CITY PRESS JUNE 9 2002 i Aâ\200\230 VIEWPOINT /ANALYSIS

KWhCI 10 itio ? coo ¥ i pposiTion s $\frac{3}{200}^200'$ WITH two Ayears to go before the country $\frac{200}{231}$ s next general 'elections, the political atmosphere is once more thick with speculation about the possible realignment of the small and $\frac{200}{230}$ fractured black political parties and the impact this could

have on the country $200 \ 231$ s political landscape. Sekola Sello takes a hard look at_the black opposition

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HILE no one expects a re-alignment by

black opposition groups to give the ruling

African National Congress any sleepless

nights in the run-up to the 2004 elections, most political analysts who are taking a longer term view believe this development could have potentially important implications in the future.

The ruling party will win the coming elections comfortably, but it's anybodyâ\200\231s guess whether the South African electorate will entrust them with a fourth term in office. The reason is this: government is faced with many serious problems.

The economy of the country is contracting and this is impacting negatively on governmentâ\200\231s commitment to live up to the goal of achieving a better life for all. Unless there is a turn-around, government will have to deal with a growing population of the disaffected and disillusioned.

Today the ANC can still sell itself as a a^200^234 true, tested and trusted a^200^235 liberatory movement to the majority of its members and this is what makes it so popular.

But beyond the 2004 elections, voters could begin questioning the ANC on what it has delivered to the people during its three terms in office, as opposed to whether it was the premier anti-apartheid movement.

Last week the Pan Africanist Congress announced they had opened discussions with the bigger United Democratic Movement on issues of common interest. PAC secretary-general Thami ka Plaatjie says these exploratory talks will also include the Azanian Peopleâ\200\231s Organisation and its splinter grouping the Socialist Party of Azania.

This latest initiative is actually nothing new; the three parties have in the past few years been talking about the need to establish some form of co-operation.

However, what is new this time around seems to be the urgency attached to the issue.

And what is also beginning to crystallise is the apparent acceptance by the leadership of parties like the PAC and Azapo that they may even need to abandon certain things they currently consider sacrosanct, like their time honoured names.

Ka Plaatjie says they are still to flesh out areas of co-operation with Azapo, Sopa and the UDM, especially with regard to the 2004 elections.

He says they are unlikely to go to the polls as a single political entity but, if all goes well, could go to the polls as a $\alpha \approx 200\234$ coherent group $\alpha \approx 200\235$.

The PAC and UDM student wings already co-operate on many fronts and Ka Plaatjie says the two parties work and even caucu\$ together in the King

Sabata Dalindyebo municipality (Umtata), which is under the control of the UDM.

Although the PAC continues to espouse Pan Africanism, this, says.Ka Plaatjie, should not make cooperation with the UDM – which has a strong white support base $\frac{3}{200}$ problematic. .

He says the party has shed the image of being an $a\200\230$ exclusively black organisation.

 $\hat{a}\200\234$ We have whites in the party and have good working relations with farmers in the Limpopo province.

 $\hat{a}\200\234$ The image of $\hat{a}\200\230$ one settler, one bullet $\hat{a}\200\231$ is now behind us. The differences between ourselves and the UDM are essentially artificial. Our differences may be on economic issues but these are not insurmountable. We can overcome them. $\hat{a}\200\235$

Azapo takes a similar view of the UDM. The partyâ\200\231s publicity secretary, Kedibone Molema, contends that there is now a greater need among parties drawing their majority support from the black community to come together.

' cratic Alliance and the mounting problems faced

 $a\200\2340$ ur differences can be subsumed under the

common goal of wanting to make the lot of the eople better. $\ensuremath{\mathtt{i}}$

b]%%200230lilg AII\)IC cannot achieve this and it is for us to

make sure we deliver to the people $\hat{a}\200\235$.

She says it is important to bring on board UDM leader Bantu Holomisa because of the substantial constituency he commands. ey

 $\hat{a}\200\234$ We may have differences on economic 1ssues but this should not stop us from engaging each Otklt/?glexna says the forces of globalisation which have $\hat{a}\200\234$ ganged up $\hat{a}\200\235$ against blacks make it imperative that black parties also rally together.

