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FRELIMO and the Mozambique Revolution

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The presentation of a fully adequate account of the nature of the Mozambique liberation struggle, and of the revolution which has sprung from that struggle, would be a major undertaking. It would require an analysis of how the present situation has emerged from the complex history of the area. It would also require that the struggle in Mozambique be set clearly in its broader context—both the immediate context of the Southern African complex taken as a whole, as well as that of the world-wide balance of forces. And considerable attention would have to be paid to the logistics of the military confrontation and to a more precise delineation of the considerable progress being made in that sphere by Mozambican freedom fighters. To present such an account is not the intention of this brief essay; its more modest objective is to attempt to learn something significant about Mozambique by focusing on the recent development of the Mozambique Liberation Front (FRELIMO), the movement which leads the resistance to Portuguese colonialism. This is important because the politics of FRELIMO have been much misunderstood: as I shall argue, the leadership crisis which surfaced in FRELIMO after Mondlane's untimely assassination in 1969 was a mark of the movement's *growing strength*, not of its weakness, as unsympathetic or uninformed observers have sometimes tended to assume. This focus is also important because the developments which have taken place inside FRELIMO—and, more broadly, within liberated Mozambique as a whole—have implications which must be taken seriously by all who are committed to the liberation of Southern Africa.

An earlier version of this essay was presented as a public lecture at the University of Lund, Sweden, in April 1970. It was substantially revised in 1972 for publication in this volume.

1. Nationalism and Revolution

The denouement of the African nationalism which came to power in the late 1950s and early 1960s has almost invariably been a mere Africanization of the existing colonial structures. A distinctive pattern of external dependence and domestic hierarchy has emerged in post-colonial Africa which has served to choke off development rather than to liberate productive forces and release human energies. The domestic attributes of this syndrome are by now familiar:

1. An educated elite, or petty bourgeoisie, controls the state, using it both to guarantee the neocolonial presence of international corporations and to gain privileged access to surpluses for themselves. Moreover, this group overlaps with a class of commercial Africans who are rising within the middle levels of the private sector (the "commanding heights" being the preserve of the international giants).
2. The mass of the population is, at worst, terrorized and repressed; at best, demobilized and manipulated with the sideshow of tribal, communal, and religious competition.
3. Political structures, whether they be those of one-party dominant systems or of outright military-cum-bureaucratic regimes, are primarily designed as instruments to facilitate such repression and/or manipulation in the interests of the newly dominant classes.
4. Official ideologies—the vaguest of "nationalisms," the most meaningless of "African socialisms"—serve primarily to rationalize and legitimize just such exploitative relations within the system.¹

These results were already prefigured in the nationalist movements themselves, as Fanon and Nyerere, among others, have emphasized. Fanon's analysis of "the pitfalls of national consciousness" and of "false decolonization" are, of course, well known. But Nyerere's less familiar approach to this reality is almost equally instructive, for he summarizes precisely those aspects of the inheritance from the nationalist phase which have had negative implications for post-colonial Africa: leaders who desired, first and foremost, to occupy the privileged positions of the former exploiters; masses sufficiently confused by the more simplistic nostrums of nationalism to see such Africanization as a significant accomplishment, and yet very soon to become disillusioned and apathetic; political organizations too exclusively geared to the straightforward demands of nationalism and therefore destined to "lose support and . . .

atrophy"; ideologies which easily degenerated into "racialism" (Nyerere's term) and mere black nationalism, providing no real defense against the underlying structures of capitalist exploitation. Being thus as aware of the ambiguities of nationalist assertion as of its very real achievements, Nyerere can only conclude:

It is comparatively easy to get independence from a colonial power—especially one which claims to base its national morality on the principles of freedom and democracy. Everyone wants to be free, and the task of the nationalist is simply to rouse the people to a confidence in their own power of protest. But to build the real freedom which socialism represents is a very different thing. It demands a positive understanding and positive actions, not simply a rejection of colonialism and a willingness to cooperate in non-cooperation. *And the anti-colonial struggle will almost certainly have intensified the difficulties.*²

Here and there in independent Africa steps are being taken to challenge this pattern. In Tanzania, for example, Nyerere and his colleagues have made some real effort to break out of the impasse of conventional nationalism and increasingly to expose and remedy the contradictions which are masked by this inheritance; it is a difficult task, as Nyerere is well aware and as I have had occasion to document elsewhere,³ though it is not perhaps an impossible one. In any case, the problems of post-colonial Africa are not the immediate subject matter of this essay. Rather our focus is upon the nature of insurgent nationalism as it finds expression in the struggle to liberate Mozambique. And here we enter a world very different from that described by Nyerere, whose descriptions are in fact applicable to most of the rest of Africa. Of course, the struggle in Mozambique (as elsewhere in Southern Africa) is immediately distinguished by the nature of the colonial resistance to nationalist aspirations there, and by the strategies of sustained military confrontation which must, of necessity, be adopted. But this kind of struggle also detonates other processes which reshape the pattern of nationalism into a new mold and dictate, *in the nationalist phase itself*, an attempt to restructure social, economic, and political relationships in a fundamental way. This is what is happening in Mozambique; the conventional denouement of African nationalism becomes increasingly unthinkable as more and more fundamental choices are forced upon the people in the very course of waging their struggle. The result, in all likelihood, will be not merely national liberation, but a social revolution.

2. The Logic of Protracted Struggle

One crucial point must be made at the outset: all those features characteristic of the brand of nationalism which has facilitated false decolonization elsewhere on the continent have been present in the Mozambican context. Take, first, the danger of elitist and entrepreneurial dominance both of the institutional expressions of nationalism and of the structures of the newly independent country (in this case, within the liberated areas of Mozambique). Inside FRELIMO there has been a continuing problem of coping with the demands of educated elements. Many educated Mozambicans abroad have been reluctant to return to take up positions in the ranks of a people's struggle, and have preferred instead to snipe at the organization from outside. Closer to home, the "educated" have often been equally intransigent about integrating themselves effectively with the masses, lured by inflated expectations of reward for their services and the example of their privileged counterparts in independent Africa. Such reactionary members of the petty bourgeoisie have been the backbone of the conservative line within the movement from the outset. And they have been joined by others who saw independence primarily as an opportunity for mere entrepreneurial aggrandizement and the consolidation of their own personal power. We shall observe this group in action in the new Mozambique in the following section.

The mass of the Mozambican population has suffered from many of the same disabilities, for revolutionary purposes, which characterize the African peasantry generally: a profound parochialism, for example, and an only slowly dawning awareness of the broader meaning of exploitation. Of course, the particularly brutal nature of Portuguese colonialism over the centuries, and of the repression of recent years, has rendered exploitation more graphic than in many other parts of the continent. But the danger that resistance to a vaguely perceived exploitation may take on a merely ethnic or regionalist expression remains real. Moreover, Mozambique has been no exception to the rule that to a significant degree the politicization of ethnicity in Africa springs from the manipulations of opportunistic elements of the leadership who thus turn ethnic competition to their own uses.

