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SOUTH AFRICA'S REGIONAL POLICY [1]

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REGIONAL CO-OPERATION : THE RECORD AND OUTLOOK

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If one were to rank South Africa's present foreign policy con-
cerns in order of priority, its relations with the black states
of southern Africa would head the list. The emphasis on re-
gional [2] relations is in fact not new and can be traced as
far back as South Africa's pre-war foreign policy. The way
in which South Africa has approached relations in the sub-
continent has of course changed over time as conditions and
attitudes in South Africa, the region and the world generally
have changed. Nonetheless, South Africa's basic objective
has throughout remained constant, viz. to create an environ-
ment in Southern Africa that would be conducive to what the
country's rulers perceived as being in South Africa's politi-
cal, economic and military/strategic interests. Put diffe-
rently, South Africa has sought to ensure a regional context
favourable to its security, prosperity and domestic political
order. Flowing from this concern, Pretoria has tried to in-
fluence developments in the region in a direction that would
promote these interests. Such, then, is the paradigm[3]
within which South Africa's regional policy has been shaped
over the years.

The object of this paper is to examine, within this paradigm,
the various shifts or changing orientations in South Africa's
relations with the countries of southern Africa. Although
the emphasis is on South Africa's regional relations, these
of course cannot be considered without reference to its foreign
relations generally and to domestic developments since they
are all inextricably linked. Only the post-war period will
be considered because the present foreign policy dilemmas
facing South Africa are primarily the products of the peculiar
post-war international political environment. The focus will
be strictly on foreign relations at governmental level and the
South African perceptions and actions examined are therefore
those of the government of the day. This is not to say that

these are the only relevant views and actions; there are in-deed a host of others too that go to make up the totality of any state's foreign relations but in the particular context of this paper the authoritative and operative offical perceptions and actions will suffice.

1 The traditional orientation: the Western/colonial family association

Modern South Africa's very origins as 'n colonial possession first of the Dutch and then of the British, and the Western European descent of its white population, were clearly reflec-ted in a foreign policy which, since its inception in the 1920s[4], has been predominantly, at times virtually exclusive-ly, Western oriented. The perception of a "family associa-tion"[5] with Western countries was of direct relevance to South Africa's relations with African territories. South Africa hoped that its traditional ties with the Western colo-nial powers would place it in an advantageous position to in-fluence their policies towards their African dependencies. In addition, South Africa also considered itself entitled to be heard on colonial matters by virtue of its status as an independent state, the most developed one in Africa and more-over one with a large permanent white population. In due course South Africa's interests in Africa proved irreconcil-able with those of the colonial powers and their differences were such that it played a major role in undermining the fami-ly association.

In the early post-war years, General J.C. Smuts, then Prime Minister of the Union, suggested that a commission, composed of colonial powers and others with economic and military in-terests in Africa (thus including South Africa) should be established to devise a common policy for the continent. Smuts entertained more specific ideas on southern Africa and introduced an important new theme by committing himself to the "knitting together" of the various territories of the region and he even advanced the notion of an organisation for regio-nal co-operation on the lines of the Pan-American Union.

In essence, Smuts's was a design for inter-imperial co-operation involving also South Africa, which would obviously have been the dominant partner in any co-operative regional organisation. Smuts's proposed commission reflected a realisation on his part that developments in colonial Africa were bound to have an impact on South Africa and that the country should therefore try to get a hand in shaping the course of events in the dependent territories. The colonial powers however proved reluctant to draw South Africa into their scheme of things, and nothing came of Smuts's suggestions.

The new domestic order - apartheid - to which the National Party government of Dr. D.F. Malan (1948 - 54) committed itself, found expression also in its policy towards Africa. Malan's Africa Charter, first formulated in 1945 (when he was still in Opposition) and restated several times when in office, was perhaps not so much a statement of policy as an expression of a world view predicated on National Party ideology. The Charter declared that the development of Africa should be guided along the lines of "Western European Christian civilisation" and that the militarisation of the "native of Africa" should be prevented as it could endanger "our white civilisation". This anachronistic declaration in effect sought to consolidate the colonial order in Africa with a view to safeguarding South Africa's domestic order. For South Africa, in other words, the perpetuation of the colonial order became a condition for the maintenance of its domestic political order.

Flowing from its concern with creating an African environment favourable to its own interests, together with what South Africa saw as its rightful role as a part of overall Western defence against communist expansionism, the Union in the early 1950s participated in a series of discussions on the defence of Africa and the Middle East involving also the colonial powers, the Commonwealth and the United States. In addition, South Africa energetically canvassed the idea of an African Defence organisation for anti-communist states in Africa. South Africa's endeavours were, however, to no avail.

Despite the evident differences between South Africa and some of the colonial powers over political arrangements for blacks, Mr. J.G. Strijdom, Prime Minister (1954 - 58), made no secret of his conviction that apartheid was not merely exportable to the rest of Africa, but that it actually provided the only acceptable formula for relations between white and black. South Africa also remained keen to try to get a hand in the shaping of colonial policy and Mr. Eric Louw, Minister of External Affairs, accordingly suggested periodic ad hoc discussions on common interests between the colonial powers, South Africa and Rhodesia. South Africa further identified with the colonial order by cultivating, ever since the 1920s, close ties with white communities elsewhere in Africa.

In conclusion, it can be said that South Africa's family association with Western powers, despite its long history and consolidation through two world wars, started to wear thin around the edges in the first decade after the Second World War. The alienating factor was undoubtedly South Africa's domestic, and specifically racial, policies. This found expression in, among other things, differences between South Africa and the colonial powers over colonial policies. South Africa could no longer base its approach to Africa on an assumption of a community of interests with the colonial powers; South Africa had to find a new orientation in its relations with Africa.

2 The "Grand Design": domestic decolonisation and colonial liquidation

When Ghana became Britain's first black African colony to achieve independence in 1957, it demonstrated better than anything else the irrevocability of the process of decolonisation and gave new emphasis to South Africa's gradual if grudging acknowledgement that its fortunes in Africa no longer lay in a close and exclusive identification with the colonial powers. Realising this, Louw in March 1957 urged that South Africa must "accept its future role in Africa as a vocation and must in all respects play its full part as an African power". At the same time, however, South Africa could become a "permanent link be-

tween the Western nations on the one hand and the population
of Africa south of the Sahara on the other". South Africa
was, in other words, trying to bridge the gap between the dis-
appearing and emerging orders in Africa by keeping one foot in
each.

South Africa gave effect to its "role in Africa" by participa-
ting in the activities of the Commission for Technical Co-ope-
ration in Africa South of the Sahara (CCTA) and its two main
auxiliary bodies, the Scientific Council for Africa South of
the Sahara (CSA) and the Inter-African Bureau of Soil Conser-
vation and Land Utilisation (BIS), all established in 1950.
Under the agis of BIS four regional committees were formed,
one of which is the familiar Southern African Regional Commis-
sion for the Conservation and Utilisation of the Soil (SARCCUS),
headquartered in South Africa. Another well-known auxiliary
organisation of the CCTA to which South Africa belonged was the
Foundation for Mutual Assistance in Africa South of the Sahara.
South Africa considered itself a leader in the field of provi-
ding African territories with aid and co-operation and in fact
used its abilities to impress the Union's importance in Africa
upon the colonial powers. In addition, South Africa also en-
joyed trade and consular representation in a number of African
territories, including the Belgian Congo, Kenya, Mauritius,
Angola and Mozambique. The Department of External Affairs in
1955 reorganised its Africa section to improve contact with
African territories and in 1959 a separate Africa division was
established in the Department - the first geographically based
division in a Department that had previously been functionally
organised. The various links with Africa were essentially
relationships between South Africa and the colonial powers
controlling the dependencies.

