SeM/010/2021

### BRITISH POLICY TOWARDS SOUTH AFRICA

#### OUR ATTITUDE TO APARTHEID

The Prime Minister describes apartheid as "repulsive and detestable". We utterly condemn it and we wish to see it ended as soon as possible.

South Africa is not the only country where there is racial discrimination and abuse of fundamental human rights. But apartheid is unique because South Africa is the only instance of a society which has institutionalised racial discrimination in the constitution at almost every level of society and government. This is particularly unacceptable in a state which regards itself as firmly part of western society and upholding civilised, Christian values. Despite the reforms of recent years, which we have welcomed, the basic structures of apartheid remain intact.

#### WHAT WE WANT TO SEE INSTEAD

We seek the total abolition of apartheid. We want to see it replaced by a non-racial, representative system of government. It is not for the British Government or any outsiders to prescribe details. What we ask is that change should be peaceful and by negotiation, and that the new system of government should be fair and acceptable to the people of South Africa as a whole.

#### CHANGE IN SOUTH AFRICA

The problems confronting South Africans seeking peaceful change are extremely complex. There is no simple solution. But the Government believe that change in South Africa is inevitable, and that the apartheid system carries within it the seeds of its own destruction. Apart from being immoral and unjust, apartheid is bound to become increasingly unworkable. It is not going to be able to cope with the pressures generated by a rapidly increasing black population. It distorts the structure of business in South Africa and undermines the efficiency of the country's economy. It requires a large, costly and centralised bureaucracy (three fifths of Afrikaners in employment work in the public sector). Yet South Africa needs steady economic growth if it is to feed its expanding population.

We wish to see apartheid ended as soon as humanly possible. The present regime is wealthy and powerful, and not on the brink of collapse. We do not therefore think that change will be easy or quick. But we do think that change is inevitable, and when it does come the movement will be generated from within South Africa.

#### THE NEED FOR DIALOGUE

Although great gulfs divide South Africa's people, we hope that all sides will come to understand that starting negotiations for peaceful change is in their own, and each others' interests. What is needed as a first step is a genuine national dialogue between the South African Government and free and freely chosen leaders of the black community. The most effective means so far identified of getting such a process started is the "possible negotiating concept" of the Commonwealth Eminent Persons Group (set up at the 1985 Nassau Commonwealth Heads of Government Meeting). The concept is based on initial reciprocal and matching commitments by both sides.

The Eminent Persons urged that the South African Government should:

- remove the military from the townships, provide for freedom of assembly and discussion, and suspend detention without trial;
- release Nelson Mandela and other political prisoners and detainees;
- unban the ANC, PAC and other political parties and permit normal political activity;

and that, for their part, the ANC and others should:

- enter negotiations and suspend violence.

This might look like an unequal bargain. But it is the South African Government who hold the levers of power and are operating the unfair and unjust apartheid system which lies at the root of South Africa's problems. It is they who must take the initiative in promoting reconciliation and change.

#### VIOLENCE

The Government condemn the use of violence from whatever quarter in South Africa. We sympathise with the frustration felt by black South Africans and acknowledge their grievances. But we have urged the ANC and others to desist from violence because we believe violence only delays the process of change, by polarising opinion in South Africa and alienating those in the white community who must be persuaded that change is in their own long-term interest. We have also made clear to the South African Government that we deplore the use of violence against innocent civilians by the South African authorities and acts of violence by the South African Defence Force in neighbouring countries.

#### ROLE OF OUTSIDERS

There are limits on what even those external parties who retain some influence in South Africa can do. Outsiders cannot impose a solution. Our task is to do all we can to encourage the parties to come to the negotiating table. Any attempts at external mediation must be carefully prepared and the prospects for success realistically assessed. Our actions must be selected on the basis of a calculation of their impact in producing change on the ground in South Africa. There is much we can do to help if we take a pragmatic, realistic view, and work for attainable objectives.

#### PUNITIVE ECONOMIC SANCTIONS

We remain opposed to punitive economic sanctions; these would make South Africa's problems harder to solve. They would stiffen the resolve of those South African whites who are opposed to change. They would promote violence and confrontation rather than reconciliation. They would also damage our own economy to no avail, and those of the neighbouring states (see Annex A).