The latter is, in any case, only one way in which a conservative petty bourgeoisie can seek to instrumentalize and demobilize the masses in the service of its own self-aggrandizement. In fact, a liberation movement

can provide its own particular variation on this theme. FRELIMO's experience demonstrates that such elements will find themselves much more at ease with the intra-elite infighting of exile politics than with trusting their political fates to the less predictable and less easily controlled will of the newly mobilized masses in the liberated areas. The military line of such a group parallels this preference; when combined with nostalgia for the relatively easy ride to power of petty-bourgeois leaderships elsewhere in Africa, the basic distrust of the masses and of a genuine release of energies leads to a putschist approach to the necessary armed confrontation with intransigent colonialism. Finally, a familiar ideological construct locks all these components into place: thus certain elements within FRELIMO have advanced a nationalism which asks no basic structural questions about the nature of the society being brought into being, and a racialism which ignores the broader meaning of exploitation in the interests of a mere Africanization of existing structures.

From the point of view of conservative members of the petty-bourgeois leadership of the Mozambican independence struggle there has been just one flaw in all this: in the context of a genuine liberation struggle this kind of nationalism, quite literally, *does not work* as it did for African leadership groups elsewhere on the continent. On the contrary, for such a struggle to be waged successfully the energies of the masses *must* be released in a new way, the leadership *must* link its fortunes to the masses more effectively, and the imperialist enemy *must* be defined and confronted more meaningfully. In fact, once set in motion the reality of protracted struggle has increasingly imposed its own logic upon the Mozambican liberation movement.

What are the crucial dimensions of this "logic" of protracted struggle in Mozambique? We will sketch them only briefly here, though they are attested to in the publications of FRELIMO and, even more convincingly perhaps, in the eyewitness accounts of a number of visitors to the liberated areas of Mozambique in recent years.⁴ Most important has been the need to close the gap between the leadership—a potential elite—and the mass of the peasantry, the need to evolve methods of work which render the contradiction between these two elements non-antagonistic and which promise to resolve it in a cumulatively progressive manner.

A number of items are relevant here. First, given the fact of Portugal's reprisals and its calculated destruction of much of the established

infrastructure of economic and social life in areas where its military hold has faltered, entirely new institutions and programs have had to be begun in the liberated areas in the spheres of health, education, trade, and the like. Even day-to-day village life has been reorganized when villages were regrouped in more sheltered areas to minimize the dangers of direct attack, great efforts being made to render agricultural activities, in particular, safe and secure. Moreover, in the classic manner of guerrillas, FRELIMO combatants must be able to move freely from village to village without fear of betrayal; under such circumstances the peasantry has had to become the military units' active partners in struggle. As the existence of a secure military backdrop for penetration further south has become imperative, so the population has also been reorganized into an actual militia behind the front lines—this in spite of the severe constraint represented by a continuing shortage of firearms. A growing body of evidence suggests that each of these advances has begun to be effected as FRELIMO has consolidated its military advance. The most important implication of such a pattern is equally clear: that such advances involve something much more than "a rejection of colonialism and a willingness to cooperate in non-cooperation." On the contrary, they demand from the people "a positive understanding and positive actions." The knot of neocolonialism is being untied even at this very early stage.

Secondly, such a struggle has forced a deepening of national consciousness. What has been stated earlier concerning the inadequacy of certain varieties of "nationalisms" in Africa should not be taken to imply that national consciousness is unimportant: quite the opposite is the case. As noted, there is a potential for self-defeating divisiveness inherent in the realities of ethnic and cultural diversity which characterize every African territory. In addition, one of the main instruments of colonial oppression, not least in Portuguese Africa, was to "divide and rule" by means of intensifying such divisions. Under these circumstances, an achieved national identity represents a considerable accomplishment. It is therefore particularly important to affirm that a struggle like that in Mozambique actually *deepens* the meaning of such a national identity; it does not in any way by-pass it. Cadres and guerrillas must be able to move easily into regions very far from their homes; tribesmen in one region must continue to appreciate that theirs is an involvement in a more long-range, territory-wide struggle even after their own immediate geographical corner has been liberated; others, beyond the front lines, must

see that the struggle in the far north is more than just the tribal outburst the Portuguese would have them believe it to be. Such a nationalism cannot be some lowest common denominator masking a transitory alliance of tribally based notables. Not surprisingly, therefore, the spokesmen for the most militant line among the Mozambican leadership have responded with alacrity to this imperative; they have been increasingly firm about distinguishing *revolutionary nationalism* from its less savory look-alikes, and communicating this distinction to the populace.

To do this is also to deprive the least progressive members of the petty bourgeoisie of one of their trumpcards—their manipulation of ethnic consciousness under the very umbrella of a vague and sloganized nationalism. Moreover the elite, *qua* elite, has been undermined in other ways by the dynamics of the struggle. Thus both the carving out of liberated areas and the concomitant involvement of the populace introduce dimensions which slowly but surely displace the world of exile politics. Those politicians who have based their power upon links with the notables of host governments or with fellow exiles in Dar es Salaam and Lusaka must transform their practice or find their preeminence passing to others more closely linked to novel political forces within the contested territory itself. The military also yields to this logic of guerrilla warfare. A military apparatus dependent upon its ties to a mass base must develop methods of work which ensure its popular touch even while it provides leadership and raises the level of consciousness of the masses; those who cannot make the transition to being members of a real people's army are quickly spotted. As a direct result, the style and commitment which characterize cadres, rather than mere functionaries, become the order of the day both in the political and the military spheres.

In Mozambique, FRELIMO has slowly adjusted to these imperatives, though not without certain very real difficulties and tensions to which we will return in the following section. As it has done so, its further practice has tended both to consolidate these advances and even to push their logic further. If the people have, in effect, demanded cadres rather than functionaries (and new exploiters) from a movement which lays claim to their "positive understanding and positive actions," so too the movement has taken concrete steps to forestall its own possible degeneration. As a *line*, we have seen this to involve a deepening of the connotations of nationalism. It has also meant a conscious assault on the seeds of privilege—an assault most dramatically exemplified in the restructuring

of the educational system. After dismal experience with the first products of a quasi-liberated secondary school system at the Mozambique Institute in Dar es Salaam, the new school at Bagamoyo (in Tanzania) has provided an entirely different (and extremely impressive) model, as fundamentally work- and military-oriented as it is academic, with a selection and promotion system stressing both political and more formal criteria. The Bagamoyo school is in any case merely the further extension of a progressive primary school system which is mushrooming in the liberated areas. This system is quite specifically designed to fend off alienation and to turn skills to the service of the community; it is every bit as impressive as the Bagamoyo experiment (if equally constrained by lack of funds and equipment). In addition, what can only be described as a people's health system—again in sharp contrast to the standard post-colonial pattern of Africa—is being generated in these same liberated areas.

