

1. The present method of preparing a draft plan of our immediate and long term tasks in the revolution is one open to the very strongest objections . The approach is one we have often used of getting some sort of draft prepared by one or more comrades; a total absence of any support research which would serve to ground the plan on solid and accurate facts; haste and the impossibility of getting a proper collective effort at all stages of preparation . In other words our methodology is all wrong and cannot produce a sound and comprehensive , well-grounded plan. It will be a subjective effort which will merely be compounded by the further subjective efforts of those who comment upon and modify it . But it is not a plan in the true revolutionary sense and therefore contains the seeds of failure from the outset. It is the devotion to meticulous preparation and care that distinguishes revolutionaries who succeed from those who fail. It is essential that we grasp this at the outset.
2. Closely linked with the above is our concept of revolution. We say over and over again that the masses are essential to the victory of the revolution ; that we are not running a conspiracy of a few men but a revolution in which huge social forces are let loose under the leadership of the vanguard. Our planning must reflect our concept that it is the people who are going to carry out the revolution. The vanguard will provide the central core, the guidance and the means but it is the people who will as a whole organise , participate in the revolution. To do this the masses must fully grasp the strategy, tactics and methods we propose as their own . In practice they will even improve on them but essentially our entire mass must know and understand how victory will be achieved . It is in this sense that it can be said that guerrilla war is not and never is a secret possessed by a few. It is the possession of a whole nation. The fact that the enemy knows exactly what the methods and general

ideas of the revolution are does not help the enemy in the least in the long run provided those ideas are in the possession of the entire people. It is when the methods of guerrilla struggle or revolution are the possession of a small group of advanced ^{people} that they can be scotched by the security forces and wiped out. A high priority therefore needs to be given to making our concepts the possession of the people as a whole. The above is obviously to be distinguished from operational plans and the timing, objectives and motives of various specific moves. It is this latter which constitutes the secrets of the movement.

3. OUR AIMS AND OBJECTIVES.

Our ultimate aim in the national democratic revolution is the political and economic emancipation of all our people and the constitution of a society which accords with the basic provisions of our programme. To achieve this we need to conduct guerrilla warfare combined with all other methods of struggle; to drive landlords, companies and other exploiters off the land in the course of the guerrilla struggle and as part of its growth; to sharpen the contradiction within the ruling class; to disrupt the machinery of government and eventually to replace it; to destroy the military and police machine of the enemy; to control the streets and eventually the cities as a whole as we seize power in the whole country. Our immediate aim is either to intensify and expand those aspects which we have already begun and to set in motion those that have not yet been started. This is a many-sided and complex job which at all stages depends for success on hard work and efficient planning based on exact knowledge and a flair for the art of politics.

4. The following plan which we consider as very elementary and tentative indeed in the light of our previous remarks has been divided into four main sections. This is purely for purposes of convenience. Naturally a plan is a single whole whose various parts depend on one another and affect each other.

The four sections are :

- I . Research and Intelligence.
- II. Mass Organisation .
- III. Revolutionary Propaganda .
- IV. Intensification of the Armed Struggle.

I.

Research and Intelligence.

Most if not all the research and intelligence required for our plans at present fall in the ~~scope~~ scope of passive intelligence. But it is important that this basic research should be made available almost at once if our work is to have meaning .

(a) Manpower and population analysis.

The aim of the above is to discover the detailed distribution of manpower in our country. We know that the vast bulk of the potential government supporters are concentrated in the principal urban areas . Thus the twenty-two towns of Johannesburg, Vereeniging, Vanderbyl Park, OFS Goldfields, Capetown, Durban, Pretoria, Port Elizabeth, Bloemfontein, Pietermaritzburg, East London, Uitenhage, Alberton, Benoni, Boksburg, Germiston, Krugersdorp, Nigel, Randfontein, Roodepoort , Springs have a White population of 1,834,071 . The rest are divided between medium sized and small dorps and others are scattered on farms. It is important to have exact knowledge on this . This should be based on the regional set-up that we wish to establish both for our organisational and army set-up. In general our regions would comprise the following:-

CAPE S. Western Cape ; Midlands; Eastern Cape, Transkei;
N. West Cape ;

OFS. Free State Region.

NATAL: Southern Natal including Durban. Northern Natal centred on Ladysmith and Newcastle etc; Zululand.

Transvaal: Witwatersrand ; Western Transvaal; Northern Transvaal;
Eastern Transvaal.

In respect of each of these regions we must know:

- (i) The relative population of the various racial groups a
- (ii) The main towns or dorps in each.
- (iii) The military and police organisation in the area. This should include the names of the main officials in the magisterial area ; the station commanders, the district commander; the military commanders and officers.
- (iv) The chief farmers in each area. For example in the Eastern Cape the chief farmers include Mr. "Bull" Knott , Ballantyne, J.H. Smith, W. Matthews, Francis, Malcomess. All these huge farmers obtained their land during the Eastern Cape frontier wars and paid nothing for them. The people in the area are fully aware of the facts and never forget them. In each area this is the case . We must focus indignation against these land barons who in most cases constitute the main support of the Nationalist Party.
- (v) The leading party officials i.e. UP, Nat etc. in each region.
- (vi) The African leaders and chiefs in the areas .
- (vii) The Church organisations . It is vital that we know the various African churches and their leaders.
- (viii) The Colleges/Universities , Schools, Teachers especially as far as the Africans are concerned
- (ix) The main industries or factories with a concentration of workers in each area .
- (x) The chief propaganda in the hands of the enemy i.e. newspapers, information service of the BAD and so on.
- (xi) The various Organisations of the people - political, economic, cultural .

