

# AFRICA CONFIDENTIAL

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OUR NEXT ISSUE WILL BE ON  
12 JANUARY 1990

POINTERS: UGANDA, ZAIRE, MALAWI, FRANCE, NAMIBIA, MADAGASCAR

## Angola: Mobutu holds the key to peace

This time, it is for real. The Angolan peace process is entering its most promising phase so far, as the difficulties created by the flawed Gbadolite agreement of June recede (AC Vol 30 No 14), and both sides are subjected to enormous pressure to agree a ceasefire.

Until now, the mediator between the two Angolan enemies has been Zaire's President Mobutu Sese Seko. But his role is being challenged by a rival camp which would like to see President Félix Houphouët-Boigny of Côte d'Ivoire as the mediator on Angola. Jonas Savimbi would prefer Houphouët-Boigny. The Luanda government, the *Movimento Popular de Libertação de Angola* (MPLA), would prefer to stick with Mobutu.

Both sides are bidding for the support of the 'Harare Group', the eight African governments mandated by the Organisation of African Unity to work on southern Africa. Among the Harare Group, Zimbabwe, Mozambique and Congo support the Luanda version of the road to peace and back Mobutu. Zimbabwe and Mozambique both have a vested interest because they know that the terms of the Angolan settlement will govern an eventual settlement with the Mozambique Resistance Movement (RENAMO), with which they are at war (AC Vol 30 No 23). Gabon and São Tome and Príncipe back the alternative peace-making effort led by Houphouët-Boigny. Zambia is undecided.

The unofficial spokesman for the Houphouët-Boigny camp is President Omar Bongo of Gabon, who has missed no opportunity to criticise both Mobutu and the negotiating stance of the MPLA government in recent weeks. The position of the Houphouët-Boigny group was hammered out at Yamoussoukro in a meeting attended by four heads of state including Kenneth Kaunda of Zambia.

At the heart of the Houphouët-Boigny initiative is the Ivorian president's wish to show that he, not Mobutu, is the doyen of African statesmen. He is also canvassing for a Nobel Peace Prize. As for Bongo, he hopes by this manoeuvre to take over from Houphouët-Boigny as the unofficial chief of the French-speaking bloc in Africa once Houphouët-Boigny has gone. Kaunda, a former ally of Savimbi in the early days of the Angolan civil war, is acutely aware of the *União Nacional para Independência Total de Angola* (UNITA)'s ability to block or unblock the Benguela

railway, which is important for the Zambian economy. Kaunda made a miscalculation at Gbadolite in June by endorsing the Luanda government line, thinking that the result of the peace process was a foregone conclusion. He underestimated Savimbi's staying-power and is now careful to keep all his options open.

Both the Mobutu and the Houphouët-Boigny camps are trying to enlist the support of President F.W. de Klerk, whose aim is to become more involved in the mainstream of African politics. They know that de Klerk can be of great help when further pressure is needed to deliver Savimbi to the negotiating table. Houphouët-Boigny had hopes of gaining the upper hand in his rivalry with Mobutu when he invited de Klerk to Yamoussoukro in late November, turning the spotlight away from Zaire. But even the Wise Old Man of Yamoussoukro was outplayed by the Zairean maestro. Mobutu upstaged him by inviting Savimbi to Kinshasa for a 10-hour meeting, at the close of which Savimbi announced he was ready to sign a ceasefire any time, any place. The announcement was timed to eclipse any news coming out of Yamoussoukro. This gave the international initiative back to Mobutu, whose main purpose at present is to sabotage the Houphouët-Boigny group. He is succeeding.

### President Mobutu is the only mediator able to apply pressure to both sides

The MPLA government in Luanda has been watching these manoeuvres with some satisfaction since it indicates a degree of confusion among Savimbi supporters. Before Mobutu went to Washington last September, he halted arms shipments from the Kamina airbase to UNITA as a way of demonstrating his power. These flights resumed only on 27 November, when the first C-130 transport coming into UNITA headquarters at Jamba from Kamina crashed. The plane belonged to a Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) aviation company. The crash emphasises the fact that Zaire is crucial to UNITA's supply-lines, and is steadily more vital in proportion as the other historic UNITA supply-route, from Namibia, is closed. South Africa can no longer provide support from this quarter because of the treaty obligations



entered into last year and because of its loss of control in Windhoek. The incoming government in Namibia, dominated by the South-West African People's Organisation (SWAPO), is eager to 'make UNITA pay' for its alleged interference in the November elections in Namibia. SWAPO has accused UNITA of bussing voters from Angola to Namibia to support the rival Democratic Turnhalle Alliance.

Kamina cannot match Namibia as a supply-route to UNITA land, since fuel in particular cannot easily be airlifted in large quantities. With up to 70,000 UNITA soldiers in need of regular re-supply from Kamina, the air-supply factor is Mobutu's trump-card to be used when Savimbi must be forced to a negotiating position.

But Mobutu can also deliver overwhelming pressure on Luanda. It is this influence with both the MPLA and UNITA which makes him the natural mediator ahead of Houphouët-Boigny. Both Zaïre and Angola harbour one another's refugees, giving each the potential to destabilise the other.

With over half the Cuban forces gone, Luanda is finding it hard to launch offensives. The government army can no longer break the 'Savimbi trail' north from Jamba. Although the government army probably has the ability to take the key staging-post at Mavinga, now that UNITA is deprived of South African air defence, it would be a risky course of action. Government forces might find themselves bogged down and far from home. Neither the MPLA nor UNITA wants to make a mistake at this vital juncture.

Mobutu has drafted a plan which is now the main framework for negotiation. It consists of four points:

1. A ceasefire is to be signed by both parties and by South Africa and Cuba as guarantors. The ceasefire is to be supervised by third parties, perhaps including Nigeria. An international monitoring force is to be present at UNITA and MPLA military headquarters.
2. The MPLA should drop its demand that Savimbi go into exile. In return, Savimbi will drop his demand for multi-party elections. It is not clear whether all sides understand this as a rejection of any form of election or whether, as UNITA believes, there should be some other form of consultation, such as a referendum, to ask the Angolan people what constitution they would choose.
3. A round table negotiation is to rewrite the constitution so as to end the leading role of the MPLA party. Savimbi insists on this to open the way to national reconciliation.
4. Both sides will close down their propaganda organs. This is emphasised by Luanda, which fears UNITA radio stations.

Not all MPLA leaders are opposed to the idea of an independent review of the constitution. Some, like Lopo do Nascimento, the first prime minister of Angola, believe that

economic reforms must be matched by political ones. Leading ideologue **Lucio Lara** voices similar opinions, echoing developments in eastern Europe. The MPLA bottom line is clear: it is willing to allow UNITA members into the government and the administration, but they will not admit Savimbi personally to the government and they will not have a multi-party system. The MPLA may lose its grip on power, but it will never allow Savimbi a victory at the ballot box. The MPLA knows that it has the tacit support of most African countries, including Gabon, Côte d'Ivoire and Zaïre, in its opposition to a multi-party system. This compromise is possible because the reduction in East-West tension has weakened hardliners in both the MPLA and UNITA.

There are no objections coming from Pretoria or Havana. They have both decided to cool the Angola issue. The South African government is busy clipping the wings of the military establishment and even Defence Minister General **Magnus Malan** has proclaimed an end to foreign adventures. In Cuba, President **Fidel Castro** has just attended an act of symbolic burial for the Cubans who died in Angola, in the presence of President **José Eduardo dos Santos**. He will not want to re-open this matter.