Other possible gaps between "leadership" and mass which arise in the economic sphere have also begun to be quite self-consciously preempted, the solution being collective economic structures like a cooperative-based, "state trading" network, and even the beginnings of some cooperative productive activities at the village level (e.g., the "FRELIMO fields"). Finally, and fundamentally, the institutionalization of structures of participation and genuine self-assertion by the mass of the population has proceeded apace, at the levels of the *cercle*, the locality, the district, and the province—this too in the interests of consolidating a people's struggle. Such developments are crucial to the effectiveness of the drive for liberation, of course, but it is worth noting that they have important implications as well for the kind of Mozambique which is emerging inevitably from such a struggle.

Such a protracted struggle has an important educative impact as regards the international posture of a new Mozambique, and of the new Mozambicans. As the confrontation continues, the leadership as well as the mass of the population have had that much greater opportunity to become aware of the complicated network of imperialist forces which lock Portuguese hegemony into place; it is no accident that Museveni and others have found many peasants in Mozambique fully conversant with the intrigues of the NATO countries, for example.⁵ Similarly, when arms and military advice, as well as other kinds of aid, are seen to come primarily from the socialist countries—and from those few pro-

gressive forces in the advanced capitalist countries that are committed to Southern African liberation—further stimulus is given to the crystallization of an anti-imperialist ideology in Mozambique. Indeed, it is on the ideological plane that one can see many of the advances we have discussed being registered. For the ideology of the progressive members of the petty bourgeoisie who have come to dominate FRELIMO is not merely anti-imperialist; in fact, it is, at least implicitly, increasingly socialist. Unlike their more conservative counterparts, such leaders have begun to cut through to the realities of exploitation per se in their formulations, and this awareness is also communicated to the people. Here, at the level of consciousness, is emerging a final guarantee that in Mozambique the nationalist struggle will be carried through to its "logical" conclusion.

These, then, are the terms of progress in Mozambique which have been witnessed and confirmed by a number of close observers of Mozambican realities. Obviously, further first-hand observation of the life of the liberated areas would make for an even more convincing analysis, but this is not something which, under the circumstances, can be easily realized. Fortunately, however, we need not leave the matter here, for there is a range of additional evidence which is much more immediately accessible. I refer to the most visible aspects of Mozambican politics as they have publicly revealed themselves. If one looks carefully at the tensions within FRELIMO itself in recent years, one can see clearly documented the record of a sea-change in the nature of the Mozambican struggle. These tensions are most readily explained in terms of the underlying pattern which we have been tracing, and, at the same time, they confirm that such a dramatic shift from conventional nationalism to revolutionary nationalism has in fact been taking place.

3. The Politics of FRELIMO

It will now be apparent that the relationship between the objective imperatives defined by the waging of such a successful liberation struggle and the political movement which comes to give institutional form to that struggle is a dialectical one of some complexity. As has happened in Zimbabwe, most members of the petty bourgeoisie can fail to make the leap from nationalist to revolutionary politics and in consequence the struggle is momentarily stalled, the dialectic is not set in motion.⁶ Else-

where, as in Mozambique, the logic of the struggle—of mass-line politics, social reconstruction, protracted warfare—imposes itself upon a growing number of the petty bourgeoisie, who feel no other choice is open to them but to commit "suicide as a class in order to be reborn as revolutionary workers, completely identified with the deepest aspirations of the people to which they belong."⁷ Simultaneously, that group consolidates this advance organizationally and ideologically and is thus able to give further shape and direction to the positive forces unleashed by revolutionary struggle. Such a reciprocal process can then become a self-reinforcing one.

This advanced stage is not reached easily. For a movement like FRELIMO is, in reality, two entities for much of the early period of its existence: a conventional nationalist movement frustrated in achieving any easy transition to power, and a revolutionary movement struggling to be born. In the short run, this dichotomy between the two finds concrete expression in a struggle within the petty bourgeoisie, increasingly pitting those who are and those who are not prepared to make the transition to revolutionary practice against one another. Of course, as the struggle develops, and in the longer run, the masses themselves come to an ever greater degree to be the arbiters of this conflict; this too is one of the "benefits" of the horrors of guerrilla warfare. We shall see that both of these latter aspects have been present in Mozambique and that the political patterns of Mozambique and of FRELIMO reflect them clearly.

Ironically, the seeds of the subsequent division within the nationalist forces were already present at the very first moment of effective unity, the founding of FRELIMO in June 1962. The convention which brought together the then existing nationalist groupings—MANU, UDENAMO, UNAMI—was a reluctant marriage in many respects, in part the result of demands made by younger militants with more recent activist experience within Mozambique itself, in part of pressures from the Tanzanian government, host to several of these organizations. Indeed, it was the younger group which took the major initiative in drafting an initial and already quite progressive program for the new front in September 1962, "at the very moment when the established organizations were hesitating to place even their existing material possessions in a common pool for the benefit of the new movement." Small wonder that, as FRELIMO has recently admitted, "the causes which kept these organizations separate in the past—namely, tribalism, regionalism, lack

of a clear and detailed set of goals and of agreed and relevant strategies—continued to exist” and that “the early days of FRELIMO were marred by mutual recriminations, expulsion, withdrawal, as between exile politicians who refused to give up the dead, futile in-fighting of an irrelevant brand of nationalist politics.”⁸

Fortunately, the most obviously opportunist and irrelevant elements were the ones who split off, reconstituting in the process many of the organizations which had gone to make up FRELIMO, as well as several more. From this bewildering array of micro-parties there eventually emerged a second front, COREMO, based in Lusaka, which has been distinguished since its inception by its token membership and its almost total lack of activity. Not surprisingly, it has never been granted recognition as a meaningful liberation movement by the OAU Liberation Committee. On the other hand, FRELIMO, under the leadership of Eduardo Mondlane—a returned Mozambican academic of some distinction who was elected at the first congress as president primarily with the support of the younger, more militant elements referred to above—managed to strengthen its position, as much as a result of the various defections which characterized the first few years as in spite of them. By September 1964, when its first military units crossed the Ruvuma from Tanzania, FRELIMO was ready to launch armed struggle; the socio-military process described in the preceding section was thus set in motion.

