmed by the editor of the German-based *Top Secret* magazine, Mike Opperskalski, whose publication specialises in revealing key intelligence information from agencies such as the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), National Intelligence Services (NIS), Department of Military Intelligence (DMI), among others in Western countries.

„Just a few months ago, we received information from our sources within this intelligence community that the regime is planning a massive purge, including assassinations of middle-ranking cadres“, said Opperskalski.

Swoops

He added to justify the assassinations, the security forces might cover up by claiming that the killings took place during anti-crime and anti-violence swoops.

Opperskalski said that the security forces were presently „preparing necessary provocations and putting agent provocateurs in place“.

New Nation's sources said this week that black members of the SA Defence Force's 111 Battalion, in Amsterdam in the

Eastern Transvaal, had been ordered to gather addresses of ANC members (...). The addresses will be used „in time should CODESA fail“, said the source.

Intelligence sources have apparently been feeding the ANC with information that violence had been planned by the government for mid-June and early July to coincide with the establishment of an interim government as it had been thought that it would be in place by the end of June.

But, the sources said, some ANC leaders were reluctant to take the information seriously until the event of Boipatong, among other attacks. (...)

Intelligence sources said *Operation Thunderstorm* was born after the unbanning of the ANC and the release of its leader, Nelson Mandela, and began to operate soon after the signing of the Pretoria Minute. The operation had been divided into two phases with the first lasting until late 1991. During this period, the government believed that it could sideline the ANC by all methods including violence and by forming an alliance with *Inkatha* and the various homeland political parties.

Also within this phase, in terms of *Operation Thunderstorm*, the government hoped to weaken the ANC by splitting it into so-called radicals and moderates.

In the first step towards weakening the ANC, a media campaign directed against the leadership of the SACP, the ANC Youth League, MK as well as the ANC's security establishment, was planned.

After realising that the ANC remained strong by the end of 1991, the government's strategists then introduced amendments to *Thunderstorm* and *Operation Springbok* was born.

Operation Springbok is calculated to put emphasis on the „political front“ where the ANC will be forced through debate to form some coalition with the National Party (NP) in a future government arrangement.

NP leader FW de Klerk is reportedly informed on a daily basis on developments around the operation.

A source said that a special report was prepared by the Director General of the NIS after receiving reports from the several units of the DMI, the special forces and the Military intelligence. He said: „This special report is prepared by the Director General of the NIS and sent to de Klerk by a special courier service.“

Op. Thunderstorm: FW's script for chaos? (2)

New evidence not only implicates State President FW de Klerk in fomenting the violence, it has him at the centre of a sinister web of ANC destabilisation. According to German-based spookwatching magazine *Top Secret*, De Klerk and a select group of senior officials, including the Commissioner of KwaZulu police, are pulling the strings of violent puppets like the IFP (*Inkatha Freedom Party*, the Editor), reports Ivor Powell.

State President FW de Klerk is personally co-ordinating an ultra-secret team of top intelligence operatives orchestrating the violence in South Africa.

And among his top aides in a monstrously cynical plot to destabilise the ANC and hold on to power, is the Commissioner of the KwaZulu Police, top SAP security policeman, General Jac Buchner.

These are among the devastating accusations made, again, by the German-based spywatching magazine *Top Secret* in their July edition, which goes on to allege that the operation and the violence is cynically directed towards destabilising its major political opponent, the ANC alliance.

To substantiate its claims, *Top Secret* names the top-ranking security forces officers who form the inner core of *Operation Thunderstorm*. Included in the list, along with the director and four unnamed members of the National Directorate of the

National Intelligence Service are:

- * General Jac Buchner, onetime head of the Security Police in Durban, now Commissioner of the KwaZulu Police on secondment from SAP;

- * Director of Military Intelligence, General Joffel van der Westhuizen, alleged to be implicated in a signal ordering the death of Eastern Cape activist, Matthew Goniwe. Van der Westhuizen's private secretary, Pamela du Rand, was one of two security forces agents this week exposed as having been involved in the recently alleged assassination attempt on Captain Dirk Coetzee.

The magazine claims that, co-ordinated by NIS, the secret grouping reports to the State President on a regular basis — sometimes on a day to day basis. Similar claims have been made by the ANC magazine *Mayibuye* and by *New Nation* in recent weeks.

Apparently the report is sent to de Klerk's residence in the early morning, before he leaves for work and arrives by special courier. After being signed and/or amended by de Klerk, the briefing goes back by the same special couriers to the Director General of NIS.

According to the magazine, quoting highly placed but unnamed intelligence sources, the reports include proposals for, among other things, terror operations and assassinations. Central to the plot as a whole was the role played by *Inkatha* imps in fomenting the township violence in pursuit of destabilising the ANC and its allies, and this, the magazine claims, is a central part of the overall strategy of *Operation Thunderstorm*.

Thunderstorm is allegedly a highly secret network. At no stage is the State Security Council directly involved, nor are the official structures of the security forces. *Top Secret* reveals that *Operation Thunderstorm* was designed as a low-intensity warfare strategy aimed at the long-range weakening of the ANC.

In its first phase the plot — while also employing terror tactics — was largely based around a propaganda and hearts-and-minds strategy, which wanted to create a powerful political alliance around the National Party, the *Inkatha Freedom Party* and various homeland-based political parties linked to the government.

Thus, for example, the magazine discloses, one of the earliest operations undertaken on the propaganda front was an attempt to drive a wedge between radicals and moderates within the ANC alliance by means of a series of „disclosures“ of putative communist conspiracies.

Recent „revelations“ of insurrectionary tendencies within the ANC alliance and more particularly of the so-called „Leipzig option“ being pursued within the ANC Youth League and SACP structures — rolling mass actions aimed at leading to a total collapse of the government — would appear to testify to the continuity of these disinformation tactics to this day. However, the account continues, after 1991, it became clear to its strategists that there was little point to taking the ANC on in the electoral arena. Correspondingly, strategy was amended into what emerged as the government's negotiating strategy: to try to force the ANC negotiating teams into positions of compromise at what became CODESA, and in this way to drive in wedges and to weaken the movement as a whole. During the phase, *Thunderstorm* was renamed *Operation Springbok*, *Top Secret* claims.

Vital to all this, and particularly foregrounded in recent times, was the development, the magazine goes on, of *Inkatha* to achieve a destabilisation of ANC structures and to demoralise its leadership. This is where General Buchner allegedly fits into the overall picture in his role as seconded chief of police in KwaZulu.

„The regime has failed so far in weakening or compromising the ANC. Therefore they use and organise the escalation of the violence. The *Inkatha* gangs they are using, are just their instruments... they receive training, arms and logistical support from the regime's „security“ organisations. Apart from *Inkatha*

gangs, the regime uses their old mercenary forces composed of MNR, UNITA or Koevoet members and — of course — Askaris.

Elsewhere the magazine uses a pseudonymous member of the South African security forces to state that *Operation Thunderstorm* was largely based on South African experience during the Namibian war of independence and the implementation of UN Resolution 435.

One element within the overall plan, *Top Secret* claims, was the training by CCB and special police units of *Inkatha* imps for military and terrorist activities. Weaponry was supplied by the South African secret service out of stock bought in Mozambique and Israel. Along with these, anti-ANC criminal gangs, like the notorious *Amashyora* gang in KwaMashu near Durban, were armed and trained in preparation for the escalating low-intensity conflict.

Records of training exercises were published in Natal-based Zulu language newspaper *Umfrika* and in the *Weekly Mail* last year, particularly of a group of about 200 *Inkatha* members sent up to the Caprivi for training in such matters as torture techniques and abduction in 1990.

Sources in Natal gave prima facie support to *Top Secret* claims when they told VWB that about a year ago, they were contacted by NIS operatives conducting research into the Natal violence, they said with a view of compiling a report for the eyes of State President FW de Klerk. The sources said that one of the major concerns evidenced by the NIS people was to discover in which areas the ANC was especially strongly represented and where its leadership was especially functional.

Since shortly after that time there has been a sustained campaign of apparently well-targeted assassinations against the ANC alliance's leadership in precisely those areas, where it was identified as being dominant.

Buchner is rumored in Natal to have recently been recalled from Ulundi to Headquarters in Pretoria, but no official statement to this effect has been made.