: $\hat{a}\200\230Ui\-201fi)$ $\hat{a}\200\230ftllnately$ $\hat{a}\200\235$, she says, $\hat{a}\200\234$ the ANC is pandering to the whims of global capitalism. $\hat{a}\200\235$ To what extent the near collapse of the Demo-

by the official opposition, the Democratic Party, has given impetus to black political parties to come together is difficult to tell.

But there is no doubt that apart from the problems faced by the DA-cum-DP, serious opposition to the ruling party can only come from parties like the UDM, PAC, Azapo and Sopa.

They may be small at the moment but it would be foolish to ignore their potential.

Yet, before these parties engage in grandiose

talk of collaborating with each other, they need to put their houses in order. i Apart from the UDM and Sopa, they are still riven with power-plays among their leaders.] Unless Azapo and the PAC can show tl)e.publlc that their leadership is united, it will be difficult to them seriously. ta a^200^230 e exclusion 3;" the Inkatha Freedom Party from this initiative, no matter what one feels about this largely Zulu-based po_li_tlcal party, could also prove to be an unwise decision. : Holomisa says the need for glack parties to come ther cannot be over-stated. to ee wants to expand this to include churches, organised black business, trade unions a_nd oth_er organs of civil society, not $nec\hat{a}\200\230essalely$ with a view to the next elections, which he says1s already too late. There is no gainsaying that a strong, primarily black political front could be an important factor in " preventing theruling party from ac.tmg_as;f itis all too powerful - like other parties In similar situations the world over, arrogant and devoid of the imperative to be accountable to the electorate. It would also make the ANC double its efforts to

deliver to the masses.

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9 SyME 2002

The end is nigh - unless it is brown

Getting into the hearts of the black majority 1s

proving to be a tough feat for the opposition, writes Harald ~ Pakendorf

ing factor. With Marthinus van Schalkwyk as new premier, the message seems to'be that the NNP has accepted that it no longer has anational role to play but is essentially a regional party with a brown body and a white head.

There is a huge question mark hanging dver such an arrangement. It says there are no credible and capable: coloured leaders in the NNP and in the long run this will work against the already much diminished party. It is in fact one more step to-

wards an even closer alliance with the ANC. It is ironic that the NNP should look to the former liberation movement for survival. Where this leaves the DA is unclear, except that its reputation has been badly damaged. Even if the Desai Commission comes up with a neutral report, the mud will stick to the DAâ\200\231s leadership. Gone is the moral highground and in

 $a\200\234$ is the grubbiness of the politics of

money and bad administration.

The DA, too, needs to make its mark where it can wield power to show it can do better than the ANC. It cannot take the Western Province - and might even lose Cape Town. 2

Which will leave the DA where it was as the DP: a small opposition party, now stripped of its aura of moral rectitude, complaining from the sidelines. |,)

B The writer is a political commentator and former newspaper editor..

 $a\200\230$ Nincompoop threw mud at me $a\200\231$

ONDLI Makhanya's article

 \hat{a} 200\234No politician is above an-

swering to the peopleâ $200\235$ (June 2) is a pathetic expression of ignorance mixed with intellectual thuggery.

Because of the controversy about funding embroiling the Democratic Alliance in the Western Cape, it was felt necessary to slander me as well.

The article suggests that] have failed to comply with the duty of explaining the source of money that I $^\prime$ deposited in a bank in Ulundi.

It then suggests that because of my position I received special treatment from the ANC $a\200\234$ to stroke my ego $a\200\235$, suggesting that $a\200\234$ independent institutions $a\200\235$ were supposed to investigate the matter and failed to do so.

This two-year-old story has been rehashed without any understand-ing of the law that defines the rel-

Sunday Times, June 9 2002

LETTERS

evant duties or any consideration of

the explanations I have long placed

on record.

The deposit was not made into my personal account but into the accounts of the IFP, which are audited by our treasurer. Not one penny went into my pocket.

I explained that the money was contributions for the 1999 elections, collected from IFP friends who preferred making cash donations.

Under the law, political parties are not required to disclose the source of their financing. Neither I nor the IFP have failed any obligation to do so.

