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Lusaka, Zambia

September, 1980

NOTES ON REGIONAL COOPERATION IN SOUTHERN AFRICA

Introduction

Two fundamentally irreconcilable and conflicting plans for regional cooperation in Southern Africa emerged towards the end of the 1970s, namely, the South African Prime Minister P.W. Botha's "total strategy" involving the forging of a subcontinental "constellation of states" and the plan on economic liberation from the Republic of South Africa initiated by the frontline states.

The former has as point of departure historical economic relations in the region and aims at politically organizing

the neighbouring countries of South Africa in a grouping of

border states around the laager of the white minority regime, where economic conditions do not exist - as in the case with Angola - the South African plan comprises military operations.

The latter parts from growing political realities and aims at bringing the formal political independence won by the majority-ruled states in Southern Africa also to their economic basis.

The Soutxh African plan of a "constellation of states" intends to force a hegemonic political, economic and military centre upon the countries in the region, while the plan for economic liberation aims at strengthening the economies of all participating states without establishing a political high command.

The South African plan further intends to maintain the apartheid regime's occupation of Namibia and its oppression of the African majority in the Republic of South Africa while the plan

on regional cooperation between the independent Southern African

states sees economic self-reliance and strength also as a support of the struggle for liberation in Namibia as well as in South Africa. The South African plan, finally, is apparently offensive, but in essence defensive. It aims at maintaining a fundamentally unjust political and economic system in favour of a small minority.

The plan for economic liberation and integrated development appears,

on the other hand, as defensive, but is essentially offensive. It

aims at paving the way for economic growth, balanced development and democracy in the whole of Southern Africa.

Southern Africa except South Africa

The total population in Southern Africa except the Republic of South Africa, i.e. Angola, Botswana, Lesotho, Malawi, Mozambique, Namibia, Swaziland, Tanzania, Zambia and Zimbabwe,, amounts to some 55 million. Both population size and density differ considerably between the countries, but regarded as a regional unit Southern Africa is from a demographic point of view'characterized by a very pronounced growth, heavy pressure per unit of production and an urbanization rate which is among the highest in the world.

In the middle of the 1970ts, 40-50% of the population in the region was under the age of 15, and, with a yearly demographic growth rate

of between 2.0 and 3.5% the total population of the region will more than double by the year 2000. The urban population is increasing even faster and will - if the present average urban growth rate of approximately 7.9% per year is maintained - double already by the year 1995.....:

By practically all economic and social indicators, the population in Southern Africa must be described as poor or extremely poor. Where relatively high figures on GDP per capita are registered, the statistics most often conceal considerable economic gaps within the countries. Unemployment in the region is very high and almost everywhere slums are expanding. Less than 40% of the total population can read and write. Malnutrition is common.

Infant mortality rates are high and average 166 per 1000 live births.

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During the last 20 years/ Southern Africa has furthermore been the scene of far-reaching political upheavals and wars. * From Angola in the West to Mozambique in the East, from Tanzania in the North to Lesotho in the South, the subcontinent has witnessed streams of refugees fleeing the social, political and military oppression of the white minority regimes. It is hardly possible to estimate the total number of refugees and displaced persons in the region over these years, but a rough - and perhaps conservative - figure would be some 5 million, or around 10% of the total population of today. Dead and maimed victims of the oppression can be counted by the hundreds of thousands.

Over 70% of the labour force in Southern Africa earns - or rather, lives - its living in agriculture. Productivity within the agricultural sector is, however, very low and during the last years total regional output from agriculture has even decreased at a rate of 1-2% per year. Conditions for favourable agricultural development differ widely between the countries. Botswana, Lesotho and Namibia are struggling against ever increasing soil erosion and desertification, while the natural potential for a diversified agricultural production is high in most of the other countries in the region.

With the exception of Zimbabwe, the level of industrialisation is low or very low. Historically, the countries in Southern Africa were incorporated into the world economy as producers of raw materials and the efforts towards establishing a national manufacturing sector after independence have in most cases been frustrated by a lasting structural dependence of the world market, lack of capital and shortage of skilled manpower.

The Southern African subcontinent is, however, endowed with some of the most important mineral resources of the globe and has a big energy potential. Conditions thus exist for the

development of a strong industrial base. Angola, Botswana, Mozambique, Namibia, Zambia and Zimbabwe are known to have considerable deposits of inter alia petroleum, coal, diamonds, copper, iron ore, chrome, bauxite, tungsten, nickel, cobalt and uranium.

And many of these countries already today dispose of important energy sources. Zambia is thus self-supporting with regard to electric power, a commodity that the country also exports.

Angola's position as oil-exporter is well-known. At Cabora Bassa, Mozambique disposes over one of the biggest hydroelectrical schemes in the world. When political conditions so permit, the hydroelectrical power station at Cunene on the border between Angola and Namibia will have a far-reaching importance for the development of the mining industry in these two countries. (To this should be added that both Cabora Basea and Cunene are also conceived as irrigation and agro-development schemes).

The Southern African region, finally, has potentially good or very good natural conditions for multiple use of various river systems, such as the Kwanza, Luangwa, Okavango, Limpopo, Ruvoma and Orange.

If thus the young independent states in Southern Africa today show all or most of the signs which commonly characterize under-developed economies, the region as a whole has in comparison with other under-developed areas of the world an exceptionally good potential for economic development. Once political, institutional, manpower and infrastructural constraints are dealt with, the countries will ultimately be able to finance their own development and meet the basic needs of their populations.

On the way towards this*goal there are many obstacles, not least in the form of different political systems and objectives between the countries themselves. The most-powerful obstacle to surmount is, however, the economic dependence vis-à-vis the Republic of South Africa that was built up during the colonial epoch and to which the majority of the now independent states in Southern Africa - although at varying degrees - are structurally subjected*

South Africa in Southern Africa

In Southern Africa reigns a pronounced metropolis/satellite-relation, in which the South African metropolis - in itself linked to the economic centres of the West - exerts structural dominance over the surrounding economies.

The degree of dominance - and thus dependence - varies from country to country. It is most marked in the so called BLS-states, i.e. Botswana, Lesotho and Swaziland, who together with Malawi rather are to be considered economic pendants to the Republic of South Africa, (in the case of Malawi, this satellite situation is not a product of history, but a consequence of the policy of cooperation with Pretoria that the country has followed since independence in July 1964). Also the economy of the newly independent

Republic of Zimbabwe is of course closely linked to the South African metropolis. On the other end of the scale are Tanzania and Angola, who - from an economic point of view - are little exposed to South Africa's dominance, (instead of economic pressures, Angola is more

than any other country in the region exposed to Pretoria's military power). Regarded as a regional whole, Southern Africa is dependent on the Republic of South Africa for inter alia

- transport and communications
- employment?