#### BRITISH STRATEGY

The Government are pursuing policies designed to promote internal forces for change which will have a positive, practical influence. Our Embassy in South Africa and Ministers and officials in

London are actively involved. Sometimes our actions are public. Sometimes representations are more effective when private. Against this background:

- we shall continue to make clear our abhorrence of apartheid and call for its total abolition;
- we shall urge both sides to seek areas of compromise and to show readiness to take into account the legitimate interests and concerns of all South Africans, black and white;
- we shall encourage informal contacts between South Africans of all races with the aim of promoting mutual understanding;
- we shall press the South African Government to take a lead in changing the system. We shall also urge them to continue the process of legislative reform;
- in the Commonwealth and with our European and other Western partners we shall keep policy under review, against the time when opportunities for constructive external mediation may recur;
- in this connection, we shall continue to support the concept of matching reciprocal commitments identified by the Eminent Persons Group and to press the South African Government to take the necessary preliminary steps;
- we shall continue to implement faithfully the limited restrictive measures against South Africa which we have previously agreed to take as a political signal of our earnest desire for progress (see Annex B);
- we shall continue scrupulously to implement the international embargo on arms sales to South Africa;
- we shall continue to make representations as often as may be necessary to the South African Government against repression and abuses of human rights, such as detention without charge and forced removals of people;
- we shall continue to give practical and financial assistance to black South Africans, in education and training, and in community projects. We shall encourage British companies to do likewise (see Annex C);
- we shall continue our substantial programmes of economic and security assistance to South Africa's neighbours, to improve their transport communications to the Indian Ocean and to reduce their dependence on South Africa;
- we shall continue to oppose South Africa's destabilisation of some of the neighbouring countries, and to call for the withdrawal of South African forces from Angola.

#### CONCLUSION

Change in South Africa is going to take many years and will be very difficult to achieve. There is hope. But realism is needed on all sides: from South Africans of all races and from outsiders. Outsiders should remain in contact with South Africans and work together for what is attainable. The Government intend to do just that.

Foreign and Commonwealth Office: 1988

#### ANNEX

A number of the major elements of the Government's policy on South Africa require detailed consideration:

#### A. PUNITIVE ECONOMIC SANCTIONS

Critics of HMG often argue that punitive sanctions offer the last hope for influencing the South African Government to bring about peaceful but fundamental change. To some extent, a commitment to sanctions has come to be regarded as the litmus test of opposition to apartheid. This is a false equation. Support for sanctions is not the only effective way to express opposition to apartheid; nor does opposition to punitive economic sanctions amount to support for apartheid. There is no disagreement whatever on the objective, which is the total abolition of apartheid. The disagreement is over the means by which this can be achieved.

The Government respect the sincerity of those who advocate punitive sanctions, but equally sincerely disagree. There is no evidence that sanctions would be effective in bringing about peaceful political change, and there is a substantial body of evidence that they would in fact be counter-productive. Some of their effects would be:

- to stiffen the resistance of the South African Government and the majority of the white population to change. Sanctions would harm their interests, yet would not persuade them to change their behaviour;
- to worsen the cycle of frustration, violence and repression (because sanctions would raise false expectations of early change). Sanctions are not an <u>alternative</u> to violence; the ANC certainly do not view them as such;
- to undermine the South African economy. Economic growth would slow down and it would become more difficult to keep pace with the rapidly increasing population, never mind to improve the living standards of disadvantaged communities. The people who would suffer most would be those we are trying to help. Black employment and welfare would be badly affected, in a country where there is no social security.
- to undermine further the stability of the region. Many of South Africa's neighbours have precarious economies, linked to that of South Africa. If they imposed sanctions they would face an economic confrontation with South Africa; even if they did not, they could lose from a weakened South African economy and certainly would lose if South Africa retaliated against them for measures imposed by them or by others. The losses inflicted on them would far exceed the capacity of outsiders to help;
- to damage UK interests in South Africa and increase unemployment in the UK through loss of civil exports. It would be wrong for the Government to play a part in doing such damage in pursuit of a policy which we consider not only ineffective, but in fact counter-productive.

