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CriAPTER 3: POLITICAL ORGANIZATIONS 01 THE RULING CLASS . AND ITS____ALLIES

Contents: Introductory Essay: State Political Structures

The Nationalist Party
The Progressive Federal Party
Conservative Party
, New Republic- Party
Heistigte Nasionale Party
Other Far Right Groups
United Party

Chart: "White Politics" 1910-1980: Major Parties

Bibliographical N0te.

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STATE POLITICAL STRUCTURES (I)

Historical Development, 1870-1910

The form of state which came into existence in South Africa with the Union of the four British colonies in 1910 is perhaps best described as a racially exclusive bourgeois democracy. The vast bulk of the black population was excluded from all representation in and access to state structures. On the other hand however all classes of the white population, and certain limited ^categorizes of blacks (see below p 000) were incorporated into representative institutions characteristic of bourgeois democracy - parliament, political parties etc.

/ch^J This form of state emerged as the result of /specific processes

of class formation and class struggle in which capitalist relations of production were established on a large scale in South Africa. As indicated in Chapter 1 (pp 000-00), the opening up of the diamond and more particularly gold mining industries at the end of the 19th century in ^augured a process in which ca^E-italist forms of production rapidly developed in all sectors and regions of South Africa. This rapid transition to capitalism gave rise to new forms of social relations with new contradictions and struggles. In the process political relations and the form of state were transformed.

Most fundamentally, the development of capitalism transformed large numbers of the oppressed colonised masses into wage labourers. However as indicated pp 000-00, capital accumulation in all sectors was critically dependent on the availability of cheap labour. Accordingly, the development of capitalism ^in South Africa subjected blacks to a range of specific highly coercive measures such as racially discriminatory land laws, the pass system regulating their mobility, special taxes to drive

y/v them into wage labour, the com^und system etc" All these measures were explicitly designed to ensure that black peasants

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provided the necessary cheap labour power in sufficient quantities.

On the other hand, the development of the mining industry after 1870, and the subsequent transition to capitalism in agriculture 1880-1900, also transformed the previous exploiting classes, leaving capitalists as the only exploiting class. However the particular path of capitalist development in South Africa gave rise to acute contradictions and conflicts within this capitalist class itself (see pp 000-00).

South Africa's racially exclusive parliamentary system was foisted in the concrete struggles arising out of the contradictions generated by the transformation of social relations after 1870. The specific forms of capitalist exploitation which emerged reinforced the imperatives for the capitalist ruling class to maintain one crucial feature of all the state forms generated by colonialism.

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onialism. since 1652 - the exclusion of vast majority of

blacks from any representative institutions. The state was required to secure the availability of a cheap labour force for capital. Through the state the racial division of the land was effected and legitimated. The state also administered 'array of controls and coercive measures over this labour force - the most important being Pass laws and the Masters and Servants Laws (see pp 000-00). Any access by the bulk of the black exploited masses to the representative institutions of even bourgeois parliamentary democracy would have fundamentally impeded the development of such a cheap labour system. This was clearly recognised by the exploiting classes. Thus the various attacks on the relative economic independence of the African peasantry after 1880 were accompanied by demands that the very small number of enfranchised black property owners in the Cape Province be deprived of the vote and all political rights. Moreover, the fact that under the migrant labour system African workers retained some base in the peasant economy of the labour reserve areas, made it possible for the Hsacka on the right's front to present the "tribal" structures based in the reserves

as an alternative to representation in the central state.

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On the other hand these transformations placed severe strains on the earlier state forms, particularly those that developed in the Boer republics after 1852. Based on societies dominated by pre-capitalist agrarian rentier landlords, these state forms proved too unwieldy and inefficient to implement a number of the specific measures demanded by mining capital to secure its cheap African labour force in the 1890s. Moreover agrarian landlords

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who dominated the Transvaal Boer republic sought to exclude mining capital from effective representation in its representative institutions, whilst simultaneously siphoning off revenue from the mining industry to subsidise various of their own projects. These factors eventually led mining capitalists to organise together with British imperialism to overthrow these Boer / r regimes in the Anglo-Boer war 1899-1902.

This war resulted in the imposition of direct colonial rule throughout all of what is now South Africa. This however created its own conflicts as much of the settler population - and particularly the emerging agrarian bourgeoisie in the Transvaal and Orange Free State - were excluded from any specific representation of their interests in the colonial states until 1906/7. These four colonies merged into the Union of South Africa in 1910, creating a racially exclusive bourgeois democracy (partially qualified by the enfranchisement of black property owners in the Cape). The major bourgeois interests were organised into competing political parties (see Chart p 000). This form of state, which excluded the exploited masses from its representative institutions, served as to secure the necessary conditions of accumulation of capital. It also provided an effective forum for the resolution of contradictions within the capitalist class, and a vehicle for uniting it in pursuit of the common objective of maintaining bourgeois domination over the exploited masses.

In addition to the bourgeoisie however, South Africa's racially exclusive bourgeois democracy also included within its representative institutions other white classes - the white petty bourgeoisie and white workers. This can be explained by two main factors. Firstly, that these classes were too small and too weak ever effectively to challenge bourgeois hegemony on their

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own. Secondly, under the existing conditions of class struggle the bourgeoisie needed some degree of support from other white classes in order to maintain its rule over the colonised masses.

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minority categories of the black population were also
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initially granted access to representative institutions

In the Cape, Africans, Coloureds and Asians who met certain property and income qualifications (not applicable after 1926 to whites - the year in which white women also received the right to vote) were eligible to vote though not themselves to stand in parliamentary and provincial council elections. This Cape qualified franchise had been introduced in 185⁴ and was retained in that province after Union in 1910. The qualification admitted only the propertied strata of the black population whom it was

expected might identify with the bourgeoisie. The specific pa h

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/ of capitalist development, particularly in the countryside, as-
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sured that such strata would always be small and unable to chal-

lenge bourgeois hegemony. The subordination of the reserves as sources of labour power rather than of agricultural commodities
j) Jvwst severely curtailed/process of peasant differentiation and

consequent emergence of a rich OU'rican kulak class in the 'reserves'. The effects of the 1913 Land Act finally wiped out the embryonic African kulak stratum which had begun to emerge in the 'White' rural areas after 1870.

Outside of the Cape, the exclusion of African middle strata no matter how small was virtually complete. In Natal an additional educational qualification meant that not more than 50 blacks were ever registered as voters, whilst all persons other than white males were totally excluded from the franchise in the Free state and Transvaal from the outset"

After 1910 the position of the approximately 12.000 African voters in the Cape came under steady attack. Finally under the Representation of Natives Act of 1936, African were removed from the common voters role in the Cape. Instead Cape African males were given the 'right' to elect 3 special (white) MPs, and a purely advisory Natives Representative Council, consisting of

^iienibersQappo j nted,; as well as elected members, from all provinces was set up.

Institutions of South Africa's Racially Exclusive Bourgeois Democracy during the period of Segregation 1910-19^8.

South Africa's racially exclusive bourgeois democracy was based on the British 'Westminster' system. This provided for a 'separation' and degree of autonomy for the legislative, executive and judicial branches of government. South Africa was part of the British Commonwealth - enjoying "Dominion" status as a "fully autonomous and sovereign state" after the 1931 Statute of Westminster. The British Monarch was the Head of State, represented locally by a Governor-general appointed by the South African government.

Broadly speaking the legislative branch was dominant throughout the period of Segregation, although there were some signs of a partial undermining towards the end of the 1930s. Its major institutions at the national level were a parliament consisting of a House of Assembly, directly elected by the overwhelmingly white electorate, and a Senate, elected on a provincial basis by an electoral college consisting of the Members of the House of Assembly and Members of the Provincial Council from each province. Parliament was responsible for the passage of laws. Through the party system it provided an appropriate forum for the representation of diverse interests within the ruling class and its allies, as well as for the resolution of contradictions.

At the provincial level, Provincial Councils directly elected by the white electorate had responsibility for formulating ordinances on white education, health, roads, and local government affairs, whilst local authorities elected by white adult residents formulated local by-laws and regulations.

The executive branch consisted, at the national level, of the Cabinet appointed by the leader of the majority party in the House of Assembly, who himself became Prime Minister., The

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Cabinet was responsible for the administration of State Departments and introduced new legislation. During the Segregation period as distinct from that of Apartheid after 1948, the Cabinet was generally subjected to a degree of real control and scrutiny by parliament. At the provincial level, the Provincial Administrator appointed by the central government, himself appointed an Executive Committee which reflected the balance of the parties in the Provincial Council.

The judicial branch consisting of judges and magistrates was appointed by the Governor General on advice from the legal profession and was Constitutionally independent of the legislature.

Developments 1948-1976: 'r-trf.?! -r-awai earoluai.vi'iyj-gTTgfrer aÂ»4-saL.

The coming to power of the Nationalist Party regime in 1948 in the wake of the crisis of Segregation and the subsequent transition from Segregation to Apartheid (see p 000-00) brought about a number of changes in State forms. Apart from the establishment of a Republic outside the British Commonwealth in 1961 - which brought about few substantive changes in the state for a while - from substituting a figurehead President for the Governor General there were two major developments.