- capital and technology!
- around 50% of all trade; and
- food imports.

The dominance exerted by South Africa is particularly striking in the field of transport and communications. A glance at the map reveals how the communication network in Southern Africa departs from the Republic of South Africa and ramifies into the subcontinent. Six countries in the region (Malawi, Zambia, Zimbabwe, Botswana, Lesotho and Swaziland) are land-locked, and up to the independence of Zimbabwe all countries except Angola and Tanzania were dependent on South African ports, railroads, highways or airways for their international trade.

This infrastructural dependence on South Africa has, of course, a historical basis. It is a result of the colonialist penetration from the South. But this is not the only reason. The so called Benguela railway, which links the Angolan port of Lobito on the Atlantic with the mining areas in Southern Zaire and Northern Zambia, could thus to a considerable degree lessen the dependence of Zambia (and Zaire) on transport routes via South Africa. However, as is well known, the South African regime is actively backing the sabotage activities by UHITA against the Benguela railway precisely with the purpose of forcing Zambia into this dependence, (it was for the same purpose that Rhodesian troops in October 1979 blew up the Tazara railway, which links Zambia with the port of Dar es Salaam, Tanzania). Where South Africa's structural grip is threatened, the regime does not show any hesitation in using military power to maintain its dominance.

Employment is another field where dependence on South Africa is particularly pronounced. Big proportions of the labour populations of Lesotho, Swaziland, Botswana, Malawi, Zimbabwe and Mozambique have temporary jobs in South African mines and farms. It is true that their share of the total labour force in South Africa has decreased since 1973 (in the South African mines from around 80 to 50%) but the problem of migrant labour is still very acute, particularly in Lesotho. Not less than a quarter of a million Basotho earn yearly their living in South Africa, i.e. 10 times more than those receiving a salary in Lesotho. Almost half of the national income of Lesotho is made up of salaries remitted by these migrant workers. In this respect, the situation is better in Botswana, Zimbabwe, Swaziland, Malawi and Mozambique, but also in these countries export of labour to South Africa is an important source of revenue.

Less apparent is the Southern African countries' dependence on South Africa through capital investment and technology, but not at all less important. A whole network of economic relations links most of the countries to South Africa, Harry Oppenheimer's

Anglo-American Corporation/de Beers Consolidated, by far the biggest mining empire in the West, may illustrate how South African capital exerts control over the politically independent states in Southern Africa. It extracts, for example, diamonds in Angola, Botswana and Lesotho, copper in Zambia and Botswana, chrome in

Zimbabwe and coal in Botswana and Swaziland* Outside the mining sector, the concern has made very considerable investments in Zimbabwe and Mozambique and is currently expanding within the agriculture sector in Zambia. Where it does not hold majority interests, control and profits are insured through management contracts^ technology sales etc.

Dependence on trade with South Africa is of course most marked in Botswana, Lesotho and Swaziland, where the relations with Pretoria are formalized through the 1969 Customs Union Agreement. South Africa's share of total imports to these three countries varies between 85 and 95%» But also in the other countries - once more with the exception of Angola and Tanzania - there is a considerable trade dependence vis-à-vis South Africa. South Africa's share of imports to Malawi and Zimbabwe is thus estimated to at least 30%. Also Mozambique is forced to trade with South Africa, from where some 20% of the imports are coming.

In the case of Mozambique It should further be added that the country is still dependent on South Africa for revenue from South African transit trade via Maputo. Of all the countries in the region that by the time of independence were part of the South African subsystem, it is only Zambia that to a greater extent has succeeded in breaking the trade dependence on the white South.

At independence in October 194* some 60% of Zambia's imports came from the South 40% from Rhodesia and 20% from South Africa. Corresponding figures for 1977 were 0 and 8%, respectively.

Still another field in which the Republic of South Africa exerts economic and political leverage, over the majority-rules states in Southern Africa is food security. During the last years, food has in fact become one of the chief South African weapons in the region. Agricultural output in South Africa has steadily increased, whereas it has decreased by 1-2% p.a. in the rest of the subcontinent. Particularly striking is this development with regard to production of maize, the principal staple crop in Southern Africa. At the same time as maize production fell in countries such as Angola, Malawi, Mozambique, Zambia and Zimbabwe during the agricultural seasons 1978/79 and/or 1979/80, South Africa's exportable surplus reached some 3 million tons. And with this surplus, South Africa has been able to make new breakthroughs in the wanting countries. In Zambia, for example, - i.e. the country that since independence has been most successful in reorienting its trade away from South Africa - imports of South African maize has to a large extent covered the last two years 50% downfall in national output.

South Africa's shrinking hinterland

Only to establish that the Republic of South Africa is immensely dominant in Southern Africa does not, however, say anything about

the dynamics of the region since the first African states gained independence in the 19⁶⁰s. During the fifteen years that lie between the proclamation of independent Zambia in October 1964 and independence of Zimbabwe in April 1980 dramatic changes have occurred in the subcontinent, where the positions of South Africa after an initial period of consolidation have been forced back

more and more.

When decolonization started in Africa, the South African apartheid regime seemed to go towards an ever increasing isolation. The Sharpeville massacre in April 1960 raised a storm of protests and condemnations all around the world and in March 1961 the Prime Minister Verwoerd withdrew South Africa's application for continued membership in the Commonwealth in order to evade the degrading expulsion that anyway was to come. Two years later, in May 1963,

30 independent African states created the Organisation of African Unity (OAU), which on its programme had complete elimination of racism and colonialism in Africa. In order to assist the political movements that were fighting for this goal 1 the OAU also set up an African Liberation Committee,

However, during the coming ten-year-period until the middle of the 1970:s, South Africa should in fact strengthen its positions in Africa. In the middle of the 1960xs, the Portuguese regime opened the two colonial territories of Angola and Mozambique to foreign capital in a belated effort to "develop" the countries and thus undermine the rapidly growing support given to the nationalist movements# Trade with South Africa increased. (The value of South African exports to Angola' and Mozambique amounted in 1965 0,8

and 4.2 million pounds, respectively. In 1968 these figures had grown to 1.8 and 6.4 million pounds). Soon South African capital poured into the Portuguese colonies, where the gigantic hydroelectric schemes at Cabora Bassa (Mozambique) and Cunene (Angola) came to symbolize the concerted action of Portugal and South Africa aiming at maintaining white hegemony in Southern Africa. UDI (Unilateral Declaration of Independence) followed in Rhodesia in November 1965. Thereby South Africa got another companion in arms in its struggle against history, (Still another success for Pretoria at this time came in July 1966, when the World Court refused to rule on the question of whether South Africa was maladministoring Namibia or not. This in turn, however, convinced the South West Africa People*s Organization (SWAPO) of the necessity to launch armed struggle. The same year - in October 1966 - the General Assembly of the United Nations terminated South Africa's mandate over Namibia, The territory would henceforth come under the direct supervision of the UN),