The most important external scene of conflict is in Washington. The Angolan government now has the support of US lobbyist **Randall Robinson**, a leader of the anti-apartheid movement. Robinson has managed to put the leading pro-UNITA congressman, Senator **Dennis De Concini** of Arizona, onto the defensive with a clever press campaign showing the devastating effects of US weapons in Angola. He has managed to raise the MPLA's support in Congress to almost the same level as UNITA's. There are now signs of strain between the State Department and the Pentagon, no doubt fuelled by arguments after the CIA plane crash. The plane was apparently carrying a load of over 30 tonnes of weapons and electronic gear. Five CIA men died and UNITA lost at least 17 people, although there is no confirmation that these included senior UNITA military men. Robinson may use this crash for propaganda purposes as he did a previous incident when a light plane carrying UNITA supporters, including the son of the Portuguese president, crashed carrying a load of ivory. Since then, South African military officials have also said that UNITA has been involved in massive ivory-smuggling.

There are fears that UNITA might change its tactics to urban bombing or arson. A series of bomb attacks or threats in Luanda, including at the headquarters of Elf-Aquitaine, is generally thought to be UNITA's handiwork. There is a danger that the main war might stop only to be replaced by urban guerrilla warfare, Beirut-style. This could happen unless there is something for every Angolan faction in an eventual peace agreement. ●

## Namibia: SWAPO, DTA, head for coalition

The fact that no party has gained the two-thirds majority required to write the constitution on its own has allayed the fears of many Namibians, particularly the white community

and the private sector. The opposition parties find themselves in an unexpectedly favourable position, which has greatly reduced the possibility of civil strife or of an exodus



### JA TOIVO TACKLES THE DETAINEE PROBLEM

There is talk inside SWAPO of holding a party congress after a rather disappointing showing in the November elections for a Constituent Assembly and the unresolved detainee issue. If this happens, it will be the first time the party's leadership has faced a democratic election among its members.

The intense negotiations in the Constituent Assembly have temporarily moderated demands for a congress until the situation becomes more certain. It is therefore unlikely that a congress will be held before 1992, assuming independence is early next year.

There is some change in the air. Andimba Toivo ja Toivo, SWAPO secretary-general, who had been rather inactive since going into exile after his release from Robben Island in 1984, has been increasingly asserting himself. He is second only to Sam Nujoma as a national figure. On 18 November SWAPO held its first post election Central Committee meeting. Aaron Mushimba, an ex-detainee who is also Nujoma's brother-in-law, raised the detainee issue and Nujoma said he would appoint a sub-committee to investigate. Ja Toivo criticised this as inadequate and succeeded in getting the Central Committee to agree to look into the matter itself. The Central Committee will ask SWAPO security chief Solomon 'Jesus' Haula and his associates to account for detainees who are still missing.

Ja Toivo's support for a thorough inquiry is seen as a direct attack on the Kwanyama faction led by Hidipo Hamutenya. If they have to shoulder blame for the detainee issue, it will weaken their grip on Nujoma.

Peter Katjavivi's sudden rise is another step in the same direction, meeting with the approval of Ja Toivo. Katjavivi is a former Central Committee member who resigned for 'health' reasons at the time of the Kwanyama takeover of SWAPO in the early 1980s. He has now bounced back and is poised to replace the ailing David Meroro as the SWAPO number three. The ethnic factor demands that Meroro, the most prominent Herero, be replaced by someone else from his group. Katjavivi fits the bill.

Those with reason to fear for their future include Hamutenya, seen by many as the force behind the detentions and as having entertained ambitions to supersede Nujoma. His close colleagues Peter Mueshihange (defence sec), Dimo Amaambo (People's Liberation Army of Namibia commander), Maxton Joseph (transport sec) and Jesus Haula, among others, also face being sidelined if the detainee issue is made to stick. It all depends on the composition of delegates to a party congress, as some unpopular candidates might still be elected by a 'packed' congress on the strength of their ethnic affiliations.

by whites.

For the South-West Africa People's Organisation (SWAPO) what was to have been a triumphant march to the Tintenpalast, the seat of government, has become a damage limitation exercise as it comes to terms with the loss of its claim to 'sole legitimacy'.

As the majority party, SWAPO has the task of steering the constitution-drafting process to a successful conclusion and forming a government. The first of these tasks certainly demands a coalition, and the second probably does too. Despite summoning the considerable skills of Peter Katjavivi, who is liked and respected by most, SWAPO has made little headway in getting the smaller parties on its side. Other groups distrust SWAPO, and their fears were confirmed when SWAPO President Sam Nujoma said at the post-election press conference that he is not against a one-party state should Namibians want it. What further complicates negotiation between SWAPO and the other parties is the personal animosity between Nujoma, Mishake Muyongo and Eric Biwa, the leading lights of respectively the Democratic Turnhalle Alliance (DTA) and the United Democratic Front (UDF). Both Muyongo and Biwa are former members of the SWAPO central committee.

SWAPO has 41 seats in the Constituent Assembly, needing seven more for the required two-thirds majority. This is the state of play with the smaller parties:

#### ● The Democratic Turnhalle Alliance: 21 seats

The DTA, dismissed for years as a South African puppet, is now the only realistic coalition partner for SWAPO, a fact many SWAPO supporters find hard to swallow. This is not only because the DTA is the most willing to enter into an alliance, but also partly the result of the uncompromising stance the UDF has taken on the issue of the SWAPO detainees. The DTA has nothing to gain by being left in

opposition, whereas to participate in government would enhance its reputation as an indigenous force and make it more acceptable to the electorate. The DTA has indicated that it is willing to take up cabinet posts. There is talk of DTA chairman Dirk Mudge becoming finance minister in a SWAPO-DTA coalition. Top DTA officials have the experience in government which SWAPO lacks.

#### ● United Democratic Front: 4 seats

The sole objective of the UDF in the November elections was to deny SWAPO a two-thirds majority. Its advisers and policy-makers are almost exclusively ex-SWAPO detainees. Although the UDF is politically closer to SWAPO than perhaps any of the other parties, the emotive issue of the detainees will keep the two apart unless major changes are forthcoming from SWAPO, such as a purge of the torturers in its ranks. The recent inclusion in the UDF ranks of Eric Biwa, former SWAPO central committee member and ex-detainee, now Patriotic Unity Movement (PUM) president, makes an improvement in relations between the UDF and SWAPO even more unlikely. Having succeeded in their spoiling tactics against SWAPO, the UDF is left with no political strategy and is casting around for a role to play in the Constituent Assembly.

#### ● Namibia National Front (NNF): 1 seat

The NNF's Vekuii Rukoro who is also President of the South West Africa National Union (SWANU Progressives), is cultivating a role as 'the voice of reason,' avoiding squabbles between SWAPO, the UDF and the DTA. He is likely to play a prominent role on the floor of the Assembly.

#### ● National Patriotic Front (NPF): 1 seat

Moses Katjiuongua was a SWANU colleague of Rukoro before breaking away to join the interim government and



create the NPF. He is likely to support Rukoro on most issues and there is even talk of a merger between the two, resulting in the reunification of SWANU.

● **Action Christian National (ACN): 3 seats**

The ACN, the local election front for the National Party which rules in South Africa, was seen by SWAPO as a possible ally prior to the elections. The DTA's strong showing means it is no longer of critical importance. The resignation from the ACN of Jannie De Wet following an acrimonious post-election meeting spells an uncertain future. De Wet will have to give up his seat in the Assembly to the next candidate on the ACN list. He may now join SWAPO.