Firstly all categories of blacks were removed from access to the representative institutions of the central State. Persons of Asian origin had been removed from the common voters roll in Natal by the previous United Party Government in 1945* which provided instead for separate representation by four (white) Senators. Asians lost, this 'right' as well in 1948. A long complex constitutional struggle from 1951 to 1956 removed so-called Coloureds in the Cape from the common voters roll. Initially they were given the right to elect four (white) representatives to parliament and two to the Cape Provincial Council. However, in 1968 the Separate Representation of Voters Amendment Act removed this 'right' as well. Finally under the 1959 Promotion of Bantu Self Government Act, the three MPs elected by African

male voters in the Cape since 1936 were abolished. By the 1970s all categories of the black population were totally excluded from the representative institutions of the central State. Africans were supposed to exercise their 'political rights' through tribally orientated structures based on the Bantustans (see p 000-00). (The Natives Representative Council had been abolished in 1951). Coloureds were supposed to be represented by the Coloured Representative Council and Asians by the South African Indian Council.

The other noteworthy trend in the period 1948-1976 was the growing dominance of the executive over the legislative and judicial branches of government, and a corresponding trend towards greater authoritarianism. The offensive of the Nationalist Party regime against the living standards and popular organisations of the masses, together with the specific forms of state intervention to promote the interests of the class forces organised in the NP, are discussed, pp 000-00 above. Both necessitated more authoritarian forms of government. The offensive against the masses required a "strong State", not overly burdened with legalistic safeguards on human rights. The promotion of specific interests likewise required a certain reduction in legislative scrutiny and greater discretionary powers for the executive.

The result was a major shift in power towards the executive and the rise/importance of the repressive apparatuses of the State

- at this stage particularly the police and security services such as BOSS. During the 1940s and 1950s the courts had been used to some extent by the liberation movement and other pro-

By the early 1960s the judiciary was systematically subordinated through a combination of political appointments to the bench and legislation reducing the discretionary powers of judges. Similarly the legislature was reduced in importance through the granting of more and more discretionary powers to Ministers and such manoeuvres as the blatant "packing of the Senate" in 1956 in order to ensure the passage of the Acts removing coloureds from the common voters roll. As a consequence the executive

branch and more particularly the Cabinet became the dominant apparatuses of government whilst, from the early 1960s security services and the police received evermore discretionary powers. The pre 1976 Apartheid State can thus be described essentially and authoritarian police state.

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Developments after 1976: The rise of the military

As indicated pp 000-00, the late 1970s and the 1980s have been a period of acute crisis for the apartheid system and its state form. In response to the growing mass challenge a new alliance of monopoly capital and the military has now become the dominant force in the ruling class and the state. Important changes in state political structures have resulted - most importantly, the growing militarisation of the state.

The pursuit of the "Total Strategy" following the election of P.W. Botha as Prime Minister in September 1978 (see p 000-00) has propelled the military into a significant role within the executive branch, formulating not just military policy in the narrow sense but the overall strategy of the State. The specific mechanism of this growing military influence within the executive has been the State Security Council (SSC). Originally set up in 1972 as an advisory body, under Botha's premiership the SSC has become the major decision making body in the State with a network of links embracing all government departments (see entry on the Military p 000-00).

However, the perceived need for the ruling class to seek "black middle class" allies, together with its evident failure to win widespread support for the Total Strategy among the NP's traditional white petty bourgeois and wage earning mass base (see pp 000-00), has prompted the regime to seek more far reaching institutional changes.

In 1980 the Senate was abolished and replaced by a State Pres-

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ident's Council, consisting of white, so-called coloured and Asian appointees, on the one hand and 3*-;. Its brief was to form*

ii. le. te proposals for a "new constitutional dispensation". In accordance with the basic premises of the Total Strategy this would give the appearance of inaugurating a system of "power sharing" with certain categories of the oppressed population, whilst in reality ensuring that real power remained firmly in the hands of the present ruling alliance. This new dispensation was also required to free the ruling alliance from pressures from disgruntled white labour and petty "bourgeois" which impeded the introduction of socio-economic changes essential to the "Total Strategy".

The President's Council proposals were presented in May 1982 and approved in a somewhat amended form by the Cabinet and Nationalist Party caucus (purged of its far right by the engineered split leading to the formation of the Conservative Party - see pp 600). Through skilful manoeuvring the Botha faction ensured their endorsement first by a federal congress of the Nationalist Party (the first in over 40 years) and then by each of the four provincial congresses.

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T. i. 4 s - it 'i fr - w scyi" . i r ~ n - a ry ; ** 1 ^ 4 c ^ » arjt legislation / to parliament in 1983 and, according to the envisaged timetable, the new

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Under the new system certain changes will be made in the legislature so as to incorporate "representatives" of the Coloured and Asian population groups in what the official ideology describes as "consociational democratic structures". More specifically, there are to be three separate legislative chambers - one for whites, one for Coloureds and one for Asians - which would relate to one another through series of joint committees. Africans will not be included. They are to exercise their "political rights" in the Bantustans whilst municipal structures slightly increased "powers" will be set up in large "black" urban areas, such as Soweto.

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At the same time, however, the executive will be given even greater powers than at present and be freed from virtually any obligation or accountability to the "representative" institutions of the "consociational democracy". Under the new system South Africa will have an executive president elected indirectly by an electoral college consisting of 50 members chosen by the largest party in the "white" legislative chamber, and 25 and 13 respectively by the "coloured" and "Asian" chambers.

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The president will appoint a cabinet consisting of members of the three chambers

and will also have the power to decide which matters to be discussed by the legislature are matters of exclusive concern to one chamber, and which are of

"common concern". In matters of "common concern" a system of joint committees

of the three chambers will be set up to "try to achieve consensus" and take

"the major debate out of the debating chamber". In cases where the three

chambers disagree, the final decision will be taken by the President's Council.

This will consist of 60 members; 25 personally appointed by the president and

20 by the white legislature, 10 by the coloured and 5 by the Asian chambers.

The dictatorial powers to be assigned to the executive president are intended

to ensure firstly that the legislative chambers for coloureds and Asians do not

become effective vehicles for the thwarting of

popular demands for the thwarting of "executive" measures; and secondly, that the various petty bourgeois class forces still

represented in the nationalist Party (or in other parties in the white legis-

lature)

will not

be able to use their parliamentary position to block the "reforms" envisaged under the "Total Strategy". As a final reserve the executive president

will have the power to dissolve the legislature.

These proposals clearly imply a change in the role of political parties in state structures, but not the end of the party system as a means of organization

of the ruling class and its allies. The executive president and candidates

for the presidency will still need some form of political organisation behind

them, and the legislatures will still be organized on party lines. However, the implementation of the "consociational democracy" will clearly limit the

effectiveness of parties in the minority legislative chambers for the Coloured and Asian populations. It probably also implies a more authoritarian

style of government.

form of organization of the largest party in the white chamber, which would in effect be a tool of the presidency.

The Nationalist Party (2)

The governing party in South Africa since May 1948, currently led by Prime Minister P.W. Botha. Historically the Nationalist Party (NP) organised an alliance of various class forces under the banner of Afrikaner nationalism. It regards itself as the political representative of the "Afrikaner volk". Its programme is Apartheid - or, as its current euphemism has it, "white self-determination" based on "healthy powersharing".

Since the mid-1970s, the NP has been deeply divided between so-called "reformists" and "conservatives". The former favour minor modifications to Apartheid in the hope of winning black support for "capitalism". The latter also claim to recognize the need for "reforms" but reject anything which, in their view, weakens white domination. The reformists emerged as the dominant group under P.W. Botha after 1978. Under their "Total Strategy" a 'policy' of 'reform' was introduced. The conservatives, led by P.V. Botha after 1978, rejected 'reform' and favoured 'healthy powersharing'.

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ratus the interests of its class base, and to secure the favourable conditions for accumulation by all sections of the capitalist class.

At each of these distinct levels of politics, the NP functions differently and is subject to a different, yet intersecting array of pressures and class conflicts. However, since 1948 its role as the ruling party in the capitalist state has largely shaped the way in which it has represented the interests of

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the different class forces organised by the party outside of the state apparatus. To some extent, the intense conflict within the Nationalist Party and government 1971-1982 grew out of conflict between these two levels of the party's operation. In other words, various of the policies of the UP government aimed at securing favourable conditions of accumulation for the capitalist class as a whole, came into conflict with certain interests of sections of the Afrikaner petty bourgeoisie and white wage earners "traditionally" organised in the UP since 1948. Furthermore, the transformation of the HP's class base after 1948 induced strenuous conflict between the constituent force of the Afrikaner nationalist class alliance.

Organisational Structure

The UP is not a single "unitary" party, but rather a loose federation of four autonomous provincial Nationalist Parties. Each of these four parties has a distinct social base, party organisation, membership, constitution, press and political and ideological style. Each is a site of differing struggles and represents widely varying interests. The structure of the UP is vital to an understanding of its operation, as the real locus of power within the party

itself lies in the provincial party organisations rather than the national institutions of the party. Within the Provincial UPs the Provincial leaders often have greater influence than the National leader of the Party. Within the party itself (as distinct from the Cabinet) the Provincial leaders wield as much influence as the National leader himself. These provincial parties have always jealously guarded their particular interests, prerogatives and identities from each other and the "national" institutions of the Party.