South Africa's expansion in Angola and Mozambique, as well as UDI in Southern Rhodesia, made new breakthroughs possible. An important piece in this development was Malawi, which in 1967 ~ as the first independent African state - entered into a commercial agreement with Pretoria. Soon thereafter South

African statistics could show that trade with independent Africa was steadily increasing. Thus, in 1965, Africa's share of total South African exports was only 11.7%, From then on it increased continuously, corresponding to not less than 18.9% in 1971 – In absolute terms, the South African trade expansion in Africa continued until 1974*

A dramatic shift in the power relations in Southern Africa was, however, to occur in the middle of the 1970s. To a large extent due to the liberation struggle in Angola and Mozambique (as well as in Guinea-Bissau), the Gaetano regime was overthrown in Portugal in April 1974. The following year saw the birth of the two independent People's Republics of Angola and Mozambique. The apartheid regime, which during the preceding period of economic penetration into independent Africa had appeared as a friend of détente, was suddenly threatened on its borders. The mask was thrown away and in October 1975 - one month before the scheduled independence celebrations in Luanda - South African troops invaded Angola with the intention to crush the MPLA and militarily incorporate this potentially very rich country within Pretoria's sphere of interest. As is well known, the invasion ended in a humiliating defeat. For the first time the colossus was to retreat and the Republic of South Africa could no longer expand in Southern Africa. (South Africa's debacle in Angola had far-reaching repercussions inside the larger itself. In June 1976, Soweto and other African townships exploded. The struggle against the regime was from then on to be steadily intensified).

Not as striking, but in the longer run very important, changes took at the same time place in other parts of the Southern African region. In Zambia the Rhodesian UDI provoked a series of counteractions that in a certain sense could be regarded upon as the point of departure for the regional cooperation in Southern Africa which is now being drawn up,

At independence in October 1964* Zambia's economy was wholly integrated within the South African subsystem. As was mentioned earlier, not less than 40% of Zambia's total imports - including all energy - came from Rhodesia and a further 20% from South Africa. With a view to lessening this situation of dependence, Zambia set aside considerable resources for the building up of alternative sources of energy and transport routes during the first ten years of independent rule. A new hydroelectric power station was constructed at Kafue Gorge. Coal was mined at Maamba and a pipeline drawn from Dar es Salaam, Tanzania, to the Copperbelt town of Mala, where the first petroleum refinery in the country was also constructed. The result of this effort was encouraging. From a situation of total energy dependence on Rhodesia in 1964, Zambia was ten years later - with the exception of oil - self-sufficient with regard to energy.

However, Zambia - one of Southern Africa's six land-locked countries - was for its international trade still dependent on the transport routes via the white South. This dependence was broken with the construction of the 1.860 kilometer Tazara railway from Kapiri Mposhi, to Dar es Salaam, a project that by its background and economic importance had a far-reaching

influence over developments in Southern Africa. Contrary to the prevailing opinion in the West that it was economically unfeasible or even necessary to build a Northern railway from Zambia to the

coast at the Indian Ocean, President Kaunda and Hyerere turned to the People's Republic of China for economic and technical assistance. The railway - symbolically called "Great Uhuru" (freedom) - was concluded in record time and was ready to be used in June *1975* One year later it could be used to its full capacity. Locked out of both the Southern route via Rhodesia (the border to Rhodesia was closed in January 1973) and the Western route via Zaire and Angola (as a result of the war in Angola the Benguela railway was brought to a halt in August 1975) Zambia was thus able to uphold its vital international trade via Dar es Salaam. In 1977> not less than 66% of the total volume of Zambia's foreign trade was transported by Taaara* A further 24% was at the same time transported to and from the port in Dar es Salaam on the Great North Road, which was tarred in 1973.

The importance of the development cooperation for economic liberation between Zambia and Tanzania should not be overlooked. Tazara became an example of what the young African states could achieve through advantageous assistance from a non-tradition&l source. By the time Tazara was constructed, there was also a beginning shift towards the South within the East African group of countries. The East African Community, i.e. Kenya, Tanzania and. Uganda, had been subjected to difficult tensions already in 1971t when Idi Amin overthrew Preaiden Obote in Uganda. The contradictions within the EAC were subsequently to grow stronger and stronger at the same time as Tanzania in its capacity of country of asylum for the principal liberation movements of Southern Africa and host country of the OAU Liberation Committee was playing a more active role with regard to developments in the Southern part of the continent. When in 1977 the EAC formally fell apart, Tanzania was thus not- only indirectly linked to the Southern African scene, but also chairing the group of the front-line states (Angola, Botswana, Mozambique, Tanzania and Zambia)*

It was in this forum that the first ideas on economic cooperation in Southern Africa were formed as a natural continuation of the struggle for political liberation from the minority regimes in Salisbury and Pretoria.

In the second half of the 1970:s, Southern Africa looked quite different from the situation described in the middle of the 1960js.

Angola and Mozambique were independent, Zambia had to a large extent succeeded in lessening the dependence on the white South and the political cooperation between these three countries,

Tanzania and Botswana had been institutionalized within the group of frontline states. The share of South Africa's exports to Africa, which in the period 1963-1971 had increased from 11*7% to 16.9\$* had in 1975 fallen back to 11.5%. In 1976, Africa's share of South Africa's total exports was 10,1% and in 1978 only

7.4%. Even the BLS-states, organized within the South African Customs Union, had shown an increasing will of independence vis-à-vis the Republic of South Africa. In February 1975 Botswana, Lesotho and Swaziland thus joined the Lomé Convention and in August 1976 Botswana created its own central bank and its own currency. In Rhodesia, Namibia and South Africa the liberation struggle was at the same time intensified and extended.