Early debates in the Constituent Assembly are likely to concentrate on two key constitutional issues: presidential powers and land tenure. All the opposition parties would like to minimise the executive powers of the presidency and strengthen those of the future parliament. The DTA is also talking of writing a second chamber into the constitution. The DTA is unlikely to agree to significant constitutional powers which could affect property rights. This would make the SWAPO policy of dispossession of absentee landlords or the compulsory purchase of their land ineffectual. It is highly doubtful whether a significant proportion of land will become available at independence ●



F. W. de Klerk's reforms have drawn mixed reactions

# Look back in anguish

By Chris Simpson

**P**W. BOTHA once described South Africa as "a struggle between the powers of chaos, Marxism and destruction on the one hand and the powers of order, Christian civilisation and the upliftment of people on the other". The current leadership in South Africa is inclined to eschew such florid and apocalyptic rhetoric. There are still Afrikaners who will go the stake for *volk* and *vaderland*, but they are more likely to be found on the wilder fringes of the opposition Conservative Party or in the ranks of the neo-Nazi Afrikaner Resistance Movement (AWB) than within the National Party hierarchy. The references to a Moscow-directed "total onslaught", which used to pepper Botha's speeches in the early 1980s, and which served as the justification for the development of a comprehensive Total National Strategy, are now deemed clumsily anachronistic.

This is 1990, after all. The Cold War is on the wane and the Cubans are leaving Angola. The talk in Pretoria now is of domestic reform and regional detente, of Mandela's release and Namibia's independence, of bannings being lifted and the hint of negotiations to come, talks about talks. The parliamentary leader of the determinedly moderate Democratic Party, Dr Zach de Beer, now confidently predicts that the 1990s "will see the end of white minority government in South Africa". He is not alone.

The range of reforms and policy initiatives introduced by President F.W. de Klerk since taking over the state presidency from Botha in September has drawn a predictably mixed reaction both at home and abroad. Leaving aside the far right's righteous anger at the abandonment of so many trusted shibboleths, the split is mainly between those who see de Klerk as intent on dismantling apartheid, even to the extent of abdicating in favour of an interim government, and the sceptics who see his reform package as little more than an attempt to buy time for Pretoria before the banks close in and Washington finally loses its patience.

De Klerk as Gorbachev is a recurring theme amongst the optimists, no matter how superficial the parallels. A rapturous



De Klerk : Gorbachev parallels are superficial

editorial in the new journal, *SA Dialogue*, ("committed to a changing South Africa") went so far as to claim that de Klerk's "repeated use of the words 'open' and 'renewal' have made it appear as if he invented the concepts of *glasnost* and *perestroika*, while the speed with which he has put his words into action has been breathtaking".

Twenty years Botha's junior, and an infinitely more skilful media operator, de Klerk has ensured that each of the changes foisted on the South African public, be it the release of Walter Sisulu and other ANC notables, the halving of the period of military service, his own meetings with Archbishop Desmond Tutu, Rev Allan Boesak and Rev Frank Chikane, (not to mention Nelson Mandela) desegregation of South Africa's beaches, or the dismantling of the Botha-bequeathed National Security Management System, has generated considerable publicity. De Klerk has given considerable succour to the anti-sanctions lobby, long tired of beating the drum for the uncharismatic Botha and defending reforms that were palpably meaningless. British Prime Minister Mrs Margaret Thatcher, who argued with hectoring zeal against sanctions throughout the 1980s, has already claimed a 'special relationship' with de Klerk, coyly alluding to guarantees secured, and news breaking in Pretoria which is already common knowledge in Whitehall.

In Mrs Thatcher's view, de Klerk has already earned the benefit of the doubt, and argues that to impose fresh sanctions at the current time would be to send entirely the wrong signal to the South African government.

The de Klerk reforms have sown a certain amount of confusion amongst opposition groupings in South Africa, which was undoubtedly part of the government's intention. There are obvious dangers in a blanket dismissal of the whole package, but at the same time the ANC and Mass Democratic Movement (MDM) leadership has no wish to be sucked into negotiations which take place on the government's terms. De Klerk has claimed that there is "a place around the table for all organisations, parties - call it whatever you want to - who really represent a significant section of the population", but there will be few takers until his real agenda becomes more explicit.

If such a sceptical response to South Africa's "revolution from above" seems a little churlish, it is worth noting that the de Klerk 'honeymoon' comes at the end of a decade which witnessed unprecedented levels of repression in South Africa and what can perhaps best be described as "genocide by proxy" outside South Africa's borders.

Under Botha's "managing director" style of leadership, the coercive machinery of the state was brought into use as never before. Just as the massacre at Sharpeville in 1960 and the gunning down of schoolchildren in Soweto in 1976 were the strongest images of South Africa in the 1960s and 1970s, the state of emergency imposed in 1985 to curb the enormous growth in popular resistance to apartheid had a huge impact on perceptions of South Africa around the world. Although suspended briefly in 1986, the emergency has yet to be lifted. It has seen martial law in operation in the townships, with thousands being detained without trial, and the press subject to all manner of restrictions. It was a very public clampdown, but the government made it clear that international opprobrium was a price worth paying for keeping the peace at home.

The reforms which Botha did initiate, the abolition of pass laws, the recognition given to certain black trade unions and the adoption in 1983 of a Tricameral Constitution allowing for limited parliamentary representation of the Coloured and Indian populations, had the effect of alienating sections of Afrikaner opinion, spawning the Conservative Party, but they were aimed at shoring up rather than changing the key apartheid structures. Petty apartheid was viewed as redundant and therefore negotiable; apartheid as it is properly understood, as 'separate development' on the basis of racial classification, was to be





Jonas Savimbi : a cause revived by Reagan

strengthened, hence Botha's repeated emphasis on the independence of South Africa's homelands, or bantustans, as a cornerstone of government policy.

The policies adopted by Botha in the 1980s were predicated on the belief that South Africa was virtually under siege. The withdrawal of the Portuguese from Angola and Mozambique in the mid-1970s, replaced in both instances by ideologically hostile regimes, combined with the independence of Zimbabwe in 1980, meant that South Africa had effectively lost the *cordon sanitaire* which protected it from black Africa. Alarmed by the sanctuary offered to the ANC by the newly-independent states, South Africa set out to neutralise them and to assert its own hegemony over the sub-continent.

South Africa was assisted in this objective by an American administration intent on viewing southern Africa as a Cold War combat zone. It was not for nothing that South Africa was the first state to congratulate Ronald Reagan on his election to the White House in November 1980. Reagan was not slow to repay the compliment, plaintively asking a television audience in March 1981 how the US "could abandon a country that has stood by us in every war we've fought, a country that strategically is essential to the free world?" Once again, South Africa's mineral wealth and control of the Cape sea route were invoked as reasons why Pretoria should be cultivated and not spurned. South Africa was allowed to present itself as the "final bulwark against the spread of Soviet domination". Washington's insistence that independence in Namibia be linked to the withdrawal of Cuban troops from Angola, a demand which antagonised other members of the Western Contact Group, enabled South Africa to stall repeatedly on an issue which had all but been resolved in 1978. Sanctions were out, "constructive engagement" was in, Unite leader Jonas

Sarimb: (heavily subsidised by Washington in the second half of the decade) became the hero of a resurgent American right.

Botha's long-term aim was that a Constellation of Southern African States (CONSAS) would emerge, incorporating not only the frontline states, but a semi-independent Namibia and the bantustans. The scheme never progressed much beyond the drawing board, not least because of the formation of the Southern African Development Coordination Conference (SADCC) in April 1980. SADCC together Zimbabwe, Zambia, Botswana, Angola, Botswana, Mozambique, Malawi, Lesotho and Swaziland in an economic federation specifically aimed at reducing the dependence of the member states on South Africa, particularly by investing in the region's port and railway facilities so as to provide viable alternatives to the South African-dominated transport networks established in the colonial era.

