THE SWAZILAND/SOUTH AFRICAN SCANDAL

Background

During the 19th Century, colonial interests defined

. the boundaries of what are now the states of Southern Africa.

As elsewhere in Africa, these boundaries were drawn in brutal

disregard of the local population, many of whom found themselves

-cut into pieces located on different sides of international

borders. Post colonial wisdom has been in Africa that no matter how irrational original boundaries were, the redrawing of national

boundaries could only be done atâ\200\230the pÃ@ril of African stability.

Nowhere is this more pertinently true than it is in the north-eastern corner of South Africa. The border between what is now Mocambique and South Africa was the result of brutal

colonial disregard for people.

By the beginning of the second half of the 19th century, this border represented the southern limits of the sphere of. interests of colonial Portugal which had established a presence at what was known as Lorenco Marques, now Maputo. Colonial Britain's northern limits of her sphere of interests were in conflict with the claims of Portugal, not because she had real interests as far north of Durban or Kosi Bay, 'but bécause she wanted to preclude the Boer Republic of the Transvaal from

having access to the sea.

The dispute between Britain and Portugal was eventually settled in arbitration with President MacMahon of France finally drawing.a line on a map to demark the two colonial spheres of interest. At that point in time (1875) Swaziland was not even a state yet and the Dlaminis who had originated in the Maputa area had not yet established themselves as the ruling

clan in what we now know as Swaziland.

The area south of the boundary drawn by MacMahon had always been inhabited by the Tembe people now living there. Fearing Portuguese intention, the then young Tembe Chief Ngwanase

I'led south, sought = and was granted - political recognition.

and profection on condition that he did not deal with President Kruger or in any way give the Transvaal Republic access Lo

the sea. $\hat{a}\200\230$ Ngwanzse finally settled near Manguze, south of the British/Portuguese border. The people in the area had always paid tribute to Zulu Chiefs and once settled in that area,

he did so too.

European powers then connived to settle what later became South Africa's north-eastern boundary line. The Swaziland boundaries were later drawn by Britain again as a move to bplock

the Transvaal Republic's expansion eastwards towards the sea.

. During this time,. the Zulu empire was in the last phases of its formation. A Zulu state had long been formed and the tribes settled along the eastern seaboard and along the Pongola River, fell under Zulu suzerainty and paid tribute to Zulu Chiefs. Swazi princes who fled from Swaziland, such as Prince Malambule, Prince Tekwane and others, fled to this

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area as political refugees as this was Zulu territory ev at that time.

At no stage in the history of South Eastern Africa did the Dlamini clan ever have any political control over the Ingwavuma district stretching along the northern border of

South Africa from $\hat{a}200\230$ the Indian $\hat{a}202\Rightarrow$ 6¢ean to the Ubombo mountains.

The United Kingdom and Maputaland . jointly undertook to serve each other's interests; Britain to: serve the interests of the people living in what is now the Ingwavuma district by:guaranteeing them protection against Portï¬\201guese aggression, and this area to serve Britain's interest by guaranteeing to. block the then Republic of the Transvaal from expanding eastwards to the Indian ocean. As far back as 18685 "President Pretorius of the South African Republic issued a proclamation expanding the eastern boundary dfâ\200\230the Republic to the Indian ocean.

The Transvaal Republic was immediately informed by Britain that she claimed the territory situated on the banks of the Maputa river. This led to th $\tilde{\text{A}}$ © formal objection from Portugal that they too claimed sovereign rights in the area. In . 1875 President MacMahon arbitrated between the two coclonial powers

in the dispute and determined the existing boundary between

South Africa and Mocambique.

In 1875 Swaziland as such did not =ven existi o â\200\234ln the general area of what is now Swaziland, the NkoÃ@iaDlamini .clan was busy establishing itself as a dominant political force. This is a relative statement in that the Swazi had been harried by the Zulus ever since the Dlamini had begun entrenching them-â\200\231selves and only existed with British protection. It was. s8ix years later, in 1881, after MacMahon determined the now South African-Mocamblque boundary, that the Transvaal Republic and .Britain jointly guaranteed the Swazi nation their Independence The Swazi during this period, that is Frem 1880 to 1900, followed a policy of granting the Europeans from diverse quarters numerous concessions, and the first charter of self-government was actually grÃ@nted toAEuropeans in 1881 when the majority of Europeans were pressing for their incorporation into the South â\200\234African Republic, and there was in fact a period of dual control by

Britain and South Africa.

