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WAR-RESISTANCE IN
SOUTH AFRICA

Document drawn up by
ANC Ad Hoc Committee

LONDON
AUGUST 1978

Introduction

In the past few years the struggle in southern Africa has escalated dramatically. Mozambique and Angola have been liberated. The Patriotic Front and Swapo are making rapid advances towards the liberation of their countries.

In South Africa our struggle is intensifying at all levels. Never before has the regime been in such a state of crisis, and it is increasingly resorting to armed terror to maintain the status quo.

The Defence Force and other para-military sectors have become the cornerstone of the regime's survival tactics.

It is essential for us to examine and find any contradictions in the military complex which will enable us to exploit and weaken the regime's fighting capacity.

It is in this context that we are looking at the war-resistance issue.

The War Situation

Since armed struggle was first adopted as the only road to liberation in southern Africa, there has been a steady build-up of the South African armed forces, and increasing use of them against the liberation movements in southern Africa.

During the 1960's it was largely the para-military police and permanent force members of the Defence Force who were deployed in Rhodesia and northern Namibia, and who also played supporting roles in the Portuguese wars in Angola and Mozambique.

At this stage the position of civilian conscripts was that they were being trained for future action. Part of this training was 'border duty'. Civilian units were sent close to areas of conflict, but their participation remained on the whole minor.

With the growth of the armed struggle, particularly in Namibia, the picture began to change in the 70's. Increasingly 'border

'duty' came to mean active service as the army took over from the police. This process escalated enormously after the overthrow of the fascist regime in Portugal in 1974. Thousands of troops were pushed into Namibia in the following months. The 'low-intensity' war had changed into a 'medium/high' intensity war, with a corresponding increase in the use of conscripts. This culminated in the South African invasion of Angola, defeat, and withdrawal back into Namibia in 1976.

Since then, developments within the country, the escalating Namibian conflict, as well as the growing activities of freedom fighters on South African soil, have forced the regime to admit that it is now involved in total war.

Conscription

One of the major features of this 'total war' situation is the extent to which white society is being drawn into the military machine. This is taking place at all levels. The economy is being geared towards the needs of war. Civil defence groups are being set up. Almost every white household possesses at least one gun. The media are full of news and opinions on the developing war. And - most importantly - the compulsory involvement of white South Africans in the military machine is being more and more rigourously organised.

Towards the end of 1975 it was announced that civilian reservists (i.e. those people who had completed their basic training) would be called up for three-month periods (or more). This was at the time of the invasion of Angola, and this measure was announced as temporary. South Africa withdrew from Angola nearly two and a half years ago but the three-month call-up has not been withdrawn. Instead, it has been complemented by an increase in the basic training period from one to two years.

All white male South Africans (including non-South Africans who have lived in the country for two years) are registered for military service at the age of 16 at school. They are required

to do two years basic training immediately on finishing school. Those who receive academic deferments are monitored, and if a three-year course is not completed within five years, the deferment ends.

No provision is made for conscientious objection, except in very exceptional circumstances when non-combatant military service may be allowed. Penalties for evading service are severe. Someone who deserts in the face of the enemy can be shot; desertion while on active service leads to up to ten years' imprisonment; refusing to undergo training can lead to up to three years' imprisonment. Penalties also exist for in any way encouraging or advising someone to avoid military service - up to six years' jail.

After the initial period of two years' training (an increasing part of which includes active service) a man must complete eight thirty-day 'camps' in the following eight years. For those who completed their initial training before the two-year period was introduced there are the three-month 'camps' introduced in 1975.

Apart from the large-scale mobilisation of the white population, the regime is also beginning to draw recruits from the African, Indian and Coloured population into its military machine. Already Africans, Coloureds and Indians are serving in South Africa's armed forces on a voluntary basis, and there is talk of introducing compulsory military service for Indians and Coloureds.

