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DEVELOPMENTS IN SOUTH AFRICA SINCE THE UPRISING OF 1976

Report submitted by the Research Department of the International Defence and Aid Fund for Southern Africa (IDAF)

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Note: The views expressed in this report are those of the authors.

INTRODUCTION

The uprising of 1976 made it clear to the apartheid régime and to the international community that a new phase had begun in the liberation struggle.

Resistance to apartheid which had been developing and organizing during the previous years took open form and signalled the beginning of a period of more intense struggle. An exodus of young people after June 1976 brought thousands of recruits into the armed wing of the liberation movement, which had since the early 1970s been preparing for and laying the basis for a major expansion of the armed struggle. In the year of open revolt and massive repression much had been learned and the process of constituting a still more effective and united force had begun. The outlawing in 1977 of all the main legal organizations opposed to apartheid, touched only the visible surface of a broad and deeply rooted movement of liberation, as subsequent developments showed. The internal upsurge of struggle came in the context of the defeat by the liberation movements of Portuguese colonial rule in Mozambique and Angola, and the advance of the liberation struggle in Zimbabwe and Namibia. The initiative had passed into the hands of the oppressed majority in South Africa and the forces of liberation in scuthern Africa.

The régime's response to these developments was a dual one. On the one hand political initiatives were set in hand to be presented as reforms. On the other hand the régime intensified preparations already under way to defend the system by military force, through internal repression and strategy of aggression and destabilization directed at the southern African region.

Internationally a reassessment of relations with apartheid took place. The viability of the régime had been put in question. A mandatory arms embargo and the halting of the régime's attempt to establish friendly relations with some African States were early consequences. Nevertheless those countries and interests willing and ready to support apartheid seemed soon to regain some of their confidence in the ability of the régime to hold down the majority.

During 1980 there was again open mass defiance and protest. The political initiatives of the régime have proved empty. The bogus reforms and minor modifications of apartheid have proved unacceptable to a people demanding liberation and steadily nearer to achieving it. Consequently the régime has come to rely steadily more on the military might it has been preparing over the past years, with increasing operations both inside the country and in the neighbouring States of southern Africa.

For the same reasons, and despite a programme aimed at self-sufficiency, the régime now depends to a greater extent than before on the foreign support it still receives from Governments and interests increasingly ready to repeat the claims that apartheid is dismantling itself, and that the majority of black people are ready to accept the path chosen by the régime. Nevertheless the international support for sanctions has also grown and is greater than ever.

This review of developments since June 1976 documents, within the limits of the space available, the scope and depth of the resistance to apartheid and the

forces of liberation, as they have been manifested during the period, and the responses of the régime: it documents the falseness of the claim that the political initiatives of the régime are steps to end apartheid or to reform it in any sense other than to adapt it to changing circumstances; and it reviews briefly the development of an increasingly aggressive policy on the part of South Africa towards the countries of southern Africa.

There are many difficulties in reviewing developments in South Africa during the past five years, besides the difficulty of doing so in a short space. The forces of liberation and resistance inside the country are largely underground and at best only indirectly observable. The operations of the régime and its relations with its collaborators are cloaked in secrecy.

Information must be gleaned largely from what the régime puts out or is prepared to tolerate. This involves considerable reliance on the white-owned press, which has only limited relations with the black majority and is at the same time censored. Nevertheless through such means it is possible to give a certain amount of information - the harsh repression of the apartheid régime, its massive powers and its aggressive action against neighbouring States are themselves an index of the powerful forces of resistance and liberation challenging it. The available evidence suggests that the events of 1976 were the outward and visible expression of a transition, from protest politics and reaction to oppression, to a concerted and conscious attempt to defeat the apartheid régime by a combination of military and political struggle.

I. INTERNAL DEVELOPMENTS

A. Resistance and the liberation struggle

The five years since June 1976 have seen a rising level of popular struggle combined with an expanding campaign of armed action.

The most visible and frequent form of resistance during the recent period has been action over specific grievances which are a direct effect of the apartheid system on people's lives. This is documented in part 1 below. There have been widespread and sustained struggles on several fronts, often at an unprecedented level; struggles against the denial of trade union rights and low pay for black workers; against high and increasing rents and other housing costs; against crippling increases in the transport fares which black people have to pay to travel to the shops, factories and offices in "white areas" from the ghetto "townships" and "locations" in which they are forced to live; against inferior, racially segregated education; against forced removals and relocation of whole communities in both urban and rural areas.

A significant aspect of the recent period has been the growing unity between those involved in the different struggles and the growth of open organizations in opposition to the apartheid sponsored institutions. There has also been increasing open expression of political consciousness in the context of the specific struggles.

There is ample evidence (for example, in the form of trials, reports of what is said at meetings, in reports of leaflets and publications circulating and in specific campaigns) of the widespread presence and political activity of banned organizations.

Few conclusions perhaps can be drawn about relations between underground political activity and the open political activity. All evidence indicates that the situation goes far beyond opposition only to specific or isolated effects of apartheid. There is a clear demand for liberation and total eradication of the system, with widespread support for the armed struggle. This is documented in part 3 below.

Information concerning the armed struggle itself is set out in part 2.

1. Popular resistance to apartheid

The repressive response of the régime to the uprising of 1976/77 brought it only a short respite from open expression of resistance and defiance. The period since then has been one of developing organization and a rising level of struggle on all fronts. Growing unity between different sectors and integration of different struggles has been a marked feature. The banned organizations of 1977 were replaced by new organizations. There has in addition been a remarkable growth in the independent black trade union movement and the emergence of many local grassroots community organizations, largely in opposition to the apartheid-sponsored institutions.

From early in 1979 the tempo of the struggles and of the emergence of new organizations increased. This developed in 1980 into a period of sustained popular action lasting several months as people took action over education, pay, workers' rights to organize, rents, transport fares, and in protest at shootings and detentions by the police.

Little was gained in 1976 in the way of educational reform, beyond the dropping of Afrikaans as a compulsory medium of instruction in African schools. But conclusions from the experience of 1976 concerning the need for unity of different sectors in the struggle were soon being applied.

While the protests of 1977 still centred largely on education, they were also much broader than that. The Soweto Students Representative Council (SSRC), which had become the most powerful political force in Soweto, led a successful campaign to prevent the immediate implementation of rent increases by the Soweto Urban Council. It followed this with a campaign against the Council itself as a collaborationist institution, causing its collapse. School boards succumbed to a similar campaign. In June, with the support of SSRC, the Soweto Committee of Ten was formed, in opposition to the Community Council with which the régime was replacing the defunct Urban Bantu Council. (See Whirlwind Before the Storm - IDAF 1980.)

The first anniversary of Soweto, in June 1977, was observed with strikes by tens of thousands of workers and demonstrations and meetings all over the country. Soweto was virtually occupied by the police. The school protests gathered force as first pupils and then teachers boycotted. In September the news that Steve Biko had been killed in detention intensified the defiance and demonstrations still further. Within a month, on 19 October, the régime took drastic action, detaining scores of people and banning 18 black consciousness organizations, and also the World and Weekend World newspapers.

Although the protests intensified for a while, they died out, except in the Eastern Cape where they continued into 1978. Nevertheless it was less than two years before popular resistance and protests again assumed open and defiant form on a widespread scale.

On the surface the intervening years were ones of apparent quiescence although continuing detentions in many areas suggested otherwise. However, the basis was being laid for a resumption of action. Thousands of young people left the country to seek military training and some were soon returning to engage in guerrilla actions (RDM 2.6.78). Solomon Mahlangu was one of these, returning on the first anniversary of the Soweto massacre, 16 June in 1977. In the bantustans, although it was effectively suppressed, there was opposition to the bantustan leaders and the acceptance of "independence". Throughout the country the slow process of strengthening organizations and laying the basis for further open action must have been going on for the events of the following years to have been possible. The evidence of subsequent trials tends to confirm that this was the case.

The process of replacing banned organizations began almost immediately after the October 1977 bannings. Police harassment and detentions limited the extent to which this occurred during 1978 and limited the effectiveness of the new organizations. It was principally in the field of education that the first steps were taken. A Soweto Students League was formed to take the place of the banned SSRC and there were reports of students' leagues operating elsewhere. The Soweto Teachers' Action Committee was formed to represent teachers who had resigned rather than continue to teach Bantu education, and it played an active role in the campaign against proposed new legislation on African education.

At the national level, the Writers Association of South Africa (WASA) took the place of the banned Union of Black Journalists (UBJ) and many of its members who had worked on the World and Weekend World worked to make the Post and Sunday Post (themselves to be banned in 1980) fulfil the role of the banned papers. Steps were taken to form a new national political organization, the Azanian People's Organization (AZAPO), but police action delayed its inaugural conference till the following year. The detention of most of the members of the Soweto Committee of Ten put it effectively out of action.

Then in 1979, from early on in the year, various issues gave rise to increasing open activity and simultaneously, associated with it, there emerged a whole range of organizations.

New open organization

Issues affecting people in townships, like rent increases, and the establishment of Community Councils, gave an impetus to the growth throughout the country of numerous residents' associations and similar community based organizations, particularly from the beginning of 1979.

In the Port Elizabeth area, residents' associations were established in several townships early in 1979. Soon realizing the extent to which the problems they faced overlapped, leading individuals - amongst them Thozamile Botha - initiated discussions amongst them. The outcome was the formation in November of the Port Elizabeth Black Civic Organization (PEBCO). Its meetings were attended by thousands. (South African Labour Bulletin - September 1980, pp. 46-52)

In Soweto the issue of rents played a formative part of the setting up of the Soweto Civic Association (SCA) with 30 branches throughout Soweto. It was initiated by the Soweto Committee of Ten which, with the release from detention of its members at the end of 1978, had become active again and had successfully campaigned to have big rent increases delayed. Both the SCA and PEBCO adopted a stance of non-negotiation with apartheid-sponsored institutions such as community councils and bantustan "governments". (See Facelift Apartheid, pp. 62, 74.)

There has been a very substantial growth in trade union organizations. The Federation of South African Trade Unions (FOSATU) was formed in April 1979. FOSATU had 12 affiliates claiming 45,000 members. During the next 18 months other trade union groupings emerged against a background of rapid growth in the

membership of independent unions. The principal groups were the Council of South Africa Unions (CUSA), the National Federation of Black Workers, and a loose grouping of several other independent unions, including the South African Allied Workers Union (SAAWU).

National pupil and student organizations formed later in the year, The Congress of South African Students (COSAS), organizing pre-university pupils and students, was founded in June at a conference attended by delegates from all over the country. A few months later the Azanian Students Organisation (AZASO), organizing black university students, was formed.

The long-delayed inaugural conference of AZAPO was held in September, and as already noted PEBCO and the Soweto Civic Association formed around the same time. Amongst other organizations forming at this time was the Solidarity Front, which led a campaign against the Government's South African Indian Council. Press reports indicate extensive formal links being established and maintained amongst these new organizations.

Simultaneously the struggles that were beginning over specific issues gave increasing signs of unity amongst workers, community organizations, and pupils. While they must have owed much to less public and visible links than those maintained by the open organizations, they also gave rise to organized formal links.

Rent protests

Community councils, set up to replace the Urban Bantu Councils, are required to be financially self-sufficient. However, the distribution of property and of commercial and industrial activity under apartheid, means that the townships have virtually no business or industrial activity from which taxes could be raised. The only sources of income for the councils are rents and tariffs for services, liquor and beer sales and levies on employers. Rents and tariffs have therefore become a major source of income. With the central Government refusing subsidies to stave off increases, massive rent and rate rises were announced throughout the country, to take place at various times from about the start of 1979, sometimes in stages. Increases between 100 and 200 per cent were common. A campaign of organized resistance resulted, involving refusals to pay increases, demonstrations against community councils and administration boards, and legal action. Besides giving rise to the founding of community organizations and the strengthening of existing ones, the issue also sharpened the conflict between the people in the townships and the Councils whose role as agents of the apartheid régime was underlined.

The cost of housing for the Indian and coloured communities has also been a source of conflict with the local authorities set up by the Government. In many areas residents and housing associations were the means by which the Indian and coloured communities acted over the cost of housing. (RDM 12.3.81)

Bus boycotts

Bus boycotts became more widespread, frequent and sustained from the end of 1979 as workers took action to fight crippling increases in fares. The siting of residential townships for black people far away from the areas of employment and from shopping centres causes very high transport costs, which take a large part of the low wages paid to workers. Big increases were announced in several parts of the country in 1979 and 1980. There were large-scale boycotts in Natal at the end of 1979 and the following year there were protracted and bitter boycotts in the Cape Peninsula and the Northern Transvaal. The boycotts were initiated and organized by broad representative committees which mobilized whole communities. In most cases the actions were successful and the proposed increases were not implemented. (Focus No. 31, p. 12; Workers Unity, February 1981, p. 4)

Strikes

Strikes increased in number from early 1979. This was the start of a wave of industrial action which by the end of 1980 was even more extensive than that of 1973, both in terms of numbers involved and the spread of the action across the country. Apart from the scale of the action the strikes were significant for the kinds of reasons motivating them and for the militancy of workers.

The immediate causes were often wages, but there were also frequent demands for recognition of unions or of workers' committees elected under union auspices (as opposed to the liaison or works committees approved by the régime). As well as these principal issues there were many strikes in defence of victimized workers (often organizers), in pursuit of equal treatment, and, towards the end of 1980, in opposition to a new pension scheme.