It was only after the end of the Boer War in 1903 that Swaziland began emerging —as an African . stabte.: The metémor—phis of this éï¬\201ergence was the transition from a loosely organ*scd .collection of diverse clans, harried by the Zulus and protected by Britain, to an area dominated by Euï¬\201opean_interests;â\200\230governed jointly by Britain and Boer; to being governed by Britain as a High Commission territory only after the Act of Union had

been passed.

Swaziland was therefore an of f-shoot of $a\200\230$ the balkanisation of Southern Africa by colonial interests. It had no .national status at the time that the Tembe entered into their sovereign

. treatyiwith Britadn.

Whether one looks at the question politically,

historically or constitutionally, there has never been a Swazil claim to the Ingwavuma district which South Africa now intends incorporating into Swaziland.' This incorporation, and Swaziland's involvement in it, ;s a scandalous event unequalled in the

annals of the history of Southern Africa. Mever before has

there been such Black connivance to gnter linto tic giptiest of White political moves. What makes this position doubly

scandalous is the fact that agreements being entered into between

Swaziland and South Africa are parallel to the agreements entered

into between the so-called independent Transkei and South Africa.

The Transkei was only a small beginning of this more elaborate scandal which is now emerging as a background to Pretoria's powermongering amongs economically captive and weak Black

states.

The most offensive element in this series of agreements which South Africa intends to enter into with Swaziland, is that evehy-member of the communities involved in the areas to be incorporated into Swaziland are to lose their South African "citizenship and become Swazis. In any circumstance, arbitrarily

0,000 people

One of the many things which makes apartheid horrendous is the question of citizenship as seen by Preforig. did not create the Zulu nation. The affinaty each other, or the affinity Swazis feel, was not Pretoria-created. We who are Zulus are South Africans and the horror of apartheid is that it makes political capital out of the duality in any society characterised by diversity. Our. cultural identity

is used as an excuse to deprive us of our national identity.

These unfortunate people are becoming the flotsam and jetsam of South African politics and Swaziland becomes the salvaging agent who claims ownership. In practical terms, many thbusands of people who have never been to Swaziland 'in &theiq life; who have no social, economic or even cultural ties with Swaziland, and have, been born and bred â\200\230in-South:Africa for generations, now suddenly wake up one morning to find that they have to have a foreign passport in order to live - in . their country of birth. Black South Africans thus treated are appalled at being forced to become citizens of a country where all democratic institutions have been suspended for many years. 'I enclose

a press cutting which I am sure you will find danformatives

Swaziland, in this scandalous deal with Pretoria, is displaying the worst form of African political prostitution any of us have ever countenanced. In the moves taking place, Swaziland has implicated itself in reducing j-ts international'

status-to that of :another so-called homeland of South Africa.

There will be the same South African guarantees to civil servants; there will be the same South African industrial and economic

ties; there will be the same reciprocity between Swaziland

and South Africa as there is now between the so-called indepen-

dent homelands. and South Africa. In this move, Swaziland doubles

its own population with a consequent total dependence on Pretoria.

Never before has such a machiavellian move been made by Pretoria over so many people with such brutal disregard for every standard

and norm of decent behaviour.

When the South African Minister of Co-operation and Development, sic (because that is what he actually calls himself) came toâ\200\230Ulundi to announce the decision which the South African Government had already made, I told him: "You can only do this to uÂ\$ because ydu treat us as kaffirs. You only do this to us because you have gct the might to do It You only-ido this to us because you are strong enough to trample all over us.

If we had guns, you would not dare do it, but because you have guns and we have no guns, you can do it. You. make a slave look

emancipated by the way you treat us."

It is also important to note that KaNgwane and KwaZulu will never accept the kind of independence, so-called, Pretoria: is offering Black groups in South Africa. Leadership in both KaNgwane and KwaZulu is committed to fighting for Black political

rights in South Africa as a single country.

Mr. Mabuza, as the leader of Swazi South Africans, and myself, act together in the South African Black Alliance to oppose apartheid in political co-operation with South:Africals

Coloured and Indian communities.

We both see this move as an act of vengance. We are being punished because we fight for freedom. Our political

role is feared and we are being downgraded politically.