Bloody Monday⁽³⁾

MI Chef ordered Bisho massacre — editor

Instructions which led to Monday's massacre near Ciskei's capital, Bisho, came from Military Intelligence Chief General Joffel van der Westhuizen it has emerged from a German magazine. Van der Westhuizen is said to have instructed the commander of Ciskei's army, Brigadier Marius Oelschig, on Sunday to use force and „all means necessary“ to crush Monday's ANC-led march on Bisho. (...)

Was there a deliberate ambush at Bisho?⁽⁴⁾

Major questions have been raised about the Ciskei's preparations for Monday's march on Bisho, and suggestions of a deliberate ambush.

Mystery surrounds two key aspects of the homeland's crowd-control provisions: why a gap was left in the stadium fence, enabling the protesters to try to move on Bisho; and why soldiers officially there to deter such a move were hidden in the grass.

In another development this week, the German publication *Geheim* (*Top Secret*, Editor) claimed that South African Military Intelligence chief General „Joffel“ van der Westhuizen had sent a signal to Ciskei Defence Force chief Brigadier Marius Oelschig „instructing him to use force and „all means necessary“ to crush the demonstration“. (...)

Sources:

- (1) *New Nation* (South Africa), 26.6.92
- (2) *Vrye Weekblad* (South Africa), 17.7.92
- (3) *New Nation* (South Africa), 11.9.92
- (4) *Weekly Mail* (South Africa), 11.9.92

Who's Who in South Africa's Security System

Bank, Dirk van der, Colonel, DMI officer, second in command in the *Ciskei Defence Force*

Bornma, Gerrie, DMI officer, he participated in 1984 in a training course of the Federal Republic of Germany's (FRG's) secret service BND for some of its „friends“ from South Africa

Brink, Clive, DMI officer, active with *International Researchers* in Ciskei

Buchner, Jack, DMI officer, member of the ultra-secret team of *Operation Thunderstorm*, chief of Buthelezi's KwaZulu police and one of the leading organizers of *Inkatha* terrorism

Cronje, Rowan, DMI officer, currently „Minister of Defense“ of the „homeland“ Bophuthatswana

Delpont, L., DMI officer, member of the ultra-secret team of *Operation Thunderstorm*

Dreyer, C., DMI officer, member of the ultra-secret team of *Operation Thunderstorm*

Heibreg, Rohan, DMI officer, participated in 1984 in a training course of the FRG's secret service BND for its

„friends“ from South Africa; currently one of the contact people with the Special Forces

Kuhn, Jaap, DMI officer, currently active in the reorganization of the CCBs

Louw, Koos, DMI officer, participated in 1984 in a training course of the FRG's BND for its „friends“ from South Africa

Louw, Michael, Director of NIS since the beginning of 1992; from 1988 to 1992 he was its Assistant Director, before that with the DMI

Marais, Botha, DMI, operation officer of *Operation Agree* in Namibia

Nieuwoudt, Anton, DMI officer, active with *International Researchers* in Ciskei

Nel, Hendrik Chris, DMI officer, deputy head of *Ciskei Military Intelligence*

Oelschig, Marius, Brigadier, DMI officer, currently commanding officer of the *Ciskei Defence Force* (CDF)

Pasch, Louis, DMI officer, currently active in the reorganization of the CCBs

Plessis, W.N. du, high-ranking DMI officer, member of the ultra-secret team of *Operation Thunderstorm*

Rensberg, Connie van, Colonel, DMI officer, shares responsibility for various assassination attempts against anti-apartheid activists and the plans to destabilize SWAPO in Namibia

Roussoaw, Jaco, Colonel, DMI officer, currently CDF

Saunders, Cliff, DMI officer, active especially in the USA and Europe; used the cover of a journalist for South African radio and television (SABC)

Schubesberger, Horst, Colonel, DMI officer, Chief of Staff Operations of the CDF

Swanepoel, Ockert, DMI officer, head of Ciskei Military Intelligence

Swart, Dewalt, DMI officer, used the cover of various DMI

front organisations (*Dynamic Teaching, Creed Consultants*).

Thirion, Chris, Maj. General, DMI, Deputy Chief of Staff (intelligence)

Verfuss, Frans, DMI officer, used the cover of various DMI front organisations (*Dynamic Teaching, Creed Consultants*)

Vermaak, Tony, DMI officer, member of the ultra-secret team of *Operation Thunderstorm*, responsible for disinformation campaigns

Westhuizen, Christoffel („Joffel“) van der, General, DMI Director

Williams, Peter, Captain, DMI, currently reorganizing the special unit *Battalion 32*

Wyk, Ferdie van, Brigadier, DMI officer, one of the responsible officers of *Operation Agree* in Namibia, with which the South African apartheid regime tried to destabilize SWAPO

Mountaineer doesn't answer any more . . .

CIA and DMI against ANC and Ghana

South African intelligence services and their CIA partners have set up an elaborate network to penetrate the African National Congress and to distribute organised disinformation against the ANC.

One of these organisations is an alleged media service organisation, *Newscope Ltd.*, headed by the prominent Ghanaian exile, Major Kojo Boakye Djan, that has published until 1991 a magazine called „*African Preview*“. According to the registration papers handed in on the 3.11.87 at the „Companies Registration Office“ in London the company's objectives are (among others): „procure to be written and print, publish, issue, circulate or otherwise disseminate gratuitously or otherwise, reports, and periodicals, books, pamphlets, leaflets, other literature, films, records and videos; present, promote, manage, and produce such seminars, conferences, lectures, exhibitions for examination, communication and solution of problems which affect the community at large . . .“ Since Mr. Djan is a black African this offered the best opportunities for him to develop contacts with African political circles.

Newscope first surfaced filming anti-apartheid and ANC activities in detail in Britain and then, in 1987, producing videos of a crucial international ANC-conference at Arusha, Tanzania, which was attended by ANC and Anti-Apartheid-activists from within South Africa. At the Arusha meeting, *Newscope's* Director, Boakye-Djan, was accompanied by a white South African lady who called herself Catherine but whose real name is Victoria Ann Cotterill, born in Durban. Miss Cotterill is an officer of the South African military intelligence service DMI.

According to the registration papers the majority of *Newscope's* shares are held by a certain Mr. Daryl Philipson. An „*Independent*“ article published on the 3 September 1988 quoted Mr. Boakye-Djan saying that Mr. Philipson is a Swiss business man based in Geneva, Switzerland and Maryland, USA, but there has never been a „Mr. Philipson“ or a company named *Newscope* at the address in Geneva given to the Registration Office in London. According to sources from within the South African military intelligence DMI „Mr.

Philipson“ is an alias for a high-ranking DMI-officer. The *Independent* of 3.9.88 further states that „according to reliable sources Mr. Philipson has underwritten an account for *Newscope* at a branch of Lloyds Bank for £ 200 000. Mr. Djan says that he has £ 2 000 a month overdraft facility“. During that early period Mr. Djan's case officer for „day-to-day-communication“ was the DMI-officer Etienne Fourier who was working under the cover of a councillor at the South African embassy in London. Etienne Fourier had later been expelled from Britain because he was involved in trying to obtain Britain's latest anti-aircraft technology. The same Etienne Fourier has been also responsible for developing relations with the extremist Ulster Freedom Fighters (UFF), who were recently involved in a DMI-attempt to kill South African Special Branch police defector Dirk Coetzee in London.

Interview with Michael Opperskalski, Editor-in-Chief of Top Secret

Top Secret (TS): In your leading article you maintain that for years you worked together „under cover“ with the Ghanaian exile Major Kojo Boakye-Djan. Can you tell us how this contact came about in the first place?

Michael Opperskalski (MO): After the PNDC under Jerry Rawlings came to power in Ghana in 1980, the Ghanaians repeatedly claimed that massive attempts were being made from abroad, by parties including the CIA, to destabilize the political process in Ghana. This prompted me to make detailed investigations both in Ghana and abroad. In 1984 I made contact with various opposition groups based in London in order to find out more about the background conditions. Since the end of 1984 I was in increasingly close contact with Major Kojo Boakye-Djan, who at that time was Chairman of the Campaign for Democracy in Ghana.

TS: How intensive were these contacts?