War-Resistance

Just as the strength of the liberation army lies in the support it gets from the majority of the people, so the weakness of the repressive army lies in the growing demoralisation that takes place within its ranks as the war develops.

Already, the process of demoralisation is taking place, and white South Africa is proving to be not as united as the regime would like us to believe. To counter this a 'total war' psychosis is being

encouraged within the white community. Within the military itself large emphasis is being placed on the maintenance of morale. Special 'Psych-Ac' officers (psychological action) are attached to units in Namibia to report on the 'psychological situation of the troops.' Due to the restrictions on the media in relation to internal military matters it is difficult to come by hard evidence of demoralisation within the army, but it seems clear that the doubling of the period of initial service, plus the growing number of casualties, has had an effect on the morale of men in the army, as well as on those eligible for military service.

There certainly is some evidence that certain forms of resistance to the war are already taking place.

The first of these is conscription avoidance. This is where those who are eligible for military service avoid that service by leaving the country, or by using various ruses to keep the military at bay, such as applying for deferment or exemption, not informing the military of their present whereabouts, etc.

According to information given by the relevant minister in the South African parliament, the numbers of those who failed to report for service from 1975 - 1977 were:

| | | | |
|------|---|-------|--------------------------------------|
| 1975 | - | 3 314 | (595 were convicted for the offence) |
| 1976 | - | 3 566 | (893 convicted) |
| 1977 | - | 3 814 | (507 convicted) |

It is not known how many of these were being called up for the first time, or were avoiding further service. Nor is it known what percentage remained inside the country or left.

Further figures given by the regime show that in 1976, 63 104 men were called up. Of these 37 730 (60%) applied for exemption or deferment, 36 448 (58%) successfully. If we put these figures alongside the above figure for those who failed to report for duty in 1976, we find that in 1976, 26 656 men were obliged to

report for service, and 17% (3 566) failed to do so.

A report in the Sunday Times in May 1976 said that one regiment (the Rand Light Infantry) had over 15% of its total strength of trained men on the 'blacklist' - i.e. their names and last-known addresses handed over to the military police. It added that the success rate of tracking these men down was less than 10%.

It is well known that in the past years thousands of white South Africans have left the country, with emigration exceeding immigration in 1977 for the first time since the early 60's. It cannot be calculated how many have left the country to avoid conscription, but there is evidence that it is an important factor.

For instance, a report in the Cape Times of 12 January 1977 referred to newly qualified doctors who had deferred their service until they completed their studies, and then left the country as soon as they qualified. Another report in the Cape Times (29/10/77) quotes Minister of the Interior, Mulder, as saying: "There is an exodus of professional people - even South Africans - who are going to other countries....We are taking note of the fact that you are deserting the ship when we need you".

Some of those conscription avoiders who leave the country are eligible for citizenship of other countries (Britain, Eire, the Netherlands etc). Others acquire citizenship by marriage. Some register as students, seek work permits, or live illegally abroad, and some keep travelling.

A few have actually made attempts to contact solidarity organisations abroad, or foreign governments, to seek political asylum.

In Britain, since 1976, about 30 conscription avoiders have approached the AAM. In addition, some have gone straight to the Home Office, or sought help through MPs, or have gone to other organisations working in the solidarity field in Britain (notably Salscom - the South African Liberation Solidarity Committee - which is dealt with in more detail later.)

In Holland about 20 to 25 conscription avoiders have sought refuge there since 1976, according to newspaper reports. Reports have also been coming from Botswana that a dozen or so conscription avoiders are there. Other countries to which conscription avoiders have gone, or are likely to go, are: the USA, Australia, New Zealand, Swaziland, Lesotho, Canada, Israel, Scandinavian countries, and other European countries.

The legal position for conscription avoiders who seek asylum abroad is generally much the same as for other refugees. They have to prove that they are likely to be persecuted for their religious or political beliefs if they return to South Africa, and they have to claim asylum in the first country they arrive in after leaving South Africa (unless in transit). In practice this has raised some problems.