I only heard on the 3rd May this year that :'the South African Government was'in serious discussions with Swaziland. There is no truth whatsoever in the South African Government's statement that KaNgwane and KwaZulu were consulted fully. The first intimation of what was afoot came to me on the 12th

November 1979. I enclose a memorandum I prepared then for

the Prime Minister.

Nothing was heard and it was only after press reports late last y ear that I again took up the issue. I enclose mem=- oranda which were discussed with the Minister of Co-operation .and Development 'Â\formalfontarrow Town. I also enclose a prepared statement g which I read to Dr. Koorn $\hat{a}\200\230$ hof when he addressed the KwaZulu Legislative Assembly on the 14th June 1982 to inform us that the South African Government had decided to go ahead .with the deal. : '

When one looks at the whole situation histordecdlly, there is vindication and spite being resurrected. The South African Republic was blocked from expanding eastwards to the sea by the forebears of the people living in Ingwavuma. For this reason, the South African Government 1s now punishing them by casting them of f to the mercy of soume foreign state. The Swazi in their turn had always paid political tribute to the Zulus and in this move with Pretoria, the Swazi are now hurling abuse at KwaZulu from veneath the skirts of their new

White prostitute mistress. Their own skirts were not sufficient.

Completely unemotionally, simply and.-factually, the Swazi/South African agreement to expand Swazi borders into South Africa equates Swaziland with the- South African s~ called 1ndependent homelands, and must be rejected by all men of â\200\230any decent standards and by every sovereign natign in- the world. This move means that Swaziland, DYy implicatation, 1is granting 1nternat10nal status to the Transkei, Bophuthatswana, Venda and Ciskei. This is the pay-off for Pretoria. This 1s the South Af?ican Government at its worst, using the poverty of independent

states around its borders as hostages for lits political demands.

It is important for Africa to understand.why the South African Government is forfeiting any prospect of future goodwill between It andâ\200\230over five million Black Zulu South Africans in favour of a commercial type, cost-of-benefit decided relationship with 500,000 Swazis. The political atro ocity being jointly sponsored by Swaziland and South Africa is mind-boggling in its enormity. Until one perceives the real intentions and

motives of Pretoria, the position is inexplicable.

In the penultimate phase of the evolution ofapartheid,

we saw the division of political rights along an ethnic basis.

= The dominant force of Whiteness in the country feeds on Blackness for its strength. Whites cannot farm without Blacks. Whites cannot live without Blacks in industry. Whites

cannot ne without Blacks and Whites can ultimately not rule

without Black assistance. The independence of homelands, so0-

called, is the staple dlet of South African White politics., The creatlon of so-called independent states inaâ\200\234SeuthsAfrica is the penultimate phase of classical apartheid. The wultimate phase is the permanent encapsulation of Black political and economic subservience in a confederation of states of Southern

Africa.

For Pretoria, the deeply ve xing

that none of the so- -called independent buâ\200\230*7~kfr

recognised by foreign countries as national 8t

entered into a confederation with these rejected

Confederation jtself would be rejected. The international standing of the confederation of South African 1 tes so-calle would have to be rejected by every ma jor power

Pretoria in this dastardly deed of throwing 800,000 South Africans into the Swazi melting pot 1S that_Swaziland will become a confederal unit of the future confederation.b Nothing else

makes any_political.aense out of the move. While the statement must necessarily be speculative, it is an informed South African statement, and the only explanation of the plans now being implemented. Swaziland's raison d' \tilde{A} ©tre will in future be \hat{a} 200\230that

of a hostage held captive to ensure world opinion accepts the present Prime Minister's moves towards confederalism as an

ultimate expression of classical apartheid.

In January'this year, in a communiqué addressed to African Heads of State, I included a section under the heading: '*The nature of the South African Political Scene.' I repeat

what I then said now:

"It is .important to understand that Youth Africa as a political society has characteristics which distinguishes it from the states which were liberated $\hat{a} \geq 00 \geq 30$ primarily by the armed struggle. The first distinguishing feature is e-very well developed cash economy with its sophisticated mining enterprises.

and its manufacturing cocncerns. These 1nduerlal developments,

together with the mass of Black workers who supportrthem, are politically indivisible. The destruction of the manufacturing base and $\[mathbb{i}\]^2$ 01he mining base around Johannesburg, for example, would be self-defeating as .a technique, because for over two million Black pecople in the area, mining and industry-hav $\[mathbb{A}\]^0$ e

survival value - and I mean here a life and death value.