Also significant was the degree of support for workers outside the workplace in the townships; such support played a crucial role in a number of strikes. For example, the strike by workers at Fattis and Monis, which started in April 1979, was supported by a national boycott of the company's products. Support by PEBCO for Ford workers striking in December 1979 was important to their success. And although it was in the end less successful, a boycott of red meat in support of the Cape Town meatworkers, striking over union recognition, involved the mobilization of broad sectors of the community.

Support in the townships for strikers and unity amongst workers made it more difficult for employers to use some of the means commonly used to break strikes. It proved less easy to replace striking workers from amongst the large number of unemployed, and solidarity between urban and migrant workers, and between different sections of black workers, was marked.

Despite more intensive State intervention in strikes than usual, the attempt to impose the new legislative controls on the independent union movement appeared to fail in the face of its growing strength and assertiveness. The ranks of those opposed to registration grew, and the régime appeared to be preparing even harsher statutory controls on unions. (CT 25.3.81, 6.3.81)

Not only did workers enjoy enhanced support from outside the workplace, but the unions themselves were more ready to take up broader issues. Some amongst them, those with the most impressive growth in membership, like the South African Allied Workers Union (SAAWU), explicitly declared their interest in all aspects affecting the black community, holding that "unions cannot be isolated in the factory". (RDM 31.10.80)

The range of issues and militancy of workers led observers and the Government to the view that the political consciousness of workers had never been so high.

School boycotts

School boycotts and similar action by college and university students involved hundreds of thousands during 1980. Opposition to apartheid education, the immediate cause of the 1976/77 protests, never ceased. Although there was only sporadic action during 1978 and 1979, opposition again took the form of mass action in 1980. (See "South Africa: 1980 School Boycott", IDAF Briefing Paper No. 1, March 1981.)

Protests at the beginning of 1980 against appalling conditions in coloured schools near Cape Town grew into boycotts which rapidly spread throughout the country. In the face of frequent police attacks on people in gatherings and marches, African, coloured and Indian pupils and students came out to register their rejection of inferior and racially segregated education.

They were supported by parents, teachers and community organizations and by a wide range of political and religious organizations. In the course of the action there emerged joint decision making bodies, linking African, Indian and coloured pupils and students and linking pupils and parents. The boycott by African pupils continued throughout the whole of 1980 and into 1981 in some areas. So effective was it that the Government was forced to close down 80 schools. The effectiveness owed much to the support from parents through representative organizations extending across the whole Cape Province. The existence of such democratic organizations effectively isolated the community councils and official school committees on which the régime was relying, and which it insisted were the only legitimate organizations concerned with the issues.

During the course of the boycott the pupils and students did much to enlist the support of the broader community, and to give support themselves to current struggles, beyond their own immediate one - to strikes by workers, and campaigns against bus fares increases and higher rents.

Although the boycott ended, conditionally, in February 1981, the opposition to apartheid education continued with the focus most immediately on the campaign against the introduction of compulsory racially segregated education for African children. Parents organizations, community and political organizations were in the forefront of the campaign along with the Congress of South African Students.

Resistance to removals

The enforced removal of black communities in accordance with the apartheid scheme has continued during the past five years on an increased scale. Many thousands of Indian and Coloured families have been forcibly uprooted and made to live in new areas (see Focus No. 34) and the number of Africans moved and "relocated" has been steadily increasing with many still scheduled for movement. Resistance to removals has been frequent, even if not often successful, or widely reported. Amongst the cases of resistance were those at Crossroads near Cape Town, and at Walmer Township near Port Elizabeth.

Crossroads was one of several "squatter townships" which grew up around the major urban areas, the homes of people not "qualified" under the pass law system to be in urban areas, or who for other reasons (such as the housing shortage) are unable to find accommodation.

After having bulldozed one Cape Town township and made 26,000 people homeless, and evicted 10,000 from another one, in July 1978 the Government announced it would move on Crossroads. But the residents resisted in the face of police action. Their resistance gained support both locally and internationally, and the removals were delayed for some time. (See Facelift Apartheid pp. 46-48).

The most notable case of resistance in rural areas to forced removal was by the Batlokwa community in the Soekmekaar area in the Northern Transvaal. Their determined resistance prevented the full implementation of the plans to move them. The participation of the police in the forced removals was followed, in January 1980, by an attack by African National Congress (ANC) guerrillas on the Soekmekaar police station. (See Focus No. 33, p. 12).

A record of the different struggles on specific issues gives only a partial idea of the scope and nature of popular resistance during this period. It was not only the number and the scale of the specific struggles that were significant, but even more so the extent of the unity and integration of struggles, their relation to the simultaneous armed struggle, and the understanding that they were part of a struggle for liberation.

2. Armed struggle

During 1975 and the first half of 1976 there were indications of an increasing number of people leaving South Africa, mainly under the auspices of ANC, for military training.

Amongst them were some of those who later appeared in the trial of the "Pretoria Twelve" (State vs Sexwale and Others), which took place during 1977 and 1978. Echoing the views of many other people, they explained to the Court why they joined the armed struggle. This is what two of them said:

"I was, and am, essentially a peaceful person, feeling that to counter the violence meted out against us, we were forced to defend ourselves: there was no option"

(Mosima Sexwale (25))

"The question of armed struggle seemed to me unavoidable and regrettably the only way out ... This was so because of the uncompromising attitude of the people who govern us"

(Naledi Tsiki (23))

(Quoted in The Sun Will Rise, IDAF 1981)

The events of 1976 gave a powerful impetus to the trends already beginning. The instances of armed attacks, acts of sabotage, clashes with security forces increased rapidly from that time onwards. Not only has there been an increase in the number of incidents but actions have become increasingly sophisticated; using more sophisticated armaments, employing more sophisticated tactics, by highly-trained guerrilla fighters.

The build-up to the present level and form of armed resistance has passed through several distinct phases. Each phase has been at a higher level than the preceding one, in terms of actions which are militarily more sophisticated and increasingly the responsibility of organized armed groups (liberation movements) rather than by individuals or small local groups. The actions have also become more clearly related to the other struggles taking place at the time.

The record appears to have been one of consistent advance. Judging by subsequent events, periods of relative calm have signified periods of consolidation by the forces of organized armed resistance of their position inside the country, the establishment of arms caches and bases, and the careful planning and preparation for action.

Other indicators of the level of armed struggle are the level of counter-insurgency activity by the State security forces, the number of trials taking place for "security"-related offences, the discovery of arms caches, instances of propaganda distribution coinciding with armed actions, assassinations of alleged "traitors", arrests of people leaving the country to undergo military training, recruitment and so on.

Since information about the armed struggle derives mainly from the mass media, State restrictions on the reporting of guerrilla incidents tend to distort quite considerably the true picture. Many incidents are not reported in the press - some become known at a later stage during trials - and some, such as the discovery of arms caches, are reported by the police, which excludes any chance of verifying the truth of such reports. (The most comprehensive lists of guerrilla actions are: "A chronology of conflict" Work in Progress No. 13, "Guerrilla chronology," Southern Africa Nov.-Dec. 1980, and "Chronology", an annex to a paper by the Anti-Apartheid Movement produced for a National Action Conference, "Southern Africa after Zimbabwe", Paris May 1980.) A list of incidents which have been reported is given in the annex to this report.

The first phase of armed resistance arising out of the events of 1976 grew organically out of the confrontations of the Soweto youth with the police. Peaceful demonstrations were attacked by the police and in an effort to defend themselves the students began to improvise certain weapons, initially for protection. Later, selective targets symbolizing authority were attacked and later still the police, vehicles, industrial and rural targets.

Many were driven to using dangerous methods of struggle by the extreme brutality of the repression they had experienced. Possibly thousands of young people resorted to arson and other forms of sabotage. There was no clear pattern in these incidents, suggesting that most were spontaneous acts inspired by a sense of outrage and revenge (see Whirlwind Before the Storm, pp. 150-157).

The second phase, beginning in late 1976, was characterized by more organized forms of armed attack and sabotage. Individuals acquired explosives and groups were formed to conduct specific acts of armed action.

The best-documented incidents were those attributable to the so-called Soweto Students Representative Council (SSRC) "destruction committee" (also known as "Suicide Squad"). In the trial of Paul Langa in 1977 it was revealed that the group had been responsible for several acts of sabotage between August and December 1976. Among the acts listed in the indictment were a petrol-bomb attack on the Jabulani Police Station in Soweto and an explosion on the railway line to Soweto. There is some evidence that the SSRC had close links with ANC, the latter providing the elementary training necessary to carry out these attacks and possibly, also the explosives. A number of student representative councils were well organized and had probably made links with the liberation movements. The "Pretoria 12" trial in 1978 and the PAC "Bethal 18" trial in 1978/79 revealed the complex links between organized student activity in the country and the banned liberation organizations (see Whirlwind Before the Storm, pp. 160-163).

During this period there still occurred actions by individuals acting alone. For example, on 7 December 1976 a man walked into the prestigious Carlton Centre in Johannesburg with two sticks of smouldering dynamite which exploded, causing extreme damage and blowing off his right hand. This was but the most serious of a number of "solitary" acts which took place at the time by individuals outraged by what they had witnessed in the townships. These acts took place in the context of a broader mass struggle taking place at the time, which included a continuation in even wider areas of the country of the type of spontaneous violent acts which had characterized the first phase.

However, from the latter part of 1976 to early 1979 there were many actions by organized groups. The most frequent forms of action were attacks on railway lines, explosions of pamphlet bombs, shooting of ex-guerrillas who had become State collaborators and armed contacts with members of the security forces. On several occasions the police claimed to have found arms caches.

Acts of railway sabotage continued in 1976 after the period of action by the SSRC "destruction committee", and continued into 1977. Those that occurred in 1976 were shown later to be attributable to some of the accused ANC members in the

trial of the "Pretoria 12" (State vs Sexwale and others). Where responsibility for those in 1977 became known, the actions were attributed to ANC members (State vs John Phola and others, State vs Canai Liza, State vs Ramudzuli and Duma).

There were a considerable number of other bomb explosions during this period, including one at Germiston police station and Daveyton police station near Benoni, at the end of 1977 and the beginning of 1978 respectively. Along with a bomb near Benoni railway station they were alleged to be the responsibility of an ANC member (State vs Norman Velaphi). In March 1978 a man carrying a bomb in Port Elizabeth was killed when it went off in his hand. He was Makwezi Mtulu, a former leader of the South African Students' Organization (SASO). There were several other bomb explosions, including ones at administration board offices, a beer depot and the chambers of the Soweto Community Council.

Claims by the police to have found arms caches dated from January 1977, when they said they had found explosives in Soweto. Arms were said to have been found on at least six occasions during 1977, in various parts of the country, and on at least six occasions during 1978.

During 1978 there were several shootings of former guerrillas who had become State witnesses in trials, informers or policemen.

Armed contacts between police and guerrillas took place several times. One of the accused in the "Pretoria 12" trial was accused of being a member of a group of four ANC guerrillas who, in November 1976, had thrown a grenade at a police van, injuring two policemen who had apprehended the group near the Swaziland border.

Gun battles between police and guerrillas were reported on five occasions but probably several more actually occurred. Brig. Zietsman, head of the Security Police, said at the time that police had clashed several times with ANC in border operations. (RDM 17.4.78). Three of the known clashes were carried out by ANC guerrillas. On the other occasions it appears that the guerrillas escaped. One of these clashes took place near the town of Rustenburg in the Transvaal in August. The ANC claimed that its guerrillas had killed 10 South African soldiers and captured another, and that the battle lasted over four hours with the security forces using napalm, defoliants and tear gas from helicopters. (T 12.8.78).

During December 1978 an alleged PAC member was shot dead by police when he attempted to detonate a hand grenade during a police raid on a Soweto house.

The third phase in the escalating guerrilla struggle began with an attack on a police station. On 3 May three ANC guerrillas attacked the Moroka police station with automatic rifles and grenades, killing one policeman, wounding others and destroying police files. Pamphlets left on the scene explained the attack as revenge for the execution of ANC guerrilla, Solomon Mahlangu. (Star 4.5.79).

Prior to the Moroka action, armed actions had been carried out without direct and deliberate confrontation with the police. The numerous clashes between guerrillas and police had not taken place at the choosing of the former but had

resulted from detection of their movements. Moroka indicated that guerrilla groups had firmly established themselves in the cities, or at least in Soweto, and were capable of undertaking planned actions with impressive effectiveness.

Little happened between the attack on the Moroka police station and the next attack on 2 November, when ANC guerrillas attacked the Orlando police station, killing two policemen. As in the Moroka attack, grenades were used and when the police ran out they were shot by automatic rifle fire. (Star 3.11.79).

The next major attack was again on a police station and took place on 4 January 1980. A group of ANC guerrillas attacked the Soekmekaar police station with grenades and automatic rifles. Those who took part in this attack were later arrested. In court they explained that the attack was a form of armed propaganda which ANC undertook where there were conflicts between the people and the apartheid authorities. In this case, people living near Soekmekaar were suffering forced removals from their homes. (Focus No. 33, p. 12).

A fourth police station was attacked on 4 April 1980 in the heart of Johannesburg. A group of ANC guerrillas using RPG7 rocket launchers attacked the Booysens police station. No one was killed but the police station was extensively damaged. (GN 5.4.80).

The most impressive armed action yet undertaken in South Africa was the ANC sabotage of refineries at Sasolburg and Secunda on 1 June 1980. South African Defence Force leaders described the attack as well-planned and sophisticated. Undoubtedly the attack shook the régime. As an attack on a vital economic target, it may mark the beginning of a further phase in the developing armed struggle. The Sasolburg attack suggests the existence of a highly organized intelligence network, the presence of highly trained guerrillas operating inside South Africa and a well organized back-up system to provide for the guerrillas both before and after their mission.