South Africa's misgivings about decolonisation and its unwil-
lingness to identify unequivocally with the emerging order in
Africa were of course related to fears about the impact of
these events on its domestic political status quo. It was
this very status quo that was also at the heart of South Afri-
ca's steady decline into international unpopularity.

Against this backdrop, Dr. H.F. Verwoerd, Prime Minister (1958 - 1966), in 1959 announced a drastic new departure in his Government's apartheid policy. In expounding his so-called new vision, Verwoerd was at pains to associate the policy of separate development with trends in Africa. By providing for "Bantu homelands" which may ultimately become independent states, his was "a policy which does precisely what those countries of Africa which attack us desire to have themselves". He made particular reference to Basutoland where, he claimed, Britain was introducing a similar process. Far from denying blacks human rights and dignity, separate development "intended to give them dignity and rights in the highest form, namely through self-government and self-determination". Verwoerd envisaged a commonwealth-type relationship eventually developing between South Africa and the states-to-be: they would be politically independent but economically interdependent.

The homelands formula formed the basis of Verwoerd's policy towards southern Africa. Initially, he wanted to draw the three British High Commission territories into the homelands design and lead them to independence under South African guardianship - and thereby prevent the adoption of policies in the territories which would run counter to separate development. Although Britain refused to entrust the territories to South Africa and instead chose to lead them to independence according to its own design, Verwoerd still saw a role for the territories, when independent, in his scheme for regional co-operation. In the political sphere, he again thought in terms of a commonwealth that would serve as a consultative body of independent states, while economic links could be formalised in a co-ordinating body along the lines of a common market. Although Verwoerd's plans for regional co-operation initially focused only on "white" South Africa, future independent homelands and the High Commission Territories, he in due course expanded the scope to a common market stretching as far north as the Congo (later Zaire).

Verwoerd, it can be argued, reformulated Smuts's ideas on regional co-operation to suit both external demands and domestic

exigencies; externally, to correspond with colonial liquida-
tion and domestically to fit in with South Africa's own brand
of decolonisation. In addition, Verwoerd strongly believed
in the primacy of economic interests over political considera-
tions in South Africa's relations with black African countries.
These ideas of Verwoerd, particularly those relating to the
separate political and economic dimensions of relations with
black Africa, have become basic tenets of South Africa's approach
to regional relations. A related notion was that in view of
the impediments to political and diplomatic relations between
South Africa and black Africa, technical co-operation and the
provision of aid represented an important channel for communi-
cation and might moreover pave the way to political and diplo-
matic ties. Thus the high premium Pretoria placed on involve-
ment in organisations such as the CSA and CCTA.

In 1965 South Africa suffered a serious setback when the CCTA,
CSA and BIS were either disbanded or absorbed into the Organi-
sation of African Unity, from which the Republic was excluded.
With the exception of SARCCUS, South Africa was in due course
denied membership of virtually all the inter-African functio-
nal organisation in which it had so actively participated since
the early 1950s.

On top of these political blows, South Africa's security concerns
assumed an ever increasing salience with the tide of black libe-
ration steadily moving southwards in the 1960s and domestic po-
litical violence reaching serious proportions in the early part
of the decade.

Southern Rhodesia, with which South Africa had a long love-hate
relationship, began strengthening ties with its southern neigh-
bour upon the dissolution of the Federation in 1963. The di-
visive factors between the two countries - white Rhodesians'
traditional anglophilic sentiments as against the Afrikaners'
republican sympathies, Southern Rhodesia's entry into the Cen-
tral African Federation and its pursuit of the racial policy of
partnership, which was anathema to the supporters of apartheid
or separate development - began to submit to what was being

perceived by both countries as a new identity of interests.
Verwoerd lost no time in suggesting, in 1963, that if Southern
Rhodesia could become an independent state, it could lead to a
new closer relationship with the Republic of South Africa,
whether "in some form of organised economic interdependence"
as in the European Economic Community, or "for common political
interests" on the lines of the Commonwealth.   These sugges-
tions however came to naught because it was politically inex-
pedient for South Africa to associate closely and formally with
a country that had declared itself unilaterally independent
and had thereby earned itself universal disapprobation.   The
Portuguese territories of Angola and Mozambique were, by and
large, excluded form Verwoerd's regional designs.

By introducing the new homelands design, Verwoerd sought to
provide a new model for resolving South Africa's racial pro-
blems in the first instance;   a secondary consideration was to
provide a new formula for regional relations in southern Africa;
and 'n tertiary motive was to try to adjust the domestic base
in a limited way to meet the exigencies of foreign policy.
The new design however failed to realise its "external" - i.e.
secondary and tertiary - objectives for the simple reason that
it failed in its primary objective.   Abroad, both the domestic
and regional dimensions of separate development were seen as
principally designed to safeguard white supremacy in South
Africa.   The unmistakable opposition of black South Africans
to the new dispensation merely strengthened this perception.

Escalating domestic black resistance to the South African go-
vernment's policies in the first half of the 1960s, coupled
with the country's rapidly deteriorating international posi-
tion, had a profound impact on both its domestic and foreign
policies.   Faced with widespread unrest and a sustained sabo-
tage campaign, an upswing in emigration and a down-turn in the
economy, the Verwoerd government resorted to the "politics of
security"[6]   The Government was hardly in a position to launch
any major foreign policy initiative;   South Africa became locked
in an introversive mood.

3 The outward movement: the search for a rapprochement with Africa

A major difference between the present and previous foreign policy orientations should be noted at the outset. The Verwoerdian grand design was, at least in part, an attempt to provide a domestic policy commensurate with the demands of foreign policy; the outward movement, by contrast, was essentially externally oriented and implicitly denied that foreign policy demanded a domestic corollary. The foreign policies generated by both orientations nonetheless shared a fundamental objective, viz. safeguarding the domestic base.

The fact that Mr. B.J. Vorster, who succeeded Verwoerd as Prime Minister in 1966, could have embarked on the so-called outward movement in 1967, is a measure of the success of Verwoerd's "politics of security". The tightening of security paid handsome dividends in terms of suppressing internal violence, restoring white confidence and steering the economy firmly towards growth. In short, South Africa could face the world with renewed confidence and approach Africa from a position of strength.

