

I. Innonucum

I. Since the August 6 Ptoletla Summit of the South Atlantic government and the ANC, there has been an upsurge of violence directed primarily against black communities. 'I'ilo lonns II has assumed vary. but Ilio scale of the attacks and their political nature are unprecedented. In this Discussion Document, we seek to identify the character of this violence, the conjunction within which it occurs, what objectives it pursues, and the!) crucial question of the response of the ANC and the test of the liberation movement.

2. In approaching this situation, the following crucial issues need to be borne in mind:

2.1. In the same time we will discuss and discuss the strategy and tactics of the liberation movement in the negotiations. The violence is modifying the political terrain. It is not a separate and incidental factor in an otherwise smooth transition. Neither is it ancillary to negotiations about a new constitution.

2.2. While the issue of the armed struggle (both political and military) is central to the approach of the liberation movement, it is crucial for the democratic forces to assume an offensive position. The violence has created a set of conditions allowing for a strategic advance on the part of the liberation movement on a variety of fronts.

It is therefore crucial for the liberation movement to adopt a much more offensive line towards the new situation, and to rid our thinking of the inhibiting effects of yesterday.

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II. THE STRATEGIC CONCEPT

1. There is no gainsaying the fact that the changes in the place, especially since February 2 are a result of internal struggles and external pressure. The current phase of 'talks about talks' as a prelude to actual negotiations is a reflection primarily of the deep. air-toned crisis affecting the apartheid system. Since the mid-

1980s, the ANC has asserted that the system of apartheid has entered a profound crisis from which it cannot recover. The factors cited in this regard are:

' The structural crisis of the apartheid economy, which is both political and economic and, more important, the colonial/racial environment within which these 'relations are entangled; .

' The refusal by the majority of the people to be governed by the apartheid state, and the corresponding crisis of policy facing the ruling group; and

' related divisions and conflicts within the ruling class as a whole.

2. It is these factors which set in motion the talk among the various classes about 'co-optive negotiations' in the mid-1980s. In the mid-1980s, the liberation movement took the initiative to demand that the apartheid system should take place, as reflected in the OAU (L'arate) and the United Nations Documents. The actions of 'the state - the national government, two sound political principles, III! "In State of Emergency in most parts of the country. etc - were taken on the basis of an agenda defined by the liberation movement and an approach involving the unanimous support of the international community. However, two fundamental issues need to be taken into account:

2.1. The balance of the ICOS which made the armed struggle possible is not necessarily the balance which would lead to a genuine resolution of the conflict.

Negotiations themselves are a result of the struggle - a result of the conflict and the fundamental question of the national democratic struggle. The issue of the transfer of political power.

2.2. While the movement so far has been the process of negotiations should take place and in the process the strategic initiative, the tactical initiative will

not always be in its hands. In the current circumstances this phase of struggle, the liberation movement can lose the strategic initiative if it does not maintain its offensive posture.

3. Violence in any situation is not an end in itself. It pursues given political objectives.

Therefore, in order to understand the current character and aims of the current violence, it is necessary to point out that within the broader strategy and tactics of 'the forces in power. The response of the ruling class to the all-round crisis of apartheid, characterized by the post-February 2 policies and actions should not be seen merely as desperate self-management. Locked within it are attempts by the

um Imw any pomluul prouuunnuu, mu conhouuus UIU punsulnu uommu pulmoul ohjucllvos.

2.2. I ha acliOns are characlmlsod by dolibmalo lonorlsm. In many Instances, lhorO Is no lnnnedlalo conespondonco bolwoon lho Iargol oI lho allacks and lho poIIIIcaI nhns boIng pursued.For Instance. Iha vlcllms oI lhe Italn massacres could as well have boon mombms oI Inkalha, Clskol Nallonal Independence Parly or oven 0"-duly black polcemcn.