MO: Well, this relationship certainly developed gradually. From the beginning I kept Mr. Djan in the dark about my aims

in connection with this action. Over time, a very close and trusting relationship developed. During the past few years he even called me „Sergeant-Major“; probably in order to emphasize that I was to play an important role in his plans. In this connection, he promised me an advisory position if he should succeed in seizing power in Ghana. Finally, at his request I even contacted his underground organization in Ghana — he gave the code name Mountaineer to this action — and acted as his courier. We were in regular contact by telephone and had many long meetings in London. During the past few years he asked me for advice on various actions he was planning in connection with Ghana or South Africa, or he let me in on the steps he was about to make. I believe that all of this illustrates the fact that the relationship became increasingly intense. For this reason I was able to learn a great deal, directly or indirectly.



Mr. Djan and his courier, Mr. Kabore

TS: How strong and influential was Mr. Boakye-Djan when you met him in 1984?

MO: At that time Mr. Djan's international contacts were still not very well developed. However, he received a small financial subsidy from an old friend in the Israeli secret service MOSSAD, a certain „Elli“ whom he had met during his active service in Ghana. One could speculate that possibly it was this „Elli“ who provided Mr. Djan with access to the CIA and the South African military secret service DMI, because about a year later, in 1985, things rapidly got better for Mr. Djan. The CIA created a political forum for him, the *World Anti-Communist League* (renamed the *World League for Freedom and Democracy* in 1990). Mr. Djan attended the League's world conference in 1986 in his capacity as Chairman of the *Campaign for Democracy in Ghana*. Only a few months later Djan was also in contact with the South African military secret service DMI, with whose financial support he founded the media firm *Newscope (Publishing) Ltd.* on 17 November 1987 under Registration No. 2194694.

The South African Connection

According to the *Register of Companies*, the majority of *Newscope* shares are owned by a „Mr. Daryl Philipson“, who according to statements made by Mr. Djan — has residences in Switzerland (Geneva) and in Maryland (USA). When questioned further, Mr. Djan repeatedly described him to me in personal talks as „an old man who has an interest in my projects and enough money to support them“. Various investigations, however, revealed that there is no „Mr. Daryl Philipson“ living in Switzerland at the address given, nor has there ever been. Nor has any firm named *Newscope* ever operated in Switzerland. However, the description of „Mr. Daryl Philipson“ fits DMI agent Cliff Saunders, who has built

up DMI front projects and disinformation campaigns in Europe and the USA disguised as a journalist working for the SABC (*South African Broadcasting Company*). Furthermore, Cliff Saunders is the secret-service commanding officer of another Ghanaian exile, a certain Dr. Ben Ofusuhene, who cooperates closely with Mr. Djan. But more on this topic later.

In any case, it is certain that „Mr. Phillipson“ and Mr. Djan came together at the initiative of a certain Gary van Dyke, allegedly a businessman. This Mr. van Dyke, alias Matthew Thomson, is in reality a deported South African secret-service officer who fought as early as 1967 as a mercenary in the Congo on orders from the DMI. In 1983 he was involved in South African plans to overthrow the Angolan government; this operation ran under the code name *Operation Kubeke*.

As early as 1988, the British newspaper *The Independent* had investigated Mr. Djan's connections with South Africa and written, on 3 September 1988: „According to reliable sources Mr. Phillipson has underwritten an account for *Newscope* at a branch of Lloyd's Bank for £ 200,000. Mr. Djan says that he has £ 2,000 a month overdraft facility.“ Whereas „Mr. Phillipson“ always remained in the background as the „old man“ and patron, DMI officer Etienne Fourie, who operated in the South African embassy disguised as a diplomat and was later deported from Great Britain, was Djan's contact person for regular communication during that time.

Newscope's Network

The role that Mr. Boakye Djan and *Newscope* as well as his business consulting firm M&M Consultants were supposed to play at the command of their South African patrons is obvious. As an African, Boakye Djan had an image that would not arouse suspicion. His goal was to build up an extensive information network in Africa. The vehicles for achieving this goal were the magazine *African Preview*, which was published for a time by *Newscope*, and a media service which he offered in the areas of video and photo technology. *African Preview* in particular aimed at receiving and publishing so-called „background information“. To this end, it built up a far-flung network of correspondents in Africa who delivered information regularly in exchange for a fee. Its main focus was on Southern Africa and West Africa. His long-term plan was to slip into the role of a sort of „elder statesman“ in Africa.

In developing contacts in Southern Africa, Mr. Djan's particular focus was on the African National Congress of South Africa (ANC). This was not only in the interest of his patron but was also based on the fact that good relations with the ANC function as a kind of „entrance ticket“ for connections reaching up to the highest levels in Africa.

For this reason, the connection Mr. Djan made with the ANC's representative to London at that time, Mr. Solly Smith, was of incalculable value. I can still remember exactly how he recounted to me triumphantly in 1988 that he had succeeded in tightly integrating Solly Smith into the organization. He had given him — after first consulting with „Mr. Phillipson“ — 10% of the shares in *Newscope* at the end of 1987/beginning of 1988 as a reward for his „valuable work and his good contacts“ on behalf of *Newscope*, as Mr. Djan put it. This statement is backed up by a copy of the relevant section of the *Register of Companies*, which we print here in facsimile.

Mr. Djan was able to reap the fruits of these contacts quite soon. First, he began to systematically observe ANC meetings and the activities of the Anti-Apartheid Movement in Great Britain; in some cases he succeeded in recording whole conferences on videotape. In 1987 he even turned up at

[illegible]

an international ANC conference in Arusha, Tanzania, which was attended by anti-apartheid activists from South Africa. He was accompanied to this conference by a young white South African woman who called herself Catherine. Her real name, however, is Victoria Ann Cotterill, she was born in Durban, South Africa. Miss Cotterill is an agent of the South African military secret service DMI.

Important Contacts

Whenever the ANC organized a conference and whenever important discussions took place, Mr. Djan was regularly and extensively informed. In this connection, I remember very clearly the final months of 1989, the period during which the ANC was preparing for the prospective negotiations with the apartheid regime. Mr. Djan was regularly sent information about these activities, in some cases via fax. I personally saw internal ANC and SACTU documents, as well as evaluations of the Communist Party (SACP), lying on his desk. In some cases these were photocopies, in other cases they were on fax paper. His network, which he had built up with Solly Smith's help, was functioning well . . . At this point, Mr. Djan was thinking out loud about raising Mr. Smith's shareholding at *Newscape* to 15%, as an additional thank-you, so to speak.

During this period, Mr. Djan made systematic efforts to work his way upward within the ANC hierarchy. In these efforts he laid especial importance on developing contacts with so-called "radical elements" within the liberation movement. One operation in this direction was his attempt to build up a confidential relationship with the former Secretary General of the SACP, Mr. Joe Slovo. Thus he assigned Solly Smith the task of placing on Mr. Slovo's desk an article that

Mr. Djan had written years before for a West African magazine about the book *117 Days* written by Mr. Slovo's first wife Ruth First. Mr. Smith was supposed to make sure that Mr. Slovo would read this article and be impressed by it. The next step was to be a meeting between Mr. Djan and Mr. Slovo, which would be deliberately arranged but would appear to be accidental. I can not say whether this operation was carried out to Mr. Djan's satisfaction.

After I had observed how high-quality, intensive, and regular the flow of information from ANC circles to *Newscope* had become, I put pressure on Djan to tell me more. I told him I could not believe that this kind of information, which in some cases was explosive in nature, was coming solely from Solly Smith, and that I would have to know more if our relationship were to develop on a more solid foundation based on trust. At this point — if I remember correctly, this was at the end of 1989 — he mentioned to me direct and indirect contacts that he had with people at the level of the ANC's *National Executive Committee*. He had developed these contacts step by step via Solly Smith.

In this connection, he mentioned for the first time the name of the ANC Secretary of Information, Pallo Jordan, with whom he, Djan, said to be indirectly in contact and who was, according to Djan, one of the „driving forces“ behind the development of contacts and possibilities for *Newscope*.

In the spring of 1990, this connection received, according to Djan, an additional dimension: an agreed-upon meeting between me and Djan had to be suddenly postponed, initially without any reasons given. Then, for the next two days Djan was no longer reachable. The explanation for this came promptly. Djan called up, apologized, and said that we now had to meet as soon as possible. The reason for the sudden postponement of our planned meeting and for his absence had been an important appointment organized for him by Solly Smith. Djan told me that he had finally managed to meet Pello Jordan personally in a London hotel. Jordan and other members of a high-ranking ANC delegation had been in transit in London. This was the reason for the hurry. Djan explained to me that the direct contact with Jordan had been important for him because Jordan was indeed a radical but operated independently within the organization. This would open new possibilities for him, Djan, because, according to Djan, the two men had agreed to expand their connections . . .