Although the outward movement was, as James Barber argued, a "broad based attempt by the South African government to improve its international status and position", its major thrust was unmistakably directed at Africa. This was deliberate, the hope being that a rapprochement with Africa would improve South Africa's foreign relations over a wide front. The key to arresting its growing alienation from its traditional Western allies, South Africa realised, lay in reaching an understanding with black Africa. At the same time, however, South Africa was reappraising its traditional unquestioning Western orientation. Since the late 1960s, a new dualism began characterising the Republic's relations with the West. It became a love-hate relationship, with all the complexities, confusions and contradictions inherent in it.

Circumstances in the southern half of the African continent in
the late 1960s seemed particularly propitious for South Africa
to give effect to the Verwoerdian vision of a commonwealth-
cum-common market arrangement.   The independence of Botswana
and Lesotho in 1966 and Swaziland in 1968 appeard to provide
South Africa with an opportunity to formalise a new relation-
ship with them and that this could moreover serve as a stepping
stone to a rapprochement with African countries farther afield.
In South Africa, the Government painstakingly prepared its fol-
lowers to accept the "price" to be paid for a rapprochement,
viz. the stationing of black diplomats in the Republic.   Vor-
ster's approach to black Africa was, however, cautious and he
thought in much less grandiose terms about regional relations
than his predecessor.   Thus Vorster merely committed himself
"to maintaining the closest economic and technological co-ope-
ration among all the countries of the region, for their mutual
benefit and joint development".   He insisted that each country
involved should retain its political autonomy and therefore
"the right freely to choose its own political, racial, cultu-
ral and economic systems".   This was a restatement of South
Africa's professed adherence to the principle of non-interfe-
rence, the object of which was to protect the country's poli-
tical status quo above all.   Put differently, Vorster was in
effect saying that regional co-operation had to be based on
the existing political order in South and southern Africa.
For South Africa, part of the given political order was the
existence black homelands which may ultimately become indepen-
dent and then entitled to full participation in co-operative
arrangements in the region.   As such, Vorster's ideas on re-
gional co-operation were firmly linked to the domestic policy
of separate development.

In terms of formalising relations between South Africa and
newly independent black states in the region, little was achieved.
In 1967 South Africa established diplomatic relations with
Malawi - to date the first and only such link with a black
state (except independent former homelands) and in 1969 the
Customs Union Agreement of 1909, involving South Africa and the

three former High Commission Territories, was revised.* Botswa-
na, Lesotho and Swaziland were also, together with South Africa,
members of the Rand Monetary Area. (Botswana subsequently
withdrew.) Outside of formal structures for co-operation,
South Africa provided a considerable measure of aid to black
neighbouring states. South Africa's was essentially a func-
tionalist approach, relying on the so-called spill-over effect
of non-political links.

South Africa and the other white-ruled territories in southern
Africa drew closer together in the late 1960s. The growing
cohesion was primarily due to security and economic considera-
tions. "Communist-inspired terrorism" was being seen as a
common threat facing Angola, Mozambique, Rhodesia, SWA/Namibia
and South Africa itself. Although no formal defence agreement
existed, evidence points to limited South African involvement
in counter-insurgency operations in Angola and Mozambique,
and the Republic also despatched police units to Rhodesia in
1967, ostensibly to intercept African National Congress (ANC)

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*The new agreement, which is much more favourable to Botswana,
 Lesotho and Swaziland (BLS) than the original one, among other
 things provides for
- unrestricted and duty-free interchange between the four par-
  ties of their domestic products and of goods imported from
  outside the customs area;
- common tariff and uniform trade regulations in respect of
  goods imported from outside the customs area;
- a common revenue pool including sales duties. The pool is
  divided according to a self-adjusting formula that contains
  a measure of fiscal compensation for the BLS states for the
  disadvantages of being in a customs union with a partner that
  is both more developed and effectively controls the union;
- protection of the BLS countries' new and vital industries;
  and
- general and special consultations between the member states. [7]

guerrillas en route to South Africa.   In Namibia, the destruction of a SWAPO guerrilla training camp by South African security forces in August 1966 heralded the beginning of what developed into a protracted low-intensity war between South African troops and SWAPO guerrillas.   In the Portuguese colonies, both South Africa's private and public sectors contributed financially to the construction of the Ruacana Falls and Cabora Bassa hydro-electric schemes in Angola and Mozambique respectively, and the Republic agreed to purchase power from them.   Embattled Rhodesia, subjected to mandatory UN sanctions, depended for its very survival on the economic life-line provided by South Africa.   South African businessmen, in turn, were not slow in seizing the opportunities presented by a captive market across the Limpopo.

The increasing importance of security considerations in South Africa's Africa policy was borne out in Vorster's statement that the Republic would not tolerate "terrorism" or "communist domination" in southern Africa and was determined to fight it even beyond the country's borders.   Another way in which South Africa sought to combat the perceived communist threat was to offer non-aggression pacts to black states in 1970.   Such pacts - for which there were no takers (except for independent former homelands several years later) - would of course have meant that the black countries involved would deny insurgents facilities for operating against South Africa.

The outward movement was not primarily associated with southern Africa, but rather with South Africa's attempts at a rapprochement with black states farther north.   It would indeed appear that Vorster was more interested in the "bigger stakes" offered by these other African states which carried greater political weight and which could not in any sense be considered "client states" of South Africa.   The dialogue initiative - as the outward movement subsequently became known - produced some initial results in that a good number of black states indicated their willingness to enter into a dialogue with South Africa. The initiative however soon petered out.   There was all along strong opposition in black Africa to any rapprochement with

South Africa, and this <u>inter alia</u> found expression in the Lusaka Manifesto of April 1969 and the Mogadishu Declaration of October 1971.   It became evident to both supporters and opponents of dialogue that South Africa and the black states had essentially conflicting objectives with the dialogue initiative: the latter saw it primarily as a means of persuading South Africa to abolish apartheid;   the Republic's main objective was a rapprochement with black Africa and insofar as apartheid was to feature in the dialogue (and Vorster declared himself willing to discuss apartheid), it would merely be as an opportunity for South Africa to explain - and hopefully justify - the policy.   The rapprochement orientation, as explained earlier, thus denied the need for a domestic <u>quid pro quo</u> in support of a foreign policy (dialogue) initiative.

The failure of dialogue, together with the unresolved Rhodesian and SWA/Namibian issues, prompted South Africa to set its sights lower and to concentrate on consolidating its position in southern Africa and on finding regional solutions to the area's conflicts.   This, however, did not spell the end of South Africa's attempts at establishing a rapprochement with black states outside the region.   It was in fact in the aftermath of the dialogue era that Vorster scored two of his most spectacular diplomatic coups in Africa: in September 1974 he held talks with the Presidents of the Ivory Coast and Senegal in Yamoussoukrou and in February 1975 he met with the Liberian President in Monrovia.   These breakthroughs however failed to produce any substantive and lasting political benefits for South Africa.