The British government, for instance, has granted asylum to military refugees without actually calling it political asylum. It allows people to stay in Britain on 'humanitarian' grounds by giving them a blanket residence and work permit. So far about four South African military refugees have been given 'asylum' in this way. The situation is similar in Holland. In Botswana certain problems have emerged due to Botswana's generally difficult refugee situation, and to the difficulties caused by some military refugees trying to get from Botswana to Europe.

An interesting method of avoiding conscription and remaining in the country was revealed by Police Minister Kruger when he said: "Many young men who have joined the police force since October 1976 had no intention of making it a career but had done so to evade military service". (Rand Daily Mail 10/5/77). Subsequently, Kruger passed a law compelling people to remain in the police force for at least 24 months of permanent service.

Another form of war-resistance currently taking place of which there is some evidence is conscription refusal - i.e. people openly refusing to do service on the grounds of political, moral or

religious beliefs (conscientious objection). According to information given in parliament, the numbers of people who reported for training and then refused to participate were as follows:

| | | |
|------|---|----|
| 1975 | - | 10 |
| 1976 | - | 18 |
| 1977 | - | 25 |

In addition, the number of those who failed to report for service, were caught, and then gave conscientious objection as a reason for not reporting, were as follows:

| | | |
|------|---|-----|
| 1975 | - | 150 |
| 1976 | - | 95 |
| 1977 | - | 86 |

A report in the Rand Daily Mail of 10 May 1977, which the army refused to confirm or deny, said that between 100 to 120 Jehovah's Witnesses were in detention barracks last year for refusing to serve.

Another form of war-resistance is desertion. Desertion is generally regarded as being when someone actually doing service leaves the army without intending to return. It is not clear what constitutes desertion legally because South Africa has not formally declared war, but it is possible for the law to be interpreted to include as deserters those people who merely fail to report for training.

Whatever the legal position, the South African regime has denied on at least one occasion that any servicemen have deserted while serving in Namibia, claiming instead that 31 members of the army had gone absent without leave, had been charged and sentenced. Defence Minister, Botha, specifically denied that between 10 and 100 men had deserted as had been reported in a Geneva newspaper article written by Rolf Freiberg of the Inter-parliamentary Fact-Finding Commission on South Africa.

The White Community and War-Resistance

We can see that certain forms of war-resistance are already taking place on a small but significant scale. It can be said with some confidence, that, as the armed struggle develops, these forms of war-resistance will increase. It is vital for our struggle to anticipate the development of these forms of war-resistance, to actively encourage them, and - most importantly - to look to the possibility of encouraging and organising more active forms of war-resistance - like information gathering within the military, sabotage, anti-war propaganda, pro-liberation movement propaganda, encouraging people to defect etc.

In order to be able to do these things it is important to understand the white community and the divisions and divergent interests within it. It is from the white community that the bulk of the Defence Force is drawn. At the moment it is only for white males that military service is compulsory.

The regime likes to present the white community as united against the 'threat from outside', and in important ways the white community has buried some of its internal differences in the interests of maintaining a solid front to the liberation forces. But beneath that front lie many divisions - class and national - which are likely to begin to bare their teeth as the prospect of unlimited war, or imminent defeat, looms more and more darkly.

While it would be wishful thinking to believe that large sections of white South Africa are going to take the side of the liberation movement at this or any stage of the struggle, it is possible that significantly large numbers will become fed up with the war, and refuse to participate, and perhaps even actively resist the military authority.

There is however, at the present moment, one sector of the white South African community from which more active war-resisters - i.e. those who might enter the military and subvert it from within - might come. That sector consists mainly of those white progressives - students, academics, journalists, teachers, artists, religious

leaders etc - who have a revolutionary approach to the South African struggle and are still working 'above ground' inside the country. It is from amongst the ranks of these people (at this stage at least), who already have a fairly high level of political consciousness, that we are likely to get cadres who will infiltrate the military.