At the end of 1990 Mr. Djan traveled to South Africa in order to observe the ANC national conference. This conference was especially significant because it was to set the guidelines for negotiations with the regime.

TS: Have you ever confronted Solly Smith or Pallo Jordan with these accusations? Was the ANC informed about these events?

MO: Well, I contacted both Mr. Smith and Mr. Jordan by fax in order to give them an opportunity to respond to these accusations. Mr. Smith has not answered to this day, and the documentation is of course also indisputable; we are printing some of these documents in facsimile. This silence can therefore only be judged as an admission of guilt. Mr. Jordan sent an answer; we are also printing the text of his fax. He denies knowing Mr. Djan personally or being familiar with *Newscope*, or even ever having met Mr. Djan in London through the offices of Mr. Smith. At the same time, he threatens me twice in a very rude way and challenges me not to use this information unless I want him to take court action. But the fact remains that his name has been mentioned within the framework of an investigation of infiltration by the South African secret services; that this investigation, which has lasted several years, has yielded numerous documents; that on the grounds of my close relationship with Mr. Djan I am an eyewitness; and that Mr. Smith has still not repudiated the accusations against him -- including the accusation that he was the one who introduced Mr. Jordan to Mr. Djan.

Pallo Jordan Answers *Top Secret*

We gave Pallo Jordan and Solly Smith the opportunity to respond to the results of our investigations. Solly Smith preferred to remain silent; Pallo Jordan answered by fax on 17 September 1992, as follows:

„Dear Mr. Opperskalski, I have just returned to my desk after being away from my office for a week.

If I were you, I would think very carefully before publishing even a word of the allegations you make in your note and the briefing document you previously sent to Ivor Powell of *Vrye Weekblad*.

(i) I do not know any Ghanaian exile by the name of Mr. Kojo Boakye-Djan. I have never been introduced to a person by that name as far as I can recall.

(ii) I know nothing or next to nothing of a publication *Newscope* which you mention.

(iii) Mr. Solly Smith has never organised any meeting between myself or any Ghanaian journalist in London or elsewhere.

(iv) I do not assist journalists to cover ANC meetings except as part of my duties as Head of the ANC Information Department. While I was in Lusaka that task was handled by Mr. Tom Sebina, whose official task included Media Liaison; here in Johannesburg that task has been ably filled by Mr. Saki Macozoua and his desk, Media Liaison. I would warn you most sincerely that if a single slander, either direct or by innuendo, appears in your journal about myself, I shall not hesitate to seek redress to the full extent of the law. In other words I shall take you to the cleaners.

A copy of this telex will be sent to the ANC Legal Department.

I trust this clears up your questions.

Yours sincerely

Z. Pallo Jordan
Secretary of Information"

From the beginning, I have informed responsible ANC persons at the highest level about the step-by-step course of my investigations. These accusations are too serious to be merely swept under the rug, especially in view of the most recent developments in South Africa. If the ANC should initiate an investigation of the entire affair, we will of course print a report on its results in one of our future issues. The same holds true for any official statement that may be published in this connection by the ANC leadership.

TS: Did Mr. Djan have other means of access to the ANC leadership?

MO: Yes, and here too Solly Smith, the former ANC representative in England, was the initiator. In addition to his cooperation with Mr. Kojo Boakye Djan, Smith was also in close contact with another Ghanaian exile, a certain Dr. Ben Ofusuhene, called Mr. Ben for short. This Dr. Ben worked together closely with Mr. Djan; thus for example, Dr. Ben's son was employed by Djan's *Newscope* for a time. Dr. Ben's task was to create extensive operative and personal contacts with the relatively large community of South African exiles in England.

At the end of 1986/beginning of 1987, Solly Smith introduced Dr. Ben to Dr. Francis Melli, who was a member of the ANC and the SACP leadership and Editor-in-Chief of the

ANC official publication *Sechaba*. Thanks to his function, Dr. Melli had the most intimate knowledge of internal information about the ANC and the SACP. A very intensive relationship developed very quickly between the two men. In 1987 Dr. Melli even moved into Dr. Ben's house near King's Cross in London, to live there rent-free. Dr. Ben's surgery occupies the ground floor of this house. One of the rental apartments in this house was used by Dr. Francis Melli rent-free from 1987 until his return to South Africa in 1990. Step by step, Dr. Melli became dependent on Dr. Ben, both financially — Dr. Ben repeatedly gave his „friend“ Melli both small and larger sums of money — and personally through Dr. Ben's adroit exploitation of Dr. Melli's alcoholism. In this way Dr. Ben succeeded, for example, in getting his hands on the records of a secret internal ANC meeting (of the *Advisory Committee of the Chief Representative*) on 12 August 1988 in London. Dr. Ben passed along to Mr. Djan a copy of this paper, which he later presented proudly as evidence of his high-level contacts within the ANC.

Via Francis Melli, Dr. Ben offered to buy a larger office building in London as a present to the ANC. Because the ANC reacted very coolly to this offer, Dr. Melli even arranged to meet the wife of former ANC President Oliver Tambo in order to „force through“ this project. For Dr. Ben, money was no object...

Dr. Ben's Background

Dr. Ben worked for the South African military secret service DMI. His commanding officer was DMI agent Cliff Saunders. How unambiguous this connection with the DMI was can be seen clearly by examining another operation carried out by Dr. Ben, over which the ANC, however, maintained control.

In 1988 ANC journalist H. Mzala was introduced to Dr. Ben by Francis Melli. Mr. Mzala told him that he was writing a book about the role of the so-called „homelands“ in South Africa, but that the financing of this book was still not covered. Dr. Ben immediately offered to help him, saying: „I have a friend, an old man, who has a lot of money and who is prepared to help.“

What is interesting here is his mention of the old man; it recalls, even through its choice of words, Mr. Djan's repeated references to „Mr. Phillipson“, the patron of *Newscope*. Is this „old man“, alias „Mr. Phillipson“, the same person as DMI agent Cliff Saunders? If so, another interesting circle would also be closed. The fact is that Mzala later — after a personal meeting in the spring of 1989 — gave a description of this „old man“ which fits Saunders. This meeting took place because Mzala had informed the ANC about these developments from the beginning, and the ANC had advised him to maintain these contacts in order to get to know the people working behind the scenes.

During this meeting, the „old man“ promised concrete assistance: 500 £ a month, a computer, and the use of one of „his“ houses in Camden Town free of charge. This house later on turned out to be a DMI safe house. Moreover, he promised to help get the book published. Finally, Mzala received an additional 800 £ from Dr. Ben — as a „loan“. This was the only meeting that ever took place with the „old man“. In later meetings he was represented by one of his alleged co-workers, a supposed „businessman“. This man, white and in his late thirties, spoke English with a clear South African-Boer accent and made a noticeable point of never appearing in photos — which were made within the framework of informal meetings at Mr. Mzala's home — or even being seen by persons he did not know. But this relationship could not be further developed, because Mzala became severely ill and later died.

The Death of Dr. Melli

In 1990 Dr. Francis Melli returned to South Africa in order to resume his political activities there. However, he remained in extremely close contact with his „friend“ Dr. Ben. The latter finally traveled to South Africa himself in September 1990 in order to build up his network on the ground and to incorporate Dr. Melli into it from the very beginning. Thus for example he offered to buy a house for Dr. Melli in East London, South Africa. He said he had the money to do this, and moreover could then himself live with Dr. Melli, because in the future he would often be in South Africa.

On 8 October, the two men planned to travel to East London in order to look at appropriate houses and, if they found a suitable one, to buy it immediately. The two men celebrated and drank freely the evening before; Dr. Melli consumed large quantities of alcohol, as always at Dr. Ben's expense. The drinking continued the next morning. Thus Dr. Melli was completely drunk when he and Dr. Ben drove to the airport in order to fly to East London.