Perhaps one could argue that because parties are also publicly financed through tax money, private contributions should be disclosed, as in other countries. However, this would require changing the law.

Historically, in its fundraising

efforts, the IFP has received only peanuts by comparison with other parties and, to the best of my knowledge, we never received funding from any questionable source.

I must also take exception to the suggestion that $\hat{a}\200\234$ the IFP was tainted

by its participation in the homeland

systemâ\200\235. In fact, Inkatha (not the IFP) ran the erstwhile KwaZulu government in such a way that it did not $a\200\234$ participate inâ\200\235 but rather challenged and eventually disintegrated the homeland system, for we always refused to take independence.

That is why former President F W

~ deKlerk stated before the Truth and

Reconciliation Commission that it was my refusal of independence a la Pretoria that made them abandon

 \hat{a} 200\230the grandiose apartheid plan.

Our involvement in the KwaZulu government was with the original

~ MONDLI MAKHANYA

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blessing of the ANC and, actually, I took up my position at the request of the ANC' \hat{a} 200\231s leaders of the time.

One also wonders about the double standards employed by the author, who does not feel that the ANC is a 200 234 = 0200 235 by its many high-ranking leaders who served even in those independent states that enabled the homeland system to develop.

Obviously, in a season of politics in which mud is flung around, Makhan-ya felt it necessary to throw a large lump of it in Buthelezi's face. If objecting to this makes me the $\frac{3}{200}$ that this malicious journalist portrays me to be, so be it.

But I will not let my name be tarnished by just any nincompoop just because he is a journalist. | have human rights like every other citizen. - \(\alpha \) \(\alpha \) MANGOSUTHU BUTHELEZI MP, President: Inkatha Freedom Party

VIEWPOINT/ANALYSIS .

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The dominance of the ANC is a result of the ruling party \hat{a} \200\231s tactics as well as the weakness and bankruptcy of the opposition, writes Dumisani Hlope

Our unique multiparty one-party democracy

quickly becoming one of a

special type. It is a peculiar multiparty state with elements of a one party state.

Conventional wisdom suggests it is a multiparty democracy with one party dominating.:

Traditionally, a one party state is defined as a society with a single party which doubles as a government to the exclusion of the existence of any other party.

This traditional conventional conception of a one-party state is too- limiting. Multipartyism should not be simply conceived on a numerical basis. There must be substance to it beyond the numbers. .

Recent developments demand the re-examination of the distinction between a one party state and multiparty democracy. The substance of multipartyism is to afford the citizenry a variety of policy options. Considering there is little that separates South African political parties on policy, South Africaâ\200\231s multipartysm is a mere paper tiger.

The DA, NNP, IFP and to a certain extent, the UDM, all have relatively similar economic policies to that of the ANC.

Other parties, such as the PAC, Sopa and Azapo, which should be giving the electorate alternative thinking on economic policies, are too marginal and fail to attract the necessary support from the electorate.

If multipartyism should reflect diversity on matters of policy, South Africa ceases to be a multiparty state.

SOUTH Africaâ\200\231s democracy is

Crudely put, South Africa is a i

one party state within a legal and constitutional framework for multipartyism - a one party state democracy within a multiparty system. '

Both sides are to blame for this: the ruling party and the opposition parties.

The PAC, Azapo- and Sopa would be far more effective as a single political party.

It appears that the differences among these parties are not necessarily a matter of substance, but of personalities.

CO-OPTED ... Azapo leader Mike Mangena canâ $\200\230$ flead opposition because he is now a part of government

The official opposition, the white. DA, is busy destroying itself. It has presented itself as the only jnstitutional guarantor qf white privilege. Thus, many see it as a modern day National Party legitimised by the new democratic dispensation.

It lacks the necessary appeal to attract sizeable black support. More destructive are the current scandals that ravage the party.

The DA and the NNP have made the Western Cape province ungovernable in the age of democracy. All this does not bode well for the development of both the DA and the NNP. The latter has become a

very fast-sinking ship. With the help of the ANC, the NNP ship is sinking even faster. $2\,$

_ This is one area where the ruling party has also contributed to the growth of one-party domi-

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., While many ruling parties all s ,ove_'r,va\200\230the world sing the tune for

multiparty politics, it is equally true they also see other parties as a nuisance. In the crudest form, the ruling parties either bans or co-opts other parties.