- (xii) The main languages of the people in each region.
- (xiii) An assessment of whether or not the area is Congress-minded.
- (xiv) The number of political prisoners for each area and in which prisons they are kept . Who the prisoners are and what has happened to their dependants.
- (xv) The military potential of the enemy and ourselves in each region; where forces would come from to help the authorities in any initial guerrilla activity in the region; the possibilities of a smashing sabotage blow at either the communications or economy of each region and the effects of such sabotage on the employment of the people in the area and on morale etc.

The above information does not require the employment of any trained agents etc. And yet we do not seem to have it . If we do it will greatly assist in the planning of our entire work - military , organisational and propaganda . It is absolutely essential that we should be furnished with this information as soon as possible .

(b) Political trends.

We cannot be satisfied with general knowledge of "white" politics in South Africa . In general we know that the bulk of political opinion among the whites supports racialism and white supremacy. This is not sufficient knowledge for a movement such as ours which is planning a revolution . Our research sections must be able to furnish exact information on what is happening in the Nat party ; who are the personalities and what do they stand for; what economic forces do they represent; who are the prime movers of policy in these organisations; Who oppose the major groupings and why. The same is true of the UP and of the Progressives . The aim of such knowledge is to assist us in the task of exacerbating contradictions wherever we can; introducing confusion wherever possible and eventually destroying these groups as power nuclei. We also need to know the mainsprings of progressive ideas e.g. in the universities.

and in student and staff organisations; in societies ~~such~~ such as the scientific and medical societies, the cultural organisations etc. Our object here is to find organisations which can be infiltrated by our people and used as legal cover for other work; also these organisations at critical moments will be vital either to neutralise large groups of whites or serve as support for a new revolutionary government which will desperately need technical and other support from people who have skills, who might not be revolutionaries but who are not actual enemies. This must be prepared for with great skill. Exact knowledge of these organisations, of the student and staff groups and of societies at universities and outside them is necessary for us at this stage.

Non-White Politics is changing fast. We have not been in close contact organisationally for some time. We all have knowledge of bits and pieces drawn from our vast experience in the past and what we collect individually. But as an organisation we lack organised knowledge of exactly what is happening and has been happening in the various regions. The government through Minister De Wet Nel estimated in 1960 that just over 10% of the non-Whites were supporters of the liberation movement. This would make it about one million then and about 1.4 million on to-days figures. This was a considerable figure. De Wet Nel of course thought he was downgrading the movements and no doubt he did. But the point is that there was a huge group of ~~people~~ people who were not only outright supporters of the movement but made manifold sacrifices for the struggle. Many are arrested. But we must on no account make the mistake of thinking that about one million people are unintelligent without us; have vanished into thin air; or have become government supporters. Also new organisations have sprung up. The various groupings in tribal politics produced by the Bantustan policy; This policy has had one effect which cannot be denied. It has taken hot politics - discussion, election manifestoes, parties etc. into such areas as the Transkei. Now it is the Ciskei. The government is pausing as far as Sekhuniland and Zululand is concerned because the ANC there is strong. It is worth recalling that the ANC was banned in the Northern Transvaal in 1958. Also in Zeerust. In short we must attempt an estimate of the

potential among the Africans, Coloureds, Indians, Trade Unions.

It is a mistake to be satisfied with the remark "There is no SACTU". SACTU was a co-ordinating body and its disappearance ought not to lead to the inference of the disappearance of constituent trade unions whether in Durban, P.E. W. Cape, Transvaal etc. What is in fact the position?

The Stoege bodies. The Transkei Bantustan; Tswanaland; Ciskei; Coloured Council in which elections are due soon; Indian Council (was the propaganda in Sechaba wise in our circumstances to-day). What are the powers of these local government bodies? Who are the personalities involved? How can we operate to further the revolutionary cause.

The infiltration of centres of power i.e. police army, security and discovery of their agents operating against us we will not deal with here but it is obviously important. But we stress that although this is most vital in helping to enable us to have foreknowledge of what our enemy's plans are it is not the only or the bulk of the work we have to do in our intelligence job. Most of it can be done with a small expenditure and with proper facilities, filing systems, patient research in quite open and legal publications etc. We are not doing this systematically hence the appearance of guesswork in much of what we do. We must immediately close this gap.

II. MASS ORGANISATION.

Our chief objective in the field of mass organisation is to stimulate opposition and resistance to the government; to establish illegal units under the direct control of the movement; to inspire those not directly under our control; to arm the people. Our plans in this field are divided into three sections:

Legal work.

Semi-Legal work.

Illegal Work.

Legal Work.

The task here is to endeavour to ensure close contact between the revolutionary movement and those organisations which can operate openly in the country. Here the words of Lenin should be recalled that we must work in all organisations where the masses are, no matter how reactionary. The only condition is that people who work there must be under the strict control of the revolutionary movement and must carry out unconditionally the orders they are given. The Legal organisations serve the illegal and are and must be subordinate to the needs of the illegal revolutionary work. It is only on those conditions that work in some of the most reactionary bodies by any revolutionary becomes justified.