Since the Sasolburg attack there have not been any further actions of a comparable nature. Amongst the incidents that have occurred was the sabotage of the Soweto-Johannesburg rail link on 15 October, on the same day as the Minister for Co-operation and Development, Dr. Piet Koornhof, was given the "freedom" of Soweto. ANC pamphlets were found near the scene of the explosion, police reported. (T/GN 16.10.80).

Later in the month a grenade attack took place on WRAB offices in Soweto. Three people were wounded when "foreign-made" grenades were thrown from near the security fence. In November a suspected ANC guerrilla died in a hand grenade explosion in Soweto after a shootout with the police.

3. Mobilization in the liberation struggle

One of the most significant aspects of the 1970s and in particular of the period since June 1976 has been the increasing extent to which the ideas of the liberation movement have been openly expressed, and its methods and goals clearly supported.

The heightened political consciousness has been observable in many ways: in the course of the campaign on specific grievances; at the few kinds of political gatherings open to black people when the organizations were banned and meetings restricted; in the funerals to commemorate those who died in the struggle; in the campaign for the release of political prisoners; in demonstrations at trials.

In all the campaigns of action on issues like education, rents, boycotts and so on, the understanding that the grievances have their origin in apartheid has been present and spelt out in leaflets and slogans. So too has the knowlege that the gains that can be achieved through the methods of protests are limited as long as the apartheid State, with its massive powers of repression, remains.

With outdoor meetings banned since June 1976, the principal forum for the public expression of political ideas became funerals of political activists and the services to commemorate major events of political repression, such as Sharpeville Day, Soweto Day and the day of banning of Black Consciousness organizations (19 October 1977). Such services were attended by hundreds and even thousands at times. The new organizations like AZAPO, COSAS, AZASO, WASA and PEBCO were active in organizing and sponsoring the services. They became occasions for remembering the sacrifices of the liberation struggle and for dedication to the struggle.

While the apartheid régime outlaws political organizations and brands their activities as criminal and "terrorist", in doing so it is acting in opposition to the attitudes of the majority in the country. The clearest demonstrations of this have come at funerals of political activists or guerrillas, in demonstrations at trials and in the campaign for the release of political prisoners.

Funerals of political activists have drawn very large numbers. Up to 20,000 attended Steve Biko's funeral in 1977 and that of one of those shot by police in the Silverton Bank siege in 1980. The role of funerals as occasions for political mobilization was evident in 1976 and continued through the years since then. During 1980 there were several reports of funerals at which the colours of the banned ANC were displayed, sometimes on clothes worn by mourners and sometimes draped on coffins. There were also reports of the circulation at funerals and commemorative services of the petition to free political prisoners. (Focus No. 28, p. 12).

The response to the régime's killing of three guerrillas during the Silverton Bank siege was of particular significance for what it showed about attitudes to the armed struggle.

While the police and the Government described the three as terrorists, newspapers with a black readership to which the editors were responsive, described them as guerrillas and gunmen or freedom fighters. Some black journalists on newspapers more responsive to white readers said they found themselves in an invidious position when editors rewrote their copy inserting "terrorists" to describe the three. The Steyn Commission on the Reporting of Security Matters expressed concern about this difference in attitudes, regarding it as evidence of "the degree to which the polarization of South African society had taken place". (P. 72 of the Commission's Report).

The conflict went beyond the pages of newspapers. The funerals of the three killed at Silverton by the police drew very big numbers: 20,000 attended the third funeral, the largest since Steve Biko's, despite the fact that the dead youth was unknown beyond his part in this one action. Thousands taking part in the procession chanted: "He was not a terrorist, he was a hero". (Focus No. 28, p. 12).

Of similar significance for the political attitudes it showed, was the reaction to the régime's killing of 12 ANC members in the raid into Mozambique in January 1981. Black organizations of almost every kind strongly condemned the Matola raid, and there were many statements from organizations and individuals showing that far from being regarded as terrorists, those in the liberation movement and engaged in armed struggle are seen as heroes. Fearing open expression of opposition to the raid and of support for ANC, the régime prevented the return of the bodies of the dead to South Africa for burial, and banned services to commemorate and honour the dead. A week after the ban the South African Council of Churches organized a memorial service in Soweto. It was attended by thousands, including 18 priests. Representatives of several organizations spoke at the service, including a representative of the Azanian Students Organization, who said: "They died in pursuit of a better South Africa. They wanted black and white to share in the wealth of this country, that the doors of learning be opened for all. They set themselves to fight for liberation and we need to rededicate ourselves to their goals." (Focus No. 34).

The status of Solomon Mahlangu as a hero of the people was demonstrated through protests at the time of his execution and by the attendance at his funeral.

In such ways, undoubted and widespread support for the armed struggle has been shown. And actions like the guerrilla attack on Sasol oil plants at the height of the protests of 1980 were received with enthusiasm.

Militant demonstrations both inside the courtrooms where people are standing in political trials and outside are now very common, with the singing of freedom songs and the chanting of slogans. During the recent trial of Oscar Mpetha in Cape Town, demonstrations took place with people carrying placards saying "Botha is a terrorist" and calling for the release of Nelson Mandela and all political prisoners.

The campaign for the release of Nelson Mandela and all other political prisoners was of major significance. Launched by the Sunday Post immediately after the Zimbabwean independence elections, it circulated throughout the country at the height of the protests and boycotts, and despite considerable police harassment of the committees organizing the collection of signatures. Eventually about 100,000 signatures were collected, some internationally, but mainly from inside the country. Supported by a wide range of organizations, the campaign demonstrated how much those imprisoned by the régime are regarded as leaders. Similarly, the AZAPO conference early in 1981 called for the lifting of the bans on the ANC and PAC.

1980 was the twenty-fifth anniversary of the Freedom Charter and there were many reports of it circulating and being discussed and many references to its ideas.

During the year the Publication Control Board declared one reproduction of the Charter an undesirable publication, to try to stop its circulation. But by that time the Freedom Charter had been produced in the Sunday Post, a fact that was cited by the Minister as justification for the closure of the newspaper later in the year.

An important development has been the steady evolution amongst some churches church bodies of more clear support for the liberation struggle. It has been shown in increasing support for white war resisters, in a readiness to participate actively in services to commemorate those who have died in the struggle, and in a gradually stronger support for disinvestment and the sports boycott.

If support for the armed struggle and for banned organizations involved in underground work has been one indication of the commitment to liberation, so too has been the opposition to the apartheid-created institutions. The régime has tried to impose political structures on the black majority, the bantustans and community councils for Africans; and the Local Affairs Committees and Management Committees for Coloureds and Indians, as well as the South African Indian Council and the Coloured Representative Council. The régime has found people to co-operate in these institutions. But the rejection of them by most of those they are supposed to represent is shown in the low participation in elections and in the development of the network of community organizations which are an alternative means for expression of black interests and needs. (See section on apartheid political structures, p. 31).

The bantustan structures still exist, and in three cases so-called "independence" has been enforced through the collaboration of a small section of people. This was only achieved in the face of strong opposition, but such means as detention of opponents, and nomination of compliant figures to outnumber elected opponents (see Divide and Rule, IDAF, 1981). The new organizations like SCA, PEBCO and AZAPO are all committed to a stance of non-negotiation with the apartheid régime and reject the so-called "dummy institutions".

A very different kind of indication of the political situation but one pointing in similar directions is found in the actions of the régime. In various ways it gives evidence of the repressive forces it seeks to crush. In general, the expansion of the security forces is a direct result of the opposition to the apartheid system. Those in command of the security forces have several times stated that the threat to the system comes from within the country, rather than from outside and that the battle cannot be won simply by military means. The scale of security operations indicates deep opposition. Censorship, detentions, bannings, arrests and trials, as well as physical force have been deployed constantly with increasing intensity. And still the opposition continues to mount. Security trials have brought many people to court during the past five years and they have mostly been members of highly developed underground organizations.

In the justification given for its repressive actions, claims are frequently made about the threat posed by banned organizations. While care must be taken in interpreting such statements, the régime has little incentive to artificially increase the esteem in which the organizations are held, by attributing to them the capacity to threaten the security of the State, and so the statements cannot be ignored.

For example, the Report of the Steyn Commission of Inquiry into the Reporting of Security Matters gave considerable space to the threat posed by banned organizations. It cited ANC and PAC and devoted several pages to justifying the banning of the Post and Sunday Post: the Minister accused them of fomenting a revolutionary situation, of being infiltrated by ANC and of propagating ANC propaganda. On a number of occasions legal organizations were claimed by police or ministers to be fronts for, or manipulated by, banned organizations (e.g., T 24.2.81).

All the evidence therefore, from different sources, points consistently to major advances since 1976 in the forces of liberation in the broadest sense, in terms of organization and unity, in terms of a growth in military capacity and in terms of political consciousness. There is an increasingly determined demand for liberation and the complete destruction of apartheid and widespread mass support for the aims and methods of the banned liberation movements. The nationwide resistence of 1980 was much more than simultaneous struggles over specific issues. It was also an upsurge of the liberation struggle on many fronts.

B. Response of the apartheid régime to the upsurge of popular resistance and the liberation struggle

Faced with the upsurge of popular struggle from 1976, as well as the advances in the southern African liberation struggle from 1974, the régime has responded with all its resources to maintain itself. It has used the full force of its repressive powers to try to crush resistance. This is detailed in in part 1 of this section. On the other hand it adopted a number of political initiatives (explained in part 2), aimed at defusing and dividing the resistance and opposition, both inside and outside the country. Presented as reforms, the initiatives have turned out to be a restructuring of the apartheid system in order to promote its survival in new conditions. Those improvements that have occurred are only marginal in relation to the main aspects of the developments.

Aware that the initiatives would fail to halt the struggle for freedom, the régime has accelerated a programme of vastly expanding its military and repressive powers in preparation for intensified war and repression. This is covered in part 3.

1. Repression

The repressive actions of the régime have been shaped by the forces threatening it. The emergence of new legal organizations and their reappearance after banning, the forging of unity between different groups and sectors of the oppressed, the major growth in the strength of working class and community organizations, and increasing guerrilla action have dictated the pattern of repression. Repeatedly, and in various ways depending on how they assessed the situation, those responsible for attempting to crush resistance have used the following methods:

- Organizations, formal and informal, have been disrupted by bans on the organizations, or detentions, bannings and other actions against activists and people in leading roles;

- Organizing and mobilizing have been prevented or disrupted by bans on meetings, censorship of publications and direct physical disruption of meetings by the police;

- The law and the courts have been used on a large scale against people participating in meetings and protests;

- Security laws and other laws, along with detention, have been used against those active in underground organizations and the armed struggle.

The record below, which covers these aspects of repression, gives some idea of the scale of the repression, although not of the extent to which it is part of a co-ordinated operation involving police and security police, the military and various government departments. Some indication of this wider repression is given in part 3.

The record is also incomplete because still further restrictions have been imposed during the past five years on the freedom of the press to publish information about the activities of security forces, and because the security forces have taken steps to reduce still further the access of the press and public to information about its activities or to the scenes of security operations. Except where stated otherwise, the information in this section is drawn from Focus and from the annual Surveys of the South African Institute of Race Relations (SAIRR).

Restrictions on meetings have been in force since June 1976, when outdoor meetings were banned under the Riotous Assemblies Act. By successive renewals this ban has remained in force since that time up till the present. Only sports gatherings or meetings for which permission has been granted are legal. In June 1980, as the fourth anniversary of Soweto approached, still more restrictions were imposed: for two and a half months all meetings of more than 10 people, of a political nature, were banned.

The Riotous Assemblies Act also empowers the Minister to prohibit a specific gathering. This power was frequently exercised. Funerals, although escaping the general bans, were prevented by the Minister on a number of occasions, because of their political significance. This happened with a mass funeral for people killed in Soweto in 1976, planned by the Black Parents Association; it happened to a planned funeral in Grahamstown in August 1980 for people killed by the police in demonstrations there. And the services to commemorate and honour the ANC people killed in the Matola raid were banned. Their families were also prevented from burying them in South Africa when the Government refused to allow them to bring the bodies back from Mozambique.

There were many other bans on specific meetings, notably in 1980 in the months before the ban on all political meetings was imposed. Meetings affected included public meetings on the education issue, report-back meetings at which workers' representatives were to tell members about negotiations, and two meetings at which Bishop Tutu was to have reported back to parents and pupils in Port Elizabeth on meeting with the Minister of Education and Training.

Police attacks on people at meetings have been very frequent, particularly during the protests of 1976-77 and the nationwide protests of 1980. Police used a wide range of weapons, including batons, tear gas, whips and dogs and, on many occasions, guns. Sometimes birdshot was fired, sometimes plastic bullets and sometimes ordinary bullets. At least 50 people were shot dead by police during demonstrations in 1980. Many more people have been injured. The police used in these attacks have often been heavily armed riot police. Participation of the military in the suppression of protests has been observed on several occasions. (See part 3).

The number of people and meetings subjected to police attacks of these kinds is very large, and the use of the police as a physical force to break and crush demonstrations and protests and boycotts has been regular and the most common response. Not only pupils and students, but also bus boycotters, rent protesters, strikers, those resisting forced removals, and people protesting outside courts during security trials, are just some of those who have faced attack.