Following the imposition of wide-ranging sanctions, notably by the US Congress, events in South Africa have as we feared shown that punitive sanctions do not have the desired effect and only increase the intransigence of South Africa's white community. In the whites only election of 6 May 1987 the extreme right wing was considerably strengthened. On the other hand economic pressures on South Africa which are the result of market judgements can and do have an effective political impact.

#### B. BRITISH RESTRICTIVE MEASURES

The British Government have adopted a number of restrictive measures against South Africa. The intention is to send a political signal to the South African Government of our strong opposition to apartheid and to bring home to them the urgent need for fundamental change. But the aim is to do so without destroying the jobs of large numbers of ordinary South Africans in the process. The intention is not to discourage legitimate civil trade. Full details of our restrictive measures are in the appendix.

#### C. AID TO BLACK SOUTH AFRICANS

Our programme of aid to black South Africans is an important way of promoting internal forces for change in South Africa.

- since 1979 we have been offering training for a future in which all South Africans will have their rightful share. In July 1986 we announced an expanded programme of assistance: an extra £12.75 million over five years was set aside to cover 80 undergraduate scholarships a year for study in Britain, and for training and other activities in South Africa;
- this is additional to the £7.5 million already being spent over the same period on postgraduate and post-experience award schemes and the £75,000 a year which we contribute to Commonwealth Scholarship funding;
- following the 1987 Commonwealth Heads of Government Meeting we have expanded both the undergraduate and post-graduate schemes by a further ten training places each, and made available an extra £80,000 a year for in-country small project and gift schemes;
- in 1987-88 we are sponsoring 330 students. This will rise to 490 in 1988-89;
- we now plan to spend some £21 million on assistance to black South Africans over the five years beginning April 1987;
- under the 1987 EC budget £14.5 million is allocated to aid for black South Africans. Britain's share is approaching £3 million.

#### D. AID TO SOUTH AFRICA'S NEIGHBOURS

Our programmes of economic and security assistance to the neighbouring states are substantial. We support the efforts of the Southern African Development Coordination Conference (SADCC) to reduce their economic and transport dependence on South Africa. Since SADCC was formed we have contributed:

- £819 million in bilateral aid to the SADCC states;
- £45 million in pledges to SADCC projects (mostly vital transport projects). This includes a new pledge of £10 million announced by the Minister of State at the Arusha SADCC meeting on 28/29 January.
- a bilateral training programme under which 1,300 people from the region are currently studying in Britain, and an additional 50 awards each year for special regional training needs.
- some £104 million to SADCC and its members through the European Community between 1986 and 1990, plus one fifth of the cost of EC food aid to the region.
- we have now pledged to provide 30% of total contributions to the newly formed Commonwealth Special Fund for Mozambique, up to a maximum British contribution of £3 million.
- £20 million of additional programme aid to Tanzania was made available in January 1988.

#### E. THE ANC

We acknowledge that the ANC is an important focus for black opinion in South Africa, and one of the representative organisations of the opposition.

A central purpose of our Ministerial and other contacts with the ANC has been to seek to persuade them that violence and acts of terrorism are not the right approach and will delay the end of apartheid. At the same time, we have consistently argued that the ANC and other political parties should be unbanned and Nelson Mandela and other political prisoners set free, so as to create a climate for dialogue in the context of a suspension of violence on all sides. These objectives were re-endorsed at the Commonwealth Heads of Government Meeting in Vancouver in October 1987.

# F. SOUTH AFRICAN GOVERNMENT REFORM OF APARTHEID LEGISLATION

We acknowledge that the South African Government have taken some positive action in recent years, and we have welcomed it. These actions include the abolition of the Pass Laws; removal of much petty apartheid; ending of much job reservation on a racial basis; restoration of South African citizenship to some blacks resident outside the "independent" homelands; the granting of freehold property rights to all South Africans; the legalisation of black trades unions; and the lifting of restrictions on black small businesses.

The various reforms are a beginning. But the South African Government have yet to address the fundamental issue of black political rights in central government and to abandon the concepts of separate development and population registration by racial origin. What is required is for the structure and philosophy of apartheid to be totally dismantled in favour of a non-racial, representative system of government. The release from prison of Mr Govan Mbeki on 5 November 1987 was a welcome step in the right direction. But it can only be truly significant if it signals a change of heart by the South African Government on the release of other long-term political prisoners and on dialogue with credible black leaders including representatives of the ANC. We were also encouraged by the proposals for an experiment in multi-racial government emanating from the KwaZulu-Natal Indaba. We regret that the South African Government have rejected these proposals.

