

CONFIDENTIAL

INKATHA YENKULULEKO YESIZWE  
KGARE YA TOKOLOHO YA SETJHABA  
NATIONAL CULTURAL LIBERATION MOVEMENT  
CENTRAL COMMITTEE MEETING

PRESIDENTIAL GREETINGS

20TH JANUARY 1990

I have called this Central Committee to share my thinking with you and to bounce some ideas off the-Central-Committee. It 48 only a little over a month since we last met as-a Centralâ\200\224 Committee\_ but more lis happening \_than\_hits \_the \_headlines.

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In particular I would like to share with you some thoughts which have resulted from my discussions with the State President Mr. F.W. de Klerk and a number of his Cabinet colleagues. Mr. de Klerk has only been in office just over four months\_and he has only been the

leader of the National Party seven months. However, I have already  
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had more discussion with him than I ever had â\200\224with\_\_all South  
Agrica's previous Presidents-â\200\224and Prime Ministers.

Mr. de Klerk is serious about-talking to Blacks. He has put a  
Cabinet team together who are also serious about talking to\_ Blacks.  
It is absolutely true that we have not yet talked political-turkey,  
so to speak. I will continue to shy away from anything other than  
talks about talks\_and talks about what talks ought to be about

the need for Central Committee members to mobilise in their own constituencies.

I yesterday challenged the members of the Caucus to do just this. I went as far as to say that files should be opened for each member of the Assembly and each member of the Assembly should have recorded in that file the number of possible meeting places in his or her constituency. I then asked for an itinerary of meetings to

tÂ¢ - think that it might: -be wrong. What I am pointing to is debate about the role of,ethnicity in South Africa, the role of culture in South Africa. And the degree to which His Majesty and the Royal family could or should be brought into politics-must-â\200\224ultimately be decided byâ\200\224-intuitive\_wisdom,â\200\224gutâ\200\224-felt wisdom. Our Secretary-General will be doing us all.aâ\200\224major \_service\_ lin presenting some thinking about tactics and strategies on the eve of

until Dr. Nelson Mandela is released from jail and he and other

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. political prisoners have my freedom to talk)or not to.talk.

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I will continue to impress on the State President the urgent need

to release Dr. MNelson Mandel%>and I believe that media speculation

that DE Â« Mandela will now be released in the shorter term\_\_ rather

than in medium or long\_term, lis\_correct.

I will <continue to wurge the State President and his Cabinet

colleagues to accept the urgent need for a Statement of Intent

factor in politics.

I use the term "ANC/UDF/COSATU factor" because that is what it is right now, There is a battle within the battle in behind-the-scenes manoeuvring in which the so-called Mass Democratic Movement

is being established to pull all ANC allies together. It was in

fact a very astute political move because the world now thinks that

there is now such a thing as a Mass Democratic Movement. It has no

guts, it has no decision-making powers, it has no structure, It has

no executive but it is treated as a substantial political-body -in the media.

The ANC is presenting its decisions now as decisions of the Mass

Democratic Movement. = UDF decisions are UDF decisions; COSATU decisions are COSATU decisions but there are no so-called Mass

Democratic Movement decisions. There are only ANC decisions.

That observation was more as something said aside than anything



else. I just want Central Committee members to start thinking about the use of the term "Mass Democratic Movement."

As I was saying, there will be three groupings around the negotiating table. In talking about these groupings I start off by saying that I am very glad that there are going to be three groupings. This will force negotiations to be more public, more open-ended and it will ensure constant consultation with the people.

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My ' brothers and sisters, in all my political career I have never denigrated leaders of free Africa, nor have I ever bemoaned decisions of other sovereign nations. They have had their own histories; they have had their own life experience and they have

had their own sovereignty within which they are quite entitled to do what they have done.

When therefore I make an observation about the Lancaster House

negotiations it: is: pot.t.an: observation â\200\230casting any kind .of  
 aspersions. The observation lis that the Lancaster House  
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negotiations were secret behind-the-scene things which the Black  
 people in Zimbabwe neither saw7nor heard.