The ANC's Approach to War-Resistance

The importance of an understanding of the white community, and particularly the possible role of white 'radicals', in relation to war-resistance, lies in the fact that it helps us to answer the question of what approach the ANC should adopt to war-resistance.

We have shown that some forms of war-resistance are already occurring to some extent. Should we wait for this process to take its natural course, or should we actively encourage war-resistance?

This question obviously relates to the question: What sort of work within the military do we consider to be most important or likely? The answer will be contingent on the stage that the struggle is at at any moment, and on the developments within the society as a whole.

Basically our strategy must be to undermine the military machine. This can take various forms:

- 1) Infiltration of cadres into the army for various purposes;
- 2) Agitation against the war - demoralisation ^{of} ~~of~~ personnel, encouragement of conscription avoidance and desertion.

These basic tasks are not contradictory and in many ways supplement each other.

If we accept the principle of infiltration of the army it is essential to elaborate a programme which will make this possible.

We must also consider the question of what to do with those that have already 'draft-dodged'. Here there are two categories - those that remain inside South Africa and those that have left. As many

fall into the latter category we will concentrate on these.

We believe that it is necessary to evaluate each of these conscription avoiders who leave the country, to check on their security, and then for political recruitment into one of the following areas:

- 1) Overseas solidarity work (eg AA movements);
- 2) Activities of the ANC External Mission;
- 3) Internal underground;
- 4) MK.

Any individual who indicates potential in the last three categories must be referred to the relevant structures of the organisation.

We believe (a belief that needs to be turned into a strategy) that conscription avoidance is not an end in itself and that we should influence people to remain in the country and become actively involved in all aspects of the struggle. The mere fact of being conscripted, and having to fight, should not be the sine qua non for leaving the country.

This once again brings us to the issue of the relationship of war-resistance work to overall political work within the white community. An attempt to channel war-resistance from mere conscription avoidance or desertion into active resistance must be based on our overall strategy and tactics.

Presently there are whites in South Africa (albeit a small number) who are politically conscious and committed, and who are finding ways of avoiding conscription. They believe that they can play a more meaningful role by remaining in the country. It is this section that must be won over to the movement and which will provide a possible reservoir of recruits for the various tasks of the movement.

It is important that we intensify our work in this field to ensure that we reach and recruit potential cadres before they leave South Africa. At the moment many of the conscription avoiders who have left South Africa are not politically motivated. Presently, in an

ad hoc manner, we come into contact with some of them. The few that were politically involved at home have been brought closer to the movement and are being involved in various aspects of the international campaign against the regime. However, it is important that we set up some structure (see Conclusion) which will enable us to have access to larger numbers of conscription avoiders for the purpose of politicising them, monitoring their activities, obtaining any relevant information etc. This will also enable us to maintain a political control over the direction of this issue. It is also possible that through these structures we might come into contact with potential recruits who will return home to continue the struggle.

Other Organisations working on War-Resistance

The war-resistance issue in relation to South Africa is slowly gaining recognition both inside and outside the country as an issue of importance and concern to all those interested in South African liberation.

Inside the country church groups, student groups and the like have taken up the issue within the limitations allowed by law. In a recent underground leaflet the ANC called on soldiers to resist the war.

Outside the country, various solidarity organisations, anti-apartheid movements, and ANC external branches have taken up the issue to some extent. In London, an ad hoc group consisting of ANC people (some of them conscription avoiders) who are in the AAM has been working on the issue of war-resisters in the UK. It has played a large part in getting the UK government to grant 'asylum' of some sort to war-resisters, and has explored many other areas of the problems and possibilities of war-resistance work (this document being a part of that process).

There is one organisation in particular which has taken up the war-resistance issue in a big way, and in so doing has created many problems. This organisation is Salscom - the South African Liberation Support Committee. Salscom is an organisation of white South Africans.