Meanwhile, on 5 October 1974, a new phase in South Africa's relations with black Africa - and more specifically southern Africa - was launched with the first in a series of meetings between South Africa and Zambia in an effort to resolve the Rhodesian issue.   Vorster's famous Senate speech on 23 October 1974 in which he said "Southern Africa has come to the cross-roads" and had to choose between peace and escalating conflict;   South African UN Ambassador Pik Botha's statement to the Security Council the following day that the Republic was

committed to the elimination of racial discrimination; and
Vorster's "give us six months" appeal in November 1974, were
all designed to set the scene for the new era of détente.
South Africa's détente moves however encountered strong opposi-
tion in black Africa.   In April 1975 the OAU Council of Minis-
ters adopted the Dar Es Salaam Declaration on Southern Africa
which inter alia stated that "any talk of détente with the
apartheid regime is such nonsense that it should be treated
with the contempt it deserves".

Despite the obstacles, the Pretoria-Lusaka initiative went
ahead and culminated in the Victoria Falls conference in Au-
gust 1975 between the Rhodesian government and its black na-
tionalist opponents.   Also present at the historic meeting
were Vorster and Zambian President Kenneth Kaunda.

The effects of détente were also to be seen in Namibia, where
a South African initiated constitutional conference got under
way in September 1975.   The Turnhalle Conference, as it be-
came known, was representative of the various ethnic groups in
the territory.   It was this very ethnic composition together
with SWAPO's absence that undermined the Turnhalle's credibi-
lity abroad.   The Conference nonetheless represented a signi-
ficant new departure in that all races were for the first time
drawn into the process of political decision-making on Namibia's
future.

The era of détente was short-lived, its demise caused primari-
ly by the collapse of the joint Vorster-Kaunda settlement ini-
tiative for Rhodesia (which, in turn, was mainly the result of
the Rhodesian government's intransigence) and South Africa's
intervention in the Angolan war.   The failure of détente was
a severe setback for South Africa, which had entertained high
hopes for the initiative.   For South Africa, détente went be-
yond a mere Rhodesian settlement.   Dr. Hilgard Muller, Minis-
ter of Foreign Affairs, had spoken hopefully of détente drawing
the states of southern Africa together in a strong bloc which
could present a united front against its common enemies.   Vor-
ster envisaged an "economic power bloc" and also coined a new

expression: "a constellation of politically completely independent states" with close economic ties. In addition, South Africa was not oblivious of the wider foreign policy benefits which might accrue from a breakthrough in southern Africa; it had by then become conventional foreign policy wisdom that the key to a general improvement in South Africa's foreign relations lay in normalising relations with black Africa.

South Africa's limited military intervention in Angola in 1975/6 should be seen against the background of the Republic's objectives with détente - although the end result of the action was to undermine détente. By intervening on the side of the pro-Western UNITA and FNLA movements against the communist-backed MPLA, South Africa hoped to prove itself as a reliable ally of black states that supported détente and presumably opposed communist involvement in southern Africa. South Africa was, moreover, encouraged by some black states to send forces into Angola. By taking up arms against the MPLA and its Soviet and Cuban backers, South Africa also hoped to demonstrate its commitment to the West generally. The notion of serving Western interests - and also of deserving some reward for it - was of course strengthened by the United States' blessing of South Africa's intervention and Pretoria's belief (if not more) that Washington was committed to providing tangible support for the combined South African-UNITA-FNLA actions. Apart from all these considerations, South African intervention in Angola had two other important and immediate objectives, viz. to prevent SWAPO exploiting the chaos in Angola to step up attacks into Namibia, and to prevent a pro-Soviet regime being installed in Luanda.

South Africa's intervention failed to achieve the latter objectives and by March 1976 the bulk of its forces had been pulled out of Angola. Not least of the reasons for the withdrawal was the inability of Washington to provide the military support South Africa and its Angolan allies hoped for.

Despite the strain that the perceived let-down caused in US South African relations the two countries joined in a renewed

effort to find solutions to the conflicts in white-ruled southern Africa. America's revived interest in the region was primarily in response to the Soviet success in Angola and a consequent fear that the Soviet Union might extend its direct involvement to other southern African conflict situations. The main focus of the American-led search for peace was on Rhodesia, where repeated British attempts at resolving the issue had failed. Although the Rhodesian initiative had passed from Britain to the United States, they co-operated closely to produce what became known as the Anglo-American plan. South Africa's involvement in the Rhodesian settlement initiative was primarily due to the crucial influence it could exercise over the Rhodesian government. Yet South Africa had a very real and direct interest in a Rhodesian settlement since the conflict might escalate to a point where the Soviet Union and/or Cuba and South Africa might get sucked into it on opposing sides.

Of secondary and less immediate concern to the United States, yet matters of great importance, were Namibia and the situation in South Africa itself. In Namibia the Turnhalle Conference failed to obtain any international recognition as a genuine national constitutional conference and SWAPO remained committed to the armed struggle. With Angola in MPLA hands, the fear was that the war in Namibia could escalate dangerously and provide new opportunities for the Soviet Union and its Cuban allies. In South Africa itself, massive unrest and violence in black townships all over the country began to erupt only days before the first high-level American-South African talks, thus vividly underlining the Republic's own serious political problems.

The collapse in late 1976 of the Anglo-American initiative on Rhodesia was a matter of serious concern to South Africa, for it carried potentially serious security and diplomatic implications. But worse was in store for the Republic. The following year saw a quick succession of major events that had a profound impact on South Africa's international position. In the United States, the Carter administration took office in

January 1977, bringing new strains to the already troubled rela-
tionship with South Africa.   An early manifestation of the
growing tension was Vorster's meeting with Vice-president Walter
Mondale in Vienna in May 1977, where they took diametrically
opposed stands on South Africa's political future.   The Repu-
blic's foreign relations suffered heavily as a result of black
consciousness leader Steve Biko's death in detention in Septem-
ber 1977, followed by the Vorster government's sweeping ban on
a wide range of political organisations, newspapers and indi-
viduals a month later.   The UN Security Council responded in
November 1977 with a mandatory arms embargo against South Africa.
The country was forced onto the defensive more than ever before
and domestically South Africa resorted to the politics of sur-
vival.   The external corollary was a compound of introversion
and dissociation, expressed in sporadic official suggestions
that the Republic become "neutral" in the East-West conflict,
"look East" or side with the "Fifth World".   Regional rela-
tions also attained a new prominence and Muller reiterated the
ideal of "a constellation of states ... which peacefully co-
operate with one another".   The regional option was in fact
the only potentially feasible alternative among those mentioned;
the others were more expressions of disillusionment, anger and
anxiety than considered statements of policy.

4   The regional option: from constellation through destabili-
    sation to moderation

What is new in South Africa's preoccupation with regional rela-
tions in the early years of Mr. P.W. Botha's premiership (1978 -),
compared with its previous emphasis on closer regional ties, is
the vastly changed environment in which it is set.

First, the domestic situation was more unsettled than at any
time since the early 1960s.   This was primarily caused by the
pervasive racial tension and what was perceived as a mounting
international "onslaught" against South Africa.   To this can
be added a crisis of confidence in the ruling elite following
the so-called Information scandal.   A reflection of the mood
of the country was the upsurge in white emigration in the latter

half of the 1970s.

Second, the collapse of the Portuguese empire had removed two
vital links in South Africa's cordon sanitaire as Angola and
Mozambique became independent under governments highly antago-
nistic towards South Africa.   Communist powers had moreover
established a military and political foothold in Angola.   The
MPLA regime in Luanda openly supported SWAPO in its war in
Namibia, and Mozambique's FRELIMO government gave sanctuary and
support to the ANC.