Towards economic cooperation in Southern Africa

Towards the end of the 1970s the idea on economic liberation and integrated development that took shape within the group of frontline states resulted in the setting up of a secretariat and a documentation unit, in which the late President of Botswana, Seretse Khama, Tanzania's High Commissioner to the United Kingdom, Nsekela, and the North-American economist Reginald Green played important roles. In 1978 and 1979 the secretariat rapidly developed into a formal project, whose status and objectives were sanctioned by the Foreign Ministers of the frontline states at summit meetings in Botswana's capital, Gaborone in May and June 1979. The guidelines for economic liberation and cooperation in Southern Africa thus laid down by Angola, Botswana, Mozambique, Tanzania and Zambia were finally made public at the Southern Africa Development Coordination Conference (SADCC) that the countries organized in Arusha, Tanzania, 5-4 July 1979.

The Arusha conference actually consisted of two parallel meetings, one between the Finance Ministers of the frontline states and the other between the ministers and potential donor countries and organizations. The subject of the conference was economic liberation and development. The Finance Ministers of the frontline states draw up ambitious plans, issued a declaration of intent and asked the invited donor countries and international organizations for financial support. If the intentions of the meeting thus were clear, the plans did, however, lack concrete proposals and no firm commitments of support were made.

The Arusha declaration was to be sanctioned by the Heads of State of the frontline states. During the latter part of 1979 the plans on economic cooperation had, however, to be postponed due to the intensive developments in Southern Africa. Political and military realities came in the forefront. In September, October and November, Mozambique, Zambia and Angola were once again exposed to repeated military aggression by the minority regimes in Rhodesia and South Africa. To a larger extent than in the past, these attacks were now directed against civilian "targets" and economic installations and the question of economic cooperation and reconstruction seemed more and more remote. Instead, a general war threatened to break out in Southern Africa.

Little gleams of hope of a peaceful future did, however, break through in the midst of the darkness, at least with regard to Rhodesia/Zimbabwe. In September 1979 negotiations started at Lancaster House in London on the future of Zimbabwe. If they led to a democratic solution in accordance with the will of the majority, quite different prospects for regional economic cooperation would be created than those prevailing when the Arusha conference was held.

In the beginning of 1980, the conflict over Rhodesia had the

unravelling everybody had wished to see* butf*nobody really had dared to believe in. An agreement was signed at Lancaster House, cease-fire declared, the liberation armies presented themselves at the military assembly points, the South African troops withdrew from Rhodesia and - in spite of serious tensions - free

and democratic elections were held in the country at the end of February. As is well known, the elections led to a landslide victory for the Patriotic Front, particularly for Robert Mugabe's ZANU, who, with own parliamentary majority, formed the bulk of the government "in the independent Republic of Zimbabwe that was proclaimed on 18 April . 1980,

The importance of independent Zimbabwe

With Zimbabwe independent, the postponed issue of economic cooperation in Southern Africa was suddenly given new impetus.

A fragile, but real peace set in in the Eastern parts of the subcontinent. The front against the white South was pushed forward from the Zambesi to the Limpopo and the military attacks against Mozambique and Zambia ended. The Tin-imposed sanctions on Rhodesia were removed. Transport and communication that had come to a halt during the war were started anew and Zimbabwean refugees could return home from the neighbouring countries of asylum. In spite of the fact that the question of Namibia was still to be settled and that a situation of de facto war prevailed in the Western parts of the region, a qualitative change had taken place in Southern Africa. The correlation of strength between the majority-ruled states and the minority regime in Pretoria was altered in favour of the former* Zimbabwe was free and Pretoria's plan on a "constellation of states" had thereby received a serious blow. As Reginald Green has put it?,¹ From the constellation perspective, the emergence of a Zimbabwe government, led by {.Â».) Mugabe was a disaster. Not only had a major star dropped out of place, leaving a gaping void, (but)' its loss had the effect of blocking attempts to extend the constellation's northern boundary, to recapture Zambia and incorporate the, orbits of Malawi Â» Zaire, Central African Republic and Gabon".

In spite of the open wounds left by the war, Zimbabwe was economically stronger than the other frontline states, which - together with the pivotal location of the country - rendered the prospects for the planned regional economic cooperation much brighter. South Africa's set-back and the strengthening of the frontline group through the membership of Zimbabwe also meant that the frame for the cooperation could be extended to include the other majority-ruled states in Southern Africa, i.e. Malawi, Lesotho and S wa zi land,

If the independence of Zimbabwe thus opened new possibilities for economic cooperation in Southern Africa, the potential strength of the newcomer was such that the cooperation had to be planned within the frame of an overall and long-term strategy, where comparative advantages for all participating states should take the first place. Such considerations were prominent when the majority-ruled states of Southern Africa on 1 April 1980 - only one month after the elections in Zimbabwe - met in Lusaka, Zambia, to carry

the intentions of the Arusha conference further and lay the basis for economic liberation, coordination and development in the region.

(Before turning to the Lusaka summit, it should be noted that related movements towards economic cooperation took place among the Portuguese-speaking states and the member states of the OAU)

as a whole in 1979 and 1980. Of particular importance to Southern Africa was the cooperative effort among the lusophone African states, i.e. Angola, Cape Verde, Guinea-Bissau, Mozambique and São Tomé and Príncipe. As was the case within the group of frontline states - of which Angola and Mozambique are members - the lusophone cooperation in the economic sphere built on a political legacy of solidarity between the countries.

who as pre-independence liberation movements were organized in the Conference of Nationalist Organisations of Portuguese Colonies (OONCP). Two lusophone economic summits have been held so far, the inaugural summit in Luanda, Angola, in June 1979 and a follow-up meeting in Maputo, Mozambique, in March 1980. The meeting in Maputo endorsed a general agreement on economic cooperation. Basic principles were established to govern relations among the five member states in the fields of trade, transport, finance, banking and insurance, with priority given to the attainment of self-sufficiency in the food, transport and communications sectors, thus anticipating the priorities that would emerge from the deliberations in Lusaka).

The Lusaka Summit

The summit held in Lusaka on 1 April 1980 was attended by the five frontline states, i.e. Angola, Botswana, Mozambique, Tanzania and Zambia, as well as (the formally still not independent)

Zimbabwe, Malawi, Lesotho and Swaziland. Occupied Namibia was represented by its recognised liberation movement, SWAPO. The US Economic Commission for Africa (ECA) and OAU participated as observers to the meeting. The importance given to the summit by the participating states was apparent from their level of representation. All frontline states as well as Zimbabwe and SWAPO were represented by their highest political leaders (dos Santos, Khama, Machel, Maseru, Mugabe and Nujoma), whereas Malawi,

Lesotho and Swaziland - who for the first time participated together with the frontline states in deliberations on the future of Southern Africa - were represented at ministerial level.

