MEMORANDUM FOR PRESENTATION AT A MEETING WITH HE PRESIDENT DANIEL ARAP MOI OF KENYA
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The parameters within which the Black struggle for liberation in South Africa must be conducted

South Africa will be the last country in Africa to liberate itself from white racist domination. The struggle has been long and has been bitter and costly in terms of both suffering and loss of life. It lis wunderstandable therefore that there are those who scream enough is enough and put the need to eradicate apartheid so high that they do not stop to count the cost to future generations of their tactics and strategies.

I am always personally guided by the fact that there are some countries in Africa and the Third World in which political victories have left the people worse off and which gave rise to a long sequence of revolution and counter-revolution with the people paying the price of failed politics.

The South African problem is a complex problem but even so the ideals for which we strive need not be complex. My own leadership, my own goals and my own tactics and strategies are decided for me by the simple truth that if there is going to be democracy after apartheid lin South Africa, then it will have to be a democracy

within which there is successful campaigning against poverty, ignorance and disease.

If political victories in South Africa are achieved in such a way that the growth base of the South African economy is destroyed victories will be empty. And if the struggle is conducted so that the ability of the people to develop a national will to fight poverty, ignorance and disease as the country's highest priority after political victory is not assured, again political victories will turn out to be empty victories for the people.

These two things - the need to preserve the growth potential of the South African economy and the need to reconcile Black and White across all the barriers apartheid has erected - form two important

parameters within which I llead in the Black struggle for liberation.

Economic realities dictate what can and cannot be done in politics if we want to preserve the growth potential of the South African

economy and human nature, so to speak, prescribes what can and cannot be done without damaging the prospects of there one day being a reconciled South Africa. These two parameters are hard

task-masters but they make for the kind of sound leadership which is rewarded by continually expanding constituency support.

Tactics and strategies in the Black struggle for liberation

As was mentioned at the outset the South African struggle has been long and hard. It is only natural that there has been discontent at times with the lack of progress in the conquest of apartheid. At various junctures there have been major divisions of opinion in South Africa's black body politic when it came to questions of tactics and strategies.

The ANC/PAC split

The old ANC emerged soon after the Act of Union had excluded Blacks from participating in South Africa's parliamentary process and it was brought into being with the primary task of gaining Black acceptance as equals in South Africa's constitutional life. This

defined the struggle as a struggle for a non-racial future, even if Blacks had a specific role to play in bringing it about.

The first major split in the old ANC followed the emergence of the Pan Africanist Congress which was greatly influenced by Kwame Nkrumah's writings. What is relevant for today's discussion is that it was a split due as much to tactics and strategies, as it was a split over political theory and ideology. It came into being as a militant rejection of the old guard leadership of the ANC.

The emergence of Black Consciousness

The earlier PAC/ANC split occurred when there was a massive crackdown by the South African Government of the day in which the State battered black democracy. The rise of Black Consciousness and the formation of Black Conscious organisations such as the Black People's Convention [BPC] and the South African Student Organisation [SASO] also occurred at a time when the Government was cracking down on Black democratic developments. The ANC and PAC were banned in 1960 and the 1960's were vacuum years. But by the mid-1970's there was a re-groping in Black politics and a resurgence of Black political activity.

Inkatha emerged in the mid-1970's in the same circumstances in which Black South Africa produced the Black Consciousness Movement. There was a call that something had to be done and there was also a call for the ANC to became involved in what could be done inside the country to oppose apartheid. They were vacuum years and something had to be done. 1Inkatha emerged to do it.

I brought Inkatha into being once again to rally the people under the traditional lliberation banners. Inkatha rose to fly the colours of liberation, sing the songs of liberation and once again establish a democratic organisation which gave people something to do for their own liberation.

The emergence of the United Democratic Front [UDF] and the Congress of South African Trade Unions [COSATU]

By the 1980's many of the Black Consciousness organisations which came into being the previous decade were defunct after being battered and bruised by an increasingly larger range of Draconian measures the Government was adopting to control black politics. And those who had not joined Inkatha, could not join the ANC or PAC, were gathered together in the UDF and COSATU. The politically significant difference between them and other organisations was that they were formed as much to support the ANC's \hat{A} «claim for political dominance in black politics, as they were formed to oppose apartheid.

Political diversity and the guestion of tactics and strategies

Political diversity in black politics should enhance the - struggle for liberation. Apartheid is all-pervasive and needs to be tackled on every possible front in every possible way and only a multitude of strategies will do this. That is one reality. On the other hand there is another reality and that is that if the totality of what black politics does makes Black inputs into the process of polarisation in South Africa, South Africa will be in serious trouble after apartheid has been eradicated.

It cannot be over-emphasised that the South African situation differs from situations in which people struggled for their liberation in the States around South Africa - Mocambique, Angola and Zimbabwe. There is an unfortunate tendency to draw one-to-one conclusions when comparing the South African struggle with the struggle elsewhere.