It was formed by three white South Africans who were originally in Okhela and who broke away in 1977 from that organisation. The three individuals are Terry Shott who in South Africa worked in the Wilgespruit Fellowship Centre outside Johannesburg, and since leaving the country has studied in Sheffield in the UK, was involved to some extent in the British Socialist Workers Party, and is now working full-time with Salscom; Bill Anderson, who left South Africa having served in the South African army in Namibia and who told the western press about torture carried out by South African troops in Namibia against the population, and who now also works full-time for Salscom; Don Morton, the third member, is a former Methodist minister in South Africa, now based in the U.S.

Salscom has launched wholeheartedly into the war-resistance issue, and its method of work and existence are proving a problem for the ANC and solidarity groups. It is necessary to examine Salscom - its politics and programmes - in order to help decide what approach the ANC should adopt to this organisation.

In its inaugural document, published in November 1977, Salscom describes the conditions which led to the formation of Okhela (and itself) as follows:

"The rise of the Black Consciousness Movement in South Africa in the late 1960's was to have a profound effect on the progressive white movement inside and outside the country.....Black groups had stated clearly the futility, and in fact danger, of relying on white-dominated multi-racial organisations as agents of fundamental change in South Africa....."

"The response of the white community towards black consciousness went three different ways:

1. Some refused to accept the new reality and continued to work in multi-racial organisations.
2. Others felt that there was nothing that whites could do and disbanded in disillusionment.
3. Some responded to the BCM by recognising that the

question was not 'what can we do for blacks' but rather but rather 'what can we do about white racism in our own community of whites'."

This is a fairly reasonable assessment of the political position as far as whites were concerned after the banning of the liberation movement. A vacuum had been left in the open political sphere, and the rejection which white progressives experienced from the black consciousness movement led them and their organisations - Nusas, the Christian Institute etc. - to seek a role specifically geared towards the conditions of the time.

The mistake made by Salscom, and by Okhela as well, was to conclude from their analysis and perception of the situation that what was needed was an organisation of whites that would operate as a parallel liberation movement - i.e. that would operate clandestinely inside the country and work outside the country mobilising support for the internal struggle. Their mistake lies in the fact that they transfer the strategies dictated by internal open struggle to the strategies of the revolutionary struggle as a whole, at all levels.

The extent of this mistake becomes clear if we look at Salscom's attitude to the black consciousness movement and the ANC. It is precisely because they fail to distinguish between the particular conditions of open struggle and the overall conditions of struggle that Salscom can say the following:

".....Various leadership groups are at present operating at different levels inside the country and in exile. All claim in one way or another to represent the oppressed masses of their country, but at this stage in the history of the liberation struggle, the various elements appear to us to be in a state of considerable disunity....."

"The National Liberation Movement, we believe, will need to be a broad umbrella organisation combining the progressive forces in struggle against the apartheid

state. We feel that no one movement represents all this at this stage in South Africa....."

".....In the suppression created by the uprooting of the PAC and ANC, the BCM grew in strides and continued the tradition of resistance.....There can be no doubt that the BCM is by far the most politically active movement with a massive following amongst the black population in South Africa....."

"There is a tendency amongst exile groups to be sceptical and critical of internal political developments especially if these developments are seen as a threat to that organisation's wish for exclusive recognition as the liberation movement....."

"In summary it seems correct to ^{state that the BCM is} ~~state that the BCM is~~ indeed in the forefront of the struggle in South Africa with a massive following amongst the people. That is not to say that the BCM is the National Liberation Movement, but it does mean that they are the most effective political force confronting the state at the moment and therefore the leadership of any united force will have to come largely from their ranks."

"While they have mass support inside the country, the BCM has been unable to build a substantial support base outside the country, largely due to the monopoly the ANC has on external support and its paternalistic attitude to the BCM.....As long as the ANC claims that it is 'the' legitimate and only vanguard movement, progress on the inside will be severely hindered."

"The traditional liberation movements should be a little humble and accept that a new force has moved into the vanguard of the National Liberation Movement that will lead South Africa to total liberation."