There was an assumption, particularly by President Mugabe, that he  
 knew what the nation wanted. He negotiated out of sight of the  
 people and the power of British colonialism, together with the  
 concurrence of the politically defeated then white Rhodesians

thrust those decisions on the people of the then Rhodesia.

There is no dispute about what I am saying. Let us say President Mugabe was absolutely correct in his assumptions about what the

black people of Zimbabwe wanted. That is not the issue. The issue is that a two-party negotiation, behind-the-scenes is not for South Africa.

This is what the ANC must hear. The ANC want a two-party negotiation. In the Harare Declaration document presented to the

United Nations and the OAU the myth is further continued that there is only the Government and the ANC. The throwing around of phrases like "all parties must be represented" do not detract from the base line politics of ANC manoeuvring.

It is the same idiom as there always has been in ANC international propaganda. When the Commonwealth sent an Eminent Persons Group to South Africa they also talked about the need for the South African Government to negotiate with Blacks and they too used phrases

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indicating that all black opinion must be represented. In their dealings, however, and in their formulations, however, we all know and the world knows that they were looking at the ANC and Government as two prime contenders with the so-called other opinion backing up one or the other of these two contenders.

In deed, as opposed to in word, this becomes even more clear. It is only the ANC, and more latterly also its UDF/COSATU partners, who are given observer status as Commonwealth meetings.

There will not be a Lancaster House-type conference to settle South  
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Africa's political problems. Inkatha will be there in all its  
political sovereignty to act out its independent mandate which we  
receive from the people.

During this Central Committee, I will be calling on our Secretary-  
General to present some thinking about tactics and strategies. I  
want to pause here to say how thrilled I was that the Secretary-  
General took the initiative of preparing thought for discussion

about how we should proceed from here onwards.

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My brothers and sisters, I know that I lead from up-front.,and I

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believe that is what the case should be. But upâ\200\224frons I employ the

collective wisdom of Inkatha. Up-front I am backed by the  
collective support of Inkatha. Inkatha's structures should be the  
structures of filtering wisdom upwards from the people to branch

committees, to regional committees, to national committees and



finally to the Central Committee for distillation and  
implementation.

I want to pause just briefly here to talk about the need to bring  
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out Inkatha's inherent wisdom. Inkatha's members and members of  
the Central CommMittee are people who are like people everywhere.  
Among them there are the shy who find it difficult to stand up and  
make an independent statement. To the shy I say I understand<sup>7</sup> but  
do stand up because we need your wisdom.

Among them there are the humble who value collective wisdom and value the wisdom of their leaders. and are always ready to bow to )

the opinion of political seniors. To them I say that the most wisdom that I hear normally comes from peasants \_and often unlettered peasants at that. I believe in ordinary people. There is a wisdom on the ground that you can be absolutely sure can not be found in the high echelons of university-learning. Knowledge and position, degrees and the ability to throw concepts

and theories areound can be a million miles away from truth and wisdom. To the humble I say your wisdom is wanted because it lis humble wisdom.

There are some who will be quiet because they believe that it lis better to remain quiet than to speakâ\200\230and show your\_ignorance. To them I say debate is as valuable for the Movement when it is debate that says no to something as it is debate which applauds something. I want Central Committee members to make 1990 a year of hard

thinking, open expression and down-to-earth scorching debate that distills the gold from the dross.

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I will continue leading from up-front but I really have felt the absence of challenging debate Åffrom the floor of the Central Committee on many occasions. I have to interpret the day and age; I have to interprep the political climate and I have to interpret these things by interpreting the mood of Inkatha's Annual General

Conferences, the mood of its Women's Conferences and the mood at its Youth Conferences. And particularly I have to interpret these things by the mood of the Central Committee.

When we consider what our Secretary-General has to say to us, I believe we should do so in the context of what I am saying about there being necessarily a three-party presence at the negotiating table. I must just add right now that I do not think in terms of a three party presence in a way which down-grades the importance of

any other presence. I used the word groupings and I said there would be three groupings - not three parties.