It appears the ANC has opted for the latter. In the process, it has also actively contributed to the current emergence of the oneparty state scenario.

The IFP is contained by the ANC. In a recent interview, Chief Mangosuthu Buthelezi is reported to have stated he would like to quit participation in the national

- government. However, because he wants to avoid political violence, he wonâ\200\231t quit.

The insinuation here is that IFP followers have a violent instinct and would act as such rather than make a rational choice. This is not true.

IFP followers are reasonable .people and there is no way they would become violent simply because Buthelezi has ceased participating in the cabinet. What would help is for the IFP leadership torefrain from violent utterances whenever they are face with challenges from their political foes.

Democracy is not a system of mutual consensus at all costs. Democracy provides means and institutions through which differences could be channelled peacefully.

Recent developments in the

Western Cape involving " the NNP clearly indicate
that the ANC has managed to get the NNP exactly
where it wanted it to be:
an insignificant political
_'player in national poli-

Just like the UDM, and the IFP, the NNP has become a regional party.

Its significance is likely to decline further after the forthcoming elec.Burning issue of Ulundi rattles the coalition

Ulundi, what implications do the move of the

Described by the IFP; \hat{A} as the second burning of KwaZulu-Natal legislature f,r,gm_*U,,Iunditgw_l_?ig;grmaritzburg have for this town of som e 350

/000 people? Sipho Khumalo examines the future of Ulundi and the significance of this decision on the future of the sickly coalition government of the IFP and ANC

B Defending the second burning of Ulundi, Zulu warriors, shields and spears

in hand, march to protest against the vote on the seat of the legislature $\tilde{\ }$ Picture: SBU MFEKA

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omfortably nestled below majestic Zululand hills which 129 years ago gave Zulu armies an eagleâ\200\231s eye-view of approaching enemies, Ulundi (Ondini, if you like), is described in a glossy tourist brochure as the Heart of the Kingdom of the Zulu.

Lying amid these rolling hills and meandering valleys of Emakhosini (Valley of Kings), where many of the early Zulu kings lived and are buried, Ulundi is a place steeped in tradition and heritage. This valley is where, three centuries ago, the seeds of Zulu history germinated.

NKkosinkulu, father of the Zulu nation, lived and was biried in the Emakhosini. Less than a kilometre from the town lies Ophathe Gorge, where King Dinganeâ\200\231s armies lured the Boer army into a trap in the Battle of Ophathe.

Also not far from here is Ngqoki Hill, where the Zulu military strategist, King Shaka, in 1818 registered his first major victory over his arch-rival, Zwide.

After a difficult period characterised by the erosion and emasculation of what used to be the powerful Zulu kingdom, King Cetshwayo $\hat{a}\200\224$ who had inherited the throne of the Zulu after the death of his father in 1873 $\hat{a}\200\224$ chose Ondini as the site of his capital. It was from here that the victorious Zulu warriors were deployed to face the might of the British army at the Battle of Isandlwana.

While Zulus were still buoyed by the victory of Isandlwana, Britons six months later regrouped and on July 4, 1879, Ulundi was torched in what marked the final destruction of the Zulu kingdom.

It was with this strong historical significance that Zulus had hoped Ulundi would rise from the ashes like a Phoenix, with moves to rebuild it in the 70s as the capital of the then KwaZulu homeland.

It is also against this emotive back-ground that angry reactions of the IFP to the last week $\hat{200}231s$ events of relegating the town from being the seat of the legislature should be understood.

As IFP chairman and KwaZulu-Natal premier Lionel Mtshali pointed out during intense exchanges over the issue, that the moving of the seat of legislature

to Pietermaritzburg to his party amounted to the $\hat{a}\200\234$ second burning of Ulundi $\hat{a}\200\235$.