It is clear from these quotes that Salscom has mistaken particular conditions of struggle for the struggle as a whole. In subsequent discussion Salscom has expressed some regret that it placed so much emphasis on the black consciousness movement in its inaugural document. It has even very recently claimed in discussion that it now recognises the ANC as the 'major liberation force' in South Africa.

Our struggle has developed to a stage where those who once supported the 'liberation movements' are now beginning to recognise the ANC as the only liberation movement. The struggle, and our consistency in relation to it, are showing the correctness of our approach. Salscom is following this trend. But we must recognise that Salscom's existence itself is anti-ANC.

Salscom has chosen to devote its major attention to the issue of war-resistance. Salscom says of this area of activity:

"We believe that it is essential to establish a very clear precedent of desertion before we can expect to see the initiation of widespread dissension being taken on the inside. Desertion can thus only be seen as a means to the end in establishing a very firm and clear support base outside the country that can give whatever aid necessary to an initiative on the inside."

Salscom's aim is to encourage desertion (and conscription avoidance) and by so doing to create an external support base which, in turn, will provide support for internally ^{initiated dissension} ~~initiated dissension~~. This is extremely vague. What seems clear is that Salscom wishes to make use of the war-resistance issue to recruit more people into its ranks in order to give itself a power base from which to operate in relation to the struggle as a whole.

Salscom also hopes to encourage more active forms of war-resistance. It suggests that war-resisters who have served some time in the military can provide information on the military to Salscom. This

information will be processed ('transferred into charts, reports and strategic maps') and then handed over to the 'liberation movement'. As the large part of the value of this sort of information lies in the fact that the enemy does not know we have it, it seems risky to have such information collected and passed on from an organisation outside the ANC, presuming of course that Salscom means the ANC alone when it refers to the liberation movement.

Salscom has also said in discussion that if any potential ANC sympathisers or recruits passed through its hands, it would pass them on to us. It breaks all rules of security to have an outside organisation passing recruits on to us.

Salscom's approach to war-resistance, then, is problematic, if not potentially dangerous.

There are two particular areas of its work which need looking at. The first is their attempts to encourage conscription avoidance and desertion within the country. This is done primarily through publicity and propaganda. Its main ^{project in this area} ~~project in this area~~ is the publication 'Omkeer' which it has posted to people inside the country, and which has received a fair amount of publicity in the South African press. As a piece of propaganda 'Omkeer' is worthy of some praise. What is problematic about 'Omkeer' is that it not only presents those who read it with the idea of war-resistance and the possibility of getting out, but it also presents them with an organisation - Salscom - whose role in the struggle is ill-defined. Thus it is confusing. 'Omkeer' is concerned solely with encouraging conscription avoidance and desertion. It offers no possibility for work within the military. This problem arises precisely because Salscom is not a liberation movement and cannot advocate or organise more active forms of war-resistance.

The other area of Salscom's work worthy of note is its attempts to take up the issue of war-resistance externally. In this area it has initiated a fund-raising campaign, the pressurising of international and support organisations and governments to

recognise the issue of war-resistance in South Africa, and it has organised (in London) the picketing of the premier of the pro-mercenary film 'Wild Geese' etc. Some of these things are things we might do ourselves if we launched whole-heartedly into a war-resistance campaign.

In London Salscom has also initiated a South African War Resisters group (SAWR) with the intention of aiding conscription avoiders and deserters in the UK and encouraging a political education process. It has also initiated the South African Military Refugee Fund (SAMRAF) in an attempt to raise funds to aid ^{war resisters.} ~~deserters.~~

Again the problem arises that it is Salscom which has initiated and is organising these projects - outside of the main solidarity organisations. This creates competition between Salscom and the solidarity movements. For instance, in the UK there is a danger that Salscom's 'high-profile' tactics will endanger the gains made by the AAM in relation to the government etc. Also, we must ask what sort of political education Salscom will give the people who come into its hands. Another important point is that Salscom's approach means that the issue of war-resistance is not being fully related to other solidarity issues, like support for the armed struggle, the arms boycott etc., and thus the war-resisters issue can be blown up out of proportion to other aspects of the struggle.