There, however, the situation escalated. In the airport terminal, the totally drunken Dr. Melli and Dr. Ben happened to meet several ANC officials, who found it intolerable for a member of the ANC leadership to behave this way in public. While Dr. Ben disappeared in a panic (he was staying at the Carlton Hotel), the ANC officials took Dr. Melli to the Protea Inn Hotel and checked him into a room on the seventh floor. They also reported back to their organization, which thereupon decided to initiate a detailed investigation of the incident and its background, especially the role played by Dr. Ben.

Dr. Ben grew alarmed: his entire carefully built up construction was threatening to collapse. On the evening of 8 October, Dr. Ben sent a taxi to pick up Francis Melli. Melli did not come back until late that night, and died several hours later. His corpse was found on 10 October sitting on his bed fully dressed, as though he had died shortly after returning to his hotel room. There are indisputable indications that Dr. Melli was poisoned at the orders of the DMI, apparently during the meeting with Dr. Ben to which he had been brought by taxi. The DMI probably feared that Dr. Melli would begin to talk, in view of the impending investigation and his own labile condition, about his own role, about the activities of Dr. Ben, Kojo Boakye-Djan, and their South African manipulators, and possibly also about other cases of infiltration that had been successfully carried out by the South African secret services with his help or that of Solly Smith. Dr. Melli knew too much, and for this reason he had to die. . . . On 9 October Dr. Ben left South Africa in a hurry, traveling towards London, where he dropped out of sight.

Attempt to overthrow the government in Ghana

TS: How is all of this connected with Mr. Djan's activities against the Ghanaian government?

MO: Well, from all of his other African activities it is clear that Mr. Boakye-Djan belongs to the circle of Ghanaian exiles who want to overthrow the Ghanaian government led by Jerry Rawlings — whatever the cost. His activities towards this goal have been completed in various stages, which have essentially depended on three factors:

- 1) the international support received by Mr. Djan for his activities in and against Ghana;
- 2) the intensity of his involvement in other projects, especially the activities against the ANC which have already been described;
- 3) Mr. Djan's lack of a base, both in Ghana and among Ghanaian exiles and the political opposition.

Against this background, his activities can be divided into three stages. First, from the beginning of the Eighties until

about 1985 he was extremely isolated and had no political platform worth mentioning at his disposal which he could have used as a base for his operations. Then he created the *Campaign for Democracy in Ghana*, for which he systematically sought supporters in the West. While the South African military secret service DMI used him mainly for its own anti-ANC operations, it was primarily the North American CIA that tried to build him up as an anti-Rawlings force.

He won international acceptance mainly through his participation in the international congress of the *World Anti-Communist League (WACL)* in 1986 in Luxembourg. The WACL (renamed the *World League for Freedom and Democracy* in July 1990) is a well-financed federation of fascists, Nazi collaborators and neo-Nazis, racists, fugitive criminals and war criminals, leaders of Latin American death squads, and respectable conservatives, and serves as a CIA front organization. Led by retired US Army Major General John Singlaub — a former senior CIA official who had played a leading role in coordinating „*Irangate/Contragate*“ projects for Lt. Col. Oliver North — the WACL was transformed into a highly effective and active supporter of right-wing and extremist guerrilla groups around the world (UNITA, MNR, the Nicaraguan contras, and the Afghan mujaheddin, to mention a few), many of them terrorist and mercenary groups.

With the help of the WACL, Djan could systematically build up contacts from about 1985/86 onwards with various other CIA-influenced or CIA front organizations. At this point I would like to name some of them: the *Heritage Foundation*, *National Endowment for Democracy*, *Freedom Inc.*, etc. I have copies of some of his letters to these and other groups. But he also developed contacts with reactionary groups and mercenary organizations in Africa; in this connection one must name UNITA and a certain Mr. Guirina from Burkina Faso, who, in close contact with the CIA, was already conspiring against that country's former Chief of State, Thomas Sankara. Guirina operates out of France and the Ivory Coast, and he opened up possibilities for his friend Djan to become active in West Africa, especially in the Ivory Coast and Togo, and to build up organizational structures there. The phase of organizational construction was finished about 1990. From that time on, Djan was successful in developing structures in Ghana on his own.

At about the same time, his operations against the ANC went through a crisis of sorts. I've already related the background of the death of Dr. Francis Melli. The first articles about his South African associates behind the scenes were appearing in British newspapers. Thus Mr. Djan was at great risk of being compromised altogether via his DMI-supported *Newscope* structures. For this reason Mr. Djan decided, on the CIA's advice, to reorganize his entire action program and from that time on to concentrate almost entirely on Ghana.

The CIA Becomes a Decisive Factor

TS: How did the CIA exert its influence in concrete terms?

MO: I've already explained that the CIA offered a helping hand in the development of international contacts between 1985 and 1990. From about 1990 on, the CIA became the decisive factor and pushed its colleagues from South Africa into the background. In the early summer of 1990 the CIA developed a profile of Kojo Boakye-Djan (KBD) and gave it to him in written form (see facsimile). The title of this profile was „KBD and Ghana“. Brief but cogent, this paper summarizes his strengths and weaknesses, lists his potential supporters and opponents within the Ghanaian political opposition, and develops an action program for him that is described as follows:

„KBD and Ghana

Strength: lowering above all others and cutting across the

A Book and Its Role: Ilka Model's *A Piece of Madness*

The author of a *roman à clef* is motivated by a desire to make something happen. This is certainly true of Ilka Model, the author of *A Piece of Madness*. Even the blurb on the book jacket makes this clear: "It is the end of the Seventies in Ghana. This country, which once strode into independence debt-free and full of strength, is economically ruined and run-down. Corruption, the black market, and smuggling are flourishing, traditional values seem to be lost . . . One man wants to change all this . . . and a woman helps him do it. People call him a bloodthirsty revolutionary, the Jesus Christ of the Third World, a drug addict, a homosexual, an ascetic, a womanizer . . . (. . .) Using notes and diary entries that were made during a time of high tension and danger, the author has created a novel that fascinates the reader through its authenticity and directness, and describes from a very personal perspective a time of upheaval in Ghana, which today is oriented toward the West."

It is a fact that towards the end of the Seventies Ghana was totally finished, plundered by a series of corrupt governments and their Western patrons. On 4 June 1979, young military officers led by Flight Lieutenant Jerry Rawlings overthrew the last of these corrupt regimes in order to give the country a chance to make a new beginning. After a massive anti-corruption campaign, the military returned power to the civilians.

However, the old conditions returned very quickly and came to characterize everyday life in the country: corruption and exploitation. The civilian politicians had remained the same as they were before. For this reason, Jerry Rawlings and his supporters decided on New Year's Eve 1981 to intervene once again in order to launch a process of revolutionary change for Ghana.

Since that time, the USA above all has been trying to destabilize the government of Ghana in order to restore the old conditions. Nonetheless, the balance sheet for the past 11 years is positive, despite all of the contradictions. The country has not only recovered economically; at least equally important is the fact that the Ghanaian people have recovered their dignity. This can be seen especially well in terms of two factors: their recollection of their African roots, which Western colonialism had tried to tear out; and democratic participation in social life, especially by those classes and social levels which had stood "outside the door" for decades: the poor, the peasants, and the underprivileged.

This is the context in which Ilka Model's novel takes place. Its key figures are recognizable: Model's Jesse Johnson is Jerry Rawlings; Captain Smith is Captain Kojo Tsikata; Koaje Tsan is Major Kojo Boakye Djan. And the process of identification which the author forces upon the reader is oriented toward the images sketched out by the dust-jacket blurb. The book's authenticity is supposedly guaranteed by the alleged intimate relationship which the author had with the novel's hero Johnson/Rawlings. Professed biographical details are meant to lend the book authenticity.

"Only he, Jesse Johnson, remains an inwardly torn, hunted man" — this is how Ilka Model summarizes her characterization of Johnson/Rawlings in the final sentences of the book, after having provided examples in the previous 370 pages of this alleged inward upheaval: uncontrolled outbursts of rage, homosexual contacts while having several women friends, reckless use of his power as well as recklessness in his personal relationships, drugs, a weird voodoo cult.

In one scene Johnson/Rawlings sleeps with the author, who at that time is tarrying in faraway black Africa as the wife of a German diplomat, while her husband is present in another room of the house. Their first sexual encounter has been short and brutal, in an automobile, without any feelings. The white European reader's prejudices are once again confirmed: this is simply the way Africans are — inwardly torn, obsessed by power, chauvinistic, and mired in backward ideas.