 $\hat{a}\200\234$ Ulundi was the last capital of the Zulu kingdom and its destruction under the conquering British army symbolises the subjugation of the Zulu people. Moving the capital out of Ulundi would be perceived by many of us as second burning of Ulundi, $\hat{a}\200\235$ said Mtshali.

But what does this mean for the small town of Ulundi which now boasts two big supermarkets, four banks, a hotel, emerging industrial area, garages and a sleepy township, which also houses a posh ministerial village near the assembly? Ulundi also boasts imposing and modern parliamentary chambers, a huge administrative complex and a monumental statue of King Shaka.

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B An imposing statue of King Shaka, founder of the Zulu nation, stands majestically outside the legislature in Ulundi

The Prince Mangosuthu Buthelezi Airport serves the town, which has brought important facilities closer to more than 350 000 local people

In examining the legIslature s move to Pietermaritzburg, it is important to clearly understand the difference between the capital and the seat of the legislature. Politicians, in particular IFP ones, have tended to deliberately obfuscate the issue.

Firstly, the constitution makes no pro- ${\mbox{-}}$

vision for a provincial capital but for a seat of the legislature. Further, the move effectively means only about 60 staff members of the legislature will have to move to Pietermaritzburg, leaving intact at least nine government departments headquartered in Ulundi.

These are the Premierâ\200\231s Department, Public Works, Education, Social Welfare, Local Government and Traditional Affairs, Safety and Security and Agriculture. Also housed at the administrative complex are regional offices of education and many other regional offices. Other offices are scattered around Section A of

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Ulundi and in town. Ulundi will effectively remain an administrative city for the KwaZulu-Natal government with only five departments based outside Ulundi.

These are mostly ANC-led departments like Health, Transport (based in Pietermaritzburg), and Housing and Economic Affairs and Tourism, based in Durban. Finance and the Treasury are also based in Pietermaritzburg.

The move will mean the office of the Speaker and the secretary will move from Ulundi. The office of the deputy speaker; deputy secretary, secretary of committees and the National Council of Provinces are based in Pietermaritzburg.

Ulundi Municipality spokesman Joseph Masango conceded that although he did not support the move of the legislature to Pletermarltzbu}g the move itself would not have a major impact on the economy of the town.

 $\hat{a}\200\234$ If only 60 people are going to be affected, we are not going to lose so much economically My fear was that all govern-ment departments were going to move to Pietermaritzburg. This would have had a huge impact because the government is a major employer of residents here. $\hat{a}\200\235$

Masango pointed out that Ulundi, with its rich history and culture, also needed to explore its untapped tourism potential.

But what brought about the move to Pietermaritzburg, when the ANC and IFP had accepted the dual legislature concept since the mid-1990s?

Firstly, Mtshali had just politically outpaced the ANC over the issue of rolling out Nevirapine in the province, embarrassing the ANC. This culminated in an acrimonious showdown between Mtshali and ANC KwaZulu-Natal chairman Sâ\200\231bu

Ndebele during the state of the province address in Ulundi. The mistrust between the coalition partners $\hat{a}\200\224$ built on shaky

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Burning issue of

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Reconciliation is a twoâ\200\224vvay street

 $\tilde{\ }$ John Battersbyâ\200\231s article in the Tribune last week, which was based on an interview with Deputy

President Jacob Zuma and which dealt with, among other things, ANC-IFP relations and the King, has

elicited this response from IFP leader and Home Affairs Minister Mangosuthu Buthelezi

e article offers th $\tilde{\text{A}}\text{O}$ opportunity to clarify the status of the reconcilia-

tion process with His Majesty King Goodwill Zwelithini of the Zulu nation, which has often been discussed in newspapers with little understanding of its underlying reality. It is important that people accept the need to learn things they may not be fully familiar with.

Matters relating to the king are not part of ANC-IFP relations. It is not a matter between political parties, but one which affects the Zulu nation. It is not political, but cultural. In my dealings in this matter, I have never acted as the IFP president, and one would expect that Deputy President Zuma also did not act in his ANC capacity.

Knowing the facts and understanding the context show that it is false to suggest any fault on my side for the incomplete reconciliation with the king. This is not a family squabble, but a matter which affects our nation $200\231s$ unfolding history and needs to be dealt with within our cultural context.