#### G. TRADE WITH SOUTH AFRICA

HMG's policy on civil trade with South Africa is straightforward: within the limits of our international obligations and undertakings, the level of trade should be determined by those engaged in it.

Economic progress has in the past contributed to pressure for reform of society. We do not believe that weakening the South African economy now would benefit black South Africans. Economic growth in South Africa will not of itself guarantee the breakdown of apartheid. But it is a major way in which apartheid has been and will continue to be eroded. It will also provide resources for black advancement and help create the confidence needed for the political changes for which we and our international partners have called.

#### H. DISINVESTMENT

The Government regard this as a matter for the commercial judgement of companies. We do not encourage disinvestment. It is widely recognised that disinvestment has had no positive effect in altering the South African Government's policies or hastening the end of apartheid. Disinvestment has had negative consequences on the terms and conditions of employment for black South African employees. Many new local managements do not adhere to the EC and American codes of employer practices (see below). There are signs that black labour organisations inside South Africa are having second thoughts about the efficacy and desirability of disinvestment. The Confederation of South African Trades Unions (COSATU) stopped short of advocating disinvestment at their annual Congress in July 1987.

#### I. EUROPEAN COMMUNITY CODE OF CONDUCT

In 1977 we took the lead in drawing up a Code of Conduct for European companies with interests in South Africa. The Code sets out guidelines for good employment practices with regard to recognition of trades unions, training, migrant labour, pay levels, employee benefits, and desegregation. In 1985 the EC strengthened and improved the Code with specific reference to areas which had become of growing relevance and concern, namely company involvement in community projects and the promotion of black business. The code remains voluntary.

British companies provide employment for almost 80,000 black workers in South Africa, supporting an estimated five times that number in the black community. They also give direct assistance to educational programmes, technical training and community housing for blacks. In most cases, where Western companies have disinvested from South Africa the new South African managements have ceased to observe the terms of Western codes of conduct, to the detriment of black workers' interests.

#### J. THE "INDEPENDENT" HOMELANDS

In common with all other states except South Africa the Government do not recognise the so-called "independent" homelands.

The UN Security Council has condemned the South African policy of creating independent homelands and has declared them null and void. The Government remain committed to this decision, to which we were a party.

We regard the creation of the homelands as a central feature of the policy of Grand Apartheid pursued by the South African Government, to which we are wholly opposed. The homelands will be part of the new South Africa which will emerge from the process of fundamental political change. Recognition of them now will do nothing to alter that fact.

#### K. NAMIBIA

The South Africans should end their unlawful occupation of the territory, allowing the Namibian people to choose their own leaders in free and fair elections. The machinery for such elections is part of the UN Plan for Namibia, which, together with fellow Western members of the UN Security Council, we helped to negotiate. The plan was agreed with all the parties, including South Africa and endorsed by Security Council Resolution 435 in 1978. It remains the only internationally accepted basis for an independence settlement and we have consistently supported negotiations towards its implementation.

We take every opportunity to urge on the South African Government, both publicly and in private, the pressing need for them to withdraw from Namibia in order to allow the Namibians to choose their own government through the early implementation of the UN Plan. In October 1987 we voted in favour of Security Council Resolution 601 which authorised the UN Secretary General to arrange a ceasefire and to take the necessary steps for the implementation of the UN Plan. We do not, and shall not, recognise the "Transitional Government of National Unity" (TGNU) or any settlement inconsistent with this Plan.