However, these Africans are lucky enough to have their Western patrons, à la Ilka Model, who advise and civilize them. Thus Ilka Model portrays herself — a representative of the white colonial masters — as Johnson/Rawlings' advisor/lover, who has a considerable influence on political developments. She has access to him at any time, organizes important meetings with Western diplomats — benevolent ones, of course — and is initiated into all of his secrets. Indeed, she even suggests he is in some way dependent on her when she recounts that Johnson/Rawlings' helicopter flies in circles above her house during (!) the coup in order to pick her up. And *this* is the kind of person who is the Chief of State of Ghana today . . . Poor Africa, readers will probably think, and some of them will draw comparisons with the African monsters who have been highly publicized in the Western media, like Idi Amin, Bokassa, Obote, Barre — the personified extremes, so to speak, of the characteristics of Johnson/Rawlings, unable to develop democracy or improve their societies without the wise guiding hand of the white man.

Some of the prosperous, intellectual readers in Bonn or Berlin will then lean back in their comfortable armchairs, reach for their wallets, and pull out money for one of those Western "development aid" projects that are supposed to civilize the black man. How simple it is, after all, to pacify one's bad conscience and, in effect, resurrect Christopher Columbus, who discovered America in order to civilize the continent according to European standards, i.e. exterminate the Indian civilization and its people and pillage the continent.

Yes, there was such an Ilka Model in Ghana. There is evidence that she and her husband were in fact in this West African country at the behest of the West German secret service, in order to try to influence developments in that country. However, in her description of her alleged relationship with Johnson/Rawlings the wish was father to the thought. Neither the role she is supposed to have played, nor her relationship with Johnson/Rawlings, nor the description of his characterizing moments really. Large parts of the book certainly consist of descriptions of the unfulfilled dreams of a frustrated and dissatisfied wife who understood nothing about the country in which she, after all, lived for several years, or about its traditions. The book — deftly written, to be sure — is a mixture of prejudices and dreams molded into half-truths and falsehoods which betray a lack of understanding for Africa, its rich traditions and cultural roots, and its people.

One could simply dismiss this book as a piece of stupidity and nonsense. But this would be too simple, because on the one hand it feeds racist prejudices, and on the other it serves, whether intentionally or not, those powers that would like to destabilize the development of Ghana in the interests of Western neocolonialists. For this is a well-known and often-used method of derailing a social process: disqualifying and discrediting its leading personalities. It is used to justify every form of intervention. The global outlook of the gentlemen in Bonn, Washington, or London has to be confirmed, after all.

A Violent Coup Was Also Planned

TS: Were there also plans for a violent overthrow of the Ghanaian government?

MO: Yes, and very concrete ones too. The first goal was to carry out the political preparations for a violent coup, destabilize the country, and isolate it internationally. In Mr. Djan's eyes the *MFJ* was a means to this end. The plan was to incite unrest inside the country and characterize Jerry Rawlings' government as a repressive dictatorship. It was clear to Mr. Djan from the start that a purely political road to power would be closed to him; for this, he is simply too unpopular in Ghana. Thus it becomes logical that for him only a violent coup is thinkable as a means to his end. All of the political actions developed by him are only meant to smoothe the way for such a violent coup. In one of his internal papers, Mr. Djan writes about this as follows: „We have selected uprising as the best option (...)“ In such an uprising the most important thing would be „to liquidate Rawlings and Tetteh in the very beginning“.

In order to prepare for a violent coup, Mr. Djan has built up several organisational structures. One of them is a base in the Ivory Coast which is headed by Mr. Blay's brother. The latter has secret-service experience dating back to one of the corrupt regimes that held power before 1979. A Ghanaian businessman named Kabore (see photo with Djan in London) serves as one of his couriers. In addition, Mr. Djan has stationed a small team in Togo which is directed from the Ivory Coast. In Ghana he has managed to infiltrate an official organisation for his own purposes; this is the *Central Region Integrated Development Programme*. This program includes the training of armed nature-reserve guards. Some of these guards are loyal to Mr. Djan and in case of need they can operate as small disguised armed cells on the ground. The person responsible for these groups is Mr. Kwesi Agbley, who is also a follower of Mr. Djan; he is responsible to Mr. Baaku and is officially in charge of organisational and personnel matters within the *Central Region Integrated Development Programme*. Moreover, Blay and Baaku have managed to recruit the responsible regional governor, Ato Austin. Thus Mr. Djan has managed to build up military structures as well as political ones.

However, at this point (1990/91) it was clear to him that the time was not ripe for a military uprising and that the armed forces controlled by him were still only weakly developed. For this reason, he deliberately tried to make contact with Godfrey Osei, the Ghanaian dissident who had already participated in 1986 in an unsuccessful military coup organized by the CIA. In 1990/91 Osei was fighting, together with about 200 other Ghanaians, as a mercenary on the side of Charles Taylor in the Liberian civil war. In case of an armed uprising, Osei and the other Ghanaian mercenaries were / are to provide armed support. Mr. Osei also has excellent contacts with the CIA.

Losing the Initiative

TS: Why have these plans not been fully implemented so far?

MO: In 1991 the Ghanaian government initiated a process of further democratization of the country, thus taking the initiative out of the hands of the entire political opposition. Presidential and parliamentary elections will take place in November / December 1992. Initially, the opposition was paralysed for a time. In view of the country's economic stability, they could not compete with the government in this area. Also, Rawlings and his followers can not be accused of corruption. And now the Ghanaian government had also seized the initiative regarding the question of democracy.

Thus, after a period of heated discussions the opposition



Godfrey Osei; credit: Soldier of Fortune, April 1987

split into a majority which is willing to participate in the democratic process and the elections, and a minority grouped around Mr. Djan which rejects this process, calling it a „farce“. Mr. Djan himself was undecided for a time and founded his own party, the *Free Democrats Union* which, however, did not fulfill the criteria set by the Ghanaian law concerning political parties, and thus has no significance whatsoever.

TS: Have all of Mr. Djan's plans collapsed as a result of this latest development?

MO: They haven't collapsed, but probably they've been shelved for the time being. Certainly Mr. Djan's supporter, the CIA, is now betting on two horses at once. The CIA has by no means broken off its contact with Djan, but at the same time it is supporting various opposition groups in Ghana, both financially and through propaganda, directly and indirectly. Thus for example, the CIA used a South Korean businessman to give financial support to a pre-party or precursor organisation, *Our Heritage*. The organisations on which the CIA is betting include the *Popular Party for Democracy and Development*, the *People's Heritage Party*, the *People's National Convention*, the *New Generation Alliance*, and in particular the clearly conservative *New Patriotic Party*. In nearly all of these organisations, followers and co-workers of Kojo Boakye Djan hold key positions and thus influence the direction and strategy of these organisations.

If these forces should win the elections, the country will slide back once again into a situation like the one existing before 1979: a national sell-out and widespread corruption. The CIA's strategy for destabilizing Ghana would have succeeded.

However, the CIA is simultaneously continuing to keep Mr. Djan up its sleeve as its trump card, in case of another possible development: if Rawlings and his followers win the elections, this would be a blow on behalf of the opposition, which then, in alliance with the CIA, would complain about election fraud — as Savimbi is currently doing in Angola — in order to draw attention away from its own defeat. This would be the signal for a massive political destabilization campaign against the new, democratically elected government led by Jerry Rawlings. A part of the outvoted opposition — so speculates the CIA — will then turn to Kojo Boakye-Djan and his as yet unused military option. Whatever political scenario is played out during the coming months in Ghana, Kojo Boakye Djan and his CIA supporters constitute a threat to the democratic process in that country. I hope that this disclosure of his plans, activities, and behind-the-scenes supporters will help to isolate him and his followers politically in Ghana, and to open the eyes of some of the political forces in that country to the fact that they are being manipulated without their consent by a foreign power, the CIA, in order to destabilize their homeland in the interests of this foreign power. If our effort succeeds, then our years of investigation will have been worthwhile. In any case, we will keep an eye on Ghana.