In the final declaration from the Lusaka summit it was stated that "it is necessary to liberate our economies from their dependence on the Republic of South Africa, to overcome the imposed economic fragmentation and to coordinate our efforts toward regional and national development". Four main objectives were identified, namely:

- the reduction of economic dependence, particularly, but not only, on the Republic of South Africa
- the forging of links to create a genuine and equitable regio-

nal integration!

- the mobilization of resources to promote the implementation of national, inter-state and regional policies! and

- concerted action to secure international cooperation within the framework of our strategy for economic liberation*1 â€¢

The step from political to economic liberation was described in the following way by the chairman of the summit, the late President of Botswana, Seretse Khamat

"For many years we have struggled for political independence, for the right to rule ourselves and determine our future"

We have done this independently as separate nations, as well as collectively by giving whatever support and assistance we could to one another. Some of us in this region have demonstrated that it is possible to achieve common objectives through collective effort" We have, as frontline states, mandated by the OAU, successfully demonstrated solidarity and collective responsibility in the search for political liberation in Zimbabwe and Namibia" Whilst in pursuit of this objective, we realised the urgent need to extend the struggle from the political to the economic sphere" (...)

"We all know that our economies are to a very large extent, albeit to varying degrees, dependent on the economy of South Africa. We may be proud of our political independence, but before we achieve some degree of economic independence, our task is not complete, (...) We fully recognize that we are all still developing nations and not equally endowed with resources. But as a region we are certainly rich in resources* human, agricultural and mineral. What is required is the development of these resources for the benefit and welfare of the entire region and its peoples. More specifically, our goal is to achieve economic liberation and to reduce our economic dependence on the Republic of South Africa. We seek to overcome the fragmentation of our economies and, by coordinating our national development efforts, to strengthen them. The basis of our cooperation, built on concrete projects and specific programmes rather than on grandiose schemes and massive bureaucratic institutions, must be the assured mutual advantage of all participating states".

Coordination philosophy

The main objective is thus to achieve economic independence from South Africa. As appears from the quoted statement by President Khama, the way towards this objective shall not pass via the establishment of a new interstatel economic organization, but via specific and concrete projects in different fields of strategic economic importance.

To render it more difficult for South Africa to exploit the weaknesses of the individual Southern African states and carry out a classical policy of divide-and-rule in the region, it would appear that a free trade area, a common market or a customs union would be an appropriate structure for the cooperation"

Such an orthodox approach - traditionally advocated by liberal economists as necessary to create a bigger market and attract essential foreign investments - was, however, already at an early stage rejected by the initiators within the frontline group. There are various reasons for this. Suggesting trade as the first step in the x*egional approach did not encounter any support, since an analysis of the trade patterns demonstrates that the trade of

the majority-ruled states is largely with countries external to the region or with the Republic of South Africa* The manufacturing industry that does exist in these countries has first and foremost been built up to serve sophisticated extra-regional, high-price-markets and not the economically weak mass-markets of the neighbouring states. Inter-regional trade with raw materials and serai-manufacturers does likewise not have bright prospects until the countries have created the industrial capacity to utilize them.

In a formalized preferential trade area, the foundation could be set for unbalanced growth. As the experience of inter alia the Central African Federation and the East African Community illustrate, in any such trading arrangement the primary benefits would go to the economically most advanced country to the detriment of others. This understanding grew stronger after independence in Zimbabwe. In Southern Africa, any trading arrangements would have to include Zimbabwe, yet this country's economy and industrial base is sufficiently well advanced that unequal benefit would accrue to Zimbabwe in such an arrangement,

What has been said can be even more strongly argued with regard to the idea of forming a common market or a customs union. In this respect should be added that the most important productive sectors in the region are dominated by powerful transnational - furthermore often South African - corporations. In the mining sector, for example, one or a few companies, such as Anglo-American, American Metal Climax or Rio Tinto Zinc, control the same branch of production in several of the countries and a common market or a customs union should most likely not strengthen the prospects for economic liberation, but the structural grip these corporations already have on the Southern African economies,

Instead of a formalized traditional cooperative framework, the majority-ruled states in Southern Africa have chosen to achieve their objective of economic liberation and development through a functional approach, where selective and concrete projects will be jointly carried out. Selective x-regional problem solving through national action and national problem-solving through selective regional approaches are to be integrated into the individual strategies of the countries. In the field of transport, for example, coordination is necessary. It could, however, not be implemented by a supranational institution, but through development of the transport capacity of all the participating states.

By reinforcing the parts/countries, the whole/the region is strengthened.

Given the complexity and diversity of the Southern African region, there will only be a limited number of opportunities for all countries to participate in joint projects. Although the chief objective to achieve economic independence is subscribed to by

all the majority-ruled states, this objective has not the same practical meaning all over the region, itay^sectors for Swaziland are thus transport, commercial injeastrn.cture -affif* imports of consumption goods, whereas imports of machinery and equipment for the mining industry play an important role in .the cases of Zambia and Zimbabwe. Rather than common projects, it can thus

be expected that most regional programs will involve two or possibly three countries, where mutual advantages are assured,

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Since the majority-ruled states in Southern Africa do not intend to form a traditional interstate economic organisation* but aim at strengthening the region through bilateral or trilateral functional projects and programmes* neighbouring states could also participate without being formal members of the cooperative framework*. Thus, the Lusaka declaration clearly states that the majority-ruled states of Southern Africa do not envisage this regional economic coordination as exclusive.

The initiative towards economic liberation has flowed from our experience of joint action for political liberation. We envisage regional coordination as open to all genuinely independent Southern African states", (in the field of transport and communications, the Lusaka declaration further states that the signatory states "will seek participation of all genuinely independent states in the Southern Africa region (and) observer status will be open to Liberation Movements wishing to participate in anticipation of genuine independence. Similarly, in manpower development and research* the involvement of Liberation Movements is essential to amass the knowledge and train the personnel necessary once political liberation is achieved.**)

Which non-signatory states that thus could participate in the coordination effort is, of course, dependent on the concrete project or programme to be carried out*. A typical functional project within the cooperative framework described above is, for example, the rehabilitation of the Benguela railway through Angola, Zaire and Zambia. Angola and Zambia are in their capacity of frontline states members of the "inner circle"*1 of the Southern African group* whereas Zaire did not participate at the meeting in Lusaka in April 1980. Given its geographical position, Zaire is, however, a country that could join the sub-continental coordination for specific projects, (Relations with Zaire, particularly in the field of transport and communications* grew rapidly closer during the months following the Lusaka summit, as will be seen below). Other countries that have been mentioned in this context are São Tomé and Príncipe and the island states in the Indian Ocean* i.e. Madagascar, Mauritius and the Seychelles.