Third, the hopes for an internationally acceptable settlement
in Rhodesia faded with the failure of the Anglo-American peace
plan and the steady escalation of the war.

Fourth, South Africa's fortunes in Namibia fluctuated greatly.
In April 1978 South Africa accepted Western proposals for a
settlement of the conflict in the territory.   The UN Security
Council endorsed the proposals in July 1978 but repeated UN
attempts failed to reach an agreement with SWAPO and South
Africa on implementing a settlement.   South Africa blamed the
failures on Western duplicity, UN bias towards SWAPO, and SWAPO
intransigence.   In short, South Africa displayed little con-
fidence in the other parties involved and in the search for a
settlement.   The other parties in turn expressed serious doubts
about South Africa's commitment to an international settlement
in Namibia.

Fifth, South Africa's relations with the West deteriorated
considerably after 1976/7 and the impasse over Namibia merely
added to the strains.

Finally, South Africa itself contributed to changing the poli-
tical complexion of southern Africa by creating what it regards
as fully fledged new states through granting independence to
black homelands (Transkei, Bophuthatswana, Venda and Ciskei to
date).   This of course allowed for the implementation of the
Verwoerdian design for regional co-operation.

On the whole, it is clear that these changes in South Africa's

external environment were to its detriment and that they, together with the internal difficulties, have probably exposed the domestic base to greater pressure than ever. Under these circumstances, it is not surprising that the Republic resorted to a defensive strategy at home and regionally: South Africa was, as it were, forced to retreat behind the perimeters of southern Africa.

Although the notion of a constellation of southern African states was not new, Prime Minister Botha gave this inherited concept a substance previously lacking and indeed made it his first major foreign policy initiative. But since it was "revived" by the Botha government early in 1979, the concept of a constallation has been through different official definitions of its nature and scope as policy makers have tried to adjust it to changing circumstances.

Foreign Minister Pik Botha's address to the Swiss-South African Association in Zürich on 7 March 1979 ranks as one of the earliest authoritative statements on a constellation. As initially formulated, the regional option showed a set of clear assumptions:

(i)   A constellation offers an opportunity for finding regional "solutions" to regional problems. Given its stated disillusionment with Western peace initiatives in both Namibia and Rhodesia, South Africa presented a constellation as, at best, an alternative to Western settlement attempts and, at least, as a form of reinsurance or fall-back position in the event of these efforts failing. South Africa saw itself carrying a special responsibility towards the leaders of Namibia (i.e. the Turnhalle participants) and Rhodesia (i.e. the parties to the internal settlement of March 1978): "if we let (them) down", Pik Botha said, "the whole of southern Africa is going to disintegrate".

(ii)   The "moderate" countries of southern Africa all face a common "Marxist threat" and cannot rely on the West

for support.   The security of black and white was per-
ceived as indivisible and unless they joined forces,
common enemies would, in Foreign Minister Botha's words,
"shoot us off the branch like birds, one after the other".
As an alternative to the grave and evil consequences
flowing from a "Marxist order", the Prime Minister ad-
vocated "a regional order within which real freedom and
material welfare can be maximised and the quality of
life for all can be improved".   Despite the pronounced
anti-Marxist strain of his expostulation, P.W. Botha
paradoxically left open the possibility of Marxist
states being included in a constellation.

(iii)   Given a common threat, members of a constellation would
engage in military co-operation.   Thus Pik Botha sug-
gested that the countries of southern Africa should
"undertake joint responsibility for the security of the
region".   An element of the proposed military co-ope-
ration would be a non-aggression pact between constel-
lation members - "an agreement which will involve the
combating and destruction of terrorism ... and the mu-
tual recognition of borders ... a joint decision to
keep communism out of southern Africa", the Prime Minis-
ter explained.

(iv)   Apart from security considerations, the countries of
southern Africa are bound by a host of other common
interests in the areas of agriculture, commerce, trans-
port, health, labour, power and energy, and scientific and
technological development.   P.W. Botha went so far as
to suggest "the harmonisation of economic, fiscal, man-
power and other policies".   More nebulous was what
South Africa saw as a shared interest in peace, stabi-
lity, order, development and prosperity.   Pik Botha
drew the threads together with his suggestion that the
countries in the region should develop "a common ap-
proach in the security field, the economic field and
even the political field".

(v)   Co-operation in technical spheres would in time spill
        over to the political field.   The spill-over factor
        was inherent in earlier statements on a constellation,
        thus giving the whole endeavour a distinct ring of de-
        terminism.   Not only would co-operation extend into
        new areas but would also become increasingly institu-
        tionalised using existing co-operative structures
        such as the Southern African Customs Union and SARCCUS
        as a basis.

(vi)   Being a grouping of moderates, or "responsible leaders",
        a constellation would operate on the basis of the exis-
        ting regional political order (and such domestic changes
        as South Africa considers appropriate).   This of course
        implies acceptance of independent former homelands by
        other members of a constellation.   In talking of his
        willingness "to seek a modus vivendi which does not
        involve sacrifice of principles or undermining our
        stability", the Prime Minister was probably conveying
        this very message.   This condition, together with
        Pik Botha's statement that international recognition
        for Transkei, Botphuthatswana, Venda, Rhodesia (under
        internal settlement leaders) and Namibia (when indepen-
        dent - presumably under DTA leadership) was unlikely
        and his emphasis on their having to join forces with
        South Africa against "radical onslaughts", invariably
        creates the impression of a constellation as a defen-
        sive association of "pariahs".   This impression is
        further strengthened by the link between a constella-
        tion and the Government's "total national strategy".

(vii)   Although a constellation may emphasise the links be-
        tween international outcasts, its membership could also
        extend to recognised black states.   In his Zürich speech,
        the Foreign Minister saw a constellation embracing
        seven to ten states representing 40 million people
        south of the Kunene and Zambezi rivers - a grouping
        thus including Botswana, Lesotho and Swaziland.   It
        was hoped that Zambia too would join.

(viii)   Being based on the existing regional order, a constel-
         lation would reflect the "realities", as seen by the
         Government, of South African society.   The most funda-
         mental reality for South Africa is that of "multina-
         tionalism" and its concommitant notions of "vertical
         differentiation" and "self-determination".   The link
         between a constellation and South Africa's racial poli-
         cies is further borne out in some of the definitions of
         membership of a constellation.   The Prime Minister,
         for example, included independent former homelands,
         dependent homelands and even urban blacks among the
         components of a constellation.   This has inevitably
         led to suggestions that a constellation is being propa-
         gated as a device to resolve certain dilemmas in the
         policy of separate development, notably the political
         future of non-independent homelands and urban blacks.