The readiness of the police to use these methods has given force to the bans on meetings imposed by the Minister, and has been one of the main obstacles to be faced by those taking protest action. After the experience of 1976, when police killed hundreds of demonstrators, the organizations leading the protests of 1980 tried to avoid direct confrontation with the police. The fact that the numbers of deaths were much lower than in 1976 is a measure of their success in avoiding such confrontation, in spite of the fact that the police still carried out attacks on peaceful meetings.

Bans on organizations and individuals have been extensively used as another means to prevent political activity. The banning of the 18 organizations in October 1977 effectively eliminated open organized opposition to apartheid for almost two years. It was combined with restrictions on many people who might have continued organizing open opposition and trying to build new legal organizations. Whereas in 1975 there were only 15 new banning orders imposed on individuals, the numbers rose rapidly after June 1976. There were 50 new bans in 1976, 38 in 1977 and 59 in 1978. The banning orders were used against community leaders, church people, political and trade union activists and journalists, amongst others.

Banning of publications to prevent the dissemination of information and the discussion of ideas has resulted in the closure of newspapers, first the World and the Weekend World in 1977 and later the Post and the Sunday Post in 1980. Many periodicals and leaflets of political organizations were banned, as were numerous leaflets and pamphlets produced in the course of popular action, particularly during 1980, in order to mobilize support in the townships for boycotting pupils and striking workers. Student publications were subject to frequent banning: by June 1979, 167 individual issues of student publications had been declared undesirable, and 7 publications banned.

Detentions under security laws have become one of the main weapons used by the police in trying to stop protests by organizations and intimidate activists. During the mass protests of 1976 and 1980 the number of detentions was very high, and even during the intervening years the numbers of people being detained indicated that there was still active resistance.

Between June 1976 and September 1977, 2,430 people were detained under security laws, according to official figures. Many were held in terms of the General Law Amendment Act, which allows detention without trial or charge for up to 14 days. Section 10 of the Internal Security Act - which came into force in June 1976 - allows preventive detention of people thought to be actively organizing resistance and protest: many were detained under the Act in 1976, at least 47 in October 1977 when the 18 organizations were banned. During 1977, 313 people were detained under the Criminal Procedure Act as potential State witnesses, and at the end of the same year 240 people were being held under the Terrorism Act.

There were many allegations by witnesses that they had been tortured while being held under the Criminal Procedure Act. Intensive police brutality towards detainees was reflected in an increase in deaths in detention: 26 people including student organizers and people connected with banned organizations are known to have died between 16 June 1976 and December 1977. Although there have not been reports

of deaths in detention since then, there is continuing evidence which is claimed to have been extracted under torture.

Detentions during 1978 were largely concerned with trials, or else were directed at those involved in the early stages of the formation of new legal organizations. That the detentions were still related to the education protests is reflected in the fact that 169 of those in detention, half of the total, were school pupils.

Corresponding to the massive upsurge of popular struggle during 1980, the number of detentions rose sharply: by the end of the year 965 people had been detained, amongst them pupils, students, teachers, journalists and trade unionists. Although the numbers being detained lessened, there was no sign of detentions ending during the first quarter of 1981.

Political trials have occurred on a very large scale, as the statistics below, and on pages 24-25 show. Statistics for trials taking place under security legislation since 1976 point to the fact that the momentum of resistance has not lessened. For example the leap in convictions under the Terrorism Act, from 9 in 1975 to 50 in 1976, has been sustained (see table 1 on p. 24). Not until the autumn of 1980 did the number of current trials fall to the 1976 level, and even then the figure masks the unusually large number of postponements of trials that occurred.

A very large number of people have appeared in court after taking part in protest and demonstrations. Charges like those of "public violence" and "riotous assembly" have been used to deal with the mass demonstrations that occurred, and they are an indication of the extent of the resistance. In the two years after the uprising of 16 June 1976, many were charged with public violence, riotous assembly, malicious damage to property, and inciting unrest, as the following shows:

	No. charged	No. under 18 charged	No. convicted	No. under 18 convicted
1977	21,282	4,531	13,366	2,983
1978	21,061	4,186	14,300	2,893

Although the over-all figures for 1980 are not yet available, it is apparent from reports of trials that prosecutions on a very large scale were used to deal with the mass protests surrounding the school and bus boycotts, the labour strikes and the other protests of 1980.

Within major security trials there has been a noticeable shift since 1978 away from exclusive use of security laws, and a greater use of charges of common law offences, such as sedition, treason and murder. Four of the 5 death sentences passed during the period were for treason. Common law charges are generally alongside security charges to ensure conviction if one of the charges fails. The

Terrorism Act, used alone or in combination with others, remains the chief law used, although in 1977 it was rivalled by sabotage, indicating the large number of trials concerning damage to property at Soweto and elsewhere.

As with other matters concerning the "security of the State" trials are becoming increasingly shrouded in secrecy. By 1978 the SAIRR was noting a tendency towards hearing evidence in camera, a procedure carried to the ultimate in the 1978 Bethal trial of PAC members, which was heard totally in camera with the names of all witnesses being withheld. In order to prevent courts becoming a focus for opposition, many trials were held in remote areas, prisons or police stations. Regional magistrates can now try security cases and pass sentences of up to 10 years, so that trials are more widespread geographically. All these devices make it more difficult to report fully and accurately on trials. Certainly many secret sabotage trials (where no defence was filed) appear to have been held in 1977.

A number of students charged since 1976 have used political trials as a source of information on the changing character of resistance to the régime. After 1976 there was a marked increase in the number of people charged with leaving the country to get military training or assisting others to do the same. Increasingly the major trials since 1978 have involved trained liberation fighters who have returned to South Africa after training abroad. Where sabotage features in the indictment it is likely to refer to a guerrilla strike on a particular target rather than an isolated incident. The majority of those in trials of this kind have had an ANC connexion.

The conduct of political trials shows evidence of increasing State interference in the judicial process. The Rabie Commission was appointed in 1979 to investigate internal security legislation in the face of much criticism that it was impossible for political prisoners to get a fair trial. The common practice of torture to secure admissions of guilt is well attested from court records and evidence of lawyers - one recorded that 70 per cent of his clients displayed evidence of assault. Lengthy arguments in court over the admissibility of statements obtained under duress led to amendment of the Criminal Procedure Act in 1979, so that now admissions of guilt are to be assumed to have been freely given. The onus to disprove this is firmly on the defendant. In this respect the judicial process is clearly weighted in favour of the State.

Convicted political prisoners have had to face increasingly severe sentences. Although prior to 1978 the prosecution had demanded the death sentence in many cases, it was only with the sentencing and ultimate execution of Solomon Mahlangu that the step was taken in recent years. Since then 4 death sentences have been passed, of which one was commuted to 20 years' imprisonment and the other 3 are subject to appeal. This seems to mark a determination on the part of the State to ruthlessly suppress any trained guerrilla fighters they may capture, as all 5 (Mahlangu, Mange, Lubisi, Mshigo and Manana) had received military training outside South Africa.

Table 1

Charges and convictions under the Terrorism Act 1976-1979

	1976	1977	1978	1979
Charged under Terrorism Act (possibly with other charges)	96	97	108	105
Acquitted/charges withdrawn	12	32	18	26
Convicted	50	35	44	56
Convicted of a lesser charge	6		2	6
Still on trial	28	30	43	17

Growing numbers of lawyers have voiced criticism of the increasingly repressive nature of the legal system. In 1980 a number of lawyers participated in the formation of an association, "Lawyers for Human Rights". They included a Supreme Court judge who called on the profession to make its voice heard on violations of human rights in South Africa (RDM 23.6.80).

Table 2

Trials and sentences for violations of the Terrorism and Internal Security Acts and for sabotage - 1976-1979

Principal charge	No. of trials	Accused	Convicted	Proceeding	Acquitted or charges withdrawn	Years of imprisonment
TERRORISM ACT						
1976						
1977	45	97	35	30	32	334
1978	32	90	31	3	25	272
1979	26	71	20	10	5	153 1/2
SABOTAGE						
1976						
1977	38	257	88	25	144	524
1978	22	48	38	3	6	241
1979	3	1	10	-	-	62
INTERNAL SECURITY ACT						
1976						
1977	3	35	15	-	20	16
1978	7	10	8	-	2	32
1979	6	7	5	-	2	4

2. Adapting apartheid to new conditions

Following the events of 1976 the apartheid régime was aware that repression alone would not secure its continued existence. It therefore embarked on a number of political initiatives aimed at satisfying some of the demands for change, at gaining the co-operation of some sections of the oppressed majority and at intensifying the controls on the majority. The measures were presented as reforms paving the way for "a new dispensation", and even spelling the end of apartheid (a fuller account is given in Facelift Apartheid, IDAF 1981).

Many of the current developments in the field of government policy and restructuring of the apartheid State were under way before 1976. The militarization of every aspect of society, the involvement of the private sector in political matters and its desire for changes in the regulation and training of labour, the search for political structures for the Coloured and Indian communities: these all predate June 1976. But the uprising of that year and the next gave impetus to these developments and added strength to the forces promoting them.

The five years since then have borne out the view that all the changes and reforms being considered and promised, were attempts to preserve the basic system of apartheid while making such adjustments as were needed in the light of changing economic and political circumstances. So far the political initiatives have failed to stem the tide for demands for political liberation. Even those supposed to benefit from the "changes" have been active in rejecting them as bogus.

The principal concerns of the régime's domestic policy have been on the one hand political structures for the groups into which apartheid divides the black majority, and on the other hand a range of issues affecting labour, in particular African labour. In relation to these fundamental aspects of the system, such improvements as have occurred are marginal.

Apartheid political structures for black people

The appointment in April 1976 of a Cabinet Committee (under the chairmanship of P. W. Botha, then Minister of Defence) was an early step in the current search for a political arrangement which would separate the Coloured and Indian groups from Africans and try to bring them into alliance with whites. Africans were excluded from the constitutional schemes put before Parliament in 1979 and 1980. Opposition to the exclusion of Africans was one of the major reasons for the withdrawal of the first scheme. Yet the second scheme, adopted by Parliament, still had no place for Africans except in a separate and powerless Black Advisory Council. This committee, based on the bantustans, would consult and liaise with the President's Council. The latter consists of 60 white, Coloured, Indian and Chinese members appointed by the President. It is a powerless, merely consultative body and the regíme has explicitly presented it as only an interim measure whose function is to produce further constitutional schemes.

Neither the Black Advisory Council nor the President's Council found support in the black community. Faced with calls to include Africans on the President's Council, the Prime Minister said it was out of the question, "an insurmountable obstacle". He insisted that while the Government was prepared to create consultative bodies for Coloured, African and Indian leaders, it was not prepared to do so on the condition that it accepted majority rule in South Africa. "If confrontation must come over that" he said "then it must come". The policy of

exclusion of Africans from the President's Council was confirmed again during the 1981 election campaign (GN 24.6.80. 11.8.80; RDM 31.1.81). While the plan for a Black Council was dropped, the rest of the scheme went ahead. The President's Council was set up and 60 people were found to serve on it despite the almost total absence of support for it amongst the black community.

With the rejection of the President's Council the failure of the régime's constitutional initiatives is completed by the fate of the national bodies which it set up for the Coloured and Indian communities. The Coloured Representative Council (CRC) ceased to serve the purposes of the régime towards the end of 1980. The CRC was a partly elected body with very limited powers and unable to move outside the apartheid system. The Labour Party, which formed the majority on the Council, clashed with Prime Minister Botha over the 1979 Constitution Bill. It demanded universal suffrage and representation of all peoples in a single parliament. Botha warned the Labour Party that "if it did not co-operate with him he would have to find Coloured leaders who would." Early in 1980 the Coloured Representative Council was abolished. Botha planned to replace the CRC with a wholly nominated Coloured Persons Council, but in the face of Labour Party opposition to it, the proposal has been dropped. (GN 12.8.80).

The South African Indian Council (SAIC) has also failed to win the support of the Indian Community. Originally an appointed body, the régime has plans to hold elections to the SAIC. But a long campaign against it fought with determination has caused the elections to be delayed four times. The elections are now due to be held in November 1981, and a nation-wide campaign against them was reported in March to be gathering momentum. (FM 20.2.81; S 4.3.81).

With the failure of the President's Council and the régime's national bodies for Coloureds and Indians to win black support, the régime is currently investing considerable political resources in the field of regional and local governments. There is a powerful current of opinion, most clearly articulated by the apparently influential head of the Bureau for Economic and Political Analysis, that the key to apartheid's political problems is to be found not at the national level but at regional and local levels. (Star 9.8.80)

The first task of the President's Council is to consider the reports of committees of inquiry into local government structures for the Indian and Coloured communities. A report on the opening of the President's Council in February 1981 commented: "There is little doubt that the National Party is trying to draw Indians and Coloureds into joint structures with whites and is starting at municipal level." (RDM 4.2.81)

For some time now there have been persistent rumours and suggestions in the press that there are plans to develop a new system of regional and local government which would be "mixed". "Reliable sources" have said that the Government is prepared to negotiate details of the system with Coloured and Indian "leaders". They also said that Africans would be excluded, as the Government was preparing to create autonomous municipalities for them in the urban areas which would link up with the bantustans. The new "metropolitan" scheme would stick to the group areas and separate development policies, but at the same time provide another

forum where whites, Coloureds and Indians would have some share in decision making. (Star 13.9.80).