The least adaptable elements within the original nationalist coalition had been cast aside, but this did not by any means ensure clear sailing for FRELIMO. In fact, the struggle within the petty bourgeoisie merely became more subtle in the succeeding period as, from 1964 to 1969, a fresh wave of tension built up. As hinted earlier, one aspect of this centered on the question of education broadly conceived, and particularly on the role of the proto-elite within the institutions of a free Mozambique. Confrontation with overseas graduates arose early and led, among other things, to the movement's instructing certain sources of American-based scholarships to cut off support for Mozambicans who were proceeding to second and third degrees; it was hoped in this way to force skilled nationals back into the struggle, after mere persuasion had failed. Such exemplary initiatives were not particularly successful, but it is the fact of these and other initiatives having been launched which helps account for the (quite unrepresentative) hostility of many

elitist Mozambicans in the United States toward the FRELIMO leadership. However, the most important arenas of confrontation, as also noted earlier, were closer to home—and particularly at the Mozambique Institute, FRELIMO's center for post-primary education.

A key actor in this particular drama was a Mozambican Roman Catholic priest, Father Gwenjere. Many people now believe him to have been an agent provocateur acting on behalf of the Portuguese, and certainly he came to nationalism rather precipitately after an orthodox early career inside Mozambique itself. What is more clear is that, from mid-1967 when he left the territory and linked his fortunes to FRELIMO in Dar es Salaam, he inflamed elitist sentiments, particularly within the Mozambique Institute, encouraging students to expect scholarships for further studies and quite specifically advising that they resist the 1966 decision of FRELIMO's Central Committee that all such students spend at least a year inside Mozambique actively participating in the struggle after completing secondary school. To this was added the demand that the medium of instruction be English not Portuguese (English being, in effect, the language of scholarships!) and, manipulated equally demagogically, the demand that certain progressive white teachers at the Institute be sacked. This conflict escalated to the point of forcing temporary closure of the school. However, it also brought the censure of Gwenjere by FRELIMO in March 1968, and his eventual removal from the movement (though not before he had stirred up members of the long-standing community of non-FRELIMO Mozambicans in Dar es Salaam to stage a raid on the office of FRELIMO during which a Central Committee member was killed). Even more importantly, perhaps, these events stimulated an intensification of those efforts, referred to in the preceding section, to restructure the education system of the new Mozambique. Meanwhile the political reverberations of these incidents continued to be felt within the movement well into the following year.

A second arena of tension developed during this period which also involved the broadest kinds of structural implications, though it too centered most graphically around the person of a single man, Mzee Lazaro Kavandame. Kavandame had been an active leader among the Makonde of Cabo Delgado Province (in MANU and in the cooperative movement) for many years, and soon became the most prominent of FRELIMO politicians with a base in the area (being, for a period, the

Secretary of the Province and a member of the Central Committee). But the limitations of his particular kind of leadership soon revealed themselves: such leadership was self-serving economically, divisive politically, incoherent militarily,⁹ reflecting, in short, a style and substance very much after the fashion exemplified by regional political "barons" in a country like Kenya. Most negatively, he sought to turn the new commercial structures of the liberated areas to his own use, skimming off large surpluses for himself and his immediate supporters. As he came under increasing pressure from FRELIMO leaders, and from more committed militants within his own area, he quite predictably began to play the tribal card, seeking to crystallize "Makonde consciousness" around his own person. He also actively sought support for his intrigues among certain of the less progressive but strategically placed elements in the Tanzanian leadership. By 1968 he was even prepared to make an (abortive) bid for separatist independence for his province, to actively sabotage FRELIMO's military efforts,¹⁰ and, when finally balked and expelled from the movement in early 1969, to go over to the Portuguese and make public pronouncements on their behalf. It is important to note that long before this latter move it was perfectly clear that Kavandame had forfeited any claim to enjoying popular support, even among his own tribesmen. Just as the logic of the struggle had transcended Gwenzere and his elitism, so too it was moving beyond the familiar politico-economic royalism and Africanized exploitation of such men as Kavandame and others.

By 1969 the existence of two different "lines," as FRELIMO periodicals came increasingly to refer to the elements of contestation within the movement, was readily apparent. But the final scenes of this particular phase of the Mozambican drama were not to be acted out until after the assassination of Mondlane in February 1969. It is impossible to say what the pattern of FRELIMO's development might have been had that assassination, by an unknown hand, not occurred—probably much the same, with minor variations. What is clear, however, is that Mondlane's role had been crucial to *guaranteeing* the kind of shift within FRELIMO and within liberated Mozambique which was taking place during his presidency. If Gwenzere, Kavandame, and (as we shall see shortly) Vice-President Uria Simango represented a wholly petty-bourgeois nationalism, and if a handful of others represented a quite developed revolutionary position from a very early date, then Mondlane stood closer to

the center of the FRELIMO political spectrum. And, so situated, he came to epitomize those absolutely crucial members of the Mozambican petty bourgeoisie who were prepared to accept more and more of "the logic of protracted struggle," to contemplate "committing suicide" in the interest of a revolutionary politics.

Thus it was impossible to talk with Mondlane, or to hear him speak over the years, without observing the growth of his own understanding and practice. Some observers have insisted, nonetheless, that aspects of his accustomed life style and political approach would have imposed a severe limitation upon how far he could have continued to move in this direction. Again, it is unnecessary to speculate about such matters. The fact remains that by using his powerful presence within the movement to guarantee the necessary minimum of organizational unity, while also swimming with the tide of revolutionary nationalism and accepting more and more its logic, he did preside over the build-up of the prerequisites for further progress. By the time of his death the struggle was sufficiently advanced to have shifted the center of political gravity to within the territory. The Second Congress, held, significantly, inside the liberated areas in 1968, had already moved to increase markedly the presence in the Central Committee of direct representatives from the political and military institutions of the interior. The new mass basis of Mozambican politics was beginning, strikingly, to assert itself. Similarly, a cadre of revolutionary petty bourgeois, adapting, like Mondlane, and often even less equivocally, to the new imperatives had by then emerged within the political and military spheres and could hope to consolidate its hold on the leadership positions. In fact, Samora Machel, who was to become president in 1970, can be seen as being fully representative of this group. When the showdown came inside FRELIMO, as it inevitably had to after the cancelling out of Mondlane's dominant role, it was these popular and progressive forces which were able to carry the day.

The result did not take place without a struggle, a struggle which racked FRELIMO in 1969. For the "tendency" toward conservative, petty-bourgeois nationalism ran right through the movement and very far up the apparatus. Indeed, it became increasingly clear that this tendency found its ultimate focus in no less important a personage than Reverend Uria Simango, the vice-president of FRELIMO under Mondlane. Simango, a powerful figure within FRELIMO from the outset (he was Mondlane's closest rival for the presidency in the earliest days, for ex-

ample) staked out a position which consistently tilted in that direction, tending to reduce the complex nature of the struggle to its most baldly racial dimensions and the question of military tactics to its most adventurist (and self-defeating) formulae. Not surprisingly, it also began to be apparent in the last few years before Mondlane's death that Simango was giving tacit support to the deviations represented by both Gwenjere and Kavandame, despite his having taken an active hand in the Central Committee decisions which expelled them both; indeed, his involvement with Mozambique Institute students appears to have been particularly overt and was in any case only one of many indications of his identification with such elitist pretensions. Still other aspects of the syndrome of conventional nationalism were to characterize his position in a quite predictable manner—notably the use of ethnic and regional counters as a means of consolidating his power base. In this case Simango tried to light the spark by setting his fellow "northerners" against the specter of "southern dominance."