The "regionalist" or "provincialist" conflicts which have always characterised Afrikaner nationalist politics thus rest on four separate party structures. However, the regionalism is more fundamentally explained by the fact that these parties each have a distinct class basis. As separately-organised, separately-led and separately-financed political institutions with different class bases, each provincial Nationalist Party is the institutionalisation of a distinct form of class alliance, differing in important respects from those of its federal partners. Moreover, in the period of Nationalist party rule from 1948 to the present, the class forces organised in the Afrikaner nationalist

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alist alliance in each province ffeve been affected in different ways by th
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policies and strategies of the UP-ruled state to secure overall capitalist

prosperity. Thus the conflicts between the class forces organised in the Afrikaner

Nationalist Party have often taken the form of regionalist confrontation.

The recent struggle between the so-called reformers and conservatives was

often depicted as a struggle for dominance by the Transvaal ICP (then led by

Andries Treurnicht) over the Cape ICP (led by Prime Minister Botha).

Early Class Basis in each Province

When the ICP came into office in 1948 the composition of the Afrikaner nationalist

class alliance differed in the various provinces. In the Transvaal

the ICP organised for the first time an alliance of capitalist farmers (who

were losing labour to industry); specific strata of white labour; the large Afrikaans-speaking petty bourgeoisie which, like white wage earners, were

threatened with displacement by Africans "from below"; and, emerging out of

this petty bourgeoisie, a small group of aspirant commercial and financial capitalists

organised in the "Afrikaner economic movement". This latter group

was heavily dependent on the reinvested surpluses of agriculture and the

savings of Afrikaans-speakers of all classes.

Moreover, alongside the ICP, Transvaal Afrikaner nationalist politics were

dominated by the secret Afrikaner Broederbond (Afrikaner Brotherhood).

This

was effectively the institution through which the specific interests of the Afrikaner petty bourgeoisie came to be independently organised and articulated.

The Broederbond assumed a self-conscious role as the vanguard of Afrikaner

nationalism. Through it the Afrikaner petty bourgeoisie exercised ideological dominance over all class forces organised in the Transvaal ICP and other

organs of Afrikaner nationalism in the province. Thus within the Transvaal

ICP an Afrikaner nationalist ideology was developed which stressed a particular

form of anti-British sentiment and emphasised the interests of the (white)

"small man" against the large, and predominantly English-speaking monopolies

which dominated the economy.

The situation in the Cape differed markedly. Here the ICP had long rested on

an economic- and political alliance between the wealthier capitalist farmers

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on the one hand, and a small groups of financial capitalists in the SAH1A
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and later Rembrandt companies on the other (see entries pp 00C-00).

The moving spirits of SANIA had in fact dominated the Cape NP since they first formed it in 1915*. Thus the Cape NP was always far more openly capitalist in orientation and sympathies than the other provincial NPs (particularly the Transvaal). Its interpretation of what constituted the Afrikaner "volk" and "its" interests, likewise varied considerably from the petty bourgeois

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"anti-capitalism" which dominated the Transvaal NP. Significantly, the Broederbond did not develop into a strong force in Cape Afrikaner nationalist politics. Indeed the Broederbond was often characterised in the Transvaal as the major oppositional force to "Cape Finance Power".

In the Orange Free State, a province of little industry, dominated by agriculture, and later gold mining, the petty bourgeoisie and rural capitalists were the real base of the NP. This gave it a more rural orientation than both the Cape and Transvaal parties. Here too, the Broederbond was a significant force amongst the petty bourgeoisie of the province. However, compared with the Cape and Transvaal, the Free State is a small province and its party was eclipsed by the NPs of the two major provinces. Similarly in Natal, the Afrikaans-speaking population was relatively small, and the Natal NP did not develop into a significant force.

The NP in Power - Policies and Internal Conflicts

The acute political crisis which brought the NP into power under Dr. D.F.

Malan in 1948, was discussed pp 000-000 The Nationalist Party mobilised an Afrikaner nationalist class alliance organised around a programme of "Apartheid" a programme pledged to a restructuring of the conditions of capital accumulation in such a way as to defend and advance the material interests of Afrikaner capitalist farmers, wage earners, petty bourgeoisie and small and aspiring capitalists on the basis of intensified repression and exploitation of African workers.

Three broad phases of NP rule can be identified, i.e. 1948-1960; 1960-1973;

1973 - present. Each of these is marked both by distinct policy directions,

and internal conflicts between the class forces within the NP.

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pointed to vital positions on numerous state economic boards and to senior management positions in State industries. In short, various forms of state

support to Afrikaner capitals ensured their integration on favourable terms

into the emerging relations of monopoly capitalism. In many ways, this class

force was the major beneficiary of UP rule. In 1948 there existed hardly any

Afrikaner business undertakings worth talking about. Today, SANLAM is the

second biggest conglomerate in the country, and two other Afrikaner monopolies,

Volkskas and Rembrandt are amongst the eight non-state conglomerates

which dominate the South African economy (see entries pp 000-000 and 000).

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Thus while all sections of the original UP class base benefitted directly from HP rule, they did so unevenly. From the early 1950s, conflicts began

to develop within the nationalist Party between the various class forces from .

standards for all white

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which it drew support. These conflicts centered on the question of which class force was the "real" representative of the Afrikaner "volk". Increasingly they developed into a struggle "between on the one hand the petty "bourgeoisie of the Transvaal and Orange Free State, also organised into the Iroederbend, and on the other the financial capitalists in SiHLAT. and Rembrandt in the Cape. These conflicts also arose out of the changing character of the Nationalist

class alliance. By 1960, so successful was the HP government's promotion of Afrikaner financial institutions that they had ceased to depend on the surplus profits of Afrikaner capitalist farmers as their major source of finance.

Thus particularly in and through the Cape HP, Afrikaner capital began to advocate independent policies. By 1960, the Cape HP was seen as "the official opposition" within the nationalist Party. The class-based conflicts in the HP thus appeared as "regionalist" struggles between the Cape and Transvaal HPs.

ii) 1960-1973

1960, the year of the Sharpeville massacre marked a new phase of HP rule.

Paced with mounting mass resistance to Apartheid, the regime now led by Dr. E.F. Verwoerd, launched a two-pronged strategy. Firstly, under the supervision of Justice Minister John Vorster it greatly intensified repression. In

April 1960 the African National Congress and Pan Africanist Congress were proscribed. Detention without trial was introduced, torture of prisoners became standard practice and heavy prison sentences, and a number of

death sentences were handed out to organisers of political opposition to the regime.

At the same time, the "political solution" of the Bantustan programme was introduced. This took national oppression and dispossession to the logical conclusion by decreeing that the African majority of South Africa's population

were not South Africans, but rather citizens of one of ten "ethnic homelands"

(see entry p 000).

By 1964, the mass political struggles of the 1950s and early 1960s had effectively been defeated. Various rural revolts had been brutally suppressed, the independent unions organised in the South African Congress of Trade Unions "bled white" through repression, and the underground network of the liberation movement effectively destroyed. Through its repressive measures, the regime had managed to "stabilise" the political situation and attract back even more

massive inflows of foreign capital than had fled the country during the Sharpeville crisis. This repression was decisive in holding African wages down to minimal levels and created the conditions for the Apartheid economic "boom" which lasted from the early 1960s to early 1970s (see pp 000-00).

During these years, the conflicts within Afrikaner nationalism burst violently into the open in bitter and public struggles between so-called verligte (enlightened) and vsrkramctefreactionary) nationalists. Most significant in

these struggles was the emerging open cooperation between SANLAM and Rembrandt on one hand, with the non-Afrikaner financial, mining and industrial monopolies on the other.

In 1963, a SAITLM's subsidiary was virtually given control of/major mining house, General Mining, by Anglo American. This move provoked deep division even within the Nationalist Party, leading one nationalist newspaper to argue that "it would be tragic to the future existence of Afrikanerdom, and eventually the whole white civilisation, if the (Afrikaner) capitalistic and political powers should split". To still these criticisms, the SAHLAK subsidiary donated R 10.000 to the NP.

In the early 1960s, within the NP itself the forces of petty bourgeois Afrikaner nationalism coalesced around the Prime Minister and Transvaal leader Dr . H.P.

Verwoerd. The Cape NP was treated within the NP as an opposition force.

Verwoerd. was able to mobilise against Cape Afrikaner finance all the other class forces in the nationalist alliance. This was achieved largely through

the Afrikaner BroEierbond and by centralising power in both party and

into Verwoerd's two functions as National Leader of the NP and Prime Minister

respectively. This was unprecedented in the history of the NP - which was

now transformed into a simple vehicle of support for the government. During the years 1960-66, the intense conflicts within the nationalist class alliance

were displaced from the party itself, to all other organs of Afrikaner nation

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alism, which vs*6 a fierce struggle for dominance between verligtes and verkrampes.