#### APPENDIX

#### RESTRICTIVE MEASURES IMPLEMENTED BY BRITAIN

- 1. Measures agreed at the Meeting of EC Foreign Ministers, September 1985
  - i) A rigorously controlled embargo on exports of arms and para-military equipment to South Africa;
  - ii) A rigorously controlled embargo on imports of arms and para-military equipment from South Africa;
  - iii) A refusal to cooperate in the military sphere;
  - iv) The recall of military attachés accredited to South Africa and refusal to grant accreditation to military attachés from South Africa;
  - Discouraging cultural and scientific agreements except where these contribute towards the ending of apartheid or have no possible role in supporting it; and freezing of official contacts and international agreements in the sporting and security spheres;
  - vi) The cessation of oil exports to South Africa;
  - vii) The cessation of exports of sensitive equipment destined for the police and armed forces of South Africa;
  - viii) The prohibition of all new collaboration in the nuclear sector.
- 2. Measures agreed at the Commonwealth Heads of Government Meeting, Nassau, October 1985
  - i) The strict enforcement of the mandatory Arms Embargo against South Africa;
  - ii) A re-affirmation of the Gleneagles declaration of 1977 which called upon Commonwealth members to take every practical step to discourage sporting contacts with South Africa;
  - iii) Agreement upon and commendation to other governments of the adoption of the following further economic measures against South Africa:
    - (A) A ban on all new government loans to the government of South Africa and its agencies;
    - (B) A readiness to take unilaterally what action may be possible to preclude the import of Krugerrands;
    - (C) No government funding for trade missions to South Africa or for participation in exhibitions and trade fairs in South Africa;
    - (D) A ban on the sale and export of computer equipment capable of use by South African military forces, police or security forces;

- (E) A ban on new contracts for the sale and export of nuclear goods, materials and technology to South Africa;
- (F) A ban on the sale and export of oil to South Africa;
- (G) A strict and rigorously controlled embargo on imports of arms, ammunition, military vehicles and para-military equipment from South Africa;
- (H) An embargo on all military co-operation with South Africa;
- (I) The discouragement of all cultural and scientific events except where these contribute towards the ending of apartheid or have no possible role in promoting it.
- 3. Measures which the UK agreed to implement following the Commonwealth Review Meeting, Marlborough House, August 1986.
  - i) A voluntary ban on new investment in South Africa;
  - ii) A voluntary ban on the promotion of tourism to South Africa;
  - iii) The implementation of any EC decision to ban the import of coal, iron and steel and of gold coins from South Africa.
- 4. Measures agreed at the EC Meeting of Foreign Ministers, September 1986.
  - i) A ban on imports of certain South African iron and steel;
  - ii) A ban on the imports of certain South African gold coins;
  - iii) A ban on certain new investment in South Africa.

# JOINT COMMUNIQUE OF THE SOVIET AFRO-ASIAN SOLIDARITY COMMITTEE AND THE AFRICAN NATIONAL CONGRESS MARCH 1989

During its official visit to the USSR in March 1989, the African National Congress delegation, headed by its Secretary-General, A Nzo, met with a delegation of the Soviet Afro-Asian Solidarity Committee, led by its chairman, M Kapitsa.

The delegations agreed that the principal source of problems faced by South Africa and the region is the apartheid regime. The apartheid system is sinking into an all-round crisis, with the legitimacy crisis being one of its most burning issues. This crisis entails an aggravated political situation and economic stagnation. Parties agreed that apartheid cannot be reformed — it must be destroyed.

The ruling group's verbal juggling is helpless to camouflage its intention to keep itself in power, and the racist laws in force, at any cost. The regime intensifies reprisals, even against conspicuously non-violent organisations. The shameful verdict at the Delmas trial of the UDF leaders is a recent illustration. The racists instigate the Natal conflict, where peace should be restored for all the oppressed people fighting their common enemy — apartheid.

The two sides agreed that the breakthrough in attaining a settlement in south-western Africa, namely, the proclaimed cessation of South Africa's aggression against Angola and commencement of the process leading to Namibia's independence, are a major victory scored by national liberation forces over forces of colonialism and reaction. This is a result of the Namibian people's courageous struggle led by SWAPO, and the heroic resistance of the Angolan people, supported by the Cuban internationalist forces and the rest of progressive humanity. The SAASC and the ANC call upon all honest people in the world to give as much aid as they can to the Namibian people to enable them to elect their constituent assembly in an atmosphere of peace and freedom, and under the United Nations' effective supervision and control.

The SAASC and the ANC point out that at present the South African government exerts vigorous efforts to break out of international isolation by publicising its forced withdrawal from Angola and the forthcoming independence of Namibia, but inside South Africa the regime continues its policy of repression.