The major, and so far unanswered, question is what powers such local government bodies would have. Both past experience and government statements indicate that they would lack power to move outside of the apartheid system. Equally crucial is the question of how they would be financed. The racial distribution of property and economic activity under apartheid leaves local government for blacks without a viable financial basis. (Slabbert and Opland, Dilemmas of Evolutionary Change, Rhodes University 1980, pp. 33-34). Judging by the draft bills published in November - and withdrawn for redrafting - the municipal bodies for Africans may well be encouraged to seek finance through fines on pass law offenders, something that would define them even more sharply as agents of apartheid than their role in the issue of rents has already done (RDM 5.11.80). In general there is already widespread scepticism concerning the possibility of viable local government for black people under apartheid, let alone widespread rejection of the acceptability of such institutions. (RDM 18.2.81).

Although the régime has succeeded in setting up a system of local councils and committees for each of the African, Coloured and Indian communities, they have little support amongst those they are supposed to represent. Powerless and obliged to administer apartheid, the evidence of their lack of support is seen in the low participation in elections to them, often the result of boycott campaigns. It is also to be seen in the remarkable growth of alternative community organizations which have become the effective vehicles for the representation of the interests and aspirations of communities at a local level.

The average vote in Indian Local Affairs Committee elections has been 14.2 per cent. (FM 20.2.81). The Labour Party continues participating in Coloured Management Committees at local government level, but is divided over whether to continue doing so. There is low participation in elections to them, and the participation has declined. Coloured disillusionment with separate and powerless institutions is reflected in a decline in the number of registered voters since 1969. (CT 29.2.80).

The situation in the bantustans is parallel to that in the urban areas. Although the bantustans remain, and three have been forced into so-called "independence", support for them is confined to a minority and the continued existence of the "governments" requires draconian security laws and the suppression of resistance. (See Divide and Rule, IDAF 1980, for a detailed account).

In October 1976 the Transkei was declared "independent" with most of the official opposition being detained before the ceremony. The "independence" ceremony in December 1977 in BophuthaTswana took place in the face of massive opposition, most directly shown in the burning down of the BophuthaTswana Legislative Assembly building in mass demonstrations a year before independence. The Venda bantustan was declared "independent" in September 1979; the ruling party had lost the election but retained power through the nominated members and South African support.

The Ciskei may be made "independent" in December 1981 following a referendum in which a great majority were said to have supported "independence". The referendum, conducted shortly after an opinion survey had shown 90 per cent opposed to "independence" took place against a background of threats against anyone who might abstain or vote against "independence" (ST 21.12.80)

The determination of the régime to push bantustans into bogus independence continues in spite of its admission that they can never be econcmically viable. The propaganda for the current version of the bantustan policy, the "constellation of states", is based on the premise that bantustans cannot be economically independent. Nevertheless participation in decision making in the multilateral development bank, the centre piece of the scheme, will be confined to so-called "independent" banstustans. (SE 27.7.80; CT 2.9.80).

For all the changes in name, the basic policy still remains, of depriving the African majority of political rights and instead imposing a political structure on them based on fragments of the country and shaped by the needs of the migrant labour system.

The traditional and basic functions of the bantustans as reservoirs of cheap labour and dumping grounds for the unemployed has intensified. Massive relocation schemes together with a long downturn in the economy led to a growing number of people being trapped in the rural ghettos. Several recent studies have shown an alarming increase in poverty, malnutrition and poverty-related disease in the bantustans. The tightening up of the pass laws and of labour recruitment through labour bureaux has further exacerbated the situation. (Focus No. 32, p. 10; Annual Report of the Johannesburg Advice Office of the Black Sash Advice Occife for 1980).

In addition to their traditional functions as part of the migrant labour system, the bantustans have increasingly assumed a new function in the maintenance of apartheid, as areas of counter-insurgency. (See pp. 45, 49).

Despite the clearly fraudulent nature of the bantustan policy and the refusal of the international community to recognize the so-called "independence" of the bantustans, the régime is pressing ahead with the policy as a simultaneous means of depriving Africans of political rights, as an important element in its military strategy and as a key element in the continuation of the migrant labour system.

New labour controls

The increased relocation of the unemployed to the bantustans noted above is one of the consequences in a series of changes in the system for the regulations of black labour. Presented by the régime - and hailed by large sections of the South African and foreign media - as a "new labour dispensation", accompanying the "new political dispensation", the changes have proved to involve the tightening of controls on labour, both in relation to the movement of workers and their rights to organize.

The cabinet committee appointed at the height of the 1976 uprising to investigate the situation of urban Africans was soon followed by the appointment of two major commissions. One was the Wiehahn Commission of Inquiry into Labour Legislation and the other the Riekert Commission of Inquiry into Legislation Affecting the Utilization of Manpower.

In fact the Wiehahn Commission's task, as numerous statements by Ministers insisted, was to control the growing black trade unions and prevent them from becoming a political threat. The recommendations of the Riekert report were, the Prime Minister informed Parliament, "a change in mechanism, not a change in policy". The whole of the new dispensation was summed up in a manifesto of 12 points by the Prime Minister: they were, he explained later, a reformulation of the principles of apartheid. (DD 30.4.80). Measured against what has happened in practice these have proved accurate estimates, while the promises and expectations of reforms and the "death of apartheid" have proved empty and bogus.

Trade unions

Two of the main reasons for the appointment of the Wiehahn Commission were the economic demand for more black skilled labour and the growing strength of the black trade union movement. The report aimed at promoting the growth of a body of skilled black workers, and fitting them into the structure of apartheid's laws. (See Facelift Apartheid pp. 37-44).

The report recommended the recognition of black trade unions under the Industrial Conciliation Act under which white unions were recognized. Access to the official bargaining system, however, would be conditional on a union being registered, thereby submitting its rules and finances to official control and scrutiny. The Commission was also concerned at the fact that unions which were not subject to control were, and would continue, receiving funds from overseas sources. The Commission recommended that the Government should prohibit political activities by unions.

Although the report made no recommendation on whether unions should be segregated or mixed, it has turned out that only segregated unions have had applications for registration accepted. (CT 25.2.81).

Apart from maintaining and promoting racial division amongst workers, the Wiehahn measures promote other forms of division as well. The division between the registered unions and the "illegitimate" unregistered workers is one example.

A major division which would be the effect of the proposals if they were successful, would be between urban and migrant workers. The Commission and, after some resistance, the Government, granted union rights to migrant workers. But even so the structure of the Industrial Conciliation Act would, in Wiehahn's view, inhibit the unions themselves from attempting to organize migrant workers. A union would be registered only if it managed to recruit a required proportion of eligible workers within the category it had defined for itself. If the union defined its membership to include migrants, who are on one-year contracts it would have to engage in a permanent recruiting drive to obtain the required proportion as members. Wiehahn commented "Constitutional limitations are therefore likely to be imposed by unions themselves as a matter of self-interest."

The recommendations of the report assume that the benefits of being admitted to the official bargaining machinery would induce unions to submit to the discipline involved in registration. Although it appeared for a time that a significant proportion of independent unions might register, in the end the independent trade union movement effectively resisted the pressures to register, or to accept registration under the conditions which involve racially segregated unions (CT 25.3.81). As a result the régime is now planning further legislation, apparently to submit unregistered unions to the same stringent controls as the registered unions. The Minister of Manpower Legislation told a meeting that "a dangerous situation had arisen in South Africa, making it necessary to place all the trade unions under the discipline of the law." (CT 6.3.81).

The Wiehahn Report made two other recommendations, since adopted by the Government, calculated to help build a body of black skilled workers. One was the removal of job reservation, which keeps certain categories of work for whites only. Legislation enabling the Government to phase out the few remaining area of job reservations was enacted in March 1980 (RDM 19.3.80). The second recommendation was to increase the number of facilities for training black workers: in practice this has meant providing training of semi-skilled workers at segregated institutions. To the extent that they promote an increase in the number of skilled black workers, the measures give official recognition to the erosion of some of the power of white workers. For this reason the measures are regarded with hostility by white workers. Observers suggested that this was the reason for the failure of the Wiehahn Commission to produce more than two of the five parts of its report by mid-1980, and that this was "dictated by a desire not to threaten party unity and not to alienate white labour." (CT 26.5.80). Events during the 1981 election campaign indicate that sections of white workers do believe the proposals threaten their position (Star 14.3.81; T18.3.81). Nevertheless, the main effect of the changes sought by the régime is the control of black workers.

Apart from the measures arising out of the Wiehahn Commission, the régime has used several means to attack the independent union movement. These include detentions of union organizers, prosecution of workers and organizers involved in strike action, and the implementation and application of the Affected

Organisations Act and the Fund Raising Act to restrict the raising of funds by unions from other sources. The effect of these latter measures would severely restrict the ability of unions to sustain strike action. (Focus, especially Nos. 29-34).

Pass Laws

While the Riekert report was widely hailed in the white-owned South African press, and in the foreign media, as introducing a "new political dispensation" for urban Africans, its actual function was to simplify and streamline the laws relating to influx control and to make them more efficient. In the words of the Prime Minister, the Report outlined a change in mechanism, not a change in policy.

In particular, the report stated a need to remove the point of control "off the streets", where the police carried out the surveillance of passes. It proposed that the elaborate system of rights to remain in urban areas, under section 10 of the Urban Areas Act, should be replaced by new criteria. All, and only Africans, with "lawful employment and approved accommodation", would be entitled to reside in urban areas. The aim, in the words of the report, was:

> "... more effective control over migration than in the past, and the avoidance of much of the friction that accompanied such control in the past, in that emphasis will be placed mainly on the control of employment and control of accommodation" (quoted in Facelift Apartheid, p. 53).

Control over employment was to be increased through more effective use of the labour bureaux as points of recruitment and registration of contracts.

Various aspects of the recommendations of the Report have already been implemented by amendments of existing legislation pending the introduction of major legislative measures currently under discussion. What has already taken place has brought about a deterioration for the great majority of workers, and only slight benefits to a small minority. What is known of the proposed legislation indicates that things will continue to deteriorate.

The first of the Riekert recommendations to be implemented was an increase in the fine on employers employing "illegal" labour, that is people who were not registered with the labour bureaux. The new fine was so high as to make it no longer worthwhile for employers to risk a fine by employing unregistered labour. As a consequence thousands of workers were endorsed out of urban areas at the end of 1979 and sent to the bantustans, and many others who were allowed to stay were put on one year contracts. (Focus No. 27, p. 16).

The adoption of Riekert recommendations as policies for the operation of the labour bureaux have had the effect of making it much more difficult for people from rural areas to go to urban areas to work. Bureaux in the urban areas are under instruction to recruit "local labour" that is to give preference to work-seekers already in the urban areas. Labour bureaux in the bantustans are being closed down and recruitment is being centralized at bureaux just inside or outside

bantustan borders, making it most impossible for those people who live far inside bantustans to apply.

In its annual report the Advice Office of the Black Sash in Johannesburg notes a great increase during 1979 and 1980 in the number of people coming for help, but for whom they could do nothing and commented that the increase:

> "... is a reflection of the greater severity with which influx control is now being enforced and of the increasing exclusion of black people who live in the bantustans from participation in the development of the so-called white area."

While things have seriously deteriorated for the migrant, rurally based workers, the claimed improvements for urban-based workers have been marginal. On 13 June 1980 amendments to the Black Labour Regulations Act allowed people with urban residence rights to move from one urban area to another provided they have a job and accommodation to go to. But these measures have a negative effect on the majority, since employers are now tending to tell job seekers that they are only interested in those who already have the residence qualifications. In addition the enormous housing shortage means that very few can take advantage of this "freedom to move". The officially acknowledged waiting list in Soweto is now for 34,000 family housing units. The real need is very much greater. During 1980 the West Rand Administration Board built no houses in Soweto and only 420 were built privately. Some people have been on the waiting list for houses since 1970 and even those who can afford to buy a house under the 99-year leasehold scheme are told that there are no houses. (Johannesburg Black Sash Advice Office, Annual Report for 1980).

To date, then, the implementation of the Riekert recommendations has meant an intensified application of the pass laws, with a serious deterioration in the position of migrant workers based in the rural areas. The position of those based in the urban areas has been marginally improved in a minority of cases and the new legislation that is proposed appears to threaten the rights of such workers.

In November 1980 the Minister of Co-operation and Development published three major draft bills to implement the full set of Riekert proposals. In the face of fierce criticism they were withdrawn for redrafting, but indications are that the new version, not yet published will propose changes that would remove from urban-based Africans the residence rights they currently have. The right to be in the urban areas would depend on having a job and accommodation - loss of either would cause a loss of right to remain. (S. Ex. 1.2.81).

* * *

Although there has been much talk of change and reform since 1976, the changes in the political sphere have so far proved empty, and the changes in relation to labour have meant attempts to shackle the independent trade union movement and intensified application of the pass laws greater insecurity for those in urban areas and greater difficulty in escaping the fearful poverty of the bantustans. (Focus No. 32, p. 10).

3. Increase in repressive powers and military capacity

Hand in hand with its political initiatives, the régime has urgently accelerated its programme to increase its capacity to repress resistance and defend itself against the forces of liberation. This has involved several aspects, including an increase in its forces, new security legislation and a restructuring of the régime in a way that establishes military control over strategic sectors of the economy and over the Government and administration. The arms embargo and the threat of sanctions have led to a massive programme of import substitution in strategic sectors.

New security legislation

Much of the security legislation used since 1976 had already been enacted before that date. To some extent the State had anticipated Soweto, and had sufficient laws to deal with the protest in advance of 1976. The wide-ranging Internal Security Act was gazetted on 16 June 1976 itself. By making it an offence to endanger State security, it broadened the scope for prosecution of those individuals and organizations unlikely to be convicted as communist sympathizers even using the wide definition of communism in the 1950 Suppression of Communism Act, in particular the Christian and black consciousness organizations. But new laws have also been passed. Some extend the power of the security forces, some are aimed at controlling the whole court process to ensure that such laws as the Terrorism Act and the Internal Security Act are used to maximum effect. (See p. 28 above). Some new laws limit the amount of information which can be published about the security situation and how it is being tackled.