West Africa: Ghana in the CIA's Gunsights

by Heiner Waldmann

The attacks mounted by the CIA against the Republic of Ghana since 1981 have been spasmodic and intense, and they have clearly become chronic. Thus, these CIA operations constitute a model that is instructive in general, not only for the developing countries of Africa. The Republic of Ghana, sovereign since 1960, is an agrarian country in West Africa with a wealth of raw materials and a population numbering more than 12 million. Its main trade partners include member states of the EC and NATO (Great Britain, the FRG, the Netherlands, and the USA), all of which are trying desperately to cultivate continued neo-colonialism in Ghana as well as elsewhere. One aspect of these efforts is the series of internationally noted military coups which took place in 1966, 1972, and 1978.

The CIA, founded in 1947, became active in this region when it was still a British colony known as the Gold Coast. The first evidence of CIA envoys can be traced back to 1952, and has been confirmed by a wealth of documentation. In the last third of the Sixties, the CIA began to transform its office, located in the US Embassy at the corner of Liberia and Kinbu Roads in Accra, into an anti-African center whose sphere of influence would extend far beyond the borders of Ghana. The CIA found the strategic location of the metropolis of Accra ideally suited to its purposes: within a 1,000-mile radius of Accra lie almost a dozen other African states (the Republic of Benin, the Federal Republic of Nigeria, the Republics of Cameroon, Guinea, Togo, Niger, the Ivory Coast, Liberia, Equatorial Guinea, Mali, and Burkina Faso). Ghana itself borders on three states (the Ivory Coast, Burkina Faso, and Togo), and from Ghana it is relatively easy to monitor and closely supervise ship traffic going from South Africa to Europe and to the USA.

After 14 years in office, the politically progressive Prime Minister Kwame Nkrumah — who had become President in 1960 clearly indicated that Ghana, a member of the UN and the OAU, was going to steer a clear political course within the Movement of Non-Aligned States: positive neutrality, peaceful coexistence, and the wholesale elimination of racism and apartheid in the southern part of the black continent. The CIA responded by mounting its first massive campaign in this region.

O'Shaughnessy Came to Organize A Coup

At the end of 1965, John D. O'Shaughnessy (27) had come to Accra disguised as a traveling US diplomat. His visiting card identified him simply as a *Program Analyst of the Agency for International Development (AID)*. In fact, he was a well-trained and multilingual CIA specialist in coup d'états. In his attach case he had explicit information and instructions from not only the CIA but also the FBI. Nkrumah had studied in the USA and Great Britain and had been politically very active there as President of the *Association of African Students* in the USA and Canada — and for that reason had long been the "subject" of observation by the CIA, the FBI, and the British SIS. In an FBI dossier, he was judged to be "nationalist, patriotically inclined, incorruptible". For the CIA, this amounted to his political death sentence. By offering six-place sums, the emissaries from Washington, O'Shaughnessy and Howard T. Banc, bought military officers and shock troops. On 24 February 1966, a bloody military coup overthrew the

Nkrumah government and installed a military government subservient to the USA, which held power for three years.

Henceforward, every time the economic interests of Wall Street were not being optimally fulfilled, i.e. when Ghana wanted to implement a foreign policy that was overly "open" to all sides and acted too effectively against the South African apartheid regime, CIA mercenaries such as military men Achampong (1972) and General Akuffo (1978) were set into motion to overthrow the government. Both of them were brought to trial in 1979, confessed their crimes, and were executed for high treason. (By 1971 O'Shaughnessy had been so thoroughly unmasked throughout Africa as a top CIA agent that he was banished to Washington for the first half of the Seventies and in 1979 was "banned" by his superiors to Madras, where he turned up disguised as a consul general!)

From the beginning, the USA systematically attempted, through its CIA representatives in Accra (as in other countries), to infiltrate the army and security forces and build up cells, and to establish an arms monopoly by equipping the country with US weapons systems. In his documentation *"Supplying Repression: US Support for Authoritarian Regimes Abroad"*, Michael T. Klare of the Washington-based Institute for Policy Studies documents the following facts: that between 1950 and 1976 no fewer than 227 military people from Ghana were trained in and by the USA; that in July 1975 alone, five million bullets and 5,000 guns were delivered to the Ghanaian security forces; that two US security advisors were continuously stationed in Accra; that between 1961 and 1973, 70 Ghanaian policemen were trained in the USA; and that there is proof that during this period the USA spent \$ 239,000 in bribes to Ghanaian police officers.

1982: CIA Plan „Ashanti I“

When the Ghanaian patriot Lieutenant Jerry Rawlings and his Revolutionary Council of the armed forces began on 4 June 1979 to actively combat treason and corruption to the extent that was necessary, and especially after the *Provisional National Defense Council (PNDC)*, headed by Rawlings and supported by the masses, took into its hands the destiny of the people of Ghana (which comprises more than 100 ethnic groups), the fat years of the CIA's proliferation — which had till then been tolerated and promoted in Ghana — were over.

The CIA's former Chiefs of Station in Accra — Bano, Latrash, Haase, and their assistants Williamson, Twetten, and Richardson — sadly watched the results of their years of subversion crumble. At this time, as a precaution, CIA envoy Horgan and his vice envoy Charcut received their marching orders from Langley to leave the scene in good time.

Instead, the counterrevolution was from now on systematically guided by the CIA from outside the country, according to the guidelines set by the document *"Ashanti I"* (Ashanti was an ancient African empire from pre-colonial times in this region). A chronological survey of the year 1982 reveals that.

The public media took notice when CIA swashbuckler O'Shaughnessy established his headquarters at 111 United Nations Drive in Monrovia, capital of the not very distant Republic of Liberia.

January: The State Department loudly "regrets" the new developments in the Republic of Ghana. Simultaneously,

Ghanaian newspapers succeed in exposing the fact that the CIA, together with „allied“ African states, is preparing to invade Ghana.

March: Two attempts to assassinate Jerry Rawlings fail. A British terrorist makes one of these attempts for 150,000 pounds sterling, but it is reported that army members were also recruited for an assassination conspiracy.

July: Foreign monopolies begin to reduce production and lay off workers in their Ghanaian subsidiaries in order to destabilize the country's economy. Parallel actions by US, British, and FRG concerns make a strong impact. For example, the foreign-controlled VALCO aluminum-refinery concern drastically reduces production by one-fifth and threatens mass layoffs. At the same time, 60,000 tons of cocoa, i.e. one-third of the total exports of this monoculture, are withdrawn from state control and smuggled out of the country in order to cause a shortage of foreign currency. Three state-appointed High Justices are brutally murdered.

September: The Accra newspaper *Worker's Banner* exposes operations by CIA terrorists aimed at stirring up ethnic hostilities.

October: A group of CIA agents is arrested in Accra. Their task was to infiltrate the armed forces and incite unrest. On 23 November an attempted coup by anti-national military men breaks out in several places, but with the help of the civilian population it is nipped in the bud everywhere. The hard core of the coup organizers, i.e. seven US diplomats including the coup organizer O'Shaughnessy, who has traveled to Ghana for the occasion — flee the country. Another member of this hard core is US Ambassador Thomas Smith, who retreats to Nigeria after being exposed.

CIA Director Casey Refuses to Give Up

In 1983 the CIA intensified its operations against Ghana. Its subversion coffers in Washington and Langley were replenished, and supplementary special staffs were set up at various leadership levels and in different locations. Ghanaian subsidiaries of US monopolies, the *American Club* in Accra, and US diplomats intensified their attempts to make contact with compliant „black tools“.

January: The *People's Daily Graphic* in Accra warns its readers that coup expert O'Shaughnessy has once again entered Ghana. The reaction by speculators within and outside Ghana chokes off the supply of goods coming into the country, inciting widespread unrest. In London, the CIA and the SIS, working together with counterrevolutionary emigrants, launch a violently vehement „*Campaign for Democracy in Ghana*“. The Israeli secret service MOSSAD also joins in, channeling heavily armed terrorist groups into the country. For the BBC in London, Ghanaian ex-Major Boakye Djan turns out to be a specialist in psychological warfare, i.e. subversive propaganda and anti-Ghana rabble-rousing.

March: At the beginning of the month the CIA begins its second violent attempt to destroy the *Provisional National Defense Council* and ... is forced to experience its second disaster. The „*Ashanti II*“ variant collapses in the face of popular resistance and the alertness of the well-disciplined Ghanaian national security apparatus.

„Ashanti II“ Also Hopeless

In 1985 the CIA started its new operation, „*Ashanti II*“. Once again the US embassy in Accra was the focal point of the underground activities.