I do not believe that we can at this point in time see the who's who and the whats and the howstff the negotiating table. A llot will depend on how Mr. F.W. de Klerk puts his act together. Â¢ believe that negotiations will take the form of a process.

In contrast to this, the ANC want negotiations to be about the laying down of National Party power and the establishment of some

kind of constituent assembly which will take over the role of

government and be midwife to a post-apartheid constitution.

One hears talk these days about who will be at the negotiating table and the idiom of the talk is that the Government must allow so-and-so to be there or ensure that so-and-so will be there. My brothers and sisters, that is not the way it is going to work. The Government is still perhaps under the illusion that they can say

that the ANC will have to lay down arms before it can negotiate or

that it will have to call a cease fire before it can " negotiate.

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The ANC has either 'the clout to ensure that it 18â\200\224 at  
negotiating tabke or it has not got.â\200\235 this â\200\234 clout. What  
Government wants is not very important. What is important is  
political presence and the political weight to make it to  
negotiating table.

And once at the negotiating table it is political presence

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political weight which will give a negotiator and his allies around



the table the influence and the command of power to sway others.

You can be quite sure that negotiation is going to be a process and in that process Political power will be made\_ or broken. I do not believe that you can look around present day South Africa and do more than be relatively coherent as you predict who will be at negotiating table.

What the fate of the UDF will be is for me very vague. COSATU is more structured; it has more organisational guts and is more real.

The . UDF . for me is a passing mood amongst some opponents of apartheid. It was born to protest; it was shaped to protest and it

has remained unexercised in membership problems, because it has no  
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membership. Affiliate organisations. will yet face the deficiencies of not having membership-based roots into grass-root society.

Right now I would not want to go on record and say too much about what the ANC presence at the negotiating table will actually be like. I would guess that we may be able to say a bit more about

the ANC at the future negotiating table after it has held its

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Consultative Conference later this year.

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Will the swallowing of prisoners released from jail be medicine for the ANC or 'hot'? This is a question that I would not like to express myself about for the record. - We may be able to come a bit

nearer to speculating about it when Dr. Mandela is released from

jail and we see which way he moves and what responses there are to

him. We have the consequences of Mr. Oliver Tambo's indisposition

to take into account.

You can be quite sure that in the ANC's own thinking it sees itself as a government in exile; it sees itself returning to govern and it sees itself as the sole contender to power. You can also be quite sure that there is a wondering about who will be State President, who will be a Cabinet Minister and who will be a whatever. You can be quite sure that the beckoning finger of power to come is

stirring hearts, and ambition is rising amongst individuals who

will have to contend with each other for final selection.

The ANC can now afford to adopt the kind of hard-line approach that it adopted in Harare recently;; it can afford to strut around saying that the armed struggle must continue and it can afford to continue laying down conditions to negotiations. It can afford to do these

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things because it cannot afford to go to the negotiating table now.

We are ready to go. It is not. I do not really know quite how

ready the South African Government is to go. I believe that the

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State President is absolutely sincere in his commitment and

intention to get the politics of negotiation on track, but I do not think he is yet ready to do so. So whether we are talking about

the ANC or whether we are talking about the National Party or we

are talking about the National Party in the form of the government,

we are talking about unknowns.

I simply warn against making assumptions. I warn particularly

against making assumptions without knowing that you are making

assumptions.

Point one- that I make therefore is that the politics of the immediate future and the politics for we know not how long>is going to be the politics which will decide whether negotiations are big-bang type negotiations to establish a constituent assemblyDto which the Government can hand over power before there ls a new constitution, or whether the process of bringing about radical change can be a process in which change lis legislated linto

existence by the existing de jure and de facto government of the

day.

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//En this regard, I want to digress. During last year I became ever

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more insistent that the Central Committee of Inkatha is  
insufficiently prepared to mobilise the on%â\200\224the-ground forces. - that  
we would need to back up our negotiating stances. I appealed again  
and again for the implementation of the thinking contained in a

"Short Guide to Practical Politics". I talked again and again for



no right to represent the people of their constituencies.