There are of course bodies which are legal simply because the enemy cannot do anything about them. Here again revolutionaries must work.

Africans.

The main organisations where Africans are to be found in the mass are:

The tribal organisations both at national and local level. In Zululand for instance this organisation centres on the King and the chiefs of the regions. Some of the chiefs are hereditary and have a prestige derived from that fact. Others are entirely dependent on government support and favours. But they collectively they have functions and support from among people in the Reserves and sometimes in the towns. The most powerful chief in Zululand is undoubtedly ~~Chief Mkhize~~ and in the current controversy over the succession to Cyprian is a key figure. This is no mean quarrel because over it hovers the Bantustan issue and the attempt of the government to destroy ~~the Bantustan~~

~~He~~ who is a strong opponent of Apartheid . The example of ~~him~~ shows how one good and strong man can be of tremendous use to the cause. He once asked for aid from the movement through Bram Fischer. He did not get it at the time. We will have to consider it seriously right now. The same situation applies to the Royal House of the Bapedi which is strongly influenced by ANC ideas through such people as ~~him~~ and numerous members of the ANC in the tribe. It is true that often the tribal leaders are inconsistent, confused politically and vacillating with personal politics very much to the fore. But our job must be to find in all areas how we can use the tribal organisation for our purposes . Concretely we propose that:-

That ~~he~~ be given financial and other support ~~tax~~ within the tribal and Bantustan context to organise against the government. To participate ~~in~~ in any Bantustan that is formed in the Transkei manner with the aim of ensuring that it is under the control of ANC elements at all levels. That a reliable means of contact be established .

That similar machinery be established in Sekhukhuniland; W.Transvaal, Northern Transvaal, Ciskei, Transkei.

A confused situation has arisen in the Transkei. To begin with a number of people previously associated with the ANC are in the Matanzima group and they are intellectuals with prestige such as Miss Sigcau - a former staunch Youth League member at Fort Hare who clashed violently with her father Botha Sigcau; the former lecturer C. Ndamse and E. Tshunungwa who at one time was supposed to be PAC but vigorously denies this . The opposition members are attacking Matanzima's group for being secret ANC supporters. This has not been helped by Matanzima's statements that

he is only opposed to POQO but not to the ANC and that he only differs from the latter in method etc. The whole question of the Transkei and the tactics to be adopted to the Bantustan local governments needs to be examined and a policy decision adopted. But for the purpose of the plan it must be stressed that there is a tremendous ~~amx~~ amount of political ferment in the Transkei and our people should be ~~xxxxxxxxx~~ picked to infiltrate various bodies which will act as a cover for their work.

The Churches.

Over 11 million Africans are members of the Churches. That is practically the whole population. The Churches meet every Sunday and even more. They have a ready-made organisation; There are tremendous opportunities for propaganda in the Churches; a lot of the welfare and educational work is done by the churches among Africans. The three biggest church groups are the Methodist, Anglican and Lutheran churches. These churches also coincide with what will be our biggest areas of operations in the long run e.i. Northern Transvaal, Natal, Ciskei and Transkei. Then there are the separatist churches which have over two million adherents altogether. These are generally insecure, intensely inward-looking, generally unreliable from a political point of view but potentially very anti-establishment. In the Defiance campaign members of these ^uchurches played a very important role. They have the advantage (the churches) thatt their activists can enter all areas virutally without suspicion. This applies particularly to the well established and organised churches. The ANC had tremendous influence in the ~~Anglican and Methodist~~ Anglican and Methodist clergy. This has been allowed to remain idle and unconnected with us. Some of the leading figures such as ~~the~~ ~~of the~~ ~~of the~~ who is struggling to keep that movement alive without funds, need our strong support. Incidentally on the Witwatersrand practically every Anglican Minister among Africans is or was an ANC member. The chief job of contacts we establish in the church field must be that of maintaining close contact with the families and

dependants of guerrillas, political prisoners and finding out their needs. Also we would endeavour to support projects which would increase the prestige of national-minded clergy who support the cause of the people. To begin with strict limitation of their work to these aspects which are in any event part of their ^{normal} work as priests would be very valuable. They would also be extremely useful as correspondents on the local developments in their areas. In each City and in each region we only need one such contact. It will not be difficult ~~to~~ to choose these and to maintain very discreet contact with them directly with the Revolutionary Council.

The Universities and Schools.

At the end of last year there were in South Africa 2,000,000 African pupils; there were 9500 primary schools; and 376 Secondary schools. There were approximately 40,000 teachers. There were three university colleges. The support of these sectors of the population was vital for the revolution furthermore this was the section of the population that readily understood and could read our propaganda. From a political point of view there were certain key colleges such as Lovedale, Healdtown, St. Johns, Marianhill, Gore-Brown, Adams, Kilnerton, St. Matthews; The university colleges- Fort Hare, Turfloop, Ngoya, Wentworth. In all these we need to have a contact in the staff and in the student body. In some of these colleges despite the usual turnover of students there is a tradition of opposition to oppression. It is important that our literature should reach these colleges. This is not necessarily illegal literature but the literature of struggle and of revolution, books on Africa, on independent states etc. The staff organisations are not well organised and there is fear of even having a teacher's organisation. Thus only 800 teachers are members of the Transkei Teachers Association; The same sort of situation applies in the other provinces. In each of the regions we have referred to and in the main colleges at least one contact must be our target in the immediate future.