The failed armed struggle

There was a successful armed struggle in Mocambique and Angola, as well as in Zimbabwe but there will never be a successful armed struggle in South Africa. That is the first major difference from which a number of other differences flow.

There will not be the kind of Lancaster House-type conference or the handing over of power in the fashion that it was done in Mocambique and Angola. And perhaps most importantly, there is not one major liberating force which will inherit power after the struggle.

In South Africa there will be no vanquished and there will be no victor and there will be no suing for peace. We face either a recalcitrant white South African Government continuing to legislate for apartheid and govern for apartheid conflicting with forces it cannot beat and which cannot beat it, or we face an attempt to normalise South Africa as a modern, Western-type industrial democracy.

Stark alternatives

I say our alternatives are starkly limited — as this thinking indicates — because only the normalisation of South Africa as a modern, Western-type industrial democracy could be an alternative to the armed struggle because that is the only way in which we will be able to get the politics of negotiation off the ground.

There are over five million Whites in South Africa and they are not ex-patriates and cannot be regarded as settlers who can be chased home. They are Africans and will have to be dealt with as Africans, as white as their skins are. They have nowhere to go and their numbers are llarge enough for them to demand a say in the putting of a post-apartheid society together.

This is more particularly so because the South African Government is both a de facto and de jure government of the day and if we are going to have anything other than an armed victory against apartheid, we will have to ensure that a new race-free democracy is legislated into existence.

I know that there are still some who think in terms of a settlement \mid conference of one or another kind and the possible formation of an $200\230$ interim government which will supervise an election, in much the same way as the Namibian situation is being handled. The National Party Government is not a Turnhalle Government and you can be quite $200\230$ sure that the South African Government would rather revert to war: before handing over power to an interim government.

Quite independently of the status of the South African Government and the fact that Whites have nowhere to go and must be taken i account of, there are other factors which are important when it $a\geq 00\geq 30$ comes to the decision of what tactics and strategies to employ to bring about radical change.

We must all be very conscious of the fact that white society in South Africa is highly militarised and will provide a highly efficient counter-revolutionary core which would be put in a strategically unassailable position. In fact a White South African equivalent of UNITA or RENAMO would make those movements pale into insignificance by comparison.

| While every country which has been liberated in Africa has to one or another extent been dependent upon the industrial sector and the continuing industrialisation of their country, nowhere in Africa has a struggle taken place in which there is such total dependency on the industrial sector, as is the case in South Africa.

There are millions of Black South Africans 1living in formal

townships clustering around white cities and towns in the country.

Beyond these black townships there are vast sprawling black \ Squatter areas around every major industrial city. There is a vast i process of urbanisation taking place and the dependence of Blacks on weekly pay packets is so widespread that complete degenerate chaos would result from breaking the productive capacity in South Africa's industries.

The armed struggle will not succeed and there will be no seizure of power and no forced situation in which there is an interim government. The only thing other than the armed struggle is a negotiating process in which final reliance is placed on the strategic and tactical advantages Black South Africans enjoy because there is a total White dependence on Blacks in the economy.

Black bargaining power is already high and it can only increase over time.

' There lis also the reciprocal Black dependence on Whites in the economy and this interdependence creates the circumstances in which; political bargaining can take place in the context in which both Black and White are curbed because both groups have too much to lose if everything breaks down.

I am very aware of the fact that white politics has been pushed f beyond the point of no return when it comes to the eradication of

apartheid. The foundations on which previous National Party | Governments have attempted to defend, adapt or elaborate apartheid) are now actually destroyed. Apartheid lis so economically

untenable, so socially impossible and so politically suicidal that White politics faces the task of moving away from apartheid or succumbing in the chaos which failure to do so would create.

Changes in South Africa that have already taken place have not addressed any of the real core constitutional issues which must now be faced. On the other hand, they have been far more than cosmetic changes. They have been changes which have broken the monolithic power of the State and they have been changes which have increasingly and step-by-step progressively made the facing of core constitutional issues a vital necessity.

} Hope that the South African Government will embark
1 on a programme of meaningful change is justified

There is more fluidity in the South African situation than there has ever been in the history of the country. What was ruling National Party policy for nearly 40 years lis now only being defended by the Conservative Party as the Official Opposition in Parliament.

i The change of leadership in the National Party which took place earlier this year is significant indeed. The necessity of bringing about radical reform asserted itself during Mr. P.W. Botha's term | of presidency and he would have lost his National Party leadership; position, whether or not he had a stroke because his Party judged that he would not be able to lead White South Africa into and through reform successfully.

Mr. F.W. de Klerk on the other hand knows why his predecessor was ousted. I have met him twice now, once soon after he became leader of the National Party and again at the end of November. Whereas there was no-go politics and even no-speak politics between Mr. de Klerk's predecessor and myself, his style of leadership, his

commitments to reform, and I think the nature and character of the man, are such that we have a right to expect him to put the politics of negotiation on track. Mr. de Klerk convinces where he goes and he is building up a momentum in white politics which is beginning to carry the white body politic, as I say, beyond the point of no return.

