

Das Porträt: Cyril Ramaphosa (ANC)

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„Wunderdokter“ aus Soweto

Während der Verkündung des Wahlergebnisses versteckte sich Cyril Ramaphosa an einem Ausgang der Konferenzhalle. Die ersten Minuten als neuer Generalsekretär der südafrikanischen Befreiungsbewegung Afrikanischer Nationalkongreß (ANC) gerieten ihm zum Horrortrip: Einige Anhänger hoben ihn auf die Schultern und trugen ihn im Triumphzug zum Podium — während der 38jährige Ramaphosa hilflos und mit wachsender Verzweiflung versuchte, wieder festen Boden unter die Füße zu bekommen. „Abheben“ liegt dem gelernten Anwalt nicht.

Einige Tage später — in Washington hatte US-Präsident George Bush gerade die Aufhebung einiger Sanktionen verkündet — war Ramaphosa in der Rolle des alten Hasen zu bewundern: Souverän kanzelte er die US-Entscheidung



als „vorschnell“ ab und überließ weitere Erklärungen dem außenpolitischen Sprecher Thabo Mbeki. Ramaphosa, das wurde deutlich, drängt sich nicht ins Rampenlicht. Doch er stellt sein Licht auch nicht unter den Scheffel.

Nun soll Ramaphosa Schwung bringen in den bürokratischen Wasserkopf ANC, eine „Regierung im Wartesaal“, die im letzten Jahr mehr als 20 Prozent des knapp sieben Millionen Mark umfassenden Budgets für Reisen und Lohnkosten ausgab, während die politische Bildung mit nahezu Null abgepeist wurde. Ramaphosa selbst über seine Aufgabe: „Daunting“ — ziemlich schwierig.

So wird nicht nur Südafrikas weiße Minderheitsregierung zukünftig einem gewieften und hartnäckigen Verhandlungspartner gegenüberstehen. Auch dem ANC stehen schmerzhaft Veränderungen bevor. Just dafür aber holten die Mitglieder den „Wunderdokter“ Ramaphosa aus dem politischen Abseits, in das er von Nelson Mandela gedrängt worden war.

Im letzten Jahr noch, bei Nelson Mandelas Freilassung, hielt der Generalsekretär der Bergarbeitergewerkschaft „NUM“ das Mikrofon, als „Madiba“ zum ersten Mal nach 27 Jahren Haft zu seinen Anhängern sprechen konnte. Danach verschwand Cyril Ramaphosa aus dem Rampenlicht. Winnie Mandela kann den gelernten Anwalt nicht ausstehen, seit er öffentlich ihr Verhalten in der Affäre um die Mißhandlung von Jugendlichen verurteilte.

Ramaphosa sprach mit seiner Kritik an der damaligen „Mutter der

Nation“ Sowetos Bewohnern aus der Seele. Der Bergarbeiterführer, der selbst nie unter Tage gearbeitet hat, wohnt weiter in Jabulani, einem der deprimierendsten Viertel von Soweto, und engagiert sich konsequent für lokale Belange. Er wurde in Soweto geboren, seine Mutter lebt noch und er hat einen Bruder und eine Schwester. Ramaphosa ist verheiratet, aber kinderlos. Während des Studiums, in den 70er Jahren, traf er auch Steve Biko, den südafrikanischen Begründer der Bewegung des „schwarzen Bewußtseins“. Mehr Angaben über sein Privatleben verweigert der neue Generalsekretär.

Die politische und soziale Bodenhaftung verlor Ramaphosa nie, und dies verlieh ihm bei den Anhängern die nötige politische Glaubwürdigkeit, um sich an den Verhandlungstisch zu setzen. Denn wo immer Flexibilität zu erkennen ist, sucht Ramaphosa die Chance des Handelns. Zudem versteht er sich aufs Organisieren. Seit der Gründung im Jahr 1982 stieg die Mitgliederzahl seiner Gewerkschaft von 6000 auf 340 000 und liegt gegenwärtig knapp unter 300 000. Er trotzte den mächtigen Bergwerksgesellschaften Zugeständnisse ab, und er engagierte sich in der UDF, der Vereinten Demokratischen Front, die seit Mitte der 80er Jahre in Südafrika den Widerstand gegen das Apartheid-Regime anführte.