Enough of this was clear by 1969 for spokesmen of the progressive tendency to move to block Simango's "automatic" ascendance to the presidency in the wake of Mondlane's assassination. When the Central Committee did meet in April 1969, the ground rules of post-Mondlane politics were staked out by means of a fierce and effective attack on the many conservative elements which continued to be prominent within the organization (Nungu, for example); not coincidentally, a number of such men were known to be close associates of Simango. In such an atmosphere it was also possible to organize the succession in a manner more favorable to the progressive group: a Presidential Council—consisting of Simango, Marcellino dos Santos (a man of the left within FRELIMO for a long time), and Samora Machel, the head of the army—was formed. In this way certain formalities were observed; FRELIMO statements could even conclude at the time that:

Almost from the very beginning of FRELIMO there had been comrades with . . . erroneous conceptions. Some of them had deserted in the course of the Revolution . . . Gradually, therefore, it was seen that "the Revolution itself ensures the rejection of the impure load it carries." But other elements remained among us carrying their mistaken ideas. It was on the latter that the last meeting of the Central Committee had a decisive influence, bringing them back again to the revolutionary path. This action was the work of a group of comrades who had always kept themselves

faithful to the interests of the masses, respecting collective values and fighting individualism and personal ambition that foment opportunism, comrades linked with the concrete reality and immersed in the realization of the principal tasks of the struggle.¹¹

Yet, as very soon became apparent, what really happened was that "in that meeting we finally identified the existence of two ideological lines":

After this, the division became more acute. A struggle began between the groups representing the two lines. And all the problems, all the difficulties we have had since then are the result of this division.¹²

The stage had merely been set for the final act of the struggle for succession between these two tendencies.

As noted earlier, however, the die had been already cast. Samora, after all, represented the army, a powerful base in its own right, but all the more so when one considered that this was an army with an ever increasing number of the attributes of a people's military force and one rooted in a vital political process now established *within* Mozambique itself. Thus it was no accident that when Kavandame held back the "Cabo Delgado delegation," representative of his own clique, to the FRELIMO Conference of 1969, Cabo Delgado was effectively represented by military delegates from that province; no accident, either, that it was the "military," and not Kavandame, who could claim the effective allegiance of the people in Cabo Delgado, as events were to prove very soon thereafter. We have also observed the way in which the Central Committee, after the conference, reflected these new facts of political life in its composition. Simango himself must have realized that time was running out, that the days of exile politics and exile politicians, of nonrevolutionary nationalism and simple racist pieties, were drawing to a close. He chose to stake all on one last, desperate gamble: the publication of his document "Gloomy Situation in FRELIMO."¹³

This text, a *locus classicus* for students of the disintegration of conventional African nationalism in the context of truly revolutionary conditions, made entirely clear what could only be suspected prior to its circulation. In addition to many shrill and reckless accusations of murder and assassination made against the "Samora group," Simango's document publicly revealed the latter's close identification with each of those reactionary aspects of Mozambican nationalism against which the more progressive tendency of the leadership had set itself. The mobilization of

tribal sentiment for factional advantage is one aspect of this. Simango's document several times manages to identify his opponents—albeit misleadingly—as “southerners”: “Since 1966 there has been a tendency of a group, unfortunately composed of people from the south which included the late president of FRELIMO, to meet and take decisions by themselves and impose them on the people through maneuver.” Similarly, the attack on Janet Mondlane, which is also premised on a totally false picture of the degree of autonomy the Mozambique Institute has had from Central Committee scrutiny, comes across clearly as an attempt to substitute emotive and racial arguments for substantive arguments concerning policy.

Equally significant are Simango's expressions of solidarity with elements which were, by the time of his document's publication, wholly discredited. Now for Simango, “the participation of Father Gwenjere in the Mozambique Institute problem and in other affairs of FRELIMO was an expression of sympathy and solidarity with his own people.” Yet Simango had participated fully and without dissent in the decision to expel Gwenjere from FRELIMO. Exactly the same was true for the case of Kavandame, but in his document Simango's picture of the Cabo Delgado situation is a blurred one, and Kavandame emerges as much sinned against as sinning. Needless to say, nothing is noted in his analysis about the economic aggrandizement and exploitation indulged in by the Kavandame group, though that had been the heart of the issue. In a parallel manner, other sections of the document seem quite specifically designed to flatter the elitist pretensions of the Mozambican student group, in Tanzania and abroad; moreover, immediately after his subsequent expulsion from FRELIMO in December 1969, Simango wrote to Mozambican students in the United States assuring them that in any movement of his own which was subsequently established, their accomplishments would be scrupulously recognized. As noted above, FRELIMO responsables had suspected at the time that Simango was more linked with the initiatives of Gwenjere and Kavandame than he had cared to state openly; now his declining fortunes had forced him to reveal his hand in an open bid for what remained of their constituencies.

Predictably, this package was cemented ideologically: by means of the disarming rejection of the necessity for any ideological clarification!

There is a swing to say that we are divided on ideology. This can only mean difference on economic, religious, social policies (class), etc. I agree

that ideology is very important but it should never be considered as a uniting or dividing factor of the nationalist liberation force at this stage, if all agree and accept fundamental principles: (a) liberate Mozambique from the Portuguese colonial domination and (b) through the armed struggle.

Of course, many others who have continued to play an active role in the FRELIMO leadership would agree, up to a point, with this sentiment—agree that it is premature to speak too overtly and aggressively about the tasks of “socialist construction,” agree that a broad-based national liberation front characterizes the essential nature of the movement at the present time. But in Simango's case such sentiments have to be interpreted in the light of the particular kind of faction he was attempting to put together and of the particular kinds of quasi-class interests he was objectively representing. Only then can this kind of “negative ideology” be understood for what it is in practice: a shield for the sorts of “internal” exploitation, inimical to the further development of the struggle, which we have been describing.