My relationship with the king is not broken, as I perform for him the duties of my position as his traditional prime minister.

However, for reconciliation to be -achieved, certain rituals need to be undertaken, including the smoking of the peace pipe. We have maintained this

protocol, for instance, on the occasion in 1994 when one of the kingâ\200\231s wives was attacked in Durban, which prompted amaKhosi to donate 40 head of cattle to him. The same protocol requires that certain functions cannot be performed until the peace rituals have been undertaken which, for instance, did not allow me to receive, on behalf of the king, a high-powered Portuguese delegation. In our culture, we cannot pretend reconciliation when it has not been achieved.

When he was our president, Nelson Mandela tried to bring about this process of reconciliation through an env1saged meeting at the kingâ\200\231s palace, KwaKhange

lamankengane, which never materialised. In 1996, the king called a meeting meant to finalise reconciliation between us, but the meeting could not take place because members of the kingâ\200\231s immediate family were not present.

As I was driving home, I was stopped by Mr Mathambo Gwala, the Kking's induna, who was following me in another vehicle. He told me that the king wanted me to drive back to his palace. I did so.

The king offered me a beast, according to our tradition. When he did this, he was with two KwaZulu-Natal ministers, the now Deputy President Zuma and the Rev

CJ Mtetwa. I asked them to join me in

thanking the king. The king offered to have the beast delivered to my home, but I pointed out that since the king had promised to call a meeting soon, the beast should remain at the palace so that it could be slaughtered there and its blood allowed to drip on the soil in accordance with our custom. The king agreed. As the king has never called that meeting since 1996, that beast has not been slaughtered to this day.

Paralysed

The kingâ\200\231s failure to walk the path of reconciliation has paralysed other rituals within our nation. For instance, I was advised that even our church leaders were unwilling to participate in the celebration of his 30th coronation anniversary if internal peace within the nation had not first been achieved. The same uncertainty persists in respect of a dinner which the king still wishes to orgaâ\200\231n-ise next month.

I have tried everything to foster reconciliation, as required by our protocol. In November last year, I wrote the king a letter in which I implored him to call the reconciliation family meeting he promised to call in 1996 before any of us is called by our Maker to a better life, especially in my case, being so much older than he is. Unless sorted out during our lifetimes,

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this rift will carry on to future generations and become impossible to heal.

I have never uttered a word castigating the king, in spite of the terrible situation in which his conduct has placed our nation. Our relationship has been cordial wherever we are together, in spite of his complaining about me to the point of bemg reported in 1994 in an Australian newspaper comparing his position to that of Madiba, stating that he had also been jailed

for 20 years while constrained by the protocol developed by the erstwhile KwaZulu Government under my leadership.

On May 18, 2002, the kingâ\200\231s izinduna met my izinduna in Mahlabathini, to still pursue the idea of holding this meeting of reconciliation. I was informed that all the izinduna intend asking for an audience with the king to plead with him to call the meeting he promised to call in 1996.

Much more needs to be done on the path

of reconciliation and I will leave no stone unturned to pursue the unity of the Zulu nation. I had to explain this matter as the deputy president $200\23$ interview with John Battersby was extremely misleading. It is wrong to create the impression that I need to do anything myself to bridge this rift. I am waiting for the king to call the meeting he promised. I will attend such a meeting any time the king decides to call it.

Opposition .

tions in 2004. In fact, the NNP through Marthinus van Schalkwyk has become an opposition with- \(\frac{1}{3}\200\230in \) the opposition. - Van Schalkwyk has become an ANC foreman in dealing with Tony Leon and his DA. It can safely be said the ANC is governing the Western Cape through the NNP.

This leaves KZN as the only province not governed by the ANC. However, with the new legislation on crossing the floor and its partnership with the NNP and the Minority front, the ANC could easily grab KZN.