2.3. 'l he campaln Is nol holng undmlakon by an organlsallon Independent ol lho slalo. 'lho pelpelralors loml pan oI lho slalo machlnory; Ihcy are an arm ol lho oslahllshmonl, wllh lho backlng or nl lonsl Iacll suppon ol Iorccs Iron! lho hlghest governmonl echelons, and they are commanded by clrcles well-oslabllshed wllhln lho slalo Inachlnory. The conImIIors and, In many cases, lho Immodlale command. ms aro whllo. Thls appllos also lo lhose unlls whlch come from lho KwaZqu banluslan sltuclmos.

2.4. The open. dlrect IOIO oI lho SAP and SADF has boon documoned: both In . suppon ol lho vlgllanlo Iovcos and as dlrect porpelxalors - Ior Instance. lho Scplombm 4 Sebokong massacre. Tho acllons oI Ihosa unlls Is not an abonallon, hut mIlolcls lho conlldonco ol Iorcos ncIlng wllhln lho ambll oI slalo pollcy wllh lho suppon oI command slruclmos all lho way up.-

2.5. The slalo ilscII has no! allomplod lo blamo lho lighI-wlng In lho Iorm oI lho AWB 0: any olhor such Imcos Ior lho violence. Halher, lho violence has been oscallng In a pmlod when lho Impresslon was bolng glvon Ihal lho nolworks oI lhose Iorces wom bolng weakened and lhch loaders aneslod.

2.6. The llmlng, both gonoraIIy and In rolallon lo palllcular IncIdonIs was IlsoII Inshucllvo:

' lnunodlalely allor lhe PIOIOIIa summl whem lho ANC announced lls declslon lo suspend amlod acllons;

I when ANC branches were belng launched In Illa bulld-up lo lho PWV IIeglonal Conlorenco; ,

I allack on Schokeng hoslol dWOIIIOIS al a "me when NUMSA members - many oI Ihem living In lho hoslol - were on shлке;

' allacks on squallels In lho mldsl oI a campaln lo occupy land; and

' lho SWIlClIlng oI lho vIoIcnco on/oII In IeIaIIon lo de I(Ielk's Inlomallonl vlsls.

:lle vlolonco pm so, has colnclded wllh a mom aggressive slanco on lho pilII oI lho governmonl/NP agalnsl lho liboralion movemont. Immodlaloly prior lo and

dmng lho vloIonco. slalo propaganda agalnsl lhe ANC and lls Ieadership Inlonsl-lled. Even "lho men ol Inlcgvllly" wow 00an (Jul oI lholr way lo allack Iha ANC al lhe slghlost prononco. WllhIn lho SABC-TV, lho vlolenco was pieceded by IeshucIlng

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iIIlILII, I-.z. UK ., .r...vuu uII IHUHILJLA... nqu-avug IUI .Ixu., I, . . . movement as lho hoad oI Ihu desk duallng wllh axha paullanlonlany ungunlsullunu.

4. The pollllcal mollvos oI lho pmpohalms oI lho vlolonco am quillo clear.

4. I. In lho Immedlale sense. Ihoy alm lo:

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' Inlroduco Ioar. dlspndoncy and gonoral deslablllsallon wllhln lho black commu-nllas. and thus desloy lho vlbranl opllmism ol 0 people In pollllcal mollon;

' ongondm a sense 0! husltallon among lho pooplo wllh lho prosont oulov oI lhngs

- Ior Ihom lo slarl wondmng whelher Illa pro-February sllnallon wns nml hollor; .

' discredit lhe ANC whlch Is soon as boIng unablo lo blng lhe vIoIoncn In an and, unablo lo respond ollecllver lo lhe tequesl Ior amls, and havng dillulcllos ln soIIIng lls declslon lo suspend armed acllons:

' create an excuse Ior reptesslve measures such as Oporallon Iron Flsl, and lo Ihon use lhcse measures lo Iurlher weaken IhaANC and oIhor democr'allcorganlsallons;

' by swllchng violence on/oII al glven momonls. ctealo lho Impresslon Ihal lho slalo ls Indispensable lo lho nchlevemont oI peace In lho Iownshlps; and

' Ior somo OI lho Iorcos, dolall lho whole nogollallng pIOCOSS.