It also represented an appeal to a particular kind of external constituency—in Tanzania, and in Africa in general—whose support Simango now sought. There were elements within the Tanzanian leadership, for example, which could be attracted by this brand of “anti-ideological” (and effectively self-serving) black nationalism; indeed, such men had actually attempted to facilitate the strengthening of this sort of tendency within FRELIMO in the immediately preceding period. Simango may have hoped that similar elements, themselves more strongly entrenched in African countries other than Tanzania, would rally to the support of this kind of line. But Tanzania was the key, and there such leaders were being themselves outflanked by the development of Tanzania's own brand of socialism; with the issue already settled in that country, at least for the time being, Nyerere could make clear his unambiguous preference for the more progressive wing of FRELIMO. Moreover, the essential opportunism of Simango's own shifts of position soon became graphically apparent. By the time of his issuing a second, even more desperate, document at a meeting of the OAU Liberation Committee only a few months later Simango's description of the “gloomy situation” in FRELIMO had been turned more or less upside down. Whereas before it had been the Samora/dos Santos group which had been prematurely introducing “the question of scientific socialism and capitalism in Mo-

zambique" ("Gloomy Situation in FRELIMO," p. 4), now the same group stood accused of the opposite vice: "Talks about replacement of people and necessity to purge the organization of Communist elements were frequent. Precisely it is these people the propaganda was directed against who have been removed in one way or another."¹⁴ One could only speculate that Simango, having failed in Tanzania with his black nationalist ploy, was now laying the basis for a possible (though equally unsuccessful) "ultra-left" appeal to Chinese sources of aid.

For Simango, effectively blocked within FRELIMO by the strength of the organization and the new reality of its popular character, and deprived, as well, of any Tanzanian support, had in mind the launching of a new movement; suspended from FRELIMO (November 1969), he tried to mount just such an alternative. This in turn was the last straw for the Tanzanian authorities, and in February 1970 he was ordered from the country. He drifted to Cairo, with occasional forays into Zambia and the United States, and before long, like others before him who could not keep pace with the Mozambican revolution, he had entered COREMO. From that resting place his ineffective sniping action has continued.

The volte-face of some of his closest confidants is even more striking. Murupa, an erstwhile Central Committee member, went over to the Portuguese side not long afterward, becoming in time a senior official in the colonial apparatus with responsibility for implementing the strategic hamlet program. To give him his due, Simango has to date publicly resisted Portuguese blandishments designed to lure him to their side. But the links which continue to exist between him and Murupa, for example, remain unknown and, in any case, the objective result of his apostasy can only be to strengthen the ability of the Portuguese to confuse the issue at stake in Mozambique.

Fortunately, the creation of such a possibility is not the most important result of the series of events we have been tracing. More significant is the fact that this process has, on balance, helped to *strengthen* the movement. Indeed, FRELIMO's own conclusion seems to be substantially accurate:

The spirit which prevailed at the latest meeting of the Central Committee revealed that we have already reached an advanced phase in that process of purifying our ranks. Frankness reigned—there was friendship and revolu-

tionary fraternity among all members. The climate that we felt was the result of the ideological unity that existed among us. For the first time in the history of FRELIMO, there were no discordant voices on the Central Committee which were opposed to the revolutionary positions; it constituted a solid and united block.

We consider that a great victory has been achieved, one that must be preserved and defended at all costs. The Central Committee itself recommended continuous vigilance; in order that that vigilance may be efficiently exercised, the Central Committee clarified certain concepts. Thus, the Central Committee stressed its definition of the enemy. The enemy has two faces: the principal and direct enemy, i.e., Portuguese colonialism and imperialism, which are open enemies we confront daily in the battlefield, and in relation to whom no doubt or confusion is possible. The other face is that of the indirect or secondary enemy, who presents himself under the cover of a nationalist and even a revolutionary, thus making it difficult to identify him. The Central Committee reaffirmed that the characterization of the enemy for us will never be derived from color, nationality, race, or religion. On the other hand, our enemy is that one who exploits or creates conditions for the exploitation of our people, whatever his color, race, nationality, or religion.

Within the same intention of providing ideological weapons to our comrades so that they may be able to better defend our revolution, the Central Committee defined the qualities which every FRELIMO militant must build or develop in himself: continuously fighting ambition, opportunism, tribalism, and corruption. The existence of a high level of these qualities will be the condition for a militant to be appointed for positions of responsibility in our organization. . . .

Thus, a new period is being opened in the life of FRELIMO. We took an important step forward in the consolidation of our unity, we elected a truly revolutionary leadership, we clarified our political line, we came nearer our final victory.¹⁵

It may be that some potential contradictions remain beneath the surface. The terms of the emerging ideology are still left somewhat undefined. "Exploitation" and "imperialism" characteristically join "Portuguese colonialism" and "ambition, opportunism, tribalism, and corruption" in the list of FRELIMO's enemies, but any public hint that the movement has "socialist" intentions is systematically avoided. It is therefore possible that there remains ground for tension within FRELIMO ranks between the varying claims of "socialism" and "nationalism" (albeit "revolutionary nationalism") at some subsequent stage of development, and particu-

larly in the post-independence period. But even if this possibility exists, it is, for the time being, a fairly remote one. Moreover, all our evidence suggests that the trend of events may work, in the future as in the past, to resolve this potential contradiction and to fuse the meanings of socialism and revolutionary nationalism in Mozambique. For FRELIMO's *practice* continues to be an increasingly progressive one. And with the most overt sources of tension within the movement removed, the cadre who remain are primarily those who can be expected to move still further with the logic of protracted struggle. Mozambican advances since 1969—both in military terms and in terms of national reconstruction—would seem to bear out this supposition in impressive fashion.

4. Prospects

It can be concluded that the triumph of this line within FRELIMO both reflects the emergence of a popular base and a progressive infrastructure for the Mozambican liberation struggle *and* gives promise of further mobilizing and consolidating these crucial features. The positive impact of these developments upon the military struggle can scarcely be overemphasized. Experience elsewhere suggests that liberated areas of the sort which are being firmed up politically and economically in northern Mozambique are the *sine qua non* of further advance. It is significant that in both 1970 and 1971 the Portuguese launched what were heralded, in advance, as final mop-up campaigns in Cabo Delgado and Niassa provinces, throwing vast numbers of soldiers and much matériel into the fray. On both occasions they were forced to draw back beyond the Zambezi in disarray, leaving only the few fortified posts which they already held and a population largely undismayed by the outbursts of Portuguese terrorism and intimidation witnessed during the offensives. A local population increasingly conscious, organized, and self-reliant also frees many more full-time militants for further advance; the dramatic successes during the past two years in Tete, where guerrillas have pushed south of the Zambezi and into the vicinity of the Cabora Bassa dam, are testimony to the accomplishments which lie behind. Moreover, such successes tend to have a snow-ball effect. Certainly, progressive forces in the world at large have come to recognize the vigor and commitment of FRELIMO's efforts ever more decisively. Thus the Chinese, somewhat loath in the past to commit themselves to movements

which already enjoy Soviet and Eastern European assistance, have continued to intensify their support for FRELIMO and their overt manifestations of solidarity. Even liberal forces in the advanced capitalist world (e.g., the World Council of Churches, the governments of the Scandinavian countries) have had to come to terms with the reality of FRELIMO advance and begin to examine critically their previous indifference to, or even tacit support of, Portuguese colonialism.