These premises suggest that the South African government con-
sidered a constellation as not merely desirable but indeed
inevitable.   Although the proposed arrangement was seen as de-
sirable from the point of view of South Africa's own interests
in the first instance, the clear implication was that a constel-
lation was also desirable from the perspective of the other
prospective members.   As regards the element of determinism,
the implicit, and often explicit, assumption was that the cen-
tripetal forces at work in southern Africa - particularly eco-
nomic but also political and security - were inexorably steer-
ing the countries in the region (or most of them at any rate)
towards ever closer and more formal relationships.   The cen-
trifugal elements, it was assumed, would in the end inevitably
submit to the force and indeed the logic of those making for
stronger regional ties.

Such notions were the result of a tendency to exaggerate the
importance of economic ties in southern Africa and to under-
estimate the potency of divisive political and ideological
factors.   In typical Verwoerdian fashion, reliance was placed
on the primacy of economic forces and the concommitant notion
that co-operation in this field will, in line with functionalist

thinking, spill over into the political and even military areas.
Closely related to this brand of economic determinism was a ten-
dency to assume shared perceptions among prospective constel-
lation partners, particularly with regard to the nature of ex-
ternal (that is extra-regional) threats and the need for a com-
mon military-cum-political response.   In addition to these
features, the official expositions of a constellation have been
characterised by a considerable measure of vagueness and con-
tradiction, which indicates that the proposals had not been
thought through.

Being based on the assumptions outlined, it is not surprising
that the hoped-for constellation of seven to ten states did not
emerge.   Botswana, Lesotho and Swaziland were quick to give
notice that they could not consider joining a constellation as
long as South Africa adhered to its existing racial policies.
An even more severe setback followed when Zimbabwe became in-
dependent under a ZANU-PF government.   Prime Minister Robert
Mugabe not only made it plain that Zimbabwe had no intention
of playing the key role reserved for it in a constellation, but
he also demonstrated his political distance from South Africa
by joining forces with the Frontline states in their attempt
to form an economic grouping aimed at lessening the black
states' dependence on the South African economy and transport
and communications networks.   Lesotho and Swaziland likewise
joined the new Southern African Development Co-ordination Con-
ference (SADCC).   It is highly ironical that Zimbabwe, which
had a central role earmarked for it in the Pretoria constella-
tion, assumed a leading role in this move away from South Africa's
regional design.

These developments forced South Africa to amend some of its
ideas on a constellation and to reduce an initially grandiose
design to what is now essentially a device to restructure rela-
tions between present and former parts of the South African
state.   What remains can be designated an inner constellation,
with the outer or wider constellation rendered unfeasible by
the prevailing political climate in southern Africa.   This,
however, is not to say that South Africa abandoned its long-

held notion of creating an association of friendly, closely
co-operating and interdependent states in the region.   To es-
tablish such a favourable external environment remains a cen-
tral objective of South Africa's foreign policy.   South African
spokesmen continued to argue that this desired state of affairs
would in time emerge - and they based their assumptions on some
of those upon which the constellation idea was originally for-
mulated by the Botha government.

The inner constellation has since been formalised between South
Africa, Transkei, Bophuthatswana, Venda and Ciskei - the so-
called SATBVC states.   The process was set in motion with a
summit meeting between the leaders of these countries (except
Ciskei, then not yet independent) in Pretoria in July 1980.
A second summit meeting between the five countries in Novem-
ber 1982 set the seal on the development of a comprehensive
network of interstate structures for co-operation.[8]

At cabinet or policy level, the SATBVC countries are joined in
the Multilateral Development Council of Ministers, whose func-
tion is to formulate policy guidelines for the entire network
of multilateral bodies.   The departmental and technical level
is represented in the Multilateral Economic and Finance Commit-
tee and its seven Multilateral Technical Committees, their sub-
committees and working groups.   The seven Technical Committees
are the following:
- Agriculture and Environment Affairs
- Industries, Commerce and Tourism
- Transport
- Posts and Telecommunications
- Health and Welfare
- Manpower and Education
- Financial Relations.

Finally, there are six inter-state Regional Liaison Committees,
concerned with the development of different regions; the re-
gions are functionally defined, thus transending political
boundaries.

Last year, the five states involved in this grouping held 62 multilateral and 9 regional meetings. The SATBVC association has, as it were, taken to the road. The term, constellation, has meanwhile lost its earlier prominence in official South African statements. Instead, neutral expressions such as "multilateral co-operation" are used.

The TBVC countries are also formally linked with South Africa through customs agreements and the Rand Monetary Area. Although the terms of agreement applying to the TBVC countries are the same as for the BLS states, political considerations prevent the admission of the ex-homelands to the Customs Union alongside Botswana, Lesotho and Swaziland. Reference should also be made to the Development Bank of southern Africa which came into operation in 1983. Although an autonomous regional institution, the bank is at least at this stage virtually exclusively identified with the SATBVC countries.

Looking at the principles of multilateral co-operation between the five countries and at the established structures, it is evident that the emphasis is on economic and development co-operation. The SATBVC countries are however unlikely to restrict their co-operation to more or less technical matters. At the 1980 summit meeting between South Africa, Transkei, Bophuthatswana and Venda, it had already been agreed to promote co-operation also in matters of security. By then, bilateral non-aggression pacts had been concluded between South Africa and each of the then independent former homelands. These agreements continue to exist independently of the multilateral structures for co-operation. As regards political co-operation with South Africa, it is fair to say that the four ex-homelands, given the international non-recognition of their independence and their heavy economic dependence on South Africa, have no effective freedom of action in international politics. Without any international standing, the TBVC countries' "foreign" political relations are almost exclusively with South Africa.

Although it has not happened yet, formal structures for co-

operation in both security and political matters may in due course be set up as part of the wider network of multilateral structures between the SATBVC countries. In such an event, the bilateral non-aggression treaties might be converted into a multilateral defence pact. The case for a permanent forum for political co-operation would seem to become stronger if this grouping is formally developing into the confederation envisaged by Pretoria. Official talk of a confederation has inevitably led to speculation that such an arrangement would merely be an intermediate stage in a process of reintegrating the former homelands into the South African state through a federal structure.

With only former homelands joining, South Africa's regional design has obviously not produced the comprehensive pattern of inter-state relationships long cherished by South African policy makers. As a foreign policy objective, the constellation has failed; the inner constellation is in fact of limited relevance to South Africa's foreign relations. In a regional context, the SATBVC grouping will in no way ease South Africa's relations with black states since they have in any case never recognised the independence of Transkei, Venda, Bophuthatswana and Ciskei. If anything, the SATBVC association may complicate these relations by introducing a highly controversial element into an already difficult situation.

The refusal of the "real" black states of southern Africa to join Pretoria's constellation-cum-confederation, means that South Africa has to concern itself more with the non-members than the members of this grouping in creating a regional environment favourable to its own interests. In more ways than one, South Africa was forced to set its sights lower. First, the Republic realised that the black states were nog going to join its proposed constellation; relations with them could thus not be improved and formalised through elaborate formal structures for inter-state co-operation. Second, the early 1980s saw mounting domestic and regional threats to South Africa's security; basic considerations of security took precedence over ambitious plans for regional co-operation.

