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- SUNDAY TIMES, November 22 1992. 23

Picture: COBUS BODENSTEIN

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\"{ eaell'\-i  
22/1/92

By S'BU MNGADI

N August 6 1979, King Good-

will Zwelithini stunned a  
packed KwaZulu Legislative

Assembly when he scaled an enclo-

sure for diplomats and bolted out of

the building into the night.

~ Unable to endure hours of cross-  
ination by KLA members, Zwe-

thini left KwaZulu Chief Minister

Mangosuthu Buthelezi in a powerf  
seat as the undisputed B der  
of the Zulus from then on. When the  
â\200\230Zulu monarch finally returned he  
was only to become a constitutional  
Â» king of the Zulu nation with no politi-  
cal power.

: The 1979 incident was part of an  
i ng tense battle for political control of  
the Zulu throne between senior mem-  
| bers of the Zulu royal family on the  
. one hand and Buthelezi, Inkatha and  
the KLA on the other.

. In January 1976, when Zwelithini,  
chiefs and Zulu traditionalists were  
gll?gedly im;ol\.;ld in secret attempts  
- to forma political party in opposition  
to Inkatha in KwaZulu, Buthelezi  
called a eapecial KLA meeting and  
summoned the king to answer for his  
involvement in politics.

m?h}he'lezi an t.;e KLA made Zwe-  
ithini sign an undertaking that he  
iwould refrain from partyn:olitics.

7 However, senior members of the  
'Zulu royal family were, and continue  
to be, unhappy with the removal of  
the royal family from the seat of  
litical power in KwaZulu. And  
â\200\230 utl:â\200\230elez x ublicly acknowledges that  
mos

s tension was to continue an  
exploded in 1980, when the king was  
again nugmoned to the KLA and  
charged with having accused Buthe-  
lezi collaborating with the SA gov-  
ernment. â\200\230

political leader \_

] members have never sup-\_\_  
por\_Igs nkatha. | way

When Zwelithin failed t0 aPPECT,

i his a  
the chl?:{ miwĩ-\201hji;f" Wĩ-\201t from quote a thoritatively to show that

od and many privi- kings ha  
the KLA.

Zulu king: A

his sa  
Pretoria was halv  
ges withdrawn by t?;m :  
In addition, all ests for  
interviews with an invitations  
Zwelithini were t0 be @  
L  
nted justice  
. phzâ\200\230t. etwa, the kingâ\200\231s chief spo  
| who was to be presen

minister Rev

interviews.  
Writing  
. Gerry Mare and Geor  
stated: â\200\234B  
| the king into  
e  
" Inkatha.â\200\235 ; !  
It was this subjugation. of the king  
in the '80s that gave the KwaZulu  
chief minister more power t0 play his  
â\200\234Zulu nationglismâ\200\235 card with the  
king on his side. \_  
Bgut the king retained his royal  
status as a symbol of the Zulu nation,

and Buthelezi did much to boost the  
king in that role, thus offering consid-  
erable compensation for the loss of  
litical power. j  
Since then there has been an ami-  
cable truce between them, with both  
sharing the same speech writers.  
The king remained marginali  
for many years after this, but sudden-  
ly last year Buthelezi thrust him into  
the spotlight. The Inkatha leader in-  
sisted on the inclusion of Zwelithini  
at Codesa, which Buthelezi later boy-  
cotted when he could not have his

in Appetite for Power,  
ina Hamilton  
â\200\234Buthelezi managed to \_s!uft  
a subsidiary position,  
to the KLA and to

Buthelezi campaigned that the po-  
sition of the Zulu nation be addr

in any new constitutional negotiation  
and Zwelithini came in handy when  
Inkatha aggressively proposed 2  
strong regional autonomy instead of  
an ANC-favoured unitary system for  
the whole country.

22 | 92

Buthelezi quoted and continues to  
been involved in constitu-

tional settlements all over Africa as

. lcolonies gave way to independence.

to' And he argued, much to the irritation

by of other paramount chiefs, that Zwe-

Zulu cabinet. The KLA ap- lithini was the only king in SA.  
Celani

keSMaN, recent appeal to the Zulu monarch to

ANC president Nelson Mandelaâ\200\231s

Â¢ at all media pelo end violence was significant,

because for the first time the ANC  
acknowledged a role for the king in  
reaching some kind of harmony &

accord between Inkatha and the

ANC.