Measures which extend the powers of the security forces include the Parliamentary Internal Security Commission Act of 1976 which increases executive power over internal security. In 1978 the Secret Services Account Act enabled greater and undisclosed sums to be made available for counter-offensive measures. Power to deploy the police beyond the borders of South Africa was conferred by amendments in 1979 to the Police Act and the Railway and Harbours Acts. The same legislation also extended the distance between the South African border and a foreign State from one km. to 10 km., thereby enlarging the "no man's land" or restricted zone along the borders. (Focus No. 22, p. 7). Legislation which limits reporting has been part of an over-all strategy to control the media. (Focus No. 31, p. 10). Reporters' credentials have been scrutinized before press cards for court attendances are issued; even where court proceedings are not held in camera directions on what to publish may be given; in 1980 whole areas were made out of bounds to journalists during the June disturbances. Bans and trials have involved reporters, editors and even whole newspapers. In June 1980, a Commission of Inquiry into the Mass Media was established, not long after another commission had reported on the reporting of security matters.

New laws have, in particular, severely restricted reporting on and about the police in line with earlier restrictions on reporting about prisons and the armed forces. The 1979 Police Amendment Act made it an offence to publish untrue information on the actions of the police and placed the burden of proof (regarding accuracy) on the reporter. At the same time as the police were being granted leave

to operate outside South Africa's borders, public information on their activities was being restricted. Statistics regarding detainees are more difficult to assemble and to interpret following the 1980 Police Amendment Act which forbids naming detainees held under the Terrorism Act, without police permission. In 1977 pictures or photos of detainees had been banned. Since 1979 the major source of news about the police has become the Police Public Relations Directorate which was set up during that year.

Certain laws have been passed as a direct result of press publishing information which was embarrassing the régime. Following Steve Biko's death and the publicity surrounding the inquest, the 1979 Inquests Amendment Act was passed to effectively prohibit all reports until an inquest gives its verdict. Similarly the 1979 Advocate-General Act prevents a repetition of the publicity on the Department of Information scandal by limiting reports on Government financed bodies.

Additional laws passed in 1979 and 1980 have extended the secrecy surrounding key areas of the economy and indicate the moves towards placing the country on a war footing. These were the National Supplies Procurement Act and the Petroleum Products Amendment Act, both of 1979, and the National Key Points Act of 1980 passed within days of the ANC raid on the SASOL plants.

These Acts have brought to 100 the number of laws to which the press is subject. It is widely believed that the appointment of the commission of inquiry into the mass media will be followed by still further restrictions.

Militarization

Today there are approximately 230,000 members of the apartheid armed forces under arms at any given time. This represents an increase of over 150 per cent since 1974 and over 50 percent since 1977. Military expenditure for 1981/82 is expected to top R 3,000 million, an increase of over 300 per cent since 1974 and just over 50 per cent since 1977. These figures are indicative of the drastic militarization that is continuing to ensure minority rule in South Africa. (1974 and 1977 figures from Apartheid War Machine, tables I, VII and VIII. 1981 troop figures are extrapolated from tables VII and VIII. 1981 budget from FM 21.11.80).

	1974	1977	1981
Military expenditure	R 707m	R 1,940m	R 3,000m
South African Defence Force	269,000	367,500	500,000
South African Police	59,000	72,000	75,000
Standing Operational force (SAP and SADF)	90,000	150,000	230,000

The rise to power of P. W. Botha, after 12 years as Minister of Defence, in 1978 did not take place in a political vacuum and was not only a change in the personnel of the ruling group. The Botha régime has introduced significant developments into the mechanics of State power which amounted to a transformation

of the régime from a police to a military State. Botha's rise to power is symbolic of the fundamental change in the role of the military from being a tool of Government to becoming the central decision-making force in Government. (Apartheid War Machine, chap. 2).

The Botha régime has presented itself in terms of the idea of "total strategy" to mobilize white South Africa behind its efforts. In one sense this catchphrase is apt in that it reflects the key strategic perspective spelt out in the 1977 White Paper on Defence: "The resolution of a conflict in the times in which we live demands interdependent and co-ordinated action in all fields - military, psychological, economic, political, sociological ...". On the other hand, however, it camouflages the fact that apartheid strategy is being developed, initiated and controlled by a highly centralized, military controlled, power base.

The centralization of Government has taken place on two levels. Publicly, the régime has rationalized and streamlined Government's administration and interdepartmental co-ordination. Behind the scenes the State Security Council (SSC) has taken over the reins as the major decision-making body, giving the Cabinet a much reduced status. (T 1.7.80; ST 28.9.80).

Key members of the State Security Council - 1981

P. W. Botha	Prime Minister	(ex-Min. of Defence)
M. A. Malan	Minister of Defence	(ex-Chief of SADF)
Gen. C. L. Viljoen	Chief of SADF	
Lt. Gen. A. van Deventer	Secretary of SSC	(Seconded from SADF)
J. A. Coetsee	Minister of Justice	(ex-Deputy Minister of Defence)
Gen. M. Geldenhuys	Chief SAP	
L. Le Grange	Minister of Police	
R. F. Botha	Minister of Foreign Affairs	

The military influence in politics is also clear from the appointment of generals into top political posts: General Malan (ex-Chief of SADF) is now Minister of Defence; Maj. Gen. N. Webster (ex-Director-General Resources, SADF) is on the "President's Council"; and Lt. Gen. J. Dutton (ex-Chief of Staff Operations, SADF) has been appointed as South African Ambassador to Chile.

One of the Botha régime's first steps on coming to power was to put into motion the rationalization of the State's intelligence structures. The police-orientated Bureau for State Security (BOSS), which was the major influence in the Vorster régime's strategic planning, was eclipsed by the Department of Military Intelligence and by the State Security Council.

Military-industrial complex

The militarization of the State has included the drastic expansion of a domestic military-industrial complex. Over 100,000 workers are involved either directly or indirectly in the manufacture of a broad range of military requirements.

The process by which the private sector has been drawn into an alliance with the State, under the dominance of the military, has been clearly visible since soon after the events of June 1976, despite a rebuff from Vorster when the business sector tried to intervene directly in politics. The process has involved a series of seminars and conferences, the incorporation of business leaders into administration and government, and a further integration of the private sector and state economic enterprises in strategic sectors of the economy.

During 1977 the National Development and Management Foundation (NDMF) organized various conferences and seminars. In April the first phase of a series entitled "South Africa must grow to survive" brought industrialists and economists together to discuss import substitution. A conference organized in December by the NDMF brought together business leaders, key members of the SADF and representatives of the Department of Labour. The aims of the conference, whose participants had to sign the Official Secrets Act, was to enable the three groups to understand each other's needs. (Work in Progress 15, p. 3).

Several conferences in 1979 included one in August in Durban organized by the Rural Foundation, on "rural development". Participants included the Officer Commanding of the Natal Command, who stressed the relationship between "development" and counter-insurgency. (Citizen 13.8.79; Star 11.8.79; FM 17.8.79). A seminar later in the year by the Prime Minister's Economic Adviser was the prelude to the Prime Minister's appearance with several cabinet ministers at a business conference in Johannesburg in November, at which he sought the co-operation of the business community in his "total-strategy" and "constellation-of-states" policy.

The private sector has been drawn into close collaboration with State corporations. Over 800 companies are involved in contracts or subcontracts in the military industry. A highly influential body, the Defence Advisory Council, has been expanded and is playing a central role in the formulation of economic policy. Every major South African monopoly has at least one director serving on this committee.

The rapid development of a domestic military industry has contributed greatly to expansion of technological abilities in many sectors of local industry. In particular the South African electronics industry has experienced a major boom, with projected sales for 1981 expected to exceed R 2,000m (FM 13.2.81).

A logical development in the expansion of the South African weapons industry is the export of arms. The Deputy Minister of Defence told Parliament: "It will not be a paying proposition to operate an armaments industry solely for the purpose of meeting our own needs, and ... exports will in future form an essential and growing component of this industry." (Debates 6.6.80). The export of arms is already taking place with potentially serious political connotations.

Unconfirmed reports indicate that South Africa, in conjunction with Taiwan and Israel, is developing a long-range "cruise missile". If the report is correct, this indicates a serious threat to international peace. (Register, February 1981). Although the régime has experienced little opposition in its militarization plans from multinationals or the domestic private sector, it is taking no risks in ensuring the smooth running of its operations. In 1980 new legislation, the National Key Points Act, was introduced to ensure the control and defence of key industries. Earlier legislation, the National Supplies Procurement Act of 1970, laid down the basis upon which the military is able to co-opt any industry for the production of war material.

To protect industry, white employees at many factories are being pressurized into volunteering for service in Industrial Commandoes. While the stated purpose of these units is to defend installations against sabotage and other attacks, the existence of in-plant military forces has potentially serious consequences for the legitimate struggles of workers using their industrial power to achieve basic human rights (Business Week 2.11.80).

Import substitution programme

The expanding military-industrial complex has led to an increasing self-sufficiency in the field of weapons requirements. The régime is now capable of supplying the armed forces with all basic weapon systems and munitions. However, in its aspirations to develop a continually more sophisticated military machine, the apartheid armed forces are still dependent on international collaboration.

Sales to South Africa of weapons which it cannot manufacture are still taking place, despite the mandatory arms embargo (see the papers of the International Seminar on Implementation and Reinforcement of the Arms Embargo, organized by the United Nations Special Committee Against Apartheid, April 1981).

In general the import substitution programme, both in weapons and in other strategic areas, has definite limitations, and in certain respects increases dependency on international colalboration.

Increased emphasis was given to import substitution following the 1976 uprising and the international responses which included a rapid outflow of foreign capital, the imposition of the United Nations Mandatory Arms Embargo in 1977 and the oil boycott by OPEC. A survey in 1976/77 conducted by the major industrial associations resulted in a recommendation that special attention be given to the financing of import replacement projects.

The threat to oil supplies, as well as rising oil prices has led to the South African régime shifting its energy base to coal and there has been, and continues to be, a massive surge in capital projects in coal mining, chemical industries, particularly those concerned with the conversion of coal into other forms of fuel, and electrification. R 11,000m is currently being spent on expanding electricity generating plant, mainly coal based, so that electricity could meet 40 per cent of the energy needs by the end of the century. Electrification of 85 per cent of all freight

and passenger lines is planned by 1985, at a cost of R 350m. By the time SASOL III is completed in 1982/83, an estimated R 6,000m will have been spent on it (Standard Bank Review, January 1981).

Despite the massive investment in the programme of import substitution, the economy cannot provide complete self-sufficiency. The need for finance, technology and export markets still creates dependence as does a major shortage of skilled labour.

The development of the apartheid economy has historically been dependent on extensive foreign investment and is ever more so with the accelerated programme of import substitution. While the recent increase in the price of gold provided much of the finance, it was not sufficient. Foreign investment is currently concentrating on the strategic fields of energy production (oil, coal and nuclear) as well as computers and electronics (First Special Report of the Special Committee against Apartheid, 22 October 1980, pp. 38-39).

Transfer of technology and skills, and the granting of licences have been vital for the development of South Africa's own armaments industry and its nuclear weapons programme. The shortage of skilled labour is so acute that it will be a source of continuing dependency. Recruitment of skilled labour in Europe and elsewhere by South African companies is taking place on a major scale, evidenced by a very large number of advertisements for jobs in South Africa in the press in many countries.

Expansion of military capacity

Potentially the most ominous aspect of apartheid militarism is the nuclear weapon capability that the régime obviously now has. Not only is this a very real threat to peace in southern Africa, but both the régime's willingness to share this capability with other repressive régimes and the international political repercussions of nuclear adventurism make the South African nuclear warhead a further threat to world peace.

The drastic increase in the number of military and paramilitary personnel under arms in South Africa and Namibia is a real indication of the increasing struggle between the forces of resistance and repression. Not satisfied with present strength the régime is continuing to seek methods of expanding troop levels.

The Permanent Force of the SADF has expanded its ranks in the past few years through the recruitment of black South Africans and Namibians and the influx of a substantial number of mercenaries. Not only are blacks being used to increase strength, but they are being deployed in a manner that is clearly aimed at distorting the reality of the nature of the struggle in southern Africa. While black soldiers represent less than five per cent of total SADF strength, they constitute about 20 per cent of operationally deployed forces. The defeat of racist rule in Zimbabwe led to a major flow of mercenaries and Rhodesians into the SADF. The majority of these troops are believed to have been channelled into special operations units which are spearheading the régime's acts of aggression against neighbouring States (Focus Special Issue No. 2, April 1981).

The apartheid military still relies, however, largely on its large part-time conscript force. At present all white males are conscripted for an initial two-year period followed by at least three months service each year for the following eight years. Plans are believed to exist for the expansion of conscription for Coloureds and Indians. In Namibia the attempt to introduce conscription for blacks has met with mass resistance.

A further development has been the establishment of military forces in the "independent" bantustans. The most advanced of these, the BophuthaTswana Defence Force, is under the control of the local SADF territorial command and forms an integral part of the régime's military infrastructure along the Botswana border. A similar situation exists in Venda on South Africa's north-eastern borders (Apartheid War Machine, p. 69).