The conclusion to be drawn from all this is that there are areas of work in relation to war-resistance which need to be tackled. There is no doubt that this issue is capturing the imaginations of the international community. Salscom documents (previously submitted) claim that they have the support of many leading people in Europe and North America and some have agreed to serve on the board of SAMRAF. It is clear that if we do not tackle the area of work ourselves, the wrong organisations will fill the resultant vacuum.

Conclusions and Recommendations

War-resistance is an important aspect of armed struggle. It is

possible on a significant scale in South Africa.

Conscription avoidance and desertion are likely to be the most common forms of war-resistance. But it is vital for our struggle to encourage more active forms of war-resistance, and this approach should be central to our work in all spheres related to the war-resistance issue.

It is urgent for the ANC to adopt a clear approach to the war-resistance issue in order to clarify as soon as possible the current confusion that exists within and without our movement on this issue. We recommend that this approach should take into account the inevitable fact that many war-resisters are coming, and will be coming, into exile, and that attempts should be made to draw as many of them as possible closer to our movement, by trying to involve them in solidarity work and, where feasible, in the work of the ANC itself.

We recommend that the ANC adopt a clear attitude to Salscom, and that this attitude should centre on the observations made in this document - namely, that Salscom is in essence an anti-ANC organisation, that its work in the area of war-resistance is sowing confusion, and those aspects of its work which are worthwhile should be tackled by the ANC or the major solidarity organisations.

We recommend that one of the important tasks in relation to war-resistance should be propaganda - both internal and external. We suggest that internal propaganda should take account of what sections of the community - specifically the white community - it is being addressed to, and that the issue of war-resistance should be raised in the context of the overall concerns of the particular community. As the most likely source of active war-resisters at this stage is the progressive whites, we feel that propaganda should be aimed at these people, raising the issue of war-resistance in the context of the concerns of progressive whites - calling on them to stay in the country, do their service if necessary, undermine the military from within where possible etc.

We recommend that external propaganda be addressed to South Africans abroad, raising the issue of war-resistance, and suggesting the possibilities for active forms of resistance to those who might be able to return home. We also recommend that general propaganda on the war-resistance issue be addressed to the overseas public, governments, support groups, etc.

Part of the function of work on war-resistance outside South Africa is the provision of services to war-resisters - i.e. help with getting asylum, material assistance where necessary, advice, and so on. This is an important way of drawing people closer to our movement, and thus should be tackled. At the same time the plight of white war-resisters should be kept in perspective to ^{other} ~~others~~ needs in our movement, and should not be allowed to take an unbalanced place in our work.

We recommend that an all-out attempt be made to draw war-resisters in exile close to the solidarity and liberation movements. This attempt should include propaganda directed at war-resisters abroad; assistance with asylum; advice and material aid; mobilising around the war-resistance issue in relation to governments, the public, political parties, churches, trade unions etc; the involvement of war-resisters in solidarity work; and the relation of the war-resistance issue to other issues such as armed struggle, arms boycott, other refugees etc.

In the UK we recommend the following: (this could also apply to other European countries)

The ANC request the AAM to take up the issue of war-resistance as part of its solidarity work. We recommend that this be done together with a clear statement on the ANC's overall attitude to war-resistance, and should include a clear statement on Salscom and any other such organisations.

We propose that a broad committee be set up by the AAM, including members of the AAM executive and head office staff, some South

African war-resisters, an ANC representative and others.

Finally, in relation to all the above recommendations, we stress the urgency of adopting a clear approach to this issue in order to as quickly as possible clarify the confusion which has arisen through the efforts of organisations like Salscom, and the growth of war-resistance in the country.

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