Hie assassination of Verwoerd in September 1966 brought these conflicts into the open and back into the HP itself. The new leader, John Vorster, tried

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to play a Bonapartist role within the party hy standing above the squabbling factions and relying for his major personal basis of support on the security apparatus generally, and in particular, the notorious Bureau of State Security -

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(BOSS - see entry p 000). Yet Vorster could not remain neutral/the IIP underwent its most serious splits since the 1940s. He and other leading "centrists" eventually allied themselves with the verligtes in the struggle against verligism". By 1969 the conflict led to a formal split. Four verligte IIPs led by former Cabinet Minister and senior Broederbond, Dr. Albert Hertzog, were expelled from the IP. They formed an ultra-right wing Eerstvolgende (reconstituted) HP based on "the true Afrikaner nationalism of Strijdom and Verwoerd" (see entry p 000).

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The immediate issue provoking the split was a modification to sports policy to allow visiting international teams to include black players. However, the verligte-verligte conflict was essentially a class-based struggle between those who wished to preserve the nationalist alliance of 1948 as a class alliance dominated by the interests of small farmers and the petty bourgeoisie (verligtes) against those who realised that in 20 years in power, the social basis of Afrikaner nationalism had shifted profoundly, and who sought to transform its ideology and politics to suit the changing class composition of the volk. The verligte phenomenon was a response to the emergence particularly in the 1960s of a class of aggressive, self-confident Afrikaner capitalists, whose interests now went beyond those of the narrow class alliance out of which they had emerged. Significantly, these struggles no longer primarily took the form of regionalist conflicts. By the late 1960s, the verligte influence was no longer confined to the Cape, but was emerging as a strong element in the Transvaal as well. Just as had occurred in the Cape a decade earlier, Transvaal businessmen were no longer totally economically dependent on an alliance of all classes of Afrikaans-speakers, and were beginning to push, even within the Broederbond, for new economic and political policies.

iii) 1973-present

The third phase of HP rule, from 1973 onwards, can be characterised as a period of rising mass, and particularly working class struggles in the context of economic crisis. The interaction between the two gave rise to the removal of Vorster as Prime Minister in September 1978, the adoption of the "Total Strategy" (see p 000), and the reopening of severe conflicts within the party, which had remained largely dormant 1969-74.

The gathering political and economic crisis of the mid 1970s is discussed p 000-00. By late 1976, in the wake of the Soweto uprising it had become abundantly clear that capitalist "stability" could not be re-established solely on the basis of repression and bantustan policies. Various powerful forces, in particular monopoly capital and senior military officers, began to push for modifications to Apartheid, both to defuse black support for the liberation struggle and to facilitate the reorganisation of industrial production.

The latter period of Vorster's government [1976-6) saw the beginnings of attempts to restructure aspects of political and social relations. However, given the balance of forces within the Party, the Vorster government was increasingly paralysed on crucial policy issues. This culminated in the "Kuldergate crisis", which in effect condensed three distinct political crises: a) a crisis for individual capitalists and the capitalist class as a whole in the economic and political conditions of accumulation in South Africa; b) a crisis for the Nationalist Party as the ruling party in the capitalist state; c) a crisis for the Nationalist Party and the alliance of class forces outside of the state apparatus, on which it had been built since 1948.

Vorster resigned in September 1978. The Cape NP leader and Defence Minister, P.H. Botha, defeated Transvaal NP Leader Connie Mulder in the election for NP National Leader and Prime Minister. Botha's victory was the result of an alliance between all elements of monopoly capital - both inside and outside the NP - together with senior military officers, against the petty bourgeois right grouped around Mulder. It also marked a shift in the balance of class forces within the LIP, with Afrikaner capital establishing itself as the dominant force within the Afrikaner nationalist class alliance.

On his accession to the Prime Ministership, Botha declared that the state was confronted by a "Total Onslaught", by the 'anti-Marxist threat'. It would adopt the "Total Strategy" (previously worked out in Botha's Defence Ministry) in response. Based on an organised political alliance between the military, all sections of monopoly capital, and Botha's faction of the NP, the "Total Strategy" represented

resents

an attempt to defuse mass opposition and the national liberation struggle through

a programme seeking to break up the alliance of class forces on which the

struggle rests (see pp 000-00).

The achievement of dominance within the IIP by Afrikaner monopoly capital in the Muldergate crisis, and the consequent implementation of the pro-monopoly Total Strategy, sharply antagonised forces amongst the Afrikaner petty bourgeoisie, small farmers and subsets of wage earners. The result was a sharp escalation of class-based conflict within the IIP. The far-right petty bourgeois opposition crystallised around the post-1978 Leader of the Transvaal UP and Minister of State Administration and Statistics, Dr. Andries Treurnicht. At the same time, this situation provoked the growth of a far-right opposition to the Total Strategy organised outside the UP, largely by defectors from the Nationalists. Thus, in the 1981 elections, the far-right parties increased their share of the vote five and half fold. Throughout 1981, these groups, and particularly the largest of them, the Herstigte Nasionale Party (see entry p 000), continued to win increased support. Significantly, the Afrikaner Broederbond reversed its longstanding policy of exclusive support for the NP, and appeared to be under control of a majority faction opposed to the Total Strategy.

Finally in early 1982 the far-right within the UP were provoked to vote against P.N. Botha in a motion of confidence over his "healthy power-sharing" policies. Sixteen I-IPs led by Transvaal leader Andries Treurnicht were expelled from the UP and established the Conservative Party (see entry p 000). In order to win support for new "reform" proposals based on an executive presidency, a appointed cabinet and separate Parliament for white, coloureds and Indians, Botha convened the first meeting of the IIP Federal Congress for 40 years.

Important NP leaders;

Cape NP

P.W. Botha - Cape Leader, National Leader and Prime Minister;

C. Heunis - Minister of Constitutional Development and Planning.

Transvaal NP

F.W. de Klerk - Transvaal Leader, Minister of Internal Affairs.

E. Schoeman - Minister of Transport;

S.P. Botha - Minister of Manpower Utilisation;

R. Botha - Minister of Foreign Affairs;

M. I-lalan - Minister of Defence-

O.F.S.

P. du Plessis - OFS Leader, Minister of Agriculture.

Natal

O.P.F. Horwood - Natal Leader, Minister of Finance.

THE FROGHSSSiYs-FSArJPwul- PARTY (PFP) (3)

Currently the major "opposition" party within South Africa's whites-only parliament. The Progressive-Federal Party (PEP) represents liberal monopoly capitalism. It advocates a "national convention" of all except "those groups advocating violence" to write a new constitution. Its programme calls for universal adult franchise "in a system of checks and balances" in which a minority of whites could veto legislation. The PFP is led by Dr. Frederick van Zyl Slabbert.

The origins of the PFP go back to 1959 when 12 United Party MPs broke away over the UP's increasing abandonment of earlier commitments - in this case over land for Africans. Led by Dr. Jan Steytler they formed themselves into the Progressive Party ('Pro's') on a "non-racial" programme which would enfranchise those South Africans who possessed both property and a minimum of 10 years schooling. The party argued that the mass national liberation struggles led by the ANC could best be defused through state policy to encourage the development of a black middle class committed to "free enterprise". It advocated respect for certain bourgeois democratic rights undermined by the Nationalist regime.

In the period 1961-74 the Progressive Party remained a small party drawing support from a minority of liberal, wealthy whites. In three general elections it never won more than 10% of the votes cast. Throughout this period it had only one MP - Helen Suzman, who represented the wealthiest constituency in the country. The party was kept going by large donations from Harry Oppenheimer, Chairman of the Anglo American Corporation (see p 000), and was in fact widely seen as his personal political creation.

The intensification of mass struggles against the regime in the early 1970s finally shattered the confidence of non-Afrikaner monopoly capital in the hitherto major parliamentary opposition, the United Party (UP)- see entry p 000), and was the key factor in the transformation of the Progressive Party into a

viable parliamentary party.

In the 1974 General Elections the Progressive Party increased its parliamentary

representation from 1 to 7 seats. A growing crisis provoked a split between the more

conservative and "reformist" wings of the United Party, and the ousting from

the UP of the reformist "young Turks" led by Harry Schwarts. They initially

organised themselves into the "Reform Party" which then merged with the "Progs"

to form the Progressive Reform Party (PRP) under the leadership of Colin Eglin in 1975.