I said yesterday, and I repeat today, I would rather have half the back-up that I do have, if that half left is on the balls of its feet, raring to go, working and achieving. A fat-cat Inkatha will be crushed by the forces which are going to come into play this

year.

Perhaps the Secretary-General could make a strategic assessment of Central Committee members' constituencies and classify them boldly

and unequivocally on a continuum from being Inkatha no-go areas> to

Inkatha-dominated areas. We have suffered defeats; we have suffered set-backs. Let us have the guts to look at our real position and then deal with it. A set-back that is a skirmish lost today which will be won another day, is normal politics. That is the way democracy works. Seats are won and lost. A set-back which is a permanent drumming out of a region is another matter

altogether.

Where that has happened the  
Central Committee members  
constituencies. They must  
the people. If they cannot  
full force of Inkatha must re-claim.  
must mobilise on the ground in their  
hold regular meetings. They must rally  
do this, they cannot consult the people  
and if they cannot consult the people, they cannot bring the  
people's views, the people's  
s back-ups, nor the people's censure to  
those of us who represent Inkatha at the negotiating table.

I would rather have half the Central Committee if that half was working effectively on the ground. Comrades, at the end of the year I might be left with half the Central Committee because I am quite sure that every member of the Central Committee who hears what I say, who has the political nous that Central Committee members are supposed to have, will hear my voice as a siren-sounding, dire warning - they will agree with me and act on what I say.

"A Short Guide to Practical Politics" must be put into practice and as I have said before it was promoted as a return to grass-root type politics. I again repeat that the Central Committee is free to look at it, amend it and make it more workable. I will only

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however, be able to tolerate Central Committee members who put it aside with disdain or who are too fat-cat in their own interests to worry about discharging their responsibilities as Central Committee members.

Not only must we as Central Committee members now work on the ground among the people, for the people and with the people, but we must also attend to our own training to makeâ\200\231us, sharpervinstrumentÃ© of liberation. Training courses have already been mounted. Again, improve them, but again use them.

That was a digression. I was talking about the danger of making assumptions about political forces in a situation which was developing in a conflict between those who want a big-bang solution

and those who like me see that Black/White reconciliation can best  
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be achieved in a process.

The second thing I want to say is that it is too early to charter  
courses. We have to mobilise strength for all eventualities but I  
will burn no bridge behind me)and I. will not steer away from an  
obstacle even if it looks like a mountain from the vantage point of

today in time. Tomorrow the mountainous obstacle may collapse in a  
heap. The time to avoid the obstacle is when you actually engage

it - not when you see it as an obstacle which may be something to  
worry about later.  
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I think we need a lot of debate about the role that culture and  
ethnicity will .play in lining up forces. I need to make some  
points here which need thorough debate. Let me start by talking  
about ethnicity elsewhere. Ethnicity remains a fact of llife,  
regardless of the political system in which it is located. It lis a  
fact of llife now in the USSR where there could not have been a



stronger central one-party power base than there has been ever since Lenin. Ethnicity is a fact of life in democracies such as Nigeria. Ethnicity has remained a fact of life and has given rise to structures within one-party states, within multi-party states, within dictatorships and even in monarchies.

Ethnicity is also a factor quite independently of whether or not it is given structural expression. There can be absolutely no doubt that ethnicity decided the political fate of Mr. Mugabe and Mr.

Joshua Nkomo after the Lancaster House conference formulated proposals as though there was no ethnicity in Zimbabwe.  
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The Zulu factor in South African politics always has been there; it always will be there. The debate is whether it will be there more powerfully for the sake of democracy if it is given a political structure than if it is left to play a role across and through structures. Here we really, really need deep wisdom. Let me point to a historic reality. The Zulus were defeated in 1879. The full force of British power was applied in a concerted

effort to destroy KwaZulu's structure. The Royal House was  
beheaded politically. The Kingdom was divided into 13 and each  
piece of the Kingdom thus divided was ruled by an appointed Inkosi.