Die regierungsnahe Presse versucht, Ramaphosa das Etikett des Mitglieds der Kommunistischen Partei anzuhängen. Ramaphosa beantwortet entsprechende Fragen einfach nicht. Für ANC-Mitglieder ist wichtig: „Er ist kein profiliertes Mitglied der Kommunisten.“ Wer gehofft hatte, Ramaphosa würde andere politische Prämissen setzen, sah sich ebenfalls getäuscht. Gemischte Wirtschaft und Umverteilung des bei Weißen konzentrierten Wohlstands stehen auch bei ihm im Forderungskatalog. Im Gegensatz zu vielen anderen ANC-Führern weiß Ramaphosa allerdings, was machbar ist.

WILLIGERMUND (Johannesburg)

had only been on 24 April – days before the process of granting indemnity and releases was due to be completed.

They were also appalled to find that the committee would only be examining on 11 June the applications of several prisoners who had been on hunger strike since early May. Finally they objected to having to take an oath of secrecy.

With their withdrawal, as European Community AAMs pointed out in a memo to the president of the EC on 10 June, 'the framework agreed between the regime and the ANC for dealing with borderline cases has now effectively broken down'. They urged the EC to take a major diplomatic initiative by calling upon the Pretoria regime to:

- declare a general amnesty for all those prisoners falling within a series of broadly based categories based on the guidelines in the Pretoria Minute; and
- set up a new independent arbitration body to deal with borderline cases, with the power to resolve cases falling outside the categories covered by the amnesty. (At present the decision-making power rests solely with the state, the Indemnity Committees being purely advisory.)

Safe return of exiles

Return of exiles under indemnity from prosecution is a key issue. The South African cabinet has reportedly rejected proposals for a general amnesty drawn up by the most senior civil servant in its own Foreign Affairs ministry, Neil van Heerden, after talks with the office of the UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) in Geneva.

Since the UNHCR is not prepared to assist refugees to return only to find themselves victimised once again, it is insisting on a general amnesty as a precondition for helping to organise and finance the huge logistic operation of getting the estimated 40,000 exiles home. Thus far, only 1,500 have returned.

The ANC alone accounts for some 22,000 exiles. Keeping them waiting is part of Pretoria's strategy of creating tensions within the ANC. By 23 May, according to official figures, about a quarter of all ANC exiles (5,562) had received indemnities – but only 637 of them had actually gone home. The limited scope of the indemnities granted so far is deterring many prospective returnees, and it underlines the wisdom of the UNHCR call for a general amnesty.

Removal of other obstacles

The HRC estimates that some 1,500 political activists are awaiting or on trial in 250 different cases. The continuation of these trials, especially when they result in conviction and gaol sentences, only compounds the problem of the imprisonment of people for opposing apartheid – despite De Klerk's claim on 17 June that it 'now belongs to history'.

Repeal of repressive laws is another demand of the international community. But the only step taken to date is the introduction of enabling legislation providing for limited amendments of the Internal Security Act.



STAGE II

TALKS ABOUT TALKS

Interim government

Whereas in Zimbabwe the British government supervised the transition from white Rhodesian rule to independence, and the UN performed a similar role in Namibia, in South Africa there is no obvious outside body entitled to exercise the functions of impartial overseer of the transition.

The ruling National Party (NP) claims legitimacy and blatantly seeks to control and manipulate the transition in order to remain in power once a democratic order comes into being. Thus far it is only prepared to coopt selected individuals into a new official organ, a Council of State. This, says the ANC, would be a 'coterie of black tokens' side by side with the existing regime.

The ANC's conception of an Interim Government (IG) has recently been outlined in its monthly magazine *Mavimbura*. The main issue

gone sour. The unresolved issue of the release of political prisoners still stands as an unfulfilled promise of the government. Further than that, the issue stands as one of the main factors in the ANC's decision to suspend talks, and as such it represents a major impediment in the way of progress towards a negotiated settlement in South Africa...

Release of political prisoners to date

Official figures for the release of political prisoners, and with which the HRC is in broad agreement, are as follows:

Political prisoners released

For the 14 months 2/2/90 – 31/3/91 (= 5 per week, av)	310
For the month of April 1991 (= 145 per week)	623
For the month of May 1991 (= 18 per week)	80
Total	1013

The remarkable activity during April as the deadline loomed is an indication of the arbitrary nature of the snail's pace of the release process during the preceding months, and of the effect of pressure on sweeping aside

The IG would also need to be replicated at local level, replacing and dismantling the controversial Black Local Authorities.

Under the IG, major sectoral interests could be drawn into structures relevant to them, eg trade unions and business to shape economic policy, with democratic and professional bodies similarly involved in education, health and other areas.