Equally important, these developments in liberated Mozambique have slowly but surely begun to foreclose the possibility of a false decolonization along lines hitherto quite predictable in much of Africa. Nothing can be said with certainty in this respect, of course, but there can be little doubt that the process of continually weeding out from the leadership the least progressive of the petty bourgeoisie has done a great deal to ensure the continuity of the social revolution already in train in the liberated areas. Moreover, we have noted the extent to which the army, a threat to revolutionary decolonization even under conditions which seem quite promising, has also been linked with popular aspirations and activities in ways that differ markedly from the situation in Algeria, for example. Finally, to the (considerable) extent that the mass of the peasantry is becoming an organized and active ingredient in the decolonization equation under Mozambican conditions, this too is a surety of continuity; Museveni's findings as to the growing peasant understanding of the nature of imperialism and the increasingly progressive character of their identification with the Mozambican nation suggest attributes of consciousness that are not likely to be easily shed in the aftermath of colonialism.

Of course, there are vast stretches of Mozambique which have not been directly touched by the full logic of the liberated areas, including so large an urban conglomerate as Lourenço Marques, which is the home of a significant proletariat *and* of a potentially conservative African bureaucratic group whose fortunes have heretofore been linked to the Portuguese but whose skills may have to be accommodated, albeit with great caution, within an independent Mozambique. The timing and the terms of the full integration of such parts of the country into the Mozambican revolution will have their influence on the shape of the post-colonial nation. At the same time, it is apparent that FRELIMO is quite active clandestinely far beyond the front lines of its own military advance and the promise of the liberated areas is already well known and

increasingly well understood in most parts of the country. The time is long past, if it ever existed, when any safe and manageable "neocolonial solution" was a serious option for the Portuguese; the Portuguese, for very good reasons of their own,¹⁶ eschewed it at the earliest stages, and now FRELIMO, as we have seen, has long since outgrown it. But there are tame Mozambicans; some of them, like Kavandame and Murupa, have already been on display. Simango's brand of nationalism may eventually make him easy prey for slightly more subtle blandishments; then COREMO, or some other structure altogether, could become the vehicle for a last, desperate, preemptive move by imperialism as the Portuguese falter even more dramatically. FRELIMO would not be fooled by any such elevation of a Mozambican Hastings Banda to formal authority; in all likelihood the movement would go on fighting. What the response of African states, even the most committed of them, would be to this kind of "victory" for African nationalism is more problematic. Certainly supporters of Mozambican nationalism would be wise to inform themselves of what is really at stake well in advance of such an eventuality.

Yet it must be emphasized that even this is not the most probable path of the continuing struggle in Mozambique; in fact, an even more desperate, much less equivocal, confrontation seems to be in the cards. As noted, the time may well be past when any very straightforward brand of "neocolonialism" is a live option there. Moreover, the response to the conflict inside Mozambique on the part of racist and imperialist powers which lie beyond the territory's borders seems increasingly less likely to be such a measured one. The possible contagion of Mozambican (as well as Angolan) military success is sufficiently threatening to South Africa and Rhodesia to have already forced such actors to intervene more menacingly: South African troops have been at the ready around the Cabora Bassa dam site for months and Rhodesian soldiers and airplanes have been very active militarily in Tete Province, south of the Zambezi; the police and military commanders of the three white redoubts exchanged regular visits most recently, South African mercenaries (with at least tacit South African government connivance) were identified as carrying out defoliation missions over the fields of northern Mozambique.¹⁷ This trend is bound to continue. Nor has the existence of this broader threat to the whole of Southern Africa been overlooked by the forces of international capitalism, who have noted with alarm the intensification of FRELIMO's revolutionary and anti-imperialist line (in itself vital to the

movement's military success, as we have seen).¹⁸ The hardening American position, first under Johnson and later under Nixon, which culminated in the Azores Agreement of 1971,¹⁹ has no doubt been partly a response to the specter of a future, FRELIMO-ruled, militant Mozambique (a Mozambique which gets some support, need one add, from the "Communists"!). Thus the increasingly successful Mozambican revolution is one of the chief sparks which is lighting the fuse for all of Southern Africa; in all probability, therefore, the struggle will be less easily compartmentalized along territorial lines in the future than it has been in the past. This fact does not make the liberation of Mozambique any less important in itself, of course, but it does widen the field of relevant considerations for both Mozambican revolutionaries and for their supporters abroad.

5. Implications for Metropolitan Radicals

This pattern of development in Mozambique has implications for the practice of progressives in the advanced capitalist countries. Since Southern Africa could become, from the mid-seventies, the sort of crucial zone of confrontation that Southeast Asia has been since the mid-sixties, it is well to state these precisely, albeit too briefly, here.

1. Take, first, the case of the liberal sympathizer. We have seen the extent to which the Mozambican liberation struggle has given rise to a social revolution and an anti-imperialist movement. In Africa this is the logic of genuine liberation. Yet if one reads between the lines of many liberal treatises on Southern Africa, this is precisely the denouement that most liberals seek to avoid; too often they advise, say, American support for liberation before "extremists" profit from a "deteriorating" situation.²⁰ Of course, most such spokesmen are in any case mere apologists for the corporate structure, but the most sincere (if confused) of them must be encouraged to face squarely the necessity of backing socialist and revolutionary solutions to liberation struggles. It seems inevitable that, as the Southern African situation escalates, FRELIMO will find its aims and its accomplishments distorted in the Western press; a firm understanding of the realities of the anti-imperialist struggle may be some inoculation against any attendant hysteria. Liberals may also draw their own brand of solace from the fact that FRELIMO is not so "aligned" as the NLF/PRG and that it sternly safeguards its independence from for-

turned escalation of the confrontation - with all the
implications to which I have referred

1. The matter cannot be allowed merely to rest with the blind shifting
non, however. The fact remains that the struggle in Mozambique must
be recognized a much higher priority for the African continent than it has
been heretofore. As noted, the Southern African white regimes and
many of their allies are aware that tension is beginning to escalate seri-
ously within their gates that will undoubtedly continue to act directly and
indirectly. At the same time, the fact that revolutionary advances in Por-
tuguese Africa are the major force which is placing the whole of Africa
in a new perspective. Africa is now more than ever before the principal arena
of the struggle for the liberation of the continent. It is because the
sole time was lost in Vietnam - five or ten years at least - because the
left failed to take seriously what was happening there. The same thing
must not be allowed to happen in South Africa in general, or in Mozam-
bique in particular. To be sure, some progressive elements in the West
are already engaged in effective movements of solidarity. But it is the
pressure that many more international societies that the struggle with
the seriousness it deserves.