Every effort was made to break Zulu power once and for all. There  
were no structures through which the people defeated these  
attempts. The Zulu factor did it through everything and across  
everything. The Zulu factor has worked through everything and  
across everything ever since. The Zulu King remains a Zulu King

and his summing, up of the nation in his person, his Zulu  
sovereignty gives unity to the nation.

CONTRALESA will yet find that you cannot harness the ubukhosi  
institution. It works on the ground between an Inkosi and the  
people and it is supported by what is there on the ground and in  
the hearts and minds of the people concerned. A committee is more  
a committee wherever a committee is found than an Inkosi is an

Inkosi wherever he is found. In one sense every Inkosi is unique

in his home base, in his home tradition and in his expression of the ubukhosi institution.

Let me go to the ultimate in concept to see the point I am making. God is Divine purely. His Divine Church is blameless and pure because it is the Body of Christ. The churches - spelt with a small A - the denominational churches are, however, a different matter altogether. Churches can mount holy wars and they can make unholy bummer-ups and churchmen can be vicious political animals

committing gross political stupidities. Give the Church with a  
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capital " C the structure of a church with a small Â¢ and you have  
problems.

There is a lot in life in which the same dimension is manifest. As  
soon as you secularise something you open the doors for weakness to  
enter. Do we err or do we gain if we secularise the ubukhosi

institution in KwaZulu and if we secularise the throne and the

Royal family? His Majesty has spoken at the Imbizo on the 19th

November last year. Part of that moment was the King talking as  
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His Majesty above Party politics in the context of an Inkatha  
environment.

We should all remember the power of the play "Murder in the  
Cathedral." Our Comrade Secretary-General will be talking just now  
about these things and you will be discussing and debating and  
sometimes the most constructive debates come when it is debate  
about two points of view well put.

There lies politics more than ever meets the eye. Political institutions and political practices rest in deep sub-strata of human nature and in the nature of society. You only have to look at the South African Tricameral Parliament as an attempt to make something work to see the point I make that there is danger in the new-fangled. I rightly say you cannot rediscover the wheels of democracy. There is something very valuable in the political prudence of sticking to what has worked before.



All my thinking, about the politics of negotiation is thinking filtered through perceptions of what democracy is where democracy works. It is thinking about the tried and tested and it is thinking about what I call the normalisation of South Africa as a modern, Western-type industrial democracy. The Queen of England is powerfully pertinent to the whole British democratic system but she has no political structure, and I ask myself where in the world

have any people put a political structure about a King or Queen and

put politics to work outside a monarchy? This is why I Dbelieve

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CONTRALESA is such a monstrosity.

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Whatever we debate must be debated in the context of the politics around us and not within the context of one or another projected scenario. Scenario politics is dangerous politics. It is doubly dangerous because not only may this scenario not work and not come into being, but when it does come into being it may rest on factors

somewhat different, perhaps even very different, to the factors

which we used as the basis on which to predict scenarios.

Let me go to another ultimate. Let us say we are talking about  
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heaven and what it is like. How can we do anything other than look  
at the best of the world around us and say heaven will have that  
best to a Divine degree and have it in its greatest purity. My  
heaven will be different to your heaven. South Africa's heaven  
will be different to India's heaven. Today's heaven will be  
different to tomorrow's heaven and all will be very unheavenly.

To mobilise and strategise now for a scenario which is predicted for some time in the future is dangerous politics. It would be fatuous for anybody to come with a rejoinder that there must be change and there must be adaptation and there must be progress and progress must have a goal. Obviously I know all this. I also know, however, that political leadership is political leadership

about reality today and advantage in today's reality. Politics is

bad when it suffers disadvantage today because it is preparing for

an advantage tomorrow.

And I again say there could be a fatuous response that one must strategise for future gain. Yes, I say, but not at the expense of gain today because if you sacrifice gains today you will not be in a position to enjoy your future gain - you will just not be there.