Speaking at the funeral of Natal '

midlands ANC deputy chairman  
Reggie Hadebe in Maritzburg, Man-  
dela said: â\200\234King Zwelithiniâ\200\231s contri-  
bution to the restoration of peace will  
earn him the everlasting gratitude of

all our people.â\200\235

Mandelaâ\200\231s plea was interpreted by  
many as a peace gesture, even as an  
acceptance of the Zulu kingâ\200\231s tradi-  
tional authority to speak on behalf of  
all Zulus.

But Buthelezi was angered.

He accused his ANC counterpart  
of trying to drive a wedge between  
the Zulu monarch and himself, there-  
fore becoming a threat to his power

base.

The KwaZulu chief minister said,  
he found it insulting that Mandela  
had addressed his comments to the  
king rather than to him on the issue of  
violence. And predictably, Zwelith-  
iniâ\200\231s reaction was a reproduction of  
â\200\230Butheleziâ\200\231s anger almost word for:  
word. ) i

To demonstrate Inkathaâ\200\231s political  
leverage on the Zulu king, Vrye  
Weekblad senior reporter Hennie,  
Serfontein waited for weeks before.  
the chief ministerâ\200\231s  
him permission to in  
esty.

office granted |  
interview His Maj- |

puppet on a chain?

Even then they attached stringent  
conditions. All political questions |  
were to be f axed to Buthelezi before- |  
hand. :

And as if that was not enough,  
KwaZulu cabinet ministers and sen- |

tha leaders Dr Dennis Ma-  
thcl  
a

jor Inka :  
dide and L Majila sat through

interview. They were SO u  
reference t0 Mandelaâ\200\231s plea that they

interrupted the interview.  
~This incident hig\_hl}  
Zwelithini gtill remains

detriment of his stature as @ symbol  
of unity among Zulus.

Cirt Fey Aorriccns 1ld. T

B1G BROTHER IS WATCHING ... . Goodwill Zwelithini has been forced i "  
KwazZulu Chief Minister Mangosuthu Buthelezi takes full responsibility



PAGE 2

CITY PRESS, November 22, 1992 (" - ?m:i- \201

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By QUINTON RHODES

THE ANC stuck a span-  
ner in the governmentâ\200\231s  
works this week when it  
formally accepted the  
principle of power-shar-  
ing with the NP govern-  
ment during and even for  
a specified number of  
years after the transito-  
nal period. \_

Though the move appe-  
ared conciliatory, in fact  
the effect was to intensify  
pressure on the govern-  
ment to speed up the pro-  
cess of transformation  
and to give in to demands  
for an interim  
government.

The decision to accept  
the notion of a govern-  
ment of national unity  
was taken at a meeting of

ANC sticks a spanner in the works

the ANCâ\200\231s National  
Working Committee in  
Johannesburg this week.

It represents a funda-  
mental departure from  
the ANCâ\200\231s earlier official  
position which insisted  
that the results of elec-  
tions alone should deter-  
mine the constitution of  
the future government.

In terms of the new de-  
cision, the ANC is guar-  
anteeing far greater re-  
presentation in future  
government to the NP  
than its support base  
could democratically  
claim. It proposes that an  
interim government of

national unity should be  
kept in place:

M During the period of



setting up elections for a  
Constituent Assembly;  
B While the Constituent  
Assembly is drafting the  
new constitution;

M During the period  
when the old constitution  
is phased out and the ma-  
chinery of State is being  
restructured; and

M The proposed govern-  
ment of national unity  
could be retained into the  
indefinite future.

In the words of the  
Strategic Perspective  
document: â\200\234The balance  
of forces and the interests

of the country as a whole  
may still require of us to  
consider the establish-  
ment of a government of  
national unity, provided  
the parties who have lost  
the elections will not be  
able to paralyse the func-  
tioning of governmentâ\200\235.

The document also con-  
cedes on other major  
arcas of conflict,  
including:

M A general amnesty for  
the security forces;

M Job security and pen-  
sion deals for the civil ser-  
vice; and

M The framing of poli-  
cies on the powers and

constitution of regional  
government by means of  
bilateral discussions be-  
tween the ANC and the  
government.

The document repre-  
sents an unprecedented  
gesture of conciliation by  
the ANC.

More importantly, it  
meets almost all of the  
governmentâ\200\231s stated ob-  
jections to speedily insti-  
tuting an interim author-  
ity as well as for getting  
talks back on track. The  
central point here, as  
President De Klerk made  
clear in interviews last  
weekend in London, is the

governmentâ\200\231s insistence

that it would not be prepared to accept winner-takes-all elections and demanded guarantees for the position of whites in the future.