The years 1980 - 83 will probably go down in history as a par-
ticularly turbulent period in South Africa's relations with its
neighbouring states.   These were years characterised by severe
strains in relations between South Africa, on the one hand, and
particularly Angola, Mozambique, Zimbabwe and Lesotho on the
other.   If an event has to be singled out as marking the be-
ginning of this period, it was probably the ANC's sabotage of
SASOL plants in June 1980.   Numerous smaller acts of sabotage,
armed attacks on police stations and even assassinations occurred
over the next 3½ years.   There were also two further major
acts of violence perpetrated by the ANC: in December 1982,
the Koeberg nuclear installation, still under construction,
was sabotaged and May 1983 saw the car bomb carnage in central
Pretoria.

South Africa perceived a direct link between these ANC activi-
ties and the organisation's presence in particularly Mozambique
and Lesotho.   The threat to South Africa from its immediate
regional environment seemed more serious than ever before.
Newly independent Zimbabwe, although denying ANC insurgents
sanctuary, made no secret of its solidarity with the "libera-
tion struggle" and with international moves to isolate and pu-
nish its southern neighbour.

These perceived threats from surrounding countries were the
principal factor behind South Africa's resort to a "forward"
or "offensive" regional strategy or, as critics commonly label
it, "destabilisation".   The most dramatic manifestations of
this new strategy were military strikes against ANC targets
in or near Maputo in January 1981 and again in May 1983 (al-
though there is considerable doubt as to whether it was an
ANC hide-out hit on the latter occasion) and in Maseru in
December 1982.   Such raids, whether pre-emptive or punitive,
were nothing new for the South African Defence Force.   They
had frequently been undertaken against SWAPO targets inside
Angola, a country that provides sanctuary to the guerrillas.

The extension of a hawkish strategy from Angola to some of
South Africa's other neighbours, is therefore based on the

premise that the ANC poses an immediate threat to the Republic's security and calls for tough counter-measures. The ANC cannot merely be fought on South African soil, Pretoria maintains, but should be attacked in its foreign bases. The ANC's hosts have, moreover, to be persuaded or forced to deny insurgents sanctuary - or made to pay a heavy penalty if they refuse to oblige.

In terms of the hawkish strategy, diplomatic means are either insufficient or inappropriate in dealing with surrounding states threatening South Africa's security (through their support for the ANC). Diplomacy has to be reinforced or even replaced by economic and military muscle. As the regional leviathan, South Africa is of course well placed to exert economic and military pressure against relatively weak and vulnerable black states. The means of economic pressure are varied, some highly visible and others barely noticeable: they range from the manipulation of exports to "target" states to cutting back on the importation of labour. Military pressure can likewise take various forms, for example sabotage of strategic or symbolic targets and material support for a rebel movement active in the target state.

These forms of intervention amount to destabilisation if they are deliberately intended to either create new or exacerbate existing instability in a target state. The object of destabilisation is then to promote (or force) profound political changes in the target state. These may or may not involve structural change - in effect toppling the regime in power and seeing it replaced by a "moderate" one - but would certainly involve a major change in the target state's behaviour.
The latter in the first instance concerns the target's behaviour towards the destabiliser and the latter may wish to see anything from a fundamental (positive) reorientation in policy to a specific agreement not to endanger the destabiliser's security.

There has been considerable controversy over both the means and ends of the hawkish strategy that South Africa has pursued

over the last few years.   The charges of the aggrieved states -
notably Angola, Mozambique, Lesotho and Zimbabwe - against
South Africa have been met with denials and counter-charges.

There can be little doubt that Angola has had to pay a heavy
price for its continued support for SWAPO: South Africa has
over the years undoubtedly given UNITA some measure of support
and has on occasion perhaps directly attacked Angolan military
and economic targets.   As regards the ANC's hosts, they too
have felt South Africa's wrath.   South Africa's use of econo-
mic pressure against Lesotho over an ANC presence there, is
well known.   Similar pressure may well have been applied
against Mozambique.   And then there is the Mozambique Natio-
nal Resistance Movement (RENAMO or MNR) which is widely believed
to be backed by South Africa; of the latter's sympathy for
RENAMO, there is no doubt.   The Lesotho government too has to
contend with a rebel movement, the Lesotho Liberation Army.
Lesotho believes the movement enjoys South African support.
In the case of Zimbabwe, there have been indications of South
African complicity in sabotage raids and allegations of econo-
mic pressure.   The disaffection in Matabeleland has also
been blamed on South Africa by Harare, but this charge has a
ring of unreality in view of the depth of the Nkomo-Mugabe di-
vide.

If South Africa has then engaged in hawkish actions against
neighbouring states, some of these operations may in effect
if not also in intention have produced or aggravated domestic
instability in the target states.   Whether South Africa's
hawkish strategy consists of a "master plan" for destabilisa-
tion in its ultimat form - removing regimes in power - is how-
ever an entirely different matter.   (Such a contention
sounds somewhat like a Southern African version of Moscow's
"master plan for world domination".)   Notwithstanding its
power in the regional context, it is highly doubtful whether
South Africa possesses the resources to dislodge several sur-
rounding governments and sustain perhaps unpopular (puppet)
successor regimes in the face of determined resistance.
South Africa's long experience of African wars - in Angola,

Rhodesia and Namibia - has probably made it keenly aware of the
tremendous military, economic and diplomatic costs it would
incur if its forces were to take on the role of "white Cubans"
in southern Africa. Even if one accepts that there is no
master plan, this is not to say that Pretoria has not toyed
with the idea of getting one or two neighbouring governments
replaced by movements sympathetic to South Africa.

As regards the lesser form of destabilisation - forcing changes
in the target state's policy towards the destabiliser - this
could in part be seen as a reactive strategy on Pretoria's
part. Since South Africa sees most of the surrounding black
states as committed to destabilising the Republic - through their
support for the ANC, among other things - any South African re-
sort to destabilisation would merely be a reaction in kind:
meeting destabilisation with destabilisation. Alternatively,
destabilisation could be a pre-emptive strategy: "let we
(South Africa) destabilise them lest they really destabilise us".

Rather than continue the debate on destabilisation, it would
at this juncture be more useful to consider the results of
South Africa's hawkish strategy.

The year 1984 has already seen some remarkable developments in
South Africa's relations with its neighbours. The course of
events has taken many observers by surprise because it does
not fit into the familiar pattern of relations and does not
conform with the conventional apocalyptic scenarios for the
region either. South Africa has disengaged its forces from
conflict in southern Angola and a de facto ceasefire took
effect between South African and SWAPO forces north of the
Angola-Namibia border. South Africa, Angola and the United
States met for tripartite talks in Lusaka, and Pretoria and
Luanda set up a joint commission to supervise the ceasefire
in southern Angola. Pretoria and Maputo have had two rounds
of talks on a wide range of issues, including matters of secu-
rity. Top South African and Mozambican officials met in four
working groups - one specifically concerned with mutual secu-
rity - in January 1984 and they are set to meet again. The

following month three South African cabinet ministers met President Samora Machel and also held talks with their Mozambican counterparts.

In the case of Lesotho, there is evidence that the country last year began clamping down on ANC followers in its midst, even expelling some of them.   Swaziland has long been taking a tough stand against the ANC using the country as a springboard for attackes into South Africa.   Zimbabwe has never permitted ANC insurgents the use of its territory as a base for operations across the Limpopo.