The defeat of the South African army in Angola 1975-6, together with the "Soweto" uprisings and general strikes, led to great pressure from leading capitalists on the United Party to unify the parliamentary opposition to the Nationalist Party. A committee under retired judge and former Broederbond member, Kowie Marais, produced a 14-point plan for unity between the United Party and Progressive Party in 1977. This plan split the UP three ways. Its most right wing MPs formed the South African Party (SAP - which has since joined the Nationalist Party), while the majority merged with the miniscule Democratic Party

to form the New Republic Party (NRP see entry p 000). Six former

UP MPs joined the PRP which changed its name yet again to the Progressive-Federal

Party. In the 1977 General Elections the PEP now emerged as the major parliamentary opposition party, winning 16.6% of the votes and 17 seats (to 10 for the NRP; 3 for the SAP and 134 for the Nationalist Party). In the 1981

elections the PEP increased its share of the total vote to 18, winning 26 parliamentary seats. ^

The growth of the party in the 1970s induced a number of political conflicts between the so-called "principled" liberal wing/guard of the old Progressive Party, generally rallying around Helen Suzman, and the "pragmatic" new elements of the 1970s. The issues revolved around the question of whether the PEP should maintain its role as strident liberal critic of the regime's policies to "retain credibility amongst blacks" or should concentrate on expanding support amongst the white electorate, which involved a watering down of hallowed "progressive Party principles". Cutting across this issue, many elements in PEP, particularly

those grouped around its Afrikaans journal, Deurbraak, began to attack the political strategy and performance in parliament of party leader Colin Eglin. In 1979, Eglin was replaced by Frederick van Zyl Slabbert as Party Leader, Slabbert is an Afrikaner, former professor of sociology, and one of the new Progressive Party MPs of 1974* A strong proponent of the view that the PEP should seek wider support amongst the white electorate, he has written that the PEP's most important role is to persuade "both black and white that negotiation was preferable to confrontation and that an acceptable constitutional solution could be negotiated at a national convention". According to the Johannesburg Financial Mail, as leader of the parliamentary opposition Slabbert "has had considerable impact ... his performance in parliament is outstanding".

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In the process of these changes and conflicts within the PIP, its policy of a qualified franchise has been replaced by a call for a "national Convention" to write a new Constitution for South Africa. This is accompanied by PFP 'Proposals' for such a convention which would turn South Africa into a federation of "self-governing states", based on 1. federal parliament elected through "universal adult franchise", but in which "consensus would be necessary for

! new laws as a minority of 10-15% could veto legislation". . The economic programme of the PIP calls for heavy state spending on education and social services in order to protect the basic "free enterprise economy".

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/ The differences between PIP and the ruling Nationalist Party are essentially strategic - that is now best to secure and maintain the political conditions for capitalist stability and prosperity. Since 1959 the "Prog" view has been that this will best be secured through winning the support of a large black middle class, committed to capitalism as a "strong bulwark against revolution". Its 12 point "alternative" to Botha's 12 point Total Strategy, emphasises negotiation and "planning together with members of other population groups, not for them".

Unlike the UP, whose recent "Total Strategy" is now based on a similar strategic conception, the PIP recognised the need to coopt fully the black petty bourgeoisie into an alliance with the ruling class, through much greater concessions than the HP will consider. This is clearly seen in what PIP leader Slabbert considers to be the four crucial differences between his party and the HP: i) whites alone should not decide on the Constitution, there should rather

be "joint decision making" through "negotiation and compromise"; ii) The government should not enforce "racial or ethnic group membership", the PPP

stands for "natural pluralism based on voluntary association"; iii) unlike the

HP which denies that blacks are South African citizens, the PPP "accepted the African as a fellow citizen with whom a constitutional solution had to be found";

iv) the PIP "questioned whether it was necessary to use means such as detention without trial and bannings to maintain law and order. Extraordinary security measures could not be ruled out, particularly in times of change, but laws could however not be devoid of justice".

These differences were borne out in the reaction of the PIP to the new Constitution-

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Constitutional Proposals of the Presidents Council in May 1982 (see p 000-00).

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While welcoming the inclusion of coloured/and Asians in political institutions, the PPP rejected the undemocratic "concept of an Executive President" and attacked the exclusion of Africans from the institutional arrangements recommended by the Council. In reply, PPP leader %Slabbert held a series of public meeting with the Chief Minister of the ICwazulu Bantustan Gatsha Buthelez i, ir. which they recommended the findings of the so-called Buthelezi Commission as laying a basis for progress towards "peaceful change" (see p 000) .

In short, while the IIP is committed to maintain the rule of capital and racial privileges for all whites through ever increasing repression and the balk-anisation of South Africa, the PPP stands in the tradition of monopoly capital in Europe of controlling mass struggles through incorporation. This is clear in its "social democratic" (sic) economic programme which has been described as reconciling "the two poles of capitalism and socialism".

However, this liberal and "reformist" rhetoric should not conceal the fact that the PPP favour^ the retention of all the essential structures and institutions

* of capitalist exploitation in South Africa. It remains totally opposed to one

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one vote, and supports the Botha regime's aggression against neighbouring states. Its fS&'ia^e spokesman, Harry Schwarz., in fact advocates even more drastic action against "states harbouring terrorists". Shoe the fonnation of the Progressive Party in 1959Â» it has been a party of monopoly capital. Despite its recent acquisition of some support amongst the white urban petty bourgeoisie, the party remains essentially a representative of monopoly interests.

Its programme represents in effect, the maximum demands of monopoly capital in South Africa: and the furthest monopoly capital is prepared to go in conceding

the demands of the masses.

Its links with the most powerful monopoly in South Africa, the Anglo American Corporation, are particularly close. Former Anglo Chairman, Harry Oppenheimer

remains the most important source of financial support for the PPP. His ex-son in law and chairman of numerous Anglo subsidiaries Gordon Waddell, was

a "Prog" MP (whose campaign was managed by Tony Bloom, the Managing Director of

South Africa's second largest food conglomerate, Premier Milling). Another key

Anglo Director, Dr. Zac de Beer was one of the original 12 Progressive MPs

in 1959, and was re-elected as a Pro-MP in 1977 (but has recently resigned to

concentrate on business). However, both Waddell and de Beer remain in crucial

positions on the PPP Federal Executive. Other PPP MPs (e.g. Alex Boraine)

p on
are former Anglo managers, and many of the leaders of its youth wing end up on
the Anglo American payroll.

Although the PPP is a party of monopoly capital, it stands almost no chance
of achieving office. Since 1948» the HP government has effectively secured the
conditions for monopoly profits. It has done so on the basis of a mass white
class alliance which the PPP could never organise. In other words, in the eyes
of the white petty bourgeoisie [particularly Afrikaners) and white wage earners,
the PPP is too much the tool of monopoly interests ever to be able to develop
a mass electoral base for itself. As a party of monopoly capital, its role is
to fight for the maximum demands of this class force, and so to act as a strong

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source of pressure on the regime.. This was very well expressed in 1981
by the
major PPP patron, Harry Oppenheimer:

"Since we're not going to get the nationalists out of power so quickly -
much as I'd like to, and see the Progressive-Federal Party come in - one
has got to find a means of doing social justice in a way that the reason-

able people (sic) in the nationalist Party might go for".

Important leaders: Leader: Frederick t(fen Zyl Slabbert;

Federal executive chairman: Gordon Waddell;

national Chairman:

national Vice-Chairman: Ray Swart;

Spokesperson on Justice; Helen Suzman.

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THE CONSTITUTIONAL PARTY OF SOUTH AFRICA - Konsegtiewe Party (YF) ^

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A far-right wing parliamentary opposition party formed out of a split in the ruling Rastafarian Party in March 1982. Led by former Transvaal leader of the IIP, Dr. Andries Treurnicht, the KP opposed HP plans for "healthy power sharing" contained in the Report of the Presidents' Council (see p 000). It has committed itself to the UP constitutional proposals of 1977j arguing that the Botha government has departed from these and is slowly introducing "integration" in South Africa. At the end of 1982 the KP had 18 MPs, making it the third largest Parliamentary party. It appears to have substantial support in the rural constituencies of the Transvaal, and amongst the Afrikaner petty bourgeoisie. It has brought under its wing the various far-right movements which proliferated

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after 1970} but has so-far not/cooperation/with the 3ven more right

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wing Herstigte Nasionale Party

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Although the E? was formed in 1982, its-genesis goes back to the mid-1960s, and

the emergence of the so-called verligte/verkrampste split in the Nationalist Party
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(HP). This split essentially pitted the newly emerging Afrikaner monopoly capitalists and their ideologues against the more reactionary class forces of the petty bourgeoisie, white labour and small farmers (see UP entry p 000-00). Eventually in 1969, the four leading verkrampstes were expelled from the UP

and formed the HIP. The present leader of the KP, Dr. Andries Treurnicht was at that time the main publicist of the verkrampstes, in his capacity as editor of the Pretoria daily, Die Hoofstad. He was a leading member of the verkrampste inner circle:

^cle,

together with the later leaders of the 'HUP. When the

latter were expelled from the UP, and formed the HIP, Dr. Treurnicht was in fact elected to the HUP executive at its founding congress. However, in a move which was to produce lasting bitterness with the HUP leaders, he argued against the formation of a new party and insisted that he would continue to fight for

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verkrampste principles within the UP. He was soon thereafter elected to Parliament and gradually promoted. By 1978 he was a junior minister.

The formation of the HUP in 1969 did not remove the basic cause of the verkrampste /verligte split in the HP - i.e. the changing class basis of the HP and the now conflicting interests of its various component class forces. However, after

^ 1969Â» under the leadership of John Vorster, a centrist group allied with the verligtes established firm control over the party and was able to eliminate

overt struggles for power between the verkrampste and verligte faction?. This tenuous unity began to shatter in the gathering political crisis of the mid

191 Os. (see pp 000-00) . All elements of monopoly capital, including the Afrikaner elements hitherto politically organised in the NP, intensified their agitation for rapid "reforms" to save capitalism and re-establish stable capitalist prosperity. These moves were intensely resisted by the political representatives of white labour, the Afrikaner petty bourgeoisie and small farmers, particularly in the Transvaal. The result was a sudden re-opening of intense struggles within the HP. The latter were led by the then Minister of Information and leader of the Transvaal HP, Dr. Connie Mulder, with Hendrik Verwoerd as his close ally.