De Klerk has also held out on the question of strong regional government to balance the central authority.

The ANCâ\200\231s acceptance of the Strategic Perspective document has led to intensified local and international pressure on De Klerk to speedily resolve the present negotiations impasse â\200\224 and to institute some form of interim

government.

The announcement of the ANCâ\200\231s willingness to enter into power-sharing arrangements came, calculatedly, amid a growing crisis of confidence, credibility â\200\224 and most importantly of legitimacy â\200\224 currently facing De Klerkâ\200\231s government.

This weekâ\200\231s revelations by the Goldstone Commission â\200\224 that SADF

Military Intelligence continues to be involved in

projects aimed at destabilising the ANC by covert and unsavoury means â\200\224

came on top of revelations

of enormous corruption inside Pretoriaâ\200\231s homelands.

In the wake of these and other scandals which continue to break over the governmentâ\200\231s head on an almost daily basis, the demand for interim government grew in intensity this week when Nelson Mandela stated the ANC would not be prepared to re-enter negotiations until a date had been set for an

interim government to  
take control of the degen-  
erating situation.

Particularly with De  
Klerkâ\200\231s bottom line of  
power sharing having  
been already guaranteed,  
the ball is firmly in the

governmentâ\200\231s court . . .

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/ANCâ\200\231 fraud accused refused b:ail

JABULANI Shabalala, 28, who pretended he- Was  
an ANC official, and is said to have defra.uded  
Reef businessmen of more that R7-million, Was

this week refused bail by a Roodepoort Regiâ\200\230lonal  
Court magistrate. U= 3 N

The court was told that when he was arreSted  
the police discovered that he was on the wantedj list  
and had escaped from custody. The prosecyitor  
said, if bail was granted, Shabalala would Â\$ not

stand trial. X |lga . 1â\200\230

â\200\230Shabalalaâ\200\231s co-accused Ronald Smith\vas Fon-  
ditionally granted R8 000 bail, and the trialvas  
postponed to December 15.

hANC faCtiOhÃ©Wa

/

Farhana Ismail

! A CLASH is looming over senti-

' ments held by a faction of the local African National Congress executive members and non-racial sports bodies against future tours.

The future of international tours hangs in the balance as dissension has been expressed against sports negotiator Steve Tshwete and other ANC decision-makers,

Mr Tshwete, commonly known as

NDAY

the â\200\234Mr Fixit of sportâ\200\235 had been criticised for â\200\234rough-shoddingâ\200\235 the ANC, â\200\234making deals with the United Cricket Board and the South African Rugby Football Unionâ\200\235 without grassroots consultation and ignoring imbalances in the development of sport in black communities, ;

In a move likely to create a storm in sport circles, members of the ANC as well as the National and

Olympic Sports Congress (NOSC)

have indicated they have asked the

ANC to torpedo all forthcoming tours, including the triangular cricket tournament in South Africa with Pakistan and West Indies and various test series scheduled from 1993-

1994

At an ANC Southern Natal regional congress today delegates will make a call to halt the tours and concentrate on development.

~Harry Naidu, chairman of -NOSC (Southern Natal), said: â\200\234Moves are

nts future sports tours'

TR YN

tours. The issue of the development of sport in this country has been side-tracked.â\200\235

He said South Africa needed at least five years to put its house in

order before competing inter-

nationally. More resources and money needed to be ploughed into development to correct the imbalances of apartheid from the past, Mr Naidu said. SRR

Mr Tshwete said the national executive in the ANC would never support the NOSC sentiments.

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topped

ask for the tours to be halted. Sport development varies from code to code and the ANC has decided on its

long-term objectives, Development,

It is a childish and puerile move, " for sports bodies and individuals to

B

especially in cricket, has been taking

place along with the current tour. Development is a gradual process and world competitions should take place at the same time. v i?

Mr Tshwete said the decision taken by him was in effect taken after consultation with the NEC.

being made to stop the forthcoming

.. "â\200\234THE NEW YORK TIMES 'INTER\_NATIONAL SUNDAY, NOVEMBER 22, 1992

Zulu vs. Zulu,

Old Stalinist |  
Vs Chieftain' |

By BILL KELLER  
Special to The New York Times

PIETERMARITZBURG, South Af-|

rica â\200\224 Harry T. Gwala is a Zulu by  
ancestry and a Stalinist by reputation.  
Of the two labels, he is more comfort-  
able with the second. : g  
â\200\234Worse things happened under capi-

talism than under Stalin,â\200\235â\200\235 Mr. Gwala |

said, wallowing happily in the notoriety

surrounds him as the most bellig- |

e hard-liner in the top ranks of the

African National Congress.