There have in recent weeks also been other indications of an improved political climate in the region.   First, South Africa helped with the release of twelve Soviet citizens held captive by RENAMO.   Of course, South Africa thereby proved that it was not without influence over the rebel movement.   Second, South Africa publicly declared that it had no desire or intention to overthrow the Lesotho government - a statement made in response to allegations to the contrary.   Third, Foreign Minister Botha recently spoke of an improvement in relations with Zimbabwe, and Harare confirmed that official contacts have been taking place with Pretoria.   Finally, and farther afield - but with immediate regional significance - South Africa last year clamped down on conspirators reportedly plotting a coup d'etat in Seychelles and using the Republic as a base. Pretoria went further and conveyed to the Seychelles government its desire for improved relations on the basis of existing political "realities".[9)]

On the face of it, South Africa's neighbours appear to be heeding its demands that they deny ANC insurgents sanctuary.   The question now is whether these responses are related to South Africa's hawkish strategy?

In the cases of Angola,Mozambique and Lesotho, there can be little doubt that they have been influenced by South Africa's use of military and/or economic pressure.   Perhaps there was some "demonstation effect" as far as Swaziland, Zimbabwe and

even Botswana are concerned, but this is likely to have been a secondary consideration in their positions on the ANC. Even if South African punitive measures were the principal factor explaining the recent shifts in policy on the part of the first three countries, other considerations must also have weighed with them. Most important among these is American mediation. There are indications that the United States has also played a role in easing tensions between South Africa and Zimbabwe. Second, Portugal has emerged on the scene as an influential force for reconciliation between South Africa and Mozambique. Third, nature has helped to concentrate political minds in Maputo. With a crippling drought - and then disastrous floods - on top of all its economic problems, Mozambique was made acutely aware of the need for improved economic ties with South Africa. Lesotho may well be influenced by similar considerations. As regards Angola, it too has pressing economic reasons for wanting peace with South Africa.

To sum up, it can be said that South Africa's hawkish strategy, reinforced by a number of extraneous factors, has paved the way for a new round of South African diplomacy in southern Africa. Militancy seems to have given way to moderation. However, to speak of a new era in South Africa's regional relations would be highly premature at this stage. There are numerous imponderables that may yet upset the new climate of moderation. Among these are Soviet and Cuban influence over the MPLA; UNITA in Angola, RENAMO in Mozambique and the ANC in South Africa. These "rebel" or "liberation movements" certainly do not relish the prospect of improved relations between South Africa and its neighbours and they might deliberately or inadvertently jeopardise the process of inter-state rapprochement. The protracted international negotiations over a Namibian settlement serves as a further reminder of the difficulties in resolving a regional conflict.

Conclusion

South Africa has since Verwoerd's time never been able to give effect to its ambitious designs for regional co-operation.

This **very** failure is itself **evidence that the Republic has not** succeeded in creating exactly the kind of regional environment it desired.   South Africa was consequently in recent years compelled to scale down its plans for regional co-operation; it was a case of reconciling the desirable with the possible. This has resulted in a much more modest and indeed more realis- tic conception of a favourable regional environment.   The grandiose scheme for a regional constellation of states has given way to an overriding concern with security.

South Africa has, since the collapse of the constellation ini- tiative, tried to establish a set of "rules of the game" in southern Africa.   The first and most important rule is that South Africa and its neighbours should not allow insurgents to use their territories to commit subversion against one another. Second, material support for rebel or liberation movements should likewise cease.   Should black states violate these rules, South Africa would respond with a variety of punitive measures.   Should they however obey the rules, South Africa would be duty bound to do the same.   A third rule, clearly secondary to the first two, is that political and ideological differences should not obstruct economic interaction.   The black states' part of the deal would be to refrain from econo- mic boycotts and South Africa in turn should likewise refrain from economic punishment or economic subversion.   These rules are all based on the premise that the states involved would interact within the existing political order in southern Africa. Such a set of regional rules does not amount to a local ver- sion of the Brezhnev doctrine; for one thing, South Africa lacks the capability to "do a Czechoslovakia" and sustain a client regime in power.

The prospects for establishing these rules of game have im- proved considerably over the last few weeks.   Whether the new climate of moderation will last, remains to be seen.   But even if South Africa's regional environment were to become more favourable (or less unfavourable) to its perceived interests than it had been for some years, this still would not solve the Republic's principal political and security problems.   Only the creation of a domestic environment favourable to the interests of its people could do that.

NOTES

1   This paper draws on material used in a number of published studies by the present author, in particular <u>The Diplomacy of Isolation : South African Foreign Policy Making</u>, Macmillan, Johannesburg, 1984; "South African regional policy", in Clough, M. (Ed.), <u>Changing Realities in Southern Africa : Implications for American Policy</u>, Institute of International Studies, University of California, Berkley, 1982, pp. 123 - 160,   and <u>The Constellation of Southern African States and the Southern African Development Co-ordination Council : Towards a New Regional Stalemate?</u> SAIIA, Johannesburg, 1981.   For this reason, the present paper will list only those sources not sited in any of the above publications.

2   The concept 'regional' is used here to apply to the southern African region.   Admittedly, the designation 'southern Africa' is not a neat one since there are various views on its demarcation.   Even official South African descriptions - which are of primary interest in the present study - vary considerably, as political circumstances change.   Thus southern Africa has been variously identified as the area stretching as far north as Zaire;   the area south of the Kunene and Zambezi;   and South Africa and (some) adjacent countries.   Rather than add yet another definition, this study will refer to the term in the context of the particular period in which it was used by South African policy-makers.

3   For the purposes of this study, it will suffice to consider a paradigm as a concise framework encompassing the major features (concepts, premises, procedures, propositions and problems) which are unique to the nature of a particular phenomenon.   Used in this sense, a paradigm is akin to a model or ideal type.   (Kotzé, H.J. en Van Wyk, J.J.,

Basiese Konsepte in die Politiek, McGraw Hill, Johannesburg, 1980, pp. 133 & 134.

4   The creation of the Department of External Affairs in 1927 can conveniently be taken as the beginning of an identifiable South African foreign policy.

5   The notion of a "family association" is taken from Modelski, G., A Theory of Foreign Policy, Pall Mall Press, London, 1962, pp. 76 & 77.

6   Stultz, N.M., "The Politics of Security: South Africa under Verwoerd, 1961 - 6", Journal of Modern African Studies, Vol. 7, Nr. 1, April 1969, pp. 3 - 20.

7   Ramolefe, A.M.R. & A.J.G.M. Sanders, "The structural pattern of African regionalism", The Comparative and International Law Journal of Southern Africa, Vol. 6. Nr. 1, March 1973, pp. 88 & 89.   The text of the 1969 Agreement is to be found in Republic of South Africa, Government Gazette, Vol. 54, Nr. 2584, 12 December 1969.

8   Multilateral Co-operation in Southern Africa, 1983: A Report issued by the Multilateral Development Council of Ministers, Publications Division, Dept. of Foreign Affairs and Information, Pretoria, 1983.

9   The Star, 25.1.1984.