The same applies to various primary schools especially in the main urban centres and in rural areas where the primary school is the main focus of intellectual life. Many of these schools are isolated from the police and security forces and can serve very well as propaganda and eventually recruiting agencies.

Trade Unions and places of work.

The Chief areas in which we have an immediate interest are these trade unions which still exist and were strongly under the influence of SACTU . We are also interested in key industries with a large concentration of workers and in which the colour-bar in industry is a possible target of attack. We have seen how in a vulnerable position the government can be forced to yield very important gains. The non-white doctors apart from gaining immediate and big gains are now to get 90% of the white salaries. The fight was not won completely but a strong and determined stand did present the authorities with a very serious situation. It is true that this had certain special features. Doctors cannot be replaced easily; they can find means of ~~livelihood~~ livelihood outside the hospitals. Therefore the doctors were in an unusually strong position. They were also able to get the support of many of their white colleagues. Also they were few and well educated and therefore easy to organise relatively. But this was a good struggle. In such areas as the Docks; Iron and Steel; Construction; Railways ; Textile; Food and Canning; Wine . We should endeavour to create ~~numerous~~ links even consisting of one single contact in each factory or work place or industry to begin with. This should not be an attempt to create a national or regional committee. We must concentrate on individual contacts at specific workplaces. We would propose that in each of the main urban centres we should make a choice of the most important work places and make efforts to secure at least one contact in each. That would include such places as the Telephone exchange, Post Office, Newspaper offices, Broadcast house, Magistrate's Office, the main

factories . Once we have looked for and found contacts the manner of reaching them, establishing communications methods , financing of contacts can be worked out in detail in such a manner as will protect them. But we must definitely not establish committees . If our contacts want help they must find it from those they trust with our approval.

The Indian People

The type of plan we have proposed with regard to Africans must be immediately followed with reference to the Indian people. One problem needs to be solved here. The general Indian Congress leadership i.e. Monty , JN, Padayachee, and others must be informed of recent steps taken and must approve the establishment of the Revolutionary Council and the participation of Yusuf and the Indian people through him on it . The Indian Congress has a semi-legal status and the section we have on this is primarily concerned with the SAIC, CPC, SACTU which are not illegal but are subject to administrative repression of leading figures. An anonymous Emergency Executive of the SAIC , CPC and SACTU should be formed. This anonymous emergency executive is not illegal, But must function as such. That is , it must not hold or organise any public meetings ; nor should any of its meetings be known; its membership must be restricted to not less than three or more than seven. This executive must have cells all over the country. The job of these will be to serve as the mouthpiece and to carry out the instructions of the Emergency committees. The sole task of the Emergency machinery will be to issue legal propaganda and directives; to give legal guidance to the Indian community but without revealing the personnel of the Emergency committee or its lower cells or contacts. This machinery must not be confused with the illegal machinery of the ANC whose job is illegal and revolutionary work connected with the armed struggle. In ~~the~~ other words we must respond to the government tactic of leaving the movements legal whilst dealing with leaders and committees. Let us in turn make the leaders and committees operate underground but with

legal activity and organisation of the people. The job of the emergency committee will be to greatly increase cells and contacts and ensure that the influence of the SAIC is re-established. But on no account must this machinery engage in illegal work or use the old slogans of the Congress alliance. Only the name SAIC links it with the past. It must deal with current situations. If necessary such propaganda as they produce should be prepared in co-operation with the Revolutionary Council. It is of course possible that members of the semi-legal machinery would be discovered or some individual could be detained under 180 day law and made to reveal names. This must be catered for in the form of organisation so that there is maximum protection for the machinery. But the point is that only intimidation and administrative banning can be used against them if their activities have been strictly confined to that which is "legal" in this situation. The aim of this machinery would be to inspire the people with the aims of democracy and equality in all fields; to oppose apartheid and to utilise whatever legal forms are open such a boycott ~~xxxx~~ or strikes for higher wages and an end to the colour -bar in industry; demands for education and skills. In the same way as the doctors strike which took the legal form of giving a months notice of intention to leave work; similarly strikes could take the form of mass resignations from work after a weeks notice at the factory; or the form that the dockers strike took of leaving for the reserves. Such action if properly prepared for and organised in key industries or work places could have tremendous effects .

The above applies to SACTU and CPC in which methods of semi-legality should be employed .

All sections of the work -legal, semi-legal and illegal must be co-ordinated by the Revolutionary Council to have maximum effect.