In peaceful times, Mr. Gwala may  
m be perceived as an eccentric  
ck, a bogeyman who frightensâ\200\231  
away moderates uneasy about a future  
under majority rule. But his image as a  
fearsome warlord serves him well  
these days as Natal Province, where he  
over the midlands region,

slides deeper into civil war.

â\200\230Hard Conditionsâ\200\231

â\200\234I consider myself a hard-liner be-  
cause we live under very hard condi-  
tions,â\200\235 said Mr. Gwala, an impish man  
with a gray goatee who has spent 50 of  
his 72 years in the Communist Party,  
and 21 of them in South African pris-  
ons. A week earlier his young deputy,  
we Hadebe, had been gunned down  
while returning home from a peace  
parley with the rival Inkatha Freedom

â\200\234The war in Natal is essentially a  
\* battle among Zulus, the prevailing eth-

nic group here and the largest in South |

b Inkatha Freedom Party, led by  
Mangosuthu Gatsha Buthelezi,  
â\200\230built a predominantly rural base

by promoting conservative Zulu tradi- |  
tion and by co-opting the Zulu tribal |  
authorities. The African National Con- |. |

Mark Peters/SIPA Press

Harry T. Gwala

VI

~â\200\224

".vÂç gress rejects tribal authority as an !  
anachronism, one much exploited by |

â\200\230whites under apartheid.  
4] canâ\200\231t picture myself with a shield

those feathers on my head,â\200\235 Mr. |

ala said with distaste, alluding to  
ceremonial gear Chief Buthelezi  
often dons to address his followers.

â\200\230Tribal Cultureâ\200\231 Is Passed

. â\200\234I have no such attachment, except  
to show my children what the past  
looked like,â\200\235â\200\235 Mr. Gwala said. â\200\230â\200\230Human-  
ity passed through the phase of tribal  
culture. You canâ\200\231t go to an'A.N.C. rally  
and talk about that. They will boo you

" | down. They consider themselves South

Africans.â\200\235 .

Mr. Gwala emerged from his last  
tour in the penitentiary on Robben Is-  
land with a mysterious weakening of

- | his muscles that left his arms hanging  
- useless at his side and causes his head

to slump forward. 5

Thus, his bellicose image dimini  
in.person, when the phone rings and  
must prevail upon a visitor to lift the  
receiver to his ear for him, or when his.  
secretary slips his glasses over his  
ears so he can read the computer print-  
outs charting his membership gains in  
formerly Inkatha areas. :

There seems to be an element of  
bluff in his Stalinism, which in conver-

' sation emerges more as an intellectual

re of his country.  
Not Quite a Stalinist

g:ovocation than as a design for the  
tu



He insists that his own experience of |  
whites and the|

life under the ruling  
National Party has left him with an

abhorrence for the kind of limits on |

political freedom that Stalin perfected.  
â\200\234The one-party system has its own

big disadvantages,â\200\235 he said. â\200\234The Nats

tried it. They banned everyone.â\200\235 .

- His most vivid memory of his only

trip to the former Soviet bloc,'in 1989, is

" his attempt to purchase a large suit-  
case in East Germany and finding only |

a single small version on sale.

â\200\234Centralized planning,â\200\235 he said with |

contempt, peering across his battered

" desk, where the only book is a blue-

bound volume of Leninâ\200\231s selected writ-  
ings. He has since tempered his eco-  
nomic views to make room for a meas-  
ure of free enterprise. ' - â\200\230

. On that trip, Mr. Gwala found Mos-

cow unremittingly gloomy, but accept- |

ed the word of his hosts that the misery  
â\200\230was the result of Mikhail S. Gorba-  
chevâ\200\231s reforms, not the legacy of Com-  
â\200\230munism. So when a gang of party se-  
;mrats tried to overthrow the Soviet  
leader in August 1991, Mr. Gwala sent  
them a message of congratulations.  
Mr. Gorbachev, he still contends, â\200\230â\200\230was

. a traitor to socialism.â\200\235 ;

Â© Mr. Gwala was a guerrilla in Spea  
â\200\230of the Nation, the congress under-  
â\200\230ground known as MK (for Umkhonto  
);Iâ\200\230Sizwe), and Inkatha critics say he  
has orchestrated paramilitary hit  
'squads throughout Natal in a campaign  
o drive out Chief Butheleziâ\200\231s support-  
ers. ! v

~\_More impartial observers say that,  
â\200\230at the least, Mr. Gwalaâ\200\231s militant ora-  
tory, including an oft-quoted boast that  
â\200\234we kill Inkatha warlords,â\200\235 has fanned  
â\200\230hostilities and that the A.N.C. has al-  
â\200\230lowed its supporters to rage out of  
control.