Portuguese Africa 1972

Shortly after completing the preceding essay (in mid 1971) I was in-
vited by FRELIMO to participate in a series of seminars on a number
of the historical areas of the Portuguese Empire. I was then asked to con-
tribute to special sessions during the latter part of August 1972 on
Mozambique. At that time some of the events and circumstances which I had been
able to investigate up to then only from a distance. I hope to return this
experience in greater length elsewhere, but it seems relevant to note
here that the evidence I was able to collect about Mozambique has not
even more fully than I had anticipated. The seminar advanced in the
paper. In addition, the recent seminar document that in September 1972
LIMO opened up military activities in Mozambique and South Africa is
further dramatic proof of continued FRELIMO activity and of the con-

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own ideology and foreign influence of any war. It is important to
specify the Vietnamese and Mozambique situations are similar. Let us
first of all recall - who took some (important) middle ground in
Mozambique (as in Vietnam) will be objectively leading their support
to the work of liberation of Mozambique.
2. A closely related point should also be considered by those most
sympathetic toward nationalist aspirations in contemporary Africa. First
one must not necessarily be black nationalists in the metropolitan who
are inevitably deeply concerned with the Southern African situation. It
is clear, for example, that in the United States the black community is
beginning to increasingly feel force pressing for progressive solutions in
Southern Africa and whose views and likely reactions must be taken
into careful account in the strategic and tactical calculations of whoever
of state and corporate power. But the relevance of the community's role
which must be recognized here is by no means confined to black groups.
All those who support themselves to the cause of African nationalism
will have to make their contribution in the course of the coming
struggle, discrimination for which the simplest tool made available by
a national perspective point and simple will not prove fully adequate.
It is true that a progressive "nationalist solution" may not be the
most likely outcome of this phase of the Mozambique revolution, but it
is one of the signs of possibility. If this should happen, it would be
a very important landmark in the nationalist movement were to
be carried with a Mozambique (General Frelimo) or even another. It
is a landmark on their path and on their conscience. At the very least it
will be a landmark that the diverse trends of nationalism in Mozam-
bique are to be placed on a new and another by the Portuguese and
their methods in order to achieve conditions in the advanced capitalist
countries. Let us recall that the claims of imperialism will therefore be
necessary. It will be an awareness that under African conditions the
major black nationalist movements can become the most easily coopted
and the least revolutionary at the time of the African population. But all
nationalist movements are revolutionary. It is the revolutionary nationalism of a
movement like FRELIMO which guarantees that "real freedom" to
which people are entitled at the heart of the issue.
3. However, it is not the importance of these latter consid-
erations that are important here. Even were the Portuguese
to become so isolated that could not escape away the fact that FRELIMO

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eign ideology and foreign influence of any sort. But in important respects the Vietnamese and Mozambican situations are similar. Left-liberals—of all colors—who seek some (nonexistent) middle ground in Mozambique (as in Vietnam) will be objectively lending their support to the worst barbarisms of imperialism.

2. A closely related point should also be considered by those most sympathetic toward *nationalist* aspirations in contemporary Africa. Here one thinks most immediately of black nationalists in the metropolises who are, inevitably, deeply concerned with the Southern African situation; it is clear, for example, that in the United States the black community is becoming an increasingly vital force pressing for progressive solutions in Southern Africa, one whose views and likely reactions must be taken into careful account in the strategic and tactical calculations of wielders of state and corporate power. But the relevance of the cautionary note which must be sounded here is by no means confined to black groups. All those who commit themselves to the cause of African nationalism will have to make subtle discriminations in the course of the coming struggle, discriminations for which the analytical tools made available by a nationalist perspective pure and simple will not prove fully adequate.

It is true that a preemptive "neocolonial solution" may not be the most likely outcome of this phase of the Mozambican revolution, but it is not beyond the realm of possibility. If this should happen, it would be tragic if many uncritical militants in the metropolitan countries were to be caught with a Mozambican General Thieu (or even another Hastings Banda) on their hands and on their consciences. At the very least it can be safely predicted that the diverse brands of nationalism in Mozambique are to be played off against one another by the Portuguese and their mentors in order to maximize confusion in the advanced capitalist centers. Careful scrutiny of the claims of movements will therefore be necessary, as well as an awareness that under African conditions the most black-sounding of nationalisms can become the most easily coopted and the least serviceable to the mass of the African population. Not all nationalisms are equivalent; it is the revolutionary nationalism of a movement like FRELIMO which guarantees that "real freedom" to which Nyerere was referring at the outset of this paper.

3. However, as we have seen, the importance of these latter considerations should not at present be exaggerated. Even were the Portuguese to become so inclined, they could not conjure away the fact that FRE-

LIMO already has more than 10,000 men under arms, is in effective control of vast tracts of territory, and is moving forward. Nor in the foreseeable future could imperialism really hope to breathe effective life into any shadowy, African-based hypothetical alternative to FRELIMO. Thus there is no need for any confusion as to where the responsibility of international socialists of all colors lies.

The matter cannot be allowed merely to rest with this bland affirmation, however. The fact remains that the struggle in Mozambique must be granted a much higher priority by metropolitan activists than it has been heretofore. As noted, the Southern African white regimes and many of their allies are aware that tension is beginning to escalate markedly within their gates; they will undoubtedly continue to act firmly and brutally. At the same time, the Left's response has been as yet scarcely an adequate one, in spite of the fact that revolutionary advances in Portuguese Africa are the major force which is placing the whole ugly question of Southern Africa ever more firmly on the historical agenda. Valuable time was lost in Vietnam—five or ten years at least—because the Left failed to take seriously what was happening there. The same thing must not be allowed to happen in South Africa in general, or in Mozambique in particular. To be sure, some progressive elements in the West are already engaged in concrete manifestations of solidarity. But it is imperative that many more international socialists treat this struggle with the seriousness it deserves.

Postscript, September 1972

Shortly after completing the preceding essay (in mid-1972) I was invited by FRELIMO to accompany a column of combatants on a march into the liberated areas of Tete Province. I was thus afforded the opportunity to spend sixteen days during the latter part of August 1972 observing at first hand some of the events and structures which I had been able to investigate up to then only from a distance. I hope to recount this experience at greater length elsewhere, but it seems relevant to note here that the evidence I was able to collect inside Mozambique bore out, even more fully than I had anticipated, the argument advanced in this paper. In addition, the recent announcement that in September FRELIMO opened up military activities in Manica and Sofala Province is further dramatic proof of continued FRELIMO success *and* of the con-

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