ILLEGAL WORK

We wish to begin this section by stating that insufficient thought is being given to our peculiar circumstances on this topic. We keep on repeating old cliches which belong to the early part of our century. The fact of mass communication such as Radio; the effectiveness

of communications of all kinds in our era. The ~~XXXXXXXX~~ nearness of countries to one another; The fifty years of open legal activity by the very organisations which are organising the armed struggle and the revolution; the fact of having authoritative leaders who are known to all the people as such. These factors are very important and reduce the importance of the old clichés about being "inside the country" for a leadership or centre guiding the struggle. In these days of very efficient police states with modern equipment etc. this type of argument can hand one leadership after another into the hands of the fascists. In Western Europe during the Second World War there were hundreds of sacrifices to this concept of having a centre inside the country. The centre of the Algerian ^{Revolution} was never inside the country in eight years of struggle. Progress has been achieved in Angola and Mozambique without a mechanical adherence to this idea. If by being "inside the country" it is intended to convey ~~in~~ unliberated areas controlled by the enemy then we must be very careful about it. We doubt if a single top leader or three of them situated anywhere in South Africa could give comprehensive, nation-wide leadership and guidance. They would be transformed from leaders into individual Agents or contacts. It does not require top leaders to do this at this stage. Maseru in Lesotho is 290 miles from Johannesburg; 200 miles from Kimberley; 400 from Durban. Capetown is further from all those places. Yet Maseru ^{Livingstone} is outside South Africa. The same applies to Gaborone. ~~Livingstone~~ is nearer to Johannesburg than Capetown, although it is in Zambia. A really serious look must therefore be taken at this problem before steps are taken on the grounds that they ^{conform} ~~conform~~ to some revolutionary principle. We are not called upon to form a national organisation. We are called upon to transform an existing movement with great potential and supporters and leaders into an instrument of revolution.

The illegal Work of Reconstruction involves the creation of three sections in each of our operational regions.

The sections are : The Courier ~~section~~, and Correspondence section.
The propaganda section.

Reception centres in urban and rural areas
for our men i.e. guerrillas or agents.

The Courier and Correspondence section refers to that section which enables us to maintain close contact with the situation at home and with our agents or representatives there. Thus we must have Correspondents in each of the main urban centres; in the main rural centres and in each region at least. These are individual men or women who will write in a specified time which may be once a fortnight and whenever anything happens which should be known to the leadership to an address which they have been given. Their reports will be solely connected with information of a general political character and must not reveal who they are or to whom they are ~~in~~ writing. Correspondents must also be appointed in the universities and in other important areas of political, economic or social life. The correspondents must be provided with the means and methods of preparing these reports. This should be their exclusive job. It is of vital importance and we have put it in illegal work though the actual work will probably be legal most of the time. But without these reports we cannot do effective work.

The Propaganda section

Clearly this section must consist of highly trained people in so far as they will be required to print and publish material and give some form of political guidance that way. But in fact we also need inside the country those who will preach by word of mouth. Who will use the method of the grape vine and will be in contact with the Revolutionary Council and spread propaganda otherwise than by distributing leaflets and propaganda. In the rural areas certainly this is most effective and credible. Leaflets have no credit over most of our country among Africans in the absence of confirmation by local people. Such people travelling ~~in~~ all over the country and without identifying themselves openly with any organisation and yet making powerful

propaganda fully in line with the movement's current policy. These propagandists especially in African languages are very effective. What we need is to look for and appoint them in each area and ensure contact with the movement. i.e. with the Revolutionary Council. ~~So-called evangelists or people disguised as the members of Zionist or Watchtower movements~~ could be very good in building up our movements control of the masses.

But as for the trained propagandists, skilled in underground work and able to print and distribute written material as well as respond to the needs of the situation and carry out the directions of the RC - this is something that we clearly have to work on as the key to our ~~reconstruction~~ reconstruction of political work, and organisation.

Reception Centres .

Here we need to specify what a reception centre is required for. (a) We need the type of reception centre which is passive and consists of a trader or shop at which individual agents of ours can ~~obtain~~ obtain money or food as they require it. That is a network of stores or cafes can be set up at key areas in our country to which an agent by a specified manner known to the shop-owner can obtain money or goods .

(b) Then there is the Reception centre for communications . This would be a place at which our workers or contacts or agents obtain a communication or which is a depot through which the individual can communicate with the centre i.e. the Revolutionary Council.

(c) Then there is the Reception centre at which agents or guerrillas can obtain shelter in a difficult situation. Obviously this type of reception centre requires a higher degree of of political consciousness than the previous two.

(d) Then there is the reception centre for arms and equipment and other smuggled goods which we wish to reach our people. Here again the highest possible degree of consciousness and

devotion. *is required.*

Each of these reception centres requires a different form of organisation and a different kind of person to participate in them.

What is far from clear is the type of reception centre required for a group of well-trained and armed guerrillas who arrive at an area to establish a guerrilla base. But we could say this that if in each region we had the full machinery we envisage, namely, agents in the Churches, tribal organisation and schools, and a propaganda machine as well as correspondents and plenty of revolutionary propaganda; a place where comrades could get food and goods - a fair ~~machinery~~ machinery would exist for the reception of guerrillas.

III. Revolutionary Propaganda.

Revolutionary propaganda consists of general revolutionary propaganda which tells the masses about the revolutions of other countries and the general principles of revolution; the specific revolutionary propaganda of our own struggle including its methods of conducting guerrilla warfare which must be mastered by the people; specific directives which require action by organised groups acting under the direction and discipline of the movement.