Black responsibility to back change

In an important sense there is now something to negotiate for - a normalised South Africa as a modern, industrial-type democracy and there 1 is somebody to negotiate with - Mr. F.W. de Klerk. As a

black lleader I will throw my weight behind the politics of negotiation and it will not be I who makes it impossible for Whites to negotiate a new multi-racial democracy into being. That is what Blacks have always struggled for and now that there are real prospects of the struggle culminating in negotiations which could end apartheid and herald a new democratic era, we must go for it.

Now more than ever there is an urgent need to put the good of the South African State before all Party political interests. As President of Inkatha, I have been calling for the release of Dr. Nelson Mandela and all political prisoners because that would be good for South Africa, whatever it means for Inkatha. Only last week when I met Mr. de Klerk for the second time, I again told him very forcefully that until Dr. Nelson Mandela is released, I will not be drawn into the politics of negotiation.

More than ever now, Black South Africa needs common purpose and a broad front of political unity in which the good of the State is put above the good of the Party. We are in fact approaching a situation in which there is sufficient common purpose in white politics, notwithstanding the Conservative Party and the far-right backlashes which are taking place, tovigetiithe: Sholities) of negotiation off the ground. If there is not an equivalent degree of common purpose amongst Blacks which enables them to unite for the sake of South Africa in their diversity, it will be we Blacks

and not Whites who will have to be held accountable for failure.

Black responsibility, however, goes a lot deeper than making sure that there lis a sufficient degree of Black unity to make the politics of negotiation a reality. Consensus will have to be reached in black politics and reached soon. The process of political reconciliation between Black and White must commence even now in this pre-negotiating phase of South African politics.

We cannot fight political battles, settle South Africa's constitutional issues and then turn attention to what can be done to reconcile the country's race groups. Always, always, always there lis the looming reality that both in terms of parliamentary democracy or in terms of economics, the same process that brings about a constitutional settlement should be a process in which reconciliation is arrived at pari passu with arriving at political settlements. We will need a national will to make the victory of any one party beneficial to society at large.

This is why I so emphasise the need for politics in South Africa to tackle the task of normalising South Africa as a modern,

industrial-type democracy. It will be in doing this that Black and White will find the most in common.

Whatever the national and international media have presented as the South African situation, the vast, vast majority of Blacks want

South Africa normalised as a multi-Party industrial State and they want the rule of law and the kind of parliamentary democracy which has typified Western countries. Black South Africans daily vote with their feet against revolution and daily they vote with their

feet in favour of the free enterprise system and for them the two go hand in hand.

High values can mobilise Black South Africa

Speaking as I speak, I have been able to establish the largest membership-based political organisation ever seen in South Africa. Inkatha has already mobilised over 1.7 million Blacks to become members. Right now Inkatha has the largest Youth Brigade in the country and it also has the largest Women's Brigade. It is by far the largest membership-based organisation in South Africa.

Inkatha lis a black organisation, lled by Blacks to give Blacks an opportunity of making their Black contribution to the establishment of a multi-Party democracy. Inkatha is rooted in the values and the aims and objectives of the struggle for liberation which was commenced in 1912.

Not only have I been able to put Inkatha together as a black organisation by talking the way I do talk and leading the way I do lead, but I have also been able to establish very important constituency support among South Africa's White, Indian and Coloured population groups. Inkatha is irradicably present in centre-stage politics in South Africa and it will be there as a negotiating force whenever negotiations do get off the ground.

The pragmatism I appeal for is, as I have often stated, not only important for what happens in South Africa, but it is also vitally important for the whole of Southern Africa. The people of South Africa must behave as Africans on the continent of Africa, with a responsibility to Africa. Because we are on the tip of Africa, there is always the danger of thinking of Africa behind us and looking to Europe and North America for our salvation.

As far as I am concerned, however much we are locked into a north/south economic axis, and however much we are dependent upon the inflow of Western technology and capital and the availability of Western markets, South Africa stands with its back to the West and looks north to Africa.

I am deeply dismayed whenever I look at Mocambique and Angola and my dismay is not that much less when I look at continuing poverty in South Africa's other black neighbouring States. I have visions of there one day being a vast economic back-bone stretching from Zaire through Zambia and through Zimbabwe and Botswana right down through South Africa to the Cape. I have visions of a vast network

of inter-related economic development projects in which what is good for one State proves to be good for another State.

As far as I am concerned, Black South Africa must be liberated both for the sake of justice inside South Africa, and for the sake of Africa beyond. Everything that has been developed in South Africa, its relatively vast economic infrastructure, its well-developed transportation system and its developed electricity and water supply systems, should be beneficial for Central, East and West Africa.

Every State in Southern Africa and every State in Central, East and West Africa need each other and the whole sub-continent, indeed the half continent of Africa, will be adversely affected if there is not reconciliation in South Africa and if we do not succeed in

establishing a democracy resting on a sound economic base through the politics of negotiation.