It might be argued that the whole thrust of South African regional policy in the 1980s was directed towards the destruction of SADCC. If that is the case, South Africa has failed. Despite the imposition of selective sanctions by South Africa against member states, the loss of revenue through the manipulation of tariffs, and the production lost to sabotage, the organisation has survived and remains a functioning example of regional cooperation. Although it was originally dismissed by the US as "the region's own folly", the argument being that South Africa was inescapably the regional economy's main dynamo, SADCC now enjoys extensive backing from the World Bank, the European Community and private investors. South African aggression against the member states has, if anything, helped to cement what was a fairly loose regional federation of states with very different political leaderships.

South African disruption has, however, inevitably forced SADCC to invest in security at the expense of developing, often leading to the postponement of its more grandiose projects.

The cumulative impact of South African destabilisation in the 1980s is made clear by the huge refugee crisis in southern Africa, by the breakdown of key sections of the regional infrastructure, by the spiralling infant mortality rates, and the huge dents made in national budgets by military expenditure. According to Phyllis Johnson and David Martin, authors of the Commonwealth report, *Apartheid Terrorism: The Destabilisation Report*, four million people are currently displaced from their homes in

the region bordering on South Africa. Unicef has alleged that more than 1.3m people in the SADCC states died as a direct result of South African destabilisation by early 1989. There may be a danger that these statistics have already lost their power to shock. When President Kenneth Kaunda of Zambia claims that "the ideology of apartheid is hitting the neighbours back into the stone age", the common (unstated) view in the West is that he protests too much, that the savagery and deprivation which southern Africa endured in the 1980s have more to do with economic mismanagement and poorly resolved domestic conflicts than any malice on South Africa's part.

The South African factor should certainly not obscure the shortcomings of the governments in the region, but it is difficult to evaluate their real economic and political progress in a regional environment so distorted by the effects of destabilisation. Angola and Mozambique, both integral to SADCC, have been on a war footing throughout the 1980s. Unita's resurgence in the 1980s owed much to the South African Defence Force (SADF) frequent incursions into Angolan territory, which developed from cross-border raids into full-blown invasions. The impact of their combined operations on an already vulnerable infrastructure has been devastating and permeates every aspect of economic life.

South Africa's sponsorship of Renamo in Mozambique, which continued throughout the 1980s despite the bogus promises issued at Nkomati in March 1984, extracted an even heavier toll. The 1980s was supposed to be "The Decade of Victory over Underdevelopment" in Mozambique, but the Frelimo government was reduced to crisis management in many areas as the effects of drought and flooding were exacerbated by arguably the most brutally-conducted war currently being fought in Africa. According to the US State Department, Renamo forces killed over 100,000 people in 1986 and 1987 alone.

The 1980s was effectively a decade of war and wasted opportunity in southern Africa. The long-awaited independence of Namibia will give the region a welcome boost, just as Zimbabwe's did in 1980. Settlements in Angola and Mozambique would do more than anything to give some promise of stability, but these still seem elusive. Even in the event of a serious regional detente, the economies of the individual states will become increasingly beholden to the IMF, their long term prospects of serious economic regeneration still waiting on developments in South Africa.



Times 29/12/89

## TREK TO THE FUTURE

The winds of change which toppled the communist order in Eastern Europe and reshaped the world's political landscape blew steadily, if at somewhat less than hurricane force, in southern Africa in 1989. They were strong enough to end two decades of war in Namibia, launching Africa's last colony on the road to final independence, and to bring the promise of peace to two countries devastated by brutal civil war — Angola and Mozambique.

The outbreak of peace owed much to the changing superpower relationship and to a subsequent loss of Soviet and American interest in Africa as a theatre for confrontation through surrogates. If peace was the first fruit of that loss of interest, however, the waning of superpower rivalry holds a hidden threat for sub-Saharan Africa in the decade to come.

As the region, whose relentless decline was damningly chronicled in a recent World Bank report, becomes ever more marginal to superpower concerns, its ability to extract arms, alms, or development aid from a distracted world will be severely curtailed. That is why some African leaders are beginning to look south to the one country with the resources, skills and, above all, the interest to help their economies join the modern world.

The door to South Africa's full constructive involvement in the region is however barred as long as it can be categorized as the apartheid state. And it is here that the seeds of change planted in 1989 — while appearing less than momentous to a world impatient for a quick political fix — could soon produce a completely altered landscape.

South Africa began the year in the frozen grip of an old, embittered and intransigent autocrat. It ends it under a younger, flexible leader who has not been content simply to tinker with the apartheid structure. He has not only curbed the formidable power of the security establishment and set out to control the repressive habits of the police. By tolerating mass protest for the first time in 40 years and releasing prominent black political leaders, Mr F. W. de Klerk has effectively unbanned the

African National Congress. He has thus compelled black politicians more accustomed to boycott, rhetoric and street theatre to think strategically and to seek unity within their own divided ranks.

These have been high-risk policies in domestic South African terms — not least because for the first time in more than four decades of Nationalist rule, a Nationalist leader appeared willing to ignore the resentments and fears of the white right. Having successfully tested the water of black dissent and white tolerance, Mr de Klerk now appears ready, probably in his speech at the opening of Parliament in February, to announce the next inevitable step: the release of Mr Nelson Mandela.

That is indispensable to the opening of serious negotiations. Mr Mandela is the only man who, despite attempts in some radical quarters to demythologize him, can hold the ring of the divided black opposition and deal with Pretoria from a position of authority. The most difficult steps remain to be taken. The pace of events has quickened, but there will be prolonged talks about talks before the key issue, who will rule South Africa, can be confronted.

There are still too many black politicians who believe that "people power" will topple the white citadel without the need for negotiation. There are also too many whites — and Mr de Klerk is still one of their number — who cling to the concept of "group rights" as the basis for yet another bizarre constitutional attempt to square the South African circle and share power without losing it.

There can, however, be little doubt that 1989 set the scene for the last act in the South African drama. How it ends — in conflict or in conference, in a true non-racial multi-party democracy or in yet another African experiment with discredited Marxist theories — will mean the difference between tragedy and hope, not merely for South Africa's own people but for all the countries of the subcontinent.



# ANC seeks to turn 'armed struggle' into reality

IT IS not uncommon at anti-apartheid rallies here to spot youths carrying what at first sight appear to be guns but, on closer inspection, prove to be toy AK-47s. These youths, far from provoking derision, elicit admiration from their peers. Their toy guns are symbols of "the armed struggle", an article of faith for many of those committed to the liberation of black South Africa.

They are also symbols of a fiction which both the African National Congress and the government endeavour, for different reasons, to sustain.

What the ANC calls "armed struggle" — and the government "terrorism" — barely exists beyond the minds of those who employ these terms. The ANC need "the slogan of the armed struggle", as a Soviet academic put it recently, in order not to risk losing the support of those long fed on the romantic notion that the revolutionary seizure of power is feasible. The government has needed to keep the "terrorism"


From John Carlin  
in Johannesburg

myth alive in order to justify the perpetuation of a state of emergency which bestows inordinate powers on the security forces.

Yet, playing into the propaganda hands of the South African right, the ANC, to mark their 78th anniversary yesterday, said in a statement that it would seek to intensify the armed struggle until the day the party was granted the same political freedom as the ruling National Party.

There is not a great deal to intensify. Planned attacks on police, military or government personnel by the ANC's military wing, Umkhonto we Sizwe, were unheard of in 1989. Hazy reports of attempted sabotage operations occasionally appeared in the inside pages of the local press. Most frequent were limpet mine blasts, usually late at night in remote corners of cities.

But not one civilian was re-



Winnie Mandela talks to journalists after visiting her husband in Cape Town yesterday

ported killed or wounded during the year as a consequence of ANC military action — a fact which places in context the police claim that 144 "terrorist" incidents took place in the first eight months.