In our revolutionary propaganda the Radio must now be given a high priority. The most powerful and most easily obtained programme in our country is the Voice of the Gospel from Ethiopia which is organised by the Lutheran Churches of the world. It is a two-hour programme and is extremely effective and can be heard clearly everywhere. The next most effective is Radio Peking. This is followed by All-India Radio and the SABC itself. We simply must achieve the effectiveness of Radio Peking which can be heard everywhere and in the smallest transistor. A professional approach is needed in our work here and thorough preparation of programmes which must be approved in advance by the Revolutionary Council. Broadcasting scripts excepting current news and commentary are prepared for the whole year in advance. We need to do this even with

the limited broadcast facilities we have in Tanzania , Moscow and other places. The broadcasts must be uniform and properly prepared .

On the specific revolutionary propaganda of our struggle we would propose as an immediate project the publication in all the main languages of a pamphlet on "Guerrilla War and why it will lead us to victory" . This must be a type of pamphlet which does not date and conveys ~~in~~ in brief the methods and organisation of guerrilla warfare based to a great extent on the ~~many~~ experiences our people have from the wars of resistance.

Specific directives will depend on the extent to which we succeed to create machinery in each area and region.

Propaganda must if possible be distributed inside the country. But we must not get bogged down by this. A leaflet from the Revolutionary Council consisting of Tambo and Dadoo is far more effective than anything that is produced anonymously in the country. Anybody can print a leaflet and call it an ANC leaflet. It is far more difficult for the enemy to deal with a message from Tambo . In other words we must also mount a campaign of sending propaganda of all kinds into the country from outside en masse.

Also we must prepare propaganda for a restricted audience. It must not always be general leaflets or propaganda. There are 150,000 African workers in the Iron and Steel industry. At a critical moment last year when the Iron and Steel Agreement was being negotiated a leaflet from SACTU putting forward the real demands of the workers would have been a powerful stimulus in a key industry. It would need to be got to three or four factories or townships. Yet would affect thousands of workers and their families. Similarly with the ferment in Universities just now where an ANC leaflet supporting the struggle could have great effects.

The question of regional or linguistic and traditional factors must also be taken into account. Many of our people have vivid memories of the wars of the past. These must be brought before them in their own style and linked with our present revolutionary struggle. In this connection I would propose leaflets which are fairly long and which need not correspond except in general outline directed at the Zulu, Xhosa, Pedi, Sutho (Southern) and Tswana, Afrikaans (to the Coloured people mainly) and English for the urban people of all races. This should be an appeal for unity and struggle against the fascists; a call for revolution and support for the ANC which must be projected more and more as the real and only alternative to the Nationalist Mess.

IV. INTENSIFICATION OF THE ARMED STRUGGLE.

It need hardly be said that this is the most vital section of our work. This we divide into the following sections:

- (i) Ukhonto WeSizwe and some immediate jobs.
- (ii) Recruitment.
- (iii) Arms smuggling.

In regard to Ukhonto WeSizwe immediate steps need to be taken to restore morale and discipline especially in Zambia. For this we need to take swift decisions. Among them should be the immediate purchase of a farm or area at which our men can be placed under discipline, under conditions of relative comfort i.e. we must not behave as if they are already in the field of combat or at their fighting zones. There must be the best possible facilities within our means for the men including recreational facilities. The choice of people for re-training must be done immediately. Those concerned should be informed. Also arrangements should be made to ensure that they go from training to their bases and not return to Zambia or Tanzania.

The army needs to be re-organised and placed under the new commanders in terms of the new structure.

Further effort must be directed at getting a route for the men home through Botswana. No resources we have should be stinted in this effort. It is worth literally millions for us to secure a route ~~through~~ through Botswana both for bringing people out and taking them in. All methods including bribery on a large scale must be used to get our way in this connection. We cannot be limited to searching only for good Congress people in Botswana. The government is achieving much by paying policemen in the Botswana force an extra fifteen pounds a month over and above their wages. For this they get information and co-operation. We cannot rely only on this. We try to get the willing support of all people. But this is not enough. A herd of fifty cattle worth £5. ^{each} ~~each~~ to the Bushmen chief and to ~~the~~ others would save us a lot of trouble. This should be immediately acted upon i.e. to build a route through Botswana by way of reception centres etc. The question of Botswana becomes more important in view of the next section where we will be dealing with recruitment.

(ii) RECRUITMENT .

In this section we will deal with recruitment ~~work~~ for both the army and for illegal work (organisational).

Primarily the question of recruitment is one of the youth and the President was perfectly correct to place the youth within the purview of the Revolutionary Council. A National Executive of the Youth by itself just cannot deal with the programme of education and training of youth for the tasks that face us. Such a programme can only be prepared and carried out by the organ charged with the prosecution of the entire revolution . The only aspect that can be dealt with by a youth executive is external ~~work~~ solidarity work. It is important therefore for the choice of the national executive of the youth to be based on the fact that it will have to carry out the programme of the Revolutionary Council in regard to the illegal

work and Umkhonto WeSizwe.