: '*A place like Soweto could not survive for one week
â\200\230without income with which to purchase the necessities of life.
The destruction of manufacturing and mining interests would
create a situation which would be ungovernable for the liberating

forces which organised the destruction. One $\hat{\mathtt{A}}^{\boldsymbol{c}}$

ulad talkcglibly

about bringing industry to its knees but when you are in' the position actually to do so, to go ahead with its destruction would be political folly of the highest order.

; '*Not only do we need to keep in mind that the beneficiaries of the liberation struggle should be the ordinary worker and peasant, but we should also keep in mind that we rare waging a liberation struggle to bring into the south, southeastern, south-western and central African arena a viable partner for economic development on which the future governments of this whole sub-region of Africa will depend for their internal

political stability.

'â\200\230Africa, south of the Kafue riverp and. ocean - and perhaps even beyond - has the poten $a\200\230$ ijnto a super power in any international terms, and liberéfion struggle in South Africa which precludes

and long term development would be unstatesmanlike.

'Rhetorical argbments are sometimes not easy to win, particularly when they are filled with ideological Jjargon. Every Black President and Statesman will know what-I mean when I say that the sub-region of Africa, about which are are all concerned, necessitates an approach to the struggle for liberation in South Africa in which vital resources and productive capacities are not irreparably harmed. To produce the destruction of apartheid at the expense of future Blac¢k political stability

is " "to me unthinkable.

'Thus the first element in the South African political scene is the need for political interests to evolve strategies

which are not going to be self-defeating because they led to ungovernable situations.

'Another distinguishing feature of South Africa within the - -African. context is' the fact that Whites in the .country *can in no sense be regarded as expatriates and whatever direction politics takes, substantial support would have to come from the White community. Not even the toughest of Marxist or socialist forms of government could survive without substantial White support. My policies as a leader are unashamedly: in the direction of ensuring that the Black man can be liberated. My view is that he will only be liberated if the White community is integrated

into the new society.

'I am not prepared.to generate a political by which Black $\hat{a}\200\230$ and White are cast into permane \tilde{A} on the country. I. sense that Black people abhor - racialism and the basis for a non-racial

Africa does, in:fact, exists

'We have thus a sophisticated economy in which the interests of dominantly Black labour and dominantly White entrepreneurs are indivisible and that the society at large cannot

afford a division between Blacks and Whites.

'The third dimension of South African politics which

must be looked at seriously is that we do not have a blank

sheet on which to design a new society. The gaining of indepen-

dence in Black African states did not rub out the history of colonial domination. The structure of that domination and

the aftermath of political and administrative bungling by colonial powers did not disappear with the achievement of independence.

of political accommodation of juxtaposed Black spheres of interests

The advent of the White man in South Africa inhibited a process

which have yet to be completed.

'The British and the Boers balkanised South Africa, and whether we like it or not, regionalism - under-pinned by both strong economic factors and ethnic considerations - exists. The building blocks of a liberated South Africa are therefore Blacks and Whites within the context of strong regional influences.

Political leadership is $^{\prime}$ not an imposed ideology, as some exiles

seem to believe. It is a system working within the confines

of vested interests and the control of the production of wealth for the improvement of the standards of living of the people

at large. Politics should work towards a just society in which everybody shares.in the wealth the country can produce; and should give rise to equitable and generalised improvements

in:-standards of living.

'Yet another feature of the South African political situation is the extent to which it is by now entwined in Western interests and is located in the north/south international axis. Seeking support from the socialist bloc only, or only accepting support from the socialist bloc, is doomed to failure unless we are ultimately forced some day or other to meet a White scorched earth policy. with our own scorched earth policy.

Short of that situation, the liberation of South Africa will depend heavily on our ability as South Africans to gain support

from the Western world.'

Swaziland as a threat to the emergence of a viable Southern, Central and East African region

The focus of the sectibn I have just repeated for the sake of convenience is on the nature of the internal South African struggle for liberation, as it could have been presumptuous of me to talk about what Black leaders in o?her parts of this 'region are doing. In that SwazilÃ@nd 15 nbw behaving so as to deeply affect the internal political situation in South Africa, I claim the right to discuss Swaziland's stances. Swaiilaï¬\201d's intrigue with Pretoria about the inclusion of the whole of KaNgwane and parts of KwaZulu amounts to a joint venture in apartheid by South Africa and a member of the CAU, This event is deeply disturbing to anybody involved in the struggle

for liberation here. While that fact is a matter for OAU attention and for serious consideration by individual African Heads cf State, the implications of this move are 'such that I have to

make my own statement.