If, even by Umkhonto's standards, the last six months have been especially quiet, part of the answer must lie in the fact that the overwhelming majority of their estimated 12,000 trained

fighters were relocated in the middle of the year from their bases in Zambia (350 miles from the SA border) and Angola (500 miles) to Tanzania (900 miles) and, still further away, Uganda.

The South African Communist Party, which provides much of the intellectual backbone of the ANC, recognised in a report last year that there were no immediate prospects of inflicting military

defeat on the government, but persisted in the view that the ANC's guerrillas still had a role to play as an instrument of political pressure. The inevitable reduction of military support from Eastern Europe and from the Soviet Union, however, seems likely to ensure that armed struggle, even as a theory, will in due course fade away altogether from the South African picture.



Independent 4/1/1980

# Mandela likely to be released 'within weeks'

NELSON MANDELA has given the first direct indication that his release is imminent after 27 years in South Africa's prisons. His wife, Winnie, said after visiting him yesterday that she expected him to be free in a matter of weeks.

"I don't think we are talking about months any longer," she told reporters outside Mr Mandela's prison home in Paarl, near Cape Town. Consistently sceptical in the past about rumours of her husband's release, she said yesterday: "I am very hopeful now. This is the real stuff now."

For the first time Mr Mandela, 71, had called her to discuss what she called "the preliminary arrangements for his release". She would not be drawn on what these arrangements might be, nor would she speculate on the precise date when her husband would be out.

Mrs Mandela's brief statements served to confirm widespread speculation in recent months that the long-awaited release of the most celebrated political prisoner in the world would come early this year. Speculation gave way almost to certainty after a meeting between Mr Mandela and President FW de Klerk at the presidential office in Cape Town on 13 December.

Diplomats in close contact with senior members of the government believe that the most likely date for the official announcement to be made is 2 February, when parliament officially opens and Mr de Klerk is billed to deliver an important speech.

But no one, in what has become a subject of all-consuming fascination in the South African political world, is ruling out a Janu-

From John Carlin  
in Johannesburg

ary release. Mr de Klerk, who has acquired something of a taste for *coups de théâtre* since coming to power four months ago, sprang a surprise when he announced the release of Walter Sisulu and six other long-term political prisoners in October.

Even before Mrs Mandela's statements yesterday, Pik Botha, the Foreign Minister, had placed journalists on red alert by dropping a strong hint at a weekend press conference that Mr Mandela would be released soon. He said that the government was ready to remove "obstacles to negotiations" with important black political organisations. Notable among these obstacles is Mr Mandela's continued presence in prison.

Mr de Klerk, besides, has evidently concluded that Mr Mandela is a black leader with whom he can do business. The president has made "negotiations" his watchword and Mr Mandela, in regular meetings over the last six months with senior cabinet ministers — a species of "talks about talks" — has communicated his desire to engage in "jaw-jaw" as the most satisfactory means to attempt to reach a settlement of the South African problem.

It would not be a surprise if, shortly before or shortly after Mr Mandela's release, it turned out that he had helped persuade the government to lift the state of emergency and "unban" the ANC, two crucial demands by the ANC before it will talk formally with the government.

ANC to intensify 'struggle', page 9



*Sm*

# Prisoner's wife hears the good news



Mandela showing her pleasure at the news of her husband's probable release.

## Mandela says 'prepare for my release'

From Ray Kennedy, Johannesburg

*Times 9/11/90*

Nelson Mandela, the jailed African National Congress leader, told his wife, Winnie, yesterday to begin making arrangements for his early release after more than a quarter of a century in South African prisons.

A beaming Mrs Mandela left the Victor Verster Prison at Paarl, near Cape Town, where her husband now lives in a warder's bungalow, saying: "This is the real stuff now. I don't think we are talking about months any longer. It is the first time he has called us to discuss preliminary arrangements for his release."

Mr Dullah Omar, a family lawyer, confirmed that arrangements for Mandela's freedom were discussed "in view of the general expectation that he will be released sooner rather than later".

Mandela, now 71, was sentenced to life imprisonment in 1964 for sabotage and plotting revolution to overthrow the Government. He was moved to his present quarters after contracting tuberculosis in the earlier years of his imprisonment on Robben Island in Table Bay and later in Pollsmoor Jail in suburban Cape Town.

His release — and that of all other political prisoners — is one of the basic conditions set by black leaders for beginning negotiations with the Government on political reform.

Yesterday President de Klerk was carefully studying a

statement issued by the ANC in Harare, the capital of Zimbabwe, to mark its 78th anniversary. The organization remains outlawed in South Africa.

Although the ANC statement said it would continue "the armed struggle" and added that the De Klerk Government still had a long way to go, it declared: "For our part, we are committed to seizing any real opportunity that might emerge genuinely to seek a political agreement for a speedy end to the apartheid system."

It has been evident for a considerable time that, in Pretoria's view, it is no longer a question of if Mandela is to be released but when. Considerations of security remain uppermost in the Government's mind.

Last September, in one of his first acts as President, Mr de Klerk freed Mr Walter Sisulu and six other veteran ANC leaders who were imprisoned with Mandela. Their activities, which have been studiously diplomatic, have been closely monitored by the Government in order to gauge the moment to set Mandela free.

Significantly, Mr Sisulu and the others have now been granted passports by the South African authorities to enable them to attend an ANC conference in Lusaka, Zambia, later this month.

Continued on page 20, col 7

## Mandela release 'near'

Continued from page 1

Early last month Mr de Klerk stated publicly that Mandela would be freed but added: "I'm not prepared to speculate when."

● LONDON: Sources in Whitehall said yesterday that it appeared "most likely" that Mandela would be released in late January or early February

(Andrew McEwen writes). The British Government has kept up constant pressure for his release.

Sir Robin Renwick, the British Ambassador in South Africa, raised the matter at a meeting with Mr R.F. "Pik" Botha, the South African Foreign Minister, just before Christmas.



Times 10/10/90

# Pretoria radio backs Mandela release

From Ray Kennedy  
Johannesburg

South African state-controlled radio has gone out of its way to prepare people for the imminent release from prison of Nelson Mandela, the African National Congress leader.

This comes after Mrs Winnie Mandela's statement on Monday that her husband had told her for the first time to start making arrangements for his release.

In its daily *Comment* programme to be broadcast today, the South African Broadcasting Corporation said: "South Africa has moved beyond the stage of political leaders merely expressing themselves on the need for negotiated progress."

It added: "The debate has begun to address the nuts and bolts of the process — to identify what needs to be done

on all sides for it to be undertaken successfully. That task requires the active participation of all representative leaders who support peaceful change."

The significance of the broadcast is that the corporation has been consistently used by the Government to project its views.

The broadcast noted that

Mandela expressed his support for peaceful development when he met former President Botha last July, and that the release of seven of his colleagues last September was "something of a trial run".

It said: "The seven were feted in highly emotional mass ceremonies — as Mr Mandela himself undoubtedly would be — but their release passed the

more fundamental test set by the authorities, that it should not be accompanied by an upsurge in unrest and violence."

By identifying himself with the ideals of peaceful development, Mandela had redefined his position "in the context of moves towards negotiated political change."

It is anticipated in many

quarters that President de Klerk will order the release of Mandela, aged 71, to coincide with the opening of Parliament on February 2.

Dr David Owen, leader of the Social Democrats, who is visiting South Africa and met Mr de Klerk on Monday, said that the South African leader told him openly that he was in a hurry to push ahead with reforms preparing the ground for negotiations with black leaders.

In another significant move, the Government has granted a long-denied visa to the Rev Jesse Jackson, the American black leader and one of its fiercest critics.