In connection with recruitment which at this stage we apply to people who will have to come outside for training we wish to make some observations. The fact of having a visible , well-trained army under the immediate care of the national executive outside the country has been of absolutely vital political importance. The disintegration of PAC and its loss of credit can be traced directly to the fact that the ANC was talking of an army housed in camps which everybody could see . The Liberation Committee and other groups hostile ~~now~~ to us would have been able to wipe us out if they did not have this stubborn fact in front of them. Guerrilla warfare at home is going to be in the long run the dominant factor. But for years it might be a slow unknown war with not a single headline indicating it is there. In these circumstances it will be useful for us to make sure that we always have a reasonable and sizeable group of highly trained people who in any case also serve as a reserve which the central leadership can always make available to any region or area which has suffered severe blows from the enemy. Thus whilst it is necessary for the particular comrades we ~~know~~ now have to go home as they have been here for years and are needed to start guerrilla war at home we must not forget the need always to have a core of men outside .

Recruitment involves getting people from inside drawn from various regions ; recruiting and training some of those who are already outside as students in different countries.

We strongly feel that those areas that are near Botswana such as Zeerust, Sekhukhuniland, North West Cape, ~~Free State~~ which border on Botswana must be scoured of young men who could be suitable for training . These are Congress areas and we need not concentrate on well known activists of the movement. Young people whose parents are ANC people would be suitable . In fact we must endeavour to secure parental support for our recruiting drive. This would be young men from the age of fourteen upwards who would be coming out for both education and training in the military arts.

We propose that there should be a target of two hundred in the next year drawn from the areas mentioned and who would have to come through Botswana for training.

In addition we must endeavour to obtain 100 Indian and 100 Coloured youngmen specifically for Mkhonto WeSizwe. In this connection attempts should be made to get them out legally as visitors; students; pilgrims to Mecca as far as the Indians are concerned. For the Coloureds we must work out the excuses which would justify and not cause suspicion of that number of youngmen. The government is now pressing for registration of Coloured youth as cadets. Therefore they will be watching any young man who wishes to leave the country. Coloureds work in ships, in fishing vessels. A whole group of carefully chosen youngmen could be picked up by a vessel some miles off the coast belonging to one of our friends provided we have made proper preparations and have the support of parents etc.

For the young men who have already left the country and are available for work we must be very clear what we approach them for. This depends on their circumstances, psychological disposition and political consciousness. Nobody who hates oppression is useless in a revolutionary struggle. The art of leadership is to discover the best means of ~~xx~~ utilising them in the job for which they are suited.

There is a great category of revolutionary tasks which are each distinct and important in their own right. These tasks differ in the risks involved and in the commitment required. The highest degree of revolutionary staunchness is required of those who will be in guerrilla groups fighting the enemy and those working illegally underground in revolutionary work and those in sabotage units or execution squads of the movement. But a courier can be efficient, reliable and constant without having to conform to the high standards needed for a guerrilla. And so on with all the various jobs and tasks. To some it will probably be a relief to find that all they are required to

do on returning home is to observe all around them and report as Correspondents to a given address as directed. Others will be required to act as couriers and nothing more. Others as centres at which individuals will come to them for funds or help and nothing more. With proper specialisation and training we can make use of ~~many~~ almost all those who belong to the oppressed groups and have a feeling for freedom. With careful selection of Indian, ^{Some} Coloured, and White recruits we should go far towards setting up ~~many~~ of our machinery ^{drawing on people} in India, Ireland, Britain and Canada.

It is also necessary for us to look for recruits from Swazis, Batswana and Basuto who belonged to the ANC or who wish to work for the movement and who are able to travel in and out of the Republic freely. This also applies to foreigners from certain countries who can do work for us of various kinds.

In other words there is much work for the training of people of all kinds from those already outside. A survey should be prepared on the numbers of people ~~available~~ available - who they are and their background and what they could possibly do for us. The preliminary research work here would help to determine the programme we need to have.

(iii) ARMS SMUGGLING.

We have already indicated above that the movement has large numbers of supporters in the country. One of the chief things needed by these supporters and by those who will go into the country as trained men is weapons. The question of smuggling arms into the country is a prime task of our Revolutionary Council. And here we should emphasize that we are not speaking of blind distribution of arms to anybody or to doubtful elements whom we have no connection with. We are talking of the arming of our own supporters in different areas. Nothing will destroy the credibility of our call for revolution as much as a failure to produce arms and ammunition. For decades a

crucial question at every meeting of Africans has been "where will we get the arms to fight with" . We simply cannot make the call to revolution and guerrilla struggle credible without producing in large quantities , rifles, carbines, submachine guns and adequate supplies of ammunition. It is necessary to stress this because the defeat of the Africans originally was not only a matter of superior organisation and social system , it was a matter of weapons. Menelik of Ethiopia who was shrewd enough to arm his people with the latest modern weapons defeated the imperialist armies sent against him in the nineteenth century. His country was the only one to escape because of that. Therefore we must emphasize the importance of arming our supporters especially in those areas where we know our main bases are likely to develop. Pondoland, Zululand, Sekhukhuniland, Eastern Cape , Zeerust ; and in the urban areas we must smuggle in as many arms and small arms as possible, to our own supporters. The expression "our own supporters" is not a vague expression meaning nothing . It is directed at the people in those areas where we know we had strong organisation and which will need that we investigate the setting up of a smuggling organisation when we have secured enough arms for our purposes . The idea of our people being helpless whilst the guerrillas are operating in their area is what can give rise to retaliation by the government on the people who could hate the guerrillas for bringing this trouble on them when they do not have the means to fight for themselves. Our people can fight and can organise if they are given the means to do so.