The SAASC and the ANC express support for the measures designed by the world community of nations and by international public opinion to bring pressure to bear on the Pretoria regime, including economic sanctions, the cultural, academic and sporting boycott of the regime, and the other measures aimed at keeping the apartheid government in continued isolation. The SAASC and the ANC expressed their unreserved support for the mass democratic movement in South Africa, in its struggle against the system of racism and apartheid.

The SAASC and the ANC reiterated their preference for settling the country's problems by political means. At the same time, they pointed out that the South African people is fully entitled to choose its own ways and means of struggle, including armed struggle, in line with United Nations General Assembly resolution N43/50 of December 5th 1988.

The two sides confirmed their irrevocable demand that Nelson Mandela and all other political prisoners in South Africa be released, and that captured combatants of Umkhonto We Sizwe be granted prisoner-of-war status in accordance with the Geneva Conventions of August 12th 1949 and the supplementary protocol No 1 of 1977.

The two sides agreed that South Africa's problems can only be settled through building a united, democratic, non-racial South Africa, on the basis of one person, one vote. Both sides believe that the *sine qua non* for a serious political dialogue in South Africa is the release of all political prisoners and detainees, the lifting of the state of emergency, the unbanning of the ANC and other democratic organisations, the free return of political exiles, and clearing the way for the people to express their will and to conduct political activities.

The SAASC assured the ANC that it was resolved to continue to give all possible moral, political and practical support to the South African national liberation and democratic movement, in its noble struggle for the liberation of the South African people.

Both sides expressed their profound conviction that the system of racism and apartheid will collapse as a result of the struggle waged by masses f people inside the country and the pressure applied by the world community in support of the just struggle of the South African people.



# ANC STATEMENT CONFERENCE OF CHIEF REPRESENTATIVES AND REGIONAL TREASURERS

GRAN - NORWAY - 31ST MARCH, 1989

A conference of ANC chief representatives and regional treasurers was held in Gran, Norway, from March 15th to 31st 1989. It was also attended by the Secretary-General of the ANC, Alfred Nzo, the Treasurer-General, Thomas Nkobi, and other members of the National Executive Committee of the ANC. The total number of delegates participating was 88.

The conference was held in Norway at the invitation and with the support of the International Department of the Norwegian Labour Movement, as well as the Norwegian Government. The conference was convened to review the situation in South Africa and the rest of Southern Africa. It assessed the implications of this situation for the international diplomatic and political work of the ANC. It also discussed ways and means of obtaining increased political, financial and humanitarian assistance to meet the additional demands arising out of this situation.

His Excellency the Foreign Minister of Norway, Mr Thorvals Stoltenberg, opened the conference, He pledged the continued support of the Government of Norway for the ANC, for the struggle to end apartheid and for the transformation of South African into a united, democratic and non-racial country. Mrs Vasla Vatlaesan, Secretary of the Solidarity Fund of the Labour Movement (AIS) and Mr Jorn Rüsa, Chairman of the Norwegian Council on Southern Africa (FSA), also addressed the conference and conveyed greetings and messages of solidarity from their organisations and the Norwegian public. The participants also attended a service of solidarity at the Church of St Nicholas, conducted by the Rev, Trond Bakkevig, General Secretary of the Foreign Relations Committee of the Norwegian Church Council.

The conference noted that the people of South Africa continue to suffer under the racist system of apartheid. This system is facing a permanent and deepening political and economic crisis, which has been brought about by the struggle inside and outside South Africa.

The conference noted that the recent election of FW de Klerk as leader of the ruling Nationalist Party will not result in any significant change in policy. His recent utterances, in which he spoke about 'dialogue', can have no substance without the creation of a climate conducive to such dialogue.

The reality is that Nelson Mandela and others continue to be incarcerated, and indeed the number of political prisoners and detainees is increasing. The ANC remains banned, and the list of proscribed organisations grew by at least 34 during the past year. To ensure the entrenchment of the system, as well as its own survival, the apartheid regime continues to resort to brutal repression as exemplified by the national State of Emergency which has been in force since 1986.