But even if all this were to materialise, the IG could only be a temporary and transitional arrangement, holding the ring whilst the political forces negotiate a new constitution.

Constituent Assembly

The ruling National Party and its ally, the Inkatha Freedom Party, remain totally hostile to the demand that a democratically elected Constituent Assembly be the forum for drawing up a new constitution for South Africa.

Yet around this issue more than any other exists the widest degree of unity amongst the extra-parliamentary forces. The demand for such a body, whose composition would be objectively determined by an open electoral campaign and secret ballot, is supported by the ANC and SACP, the PAC, the churches, the non-racial trade unions and professional bodies, and smaller anti-apartheid political parties such as the Azanian People's Organisation (Azapo) and the Workers' Organisation of SA (Wosa).

Kader Asmal, a member of the ANC's constitutional committee,

political prisoners still being held, statements which are patently false, misleading or misinformed. For example Justice Minister Coetsee said on 1/11/90 that there were then 250-300 who were clearly political prisoners and that the figure could rise to 600 with a 'wide liberal interpretation... Since his statement, the authorities have, by their own count, already released a further 850 political prisoners.

De Klerk was reported as having stated in London on 23 April that the number still to be released was 'well below 200'... Since that date, officially announced releases have totalled 488.

These glaring contradictions have recently been compounded by Minister Coetsee's statement (29/5/91) to the effect that the only prisoners left were those who had committed serious crimes of murder, rape, robbery and serious bodily harm... (But) the element of violence does not disqualify a particular action from being political, a fact which was clearly acknowledged and agreed to by both parties to the Pretoria Minute...

In his own information document issued on 2 May 1991, Mr Coetsee refers to at least 15 people who committed murder during unrest as having been released in terms of the Pretoria agreement... There are numerous examples of the release of

Listing of current political prisoners

HRC presently has on record 972 identified prisoners regarded by us as political prisoners in terms of the Pretoria Minute, who were still being incarcerated as at 3 June 1991... Of the above 972 prisoners, the Audit Committee [of the Department of Correctional Services (DCS), formerly the Prisons Dept] has so far agreed the following numbers as falling under the DCS's own categories:

Audited political prisoners

Security prisoners	24
Security-related prisoners	80
Unrest-related prisoners	161
Death Row prisoners	19
Total 'audited' prisoners	284

[The HRC then breaks down the balance of 688, showing, eg, that 210 names on the HRC's list are still being traced in DCS records. And it points out that of 133 homeland prisoners, most 'were convicted of treason in the attempted coup in Bophuthatswana a couple of years ago'.] The report continues:

The South African government disclaims responsibility for their incarceration or their release. However, the so-called independent state of Bophuthatswana, a 'country' composed of seven discrete pieces of land

so far – about 60% administratively, and 40% through individual applications for release. The latter method has turned 'into a bureaucratic monster that threatens to swallow up its creators'. By the end of May 1991 some 5,661 applications had been made. Whilst many of these are probably not from political prisoners, some undoubtedly are. And in addition it is known that 74 of the 284 audited prisoners have not applied.]

A way forward

It is abundantly clear that the present process of application is unworkable and undesirable... The simple answer is of course the creation of more and wider categories for administrative release. These could include simple membership of previously banned liberation organisations, regardless of the act for which convicted, provided the organisations vouched for the prisoners. A little creative thinking could quickly release hundreds of political prisoners by the stroke of a pen...

Beyond that, there will doubtless be a hard core of borderline cases. Such cases should be addressed ... by an independent arbitration body or a body in which there is equal representation, and with powers of decision.

once the obstacles to negotiations have been removed – will be the convening of multilateral talks to determine how the transition should be conducted.

Both the regime and the ANC are preparing to lock horns in debate about how such talks should be set up. Amongst the questions to be sorted out are: the criteria for selection of parties; size of the delegations; convening and chairing; mechanisms for decision-making and resolving deadlocks.

Dialogue between De Klerk and the ANC had barely started by the time the 30 April deadline for removal of obstacles came round – closely followed by the ANC's 9 May deadline for De Klerk to act to end the violence. The regime's failure on both counts guaranteed that no discussions about all party talks would take place until after the ANC conference.

De Klerk's state of the nation address on 17 June expressed the hope that preliminary talks would start by the end of the year. This implies that, despite his purported concern to keep the peace process moving, it could take three to four months of hard bargaining before the all-party talks begin.