Mr R.F. "Pik" Botha, the Foreign Minister, said Mr Jackson "will be welcome to come to South Africa and the necessary visa will be issued to him to travel at a mutually convenient time."

## Up to 25 strikers killed in clash

From Our Correspondent  
Johannesburg

Between six and 25 striking black railway workers were killed and scores injured in a 45-minute pitched battle with non-strikers near here yesterday.

Police put the death toll at six with 31 injured, but a spokesman for the Council of

South African Trade Unions said at least 25 people were killed and 60 injured, and said police intervened too late.

The battle erupted when a train carrying about 800 strikers arrived at a station platform in the town of Germiston for a union meeting and was met by about 1,000 non-strikers. The 10-week strike

by the South African Railways and Harbours Union over a pay claim and the refusal of the nationalized South African Transport Services, which runs the country's railways, to recognize it, has already claimed 17 lives.

The body has also dismissed more than 20,000 of the strikers.



Z4: Southscan (Br), 89 12 08 (abr)

## Dialogue developed in Paris between ANC and internal establishment and MDM

A large gathering of South Africans from all political and cultural sectors was held just outside Paris Marly le Roi last week. It was seen by participants as a 'Dakar II' gathering, modelled on the one last year in the capital of Senegal, which has been followed by a series of meetings involving the African

National Congress in exile. Participants were not mandated to take particular positions - not were they representing the sides in a negotiation process.

This report from one of the participants represents an individual and personal view.

If the exercise was one in building trust - then probably it was successful: there was no polarisation and no breakdown of the dialogue.

It ended with a statement, since it would not have been possible to agree on a communique.

Comparisons were made with the Dakar meeting a year ago - where for the first three days the main issue hammered on by white participants had concerned the armed struggle - and then the role of the SA Communist Party. This time the armed struggle was not mentioned, and the SACP only obliquely.

These issues had been accepted, it seemed, and concern had now moved on to the post-apartheid economy and the shape of the constitution.

As expected, the business community attacked sanctions - and the ANC and mass movement representatives explained that it and the armed struggle were the only means of bringing pressure on Pretoria for change.

But there were strong pleas from some to give the FW de Klerk administration the benefit of the doubt - in the view of one Afrikaner academic, there was now a new moral climate among Afrikaners.

The central theme of the gathering was the definition of the ground for negotiation between the state and the ANC.

Participants reflected important sectors - big business, black entrepreneurs, Mass Democratic Movement activists, the trade unions, the press (mainstream and alternative), intellectuals and cultural figures.

Two issues seemed to crystallise the differences: the shape of the future constitution and bill of rights; and the future economy.

Pretoria has set in mo-

tion a Law Commission which has now formulated a draft bill of rights as its contribution to the debate on a future constitution.

(The ANC constitutional guidelines, to be finalised next year, received less attention - along a pattern throughout the conference of reassuring white opinion about basic rights. Similarly they heard the ANC assert its policy on press freedom with no prior restrictions on publishing, but with a strict anti-racism law).

The Law Commission's position was put forward by an ex-judge. The apparently enlightened judges had presented a draft bill stressing not what the government had sought - a guarantee of group rights, for which read white rights - but individual rights, the ANC's demand.

The ANC was asked why it could not make contributions to the Law Commission from its own work on the subject. Tactically, of course it would mean that the ANC enter into a situation in which it might appear to be co-opted. The dominant power remains Pretoria.

One suggestion from the ANC side was that the contribution could be made in the form of newspaper articles, which could then be brought to the attention of the Law Commission.

This seems to be the likely response to other suggestions of the kind until a 'climate for negotiations' is created - involving the unbanning of organisations and the release of their capacity to organise, educate and mobilise.

The second issue which seemed to be a key point for the meeting concerned the economic future after apartheid.

A number of papers were read - one from the side of the unions pre-

sending a cogent and tightly argued 'new marxism' plan - involving, however, all the familiar aspects of the mixed economy, and yielding ground also on the nationalisation of the 'commanding heights of the economy'.

The presentation appeared to surprise some of the business participants. On their side a senior investment analyst set out arguments why redistribution must come from growth, and this led inevitably to policies along the lines of a free development of capitalist forces.

Another position set out a radical social democratic model.

In some cases it appeared afterwards that the differences had been purely semantic - one leading right-wing newspaper commentator said he had not realised that his espousal of market forces had been read to exclude involvement of the state in education.

Some business figures had come prepared to - as one put it afterwards - "integrate the contradictions". There was some feeling that the ANC and MDM side had not been sufficiently prepared to counter US business college theory.

The differences between political economic analysis and business analysis were simply not brought to the fore - and real antagonisms appeared to represent simply difficulties in communication.

The international situation seemed also to have its impact: the apparently imminent dissolution of the socialist states of Eastern Europe seemed to have a disarming effect (and was having a similar impact on the MDM inside South Africa according to some participants).

At the end of the deliberations, at a reception in the French foreign ministry, the chairman of the

mining house JCI, Murray Hofmeyer, spelled out points of agreement and disagreement. There could be no future within a "group" rights constitution, but negotiations should now be entered into while the parties were in place.



NY Herald Tribune 2/1/90

# South Africa Seeks Skilled East Germans

By Christopher S. Wren

New York Times Service

JOHANNESBURG — The government is encouraging skilled East Germans to immigrate to South Africa, which has a shortage of skilled labor but has a surplus of unskilled labor.

The Department of Home Affairs in Pretoria confirmed in a statement issued last week that South Africa's embassies in Bonn, Bern and Vienna and its consulate in Munich had been asked to consider suitably qualified East Germans who wanted to immigrate.

It denied reports that Pretoria had sent a delegation to Western Europe to recruit East Germans.

An advertisement inviting applications was published in a West German newspaper on Nov. 1, the department said.

The desirable occupations listed in the statement included engineers, computer specialists, accountants, physicians, geologists, metallurgists and microbiologists.

The department, whose responsibilities include immigration and emigration, was responding to press queries prompted by a report circulated Dec. 26 from Harare, Zimbabwe.

The official Zimbabwe press agency quoted an unidentified official of the United Democratic Front, the South African anti-apartheid umbrella group, as saying the South African government had been trying to recruit white manpower from East Germany and other East European countries.

"We do have a lot of skilled

black South Africans in the country who are still unemployed and a lot of educated young people who could easily be trained and fill the gap," the agency quoted the official as saying.

The Pretoria department said its embassies abroad were always looking for potential immigrants with useful skills. But it said a work permit would be issued to a foreigner only if there were no South Africans qualified to fill the job.

The disclosure has touched a raw nerve with the anti-apartheid

movement because of the high rate of unemployment among blacks.

Under the apartheid system, the best jobs used to be reserved for whites, although many such restrictions have fallen away because employers could not find enough skilled workers to meet their needs.

In some previous years, South Africa has had an outflow of emigrants that exceeded the number of immigrants. But that has tapered off since 1977, a year after major rioting in the Soweto township, when 26,000 whites left.

A decade later, in 1987, 11,174

emigrated while 7,953 immigrants arrived. The emigrants tend to have less education than the immigrants.

A marketing survey in 1987 reported that more than 160,000 white adults in South African cities and towns expected to emigrate in the next five years.

But that flow appears to have been reduced as a result of the shift away from apartheid promised by President F.W. de Klerk.

Young white men have been encouraged to stay by a reduction in their compulsory military service, from two years to one.

## Pretoria Says 58% of Blacks Failed Exams

New York Times Service

JOHANNESBURG — Fifty-eight percent of black high school seniors failed their final examinations last year, a disastrous showing that has revived the controversy over segregated education in South Africa.

According to results released by the Department of Education and Training, 74,249 student applicants, or only 42 percent, earned a matriculation certificate, which is

equivalent to a high school diploma.