Politically pressurised from all quarters, and riven by intense internal political differences in the period 1976-8, the HP government was in effect politically paralysed. It was able neither to introduce the "reforms" fought for by

English and Afrikaner Monopoly capital, nor cling to "old style Apartheid".

Several constitutional proposals for three ethnic parliaments were introduced in 1977?

but little action was forthcoming. The political log jam was finally broken in

the so-called "Muldergate" scandal, when the combined manoeuvres of monopoly

capital and the top echelons of the military over irregularities in Mulder's Department of Information discredited Mulder as the leader of the right.

When

Vorster resigned from the Premiership in September 1978, Mulder was unable to

enforce party discipline in his own Transvaal IIP. The result was that the Transvaal

supported the candidacy of Defence Minister and leader of the Cape HP.,

P. W. Botha, and Mulder was defeated. He was soon ousted from the HP and formed

the far right National Conservative Party [see also "Other Political Parties".

pp 000)

The Muldergate crisis severely discredited the forces of the far right in the

HP. However these remained sufficiently strong to elect Verwoerd as the

leader of the Transvaal HP in late 1978. With the introduction of Botha's

"reform" programme under the "Total Strategy" [see pp 000.00), the right had

a strong institutional base from which to resist these "reforms". Led by

Treumicht the KP verkrampptes fought a determined and often successful rearguard

action over the next three and a half years, earning Treumicht the title of

"Dr. Ho" in the English language and verligte press. During this period, the HP

lost much support amongst its traditional mass class base in the Transvaal, the

Afrikaner petty bourgeoisie, small farmers and white labour. The EHP captured
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fcJjiurrife. of the vote in the 1981 general elections. In the Transvaal analysis

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of the results put their share of the vote at 25%, and a verligte newspaper,

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Raoport, argued that 36% of Afrikaners had voted against the IIP. Treumicht himself came fairly close to losing his Waterberr seat to the leader of the ST

right wing splinter groups continued to attract support from disgruntled Afrikaner nationalists

[see p 000). Prime Minister Botha skillfully

sought to use Treumicht to attack the far-right, and he began to lose credibility amongst the mass of IIP supporters in the Transvaal.

By the end of 1981, the government's strategy of internal "reforms" was stalled. Its external "constellation of States" plan was also in ruins. At the November "Good Hope" conference between the government and 600 leading capitalists, the representatives of monopoly capital put very strong pressure on Botha to remove Treumicht. Moreover, the monopoly capitalists seated on the Defence Advisory Committee finally persuaded the Minister of Defence and architect of the Total Strategy, General Magnus Malan, to pressure Botha to force a break with the far right in the HP, and Treumicht in particular.

In early 1982, an official HP organ "HAT 80" editorialised that "there could only be one government" in South Africa. This conflicted with Treumicht's insistence that the forthcoming "new constitutional dispensation" would set up three separate "parliaments" for whites, Indians and "coloureds", each with its own cabinet and Prime Minister. The Botha faction argued that above these three groupings would stand a supreme "Cabinet Council" drawn from all three groups and which would wield full state power. The Treumicht groups objected and Botha called for a vote of confidence in the HP parliamentary caucus insisting on a mandate to interpret party policy at his discretion. Twenty-two MPs voted against this resolution. The Treumicht faction further lost control of the Transvaal HP when the centrist groups led by F.W. de Elers and Hendrik Schoeman allied with the verligte, pro-Botha faction. After 16 of the original 22 dissenters refused to accept the discipline of the majority in the HP caucus,

they
were then all expelled from the Party.

In March 1982 these elements came together with the National Conservative Party of Mulder and Aksie Eie Toeknoms [see p 000] to form the Conservative Party of South Africa. Its founding meeting was held in the Skilpadsaal [Tortoise Hall] in Pretoria, giving rise to many jokes about the tortoise politics of the new Party. Shortly afterwards a further two HP members of Parliament left to join the KP. Its Betreëny Programme promotes a policy of racial separation. Unlike the HNP, the KP accepts the need for some of the "reforms" which have been:

HNP, Jaap Marais. In the months which followed a number of/

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introduced m. 1977Â» such< S3 the amendments to the Industrial fConcil
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Act, mixed sports etc. But it argues that the new constitutional arangame
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planned hy the Botha regime are a violation of the 1977 IIP constitutional
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josals and imply a logic of the gradual abandonment of racial separation.

The HNP iwe/Tefused cooperation with the KP on the grounds that it (the
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is the authentic and proved party of the right wing "Afrikaner" opposition,
and

that it is not prepared to accept the 1977 proposals, nor many of the petty

changes introduced since the death of Dr. Verwoerd in 1966. Despite int
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press? speculation of an electoral agreement he ween the HNP and IP, t
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parties have opposed each other in a number of byt-elections â– . Â«. rtav.r
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The formation of the KP has increased the drainage of support from the N
P, par-
ticularly in the Transvaal. All except two of the present 18 KP Members of

Parliament represent Transvaal constitutencies, mostly in the rural areas.

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*The KP and the IIP are engaged in a fierce battle for control of all of the
traditionally important institutions of Afrikaner nationalism, especially the
Dutch Reformed Churches the Afrikaner Broederbond (see entries p 000
and p 000) .

Treumicht is a former Broederbond chairman. Its present Chairman, Dr. C
arel

Boshoff, is all but public*Â£ly identified with the KP. It is also widely
acknowledged that the KP enjoys substantial support. A number of former
IIP

Cabinet Ministers, including the architect of the KP Bantustan Policy, D.C. de Wet Nel, together with the wife and much of the family of former KP, Prime

Minister Hendrik Verwoerd, have joined the KP. A poll conducted by the author-

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itative pro-Botha KP weekly, Rapport, / indicates that 38% of "Afrikaners" in the

Transvaal support the KP, compared with 44% for the HP. Its support in other provinces is substantially weaker. However, control of the Transvaal is the key to control of the present South African electoral system. The KP has very strong support amongst smaller agricultural capitalists, all levels of the Afrikaans petty bourgeoisie and white labour. It is possible that in any future election it could significantly increase its parliamentary representation, and it might displace the Progressive Federal Party as the official opposition.

One factor impeding its prospects of growth is its inability to achieve an electoral pact with the HHP - which has split the far right vote to the benefit of the HP in a number of bye-elections. Another potential factor is the rumoured tussle for the leadership of the KP between its present leader Dr. Treurnicht, and his predecessor and leader of the Transvaal HP, the considerably more experienced and wiser, Dr. Connie Mulder.

Important Leaders: Leader: Dr. A P.Treumich

Dr. P. Hartzenberg;

Dr. C. Mulder.

IIE'.; REPUBLIC PARTY (NR?)

Parliamentary opposition party formed out of a merger of the rump of the old UP. CSCfeff Â«*><>}

arty/and the miniscule Democratic Party in 1977* The NRP won the allegiance of twenty three of the former UP MPs (the largest grouping) . W
â€¢ Vause-
Raw and Radclyffe Cadman became its leaders after the UP leader, de Villiers
Graaff and Democratic Party leader (and former nationalist. Interior Minister)

Thee Gerdener, surprisingly withdrew from the leadership despite being the
r...rsw.;!- ^ frpces in the group's original constitution The party supports the
traditional UP policy of a "Federal South Africa? under "White Leadership".

In the 1977 elections it retained only 10 seats in parliament (representing a
loss of 13). It held onto eight of these in the 1981 elections.

The NR? however, retains control of the Natal Provincial Council [the only
Provincial Council not controlled by the IIP). In 1982 the NPJ5 rejected the
proposals of the Buthelezi Commission for "consociational power sharing"
between the Kwazulu bantustan and the "white" Natal provincial administration
(see p 000). The NRP argued that the proposals did not offer cast iron guarantees to
whites - despite the fact that they allowed for a minority veto. This NRP
position led to intense conflict with the PFP in Natal, which favours the proposals
and has sought to promote them in a series of joint meetings with Inkatha

The NRP has captiously endorsed the Botha regime's proposals for a "new constitutional dispensation", but sees these as the first step in a continuing process
which will eventually include Africans in a white-led federal system.

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Current leader: Vause Raw.

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H5RSTIGTC P-BTY (P^CONSTITTITSI' NATIONALIST P^RTY) ^ '

Far right-wing verkrante party formed in 1969 by a breakaway group of four Nationalists led by former Minister of Posts and Telegraphs, Albert Eertweg (son of first Nationalist Party Prime Minister General J.B.K. Heitzog). It favours a return to fully fledged Verwoerdian Apartheid based on the 1966 principles of the Nationalist Party.