R T AP IR PRSI

'24AÂ° THE CHARLOTTE OBSERVER Sunday, November 22, 1992

|-

~ANC

- ANC supporters march through right-v

By BARRY RENFREW

- Associated Press

NYLSTROOM, South Africa â\200\224  
Several hundred African National  
Congress supporters marched

'peacefully Saturday through the

right-wing town of Nylstroom as  
hundreds of police stood guard  
against threatened violence.

U.N. observers carrying blue-

~ and-white UN. flags led the pro-

cession to Nylstroom's police sta-  
tion, where marchers submitted a  
memorandum protesting alleged  
police harassment and racist atti-  
tudes by white people in the area.

â\200\234The whites are very bad here,â\200\235

" said local ANC leader Norman

Mashabane. â\200\234There is a lot of  
harassment, a lot of problems.â\200\235

The march came a day after  
leader Nelson Mandela  
threatened to break off talks with  
President F.W. de Klerkâ\200\231's govern-  
ment if a date for installing a  
multiracial government isnâ\200\231t set at  
a coming meeting.

De Klerk needs the ANC, the  
nationâ\200\231s leading black group, to  
revive multiparty negotiations on a  
new constitution to end white  
minority rule.

But if he meets the ANC ultima-  
tum, he risks alienating many white  
people who already believe he is  
kowtowing to the black group, and  
angering other black groups which  
accuse the government and ANC  
of hijacking the negotiations.

Nylstroom, about 100 miles  
north of Johannesburg, is a bastion

of pro-apartheid white people,  
who tried to halt the march and  
threatened bloodshed against the  
demonstrators.

Andries Treurnicht, the leader of  
the pro-apartheid Conservative  
Party who hails from the area,  
called the march "an injustice to  
whites and a triumph to the ANC."

More than 300 police officers,  
backed by helicopters, snipers on  
rooftops and army troops,  
patrolled the march route. Police  
also searched people at several  
roadblocks and stopped people  
wearing uniforms of the extreme  
right-wing Afrikaner Resistance  
Movement from entering the town.

White residents looked on from  
their gardens, some with glum  
faces and others appearing curi-  
ous, while black onlookers  
cheered and raised clenched fists.

An armed police officer watches African National  
Congress supporters march in the northern  
Transvaal town of Nylstroom Saturday. Several

hundred ANC  
through the  
police stood g

"~Â\$~~,â\200\230 &y

i â\200\234THE NEW YOR;{' ''rIMEs INTERNATIONAL SUNDAY NOVBMBER 22, 1992

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â\200\230| whites under apartheâ\200\231id. T Ay  
.44] tanâ\200\231t picture myselt witl1 a shield

2;md those feathers on' my head,â\200\235 Mr.

~13Gwala said with. distaste, alludmg to  
7l the â\200\234Âceremonial -gear: Chief - â\200\230Buthelezi:

often dons to address hxs follo !



By BILL KELLER

-A Special to the New York Times A

how my children what the past  
PIETER MARITZBURG South Africa }

looked like, Mr. Gwala said. Human-

ity passed through the phase of tribal -  
culture. You can't go to an A.N.C. rally.  
: and talk about that. They will boo you;

P

rica Harry T. Gwala is, a Zulu by  
ancestry and a Stalinist by reputation  
Of the two labels, he is more comfortable.

es it

Worse things happened under capital - = Africa emerged from his last  
talismans than under Stalin, Mr. Gwala || Africa } toy in the penitentiary on Robben  
Island.  
- said, wallowing happily in the no-fear || | and with a mysterious weakening  
of -  
? the 2000 "r" Africa { Africa ds his Africa mtgs the "it" Africa ; | his mu-  
scles that left his arms hanging  
Sard-line in the top ranks of the |. i yseless at his side and causes his head i  
(African National Congress. ' | to slump forward. - ] |  
. n peai:) eeful umes After Gwala. may Thus, his bellicose image dlmim li- 201  
i fh"me g K pebx:: etv a ah" t; ccntric\_ | in person, when the phone rings and he  
row a:: d a bogeyman who frightens must prevail upon a visitor to lift the  
away m er? ttes ulnea Bsy about a future receiver to his ear for him, or when his.