With respect to the guiding coordination philosophy, it should finally* be pointed out that a transition to socialism at regional level is nowhere mentioned. Nor do the declarations endorse a basically private or permanent mixed, economy. However* as Reginald Green has written* 11 the areas cited for action and the forms of action proposed indicate that regional coordination

is perceived as basically a public sector designed and implemented arena, with private firms playing a greater or lesser role once parameters have been set by the states**,'7 To this co-aid be added that regional cooperation - if it is to contribute to more balanced and self-reliant development - requires that the participating states exercise sufficient control of what President Nyerere of Tanzania has termed "the commanding heights"* of their respective economies.

Fields for concerted action

The Lusaka declaration underlines that "the key to this strategy (of regional economic liberation and development) is transport and communications. The dominance of the Republic of South Africa has been reinforced and strengthened by its transport system. Without the establishment of an adequate regional transport and communications system, other areas of cooperation become impractical", The Lusaka summit therefore decided to create a Southern African Transport and Communications Commission with a view to coordinating the use of existing systems and the planning and financing of additional regional facilities,

(The total cost for projects and programmes in this field

in the 1980:s was estimated at more than 1.5 billion US dollars).

In recognition of Mozambique's central role as transit-country in Southern Africa, it was decided that the Commission should be based in Maputo.

The Transport and Communications Commission was by the Lusaka summit further given a central role in bringing the overall coordination project ahead. Using the Commission as the first established institution, the majority-ruled states declared their intention "to mobilise finance for urgent projects in priority sectors by holding ad hoc pledging sessions with existing bilateral and multilateral funding agencies. As economic cooperation develops, a Southern African Development Fund will be created and research to this end is being initiated. Its scope would be subsequently broadened and it might prove desirable to create a separate regional development bank".

The first meeting of the working group - attended by all member states - on the establishment of the Southern African Transport and Communications Commission was held in Maputo 50 June ~ 4 July 1980» As in the case of the other tasks delegated to the states participating at the Lusaka summit, the organizational proposal regarding the work of the commission as well as the projects relating to transport and communications identified there will be discussed at a first follow-up meeting at ministerial level in Zimbabwe in September 1980.

This meeting will thus set priorities among all the regional projects proposed in the different fields of action. And these projects will in turn be presented to potential donor countries and organizations at a pledging conference to be held in Maputo, Mozambique in November 1980* The intention stated at the Lusaka meeting is subsequently "that Southern African Development Coordination meetings of member states and other invited participants should be held annually. This will provide a mechanism for surveying results, evaluating performance, identifying

strengths and weaknesses and agreeing on future plans"

Apart from the central transport and communications sector, the Lusaka summit agreed upon concerted action and preparatory work in other fields. With regard to trade, the participating states declared that "existing payment systems and customs instruments will be studied in order to build up a regional trade system based on bilaterally negotiated annual trade targets and product lists". Several tasks were delegated to the participating

states. Thus, Angola was commissioned, to prepare a plan for regional cooperation in the energy field} Swaziland to study the prospects for regional use of educational facilities for manpower development} Zimbabwe to present a regional food security plan} Tanzania to work out a programme for regional industrialization} and Zambia to analyse the pros and cons of establishing the above mentioned regional development fund. Botswana, who in its capacity of initiator of the economic cooperation in Southern Africa was entrusted with the responsibility of coordinating the follow-up of the action programme until the pledging conference in Maputo, was given two specific tasks, namely to make a request to the European Economic Community for funding of a study on cattle diseases, particularly for production of foot and mouth disease vaccine, and a request to the International Centre for Research on Agriculture in the Semi-Arid Tropics (ICRISAT) for assistance in setting up a Southern African regional centre in Botswana.

The Lusaka summit further agreed upon undertaking concerted action "in order to exploit natural resources, in particular those of common, hydrological basins" and established - "as a matter of urgency" - the need to "identify ways in which the coordination of research and training as well as the exchange of information can strengthen programmes to protect our environment and to increase food production".

Transport patterns

Zimbabwe holds in many ways the geopolitical and infrastructural keys to the future of the Southern African region and thus to the 'economic liberation and integrated development plan' laid down at the summit in Lusaka. This is particularly true with respect to transport and communications, where the election victory of the Patriotic Front and the proclamation of the independent Republic of Zimbabwe created new conditions that within very short were to set dynamic forces in motion throughout the region.

By using transport routes via Mozambique and Zimbabwe, all the majority-ruled states in Southern Africa with the exception of the enclave republic of Lesotho are now in a position to by-pass the Republic of South Africa. A new Southern African infrastructural subsystem is thus evolving, in which the importance of Mozambique as transit-country most likely will be considerably strengthened and the gravity of the region shifted to the corridor Mozambique-Zimbabwe, two countries that furthermore are politically close to one another.

The new trade corridor via Zimbabwe and Mozambique may be of particular importance to Botswana, a country that hitherto has been practically wholly dependent on trade with and via the

Republic of South Africa. Botswana's mineral exports from Selebi-Pikwe (copper and nickel) can thus in the future be transported via Zimbabwe to the Mozambican port of Beix*a, from where the country could import petroleum products. A big proportion of Botswana's meat exports could likewise be reoriented towards African markets in the North. And such a change in Botswana's international trade could ultimately lead to the

withdrawal of Botswana from the South African Customs Union.

Whereas the opening of the trade corridor via Zimbabwe and Mozambique does not directly affect Angola, it will, on the other hand, most probably lessen the geopolitical importance of Zambia. Both the so called Botswana route from Botswana and Tazara railway and the Great North Road to Tanzania will in all probability be overshadowed by the Eastern and Southern "routes. The strengthening of the Salisbury-Maputo axis would consequently lead to a corresponding weakening of the axis Lusaka-Dar es Salaam, which up to now has been of such political and economic importance for the developments in Southern Africa,

The decision taken at the Lusaka summit to base the regional Transport and Communications Commission in the capital of Mozambique was made in recognition of the significance of the new trade corridor via Zimbabwe and Mozambique. During the months following the Lusaka summit, the shift of gravity within the region towards this corridor was also apparent from the very intense contacts that developed at highest political level between the countries in Southern Africa. Significantly enough, less than two months after the Lusaka meeting, Zaire was also participating in the discussions on regional transport and communications. The following list on high-level meetings on transport questions held in the two months of May and June 1960 can illustrate the dynamics:

2-6 June:

Fourth session of the Zaire-Zambian Permanent Joint Commission, held in Lubumbashi, Zaire:

The delegations, led by the Zairean State Commissioner for Foreign Affairs and International Cooperation, Sguma Karl-i-Bond, and the Zambian Minister of Foreign Affairs, Wilson Chakulya, reviewed agreements between the two countries in the areas of trade; and rail transport of copper and other goods. They also examined other fields of cooperation, including the construction of the Chembe bridge, the tarring of the Mokambo road and air and telecommunication links,

7-9 June

Meeting between Presidents Samora Machel and Mobutu Sese Seko in Maputo, Mozambique:

The talks between the Mozambican and the Zairean Presidents focused on encouraging economic cooperation between the two countries, especially in the areas of transportation, communications and trade as well as on resuming Zairean copper and cobalt shipments through the port of Beira,

11 June

Ministerial meeting to conclude a bilateral transport agreement between Swaziland and Mozambique, held in Mbabane, S was Hand:

Mozambique's Minister of Ports and Transport, Alcantara Santos,

arid Swaziland's Minister of Works, Power and Communication,

V. Leibbrandt, signed a memorandum of understanding covering rehabilitation and realignment of rail links, the construction of an exchange yard in Swaziland near the Mozambique border and improved operations and facilities at the port of Maputo.

12-13 June:

Meeting between Presidents Samara Machel and Kenneth Kaunda in Maputo and Beira, Mozambique *

Held in conjunction with the Fifth Session of the Mozambique-Zambia Permanent Joint Commission. The two heads of state took action to implement practical cooperation between their countries. The talks focused on the transport sector, with a visit by the Presidents to the ports of Maputo and Beira.

15-17 June*

Ministerial meeting on resumption of transport and power links between Zimbabwe and Mozambique, held in Salisbury, Zimbabwe*

Reached agreement on the problem of railway wagons, locomotives and funds held in both Zimbabwe and Mozambique as a result of the war as well as on action to be taken to assist in the full utilization of the Beira and Maputo rail links. The meeting also agreed that the oil pipeline between Beira and Umtali should be put back into service as soon as possible and that the pre-war existing level of communications between Salisbury and Beira should be restored,

17 June

Ministerial meeting between Zambia and Malawi to discuss rail link, held in Blantyre, Malawi:

The meeting discussed proposals to join the railway systems between the two countries in order to give Zambia access to the Mozambican port of Nacala.

19-20 June*

Summit meeting on transport cooperation between Mozambique, Zaire, Zambia and Zimbabwe, held in Lubumbashi, Zaire!

Attended by Presidents Machel, Mobutu and Kaunda and Prime Minister Mugabe, who agreed to take measures to improve the rail links from Lubumbashi to the Mozambican ports of Maputo, Beira and Nacala. The summit also announced the setting up of a quadripartite ministerial transport commission - which is to function separately from the transport and communications commission

agreed to at the Lusaka summit of 1 April 1980 - and decided that the transport ministers from the four countries will henceforth meet at least twice a year.

19-22 Junes

Ministerial meeting on transport links between Malawi and Mozambique, held in Maputo, Mozambique

The delegations, headed by the Malawian Minister of Transport and Communications, Henry Harawa, and his Mozambican counterpart, Alcantara Santos, discussed the transport network between the two countries.

28 June:

Meeting between President Samora Machel and Prime Minister Robert Mugabe in Beira, Mozambique:

The heads of state of Mozambique and Zimbabwe reviewed foreign policy issues and discussed immediate and future practical steps for implementing economic cooperation in the fields of transport, energy and electricity.

Zambia and Southern Africa

Less than half a year has elapsed since the Lusaka summit was held and the independent Republic of Zimbabwe was born. It is therefore much too early to try to assess how the economies in the Southern African region will be affected by the plan of action for economic liberation and integrated development that was agreed upon in Lusaka. A most probable overall economic and geopolitical shift towards Zimbabwe and Mozambique has been mentioned. In the case of Zambia, i.e. the Southern African country that was most affected by the war in Rhodesia/Zimbabwe, this trend is already clearly noticeable.

Zambia's position has, of course, to a very large extent been affected by the events in Zimbabwe. As soon as an agreement was reached at Lancaster House in December 1979 a very rapid development towards complete normalisation of the relations between the two neighbouring countries was initiated. The situation of de facto war that reigned in 1979 came to an end and Zambia could soon transfer its defence forces from the border areas with Zimbabwe to the Western parts of the country. Peace and conditions for reconstruction followed in Southern Zambia after years of military aggressions. The border posts reopened and road and rail traffic that following the UN-imposed sanctions on Rhodesia had been stopped in January 1973 was resumed. A direct passenger air-link was opened between Lusaka and Salisbury. Zimbabwean refugees in Zambia could return home.

The results of the elections in Zimbabwe were greeted with deep satisfaction in Zambia. Although Zambia in the past had channelled its support practically exclusively to Joshua Nkomo's

ZAPU, the government acted promptly to establish a good neighbour policy with Robert Mugabe's predominantly ZANb cabinet.

A series of economic, social and cultural contacts were made between the two governments, and on 20 June 1980, -they decided to establish a Joint Zambia-Zimbabwe Permanent Commission,

Reorientation of transport ...?

As was mentioned earlier, following the Unilateral Declaration of Independence in Rhodesia in November 1965* Gambia was to a very large extent able to re-route its international trade away from the white South. The normalisation of relations with Zimbabwe will, however, affect the trade and transport patterns that Zambia built up during the GDI-period. This development was initiated already in October 1978, when Zambia in order to import much needed fertiliser was forced to open the Southern rail route via Rhodesia, and then strengthened in 1979* when big quantities of maize were procured in South Africa.

In 1977 i.e. two years after its completion, the Tazara railway from Zambia to the Indian Ocean port of Dar es Salaam, handled not less than 66% of the volume of Zambia's total international trade. A further 24% was during the same year carried to Dar es Salaam by truck. The importance of the Northern route was maintained until October 1978* when the Southern route was reopened. The significance of this step is evident from Zambia's trade statistics. Thus, in 1979* the share of Zambia's total international trade that was transported via the Northern route had decreased to 49% while the Southern route already accounted for not less than 41%*. And there is all reason to believe that this trend in favour of the Southern route will be maintained. In its annual report covering the year 1979* the Bank of Zambia has, for example, the following to say about Zambia's alternative international routes: "The Southern route was found suitable because (..*) the imports in South Africa did not experience any congestions in comparison to other ports which the country currently uses. Although freight rates on the Southern route are much higher than on Tazara, the former

has an added advantage in more round-trip in view of the shorter

distance to the sea. With the independence of Zimbabwe, future traffic on this route is expected to increase substantially and may in no time even exceed that of the Dar es Salaam route*.