Also it is necessary for our trained men when they get to an area to be able to lay their hands on sufficient arms to make their propaganda credible and also enable them to get immediate recruits from our supporters. We are not going to areas which are absolutely green and have never heard of the ANC. We are sending men to areas which have a core of our people who are silent and cowed at the moment because they cannot do anything about informers and cannot retaliate against repression. We must place weapons in their hands. We believe that places like Lesotho where much

gun-running ~~take~~ takes place or Zululand where the Portuguese gun-runners collect top prices for rifles ~~we~~ must become active with our own machine devoted not to poaching or crime but to freedom .

The matter of arming supporters and politically conscious people is important because sometimes the mistake is made of thinking that " Tsotsis" and people like that should be turned from their misdeeds against the people into allies against the police . These are anarchist elements which have a grievance against the oppressor society that hounds them with pass laws etc. But that does not turn them into the best shock troops of the revolution. Our own supporters whom look up to our movement and were with us through thick and thin , and who braved the police and repression with nothing in their hands are the people who now require to be armed to the teeth if we can do it. We propose that a target of fifty thousand rifles and sufficient ammunition should be smuggled into the country to our supporters in certain key rural and urban centres . Also that caches be set up, in S.A. and in neighbouring countries like Botswana, Swaziland and Lesotho . That the full co-operation of the Indian community be sought for some aspects of these smuggling operations . Every gun in the hands of a confirmed supporter of our movement is an alteration of the balance of forces in the country in our favour step by step. The enemy knows this and has kept arms from the Africans ruthlessly throughout the last ninety years. This is an absolutely key question in the intensification of the armed struggle.

A FEW SPECIAL MATTERS.

It is essential that the NEC and the Revolutionary Council of the ANC must more and more assume the responsibilities and character of the alternative government having the care ~~of~~ the ~~entire~~ destiny of the entire South African people . The ANC therefore must be referred to as the sole legal representative of the South African people. (not a state or a provisional government or that sort of thing)

But the ANC is the sole representative of the entire people . In this connection we think that it is not South Africa as a state that we must press should be expelled from the UN and other bodies. It is the present government which is illegal and unrepresentative that is not entitled to sit in these bodies. The Charter of the UN has no provision for admission of a member once expelled. A revolutionary government would find the imperialists probably doing everything to prevent it assuming its legal rights if the state had previously been expelled . We give this merely as an example and not as something that requires practical decisions . Although the Soviet Union last year challenged the credentials of South Africa to represent the people . It might be useful for us at some stage to write to the UN telling them we are the sole representative of the South African people and that the present regime is unlawfully there. This highlights the confrontation of ANC vs. Fascist regime. In all sorts of ways we should project this and our propaganda organs should pay attention to this without exaggerating or making ridiculous claims before we have liberated areas . But we can take a leaf from the Vietnam Liberation Front which from the word go in the guerrilla struggle condemned the Saigon regime as unlawful and as puppets and traitors not entitled to rule the country. The people must hate and despise the fascist regime.

Special operations for achieving particular purposes must be part of our plans. Naturally each such special operation will need a specific decision and a specific plan. But we must remember the need for special operations whether peaceful and military; general or specific (e.g. execution of a particular traitor) .

Financial and other support from friends .

Our enemies are getting massive support from the great imperialist powers. This is all -round support ranged against us. We are a revolutionary movement and we depend a great deal on the creative support of the masses. Therefore we do not need to have the

huge material resources that the enemy has. But we need vast resources nevertheless. Our plans and problems must be placed frankly and without fear or shyness before our ~~firm~~ friends so that the scope of the problem can be seen and so that they can realise the vastness of the enterprise we are engaged in. We are fighting for power in the richest and most developed country in Africa in which the imperialists have an admittedly high stake. Such a country is not going to fall into our hands without the full support of our friends - political, economic (the Gold problem), financial, military, intelligence and so on. The full implication of our revolution cannot be made clear in short trips to our friends to ask for funds or for this or that item. There must be a full discussion at the highest level by top delegations on both sides in which the plans can be jointly examined and proper co-ordination achieved. In this way a huge push forward can be given to our struggle not only in South Africa but in the whole of Southern Africa. The ~~arming~~ smuggling of arms alone is a huge undertaking which will need their logistic support. And so also with other matters. We keep on having problems of finance and logistics which are absolutely unnecessary if there were full confidence and support from our friends based not on our requests from time to time but on proper planning jointly with them, on a long-term basis.

Alliances and external solidarity. We have not referred to these but naturally they have to fit in with the plans we make. We have a joint command with ZAPU and we are expected to strengthen this alliance in accordance with the decisions of conference. Ideally we need a ~~separate~~ separate plan indicating what we propose in regard to the alliance with ZAPU. Similarly we ought to have a plan of what the Revolutionary Council thinks should be done as far as Solidarity work is concerned to the extent that this work impinges on the revolution and on internal work.

Finance and Logistics.

The adoption of plans will then call for analysis of the financial and logistic implications. These have therefore been left out at this stage . But naturally this is a crucial part of planning and success in our operations. Without finance or logistic support our plans will remain on paper .