1 I yl Africa Africa de ut his | gtiage asla; Africa | secretary slips his glasses Africa  
\200\230 over his  
earsome -warlord Africa serves him Africa we Africa | ears so he can read the computer  
print--  
outs farting his members http gams in

+|bluff in hls Stalinism, which in conver-  
y satlon emerges â\200\230more as an intellectual  
ve under very hard condi- provocatnon â\200\230thanâ\200\231as -a de ign fo the 1

tit))&s, id Mr. Gwala, an impish man future of his country.

" with a gray goatee who has spent 50 of :

~ his 72 years in the Communist Party, Sig Nt Quiteastallnl\_st, B  
sts that his own experiences of

and 21 of them in South African pris- =

week earlier his young deputy, | life under the ruling whites \_and â\200\230the  
e Hadebe, had been gunned down | | National Party has left him with an  
e \_returning -home from a peace Â¢ . abhorrence for the kind of limits on  
l Inkatha Freedom political freedom that Stalin perfected..

: g Â¢The one-party\_ â\200\234system has its own {  
big dxsadvantages," he said. â\200\234The Nats |  
tried it 'lâ\200\230hey banned everyone.â\200\235..  
â\200\230His â\200\230most â\200\230vivid memory of his only  
trip to the former Soviet bloc,'in 1989, is  
hts attempt to purchase a large suit-  
case in East Germany and fmdmg only  
\_a single small version on sale. =" 2.  
:\* â\200\234Centralized planning,â\200\235 he satd with ||  
contempt peering across his battered |  
-"desk, where the only book is a blue-| - -  
â\200\234bound volume of Lenin's selected writ- |  
~ ings. He has since tempered his eco-

- nomic views to make room for a meas-  
-ure of free enterprise. ' < !  
% On that trip, Mr. Gwala found Mos- |  
â\200\230cow unremittingly gloomy, but accept- | |  
~â\200\231led the word of his hosts that the misery  
â\200\234was the result of Mikhail S. Gorba-  
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\*â\200\234â\200\230munism. So when a gang of party se-  
~ â\200\234curocrats tried to overthrow the Soviet  
ader 'in August 1991, Mr. Gwala sent  
them a message of congratulations.  
-Mr. Gorbachev, he stxll contends â\200\234was i  
a trattor to socialism.â\200\235

r. Gwala was a guernl]a m Spear i  
â\200\234of . the - Nation, - the \_congress under-  
round known as MK (for â\200\230Umkhonto

e"szwe) â\200\230and Inkatha critics say he |,  
ihas orchestrated â\200\234paramilitary - hit |/  
;squad throughout Natal ina campaign  
;drive out Chlef ButhelezizÃ@fsu?port-

: a2

odi

%] consider myself a hard-liner be â\200\231

g P Y TR S b

' battle ar long Zulus the prevailing eth-  
\_nic group here and the largest in South |

atha FreedOm Party, led by |  
x ef â\200\230Mangosuthu Gatsha Buthelezi,  
 . \_hds built'a predominantly rural base  
by promoting conservative Zulu tradi-  
tion and by co-opting the Zulu tribal  
authorities. The African Natlional Con- |.  
| T

ol  
fatvthe Ieast â\200\230Mr. Gwalaâ\200\231s militant ora-  
-gory includmg an oft-quoted boast that  
we kill Inkatha warlords,"â\200\235 has fanned  
\*hostilities â\200\230and that the A.N.C. has al-  
" Mowed jtsâ\200\235 supporters to rage out of  
w5 -icontrol . 35 e i i B

re 37  
P S DT> Y o DT

Il;{fgl;}ggg}ggflsggâ\200\230fgg%lthe ultimate aim of the Party is the building of a communist society,

I ot onamcsburg are towards which it is guided by the principles of Marxism-Leninism . . . tioned that I was going to Tg \_thig end, the Communist Party aims ... to end the system of capitalist exploitation and establish a socialist republic based on the

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. interview Joe Slovo, every-  
\* one said, â\200\234Ah, Joe,â\200\235 with deep  
eaning, for they all knew

i hiim from the old days.  
| However much they might  
" detest the politics of the sec-

retary-general of the South

African Communist Party

and former chief of staff of |

. Umkhonto we Sizwe (the  
Spear of the Nation), he was  
till one of them, a Johannes-

/ urg intellectual. In'a less-

P

fraught political environ-  
ment they might have  
considered him an amusing  
and ornamental enfant ter-  
rible.