The figures quoted above refer to 1979* It is, however, likely that the reorientation of Zambia's international trade has been more pronounced in 1980 due to considerable imports of maize and other consumer goods from South Africa and to the deep crisis of the Tanzania-Zambia Highway Authority.

The critical situation of Tazara was more and more apparent in the beginning of 1980. In May, the Tanzanian Minister of

Transport sharply criticized Zambian exporters and importers for not using the railway to the extent necessary for its economical performance. (To this criticism, it was replied from the Zambian side that the weak-point of the Northern route was the

port in Dar es Salaam, where long waiting'-periods, losses and corruption deterred importers and exporters (using it). The extent of the crisis of Tasara was, finally, made public in late August, when the Tenth Tripartite Tasara Council of Ministers between Tanzania, Zambia and the People's Republic of China announced that the railway had incurred losses of 19*8 million Zambian kwacha during the period 1 July 1976 to 30 June 1980, i.e. during its time of full operation. The situation was such, the

Zambian Minister of Power, Transport and Communications,

Kingsley Chinkuli, said that "unless immediate remedial measures are taken, this vital organisation is bound to grind to a halt in the near future!" A concrete reflection of this situation was the decision, valid from 13 August, to reduce the passenger traffic on Tasara to one express train in both directions every second week.

On 29 August 1980, the Tripartite Council of Ministers eventually agreed to a plan to put the ailing Tasara back on its rails* It would, however, appear that Tasara also in the nearest foreseeable future will be overshadowed by the Southern route as its most acute problem is lack of locomotive power, which could not easily be solved within a year or a year and a half, (It could here be added that neither Tanzania nor Zambia presented the rehabilitation of the Tazara railway as a priority project when the Southern Africa Transport and Communications Commission held its first meeting in Maputo, Mozambique, from 30 June to 4 July 1980, Instead, Zambia presented new railway projects, Inter alia to link its railway system directly with those of Malawi, Mozambique and Zimbabwe).

If - as it appears today - the Tazara railway will have to stand back, in favour of the Southern routes, the consequences will be considerable. Not only are the governments of Tanzania and Zambia already in 1985 supposed to start repaying the Chinese loan of some 450 million kwacha, from the revenues of the railway, but the railway was also conceived as a vital nerve for development projects in Northern Zambia and South-Western Tanzania. It would thus be a historical irony if the very project that to a large extent influenced the thinking on regional cooperation in Southern Africa should be the first to suffer when the cooperation takes off the ground.

... and trade?

In the meantime, recently published figures on Zambia's international trade during the first nine months of 1979 also reflect the shift towards the South, As was mentioned earlier, between 1964 and 1977 the South African share of Zambia's total imports fell from some 20% to 8%, In 1978, the value of Zambia's imports from the Republic of South Africa amounted to 32.4 million kwacha, or 6.5% of total imports. However, during the nine months from January to October, 1979, trade with South Africa more than doubled in comparison with the same period in 1978.

Total imports from South Africa during this period in 1979 thus amounted to 49.4 million kwacha, or 11.2% of Zambia's total imports. This further meant that the Republic of South Africa for the first time since 1975 became the second biggest supplier to Zambia, after the United Kingdom, but overtaking the United States and the Federal Republic of Germany (During the first nine months of 1979, also Zambia's exports to South Africa

showed an increase. Whereas total exports to South Africa in the whole of 1978 amounted to a value of 0,8 million kwacha, they reached the figure of 2.9 million kwacha from January to October 1979).

The Zambian statistics referred to do not break down the imports by commodity groups* It is, however, a well-known fact that Zambia's increase in imports from the Republic of South Africa in 1979 was a result of procurement of big quantities of maize. In 1978/79# Zambia's marketed production of maize showed a very pronounced downfall and reached only some 3.7 million bags, as against a yearly national consumption requirement of around 8 million bags. The deficit had to a large extent to be covered through imports from South Africa.

This situation is likely to be repeated in 1980, as the marketed production of maize during the agricultural season 1979/80 is only estimated to reach some 4.5 million bags.

Thus, during the last two years, Zambia - a potentially rich agricultural country - has become dependent on the Republic of South Africa for food imports. (Other consumer goods imported by Zambia in 1979 and 1980 include washing-powder and cooking-oil) –

Summary

Dramatic changes have taken place in Southern Africa during the last fifteen years. Angola, Masambique and now Zimbabwe have been freed and the struggle against occupation and minority-rule intensified in both Namibia and the Republic of South Africa. The economic positions of the apartheid regime have been pushed back. In 1971* Africa's share of total South African exports was not less than 18.9%* Seven years later, in 1978, this proportion had decreased to 1.4%*

The South African colossus does, however, still exert structural dominance and wide control over the economies of the majority-ruled states in Southern Africa. At the same time as the majority of the countries in the region towards the end of the 1970:s were struggling against a deep economic crisis, the South African economy showed a marked boom due to the spectacular trend on the international gold and mineral markets. Also the South African agriculture expanded, And the regime in Pretoria was not long in exploiting this strength via ~<Â£~vis the majority ruled states in Southern Africa* Thus, in 1979* "the South African trade with independent Africa increased, her investments in the continent grew and positions lost during the preceding period were to a large extent reconquered. (According to official South African trade statistics, the value of Pretoria's exports to independent Africa increased from 538 million Rand in 1978 to 748 million Rand in 1979* i.e. by 39%. Recently published South African figures for the first half-year of 1980 confirm this trend* Thus in the six months from January to July 1980, the share of total South African exports that went to Africa grew by not less than 65% in comparison with the same period in 1979*â–*)*

It is against this background the importance of the cooperation for economic independence and development the Southern

African majority-ruled states should be seen. Their formal political independence does not become real until it has been, brought also to the economic sphere. In this respect, the SADCC meeting in Arusha, Tanzania, in July 1979 paved the way

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towards a new thinking, the independence of Zimbabwe in April 1980 considerably changed the material basis for such a strategy and the summit in Lusaka, Zambia, on 1 April 1980 formalised the plan. It is, of course, too early to speculate about the future of the cooperation for economic liberation and Integrated development in Southern Africa. The structural and political obstacles ahead are many and mighty. It is, however, clear that a more firm foundation for the cooperation has been laid and that the objectives of the Lusaka summit deserve political and financial support by those who have shown a democratic commitment with regard to the developments in Southern Africa.