Of those, only 17,553 did well enough to qualify to go on to a university. The showing was said to be the worst in five years.

By comparison, 96.7 percent of the white students passed the same national examinations in the Transvaal, the first province to announce matriculation results. Critics of the segregated school system observe that the government

spends five times as much on a white student as on a black one.

At a news conference in Pretoria, Bernhard Louw, director-general of the Department of Education and Training, said the failure rate was higher because the lenient promotion policy of previous years had been tightened. He also blamed the disruption of classes by political boycotts and a 13 percent rise in secondary school enrollment.



INT. Herald Tribune 5/11/90

# Botha's East European Foray Angers Blacks in South Africa

By Allister Sparks

Washington Post Service

JOHANNESBURG — Drawing an angry response from the country's black leadership, South Africa is making a two-pronged effort to capitalize on the changes sweeping Eastern Europe.

Foreign Minister R.F. Botha is in Hungary, which Pretoria hopes may open the way to trade and diplomatic relations with that country and some of its neighbors.

The embassy in Bonn, meanwhile, is trying to attract skilled

immigrants to South Africa to offset a brain drain among the white population and the failure of the country's separate and unequal education system to produce enough qualified blacks.

Mr. Botha's surprise visit to Budapest is seen as an attempt to find a new area where South Africa can break out of its international isolation. Both the government and the Johannesburg press are presenting it as a breakthrough that could lead to expanded trade ties, and perhaps

eventually even diplomatic relations, with the new Eastern Europe.

Foreign Ministry statements imply that Mr. Botha's trip stemmed from long-standing contacts Pretoria has secretly maintained with Budapest, and that there has even been a certain amount of clandestine trade between the two countries.

That casts a new light on the morality of Eastern Europe's former Communist regimes, which for years berated the West for not applying comprehensive sanctions

against South Africa as they said they were doing.

Mr. Botha met Thursday with Hungary's foreign minister, Gyula Horn. A Foreign Ministry source in Pretoria described the meeting as "exploratory" but said the Hungarians had indicated an interest in expanding trade links.

According to South Africa's leading financial newspaper, Business Day, joint ventures might include a South African company's building and operating a vacation resort in Hungary, South Africa's

supplying diesel engines for Hungarian buses and central bank cooperation between the two nations.

In London, an Anti-Apartheid Movement spokesman said that Hungary "doesn't fully understand what it is letting itself in for; they will pay a heavy price for any deal they set up with Botha."

In Johannesburg, the opposition United Democratic Front said it was "shocked" at Hungary's invitation.

"One seriously questions the direction in which Hungary wants to

go," said a spokesman, Azhar Cachalia, "if one of the first countries it wants to have relations with is South Africa."

Blacks have also been angered by South Africa's campaign to attract skilled immigrants from Eastern Europe in the face of black unemployment at home, which in some regions exceeds 60 percent.

South Africa's embassy in Bonn and consulate in Munich have become the operational centers for

See BOTHA, Page 6

## BOTHA: Dual East European Foray Angers Blacks

(Continued from page 1)

the recruiting drive; both report being swamped with applications, mostly from Poland and East Germany.

Wessels Marais, chief immigration officer at the embassy in London, has been seconded to the Munich consulate to help cope with the rush. He confirmed Wednesday that the search was for people with a wide range of skills, "from architecture to zoology." Mr. Marais was unable to give statistics of the number of East Europeans being cleared for immigration.

The government's justification for a major immigration drive is that while South Africa has an abundance of unskilled labor its economy is desperately short of skilled manpower in almost every sector.

But the black political movement's reply is that if the govern-

ment of President Frederik W. de Klerk is serious about wanting to bring about fundamental change, it should give priority to upgrading black skills to fill these jobs and eliminate the vast discrepancy between white and black living standards.

"This kind of thing makes us doubt the government's sincerity," Mr. Cachalia said. "To us, it looks more like a move to buttress white rule."

Blacks resent Pretoria's repeated attempts to lure skilled white immigrants at another level as well. The white immigrants can qualify for full citizenship and voting rights within five years, while indigenous blacks can never qualify as voters.

Mr. Cachalia also expressed doubts about the political leanings of the East Europeans who might come to South Africa.

"I doubt very much whether they

will be imbued with the democratic spirit that has emerged in these countries over the past few months," he said. "Our experience in the past is that immigrants from Eastern Europe tend to be very conservative and add to the right-wing movement here. That is the last thing we need."



E

Times 4/1/90

## Surprise Botha visit may lead to Budapest links

By Our Foreign Staff

Mr R.F. "Pik" Botha, the South African Foreign Minister, arrived suddenly in Hungary yesterday for official talks, his first visit to a Warsaw Pact country.

MTI news agency said that he was expected to meet Mr Gyula Horn, the Hungarian Foreign Minister, and leaders of the country's new non-communist, opposition parties during his two-day stay.

The visit could eventually lead to the establishment of diplomatic relations between the two countries, and it appeared linked with a campaign by Pretoria to persuade skilled workers in Eastern Europe, disenchanted with life under communism, to emigrate to South Africa.

The Department of Foreign Affairs issued a vague statement in Pretoria yesterday saying that Mr Botha was visiting Hungary to acquaint

himself with developments there and other Eastern European countries and to tell them what was going on in South Africa. The statement added that Hungary was the only country Mr Botha would visit on his current trip.

For years anybody remotely connected with the South African Government has been *persona non grata* in any Soviet bloc country.

The trip would have been unthinkable a year ago before the reformist wave engulfed Eastern Europe and South Africa started to break its international isolation under a programme of apartheid reforms launched by President de Klerk. Mr Botha is totally backing President de Klerk and his declared aim to abolish apartheid.

South Africa has a considerable Hungarian population, most of them refugees and their children who fled after the 1956 revolution. Many

have become South African citizens. Many of them have found their political roots with the white extremist Conservative Party.

Hundreds of East Europeans are reported to have responded to Pretoria's recruitment campaign aimed at reducing South Africa's chronic shortage of skilled workers, particularly in the mining industry.

South African newspapers reported yesterday that Pretoria's diplomatic missions in Europe were working flat out to process hundreds of applications from people considering emigrating following the easing of border controls.

In South Africa, Mr Botha's visit is being viewed by some observers through a long political telescope. It is expected that Mr de Klerk will at some stage reward him for his loyalty with the restored office of Prime Minister.



Times  
26/12/89

## TEN YEARS OF MR MUGABE

The ceasefire agreement which opened the way to independence for Zimbabwe, the former white-ruled Rhodesia, was signed in Lancaster House 10 years ago this month. Mr Robert Mugabe, the country's enigmatic and complex leader, can look back with some pride on what has been achieved.

The post-independence civil war between the dominant Shona tribe and the minority Ndebeles, which at one point threatened to destroy the fledgling country, seems to have been resolved. The economy, despite serious problems, is one of the more viable in black-ruled Africa. Treatment of the white population, now numbering about 100,000, has been notable for its lack of vindictiveness.

Zimbabwe is, however, approaching a critical point with the expiry on April 18 of next year of the entrenched provisions of the British-drafted independence Constitution. It should be said at once that Mr Mugabe has been meticulous in observing the letter of the Lancaster House provisions. But he has never made any secret of the fact that he chafes under their restraints. On two key issues — the move to a one-party State and the division of land — the way is now open to a much more radical approach.

At the end of last month, the Zimbabwean legislature passed a constitutional amendment Bill which, from April 18, will make it possible by a two-thirds vote of the House of Assembly to abolish sections of the Bill of Rights guaranteeing freedom of political association and the right to compensation after compulsory acquisition of property. Under Lancaster House, those rights can be rescinded only by a 100 per cent vote. Whether Mr Mugabe intends to exploit this possibility fully remains unclear, but the mere fact that he could do so has set alarm bells ringing.