4.2. In lho broader sense. ll Is quillo clear lo lho slalo Ihal, II lho nogollallng ptoces s

worn to proceed wlllloul any hllchos. lho oulcome would mosI covlnlnly be In lho Inlcmsl oI lho Ilbomllon movmnonl. Dy cvoallng conplllcallons wllhln lho plocnss, Ihcy nol only hope lo weaken Ihelt maln oppononl. bul also lo slronglhen lho NP and IIS allles pollllally. As slaled earllor. Ihoro Is a dolibomlo slrategy lo dapllvo lho nallonl domoctallc slrugglo oI lls nallonl Ilbomllon characlor. Tho vIoIonca and rolalod ptopaganda serve Ihls potposo by:

' croallng lho Impresslon Ihal Ihom am SOIIIOIIS elhnlc dlvIslons among Ahlcans;

' Ioslmng lhe Idea Ihal Ihow Is a balllo bulwaen Ihe ANC and Inkalhn whlch mptesonls an Ideological slrugglo bolwuon 'soclaIIIsnr' as roprosonted hyANC and HS allies and "hen onlmpllse" as tcpwsonlcd by lnkallla and he aIIlos Including lho NP, blg business el al; .

' In lho same veln, pomayng aparlhold colonlallsm dlIhor ns doad or Inolovanl lo present-day pollllcs. allowng Ior lhe colonlal oslabllshment roprosontod parly by

'lho NP lo Iorm mulll-taclal alliances.

Tho vIolencia, lheroloro, cannol be divomod hom allompls lo rectull blacks Into lho NP and lho lalaled campalgn lo roVive lho 'Nallonal PatllesI oI lho overlhrown puppet roglmas In TVC 'slalas". II Is quIIo Inshucllvo Ihal, hand-In-hand wllh lhoso allompls. Is a concerlod eIIImI Io Iraln vIglIanlos In lhaso areas.

5. II we have Io elllnlnalo lhis vIoIonco and provonl II Itom Iaking place In olhm areas, we also need lo undersland lho condlllons and Iaclon; Ihal lho wglmo oXploIts and uses as cover lo bring In bandlls.

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L, Iho vIulunw'; un Ihu hulk Iowa, Inveslor cenlidunco, ole.

2.4. WilhIn the apartheid securly Iorces. dlfferences are slangIng Io emerge on the conducl ol these Iorces agalnsl the communllles. Many black policemen, especially those based In the alleclcd areas, have come out agalnsl the allacks. Some have soughl lo asslsI the aIIecIed communllles. In open dellance ol their commanders.

2.5. Among those IakIng part In these acIIons are Iorces whIch seek lo Iorpedo the whole negotlaIIIng process. DIvIsIons ate bound to emerge on the Irequency wIlh whIch the vIoIence should be Iumed on/oII. Its Inlensely and the exlenI Io whIch II should be canled oul Il the negollallng pwcess ls under llneal.

2.6. M05! cerlalnly. the control ol those orIgInaIIIng hem the KwaZulu banluslan machInery does no! He In the hands oI Inkalha as a pollllcal party. While a number oI leading Ilgures are Involved, control and command belongs lo the central slale machInely. The harm lhal Ihls does on the patty as a whole Is bound Io deepen conhadlcIIons wIlhIn the IFP.

3. These are the real ArchIlles Ileele ol the slale. On the one hand, It seeks lo curry oul e lerrotlsI bnndll war to desleblllse end weaken the Iorces ol opposlllon. On the other hand, as the government In power, II has In cenluIn the coal 0! such a war lo IIseII.WhaI ll then lrles to do, Is In conducl welI-llmed, wechontrolled acIIons whIch are admlnlslered In doses at selected me-ments. The IIBemIIon movement must exploll Ihls conlradlcIIon lo the In". The slmleglc elm must be In mlse the cos! 0! the bnndll war lo the reglme end he nIIlos. M the same llme, we need Io ldenllly the probable momenls elwhIch the reghne wlll seek lo swlIch bundIlry on (eg.. melor po'lllllceI ncllvIlles oI the ANC/SACP, olecllen cnmpnlgN Ier e ConsllluenI Assembly) as well as the polenllnl Ilesh-polnls und lhecondhIons end luclors whIch the reglme seeks lo exploll.