It is fly-by-the-seat-of-your-pants wisdom, it is gut wisdom and it is in gutsy wisdom that we need. That wisdom may tell us something is right when there is logical or speculative theoretical reasons

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the politics of negotiation. We urgently need the kind of debate that he is going to call forth. We need the kind of wisdom that that debate will bring out of us. You cannot create wisdom, you cannot buy it, you cannot bake it, you cannot manufacture it, you cannot borrow it. Wisdom is there as a by-product of a million things and it is there or it is not there. The problem usually is

that it is there but has not been brought out.

Our Secretary-General is going to bring out wisdom because he is

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going to ask us to debate serious things. It is just typical of him that he adds so much competence to that which he puts his hand to.

There is another whole issue which must take up a little more of my time before I sit down and ask our Secretary-General to address you. It is a question of structure.

I have already pointed to the fact that the ANC is playing structural games by creating a fictitious Mass Democratic Movement

structure with no mind, no body, no leaders and no decision-making power. We have the myth of there being an ANC, there being a separate UDF and there being a separate COSATU. There is in reality the ANC/UDF with some kind of almost Siamese twin related

COSATU. I say that this kind of playing with structures will yet produce grave disadvantages for those concerned.

It is quite right, however, to raise questions about Inkatha's



structure at this juncture of history in which organisations are playing structural games.

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If Hig'right politice that will win. It is being on the ball and being in tune with the movement of history that will win.

Different structures could win in this way. I would: say in principle that to re-structure lin order to ally must be distinguished from the need to re-structure in order to strengthen that which lis already in Inkatha. If it is the former we are

thinking about when we think about re-structuring Inkatha, then I say hold it until the kaleidoscope of today's organisational dimensions reshapes and clarify.

If it is the latter we are thinking about, then we must think about them in terms of the tactics and strategies of the day. I would hazard a guess that the most valuable debate today flowing from what the Secretary-General is going to present to you is going to

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be greater clarity on what our tactics and strategies actually are  
- not what they are in simple, one-sentence terms but what they are  
in the realities that the media cannot even see.

We again fall into the difficulties of endangering one thing Dby  
preparing to do another thing as a second string development. We  
have always pursued an open-handed and indeed open-hearted approach  
to the ANC. We have always held out a hand of friendship. Let us  
say now that we turn to withdraw that hand of friendship because we

want to extend a hand of friendship to an XYZ party and we cannot  
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do it to both because the tactics and strategies which take us  
nearer to the one take us further from the other how do we avoid  
either falling between two stools or suffering the disadvantages  
that always come with changing horses midstream?

I am on public record as saying that I am prepared to talk to  
Government about the constitutional future of South Africa if Dr.

Nelson Mandela is released from jail. I am prepared to move

through the  
discussions  
and I am

negotiations

Do we change  
alliances?  
questions tha

we continue o

pre-negotiating phase with Mr. de Klerk. My  
with him have been positive, they have been fruitful

satisfied that he is now serious about getting

off the ground.

strategy or adopt strategies or add strategies to  
How strong will such alliances be? These are  
it must be asked. Or do we ask another question?

our strategies, strengthen them, deepen them, make

more embracing so that there is the kind of reconciliation which  
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comes from the weak joining the stronger? I would hazard a guess  
that the only Black unity that is eventually going to emerge is the  
unity of purpose as smaller groups cluster around larger more  
powerful groups and are in the end incorporated in them.

There is a whole philosophy of strategy and tactics which need to  
be put on the table and debated. Tactics and strategies and

choices between alternatives provide the very idiom of politics.

I believe that in talking about tactics and strategies today, we will discover that what we have thus far done in the decade of our existence is far more complex and far more deep-rooted and much further sighted than is commonly believed and perhaps even than is what we perceived.

Now that I have spoken I want each and every one of you to put yourselves and your minds in the position in which I have not spoken. Think for yourselves; feel for yourselves; examine your

own intuitions; let your gut feelings come out; do justice to what  
our Secretary-General is going to present to you.