Before independence half of all farmland, which included the best quality areas, was reserved for white settlers. Today about a third of the available land is still owned by Zimbabwe's 4,000 white farmers, while 42 per cent supports 750,000 communal farmers in areas traditionally reserved for blacks. Around

7 per cent is occupied by black families resettled since 1980, and 3.5 per cent is in the hands of small-scale black commercial farmers. In equity, the case for the release of more land to Zimbabwe's nine million blacks, who are increasing by 3 per cent a year, is thus strong.

When he became Prime Minister in 1980, Mr Mugabe promised to resettle 162,000 black families within five years on idle or under-used land. Nearly 10 years later, under the present "willing seller, willing buyer" system whereby most land purchases are paid for by British aid funds, no more than 52,000 families have been resettled.

The Government is losing popularity because of corruption scandals and worsening economic problems. With a general election due to be held before the end of next year, a radical land distribution scheme might seem like a vote-winning policy.

Mr Mugabe gave an assurance last week that there would be "no wanton land-grabbing exercise". That is encouraging. Any such policy would scare off badly needed foreign investment. White farmers provide 80 per cent of marketable output and most of the vital export crops, such as tobacco, beef and soyabeans. Their precipitate replacement by black farmers would be an economic disaster.

Nor would it solve the growing problem of unemployment. There is simply not enough land to absorb the 250,000 black youngsters leaving school each year, most of whom in any case have little interest in peasant farming.

A one-party State has been a long-standing aim of Mr Mugabe. Two years ago his old rival and former comrade-in-arms, Mr Joshua Nkomo, agreed to merge his Zapu party with Mr Mugabe's Zanu-PF, ending the campaign of banditry and killing by Zapu dissidents in the Matabeleland bush. Last week a congress of the united party in Harare put the finishing touches to the merger by adopting a new constitution. A one-party State already exists *de facto*. Outlawing all political opposition groups would be a wholly unnecessary and retrograde step.



# Democracy flickers in a dark continent

*Guardian 28/12/89*

Eastern Europe's winds of change are blowing in Africa but most states are ill-prepared to welcome them, as **Victoria Brittain** reports

**A**N AFRICAN version of perestroika is under way across the continent, with the tiny west African state of Benin this month following Mozambique's lead in striking Marxism-Leninism from its official ideology. Algeria, among the most influential African states, ended one party rule earlier in the year, and was followed this month by San Tomé opting for a multi-party system.

But in Zimbabwe last week at the congress called to cement the merger between President Robert Mugabe's Zanu-PF party and Joshua Nkomo's Zapu and to revise the 30-year-old constitution imposed at Lancaster House, there were indications that Africa is not going wholesale down the East European road. The two separate questions of a Marxist-Leninist party in Africa, and of enshrining a one-party state in the constitution, were bitterly debated. And Algeria's recent congress of the Front de Liberation National (FLN) did not, as many expected, kiss socialism goodbye, but rather returned to power some of the FLN heavyweights most closely associated with trying to build it under the former President Houari Bou-

medienne. Discussing his congress, Zimbabwe's Foreign Minister, Nathan Shamuyarira, said "capitalism cannot develop Africa — there is no capital here, or coming in." And Professor Armando Enríquez, head of Cuba's research institute on Africa recently put it similarly: "The failures of building socialism in Africa have been very clear for some time, but, equally clearly, the capitalist route is not a viable alternative."

One of the by-products of the political upheavals which are opening Eastern Europe to Western aid and private investment is that — despite the official declarations to the contrary from Washington — there is going to be even less capital for Africa.

The Marxist-Leninist ruling parties left in Africa, besides Zimbabwe, are those of Angola, Ethiopia, and Congo (widely expected to be the next to change). They are not, of course, the only one-party states. Across the political spectrum from these on the Left, to rampant capitalist states like Kenya, the one-party state is the norm in Africa. The rationale is that in countries still new enough to have uncertain national identi-

ties, and with large illiterate populations, a multi-party state invites divisions on ethnic grounds, and spawns corruption. (Less publicly those in power would agree that they are easier to keep order in.)

Multi-party systems as, for instance, in the former British colonies of Uganda, Ghana and Nigeria in the years after independence, were a failure. They created a mockery of democracy, encouraged a corrupt elite, perpetuated gross inequalities between regions and between urban and rural areas.

And in Angola during the brief period of three-party transitional government in 1974, the US used the opportunity to pour arms into the two parties it hoped could block the Marxist-Leninist MPLA from taking power (a pattern reproduced in Nicaragua today).

In both Mozambique and Angola recent donor pressure to drop the Marxist-Leninist label was explicit. It was a preliminary to a push towards multi-partyism which has become the latest weapon in the long wars fought in both countries by South Africa's proxies — Unita and the Mozambique National Resistance (MNR). Both groups, whose re-

cord of terrorist attacks on the population has been their substitute for politics over the years, are now demanding a place in multi-party elections.

President Mugabe's own experience of South Africa's involvement in Zimbabwe's recently launched Zimbabwe Unity Movement (ZUM), and the launch during the congress of a previously unheard of Zimbabwe Active People's Unity Party, may explain his passionate defence of the one-party state. President Mugabe's view runs against the judgment of many of Zimbabwe's most distinguished intellectuals, a judgment which has been freely aired in the local press. Men like the prominent writer Cherrai Hove, university lecturer Jonathan Moyo, and former editor of the Sunday Mail Willie Musarurwa have all written against the president's policies with an openness that would be accepted in few, if any, other African countries.

The current epidemic of ideological change in Africa has of course been sparked by Eastern Europe's upheaval, and there are plenty of parallels in the African parties' loss of touch with the grassroots, their lack of internal democracy, and their incapacity to confront chronic social and economic crises — and not only among the parties of the Left. But in these fragile societies the fash-

ionable rush for ideological change by the embattled leadership often has more to do with outsiders' pressures — western donors and financial institutions — than with popular pressure for change as seen in the streets of Prague or Leipzig.

There is no word of change, for instance, in the one-party tyranny of Kenya where political practice consists of the population lining up in public behind candidates at election time, and with the poor routinely giving money to politicians, including the president, when they are kind enough to pass through the rural areas.

The outside pressures fall only on those states which disturb the status quo, however mildly. A decade ago one of the most vocal African states in the left caucus of the Organisation of African Unity and the Non-Aligned Movement was the Indian Ocean state of the Seychelles, freshly liberated from its fun-loving prime minister James Mancham who had been turning the islands into a paradise for rich foreigners. The new president, Albert Rene, was nearly overthrown by an invasion of South African mercenaries, and later several further attempts were made, with Western complicity, to oust him. He threw away the left wing public image and cultivated the West, although Seychelles remains a one-party

Socialist state in its constitution. It may have been the model transition the West would like for other African countries.

The \$60 billion cost of South Africa's destabilisation of the region, which has bled its neighbours, coupled with the worsening economic crisis of the continent as a whole, has left plenty of African governments similarly prepared to say Uncle, as President Reagan used to put it.

But changing ideological labels to suit Western fashion is not going to meet the primary political challenge in Africa, which is provided by democracy, within whatever political system. Algeria's October riots in 1988 and Benin's recent street demonstrations after months without payment for government employees, showed social malaise running out of control, as it now does in many African countries, but there are no Civic Forums or New Forums waiting in the wings with a political alternative.

That vacuum is Africa's legacy from the lack of democracy institutionalised in single and multi-party states across the continent. The dissenting voices of intellectuals in Harare against President Mugabe's link between a Socialist option and a one-party state for Zimbabwe are the best pointer yet to a fresh wind of democracy blowing in Africa.