The conference concluded that the situation in South Africa remains unchanged in its main elements. This imposes a continuing obligation on the ANC, the democratic movement and our people as a whole, to continue and intensify the struggle. Accordingly, we must accelerate both the mass political offensive and our armed actions. Our success in achieving these objectives is guaranteed by the firm determination of the majority of our people to resist repression, and advance towards the goal of liberation, regardless of the sacrifices they have to make. The ongoing hunger strike of political detainees is a demonstration of this mood of militant defiance. The workers' summit convened in Johannesburg on March 4th and 5th not only reflected this mood but also added enormously to the growing unity of the anti-apartheid forces within the country.

The conference noted the strategic importance to the whole region of Southern Africa of the agreements concerning Angola and Namibia. It welcomes the prospect of peace for the people of Angola and independence for Namibia. However, the conference reiterated that there is a continuing danger that the regime and its surrogates will attempt to undermine and sabotage these processes. An important objective of the strategy of the regime is to marginalise or destroy SWAPO, the recognised leader of the Namibian people. All this calls for maximum vigilance and unity by the international community to compel Pretoria to honour its commitments.

The conference noted that the regime has not abandoned its efforts to impose itself on the countries of Southern Africa as a regional power, through economic and military destabilisation. In this regard, the conference condemned Pretoria's continuing support for the MNR and UNITA, and its persistent attacks on and sabotage against Botswana, Zimbabwe and Zambia.

The conference noted that, despite the absence of any change in its policies within South Africa and in the region, the Pretoria regime has launched an offensive to gain legitimacy, and break out of its isolation. It therefore condemned the visit of Pretoria's Foreign Minister, Roelof Botha, to the United Kingdom, which was part of this process. It further concluded that the reports inspired by the regime about the imminent release of Nelson Mandela are designed to undermine the campaign for the immediate and unconditional release of all political prisoners and to improve the image of the regime, so that it can gain greater international acceptability.

The conference noted that, as the crisis of the apartheid system deepens, the Pretoria regime is heightening its offensive against the ANC. This takes many forms, including the physical elimination of our members and representatives, the spreading of disinformation about our organisation, and attempts to foment divisions and conflict in our ranks.

The conference noted that the Front Line States, the OAU, the Non-Aligned Movement and the majority of the member states of the United Nations continue to stand firm in their opposition to apartheid and their support for our struggle. In this context, conference rejected recent reports that the Soviet Union had changed its policy towards apartheid, the ANC, and our struggle as a whole.

The various attempts of Pretoria to regain the strategic initiative have failed. The balance of forces continues to favour further advances towards the elimination of the apartheid system. Within the country, the ANC, the democratic movement and the millions of our struggling people remain the decisive force for meaningful change. Together they have an urgent responsibility to step up the struggle for the earliest realisation of the objective of a democratic South Africa. This requires, among other things, further strengthening of the structures of the ANC inside the country; greater mobilisation of the people, and the unity of all anti-apartheid forces; the intensification of the armed struggle, and the total isolation of the apartheid regime. These, and other, urgent tasks call for the generation of significantly larger resources. We need to extend more assistance to the victims of apartheid repression inside the country, as well as those who have been forced to flee the country.

To expand our international work, we have to increase the number of our diplomatic missions and provide them with the necessary human and material requirements. This will improve our capacity to keep the world community informed about the situation under apartheid, counter the information blackout, and further familiarise the international community with the aims, objectives, programmes and policies of the ANC and the democratic movement of our country.

The conference noted that all world forces opposed to apartheid have an obligation to assist us to meet the demand for increased financial and material resources. This is a necessary condition for the successful advance of the world community towards the goal of the final elimination of the apartheid crime against humanity.

Accordingly, the conference elaborated new programmes aimed at obtaining these resources and improving our organisational capacity to carry out our manifold tasks. Conference also agreed on the need to intensify the campaign for sanctions, and paid special attention to such specific issues as the arms embargo, financial sanctions, and the possibility for further action in such areas as Japan, the USA and the European Community.

The conference paid tribute to our late colleague and former head of our Department of International Affairs, Johnny Makatini, for his outstanding contribution to the struggle. It warmly welcomed the appointment of Thabo Mbeki as the new head of the Department of International Affairs. Conference was also informed of further decisions of the National Executive Committee to strengthen the existing missions and to open new ones. New offices will be opened in, among other capitals, Washington, Madrid, Tunis, Tripoli, Kampala, Caracas, Accra and Managua.