To further increase its military potential the régime is in the process of establishing a "civil defence" infrastructure throughout the country to add to the defence of white areas and property. Over 600 civil defence units already exist. This system is further backed up by the paramilitary training that has become an integral part of education in white schools. Over 300,000 school children are members of school cadet detachments. The militarization of every aspect of white society has led to the emergence of a war psychosis that adds to the intransigence of minority rule.

The South African Police has, in the last decade, been transformed into a force that is essentially a fourth arm of the SADF. Crime prevention measures and operations are virtually non-existent as the force has directed its energies into attempts to contain the rising tide of mass struggle. Amendments made in 1979 to the Police and Railways and Harbour Acts are evidence that a role is planned for the police in the aggression against neighbouring States.

The modern apartheid police force is built around two pillars of political repression; intelligence and "riot control". The security police is responsible for identifying and acting against all individuals and organizations that are seen to be a "threat to the State". The majority of uniformed police are organized into paramilitary units deployed in all potential "trouble spots". Only when there are lulls in mass resistance are these forces returned to their traditional forms of service.

Despite the militarization of the police, SADF has been forced to enter the urban areas of South Africa in force. Joint police-military operations are becoming the standard method of political suppression. Senior military officers are playing central roles in the co-ordination of "crisis committees" in areas such as Port Elizabeth where worker militancy backed by student and community action has reached unprecedented levels. (Facelift Apartheid, p. 45; Focus No. 32, p. 12).

In many rural areas, particularly those strategically located along South Africa's borders, SADF is advancing a two-pronged strategy in an attempt to pre-empt the initiatives of the people in their struggle for liberation. On the one hand, civic action programmes are being implemented in the hope of convincing the local

populations of the good intentions of SADF. Uniformed and armed military personnel are operating as teachers, agricultural advisers, doctors, etc., in many areas previously starved of any professional aid. The aim of these programmes is not only to make propaganda for the military, but also to impose military influence on traditionally civilian infrastructures. The co-operation of the private sector in these programmes is indicated by the nature of the seminar on rural development organized by the Rural Foundation, mentioned above (Apartheid War Machine, p. 5).

On the other hand an extensive programme for the development of military infrastructures was launched a few years ago. Major army bases have been constructed in the Transvaal and Natal and the Air Force's most sophisticated operational base has recently been completed at a strategically located site close to the Mozambique border. An already sophisticated radar system has been upgraded and a communications system, the Military Area Radio Network, has been established to link outlying areas to centralized military commands.

While the main thrust in the apartheid military's daily operations is geared towards the maintenance and expansion of a machine capable of controlling mass action in urban areas, a significant amount of SADF's resources and energy is being channelled into the establishment of a conventional military force. Two divisions comprising at least 40,000 troops and including heavy armour and artillery are in a state of regular training and semi-mobilization. It is impossible to imagine to what use such a force could be put to resolve any internal conflicts within South Africa. The only conclusion that can be drawn from the existence of this force is that concrete contingency plans exist for possible major onslaughts on the independent States of southern Africa.

II. SOUTH AFRICAN AGGRESSION IN SOUTHERN AFRICA

Domination of southern Africa has been a fundamental aim of South Africa for many years. Since 1974 the methods and goals have become more openly and directly military, and now involve a strategy of regional destabilization by military and economic means.

In the 1960s Prime Minister Dr. H. Verwoerd put forward the idea of an Economic Community of Southern Africa. The white-dominated States of South Africa and Rhodesia were to be the nuclei around which a number of economically dependent "black" States would be grouped, under South African hegemony. Vorster's "outward looking policy" of the late 1960s and the "détente" policy of the early 1970s were similarly aimed at bringing African States into alliance with South Africa.

The means by which this goal was to be achieved was economic penetration. The condition of the strategy being pursued was an alliance of South Africa with the Caetano régime of Portugal and the Smith régime in Rhodesia.

With the defeat of the Portuguese colonial power by the liberation movements in Mozambique and Angola in 1974/75, the strategy of economic penetration and domination came to be accompanied by direct use of military power. Military aggression, both by South Africa directly and with the help of the Smith régime, has been directed against the whole region. The initiation of a state of war throughout the region and internationalization of the conflict appear to be aims of South Africa. (GN 25.6.79).

Simultaneously with stepping up its military aggression South Africa has intensified its efforts at economic domination of the region. The idea of a "constellation of Southern African States", first mentioned by Vorster in 1975, was pushed as a major and urgent priority in 1979 as the end of the Rhodesian régime approached. In May 1979 it was reported that "South Africa has laid out a blueprint for a new policy which aims to draw into its orbit all South African States, up to and including Zaire". (RDM 14.5.79).

In November 1979 the Prime Minister made an appeal to the South African business community to give its support to the scheme, and appears to have been successful. (CT 23.11.79). At the heart of the scheme is a Development Bank which would channel development finance to the envisaged client States, drawing them into an association, apparently on equal terms with South Africa's bantustans. (FT 24.7.80).

South Africa's economic strength and domination of the region, together with the other States' needs for development finance were thought to be sufficient conditions for the plan to work. (The Constellation of Southern African States; A New Strategic Offensive by South Africa in the Region; Analysis No. 2, 29.4.80, Centro de Estudos Africanos, Mozambique).

But the independence of Zimbabwe altered the balance of power beyond what was allowed for in the South African plan. An independent regional grouping has begun to take shape, in the form of the Southern African Development Co-ordinating Conference (SADCC), aiming amongst other things at reducing the region's dependence on South Africa. As a consequence the "constellation of states" project has had to be scaled down from its original grandiose plan to a mere restructuring of relations between Pretoria and the bantustans. (RDM 25.2.81).

A further consequence has been an increasingly aggressive and threatening stance by South Africa. Economically this has meant repeated threats that sanctions against South Africa will be translated into repercussions on the rest of southern Africa. (CT 3.3.81). And the strategy of destabilization initiated as early as 1975, has been pursued with greater intensity in the most recent period.

Aggression against Angola continued after the repulsion of the invasion by South Africa in 1975. Namibia has been used as a base for attempts to destroy Angola's economic infrastructure and to create maximum insecurity. The means used have been air raids and further invasions, presented as "hot pursuit" of SWAPO troops, as well as covert operations and terror tactics involving mercenaries, the 32nd Battalion and UNITAR.

The scale of damage has been immense. Over the three-year period from March 1976 to June 1979 destruction and damage estimated at $US 293,304,000 were caused as a direct result of South African aggression. At least 570 Angolans were killed, the majority of them peasants, together with 813 refugees from South Africa, Zimbabwe and Namibia. In recent months the destruction has been even greater - $US 230,996,805 worth of damage in the 18 months alone between June 1979 and December 1980. The killing of Angolans (mainly civilians) and refugees, has similarly increased. (Focus Special Issue No. 2, April 1981).

Destabilization of Mozambique took the form initially of support and training for the Mozambique Resistance Movement (MRM). Set up in 1975 with South African support by the Smith régime, the MRM was under the leadership of white Mozambicans who supported the overthrown Portuguese régime. It was used to terrorize the population in remote areas of Mozambique, with the aim of creating confusion and fear. (Obs. 9.2.81).

The MRM is now headquartered in South Africa and broadcasts from a radio station in the Northern Transvaal (where it moved from Salisbury after the independence of Zimbabwe). It is reported that South African military aircraft regularly drop supplies to MRM bands operating in remote western areas of Mozambique. (T 14.2.81).

The attack by the South African army on ANC houses near Maputo in January 1981 marked a new phase in the level of aggression. This was the first overt attack by a South African military force on Mozambique.

Attacks on Zambia have occurred for several years. In 1974 it was revealed that SADF was training a force of dissident Zambians in the Caprivi Strip. By 1978 South African troops were prepared to launch major attacks on Zambia, including an invasion that year which led to the occupation of a village for several days. In March 1979 the Zambian Government said that South African troops occupied Zambian territory for two days and terrorized villages in an effort to extract information on the whereabouts of SWAPO guerrillas (WA 17.7.74; GN 26.8.78; RDM 8.3.79).

Attacks by South African troops were at times co-ordinated with troops of the Rhodesian régime, particularly during the Lancaster House conference. On one occasion, in October 1979, 600 South African troops invaded from the west, according to the Zambian Government, as 400 Rhodesian troops attacked from the south. (Focus No. 26, p. 12).

Since Zimbabwean independence South African attacks on Zambia from the Caprivi Strip have increased, including a major invasion of two battalions of South African troops equipped with tanks and rocket launchers. Some of the troops subsequently broke up into small units and remained in southwestern Zambia for much of 1980, according to the Zambian Government (GN 29.4.80).

Since the independence of Zimbabwe South Africa is reported to have been training dissidents hostile to the Zimbabwean Government and to have violated Zimbabwean air space on a number of occasions. (Focus Special Issue No. 2, April 1981).

Former troops of the Rhodesian régime have been a major component of the units of the South African army involved in destabilization of neighbouring countries. (Focus Special Issue No. 2, April 1981).

South Africa has consistently presented its terrorism of the civilian population of neighbouring countries and its destruction of their economic infrastructure as "hot pursuit" of guerrillas or as defence of South Africa against terrorism. The aims of the strategy however are destabilization of the region and, it appears, internationalization of the struggle for the liberation of South Africa.

Writing before the independence of Zimbabwe, the historian Basil Davidson commented:

> "The central drive from Pretoria is to undermine and 'destabilize' Angola and Mozambique by whatever means may come to hand. The further plan, depending on help from abroad (notably in Western media) is to isolate these two countries from the West. Then to present them as 'Soviet stooges'.
>
> "Then to develop South Africa's 'proto-war' into something worse: into outright hostilities; into a situation where Pretoria can hope to present itself as the 'victim of communist aggression'. In this way Pretoria expects to be able to internationalize a racist war by securing open help from the West, on the argument that the West would not be 'defending apartheid' but 'fighting communism'." (GN 25.1.79).

Since that time South Africa's actions have been entirely consistent with that analysis. It is noteworthy in particular how quickly South Africa attempts to exploit shifts which seem favourable to it in the attitudes of other Governments, and to try to identify its aims with those of the West. In justifying the Matola raid, General Malan, the South African Defence Minister, referred to a major foreign policy statement by President Reagan only days before the raid, speaking of "happy signs that the West was becoming more conscious that stronger action had to be taken against terrorism". (BBC 3.2.81).

III. CONCLUSION

Writing of the last few years of Vorster's premiership, which were characterized by much talk of change away from apartheid, one commentator wrote:

> "There can be few countries where dominant élites talk so much of the need for change but do so little to bring it about. Talk of change has indeed become a political tactic in itself designed on the one hand to keep blacks quiescent and on the other hand to stave off foreign pressures against apartheid." (J. Kane-Berman, Soweto: Black Revolt, White Reaction, Ravan Press, 1978).

Since then the new leaders of the régime have also promised changes and reforms. Judging by the attitudes of some Governments, the régime has had a measure of success in projecting an image of reform. "Welcome signs of change" and "sincere efforts to change" have been advanced as reasons for weakening moves towards isolation of South Africa. This has sometimes been accompanied, as in the case of President Reagan of the United States, by an open acknowledgement of interests in the region which are tied to maintenance of the present order. It also goes often with a view that the key to change in South Africa is to be found within the apartheid system itself, in an "enlightened" or relatively "liberal" section of the ruling minority.

The review carried out in this paper of developments since June 1976 shows these views to be false. What have been presented as reforms are measures for preserving the essentials of the system, and the "enlightened" section of the ruling minority differs from others over the means of survival, but not over objectives. Any doubts amongst observers on this score have been removed during the last year. Representative of many comments was the following in the London Times: "The election campaign (of 1981) makes clear that South Africa's survival and the maintenance of its racial policy are seen as one and the same objective". (T. 24.3.81; see also T. 1.7.80; S Ex 3.8.80; RDM 28.2.81). Countless ministerial and government statements confirm this, in particular those made at National Party congresses and during the election campaign.

Most importantly, the changes which the régime has implemented and which it is implementing are, as the review shows, not reforms of the system except in the sense of adaptations to new conditions to promote its survival. As far as the main elements are concerned, in the fields of political rights, trade union rights and the pass laws, what is involved is at best a relative improvement for a minority of the oppressed, particularly if they are prepared to collaborate in the perpetuation of the régime. Otherwise the changes mean a deterioration for the majority and an intensification of control and repression.

Consistent with the testimony of many other sources close to the effects of the first years of "enlightened reform" is this comment by the Black Sash Advice Office in Johannesburg on its experience of 1980, in trying to help victims of the pass laws:

> "This has been a year of frustration where contrary to Ministerial statements and many promises, things have become worse for the majority in every way ... We have never experienced a worse year. We can only watch the anger and bitterness growing as promise after promise turns out to be hollow, as economic boom brings no hope to the majority, as people are deprived of land and citizenship and of all legal rights to participate in either the political or the economic structure of their country." (Annual Report for 1980 of the Johannesburg Advice Office of the Black Sash).

Much of the régime's programme is still to be implemented. But what is being proposed differs little in essentials from what has already happened. Harsher control on workers' organizations are promised, the local authorities for black people will be required to administer the apartheid system and have the function of dividing the oppressed majority. All indications are that the pass law system is to be tightened again as far as the majority are concerned and further security measures are expected. Few black people in South Africa believed the promises of the régime when they were made, and still fewer believe them now. The attempt to co-opt skilled workers into the system and to create a black élite with a vested interest in helping maintain the system shows little sign of succeeding. The almost total boycott of the celebration of the twentieth anniversary of the apartheid republic shows that the breadth of black rejection of the whole apartheid system has not diminished.