The ANC has proven to be tactically and strategically astute, often way

ahead of the other pohtlcal parties. It has strategically dealt with the NNP, the IFP, and Azapo (whose leader Mike Mangena is the deputy minister of education) by bringing these parties into its fold. In the case of the NNP, the ANC has strategically killed two birds with one stone: neutralizing both the NNP and the DA. Considering all these developments, which amount to a very heavy presence of the ANC in every political inch of the country, South Africa is descending into a one party state democracy. It was prudent that $Holomisa \hat{2}00 \hat{2}31s$ UDM declined Mandelaâ\200\231s political seduction to rejoin the ANC. It is even more prudent that the PAC and the UDM are considering joining forces. However, it would be misguided if these parties were simply motivated by the quest to keep the ANC at bay. The NNP and the DP used this same disastrous formula when they formed a white alliance in the Western Cape. The lesson learnt is that reactionary alliances do not work. Worthwhile

alliances are based on sound principles, values and a well directed and articulated vision. The ANC is within its rights to politically manoeuvre within the confines of the democratic dispensation. However, a one party hegemony is dangerous.

Nevertheless, it is equally true that it cannot be expected of the ANC to limit itself politically. It is therefore up to the other parties to win the confidence of the electorate.

HERE is unrest among opposi-

tion parties. As well there might

be. Two imminent changes

might just threaten the future of at least some of the smaller parties, and .in all probability reduce their public representation.

That does not just apply to the Democratic Alliance (DA) and the New National Party (NNP). It goes beyond them. And that is probably one of the reasons why there are so many cross-currents at present. Just look at the broad scene: The United Democratic Movement is talking to the Pan Africanist Congress. The Azanian Peopleâ\200\231s Organisation is mooted as a possible talks partner. The DA is talking to the Inkatha Freedom Party (IFP) in KwaZulu-Natal, where the IFP is no longer talking to the African National Congress.

The Afrikaner Eenheids Beweging has just fallen out with the old Conservative Party. And in the Western Cape the DA is decidedly not talking to the NNP. Or the other way around. Except of course in the most derogatory manner. Thereby hangs a tale.

For all of these parties two problems lie ahead. Crossing the floor will be possible at the end of next month.

That might bring some unpleasant surprises as nobody knows at this moment who will gain most from this new adventure. It might even go beyond the DA and NNP.

Secondly, the Slabbert Commission

intends reporting before the end of the year. It is looking into a possible new electoral system for South Africa. The current one makes room even for the smallest of parties.

" Any deviation from the pure proportional system we have at present will most certainly mean the death of the smallest parties and even threaten the middle-range ones too.

But that is not what drives the animosity between the DA and the NNP. It has to do with personalities and a fight for survival at a level where there is real political power.

And that level is the Western Cape.

-It is not conceivable on current evidence that either the DA or the NNP can get close to power - except of course where the ANC takes a smaller party on board.

The ANC does not have to do that, except where the smaller party can bring something to the table. This the NNP could do in the Western Cape, delivering the ANC into the provincial government. Essentially the DA and NNP are two white-based parties rooted in the old South Africa, now desperately attempting $a \geq 00 \geq 30$ adapt to a wider voting fraternity.

But getting into the hearts, of the vast majority - the 80 percent black South Africans - is proving to be a major stumbling block. It will take many

© more years and a lot more change be-

fore real breakthroughs occur.

And white South Africa is decidedly divided. Many have become apathetic, feel excluded. The rest are divided between the NNP and the DA (with the latter at last count leading the field), some (a growing number) with the Freedom Front, some are either with the ANC or at least thinking about it.

There is, in fact, no white voting block to appeal to. Which leaves .coloureds and Indians. And here there have been successes. A surprisingly high percentage of these two groups are in the DA or NNP camp. But the real fight is in the Western Cape, where coloured voters are the decid-

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Can all the

light-weights

make one

heavy-weight?

SECOND DIVISION . . . Can the UDM's Bantu Holomisa, the PAC's Thami ka Plaatjie and Azapo's Mosibuci

Mangena set aside their differences and a

llow a credible black opposition o emerge?

OUT IN THE COLD? The exclusion of the

Inkatha Freedom Party from the aTi{le1\/=R[e} form a new, black opposition, N0 matfter . 1 what one feels about the largely Zulu-based political party. could prove o be an unwise decision. Wil leader Dr Mangosuthu Buthelezi - look for new dancing partners? ;