As early as May, the — by now very experienced — Ghanaian security service pounced, exposing an imperialist conspiracy network. CIA hunching Commodore D.J. Oppang,

commander of Ghana's navy (who had served in 1982/83 as Chief of Staff of the Armed Forces) managed to flee the country. But soldiers of fortune hired by the CIA had to face public prosecutors in court: these included Felix Peisa, a US embassy employee (who had been bribed with dollars to leave the Ghanaian security forces), the traitor Theodor Atledu, post-office employee Robert Joao Appa, who had been bribed by the CIA to conduct covert surveillance of government officials, and Stephen Balfour Ofofi-Adda, a corrupt Police Department Chief. Other names appeared on a seized list of CIA mercenaries, including that of jurist Sam Okudseto, whose task was to incite colleagues and students against the government. The US administration in Washington tried to protect its CIA and to pressure Ghana by means of its usual methods. The Reagan administration threatened to freeze its financial aid to Ghana. But this maneuver also failed. On 23 November 1985 four US citizens, all of them diplomats convicted of illegal actions, were dishonorably expelled from the country as *persona non grata* and left for Togo. They were:

- * Robert Lee Kile (administrative employee at the US embassy),
- * Lawrence Gaarufi (regional director of the *United States Information Service*, or USIS),
- * Bruce Dean Tefft (CIA officer), and
- * Ms. Annette Woodams (CIA employee).

The CIA reacted to these expulsions with its attack plan „*Ashanti II*“, which bears the handwriting of such CIA Ghana experts as John Paul Horgan (58) and Phillip H. Ringdahl (47), as well as a certain Parker W. Borg.

The ship „*Nobistor*“ was loaded full of light and heavy arms, landing boats, and mercenaries from the USA and Argentina, and anchored off the coast of the Federal Republic of Brazil, poised for action but waiting for an additional 80 African counterrevolutionaries. But this time, the Brazilian navy intervened, seized the „*Nobistor*“, which had entered Brazilian territorial waters, and arrested the crew as well as the heavily armed mercenaries, who were commanded by eight CIA agents with Vietnam War experience. The Brazilians interrogated them and handed them over to the responsible Brazilian court.

One fundamental question remains to be answered: What is the secret of the considerable successes of the Ghanaian state and its government against the continuing brutal state terrorism of the CIA? The *Provisional National Defense Council* is popular with the people and can depend with confidence on its local organisations in the residential areas, villages, businesses, and institutions. Jerry Rawlings himself put it this way: „The system of people's defense committees may still be imperfect, but it remains the foundation of the revolution in Ghana“.

Some leading CIA agents with experience in Ghana:

- Bane, Howard T.*, born 5 Aug. 1927 in Virginia, stationed in Ghana 1964-1967, Chief of Station.
- Berry, William E. Jr.*, born 8 Dec. 1919 in Illinois, stationed in Ghana 1956-1958.
- Brayton, Donald E.*, born 17 Sept. 1932 in Rhode Island, stationed in Ghana 1963-1965.
- Brehm, Vance W.*, stationed in Ghana 1970-1971.
- Burgess, Dwight S.*, born 5 Sept. 1935 in New Jersey, stationed in Ghana 1964.
- Carey, William D.*, born 13 Jan. 1928 in Massachusetts, stationed in Ghana 1970-1974, Chief of Station.
- Charette, Wilfred J.A.*, stationed in Ghana 1977, Assistant Chief of Station.
- Crane, Kent B.*, born 25 July, 1935, stationed in Ghana 1965-1967.

DePree, Willard Ames, born 1 Nov. 1928 in Michigan, stationed in Ghana 1964-1966.

Eason, Earl T., stationed in Ghana 1974-1977.

Edmondson, William B., born 6 Feb. 1927 in Missouri, stationed in Ghana 1961-1963.

Foy, Edward J. jr., born 6 Sept. 1923 in Texas, stationed in Ghana 1962-1964.

Haase, James Dudley, born 29 Nov. 1930 in New York, stationed in Ghana 1974-1975, Chief of Station.

Hammond, Robert J. jr., stationed in Ghana 1975-1978.

Horgan, John Paul, born 9 Feb. 1928 in Ohio, stationed in Ghana 1977-1978, Chief of Station.

Ince, Robert W., born 3 Oct. 1934, stationed in Ghana 1968-1970.

Kloch, Mary L., stationed in Ghana 1978.

Larkin, Lawrence B., born 30 Sept. 1936 in Massachusetts, stationed in Ghana 1966-1969.

Latrash, Frederick Waldo, born 29 Nov. 1925 in New York, stationed in Ghana 1967-1970, Chief of Station.

Link, Earl H., born 19 Sept. 1923 in New Jersey, stationed in Ghana 1957-1962.

Marine, Oscar F., born 5 Sept. 1935 in North Carolina, stationed in Ghana 1964.

O'Shaughnessy, John D., born 5 Nov. 1939 in New York, stationed in Ghana 1968-1971.

Pena, Paul A., stationed in Ghana 1973-1976.

Player, Adger Emerson, born 6 May 1932 in Colorado, stationed in Ghana 1962-1964.

Richardson, Jarrel H., born 5 Aug. 1940 in Oregon, stationed in Ghana 1975-1977, Assistant Chief of Station.

Roosevelt, Jonathan, born 30 Jan. 1940, stationed in Ghana 1971-1973.

Sandlin, Roscoe N. Jr., born 6 Dec. 1940 in Texas, stationed in Ghana 1967-1968.

Stanley, William Richard, born 2 Dec. 1944 in Georgia, stationed in Ghana 1973-1975.

Taylor, John Jackson, born 4 Dec. 1931 in Arkansas, stationed in Ghana 1957-1959.

Tewalt, Ronald Lee, born 1 April 1935 in Washington State, stationed in Ghana 1962-1964.

Thomas, Charles William, born 20 June 1922 in Texas, stationed in Ghana 1953-1954.

Ticknor, Joel D., born 27 Sept. 1939 in New York, stationed in Ghana 1973-1975, Chief of Station.

Twetten, Thomas Alan, born 31 March 1935 in Iowa, stationed in Ghana 1970-1973, Assistant Chief of Station.

Walsh, Thomas H., born 10 Aug. 1934 in Texas, stationed in Ghana 1965-1966.

Williamson, Charles G., born 4 Dec. 1926 in Connecticut, stationed in Ghana 1968-1970, Assistant Chief of Station.

Other CIA agents who have carried out subversive actions in Ghana:

Bakke, Alfred C.

Bangs, Carol E.

Brown, Clyde A.

Chapman, Richard E.

Cole, Robert L.

Hughes, Robert G.

McKelvey, Larry H.

Parks, Paul D.

Trunkle, Donald J.

All of the CIA secret service officers listed above were disguised in Ghana as US-diplomats.

International News Analysis

To our Readers

Dear Reader,

We're back again -- after a year-long pause. One or another of you has certainly wondered whether *Top Secret* still exists. Nor would it be odd if a magazine like ours were to sink out of sight, in view of the increasingly dramatic global situation -- a new victim of the „new world order“, so to speak.

No, my dear sirs in the CIA, the South African secret services and the German BND, it's still too early to let the champagne corks pop in celebration: we're still alive and kicking, and we have remained true to ourselves and our principles.

But there have in fact been problems, and we are in the process of solving them. At the moment we are in a phase of extensive reorganization. A part of this reorganization which had become necessary is already finished: *Top Secret's* German sister magazine, *Geheim*, is now appearing regularly four times a year. We are now engaged in consolidating *Top Secret*. We believe that by the beginning of next year we will have finished the process of putting this magazine on a healthy and regular footing as well. One way of doing this -- as you will note already in this issue -- is a sliding-scale price increase, which has unfortunately been unavoidable. It will, in any case, affect only new subscribers. You will find a detailed list of the new prices on the reverse side of the cover.

Another reason for the publication delays is reflected in this issue. The reports on the „dirty tricks“ of the South African secret services against the ANC take up a large amount of space. This means that more energy has flowed into the very extensive investigations than we initially expected or were able to deal with. But we believe these efforts have been worthwhile.

We hope that *Top Secret* will continue to hold your interest and that we can count on your interest and solidarity.

Michael Opperskalski
Editor-in-Chief
Top Secret Magazine

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Special Issue on
South Africa
and Ghana

Extract