He remains on the execu-  
tive committee of the ANC,  
however, and is one of the  
organisationâ\200\231s chief negotia-  
tors.

I met him in his office on  
the 10th floor of the ANCâ\200\231s  
headquarters in Shell House  
in Plein Street in central Jo-  
hannesburg. At the reception  
desk I asked for Mr Slovo; the  
receptionist called him Com-  
rade Joe.

Security is elaborate at  
Shell House, but it seems rit-  
ualistic and not very effi-  
cient.

It was difficult to credit  
that until recently Mr Slovo  
was the man most wanted by  
South African security forces,  
that while in exile he had  
been the object of more than  
one assassination attempt  
and that his wife, journalist  
' Ruth First, was murdered

with a parcel-bomb in |

' Mozambique.

When I met him, Mr Slovo did not look like a man who had just undergone a course of chemotherapy for cancer. Casually dressed (in his characteristic red socks), he looked younger than his 66 most eventful years. He was polite, mild-mannered and affable, even avuncular; and I should guess that he takes de-

common ownership of the means of pro  
Power: Programipe of the Sqgth African Communist Party (1989)

Comrade Joe:  
Treading  
softly on

â\200\230light in appearing the very  
' opposite of the demon he is

frequently painted as.

He is soft-spoken with a mild South African accent (his family emigrated to South Africa from Lithuania when he was eight years old, his more distant relatives being killed there in the Holocaust); and he speaks calmly, even in response to questions which are clearly hostile, as though he had reached a state of serenity.

F late, he has been making some uncharacteristically concilia-

\_tory public statements; the

author of the pamphlet â\200\234No Middle Roadâ\200\235, which for many years was the guide of every serious South African

! revolutionary, was now say-

ing that compromise with the government was desirable

| and necessary, that the con-

cerns and fears of the whites, including the police and the army, would have to be understood and within limits accommodated, and that a certain (unspecified) period of power-sharing was inevita-

- ble.

I asked him whether his

proposed compromise was  
strategic or tactical.

It isn't a question of strategy or tactics,

he replied,  
but a recognition on the part  
of the government that it cannot go on governing in the same old way, and on the part of the ANC that we are not strong enough to seize power.

I have been in favour of a multi-party system for many years now.  
I was surprised to hear it. I asked whether his experience of exile in African countries such as Angola and Mozambique had affected his views.  
I was never impressed by the so-called socialism of Angola and Mozambique,

Ã©vz,

duction ... The Path to

' :lil\*\u] 2 Y

communism  
mistakes

master tactician

ANTHONY DANIELS talks to Joe Slovo, leader of the South African Communist Party and the

b B : s : | lonialism. Would you take  
: ; - | that as an argument in favour

. said. â\200\234Subjectively, I never  
thought it worked.â\200\235

By subjectively he meant (I  
think) that he did not give  
public expression to his  
doubts.

â\200\234The fundamental  
tion,â\200\235 Slovo continued, â\200\234is

iences in African countries  
(including Zambia and Tan-

zania) had led him to reject

nationalisation as a policy.  
â\200\234Yes,â\200\235 he replied. Â©Al-

though everyone is a

that this does not exclude

. deep involvement of the state

| in the economy, which is ne-  
| cessary. But things obviously

| cannot change overnight.

Â¢ Clllange will have to be gradu-  
alâ\200\235 : : '

Had the people in the town-

ships been told this? Was i  
not rather different  
what slogans had led them to  
believe? Had not their' â\200\230ex-  
pectations been raised to un-  
realistic levels?

Mr Slovo replied that the |

slogans had been necessary  
to activate the masses; and  
slogans inevitably simplified  
matters. However, he be-  
lieved that when the true situ-

ation was explained to the

people, they would under-  
stand; he had confidence in

the political maturity of the ;

- South African masses.

Was I to understand, then, |

that he was now a reformist?



â\200\234As against what?â\200\235 he asked.

â\200\234A revolutionary.â\200\235

He explained that without the revolutionary activity of the past few years there would have been no negotiations now. The same, of course, might be said for the South African security forces.