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/ The immediate issues leading to the 1969 formation of the HNP the Vorster

government's announced intention to "relax sports apartheid" (when and where this would help get white sportsmen readmitted to international tournaments), and its "outward looking" foreign policy offensive in Africa. More fundamentally the HNP's establishment reflected the growing fears of certain strata, of the Afrikaner petty bourgeoisie and smaller capitalist farmers that their interests were being betrayed by a party dominated increasingly by Afrikaner monopoly capital inptc [see NP entry pp 000-00] .

The HNP's original programme was a typical petty bourgeois manifesto. It called for the vigorous implementation of "pure Apartheid" and the assertion of Afrikaner dominance. It demanded restriction of urban residential rights for blacks, stricter separation of housing and social facilities and reduced expenditure on black education, housing and social amenities. It also advocated that Afrikaans be recognised the sole official language and that citizenship should only be conferred on white immigrants fluent in that language. It further proposed that the economic growth rate be restricted to a level governed by the

availability of domestic white labour and local capital - so as to protect the

country from being 'contaminated' by external "money influences".

For many years the HNP remained in the political wilderness challenging the Nationalist Party in bye-elections but failing to win a single seat. In the 1981 elections, however, it benefitted from the growing petty bourgeois revolt against the "Total Strategy" of Prime Minister Botha [see

pp 000-00) . It* won 192.000 votes (14,08% of the total), although it, narrowly

failed to win a seat in parliament.

Since the 1981 elections the visibly in strength with a number of

defections to it from the ranks of the Nationalist Party. It feafi, however, tended to stand aloof from other far right organisations and from attempts to forge unity among them.

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r* â€¢ i * â– i.J. has important differences with the Conservative Party i--..
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cVury j.). The HNP calls for a return to Nationalist Party policies as outlined in its 1966 Manifesto, while the KP advocates a return to its interpretation of the 1977 NP manifesto. These are not merely sectarian differences about when the NP departed from the "true principles" of Afrikaner Nationalism.

At issue are some more substantial policy differences. The KPs tÂ».:nl--â– .a â– ;-Â»

-igÂ»- is. oppose^ 5C "power sharing" with blacks, but accpts the need for certain "reforms" in the economic and social spheres. The . HNPr â– p 0 c i t i0

"is.- favours a return to full blooded Verwoerdian Apartheid in all spheres including for example statutory job reservation, and fully segregated facilities. To date the two parties have been unable to reach an electoral pact, thereby splitting the far right vote to the NP's advantage in a number of by-elections.

c&v-vtiK\ue .

Important leaders: Jaap Karais - Party Leader:

Beaumont Schoeman - Editor of the HNP newspaper,

Lie Afrikaner

Louis Stofberg
Nillie Marais.

OTxIEit FAT: RIGHT POLITICAL ORGAN IZ ATI OKS

The current polarisation of class forces "traditionally" organized by Afrikaner Nationalism since 19⁴⁸, reflected in the growing support for tfts the Herstigte Nasionale Party and the formation of the Conservative Party in March 1982, also produced a proliferation of smaller far-right. political organizations, particularly in the period 1978-1982.

The most important of these include:

The National Conservative Party (NCP). Formed in 1979 by Dr. C.P. Mulder, the former leader of the Transvaal Nationalist Party,

S Minister of Plural Relations and Information and candidate (against P.W. Botha) for the premiership. Mulder was forced to resign after being implicated in the "information scandal". In many respects the NCP functioned as a personal vehicle of Mulder in his campaign to "clear his name" and take revenge on Botha. But together with the Herstigte Nasionale Party (see entry p.000) it was also a mouthpiece for reactionary petty bourgeois. The NCP's programme promised

to resist constitutional proposals which might "undermine the sovereignty" of the white parliament and criticised the "trend towards concession-making" in the domestic and foreign policies. The party opposed the legislation arising from the Wiehahn Commission Report (see p.000), and rejected any moves to grant more land to Bantustans under "consolidation" proposals. In the 1981 elections the NCP put up 9 candidates who polled 19,000 votes (1.52% of the total) but failed to win a single seat. Mulder was later, however, elected as a councillor on the Randburg municipality, where one of his first actions was to call for the segregation of a local public toilet. On the formation of the Conservative Party in 1982, Mulder was elected as a member of its executive and subsequently announced the dissolution of the NCP. It is believed that he has ambitions to replace Treurnicht as Conservative Party leader. or, "P-

Aksie Eie Toekoms (Action Own Future) Group formed by dissident Broederbond members early in 1981. A small number of candidates contested the April 1981 elections as independents but under the Action Own Future slogan. They received only a small number of votes.

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After the election support built up and in November 1981 it constituted itself as a formal political party. Like the NCP, However, AET dissolved itself into the Conservative Party.

Tiie Afrikaner Iverstand Beweging (Afrikaner Resistance Movement

- AWB)

A semi-terrorist, Nationalist organisation formed in 1979 and led by Eugene Terreblanche. In 1980 it formed a political party - the

f. Is \

\$; Blanke Volkstaat party (White Peoples' State Party) - which
^ r r - - < â- v, - â- l-.. r tfee es tab 1 ishraent of a racist Nazi-

type state. Its emblem is a three-legged swastika. The AWB also has a "military wing" e'^called the Stormralke (Storm Falcons).

It too supported the formation of the Conservative party and dissolved its own political party but not its "military wlng" in March 1982. Early in 1963, eight AWB members including Terreblanche, x- were arrested on charges of illegal possession of arms. Released on bail, Terreblanche launched an hysterical denunciation of the Botha regime's constitutional proposals. He accused Botha of building the future of South Africa on a series of unstable foundations: "The first foundation stone will be laid on curry and

samoosas, the second on the Cape Coloureds, the third on Bantu beer and the fourth on Harry Oppenheimer's big hole in *Kimbejc ley" .

The Kappie#- Kommando. A women's pressure group known for the sport -

ing of voortrekker (pioneer^' - particularly the kappie (bonnet) -

as a symbol of its connLtment to the "traditional .

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values" of Afrikaner nationalism. The Kappie Kommando became J~~

in a controversy in 1982 when its leader suggested that women who had served with South African forces against the fascist Axis powers in the Second World War were basically field prostitutes. It too supported the establishment of the Conservative Party.

A

South Africa First. AÂ»Â»the-r/ri^ht pressure group, t-bough this

iwLtae mainly English speaking and Natal based. A number of its

leading personalities are British immigrants previously associated with the British fascist group, the National Front. South Africa First has been prominent in organising a campaign against proposals to allow blacks a certain access to the previously all white Durban beach front.

2CW "

Wit Komando (White Commande). A terrorist organisation involved in bombings and other attacks on verligte Nationalists, liberals and progressives .Sc^e. oC vAc *v1ew\>evt cx/e ifet'vnne, p^isc^ urv

Su.tK cxUrc^ctOj,

In September 1981 all the above groups agreed to form an alliance under the banner "Action Save White South Africa". A "unity conference" was held in Pretoria and was also attended)? by Dr. Albert Hertzog, the founder and former leader of the HNP, A former Surgeon-General of the Defence Force, Lt-General C.R. Cokroft, who described himself as a "concerned Christian" not affiliated to any of the parties", was appointed spokesman of the front. However, the'^Targest of the far-right parties, the ENP, stayed aloof arguing that whilst not opposed in principle to alliances, it would only enter one of its own terms, eÂ±=sr-

-E-all conservatives-11-t-e--t-he KlvjP. As indicated above most of the smaller far right groups have now associated with the Conservative Party.

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the opposition party in whites only parliament until 1977 when it split three ways. Some MPs merged with the Progressives (see entry p 000), some formed the South African Party which later

merged with the Nationalist Party while the majority constituted themselves as the New Republic Party (see entry p 000).

The United Party was formed in 1934 by the "Fusion" of the two major parliamentary parties then in existence - the Nationalist Party led by J.B.M. Hertzog and the South African Party led by J.C. Smuts. The "Fusion" represented the coming together of the major capitalist interests, in the face of the crisis over the abandonment of the gold standard in 1933. "Fusion" was opposed from the outset by certain groupings of capitalist agriculture and sections of the Afrikaner

petty bourgeoisie which broke away to form the Purified Nationalist Party led by D.F. Malan. The United Party represented all major capitalist interests

until the outbreak of World War 2. South Africa's participation in World War 2 and wartime-economic policies, however, divided the capitalist class. Capitalist agriculture opposed the war and favoured a separate peace with Nazi Germany, while industrial and mining capital favoured participation in the war.

During the war years capitalist agriculture deserted the UP for the Nationalist Party [renamed Herenigde Nasionale of Volks-party - Reunited Nationalist or Peoples' Party) leaving the UP to represent an unstable alliance of mining and industrial capital. Hertzog, the UP leader since

1934 and prime minister, resigned over the war question. He was replaced by Smuts who was prime minister until 1948.

The United Party's demise as governing party occurred in the context of the heightened mass struggles of the war and post war period. The party proved inc-

able of producing a decisive response to the challenge of the oppressed and exploited masses, wavering between increasing repression and attempting a cooptive strategy towards certain classes within the black population. It was effectively outbid in the 1948 elections by the Nationalists who were able to unite around its Apartheid programme those sections of the exploiting and privileged classes most vulnerable to the challenge of the masses (see or. t rj p 000) .