Conference expressed its profound appreciation for the assistance extended to the ANC by the Government of Norway, the Solidarity Fund of the Labour Movement and the people of Norway, which enabled us to meet to consider some of the urgent issues confronting us. Conference also expressed its thanks to Inger Helene and Ole Anton Klophus, and the rest of the staff of the Granavold Guest House, for their warm hospitality which contributed to making our conference a success.

On the occasion of March 21st, the 29th anniversary of the Sharpeville massacre, now observed as the International Day of Solidarity with the People of South Africa, we reiterate our call to the peoples of the world to isolate the murderous apartheid regime, extend all-round support to the ANC and the struggling people of our country, and in other ways contribute to the creation of a united, democratic and non-racial South Africa.

Forward to Mass Action for People's Power!

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During its official visit to the USSR in March 1989, the African National Congress delegation, headed by its Secretary-General, A Nzo, met with a delegation of the Soviet Afro-Asian Solidarity Committee, led by its chairman, M Kapitsa.

The delegations agreed that the principal source of problems faced by South Africa and the region is the apartheid regime. The apartheid system is sinking into an all-round crisis, with the legitimacy crisis being one of its most burning issues. This crisis entails an aggravated political situation and economic stagnation. Parties agreed that apartheid cannot be reformed — it must be destroyed.

The ruling group's verbal juggling is helpless to camouflage its intention to keep itself in power, and the racist laws in force, at any cost. The regime intensifies reprisals, even against conspicuously non-violent organisations. The shameful verdict at the Delmas trial of the UDF leaders is a recent illustration. The racists instigate the Natal conflict, where peace should be restored for all the oppressed people fighting their common enemy — apartheid.

The two sides agreed that the breakthrough in attaining a settlement in south-western Africa, namely, the proclaimed cessation of South Africa's aggression against Angola and commencement of the process leading to Namibia's independence, are a major victory scored by national liberation forces over forces of colonialism and reaction. This is a result of the Namibian people's courageous struggle led by SWAPO, and the heroic resistance of the Angolan people, supported by the Cuban internationalist forces and the rest of progressive humanity. The SAASC and the ANC call upon all honest people in the world to give as much aid as they can to the Namibian people to enable them to elect their constituent assembly in an atmosphere of peace and freedom, and under the United Nations' effective supervision and control.

The SAASC and the ANC point out that at present the South African government exerts vigorous efforts to break out of international isolation by publicising its forced withdrawal from Angola and the forthcoming independence of Namibia, but inside South Africa the regime continues its policy of repression.

The SAASC and the ANC express support for the measures designed by the world community of nations and by international public opinion to bring pressure to bear on the Pretoria regime, including economic sanctions, the cultural, academic and sporting boycott of the regime, and the other measures aimed at keeping the apartheid government in continued isolation. The SAASC and the ANC expressed their unreserved support for the mass democratic movement in South Africa, in its struggle against the system of racism and apartheid.

The SAASC and the ANC reiterated their preference for settling the country's problems by political means. At the same time, they pointed out that the South African people is fully entitled to choose its own ways and means of struggle, including armed struggle, in line with United Nations General Assembly resolution N43/50 of December 5th 1988.

The two sides confirmed their irrevocable demand that Nelson Mandela and all other political prisoners in South Africa be released, and that captured combatants of Umkhonto We Sizwe be granted prisoner-of-war status in accordance with the Geneva Conventions of August 12th 1949 and the supplementary protocol No 1 of 1977.

The two sides agreed that South Africa's problems can only be settled through building a united, democratic, non-racial South Africa, on the basis of one person, one vote. Both sides believe that the *sine qua non* for a serious political dialogue in South Africa is the release of all political prisoners and detainees, the lifting of the state of emergency, the unbanning of the ANC and other democratic organisations, the free return of political exiles, and clearing the way for the people to express their will and to conduct political activities.

The SAASC assured the ANC that it was resolved to continue to give all possible moral, political and practical support to the South African national liberation and democratic movement, in its noble struggle for the liberation of the South African people.

Both sides expressed their profound conviction that the system of racism and apartheid will collapse as a result of the struggle waged by masses f people inside the country and the pressure applied by the world community in support of the just struggle of the South African people.