I asked him about his allegiance to the Soviet Union. I

recalled reading an interview |

in the Independent, circa

ques-

| in the Soviet Press.

who has power, and in whose | interest. Or, as Lenin suc-

cinctly put it: â\200\230Who Whom?â\200\231 â\200\235

I asked whether his exper- |

N e

from

1988, in which he had said he first realised that Stalin betrayed the working class, and that the Gulag was no mere figment of capitalist propaganda, the previous year, when revelations were made

â\200\234My disenchantment was a long process,â\200\235 he said, â\200\234beginning with Krushchevâ\200\231s secret speech in 1956. It wasnâ\200\231t like a sudden religious conversion;

| it was more a development.â\200\235

â\200\234If you donâ\200\231t mind my saying so, you were a late developer.â\200\235 This seemed to pro-

voke him into a defence of

Soviet â\200\234achievementsâ\200\235.

â\200\234You must remember

| there was more to the Soviet: | Union than labour camps. It was the pioneer of free edu-

cation, free health care, housing for the workers and security of employment.

Children were looked after.

" There were the technologi-

cal achievements, and for a  
time the growth rate exceed-

ed that of America. And welfare capitalism was a response to the Soviet example.

cal inaccuracies in Mr Slovo's remarks, and he continued his self-exculpation:

Of course, these things did not outweigh the human side of the labour camps and so forth. But you have to remember as well that the Soviet Union occupied only five percent of my consciousness. The other 95 percent was occupied by South Africa. The Soviet Union was the only

consistent friend we had, |  
| while the capitalist countries

ignored us completely.

Had he ever considered the.

Soviet Union a model for South Africa?

Yes, he replied.

This established beyond reasonable doubt that to hate apartheid was not necessary to love freedom.

Did you ever go to the Soviet Union?

Yes, several times.

Did you not notice anything about it, the shoddiness and the shortages, for example?

Yes, we did, but at that time we explained them away to ourselves as the result of the arms race with the Americans. Y

And did you investigate other aspects of Soviet reality? Did you visit health-care facilities, for example, or look into housing?

You must remember that we were there as guests of |

the government, and we met |  
only the nomenklatura. They  
supported us and we believed |

what they told us; we trusted

them.â\200\235  
Slovo seems unaware even

| of colonialism?â\200\235

â\200\234You have a point,â\200\235 he said.  
I asked him about the vio-

lence in the townships. I said I  
had heard many stories of in-

timidation there. Had not  
mass action (strikes, school  
and commercial boycotts, de-  
monstrations, etc) unleashed  
something which might prove  
difficult to control? Would  
the genie go meekly in

the bottles? : y\_bici; 293  
He replied that there had  
not been a single popular  
movement in the history of  
the world whose success was  
not ascribed by opponents to

- intimidation and conspiracy.

He did not doubt there had  
been some intimidation in the  
townships, but it could  
scarcely account for the at-  
tendance of 50 000 or 100 000

people at mass rallies.

I mentioned the strike of

auxiliary workers at Barag-  
wanath Hospital in Soweto,  
and some nurses (and the neigh-

which the houses of

now of. the insouciance and "

irresponsibility of recom-  
mending so huge an experi-  
ment as communism in Southâ\200\231  
Africa on the basis of such,

profound ignorance â\200\224 if he

I overlooked the gross  
A Self Serving. history, | equality of sufficiency attrac-

was really as ignorant as he '  
said he was. 1  
â\200\234We found the idea of an

tive,â\200\235 he said. â\200\234And look at 1

the former East Germany.  
There was a survey published  
recently which showed that

60 percent of people thought |

they were better off under  
Honecker than under capital-  
â\200\234ism.â\200\235

â\200\234And in 10 yearsâ\200\231 time, isnâ\200\231t |

it likely that black South Afri-  
cans will say they were  
better off under De Klerk?â\200\235 1  
asked. : i  
â\200\234Impossible,â\200\235 he said.  
â\200\234Well, I have travelled ex-  
tensively in Africa, and many  
blacks have told me that  
things were better under co-

bours of nurses) had been !  
burnt down in an attempt to  
intimidate them into joining  
the strike. People had died.  
â\200\234These things happen in all,  
strikes. Look at your miners  
strike.â\200\235 :

4 1 asked what faith could be  
put in his political judgment. .  
He had, after all, mistaken  
tyranny for freedom and  
scarcity for plenty during  
nearly half a century. He had  
systematically disregarded  
or denied evidence of famine,  
mass murder, forced labour,  
repression, terror and brutal-  
ity.  
yâ\200\234We all make mistakes,â\200\235

' he said. â\200\234Havenâ\200\231t you?â\200\235

00 Anthony Daniels is t\_he  
author of books on Africa

' and writes for the Specta-

tor, London, in which this  
article first appeared.

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& Z / i".â\200\230/ f :

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