In the first place it prejudices the kind of country liberated South Africa will be. It prejudices the relationship that we were hoping for between-the liberated South Africa

and neighbouring Black States and Central and East Africa.

I always conceived of . sthis vast region to be potentially significant, both economically and politically, internationally. Enithat conception I had always accepted that a post liberation South Africa would be such as to make for easy and harmonious relationships with other States. The Swazi moves to consort Politically with Pretoria make me Seriously question whether

harmony in this wider Sub-region will ever pe achieved.

In the whole of Africaâ\200\231the only way in which land issues have not become insoluable and bermanent issues of war and bloodshed is to accept the colonial boundarieé as given boundaries. We have all accepted that. KwaZulu 'has accepted theâ\200\230northern boundaries which were drawn by the French President, Mr. MacMahon; at the request or Portugal and Britaift. The people south of that border are South African and we as South Africans can never abandon them. This act of Lerritorial aggression by Swaziland with South Africa's concurrence will never ever be acéepfed by any Black South African. A future Black South Africa will reclaim that land and they will not be answeréble if-that reclamation goes further and includes the whole of Swaziland in a future South Africa which replaces

the government at Mbabane with Just another regional administra-

 $\hat{a}\200\230$ tive unit. This insoluable problem will not be corrected and

will live for generations. It will dog every
States in this part of the world with problems. *]
there is even a more grave situation to which urgent attention

needs to be given.

This is the nature of the South African poditicad

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society as such.

it has not been a revolution. It is liberdation against policies and unjust institutions. When the Swazis in due course take their seat around the tables with the White minority South African Government and so-cglled Independent homelands of South Africa, and when they do so in the context of the confederation of States working actively towards holding

Central and East Africa to ransom in a drive to establish the

- Present White Prime Minister's dream of a constellation of

states, tï¬\202ey will be joint architects which design the pillars.

of support for permanent White racist power.

he struzggle for liberation will be radicalised, and I do not mean here made more violent; I mean radicalised in the sense that the struggle for liberation will be necessarily co-terminous with a revolution in which nothing will survive. The basis for the future significance of South, Central and

East Africa as a region will have been deeply undermined.

SwazilÃ@nd, under the situation which is envisaged by Pretoria, will necessarily become a highly volatile and fragile entity — one could not even then call it a country. In this move, Swaziland will more than double its population. Its civil service will not cope with the additional Loadsy~its financÃ@s will not stretch far enough; its manpower will be stressed and strained at the national and regional levels. Efficiency will not be maintained and an inefficient, undermanned central Swazi administration will have to force its willvon the people whom it is incorporating through the kind of dictatorial moves characterised by other Blacks who have accepted a Pretoria

invitation to become hated rulers.

Revolution inside Swaziland will need no instigation; revolution will be encapsulated in the new State and be part of its very national fabric. The kind of revolution I am talking about, bloody revolution, the negation of democracy, democratic procedures, wildl be a grave threat to Southern African stability Lfor a'long time to come. I repeat the point that what I am saying about Swaziland is just as detrimental to the interests of the armed struggle as it is to the interests of the Black

struggle inside the country.

Black South Africans are appalled at this move, and particularly appalled that it is being made at this point in time. Every effort should be made to dissuade South Africa's White minority government not to rush headlong into an irreversible political situation in which the minority White join with Indians and Coloureds as a new class of oppressor in a new political

dispensation based on confederalism. .

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The South African Prime Minister's appointed President's

Council has now tabled its first reports and made recommendations $% \left(1\right) =\left(1\right) +\left(1\right) +$

in.line with the Prime Minister's personal drive to achieve total .personal power in a confederal system where the executive

answerable to Parliament, and need not

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will -not be direc!
be composed of elected members. I make the serious statement

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that the President's Council, the Prime Minister's personal ambitions and the new political dispensation now being sketched, albeit tentatively, amount to a scenario in which the White South African army will be the ultimate power, and not any

democratic institutions.

June 1982.