The review indicates that the policies and actions of the régime are most fundamentally shaped by the threat facing the apartheid system. The threat comes from three directions: from the growing forces of resistance and liberation amongst those oppressed by the system, now determined to seize State power; from the shifting balance of forces in southern Africa; and from the growing strength of the international movement against apartheid.

The expansion of the régime's repressive and military potential, the subordination of everything to military imperatives, the desperate search for self-sufficiency and the strategy of destabilization in southern Africa are all shaped by these threats. The programme of adjustments presented as "reforms" is an element of an over-all strategy whose priorities are indicated by the wholesale militarization of the country and the allocation of immense amounts of resources towards the war effort in defence of the system.

The review also indicates that the maintenance and development of the régime's military and repressive capacity, as well as the possibility of its carrying out its policy of regional destabilization, depends in part on the collaboration or acquiescence of foreign Governments and interests.

The immense resources invested in developing its military capacity and the foreign support it appears to be able to count on, put very great powers at the disposal of the apartheid régime. Currently the military forces of the régime appear to be able to carry out aggression against neighbouring countries with impunity. But it would be a mistake to conclude from these facts that the régime is invincible. The build-up of the military power of the régime is a response to the power of the forces of resistance and liberation. The use of so much

of the national product for military and repressive purposes, the large-scale investment of capital in the search for self-sufficiency and the regional aggression are indications of the scale of the threat. They point to the vulnerabilities of the régime on a number of fronts.

The principal threat to apartheid comes from the determination of the oppressed peoples of South Africa and Namibia to liberate themselves. How costly that liberation will be in terms of human life and the economic resources of the whole southern African region will in part depend on the success of the international movement against apartheid in obstructing the assistance which the régime receives from foreign sources.

SOURCES AND ABBREVIATIONS

Much of what is included in this review is covered in more detail in publications of the International Defence and Aid Fund, in particular the following:

Focus on Political Repression in Southern Africa, the bi-monthly news bulletin of IDAF

Whirlwind Before the Storm by Alan Brooks and Jeremy Brickhill, 1980

Apartheid War Machine, 1980

Facelift Apartheid by Judy Seidman, 1980

Divide and Rule by Barbara Rogers, 1981

Abbreviations used in references to sources

BBC	British Broadcasting Corporation Survey of World Broadcasts
CT	Cape Times
DD	Daily Dispatch, East London
Debates	House of Assembly Debates, Cape Town
DN	Daily News, Durban
GN	Guardian, London
FM	Financial Mail, Johannesburg
Focus	Focus on Political Repression in Southern Africa, published by the International Defence and Aid Fund
FT	Financial Times, London
MS	Morning Star, London
NW	Natal Witness, Pietermaritzburg
Obs	Observer, London
RDM	Rand Daily Mail
S	Sowetan

SAIRR	Annual Survey of Race Relations, published by the South African Institute of Race Relations
S. Exp	Sunday Express, Johannesburg
SP	Sunday Post, Johannesburg
ST	Sunday Times, Johannesburg
Star	Star Weekly ed., Johannesburg
Tel	Daily Telegraph, London
T	Times, London
WA	Windhoek Advertiser.

CHRONOLOGY OF INCIDENTS RELATING TO THE ARMED STRUGGLE SINCE JUNE 1976

This list attempts to include all incidents reported in the press. However, there are almost certainly other unreported incidents. The main sources used are cited at the end of the list.

Date	Incident, place	Organization (where known)	Evidence
24.10.76	Petrol bomb attack on Jubulani Police station, Soweto	SSRC "Suicide Squad"	S vs Langa
24.10.76	Explosion on railway line between New Canada and Mzimhlope stations, Soweto	SSRC "Suicide Squad"	S vs Langa
26.10.76	Explosions near Dikgale railway station, Pietersburg	ANC	S vs Sexwale and 11 others
30.11.76	2 policemen injured when 4 ANC guerrillas they had apprehended in Eastern Transvaal escaped by throwing a hand grenade into the cab of a police vehicle	ANC	S vs Sexwale and 11 others
? .12.76	2 explosions on railway line between Pietersburg and Tzaneen	ANC	S vs Sexwale and 11 others
7.12.76	Bomb blast at Carlton Centre, Johannesburg	-	S vs Isaac Seko
15.12.76	4 leaflet "bomb" explosions in Cape Town	ANC	S vs Jenkin and Lee
31.12.76	Petrol bombs in Cape Town store	-	-
01.01.77	Bomb explodes in ANC "bomb factory" in Soweto. 1 killed, 5 injured	ANC	S vs Phala and 5 others
07.01.77	Bomb explodes on Johannesburg-Vereeniging railway line	ANC	S vs Phala and 5 others
18.01.77	Bomb on railway line near Krugersdorp kills railway worker and injures another	-	-
28.01.77	Police discover explosives cache in Soweto	-	-
17.02.77	Police discover arms cache in Graaf-Reinet	-	-
07.03.77	Pretoria restaurant destroyed in bomb blast	-	-

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Date	Incident, place	Organization (where known)	Evidence
13.06.77	2 whites killed, 2 injured in Goch Street shooting	ANC	S vs Mahlangu
?.06.77	Explosives placed on railway trucks at Langlaagte station. ANC pamphlets distributed, Johannesburg	ANC	S vs Liza
14.06.77	Arms and pamphlets seized by police in Soweto	-	-
15.06.77	Railway line between Durban and Umlazi blown up	-	-
16.06.77	2 bomb explosions on Soweto railway line	-	-
26.06.77	Police capture 3 guerrillas with arms and explosives when truck overturns in Travsvaal	-	Police allege all ANC members
?.07.77	Explosion on railway line between Princess and Horison, Transvaal	ANC	S vs Ramudzuli and Duma
19.09.77	Leonard Nkosi, ex-ANC guerrilla turned security policeman assassinated	ANC	Referred to in S vs Khumalo
26.09.77	2 policemen wounded in shoot-out with ANC guerrilla in Dobsonville house. Guerrilla killed	ANC	S vs Ramudzuli and Duma
27.09.77	Arms and grenades found by police near Swaziland border. 2 guerrillas arrested	-	-
28.09.77	2 guerrillas captured near Mafeking. Large arms cache discovered in vicinity	-	-
?.09.77	Bomb allegedly planted in main Pretoria post office. Not found, and incident not proved in subsequent trial	-	S vs Ramudzuli and Duma
02.11.77	Police clash with ANC guerrillas near Pongolo. One policeman injured, and guerrilla killed	ANC	S vs Madondo
25.11.77	Bomb explodes at Carlton Centre. 17 hurt	-	-
30.11.77	Bomb explodes on Pretoria-bound train	-	-

Date	Incident, place	Organization (where known)	Evidence
6.12.77	Bomb explodes at Germiston police station	ANC	S vs Ngwenya
8.12.77	Bomb explodes in parking lot next to Benoni railway station	ANC	S vs Ngwenya
22.12.77	Unexploded bomb found in Roodeport supermarket	-	-
07.01.78	Stephen Mtshali, ex-ANC member turned regular state witness assassinated	-	-
03.01.78	Bomb explodes in home of State witness in Alexandria	-	-
?.02.78	Police and guerrillas clash near Swaziland border. 2 police wounded	ANC	-
14.02.78	Unexploded bomb found in Johannesburg office block	-	-
24.02.78	Bomb explodes at Daveytown police station near Benoni	ANC	S vs Ngwenya
08.03.78	Bomb explodes in PE, killing man carrying it when it explodes prematurely	-	Inquest into death of Makwezi Mtulu. Police claim he was ANC member.
10.03.78	Bomb explodes outside of PE Bantu Affairs Administration Board, killing a woman	-	Inquest into death of Gladys Tengile. Police claim ANC responsible.
14/15.03.78	Fires under clothing in OK Bazaars, Eloff Street, and Edgars Store, Market Street, Johannesburg. Incidents not reported at the time.	ANC	S vs Thandi Modise and 2 others
19.03.78	Grenades and explosives found in Soweto	-	-
26.03.78	Explosive device thrown at house of Chatsworth police sergeant (Rohlathi)	-	-
?.04.78	Guerrilla killed while making a bomb in an Alexandra house	-	Inquest into death of Sipho Sibisi
04.04.78	Petrol bombs thrown, and shots fired at homes of two police in New Brighton.	-	-

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Date	Incident, place	Organization (where known)	Evidence
06.04.78	Oscar Xaba, Mangabeni councillor and member of KwaZulu Public Service Commission, attacked in AK 47 rifle incident	-	-
14.04.78	Abel Mthembu, former ANC executive member who turned state witness, assassinated	-	-
02.05.78	Police announce discovery of a number of large arms caches in Natal	-	-
25.06.78	Black policeman, Det.Sgt. Chapi Hlubi shot with Russian weapon in Soweto. House had been burnt down in August 1976	-	-
27.07.78	Arms cache found in Soweto	-	-
01.08.78	Running gun battle between at least 3 guerrillas and police in Witkleigat area. Police discover arms cache nearby.	ANC	S vs Sekete and 11 others
11.08.78	3 fire bombs found in supermarket at Prospecton near Durban	-	-
21.08.78	B. Mayeza,DONS member, shot dead in Umlazi	-	-
27.10.78	3 guerrillas clash with security forces in Bophuthatswana. 1 guerrilla killed, and one subsequently arrested. Police find large arms cache nearby	ANC	S vs Sekete and 11 others
30.10.78	Police clash with 3 guerrillas about 50 km west of Louis Trichard. Police sergeant seriously wounded. Guerrillas escaped.	-	-
22.11.78	A farm in the Tshipise area attacked by an armed man. Owner of farm wounded.	-	-
27.11.78	Leaflet "bombs" distribute pamphlets in Durban	ANC	leaflets
05.12.78	Alleged PAC member Kenneth Mkwanazi shot dead by police when he attempted to detonate a hand grenade during a police raid on a Soweto house	PAC	S vs Thusi and 2 others

Date	Incident, place	Organization (where known)	Evidence
07.12.78	Bomb blast at old Urban Bantu Council chambers in Soweto: chambers currently house the Soweto Community Council	-	-
11.12.78	WRAB beer depot damaged by explosion	-	-
16.12.78	Railway line between Berlin and Fort Jackson in the Eastern Cape sabotaged in bomb blast	-	-
27.12.78	Police find small arms cache in Bochabella township, near Bloemfontein	-	-
13.01.79	Gun battle between police and guerrillas in the Derdeport area. 1 guerrilla killed, one captured, one escapes. Police find large arms cache nearby	-	-
22.01.79	Bomb explodes on New Canada-Johannesburg railway line	-	-
24.01.79	Unexploded bomb found near Pierie Station in Eastern Cape	-	-
24.02.79	Police announce discovery of two large arms caches in Eastern Transvaal	-	-
23.04.79	Unexploded bomb on railway line between Vereeniging and Johannesburg	-	-
02.05.79	2 people injured when grenade explodes in white Pretoria suburb	-	-
03.05.79	3 ANC guerrillas attack Moroka police station, killing one policeman, wounding others, and destroying records. Pamphlets left on scene explain attacks as revenge for the execution of ANC guerrilla Solomon Mahlangu (06.04.79)	ANC	pamphlets

Date	Incident, place	Organization (where known)	Evidence
15.05.79	Bomb partially explodes in Cape Town Supreme Court	ANC	S vs Nqubelani
16.05.79	Pamphlets distributed in Soweto calling on people to support the "freedom of the gun" promised by "our comrades"	-	-
18.06.79	Explosives found on Eastern Transvaal railway line	-	-
27.06.79	Police seize TNT, detonators, explosives from Soweto home	-	-
?.07.79	Arms and ammunition found in Eastern Transvaal	ANC	S vs Lumkwane and 2 others
05.09.79	ANC pamphlets distributed in Johannesburg	ANC	-
02.11.79	Attack on Orlando police station. 2 police killed	ANC	Police and ANC claims
09.11.79	Hand grenade thrown into home of black security policeman at Wesselton	-	-
06.12.79	Explosion on railway line between Alice and East London	-	-
04.01.80	Guerrillas attack police station at Soekmekaar	ANC	S vs Lubisi and others
08.01.80	Man shot dead near Soekmekaar. Arms cache found nearby	-	-
25.01.80	Siege of Volkskas Bank, Silverton. 3 guerrillas killed, 1 hostage killed	ANC	S vs Lubisi and others
04.04.80	Attack on Booysens police station	ANC	pamphlets
01.06.80	Attack on SASOL plants	ANC	ANC statement
15.06.80	Explosion on railway line in East London	-	-
07.07.80	Tennison Makiwane, former ANC member, shot in Transkei	-	-
31.07.80	Security policeman fired on with AK 47 near Sobantu while driving home	-	-

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Date	Incident, place	Organization (where known)	Evidence
15.10.80	Soweto rail link blown up. ANC pamphlets left near scene	ANC	pamphlets
29.10.80	Grenade attack on WRAB offices at Diepkloof, Soweto. Three people wounded.	-	-
20.11.80	Suspected ANC guerrilla dies in handgrenade explosion in Soweto after shoot-out with police	-	-

This chronology is compiled from various sources, including:

- "A Chronology of Conflict", Work in Progress, No. 13.
- "Guerrilla Chronology", Southern Africa, November 1980.
- News cuttings
- Annex to "The Battle for South Africa". Paper prepared by the British Anti-Apartheid Movement for a National Action Conference "Southern Africa after Zimbabwe", 31 May 1980, Paris.