For the first few years in opposition the United Party put up a fairly vigorous opposition to certain of the measures introduced by the new Rationalist government, fearing that these would alternatively hamper the development of monopoly capitalism or provoke an uncontrollable, black uprising". During the

early 1950s, in fact, some United Party members associated with the para-military

*A£aa extra parliamentary pressure group known as the "Torch Commando" (see > p 000). It became clear that the Rationalist regime constituted no threat

to monopoly capitalism, but was on the contrary guaranteeing the cheap labour

system on which the rapid development of monopoly capitalism depended, the UPs

"opposition" became increasingly muted. After the 1953 elections, in particular,

it associated itself with the repressive measures being

introduced by the Rationalist regime - supporting, for example, the banning of

the ARC and PAG and the introduction of detention without trial. Indistinguish-

able from the Rationalists over many real issues the ingl \ 7G-?

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a political irrelevancy. i,t every election since 1948/IC om"" the proportion of seats held by it declined as the following table shows:

Table 11: Distribution of Parliamentary seats 1948-74
- % U.P. Others

1948 election 79 (52,6%) 65 [43,3ft 6 [4,1ft (Labour Party]

1953 election 88 (58,7%) 61 (40,7ft 1 (0,6ft 1! Tt

1958 election 97 [64,6\$ 53 [35,4ft -

1961 election 99 (66,Of.) 49 [32,6% 2 (1,4ft (Progressive P., Rational Union)

1966 election 120 (75 f) 39 (24,495) 1 (0,6ft

1970 election 112 [70 ft 47 [29,4ft 1 (0,656) f! TT â- *>

1974 election 123 (76,4\$ 41 [25,4\$ 7 (4,2ft TT TT Â£

The split in the UP in 1977 is discussed â- A'ogrcosi Ptafcy

â- sfiiry p 000. The result was the strengthening of the PFP which became the of-

official opposition and the formation of two smaller opposition parties - the

South African Party which later dissolved itself into the Rationalist Party and

the New Republic Party.

The Upfe leader from 1956 to 1977 was Sir de Villiers Graaff.

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11 WHITE POLITICS" 1910-1982 MAJOR PARTIES

Governing Parties

1910 South African Party

leader L. Botha and, after 1919, J. Smuts, represented an alliance of mining capital and "more prosperous" capitalist agriculture also represent Ctl% commercial capital and incipient industrial bourgeoisie _initially). " *

Unionist Party

authentic party of mining (imperialist) capital. Merged with SAP in 1920.

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Opposition Parties

South African Labour Party

party of white labour. Dominated from the outset by reformist, racist leadership but also including until first World War,

. The latter broke away during the war to form International Socialist League

_____ which became

Communist Party in 1921.
Leader F.H.P. Cresswell.

SA

Formation of National Party January 1914. Leader J.B.M. Herzog former SAP cabinet minister. Represented smaller white landowners threatened by the ongoing process of trans-

ion to capitalism in South African agriculture. Also supported the aspirations of incipient industrial bourgeoisie i.e. became* party of national capital. Called for policies of industrial protection and subsidisation for national capitalist interests against the "free trade policies" favoured by imperialist capitalist interests and implemented by SAP government

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National Party Labour Party

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â€¢ "pact" (!icÂ»^Â«i nment

in the wake oi' general strike

and Rand Revolt of 1922. Pact implemented policies of protection and subsidisation which benefit^ca pi ta1i s t agriculture and industrial capital. Also implement^a number of "protective measures" (job colour bars) to benefit white labour. Introduced the so-called "civilised labour" policy. He^oc.

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United National South African Party

(United Party) formed through a "fusion" of National Party and South African Party in the wake of the Great Depression and gold standard crisis. Represented a coming together of major bourgeois interests. Still pursued policies of protection and subsidisation but more concessions were made to demands of mining capital.

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South African Party

Lost 1924 elections to NP/LP "Pact".
In opposition under Snmmts0

Gesuiwerde Nasionale Party

(Purified Nationalist Party) formed 193[^]. Leader D[^]F. Malan. Represented an alliance of white petty bourgeois and \AA ape capitalist agricultural interests dissatisfied with the "compromise" of fusion.

SA Labour Party /

consisting of the bulk of the Labour Party who broke away from governing alliance with formation of "fusion". Leader W.Madeley.

Dominion Party

Natal sugar interests pro-imperialist, did not support "fusion" and broke with SAPo

United Party

Outbreak of World War 2 and war time economic policies led to desertion from UP of its former capitalist agricultural adherents. Became representative of alliance of industrial capital and mining capital, Liertzog resigned on outbreak of war and Smuts became leader and Prime Minister.

SA Labour Party / Dominion

entered governing coalition on outbreak of war. Madeley appointed Minister of Labour.

Party

In governing coalition at outbreak of war. Represented predominantly imperialist oriented Natal sugar farmers and petty bourgeoisie.

COLOMBIA

Argentine National Party - Afrikaner Party

coalition won 1948 election fought in the face of the heightened struggle by the popular masses of the war and postwar period

Promised a firm and decisive response to mass struggles as against the ambivalent and uncertain policies of the UP. Also promised to implement a number of policies to favour the particular interests of its constituent base - capitalist agriculture, non-monopoly industrial and financial capital, white petty bourgeoisie and white labour.

Implementation of policies of Apartheid - intensified repression, segregation, job colour bars, influx control etc. Afrikaner Party merged with

Herenigde Nasionale

Afrikaner Party

Party

(Reunited National Party) Becomes greatly strengthened by desertion of capitalist agriculture from UP. During war years buildt up a strong Base among white petty bourgeoisie and white labour. But also by deep int-

ernal divisions.

OFS rural capital. Very weak. Led by N.C.Havenga, on "Ilertzogite" principals

United Party,

Until its dissolution in 1977, the UP in opposition grew stjadily weaker. Its "race feder

.vjeve, -

ation" policies/characterised by an opportunistic attempt to pick up all grievance votes against the NP and and increasing right wing stance,, Leaders J. Smuts 19^8-50;

G.NoStrauss 1950-56)

Sir de Villiers Graaff 1956-1977"

)

South African Labour Party

(disappears from political scene in 1958 elections when it failed to win any seat in parliament) until then in electoral alliance with UP. SALP collapsed when UP revoked this alliance in 1958o

1951 to 1958 the Nationalist:
Party. D.F. Malan Prime Minister
1958-1966; J.G. Strydom 1966-1978

H.F. Verwoerd 1966-1978; B.J.
Vorster 1978-1984; P.W. Botha 1984-

United Party

â€ˆ^Progressive Party

formed 1959 when a group of
"more liberal" United Party
MPs broke away from UP ac-
cusing the latter of being
ftrltC>f1'Tin*! i'tju live . Supported by

leading monopoly capitalist
interests (eag0 ll.Oppen-
heimer of Anglo American)0
Called for reforms in order
to create a black support-
ive class for the bourge^
oisie. Original proposals
favoured a "qualified fran-
chise" open to those of all
races who could meet cer-
tain minimum (high) property
and/or educational require-
ments. Leader to 1971 J.
Steytler, only Member of
Parliament Helen Suzman,

National Union formed by disaffected NP

MP who would not accept Bantustanisation.
1 MP in 1961, who then joined the United
Party"

Herstigte Nasionale Uni ted

Party ' Party

(Reconstituted Nationalist Party) break-away from National Party led by A. Heertzog (son of former Prime Minister J.B.M. Heertzog).

Party of dissatisfied petty bourgeoisie, and white labour factions which accused Vorster of making too many concessions to "Liberal" demands. Has thus far failed to win any seats in parliament/, remained a force in white (Afrikaner) politics

Reform Party

split from UP and later joined to form Progressive Reform Party
Leader/Colin Eglin

Progressive Party

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Progressive
Federal Party

Years of ineffective "opposition" by the UP and the perceived need for the ruling class to make a more effective response to the crisis created by

New
Republic
Party

African

Party

Herstigte
Nasionale Party

Created by factions
of dissolved UP un-
willing to merge
with KPFP. Both NRP
and SAP more "cons-
ervative" than PFP.
Leader NRP Vause
Raw) Leader SAP J.

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1982 National Party

Soweto uprising,
led to the dis-
solution of UP.

A number of former
UP members of Parla-
ment merge with
Progressive Reform
Party which becomes
the "official" op-
position" under its
new name, PFP.

Leader to 1979
Colin Eglin
after 1979, F. van
Zyl Slabbert. PFP
can be seen as the
party of "big bus-
iness" which wants
to make more conces-
sions to black petty
bourgeois groups in
order to develop a
black supportive class
for capitalism. Prep-
ared to some extent
to make these at the
cost of some "white
privileges"

Conservative Party of South Africa

Formed following the expulsion of 6 Nationalist Party
MPs for their refusal to accept "healthy power sharing".
Is opposed to the inclusion of "non-whites" in central
political structures. However unlike the HNP it does not
favour a return Verwoerd-style Apartheid. Appears to have
strong support in rural and petty bourgeois constituencies
especially in the Transvaal.

Leader: A.P. Treurnicht.

SAP dissolves it-
self in 1980, and
its leader (Wile) joins NP.

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~ 1960, 1961, 1962

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