4. Our approach has lo be mulll-Iaceled. end mbsl Ilrsl and Ioremosl be pollllcal - blngIng Io the lore ou: slrateglc pollllcal sltenglhs:

4.1. The ANC and he allies ate a Ilberallon movemenI. We shouId not allow the Ieglme Io sublvacI Irom our central IhrusI the main contenI oI the slruggle - the Ilberallon oI Iho black malorlly. ospeclclly the Ahlcan people. The allempIs Io dlIve wedges wllhIn the black populalion must be conlroned wllh a conslslenI Iheme accompanled by ecIIon lo assell the mlsslon ol Ihe ANC Irom Its very loundalion: the unly oI Iho Ahlcan people In patllculat and all anll-apartheid Iorces In general. In addllon Io the tradlional melhods we have all along pursued, the process oI engagIng banluslan leaders, chlels and such Iorces as the Independent chmches musI be pursued wllh grealer vlgour and a clear sltategy. The agleemenIs reached al the IecenI summl. whIch go beyond the Issue ol vIoIence. must be lollowed up wllh a clear progTamme ol acIIon. The process lo bulld a broad paIrIolIc IronI needs Io be sol In Inellon.

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4.2. Our cenhal message Is lhal a lust and Iesllng peace wlll come as a teen" ol the destrucIIon oI apartheid. We must emphaslse lhlS. end llnk the programme agalnsl -vIoIence wllh the anll-e arlheld shuggle. Bul lhlS message wlll sound hollow II we are seen Io be Incapab 9 ol dealing wllh bandlhy new. We need lo clearly demon-slrale the cosI oI the vIolence Io soclely as a whole: lo all who seek a penceIuI lranslllon lo a new order. Io busIness groups, the church, hadlllonal slvclures In the tural areas. elc. On lhlS basls we should mobilllse all Ihese Iorces lo Iorm a unled ItonI agalnsl vIoIence. and IsoIaIe the perpelralors. Ptepatallons Ier the proposed Peace Conlerehce must be expedlled. wllh the InvolveMenI ol as wlde a spechum ol Iorces as posslble.

5. Thete has to be a deIaIIed ngramme eIAclIon addressIng the lollowIng Issues:

5.1. Co-ordlnallon ol all peace ellons. and the sellng up oI leglonal and local slruclures Involving aII Inleresled patllles.

5.2. The slrategy oI seII-delence should Include:

' sellng up ol Sheet and Vlllage Commlllees, SelI-delence UnIIs aml eIIocIive nelwmks lo galher InIormaIIon and menllor developmenIs In the Iocalllles;

' selecllve and skllluI usage ol the InIotmaIIon at our dlsposal Ier propaganda purposes;

' .a systemallc hlgh-prollle 'ballle lor the hoops" whIch alms al weakening the capaclly ol the slale Io acI agalnsl the people. and el the same llme wln over Ihose - who are Inleresled In peace. The demands lor a Code oI Conduct. demlllallsalIon oI the polIce, elc must be pul Iomrad In mass acIIon whIch Involves. aI the IorehonI sympalhelic Iorces wllhIn the slale securly apparatus, eg.. POPCRU;

a progTamme lor the ellmlnallon ol the heslel system whIch Involves. al the IotehonI, the hoslel-dwellers Ihemselves; and

' engagIng the slale In such areas as monllmg as oullned In the Gtoele Schuur and Pteloda MInules (In addIIIon Io our own networks). the usage ol Iunds lor reIleI and developmenI, elc. .

5.3. At the level of national negotiations, the state must be made to feel that it cannot wage war and at the same time expect the liberation movement to negotiate with it. Selectively and with good timing, proper responses have to be given to specific incidents, without creating the image of the movement as an impetuous force that lacks seriousness. More particularly, we should effectively use the state's questionable bona fides to amplify the call for an interim government with impartial security arrangements. This needs to be turned into a mass campaign.

6. With regard to Natal, the following additional issues need to be borne in mind: