

A Journal of Leadership
and Development
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AFRICA

FORUM

QUARTERLY

V012 o No 1 o 1992

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PUBLISHER'S NOTE

DEMOCRACY AND GOVERNANCE

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THIS is a fascinating epoch of Africa's re-discovery of itself. Some have chosen to call it Africa's democratic revolution. But whatever one may call it, one thing is clear, a rising tide of change in Africa is now irresistible.

Today, the issue is no longer whether all African countries - and I mean the entire African continent, will achieve a democratic form of government within the next two years or so. The uncertainty is whether most African leaders will allow such changes to be achieved peacefully. Those leaders who are sufficiently wise to recognise the inevitability may have a rare chance of managing the change. But those who, even at this eleventh hour, continue to believe that they can stop this tidal wave of Africa's historical movement are likely to be obliterated by its mighty force and may end up in the dustbin of history.

Denial of fundamental human rights, absence of the basic freedoms of - and for - the individual, have remained familiar traits of a majority of the governments in Africa. The strain of these styles of governance has prompted demands for a new approach to resolving various national issues. Africans are clamouring for greater responsiveness of their political leaderships, respect for human rights, accountability and a two-way channel of communication between the leaders and the people. These inter-related issues of governance can only be guaranteed under a pluralistic political framework. The reality of the choice to select those who will lead them, and the corollary of the possibility to periodically review, renew or terminate the mandate given to the political leadership, is the basis for good government.

The more profound reason for the contemporary call for democracy in Africa has to do with the inability of most African governments to improve the lot of the citizenry. Having arrived at political independence with the hope and promise of a better life, our people are today disillusioned. While the fact of neo-colonialism, as represented by unequal exchange and exploitation of African economies by interests other than African, may account, to a large degree, for the inadequate performance of African economies since independence, the major responsibility of our current stagnation must be placed squarely on the shoulders of our leaders, who have often demonstrated unimaginative approaches to the crucial issues of management.

The present clamour for democracy, therefore, must also be seen in the context of perceived redemption. There is the general feeling that our previous frameworks, having had the chance to prove their worth and failed, should give way to democracy, with the people themselves, not just the elite, determining their destiny.

There is now a clear message to everyone, within and outside the continent, who still doubt Africa's capacity and determination of its people - (150p- posed to some of their governments, to plan our development and become full partners in global

The issue is no longer whether all African countries - and I mean the entire African continent, will achieve a democratic form of government within the next two years or so. The uncertainty is whether most African leaders will allow such changes to be achieved peacefully.

It is a mistake. Those who are making the error of writing off Africa may have forgotten that there is no constant yardstick for measuring the quality of human existence. Emerging generations of Africans - like various generations in other societies, will inevitably overcome the forces of oppression and dictatorship, construct the necessary democratic foundation for orderly form of governance on which will also grow a sustained process of socio-economic transformation.

Every activity bearing upon the way many people live in other parts of the world has in the last couple of decades undergone changes, some revolutionary, most radical of all has been the accelerating rate of change itself in the very recent years and the positive impact it has brought to many - except in Africa. But the agony over the slow pace of change in Africa must be viewed in the historical context of our continent.

For all the errors, past and present, of the continent, recent generations of Africans have had to struggle every inch and every minute of our lives against historically debilitating odds.

We have survived the anguish and brutalities of slavery, colonialism and the contortions of the Cold War. Most of these were deliberately aimed at destroying our capacity for initiative and our rights for independent action. Yet, we are now blamed for the failures consequent upon impediments infused by external

factors into the political, economic and social fabrics of our society. To the extent that those who have thus attempted to marginalise Africa are today behaving as though Africans really deserve no privileges or opportunities in the global home we jointly inhabit - some are even giving greater attention to the welfare of animals than they are ready to accord to Africans.

Notwithstanding the devastating experiences of the past, Africa cannot afford to be pre-occupied with apportioning blames to its detractors. Africans are now using the benefit of hindsight to focus on a better future. The continent is being turned around primarily by Africans themselves. The forces behind the movement and uncompromising demand for change stem from the conviction that at the core of our problems is the lack of good governance which, regardless of its specific causes, has led to a continent-wide degradation of the quality of life. While the essentials of democracy may be universal, the practice of democracy has to take cognizance of historical and cultural factors. It is thus important to recognise the past democratic traditions of African societies. The human race was misled in Africa. We cannot import democracy. It must be home-grown, home-nurtured and home-sustained. While the basic structures of democracy

all over the world bear striking semblance, the other ingredients of democracy in terms of what it does, entails and encompasses, vary from place to place. As such, our practice of democracy in Africa should contain additions dictated by cultures. Evidence points to the practice of democracy in Africa Forum 0 Vol 2 o No 1

African societies before disruption by colonialism. It is also less often recognised or admitted that Africans have been actively opposing dictatorial regimes long before the drama of changes in Eastern Europe. More important, unlike Eastern Europe where democratic movements have been beneficiaries of moral as well as material support from Western nations, similar movements in Africa have until recently been hopelessly caught in the cross-fires of the Cold War.

It is thus clear how the end of the global ideological confrontation lifted the lid off our democratic revolution. The genie is now out of the bottle, and there is no way of putting it back

ATIONAL CONFERENCES, 'National Democratic Forums', 'Patriotic Fronts', these are a few of the fashionable labels for the activists. Some of them are loosely organised, some are armed, some have already won free and fair elections, while others have violently overthrown dictatorships. The overwhelming popular support for these movements has put political pluralism in the lexicon of everyday discourse in Africa.

As many readers may be aware, it is the consideration of Africa's direction under the extraordinary global dynamics that brought together many eminent individuals at the Kampala Forum - the Conference on Security, Stability, Development and Cooperation in Africa (CSSDCA). I would like to recommend that those who believe they could define democracy for Africa - probably because Africans have not done so themselves - should read the Kampala Document. This is a document which not only defines a democratic framework for Africa but also provides an overarching structure that organically links establishment of democratic institutions as a basis for national security and stability.

To successfully sustain democracy, Africa must effectively treat the causes rather than the symptoms of past failures. We must recognise that as important as democracy is, however defined, it can only deliver stability through social and economic justice. Both are necessary to guarantee that the dark forces of the combination of repression and greed shall never again rear their ugly heads. Economic democratisation, in this context, means a process of qualitative and quantitative resource management within the framework of a mixed economy with in-built norms of equity and justice, empowerment and capacity building. Economic democratisation facilitates and nurtures private initiative and participation. It is hoped that democracy, while making for good government and freeing the potentialities of the people for initiative and entrepreneurship, will ultimately transform lives of Africans, most of whom live below the poverty line. Democracy, as indeed any aspect of good government, is a bread and butter issue. The hope and promise that democracy holds out for our people today has to do with the advancement in their standards of living.

The call for democracy is grounded in perceived redemption for which the short-term prospects must be viewed realistically. For example, the payment

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The forces behind the movement and uncompromising demand for learnt from those who are change stem from the conviction that at the core of our problems is the lack of good governance which, regardless of its specific causes, has led to a continent-wide degradation of the quality of life

of a high percentage of hard-earned foreign exchange for debt servicing cannot make for meaningful development of infrastructure and other priority areas of our economies. It the emerging democracies in Africa are to survive, a lasting solution has to be found to the debt crisis.

It is true that African economies as suppliers of raw materials and buyers of finished goods, relate with the industrial economies on an unequal exchange basis. The initiative for change must come from within Africa. The outside environment and forces can only help and encourage our own initiatives. We will have to live with the fact of diminishing development assistance and loans. We will have to rely more in mobilisation of local resources for investment and on direct foreign investment. Thus, democratisation, deregulation, and competitive market economy are some of the aspects of an enabling hospitable economic environment. Others are prudent fiscal policies, elimination of corruption, encouragement of production, continuity of policies and political stability.

We are now at the threshold of learning from the experiences of those individual African countries who have crossed the threshold of democracy with free and fair elections. There are valuable lessons to be facing the challenges of sustaining democracy while fostering economic growth But let us avoid the temptation to push for quick results. This is a long and painful road where there are no quick fixes.

Let us not encourage those leaders who are taking refuge in the prediction of disappointment in short-term results.

As Africans fight for Change, they are no longer prepared to engage in the academic argument of whether there is a link between democracy and economic growth or a choice between peace and freedom that a new order may purportedly disturb. In the first place, many of the African leaders delivered neither. In any case, all of these things are necessary and there is no room for compromise or mutual exclusivity. Africans everywhere are overwhelmingly rejecting the claim of those leaders trying to perpetuate their stay in power by equating national stability with their longevity or continuity in office. We have already seen cases where they left and the tremor they predicted never came to pass. Many Africans have lost their lives and many more are suffering as consequence of civil disturbances and wars directly attributable to leaders who tenuously held onto office.

The real question for many countries in the transition is the extent to which their leaders may truly be committed to democracy and good governance. A government spokesman in one African country recently stated that multi-party democracy is as alien to Africa as three-piece suit in the

desert". Multi-partyism may be alien, democracy certainly is not. The actions of such governments as well as those who are playing dirty tricks against the opposition are only delaying the day of reckoning. My personal advice to African leaders, many of whom I know and respect, is that the best way to face this inevitable change is to welcome it and then participate in its management.

FORUM INTERVIEW

Since I was a very small boy we used to fight with the white boys, simply because I could not admit that they were superior to me,,

A FIGHTER LEADER

Two years ago, the world community joined Africa to sensationally celebrate Namibia's independence as the conclusion to a unique story of colonialism that began with the Germans and ended with annexation by the White apartheid regime in neighbouring South Africa; Black resistance to White domination lasted nearly a century, three decades of which leaders of the liberation movement SWAPO (South West African Peoples Organisation) lived in exile. In this exclusive interview, SWAPO Leader and first President of independent Namibia, Sam Nujoma, talks to Editor-in-Chief Adio Obe about the long struggle that is continuing as Namibians strive to achieve their hopes and aspirations

FORUM: Did you imagine in your youth that you would one day become President of Namibia?

NUIOMA: I was born and brought up in (UIOIIIIJI Namibia, with the oppression and subjugation to a summary system that ruled at the time, one could hardly have an ambition of becoming a leader. We were not trained to participate in the leadership of the country. You were called upon to cut off and you left your place. You were a soldier and you were supposed to be a .xcryant warrior.

But it was those young chum-stans that brought me to the position where I am today. Still I was a very small boy, we used to fight with the white boys, simply because I could not admit that they were superior to me. We would beat them up in the streets of Windhoek here. As I grew up, the colonialists became more and more aware that Africa, the sleeping giant, was awakening. Liberation struggle entered into full swing, particularly in West Africa under the leadership of powerful personalities like Kwame Nkrumah, Nnamdi Azikiwe, Sékou Touré. We were very inspired down here.

I remember the excitement over independence celebrations in Ghana, with the Queen in attendance. BC-

cause South Africa was a member of the Commonwealth at the time, the story was carried in South African papers. But we also received from the Ghana High Commission pictures of the Queen dancing with Kwame Nkrumah.

The resistance against white oppression had always been there among our people. Eventually we started grouping ourselves for specific actions.

For instance, the black youths in our district or town got together to oppose the white policy that in South West Africa, white areas of town should be separated by 500m from black areas. In spite of being divided into tribes by the Whites, all of us, black youth, banded together in resistance. We organised the boycott of municipal activities and beer halls and cinemas. Things came to a standstill. So the Boers got angry. Thus began the uprising of December 1959. Twelve people were killed on the spot, more than 50 others were injured. We were arrested and charged with inciting the uprising. They tried to frighten us and some of our colleagues were deported to rural areas.

Our organisation had to pay out a lot of money for bail. I appeared in court several times, each time the magistrate would say your case has been interrupted, but as soon as I left the clock I was re-arrested on the same charge and had to be bailed out again the next day.

It was then decided that I should go and petition the United Nations. I escaped on 1 March 1960, travelling via Southern Rhodesia and Northern Rhodesia, Tanganyika, Kenya and then the Sudan which was then independent African nation closest to us. In Khartoum, I got a Visa to travel to Accra, via Lagos where Nigerians were preparing for their independence.

The return would not be until nearly 30 years later, that is apart from a brief visit in 1966 when I spent 24 hours in jail in Windhoek. In 1960, the Independent African countries, represented by Liberia and Ethiopia started formal legal proceedings at the International Court of Justice against South Africa, accusing the Boers of misusing the mandate given to it by the League of Nations. South Africa had refused to sign an agreement with the United Nations confirming UN Trusteeship for South West Africa.

In March 1966, the South Africa Forum 0 Vol 2 o No 1 .1992

We were welcomed back as heroes. We arrived in daylight. We didn't carry any weapons, but thousands of Namibians turned out to receive us. We told our people: We fought

this war for the last 23 years, we have defeated them militarily, and we are going to defeat them electorally, too, can Chief Justice who led the South African legal team, argued that we were in self-imposed exile, and that we could go back home at any time and nothing would happen to us. That was at the beginning of March 1966. We wanted to test his words, so we returned on March 20. We were promptly arrested at the airport, and charged for having left the country without passports and for making statements against the South African government. The South African authorities, however, rethought my case; my presence, they felt, would incite black protests that may influence the case at the International Court, so they impounded the aircraft that had brought us in and forced it to take us to Zambia the following day.

FORUM: Did it ever seem like independence may not happen to you?

NUJOMA: The 1960s are often referred to as the years of Africa's freedom. That meant a lot to us. Each time an African country became independent we felt encouraged. There was a genuine spirit of African unity at the time. Whenever we met we exchanged ideas and we were given a lot of moral as well as material support. So, we were really never discouraged; had no cause to consider that we would not one day achieve our own independence. We were confident that it was only a matter of time.

It was, of course, not possible to think of a specific timetable while the struggle was on. But Namibia was always on the agenda of the UN General Assembly that created a situation whereby, with the support from the majority of the world's community of nations, there was continual pressure on South Africa to relinquish Namibia. We, therefore, thought we could probably achieve independence before countries like Mozambique and Angola which the Portuguese were claiming as provinces.

But the liberation struggle in Angola and Mozambique intensified more rapidly due to logistical reasons. Fortunately, the independence of these countries created a logistic base for SWAPO to launch the armed struggle on a much wider basis than when we were fighting from Zambia.

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I did not think the struggle would last as long as it did. I thought that the petitioning⁷ at the LIN would be effective, that the pressure would compel the apartheid regime to give up our country. But in the end, we had no choice but to launch armed struggle, especially after the International Court of Justice had dismissed the claim by Ethiopia and Liberia that South Africa was illegally occupying our Country. Actually, the outcome of that case was cleverly manipulated. First, South Africa challenged, unsuccessfully, the right of Liberia and Ethiopia to bring it to the International (Court). Then the case dragged on for so long, from 1961 to 1966, until some of the older judges, who should have supported our cause, died; one judge was ill and so could not participate. In the end, there was a tie of seven to seven, and the Australian president of the Court determined the verdict with his vote in favour of South Africa.

The saddest consequence of it all was that the Apartheid regime read the verdict as a green light for the annexation of Namibia.

The verdict was in July. Who in the following August, we embarked on our armed struggle. It was to last 23 years. We would continue to fight for 23 years.

FORUM: Do you sense racism in world affairs?

NUJOMA: Yes. That I think Spender of Australia was certainly a minor. We were left with a debt of about \$300m which the South Africans had used to purchase military hardware to suppress our people.

I did not think the struggle would last as long as it did. I thought the petitioning at the UN would be effective, that the pressure would compel the apartheid regime to give up our country. But in the end, we had no choice but to launch armed struggle.

It was white racist bent on denying the Namibian people their legitimate right to freedom. It was, and to some extent, still is, a world dominated by racists and capitalists who exploited other peoples and their resources. So we decided to fight, while maintaining pressure on the international community. It was our right to fight, and the UN supported us. African leaders passed resolutions

on decolonisation which were transmitted to the LN General Assembly and became UN resolutions. The United Nations Created a LN Council for Namibia in which Nigeria was a very active participant. That Council was responsible for establishing the UN Institute for Namibia in Lusaka, through which scholarships were provided for the training of our people. This sort of arrangement, together with assistance from many countries and world bodies, helped us to sustain the struggle.

FORUM: There did come a time when things seemed to have developed at a highly accelerated pace.

NUJOMA: Yes. Really, the process of independence came as defeat for the South African troops to quit Africa

The South Africans started playing all sorts of nasty tricks... There was some noise about delaying independence because of so-called SWAPO violations. But we continued to hit them hard. We said okay, if that's what you want, we are ready to fight for the liberation of our country Angola where SWAPO had two battalions supporting Cuban and Angolan troops. When Botha decided to divide Angola up, leaving just the north for the MPLA government, he sent in his elite presidential regiment with brand new tanks, armoured cars and fighter aircraft. These were completely destroyed. We defeated them. As a result, Botha collapsed politically. The South Africans were worried about Angolan determination to support SWAPO to the end, so they had to negotiate. With negotiations, came rapid progress towards independence. In December 1988 Cuba, Angola and South Africa signed an agreement which included UN Resolution 435 which was what really speeded up the situation. But at that time, our guerrilla forces, the Peoples Liberation Army of Namibia, were very strong. Oh yes, we were bringing down South African planes. We were completely wiping them out within the country, even in the centre of Windhoek here, we used car bombs which shook the whole centre. Oh, we were very strong.

FORUM: How did independence finally come?

NUJOMA: Of course our independence did not come smoothly. After I'd signed the ceasefire agreement with South Africa, in March 1989, the South Africans started playing all manner of nasty tricks. They attacked our freedom fighters who were re-grouping, ready to be confined to the base. They attacked civilians who were travelling to Windhoek to celebrate the implementation of Resolution 435 on 1st April. They wanted to hinder the implementation, but we were ready for Namibia's Parliament

V

them. When they attacked our guerrilla forces, we defeated them. There was some noise about delaying implementation because of so-called

SWAPO violations. But we continued to hit them hard. We said okay, if that's what you want, we are ready to fight for the liberation of our

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tWe have fought for 30 years to achieve our political freedom, now we have to fight hunger, disease and ignorance

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country.

The South African racist regime attempted to frighten our people away from associating with SWAPO, but we saw through them, defeated them, in the end their plan hoemer-anged against them We were welcomed back as heroes. We arrived in broad daylight, without any weapons, Thousands of Namibians turned out to receive us. Our election campaign message was simple; we told our people: We fought this war for the last 23 years, we have defeated them militarily, and we are going to defeat them electorally, too.

FORUM: There was talk about an exodus of Whites when you came back in.

NUJOMA: A lot of them left because of the implementation, some others waited till after SWAPO's electoral victory. Now they are coming back because there is trouble in South Africa.

FORUM: Are you drawing any lessons from your experiences on the hard and long road to freedom?

NUJOMA: Basically I have learnt that South African whites are Very dishonest people. Ours was an extraordinarily difficult situation. In the first instance, South Africa did not really hand over to us. They handed over to UNITAG. Then the South Africans took everything. They took all the aircraft, all the tanks, they left us some rotten rifles and out-of-wirder combat vehicles. They dismantled the biggest military base in Africa that was located in north-West. We inherited a system of bad education. We had education for Whites-only, which was the best, of course. Then there is education for Coloureds which was half-and-half. And then the bad education designed for Blacks in Namibia. Our situation was indeed unique compared to many African countries where the departing colonialists were kind enough to leave behind some useful equipment. To crown it all, they left us with a debt of about \$300 million which they had used to purchase military hardware to suppress our people. Consequently, for example, there are 50,000 black children for whom we cannot provide school this year, our existing schoolshaving been built for the white minority. All children whose parents are employees in the farms, don't attend school. You find the child was born there, and like his father, grows up there, looking after calves at the age of six and joining his father to look after the cattle at night; I:

The South
Africans
left us with
a White-
owned
economic
structure...
the Blacks
own
nothing

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ttWe are now
working to change
things round, to
ensure that our
national resources
are utilized for
the benefit of all
Namibian people,
irrespective of
colour or racett
Page 10

the age of ten. Meamvwhile the white
man's child goes to school, being
prepared for leadership.
We do have a problem right now,
and the basis of the problem is lack
of money. We have plans to expand
misting government and mission-
ary schools so that by the fiscal year
1992-1093, we will be able to place
every African child in school. We
have a similar plan for hnsipitals.
Right now we have severe
drought in the country. Over the
past couple of years the amount of
rainfall has continued to decline, ln
WQO we had to spend R 150 million
on food imports from South Africa.
We have plans to expand meat
production. We want to replenish
the amount of fish in our sea after
the plundering by the South Atri-
eans which has depleted a number
of species. In order to stop the cle-
v-astation by trawlers, the first act we
passed in our parliament was to
extend our national waters. The South
Africans did not leave us with a ship
to patrol our waters so we use heli-
copters, we are doing it the guerilla
way.

FORUM It seems the struggle still
continues?

NUJOMA As fighters, we are ready
to fight for our economic survival. If
we work hard there will be no poor
person here. I tell my comrades in
SWAPO: 'We have fought for 30
years to achieve our political tree-
d om, now

Presujent NU/oma WW7 CDM
we have to tight hunger, disease and
ignorance.

Our programme of economic d e-
velopment is really geared to agri-
culture, to be able to produce enough
through farming. Secondly, we want
to build schools for our children.
Thirdly, we want to provide health
services to our people. The churches
in this country play a very vital role
in providing education and hospi-
tals. So, we are working together.
Our bisheps are very different from
other bishops, they have been sup-
porting, the struggle. I think in three
years time, certainly, we will over-
cometheproblem()t'builclingenough
schools and hospitals.
Our people are still poor, but my

government is working very hard to make sure that we eliminate this poverty.

Those who agree with me must be prepared to eat just one meal a day, (I have already started to eat once a day), so that we can guarantee that the children will eat three full meals a day, so that the next day when they wake up and go to school, they are healthy and they are able to grasp what the teachers are teaching them in class

We inherited a system of bad education. We had education for Whites-only, which was the best, of course. Then there is education for Coloureds which was half-and-half. And then the bad education designed by Managing Director Abel Gower for Blacks. The Minister of Education is working at dismantling the ugly education system and formulating, a new structure based on international standards. We have borrowed professors from abroad to help set up our university.

FORUM: Will your mineral wealth help?

NUJOMA: The mining industries here are owned by foreign concerns. The uranium mine here is owned by a British company which operates from South Africa. So also is the diamond industry. But all mining companies now have to obey the laws passed by our government. We will ensure that income from mining is used for the benefit of all Namibians. We are not going to leave a stone unturned

FORUM: So the Whites still control your economy?

NUJOMA: Basically the South Africans left us with a white-owned economic structure. All the businesses belong to the Whites, Blacks own nothing.

But we are now working to change things round, to ensure that our national resources are utilized for the benefit of all Namibian people, irrespective of colour or race. We need to and we are working hard to narrow the disparity between the haves and have-nots.

FORUM: Is there resistance from the Whites who may have to give up some of their privileges so that Blacks can gain their share?

NUJOMA: Whether they want it or not, we defeated them. The door is open for them to take their suitcases and go. We welcome them to stay provided they accept the majority rule.

Many are working with us. Those who are not happy working with us are free to leave.

FORUM: What do you think of the situation next door in South Africa?

NUJOMA: I see the situation in South Africa as a process of decolonisation, I believe that de Klerk has read the writing on the wall. We fully support the people of South Africa in their just struggle to end apartheid. From the day of independence we gave both the apartheid regime equal representation with the ANC. So we hope the Whites will learn that majority rule and equal rights for all do not necessarily mean loss of their privileges or subjection to retaliatory discrimination. We have a lot of economic ties with South Africa, and the quicker Africa Forum 0 Vol 2 o No 1 o 1992

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discover

the changes are firmly in place, the better for all of us in the region. I believe that some day South Africa will play a role within the PTA. The differential 'limde Areal of the southern Africa region, which at the end of the 19th century with 15,000 WAH in West Africa and

countries in order for us to implement the Maghreb. The recently signed OAU Resolution on the African Economic Community

FORUM: How do other Africans influence your political views?

NUJOMA: The struggle for the liberation of Africa goes back very far to those very early days of Pan-Africanism, started under the influence of people like Lerumah and Du Bois. Afterwards, there were those leaders who tried to implement the idea of Pan-Africanism. So, if I am to name those who inspired us, I would include Nkrumah, Nyerere. As fighters, we are ready to fight for economic survival and Nasser.

FORUM: What do you think of Africa's persistent economic crisis?

NUJOMA: Well, Africa has development problems. In this Continent (ILI

we have qualified professors at the top level, but no middle level people to implement the ideas. That is really our handicap. A few countries on the west coast seem to have achieved a lot in this field. But many of the African countries are seriously lacking in skilled manpower at the middle level. It is not because we are not able, but simply that trained manpower without you cannot do it.

FORUM: Specifically, change in relations to the international market seem to create problems for most African countries?

NUJOMA: The tool used by the imperialists and capitalists. They know very well that Foreign exchange is a

--M

we do not have our own factories, we are selling our raw materials to them and in turn they send the material back at higher prices which our people cannot afford. We have to build the factories here on the continent. That is why the establishment of the African Economic Community is such a good idea. The first years of implementation of the Abuja Resolution should see the establishment of factories. We are suffering just like all African Countries. We export raw materials and we are told that we can only sell them at prices fixed by

capitalists. 'liherelore, we have to
ereate the factories here, produce
them here and export varied pro-
duced material. In that way we will
have ereated job opportunities for
our people, and we will use the by-
products to expand our agriculture
and other products.

FORUM: So, do you hope very soon
to wipe out your external debts?

NUJOMA: We will definitely. We
are prepared to work. We will eat
oncea day and work 24 hours, round
the clock, in the struggleJ

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GUEST COLUMN

N O SLEEP FOR AFRICA

BY KENNETH KA UNDA

H God, my God:

How dare I sleep?

Africa, my Africa, knows no sleep.

The bleeding of Somalia is deep!

Lord, it is Somali killing Somali -

Lord, it is Islam killing Islam -

Oh God, my God what of leibou til 9

H God, my God -

Burkina Faso, Mali, Tchad and Togo are set,

Lord, to wards self-destruction!

Here tribe rises against tribe -

Lord God, here Christian rises against Moslem.

Yes, Lord, here Moslem rise s against Christian.

Lord God, how dare I sleep!

How dare I sleep even if there be hope for Ethiopia! Africa bleeds, I can t sleep!

ORD, how dare I sleep?

Africa, my Africa, knows no sleep.

The bleeding of the Sudan is deep!

I see Lord, Arab killing African -

I see Lord, African killing Arab -

Lord, hear my humble cry!

It is Allah is man killing God is man!

Yes, Lord, it is God is man killing Allah is man!

012 God, my God - All this in thine Holy name -

How dare I sleep!

ORD, how dare I sleep?

Burundi and eanda refuse to sleep.

For they only want to identify

Who in Rwanda and Burundi should live and sleep

- Muhutu or Mututsi?

Oh, Lord God Almighty

Teach me, the Muhutu, to learn the Mututsi also

comes from thy holy hand!

Yes, Lord, teach me, the Mututsi to learn the

Muhutu also comes from thy holy hand!

H God, my God -

How dare I sleep?

Liberia knows no sleep!

In thy only Begotten Son's name there Christian

kills Christian -

Keen to know which tribes are more Christian and,

therefore, better!

Yes, Lord, they are keen to know which tribes shall

inherit Thy Kingdom in Monrovia by killing the

other tribes!

H God, my God -

How dare I sleep?

Africa, my Africa, knows no sleep.

Morocco and Saharawi await Allah is inspired UN

decision.

Blood continues to flow!

H God, my God -

w The continent is wide and long!

Yes, Lord - so are the problems wide and long!

; My little legs need a rest that is long!

Yet, Lord, my Africa bleeds.

How dare I sleep Lord!

ORD my beloved population giant sleeps!

She is uncomfortably m agiant's sleep!

Her heart beat IS weak and tired'

Unable to decide whether she.

is going Moslem or Christian -

is going North or South -

is going civilian or military!

H God, my God -

How dare I sleep.

Ghana in the shadow of her giant neighbour

Stands still unable to decide whether to go

forward or backward or just wait until 1
H God, my God -
How dare I sleep, Lord, for I know not, Lord,
whether Senegal and Mauritania will call on the
name of Allah, the Compassionate, Allah the
Merciful,
to be compassionate, to be merciful upon them -
Or they will resume their war even after the healing
Islamic Summit!
H God, my God -
The giant in decay is my neighbour.
How dare I sleep Lord?
How do I know Lord that someone will not need my
neighbour's services?
Lord, only Thou knowest where I stand with my
giant neighbour!
UT, Lord, how dare I sleep?
Africa, my Africa bleeds -
The fundamentalist calls his own tune of Which way, Lord, is my beloved Zambia whose
hour
self-destruction in Algeria -
Yes Lord, the fundamentalist calls his own tune of
self-destruction in Tunisia.
How dare I sleep, Lord?
Africa Forum o Vol 2 o No 1 o 1992
for self-distortion for self-destruction has indeed
come,
going?
Kenneth Kaunda
onambia

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ORD God, my God -
Look with mercy at Angola and Mozambique -
Long independent and for that long dependent!
Why Lord; Yes, Lord - why should many more
thousands perish; many more homeless and maimed?
ORD God- hold fast us together our hope in new
Uganda,
Kenya, Malawi, Swaziland, Mauritius, Seychelles,
Tanzania, Zimbabwe and two most hopefuls Botswana
and Namibia!

H God, my God -
Thou hast taught every human being is made
in thy image, Lord.
Teach us all on this continent
To love thee, Lord, our Creator
To love our neighbours as we love ourselves, Lord -
To do unto others as we would they did unto us.
I When this is fulfilled, Lord,
I Thy servant, Lord, will enjoy a giant and eternal
sleep in peace.

Oh, God, my Creator, hear my humble prayer!
Lord wilt thou bring back to sanity our Lesotha!
H God, my God -
This continent bleeds for thine children in
South Africa! Lord, please teach them to see only
Thee, Lord:

In every colour -
In every race -
In every tribe -
In every religion -
In every human!

Masai, Mara, Kenya.
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ttWe have been talked about, we have been
HlRTY-TWO years ago (wk)
of our people were killed
protesting against the Pass
Laws. And just to think of
how many of our people have been
killed in the struggle for renewed
dispensation. Its quite remarkable
to think that today, Nelson Mandela
moyes about in South Africa/ that
our organisations, which were
banned for so long, since Sharpe-
ville actually, are now operating
legally, and that at last the legal
pillars of Apartheid have been re-
pealed.

In September 1989, we embarked
on a defiance campaign to disobey
Apartheid laws. Its incredible to think
that on that occasion, the govern-
ment of South Africa and its sup-
porters were prepared to use all kind s
otyiolenee to detend a partheid laws.
I remember, we decided to break the
laws of beach apartheid by which
Black people were being stopped
from walking on (itlkl/S beaches, We
said: "No way! This is our country".
We had welcomed these people from
wherever they eame. But it had
beeome llGC that wonderful story
about the trayeller and his camel in
the desert l low, at night, he made a
fire in the tent and the camel pleaded
to introduce bits of its body into the
tentm until the camel was fully in-
side the tent and its owner was out-
side, And we walked on those
beaches, but you will not belieye it
that at one point in the demonstra-
tion the police said: 'il' you don't
disperse we are going to use liye
ammunition/ Live ammunition to
stop people from walking on God's
beaches? That is where we have come
trom, lest we have already forgot-
ten,

We have got to where we are
now because of support from the
rest of the world. I would like to say,
on behalf of our people, "thank you"
to so many who have supported our
struggle that went on for very many
years. I am thinking, especially, of
the Frontline African States which
used their limited resources to with-
stand incredible pressure in sup-
porting us. We wish you could open
our hearts and see how d eeply grate-
ful we are, and if there is any Victory
that has been notched up in the
struggle, it is your victory as much
as it is ours. And that when the
interim government is in place, or
when a truly democratic goyern-
ment gets elected, we will want all of
you to come and celebrate with us
We have hael an extiuiioixlinary

spectacle in the recent referendum in South Africa. It's been quite uncanny, actually, listening to the debates. Just listen to some of what they were saying in their advertisements: 'Wliiit do you think of a policy which will ewlude you from the family of men7H (They didn't say "and women"). They were saying apartheid was a policy whose ethics had been based on raeialis'm, on injustice, and on oppression. Then they said such a policy was eyil. This is an edited version of an address to the first Meeting of African Elders under the auspices of Africa Leadership Forum in Arusha April 1992 legislated against, but no matter what happened, the white party that got elected was the one that said the most acceptable things about how they were going to treat black people. The referendum was no exceptiontt

BYARCHBISHOP DESMOND TUTU

"tiyil?" I got a little annoyed - just a little: These people were infringing on my copyright. This is a speech that I have been making and they didnt eyen ask me whether they could use it.

It was quite extraordinary because that is what we had been saying around the world and they had been yilifying us for saying so. They denigrated us for saying apartheid was not just wrong but that it was morally and intrinsically evil. And you heard people speaking about reforming it. It was irreformable. It was a Frankenstein that had to be destroyed

On television, the Minister for Finance, rebutting an argument of his Conseryatiye Party opponent, uttered words to the effect that: HThis is precisely what I am trying to tell you, the economy is not working, but not because of sanctions? The Minister changed tune - without batting an eyelid, adding that the economy was in this parlous state because of apartheid You had to pinch yourself.

In a referendum campaign, pictures of an unkempt, dirty Black man were shown with the caption: HYou want your daughter to marry this man?" Our people have a response to that now, they say: "Show us your daughter, first." It was very subtle but these pictures were very, very effective. We were anxious, actually.

The Conseryatiye Party were getting very enthusiastic crowds. They had an advertisement which said: "Do you want as your president, a man whose wife has said we will liberate this country with our tyres and boxes of matches?" (referring to a statement by Winnie), to-

gether with a picture of someone
being necklaced, saying that "this is
what is going to happen if you vote
Page 13 Africa Forum 0 Vol 2 o No 1 o 1992

m

Yes. Vote No, if you want to vote again." That was very effective because it was hitting Afrikaaners and White people, I think, where they have always been hit in racialist elections.

But we were saying that, in fact, the Conservative Party was the one that has been consistent because they were doing all the things that they had been told. Because, South African politics has really been about the Black person. We have been talked about, we have been legislated against, but no matter what happened, the White party that got elected was the one that said the most acceptable things about how they were going to treat Black people. The referendum was no exception.

And there was a time when it seemed real that if the campaign had gone for a little longer than a fortnight it could have been touch and go. De Klerk was even tear-gassed 'at an Afrikaans university. I visited the same university a few years ago, it was quite something, but they didn't tear-gas me. I would call that an example of White-on-White violence. Have you noticed how nobody talks (ileiitC-Oii-Wliite violence? They don't describe the Violence in Northern Ireland as White-on-White violence, nor the violence in Yugoslavia as tribal.

Our people are actually remarkable in many ways. There is an incredible resilience that almost makes you want to weep. The situation is tense and the people are angry, but you come along and you tell them a story and our people will laugh. We have an incredible capacity to for-

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give. I met Walter Sisulu soon after he came out of jail. It is really humbling to be in the presence of someone who has been in jail for over a quarter of a century, because he had the temerity to say I am a human being. And he can laugh. There is not a stitch of bitterness in his heart.

Many have now encountered Nelson, he is obviously streets ahead of most people, but the example of his magnanimity is one you find among so many of our people.

There is Violence and it is very distressing. But there are many reasons for it. There is a Violence that comes from deprivation and the social scientists will tell you race has got nothing to do with it. We saw it when people were protesting against Mrs Thatcher's poll tax, some of the most violent were Whites, because they saw their lives ending in a cul-de-sac. There is a deep frustration

borne out of the awareness that your life is going nowhere, when you live in the squalor of ghettos.

The other reason for the violence is political rivalry. We accept that such rivalry exists between the ANC and the Inkatha. It is a nonsense to talk of such violence as being tribal or ethnic, because in the town the rival political groups have Zulu members, so it is Zulu against Zulu. In most of our urban areas our people are detribalised. In Soweto, in the house across the street from my house lives a Zulu, my next-door neighbour is a Zulu. If we do quarrel it is never because of difference in tribal origins, maybe because your chickens have gone into my yard and picked off my flowers. I

zwis

once told a small meeting in the United States that my mother is a Tswana and my father a Xhosa, so what does that make me? Harry Belafonte responded: "Zulu".

A very important element in the violence is that South Africa has never had a culture of tolerance. The government has demonstrated by their treatment of opponents of apartheid, with reactions ranging from vilification through state-controlled media to use of hit squads. We have thus evolved a culture by which someone who disagrees with you is your enemy, and the best enemy is a dead enemy. I have often tried to impress upon our people a saying of my fathers: "Improve your argument, don't raise your voice". More important, as many of you have become aware, is the existence of a third force in the violence. You will have noted that just before the signing of the peace accord in September last year, the violence suddenly escalated. After the signing it subsided. Referendum is announced, and in the run-up period, over 250 people get killed. Clearly, it is all orchestrated by a very professional team. When someone gets onto a train with an AK-47 gun and shoots indiscriminately, without asking who is ANC or Inkatha, there is no sense at all in saying, such action is politically motivated killing. And our people have been killed like flies. Black life is cheap, dead cheap.

We have been saying that we need a professional police force which is neutral. Clearly, what we needed, in this time, was something like UNTAC as in Namibia. The police

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We have
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your enemy,
and the best
enemy is a
dead enemy

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at home do not enjoy the confidence of the majority of the polited. In fact, we were mpeeting miracles, Remember that most ot the police have been indoctrinated with the idea that ANC and PAC were enemies, their members were terrorists who must be destroyed. So/ our people got killed, some died mysteriously in deten- They must know that Mandela as president will not automatically deliver the house they have been yearning for actually a prolessional, neutral, peace-keeping and law-entorcement ageny, we are going to be in trouble. It is clear apartheid succeeded beyond the wildest dreams of its architects. It has divided us, but it has also divided the Whites You are aware of the problems we have been facing with lnkatha. In November Our country needs healing and reconciliation, but that will only happen if people are ready to say sorry, and those who have been wronged are prepared to forgive. Those who say they are sorry should show the genuineness of their contrition by a retribution that they are willing to pay tion, We have Very strange chairs in South Africa 7 it'yon tell over a (hair, you died.

But now, suddenly, these people who used to be enemies are no longer seen as such. Mandela tells us he can telephone Mr. Klerk on his birthday to wish him a very happy birthday. They are friends, in a way, but they have not helped the police change attitudes. These guys were the same ones who used to arrest us; it we didn't have passes. Now they are supposed to treat us as human beings, and nobody has thought they needed to have a process of attitude change. Until we have a police force that is 1990, I called a summit, in Bishopscourt in Cape Town, of all the Black political leaders because some of us believed we ought to approach the negotiations with a united front. Virtually all the Black political leadership came, except Inkatha and the head of governments of two other Bantustans.

I am myself scared that Chief Butliele/i is not willing to accept the most democratic verdict, Even if we have an election, I doubt that he is going to accept whatever result. I fear that he wants a special place for Inkatha. Ite has already said publicly that it they were sidelined then

what Renamo and UNLTA have done
will be like a Sunday school picnic.
It now seems the Whites are going to
stand by and watch us club each

other. I mean it the Whites are the original Cause of the problem, the fact is that we end up killing each other

Our people need to be alerted to the fact that de Klerk is a very wary politician. Anyone who underestimates him is going to be in very serious trouble

Our people need to get their house in order. We have a number of organisational weaknesses and we should not be surprised if these are successfully exploited at election time.

The ANC has a very substantial support, but a large number of the youth are feeling alienated. It must not be taken for granted that de Klerk has been moving to form alliances and coalitions. And the fact that AXC is in alliance with the South African Communist Party has important repercussions. The ANC has to become truly non-racial, and I believe there are Whites who would like to join it but dread the link with the Communist Party.

We in the Church have to remind our people that the new democratic government is in place is not the end of the struggle. It is really the beginning. They must know that Mandela as president will not automatically deliver the house they have been yearning for. As a Church we need to stand back, so that at prayer we are not this or that party, so that we can say, as we have been saying all along: "thus said the Lord". I mean the most democratically elected government is still made up of human beings, fragile and vulnerable. They will need someone to tell them, when they fall short of the required standards, that they are no God, but just mortals, and to remind them that they must really be for the sake of those who elected them, and not for their own self-aggrandisement.

Our country needs healing and reconciliation, but that will only happen if people are ready to say sorry, and those who have been wrong are prepared to forgive. Those who say they are sorry should show the genuineness of their contrition by a retribution that they are willing to pay. '

Ours is a tremendous country with tremendous people, once this is proved, we can certainly make a remarkable contribution to the subcontinent. _1

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INTERNATIONAL COMMENTARY

NEW WORLD ORDER NOW

It is common sense does not make the security-seeking countries of the industrialised world put the insecurities of the developing countries high on their agenda of political and economic businesses now, greater tragedy will compel attention soon.

Page 22

N'HONAI, SliCLRJL'LN

It is a product not just of military but also of economic, political, and environmental safety and well-being. It is not a novel consideration - indeed, it has long been a self-evident truth. But now it derives from a force of realities.

The world is politically, economically and socially smaller than ever before, all the ills of the world are transmitted more easily and quickly than ever before and many of those ills are not and will not be effectively addressed by military responses: on the contrary, the militarisation of the world is a substantial contribution to instability and insecurity. It is clear that international security, if it is to be real and durable, must be comprehensive. It is also clear that it must be won through more conclusive victories against poverty, ignorance and disease and by fewer trials of military strength and less production and distribution of arms and weapons technology.

It is common sense. Lines do not make the security-seeking countries of the industrialised world put the insecurities of the developing countries high on their agenda of political and economic businesses now, greater tragedy will compel attention soon; blipahlet unpaid debts, the trade in narcotic drugs, the spread of diseases, the pox, environmental degradation, mass migration, military aggression and the violent extremism and fundamentalism, which are among the other sources and by-products of poverty, do not only afflict developing countries but will increasingly affect the whole world. It is many years too late for prevention. Perhaps there is too much to hope for in the near future. (Owen B. Y. NEIL KINNOCK)

Containment, reduction and eventual conquest of poverty and of the insecurity that is both its cause and its consequence must be possible. To that end, the relatively wealthy and relatively free countries of the world must, in their own interest, combine among themselves and with the poor to promote the spread of both wealth and freedom.

What the world - the whole world and not just the most wretched parts - must have, is a Strategic Develop-

ment Initiative, an SDI that really does bring global security.

A Strategic Development Initiative must promote:

- 0 coordinated international action to restore and sustain growth in the global economy on which developing countries prospects depend;
- 0 debt reduction measures that provide incentives to debt-distressed developing countries;
- 0 the freeing of world trade from its dangerous path towards protectionism in the richer countries;
- 0 policies to protect the global environment which link northern energy use to southern poverty;
- 0 growth in the flow of aid and its effectiveness

These are the live basic components of an SDI. To achieve such an approach and to build a New World Order will inevitably result in a world disorder. Clearly, treaties, while useful in defining purposes, are not enough by themselves. As Christian Aid has soberly pointed out: "their hits lie in". This article is an edited version of a speech by the British Labour Party Leader delivered last year at the OD! Overseas

Development Institute

Africa Forum

in the title of the New World Order. The initiative has not been successful. It is not the intention of the initiative to achieve it.

That, patently, is true. But there are measurable achievements and they show what is attainable, given the motivation.

The scale and speed of investment and aid to Eastern Europe is an indication of what can be done. If repeated on a comparable scale in sub-Saharan Africa, it would dramatically alter the prospects of tens of millions of people.

If not repeated in the wider world, the majority of the planet's population will be further marginalised - their insecurity and the world's insecurity will grow. The attention being given to the development of Central and Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union is natural and, in many ways, necessary.

But even as that development flows to Eastern Europe is proceeding, the needs of developing countries are growing and intensifying. They cannot be put on hold. Neglect can only mean increase.

The span of global needs - North and South, East and West - is plainly so wide that it provokes defeatism. That is understandable, but wrong. Realism requires that we take instruction from experience about the way in which change and im-

prox'ement can be secured over a relatively short period of history. Between 1945 and 1955, Western Europe recovered from the ruin of war to unprecedented Vitality and affluence, As recently as the beginning of the 1960s, Japan was at a level of economic development which put the country just outside the conventionally accepted definition of a

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country qualifying as an aid recipient. Over the same decades there have been massive changes in the agricultural and industrial performance of India and China. Dynamic new economies have grown in South-East Asia.

To make those references is not to suggest that they can be smoothly replicated in different countries and different times.

To draw attention to those advances is not to obscure the fact that, in the same 30 years, the gap between the richest and the poorest countries and peoples has grown. It is not to infer that the pitifully small Latin American or African share of world trade will grow spontaneously. It is not to say that the poor of the world will find their own salvation if they are simply left - in the classically myopic phrase - to "stand on their own two feet", when, in reality, they are flat on their backs.

UT the examples of success do say that the combination of consistent development strategies by the industrialised countries and the willingness to work for advance in the poor countries can bring substantial year-on-year change for the better. What must not happen, of course, is a repeat of the 1980s. For many of the world's poorest people those years were not simply a 'lost decade', they were an unrelenting disaster. They were the years in which total debt of the developing countries rose from US\$562 billions to US\$ 1,221 billions, the years in which the developing countries repaid US\$673 billions to banks and governments of the developed world and still ended more deeply in debt. In its crudest form, much of the drive for structural adjustment that accompanied the rising debt burden was not, and was never going to be, a means of transforming the prospects of millions of the world's poorest people for the better. It led to a structural distortion of their societies and their economies and a deepening despair for their long-term economic prospects.

The World Bank is a welcome addition to the institutions recognising that fact. As their 1991 World Development Report put it:

Half the notion of strict limits on progress must, at a minimum, look beyond growth in per capita incomes to the reduction of poverty and greater equity, to progress in health, nutrition, and to the fulfilment of the Africa Forum Vol 2 No 1 of 1992 'in Page 23 eunimianie/t."

And while some of the most fragile economies in the world have sub-

jected themselves to stringent financial disciplines in an effort to achieve growth, our country and other G7 member-countries have failed to gear our economies for growth, have failed to create the climate in which our societies advance as they should and failed to foster conditions in which the efforts of the developing world can lead to success.

Our economy and those of the other developed nations have been characterised by slow growth and rising unemployment. At the same time, real interest rates have been at an historic high, damaging our own economies and devastating those of the developing world.

A new programme of real structural change to build confidence in the economic prospects of the developing world must clearly begin with the economies of the G7. It is an inescapable truth that the world economy thrives when the G7 economies thrive. Recession in the North bites even harder in the South. The most rapid and effective means of transforming the economic prospects of the developing nations would be for the G7 to commit themselves to policies to promote growth and, central to that, to lower the interest rates. The G7 must take the lead in establishing a new debt regime which provides genuine pathways out of poverty for the developing world and offers realistic incentives rather than punishment for the economies that pursue those pathways. The G7 should increase efforts to effectively tackle the protectionism that hurts both the consumers of the North and the producers of the South and contributes to the problem of low commodity prices that gravely disadvantages the poorest developing countries.

The Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) has estimated that the cost of supporting agriculture in OECD countries amounted to US\$300 billion in 1990. The average European farmer receives 48 per cent of income in the form of subsidy - and still many small farmers suffer income reductions while consumers pay high prices. In Japan the figure is 38 per cent.

Of course, the raw and sudden liberalisation of the world's agricultural trade - if it ever came - would bring greatest benefit to low-cost. It is clear that international security, if it is to be real and durable, must be comprehensive... and must be won through more conclusive victories against poverty, ignorance and disease and by fewer trials of military

strength and less production
and distribution of arms and
weapons technology
producers, (including developing
countries such as Brazil, Argentina
and Zimbabwe), while some of the
poorest nations who have been made
dependent on imported food sur-
pluses from the OECD countries at
highly subsidised rates, would lose.
But there is no reason why the
benefits, that would accrue to the
Cairns Group and others by a more
liberal regime, could not be com-
bined with a transparent and direct
support for the very poorest coun-
tries that are net food importers.
The promotion of rural develop-
ment, the provision of seed and
agricultural materials, at reasonable
cost and fair prices for produce, are
essential ingredients for such change.
The extra economic growth in OECD
countries, freed of the present high
cost of agricultural support, would,
of course, benefit those economies
and the developing countries
The G7 must accept that the prime
responsibility for taking effective
international action to protect the
environment rests with them and
with the other leading industrial-
ised economies.
Two fundamental
environmental damage are the way
in which wealth is made in the North
and the way in which poverty is
increased in the South. The intensifi-
cation and spread of poverty, due in
part to the price and debt regimes
operated by the industrialised coun-
tries, has meant irreparable losses
causes of
of natural assets on and beneath the
land and in the sea.
The most immediate loss is felt
by the very poor and it is measured
in deaths, disease, migration and
dependency. But the environmental
degradation is also a loss - and a
menace - to the whole world.
If poverty is to be combatted, the
southern economies must grow and
their energy consumption must rise
significantly. Whatever develop-
IRT '

In its crudest form, much of the drive for structural adjustment that accompanied the rising debt burden was not, and was never going to be, a means of transforming the prospects of millions of the world's poorest people for the better, it led to a structural distortion of their societies and their economies and a deepening despair for their long-term economic prospects

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ments become possible in energy conservation and energy efficiency, in the medium term the CO₂ emissions will consequently continue to increase.

To offset that, we in the developed world must rapidly stabilise and then significantly diminish the level of our CO₂ emissions. When the 17 countries have between them produced more than 50 per cent of the total global CO₂ emissions in the last 30 years, there is clearly wide scope for improvement.

The C7 summit in Paris in 1989 contained a 51-point statement on the environment. Relatively little has been achieved in measurable terms since then. Opportunities have been lost. The UN Conference on the Environment and Development, in 1992, offers the chance to map out and implement a clear programme of action to safeguard the Earth's environment. That chance should be taken and, as its base, should be that prevention is not only better than Clean-up, it is cheaper.

While global warming holds a threat to millions of lives in the next half century, the lack of clean water and basic sanitation is taking millions of lives now. Between six and ten million children, under the age of five, die each year for want of those two basic facilities.

Children are, of course, the first and least resilient victims of a degraded and polluted environment. In a world in which 40,000 infants a day are dying of the preventable diseases of poverty, the very least of the 17's commitments should be to meeting the terms of the UN Convention on the Rights of the Child and to the need to protecting and safeguarding the lives, the health and the future of the world's children.

A rapid growth in the flow of aid to the poorest countries is essential - although, to put it into perspective, it is worth heeding the World Bank's estimate that a one per cent drop in world interest rates would reduce the cost of debt servicing by developing countries US\$54 billions a year - roughly twice the value of the UK's current aid budget

None of the 137 countries has yet achieved the UN aid target of 0.7 per cent of GNP although, arguably,

France is Close to it. Britain/s contri-
bution is less than half that figure.
Ouroverseasdevelopmentassistance
in 1990 was almost it per cent lower
in real terms than it was in 1979 It is
worth reflecting that even though
the 0.51 per cent figure of 1979 did
not reach the UN target, a level of
commitment maintained at that level
would have meant an extra 58 bil-
lion in development assistance over
the course of the following decade
That's a lot of cures, a lot of learning,
a lot of crops, a lot of lives.
The essential dimensions of any
development programme must in-
clude the priority which it gives to
the poorest countries and, conse-
quently, the systematic fostering of
partnership and the recognition of
the role played by women in the
developing world.
Women are the largest economic
providers, the first, longest and most
influential teachers and the main
cohesive influence in their families
and their communities. They are,
simultaneously, the most immedi-
ate agents of development - and the
least acknowledged.
Women are, central to any seri-
ous attempt to tackle the issue of
world population.
Familly planning means and
methods need more than the one per
cent of Britain/s aid which now goes
to population related activities. But
since the main cause of over-popu-
lation is poverty itself, the main focus
of population restraint policies must
continue to be development, debt
reduction and health care as well as
education. When poverty is beaten
back more children will - and do -
live to be adults. When families are
confident that children will survive
to maturity, families will be smaller.
The agenda items of world eco-
nomic growth, debt reduction, the
need to dismantle protectionism,
environmental improvement and
security, aid and assistance policies
will all figure to some degree in the
(i7 summits. They frequently do.
But the result is marked more by
inaction than by action.
The invitation to cynicism is
obvious. But cynics are the most
sterile of Counsellors, as well as the
least active reformers. So, I prefer to
rega rd theannual comingsand goings
with scepticism mixed with hope
that the recognition of the self-evi-
dent need for Change will bring ac-
tion and determination to work to
gain the necessary strategic and
collective approach to world Cleve-
lopment.
Increasingly, aid and develop-
ment programmes are being related
even more strongly to the promo-

tion of human rights and the rule of law. Regarding our objective of supporting the poor, the advice of nongovernmental agencies will be crucial to following a policy that discriminates for liberty without discriminating against the needy subjects of oppressive regimes.

Development Education, which has been cut so much that we are at the foot of the OECD league must be rebuilt. The agencies must have a clear role in achieving higher quality as well as a greater quantity of Development Education.

Plainly, the Strategic Development Initiative, I mentioned earlier, is not new. Lester Pearson, Willy Brandt, Michael Manley, Gm Harlem andtland and others have made the same sort of case at different times.

The passage of time, the waste of resources, the exhaustion of the environment, the deaths, disease and poverty suffered by countless millions strengthen the arguments for change. There is now a new opportunity to get it.

The radical shift in the relationships between East and West offers the best ever prospect for disarmament and the reduction in military spending, North and South.

The change makes it more possible - it we have the will - for the UN, in Sir Brian Urquhart's phrase, to "be brought to maturity" as the 'Wx'orld arbitrator and policeman".

The change makes it more possible to prevent or to quickly control conflict. The change makes it more possible to defeat poverty. And because we can, we must._1

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CULTURE

THE MARKETPLACE

The recent discoverers, of African artistic talents are only followers of a well-set complex tradition of acquisition that has combined avarice, academic study, intellectual curiosity, dilettantism and commercial advantage

In the last six months of 1991 there were no less than 54 major exhibitions of African visual art around Europe and in the United States, providing a continual backdrop the sensational increase since the mid-eighties in the amount being paid for African art objects. In July 1989, Christie's sold a Benin bronze head for 451,320,000. The all time record is the \$3,100,000 paid for Cameroonian 'Bangwa Queen' in 1990 at Sotheby's (New York).

Though African items on the international market are yet to regularly command the millions that the Japanese, for instance, may be paying for European paintings, there is no doubt that there is now a brisk commercial activity in African art. It transpired during the 1988 exhibition of Shona sculpture at the Barbican in London that some of the pieces had been loaned to the exhibition from the private collections of members of the Royal family and notable public figures.

Is there, therefore, an increase in the acquisition of African art objects in the Western arts market? Would this be a pointer to an international recognition, at last, of the talents of African artists? Presumably, a thumbs-up from Western art dealers would signal the arrival of African art and, possibly, a turning point in the fortune of our artists. African arts have been known and actively collected by Europeans for many centuries. There is a long

BY ZAGBA OYORTEY

and involved chain leading from the earliest traders, bounty hunters, and missionaries to anthropologists. The recent 'discoverers', of African artistic talents, be it in music or dance, are only followers of a well set complex tradition of acquisition that has combined avarice, academic study, intellectual curiosity, dilettantism and commercial advantage. The attainment of political independence in Africa, the explosion of revolutionary consciousness in Black (now African) America, the influence of Africans, who have been set thin; in Western metropolitan centres since the War, have helped create an atmosphere within which artistic creativity and cultural information could flow more freely. Sustained African artistic expression has generated dedicated peri-

Rezim' Nnin' is one such publication which, from its base in odieals.

Paris, focuses on artistic production in the African world Others include the International Review of xtt'rinzw xtmw'inm Arts and xtti'initi :trts, both based in the United States

The contemporary international visibility of African arts is, them tore, a tunetion of increased arts activities by Africans operating in tandem with the proclivities of hu-ropean buyers

Galleries and dealers are reluc-tant to provide figures of their trade in African artifacts, but the scope of the market could be estimated from the frequency of mhibitions by museums of all sizes and the proli-

Zagba Oyorley is a Ghanaian free-lance journalist based in London

teration in the number of shops that stock paintings, sculptures and other artifacts of African. Outlets in Lon-don include the Africa Centre in Convent Garden, Westbourne Cal-lery in west London and the Black Arts Gallery in north London, all these places regularly put on exhibi-tions from which purchases can be made.

In 1989, the Museum of Modern Art, Oxford, England held an exhi-bition of Makonde Art from Mozam-bique. In 1990, the same museum hosted an exhibition of South Afri-can Art. In the foreword to the 1989 catalogue of Makonde exhibition, David Elliott wrote: "These exhibi-tions throw into relief the ethnocen-trism of our (European) Views." A confirmation of the bridge-building effect of the arts.

African arts, through Western eyes, tall into three broad categories. First, there are the ubiquitous and, often, not so finely crafted objects ranging from bangles to paintings and carvings This variant has now acquired the apt label of 'tourist artt, available in hotel lobbies and at air-port terminals throughout the conti-nent. It has been argued that the Shetanio wood carvings ot Mozam-bique and Tanzania flowered in response to the market forces of tourism. Other examples of these mass produced forms are the cala-bash paintings that are popular in both West and East Africa.

Without dismissing the bracket of 'tourist artt, one could still con-tend they constitute instant art of a doubtful life span. But artists have always produced for a market or audience and so long as these stim-uli remain, commu nity centres, book-shops and airports will continue to

objects classified as tourist art nor
the artists who make them have per-
manent residence in this group). And
piece reflects the social status of a
collector's item. Indeed, many of the
nieres could through Hump mmHnn
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It's confident enough to venture
be large galleries and museums
find out that such places, rather
m being neutral arena for free
etition, are what an observer has
led "the last bastions of white
supremacy - by exclusion,
3iiipora ry, the cut-off point,
cording to Helen Tweed Of
; is around the turn of the
ias been said by many to be
. Partly because such a de-
does not specify to what
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itions Of the medium, tech-
Content. At the heart of the
nigh, is who decides what,
.i how.
- is also the point about the
ad application of the terms
nd lpriinitive' to African

ld the Nok sculptures or
d Benin bronze heads be
ribal or national? From a
:al point of view nation-
to be seen in terms of the
ins and institutions that bind
together and in their shared
iguage and cultural prac-
ing framing and transportation) the
agent does to get the objects to the
market.

Big auctionhouses like Sotheby's
and Christies in London deal mainly
in antiques, easily the most lucrative
sector of trade in African art. The
market in this sector operates with
the rule that period dated works of
art accrue in value and each sold
Africa Forum 0 Vol 2 o No 1 o 1992
Gaudibert international exhibition,
believes that informal get-togethers
of potential and actual patrons also
yield positive results.

The terms of critical reference
applied to and through which Afri-
can art is viewed is another area of
contention. What is modern or tra-
ditional when applied to African
art? The distinction between antique
tices. In any case what kind of logic
is it that refers to the Yoruba as a
tribe when the Yorubas number more
than the population of many me-
dium sized nations.

Cynical and sensitive Africans
think 'tribal art, is used to imply
spontaneity, lack of sophistication
and a general absence of thought-
out schematic creativity. Conspi- 337'

CULTURE

THE MARKETPLACE

IN THE last six months there were no less than exhibitions of African art around Europe and in the United States, providing a continuing drop the sensational increase of the mid-eighties in the amount paid for African art objects. In 1989, Christies sold a Benin bronze head for £1,321,000. The record is the \$3,100,000 Cameroonian 'Bangwa' carved in 1990 at Sotheby's (New York). Though African items in the international market are yet rarely command the millions that Japanese, for instance, may bring for European painting: no doubt that there is not the same commercial activity in Africa as has transpired during the last 20 years. The auction of Shona sculpture at Sotheby's in London that some (it had been loaned to the trustees of the private collection of the members of the Royal Museum, London) is a notable publicizing of African art. Is there, therefore, an increasing interest in the acquisition of African art in the Western art market? This may be a pointer to an international recognition, at last, of the talents of African artists? Presumably, a thumbs'up from Western art dealers would signal the 'normalization' of African art and, possibly, a turning point in the fortunes of our artists. African arts have been known and actively collected by Europeans for many centuries. There is a long history of the market. It could be estimated from the frequency of exhibitions in museums of all sizes and the proliferation of African art in the West.

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both West and East Africa.

Without dismissing the bracket of 'tourist tirtl, one could still contend they constitute instant art of a doubtful life span. But artists have always produced for a market or audience and so long as these stimuli remain, community centres, bookshops and airports will continue to cater for this demand. Neither the

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objects classified as tourist art nor the artists who make them have permanent residence in this group. And it is not in the medium or mode that the categorisation is made but in its easy availability and its 'tailoring to fit in with European interior decor.

The next category of contemporary art would have to be the works of those artists who produce more durable, aesthetically engaging works that may not necessarily be living room pieces. The basis for this classification is that the artists produce works that are judged by critics to be consistently good. Artists in this group, often living abroad, produce on commission or without a specific retail outlet in mind and in that sense have greater freedom with their creative imagination. In this group would be Ben Enwonwu, Ablade Clover, Valente Malangatana, Nicolas Mukomberanwa, Bruce

Onobrakpeya, Ato Delaquis. The Africa Centre has had exhibitions of the work of Delaquis and Greenwich Citizen/s gallery has hosted Malangatana and Onobrakpeya. There are other artists from Africa who live in Britain and some of the best known include Sokari Douglas-Camp, Pitika Ntuli, Emmanuel Jegede, Johnny Ohene and Gavin Anjtes.

It is important to note here that many diasporant Africans have, by the content of their work and extra artistic concerns, identified themselves simply as Africans. George Fawokan Kelly, Eddie Chambers, Tam Joseph, Dawn Taylor, Fitzroy Sang and Anum lyapo are a few of such artists. These and other well known artists periodically have their works in major galleries.

Few of these artists live entirely on earnings from their creations. Some of them teach, write, hold workshops and many occasionally do no 'artistic' work. Their work, when not made on commission, may be sold through agents who charge a percentage of the sale price. The size of this percentage, often varied and not readily disclosed, is partly determined by the popularity of the artist and how much work (including framing and transportation) the agent does to get the objects to the market.

Big auction houses like Sotheby's and Christie's in London deal mainly in antiques, easily the most lucrative sector of trade in African art. The market in this sector operates with the rule that period dated works of art accrue in value and each sold piece reflects the social status of a collector's item. Indeed, many of the pieces sold through these auction

houses were collected mostly by colonial administrators, missionaries and anthropologists. Before accepting the pieces auctioneers have to be satisfied with their provenance, quality and rarity value. The last minute rescue of the Benin bronze head (stolen from the Jos Museum in 1987) from a Zurich dealer shows how much chicanery can be involved in this trade. Figures of sales are more readily available here because auctioneers publish both pre- and post-auction values.

Having entered the market, African artists and artifacts alike realise that they have to deal with several imposed categories and conditions outside their control. In the case of living or contemporary artists, where to exhibit becomes the biggest problem. Very few galleries are owned by Africans or devoted exclusively to African art. If they succeed in getting exhibitions in such African spaces the artists find that the places attract a clientele that is limited both in terms of numbers and purchasing power. Where do affluent Africans spend their money? African artists wonder.

Artists confident enough to venture into the large galleries and museums soon find out that such places, rather than being neutral arena for free competition, are what an observer has called "the last bastions of white supremacy - by exclusion". While many efforts are being made to redress this situation, the onus seems to be on the artists and their admirers to engage the market and create their own supportive institutions. The Studio Museum in Harlem, New York, is one such initiative. Leanne Bean, an African-Caribbean lady, who set up office as an agent for African artists in Knightsbridge at the beginning of 1991, is sure that the right approach which stresses the investment potential is bound to succeed. Johnny Ohene, the London-based painter whose work is included in a recent Pierre Caudibert international exhibition, believes that informal get-togethers of potential and actual patrons also yield positive results.

The terms of critical reference applied to and through which African art is viewed is another area of contention. What is modern or traditional when applied to African art? The distinction between antique Artists confident enough to venture into the large galleries and museums soon find out that such places, rather than being neutral arena for free competition, are what an observer has called the last bastions of white supremacy - by exclusion

and contempor ary, the cut-of point, which according to Helen Tweed of Christie's is around the turn of the century, has been said by many to be arbitrary. Partly because such a delineation does not specify to what extent the criterion is affected by considerations of the medium, technique or content. At the heart of the issue, though, is who decides what, when and how.

There is also the point about the widespread application of the terms 'tribal and primitive to African art. Should the Nok sculptures or the famed Benin bronze heads be seen as tribal or national? From a sociological point of view nationhood has to be seen in terms of the conventions and institutions that bind a people together and in their shared use of language and cultural practices. In any case what kind of logic is it that refers to the Yoruba as a tribe when the Yorubas number more than the population of many medium sized nations.

Cynical and sensitive Africans think 'tribal art, is used to imply spontaneity, lack of sophistication and a general absence of thought-out schematic creativity Conspire? Ute?"

Cynical and sensitive Africans think tribal art, is used to imply spontaneity, lack of sophistication and a general absence of thought-out schematic creativity. Conspiracy theorists regard the application of tribal art as a marketing ploy for undervaluing works so labelled. racy theorists regard the application of 'tribal' as a marketing ploy for undervaluing works so labelled. The use of 'modernist and traditional' is a great source of confusion. It stems, in all certainty, from an all pervasive eurocentrism which sees "white culture" (itself a synthesis of many cultures) as dominant and mainstream, and against which all other cultures are condemned to subsist as peripheral. The degree to which non-European cultures gain access to this dubious modernity is then judged by the extent to which those societies have imbibed Western ways of doing and seeing. Did Africa leap into history with the advent of colonial rule? Could an ironsmith in an African village, using technology passed down from centuries, be seen as 'traditional' while his customers remain modern?

All terminologies are mere descriptive categories and aids to comprehension. A situation in which a set of values is imposed on one society by another and given permanence is, therefore, unacceptable, whether European art or art created by Europeans is, for the most part, carefully divided into periods (pre-Raphaelite, Renaissance.) and such categorisation shows respect for time and pride in history. Why should African art be seen simply as either traditional or modern? This delineation is suspect and does no justice to the range of African creative expression and its stylistic differences. These problems are compounded by the absence of Africans in positions of power in the international art world. Meaning that the tasks of interpreting culture, programming exhibitions or determining prices are done by people who no matter how well intentioned, simply lack the expertise and knowledge of the cultures they purport to represent. In the discourse of art criticism, 'exotic' which on the surface could mean out of this world, in reference to African art becomes a synonym for something, unknowable. This means all the critic has to do is to reduce the object to its spatial dimensions and observable features. All art is created by individuals and such individuals live in societies, share a language of symbolism, an ontology and a religion. To place the

art object on a 'universal pedestal, is to sever it from its cultural context. Any museum, gallery or critic who intends to do justice to African art has a responsibility for providing information that links the artefact to mere tip of the iceberg.

Art has always been made for a purpose and the higher degree of homogenisation in pre-Colonial African nations would definitely have made for far less fragmented and disjunctive art. Art which was social property (for use in worship or rituals) had to reflect commonly held ideas. This was facilitated by the existence of families of carvers, sculptors etc, whose members made objects as and when the need arose or to express their own ingeniousness. The Africa of today is different and the so-called traditional arts exist alongside new modes of artistic expressions. Many artists are at home in many styles and do not define themselves in either-or terms. To use one instance to label an artist is intellectual laziness, a trivialisation of what the artist stands for.

The problem faced by African artists and the devalued status of their creations is inextricable from other African products on the international market. A possible way out is through a re-integration of art and culture back into the core of African social life.

That maximum solution may be far away but certain activities could help improve the profile of our artists and works of art. More African The problem faced by African artists and the devalued status of their creations are inextricable from other African products on the international market

its original society and to go on to show how the individual artist has advanced or contributed to the art form. Perhaps this is one area where the various studies done by academics in the Various African studies associations can come in useful. Once upon a time (and that is current history) African art was discussed mainly in terms of its functionality. Alas gold weights for measuring and certain wood carvings as mere vehicles through which contacts with deities were made. Their aesthetic appeal, which involved taking on larger philosophical issues, were subsumed to, at best, instrumental considerations. This approach was instituted as a necessary counter to the prevalence of 'art for art's sake' among European artists. A study of African art in any period from pre-historic times to the present would show that function is a people have to be involved in acquiring and distributing our arts.

Our intellectuals have also to recognise the need for their direct involvement in culture documentation and interpretation.

All these would help free African artists from the restrictive categories that have enveloped them for so long. It might also be in the interests of African artists to demonstrate that, like all members of their societies and indeed of the world community, they bring to their work enduring themes and methods and also take full advantage of all resources and facilities of the 20th century. This means they can and do exist along a local, national and international axis. A fluid situation where each has a claim on the wealth of the past, faces the challenges of the present and work towards the possibilities of the future.

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REGIONAL AFFAIRS

WARS OF AFRICA

Will democratic reforms and the end of the Cold War add new dimensions to the conflicts that have plagued Africa since independence ?

BY GUY ARNOLD

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Guy Arnold is a Londonwbased
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return to a quasi-colonial situation with the USA, on the one hand, assuming the role of world policeman, and the ex-colonial powers, on the other, acting as though - for them - nothing has changed. The speed with which France and Belgium despatched troops to Mobutu's crumbling Zaire in 1991 bears this out. There is the danger that the elimination of points of conflict between the USA and the USSR, while preventing the prolongation of wars as a result of their support, merely means that conflicts will be even more messy and possibly more prolonged as the combatants look for external support in an even more complex world than that of the last 40 years. Thus, there is the danger that the elimination of points of conflict between the USA and the USSR, while preventing the prolongation of wars as a result of their support, merely means that conflicts will be even more messy and possibly more prolonged as the combatants look for external support in an even more complex world than that of the last 40 years. The fact that the two ideological courts of appeal have disappeared does not also mean that the sources of arms of potential backing have gone as well, although the business of obtaining arms will become harder and more expensive and so will place an even greater strain upon hard-pressed economies. There is, on reflection, little to suggest that the end of the Cold War will have much effect upon African conflicts except in those cases where, because of the ideological nature of the wars or the scale of the interests involved, the combatants had come to depend upon US or Soviet backing. Interestingly, in the case of Mozambique, President Chissano had already signalled his abandonment of the one-party, Marxist approach in mid-1989 before the collapse of Communist power in Eastern Europe. A withdrawal of super power backing for the sides in a war is certainly a plus yet, as the brutal little civil war in Liberia demonstrated during 1990, a country can be devastated by civil strife with little outside assistance. How then is Africa likely to fare in relation to conflicts and violence during the rest of the 20th Century? In its 1991 World Development Report, the World Bank states: 'Aid and finance agencies are entitled to ask whether it makes sense to help governments whose first priority is to add to their military strength.' That is certainly an advance in thinking for such a question was never posed during the Cold War when it was axiomatic that aid would be forthcoming, even if the donors knew much of it would go on arms, in

order to balance the other side". In its report the World Bank singled out four African countries - Angola, Africa Forum . V012 . No 1 .1992 ' Page 31 Chad, Uganda and Zaire - which spend more on the military than on education and health combined

Patterns of violence and sources of support are not as easy to define as might at first appear. Thus in the Nigerian civil war, Britain and the USSR, for example, supported the Federal Government though for somewhat different reasons while France, South Africa and Portugal supported Biafra. Generally, however, the USSR supported Marxist or would-be Marxist regimes and the West supported their opponents. This straight ideological pattern most obviously fits Angola over the period 1975 to 1988, but, though the MPLA government was avowedly Marxist and UNITA called for a free market economy, the basis of the struggle was less about ideology than about power - whether the MPLA, which had come to power in 1975, had the right to prolong their possession of it indefinitely to the exclusion of other groups by the device of a one-party state backed by massive Soviet and Cuban assistance.

The situation in Mozambique was superficially the same but, in fact, Renamo was largely the creation of Ken Flower, the head of Rhodesia's secret intelligence service, while its continued activities in the 1980s depended upon arms and supplies from South Africa. In Ethiopia, the overthrow of Haile Selassie by a military Dergue brought an end to a rightwing goxr'erninent but it was not at once clear where the military wanted to lead until Western and, most notably, US hostility forced Mengistu into the arms of the USSR.

In any case, when he came to power in 1974, the war of secession by Eritrea had already been waged for '1-1 years and the Communists, who had originally supported Eritrean secession, when it was aimed at Haile Selassie, now cynically switched sides, seeing in Mengistu a more valuable ally. Thus the three regimes in Angola, Mozambique and Ethiopia, despite the different backgrounds to their wars, nonetheless, were able to call upon substantial Communist support which, in turn, brought Western counter-involvement.

A brief examination of the continent's present war zones brings little comfort to those who would like to see development take priority over violence though there are some hopeful signs. The 1990s seem set to witness the widespread adoption of the multiparty system in Africa - in

some cases, a return to it after a period of military or other dictatorship, in others, its adoption for the first time since independence. What this will mean is a period of deep unrest and uncertainty and, even when an apparent Changeover to a more democratic system has been effected, it could be followed by a Violent backlash as in Togo at the beginning of December 1991 when the army was determined to overthrow the new Prime Minister in favour of the old President. Other countries, where demands for a multi-party system threaten turmoil, are Kenya and Zaire and in the latter case, there is already every sign of an impending breakdown of law and order as Mobutu's grip on power wanes. Hopefully, South Africa will, at last, resolve its future by adopting a genuine non-racial democratic constitution without descending into violence. But the possibility of violence is there all the time and the emphasis must be upon the hope. At present, some 10 countries are either engaged in civil strife or are attempting to emerge from a civil war with varying degrees of success. These are Angola, Mozambique, Ethiopia, Eritrea, Chad, Sudan, Liberia, Morocco, Sahara and Somalia. A brief look at each shows the problems involved and the extent to which the participants want to achieve peaceful solutions. After nearly 30 years of war that included Soviet, US, South African, Cuban and other external involvement, the peace agreement which came into effect on May 31 1991 marks a possible turning point of immense significance not simply for Angola but also for the region as a whole. It is clearly tied into events in

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when I laile Selassie was overthrown in 1974; it had not attracted a great deal of external attention. But then, the year after the OPEC revolution, which had given such influence to a handful of states in the Middle East, the strategic importance of Ethiopia, as a pawn in any East-West conflict, became immense and the USSR did not miss the chance to become heavily involved as the principal supporter of Mengistu who, by the chances of politics rather than the result of conviction, became a Marxist. By 1991, Mengistu was fighting for his political life against Eritreans, Tigrayans and Oromos, and the effective withdrawal of Soviet aid spelled his end. In the immediate aftermath of his fall, negotiations between the Ethiopian People's Revolutionary Democratic Front (EPRDF), the umbrella movement which provided the new government, and the Eritrean People's Liberation Front (EPLF) produced an agreement that Eritreans should hold a referendum on independ-

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While the big powers may cut back on the supply of arms and the World Bank make development rather than military expenditure the criterion for receiving aid, arms are always available - at a price - and any African state determined to embark upon war will find the arms even if it means starving, re cu

most other areas of development funds South Africa with de Klerk becoming President, the independence of Namibia and the fact that in this region, at least, US-Soviet cooperation appears encouragingly fruitful. The peace in Angola, precarious as it is, represents the most clear cut gain from the end of the Cold War. The problems it faces are twofold: those of reconstruction, rebuilding of the country's infrastructure and the rehabilitation of 800,000 internal refugees; and those of political trust. If elections are held in 1993, as' provisionally promised, and if UNITA wins them, will the MPLA democratically accept defeat 01' will its followers take to the bush and reverse the situation which has existed since independence? Will a UNITA government behave democratically or adopt one-party, dictatorial policies? Those questions can only be resolved after elections have been held. Meanwhile, in a form of neo-colonial irony, the British and the French are to assist in retraining and integrating the armed forces of the two sides, MPLA and UNITA. Although the Frelimo government of Mozambique received last year Bloc aid, this was never remotely on the scale of aid supplied to Angola, and by the late 1980s, companies' troops were being retrained

by the British army in Zimbabwe; the army of a nominally Marxist regime, backed by the USSR, was being trained by the ex-imperial power, with the greatest stakes in the region, which had constantly thwarted attempts by the rest of the Commonwealth to apply meaningful sanctions against South Africa. Efforts to bring about a ceasefire between the government forces and Renamo were made throughout 1990 but without success and, though Pretoria insisted that it had ceased to provide any more aid to Renamo, aid was still getting through from "private/" sources in the Republic. Thus, in mid-1991 Renamo's leader, Alfonso Dhlakama, said his movement would cease attacks upon the Cahora Bassa dam, in Mozambique's Limpopo Province, in return for money, radios and uniforms from South Africa's ISSCOM (the state electricity company). By the end of 1991, little real progress towards peace had been made though periodic meetings and truce starts gave some hope that one might be achieved. Meanwhile, both the Frelimo army and Renamo continued their desultory campaigns and recruited to their ill-equipped, badly trained and poorly controlled forces by the time-worn means of press-ganging.

The war of secession by Eritrea had already gone on for 8 years and allow Ethiopia access to the Red Sea through the port of Assab. Already, by July 1991, the EPLF was running Eritrea as though it was an independent state; by October the expulsion of 35,000 non-Eritreans from the territory, to become refugees in appalling conditions in which many died, indicated the possibility of new causes of conflict between Eritrea and Ethiopia. In any case, the regional tensions in the former Ethiopian Empire could well lead to further attempts at secession or continuing civil strife.

So bitter has the war between North and South in Sudan become, with northern tactics approaching genocide since the government of Omar Hassan al-Bashir came to power, that it is doubtful whether external pressures can make much difference. The war is fuelled by the worst prejudiced ingredients of race - the arabicised north against the black south, religion - with the north attempting to force the Christian or animist south to adopt Sharia law, and ancient hatreds derived from the former slaving practices of the north against the south. It is a conflict that gives every appearance of continuing indefinitely. Most of Sudan's aid donors cut their aid

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ernmentaid agencies have withd rawn from the country. The Saudis, who were a major source of aid, were outraged when the Beshir government came down on the side of Iraq in the Gulf War. The cost in human misery, displacement of populations and collapse of the economy, is on a massive scale and it appears at least at the present time, that the war will continue while the rest of the world stands back and does nothing.

The apparently endless saga of north versus south in neighbouring Chad has been complicated by French interventions in support of successive governments, and by Libyan interventions in pursuit of its Claim to the disputed Aozou Strip in the north, and though France has often expressed its determination to disengage, it has, in tact, repeatedly returned to fresh involvement whenever it has seen its interests under threat. There seems little to indicate that a lasting peace is in sight.

In Somalia, President Siad Barre had walked a tightrope for years, playing off the lssags of the former British Somaliland (the north) against the Hawiye in the south (Barre himself came from the Da rode in the centre), butthis balancingacttinally collapsed towards the end of the 1980s, when the end of the Cold War meant that Berbera was no longer of strategic use to the USA and he could not repeat his switch, from Washington to Moscow, that he had done with such aplomb the other way round in 1976. During 1990, the country descended into bloody civil war and Barre fled in January 1991. Somalia then split between North and South in May 1991 although by the end of the year, with General Mohammed Farah Aid eed assuming control, there was, at least, a chalice to resolve the regional differences and the Somalia North Movement (SNM), which represents the north, appeared ready to attend. The situation, however, remained fragile.

The MoroCCO-Polisario war is, pre-eminently, a post-imperial adjustment conflict. But though the territory is largely desert and the population tiny this war has gone on for years involving, originally, Mauritania and Morocco as Claimants, Algeria in support of the Polisario, a Moroccan walk-out from the OAU and now the United Nations.

As long as Algeria supported the Polisario, they had a chance ot sustaining the war indefinitely but once Algeria (for the sakeotwider Magreb Africa Forum political considerations) made its peace with Morocco the dice be-

came severely loaded against Polisario yet, given the nature of nationalism, this does not mean that the struggle will not continue indefinitely. After 15 years of conflict, the UN is trying to produce a solution by conducting a referendum which will present a Choice between independence and integration in Morocco. King Hassan, reviving the 'Green March' tactics of 1975, is sending large numbers of Moroccans into Sahara to take up temporary tent-residence so that they can vote in the referendum and ensure a majority for integration. By November 1991, Morocco had sent an estimated 170,000 new residents into Sahara (more than its total population) to take part in the voting. If he gets the vote he wants, with the connivance of the UN which so far has not protested at his tactics, King Hassan will then have legitimacy in putting down any further Polisario resistance. However, the resistance is likely to continue.

Given the history of his presidency, it was entirely predictable that a civil war against Doe would erupt in Liberia and when it came, it was brutal and bloody. It was not a high technology war and did not depend upon outside support or arms; its importance for Africa lay in the attempt, to produce a regional peace-keeping force (ECOMOG) under the auspices of ECOWAS. This may hold important lessons for the future and, in a more limited form, represents a revival of the old idea that the OAU should maintain a peace-keeping force for action anywhere on the continent.

The wars examined here represent an extraordinary mixture - civil war, border adjustments, post-imperial adjustments, religious, ideological - and though big power involvement has played a crucial part, most of them would have taken place whatever the external interests had been. The problems for the 1990s will be complex and probably messy. The first concerns arms: while the big powers may cut back on the supply of arms and the World Bank make military expenditure the criterion for receiving aid, arms are always available - at a price - and any African state determined to embark upon war will find the arms even if it means starving most other areas of development funds. In any case, as a general reversion to multipartyism, assuming that takes place, will bring its own backlash of counter-coups by those who see themselves being dispossessed of permanent power

result of the wars discussed here, there are large quantities of arms and weaponry of all kinds already in Africa. The second question concerns the changing political scene. A general reversion to multi-partyism, assuming that takes place, will bring its own backlash of counter-coups by those who see themselves being dispossessed of permanent power and, at least, some of the backlashes could deteriorate into full-scale civil strife, a danger now facing Zaire. Many African borders are now in question in a way that has not been the case since the formation of the OAU and its early, crucial resolution that every state accept its inherited borders. Chad, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Somalia and Sudan could each rearrange their borders in the near future if only in the unwilling sense of accepting the fact of division. At present, indeed, there are widespread possibilities of violence and the probability that the end of the Cold War, rather than reducing the risks of conflict because there are no longer two ideological courts of appeal, will, in fact, increase them because the North, without the pressures of super power confrontation, will simply ignore what happens in the South altogether - unless there is profit in it. On the other hand, there are plenty of indications that a return to neo-colonialism, in the form of increased interventions by the old colonial powers, is a distinct possibility. Over the last 18 months, even as the super powers have been withdrawing from overt military action in Africa, France has intervened in Gabon, Rwanda, Zaire and is poised to do so in Togo. Britain now has military training teams (BMATTs) in half the frontline African states. The decade of the 1980s begins with a continent that is heavily indebted, where poverty is endemic, where an era of political stability of a sort (one-party systems) is about to be swept away, where the main aid donors have become indifferent. Such conditions provide a natural backdrop for an increase and not a diminution in violence._1

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N THE day Trevor

Clark/s hefty book on

Nigeriats first Prime

Minister, Sir Alhaji

Abubakar Tafawa Balewa

launched in London, another for-

mer colonial officer in the West

African country made a telling re-

mark during the preceding small

talk. He said that had Nigerians, of

the pre-independence era, not been

W8 5

engulfed in a series of political crises

of their own, the White colonialists

would themselves have seized the

battleground and waged a protracted

internecine war based on vested

interests delineated by their coveted

territories of Northern Nigeria and

Southern Nigeria. Some 31 years

afterNigeria'sindependence,thethe-

matic thrust of the literary corpus of

eX-Colonialists suggests an incapa-

bility or umvillingness to counte-

nance Nigeria as an entity and not a

geographic expression of distant so-

cieties in desperate need of outsid-

ers to trumpet their sympathies and

prejudiced analyses.

Trevor Clark has needlessly cast

his work in this mould. I le huS writ-

ten 888 pages, backed by over a

decade of research, on the life of

Alhaji Sir Abubakar Tafawa Balewa.

True, he had known Sir Abubakar

from 1949 to 1959, But the subject of

the book had lived for 54 years, more

than those d eployed to the service of

Nigeria and the African continent.

Considering that his assassination,

in 1966, led to the collapse of the

First Republic, personal friendship

should not cloud a thorough exami-

Africa Forum 0 Vol 2 o No 1 o 992

V A LEADER

Black Rock

by Trevor Clark

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nation of the calamitous events.

There are pertinent questions on

which the reading public deserved

to be provided with dispassionate

answers. I lad Sir Abubakar been the

victim of a devolved colonialist po-

litical structure inherently unsuit-

able for a new country? Would the vagaries of the novelty of the imposed democratic ethos have been mastered had the military displayed less impatience and allowed longer time for trial and error before they struck? Given the pulls of centrifugality indexed on innumerable examples of extreme partisan politics and verminous ethnic divisions, what chances had single upright man at the apex of the political authority, but handicapped by extra-constitutional forces, to salvage a gradually sinking ship of state? What strategy would have ensured the Containment of the military in the apparent tottering of the main arms of government?

That the author attended to these issues only peripherally and arrived at the Conclusion that Sir Abubakar was the victim of ethnic machinations is a major mm pas which left his work redeemable simply by the fact that its subject was, in many ways, a man of impeccable moral rectitude and immense international stature. Sir Abubakar's birth, education and gradual rise to political eminence and universal respect has been pains takingly presented by Clark, interspersed with simultaneous developments around the world which the author felt could have attracted TO

the attention of the subject, and they make fine reading: HA boy was humbly born and brought up in a strong religious faith to enjoy fond traditional parental ties. By sheer Chance he was one of the few who received a rural education after the First World War, and he received it in a primitive school in a large market town, where he became conscious of a new cultural world of change and alien power".

In 1933, Abubakar qualified as a teacher after training at the Katsina Higher College. A scholarship, after the Second World War, found him at the Institute of Education of the University of London where he spent a year, obtaining the London Overseas Teacher's Professional Certificate. Back in Bauchi, where he taught, he was appointed education officer. Politics removed him from Bauchi and the teaching profession he so cherished. From being nominated to the first Northern House of Assembly, he was elected into the Nigerian Legislative Council in Lagos in 1946. Six years later, he was appointed Minister for Works. Several ministerial appointments later, he became the first Prime Minister of Nigeria in 1957 because he was the parliamentarian leader of the Northern Peoples/ Congress, the biggest

party in the Federal Parliament. He was killed in Nigerials first coup dletat in 1966.

Clark/s reconstruction of Sir Abubakar's life truthfully portrays a leader with attributes worthy of emulation. He was both unambi-

REMEMBER

A Right Honourable Gentleman: Abubakar from the U35 '

B

(Published by Edward Arnold, London and Hudahuda Publishing Company, Zaria)

Page

OOKS

tions and personally incorruptible. He did not want to lead his party and he never angled to be Prime Minister, but his preference to return to his education post in Banchi was still let. He performed the pilgrimage to Mecca only once, when the religious injunction was becoming the excuse for annual jinxing by seemingly less pious men. In times of overwhelming pressure and rancour, he would readily declare a willingness to step down: "If they don't want me here again, all I want is three hours notice - I will pack my things and go away"

At the international level, Sir Abubakar was a star player whose major role was crucial in the establishment of the Organisation of African Unity. He sent Nigerian troops to the Congo, during the crisis there, where, as part of a UN Force, the contingent acquitted itself creditably. He forged bilateral ties combining initially his Prime Ministerial duties with those of the foreign ministry. In January 1966, he convened a Commonwealth Prime Ministers Conference to tackle the Rhodesian crisis.

But with, in spite of his exceptional performance on the international scene, did seemingly intractable problems pile up on the home front? Corruption mounted. There were constitutional uproars and civil strife arising from the Federal and Western Regional elections of 1964 and 1965 respectively, the 1963 Census exercise, the Tiv riots and the unconscionable excesses of narrow-minded and power-seeking partisan politicians. But of all these, the most disturbing was the breakdown of law and order in Western Nigeria. At this time, Dr Moses Majekodunmi, the Minister for Health and friend of the Prime Minister's, saw Sir Abubakar "in a state of very personal misery over the burnings and crippling of human beings". Political commentary surmised then and since that the Prime Minister was torn between doing what he thought was right to end the carnage in the West and to ease the line dictated by his party.

It was always said that Sir Abubakar's better judgement and desired lines of action were often circumscribed by his party's hierarchy. This point of view was confirmed by Alhaji Shehu Shagari, one of Sir Abubakar's ministers, later President of Nigeria's Second Republic. In an interview published in Africa Note magazine of November 1982, Shagari said inter alia: "Sir Abubakar had one problem during

his time I le was not the leader of his party and he did not enjoy as much grassroots support as the Sardauna (Alhaji Sir Ahmadu Bello) who was, of course, the leader..Abubakar Tafawa Balewa was a very capable person but he worked under great constraints in the form of a powerful party and a powerful Regional (ioi'erninent over which he had little or no control."

But Trevor Clark will not take any of this into proper account. This is why he dismissed the anarchy arising from the continued imposition of the bankrupted administration of Chiet Samuel Akintola through a blatantly rigged Western Regional election as the work of ruffians. Astonishingly, he concluded that: "Doubtless to leave the shot corpses in the streets of a few well-known villains found possessed of illegal arms would have quietened the region within 24 hours..."

URING the 1962 crisis when legislators fought in the Western House of Assembly, Sir Abubakar declared a state of emergency and appointed Dr Majekolunmi to administer the state for a period of six months. Then only a few heads and the mace had been broken inside the House. So, why was not a fresh state of emergency put in force in 1965 when houses and human beings, in large numbers, were being torched all over the Northern Region on a daily basis? The author states this was because the Prime Minister feared that ordering troops into the Region could compound the crisis! So, was it the rapidly overwhelmed police that was to leave the shot corpses in the streets" which Clark considered a pancea?

In trying to defend all of Sir Abubakar's acts of omission and commission, Clark casts an imaginary giant with the insufferable tail in the attempt of trying to run a country in the midst of moral sadism.

dwarfs, charlatans and opportunists. It is presumptuous of this author to traverse the entire political landscape of Nigeria's First Republic and come up with only one individual who was above board.

In the opinion of Nigerians, Sir Abubakar's memory remains that of a fine man. But what was to be achieved in disparaging his peers in the futile attempt to elevate someone already on a high pedestal as the author did with wantonness? Witness Clark's brand of comparative analysis: "(The Igbo) did not care for (governments of any kind, and Zik (Dr Nnamdi Azikiwe) had erected

his position on a practice of opposition to external authority, not on any concrete programmes for execution".

"(Awolowo) attracted intellectuals, some of whom had the capacity of appeal to a broader swathe of humanity, and who by interpreting Awolowo could manufacture for him popular attributes that he lacked... His volatility in fact delayed his logical maturity for longer than has been credited to him".

But "Unlike them both, Abubakar was in fact a philosopher of humanity rather than a party man, the good administrator and chairman, giving a quiet lead through sheer force of character and having few personality warts to conceal".

Clark's beatification of Sir Abubakar, who never laid claim to sanctity, would have scandalised the late Prime Minister were he alive today, and he would most certainly have rejected the gratuitous halo as the handiwork of a peddler of fiction. Yet Trevor Clark did a greater disservice to the memory of Sir Abubakar, who was a man of peace, by presenting a most jaundiced account of both the events that led up to the January 1966 coup and the method of its execution. In the interview which he granted to the African Affairs magazine on October 7, 1991, Clark said he did not want his book to be used as a political weapon when the democracy, promised by the Nigerian military, comes into effect during 1992.

UNFORTUNATELY, it was the very same incorrect versions, of the events of January 1966, which he has reproduced, that helped to inflame passions and landed the country in the July 1966 counter coup and the 30-month civil war. The very fact that the author chose to write in this vein without even bothering to annotate his sources only demonstrates the length that former colonial masters are prepared to go in continuation, under neo-colonialism, of those sectional wars of theirs thought to have been abandoned at the dawn of independent African countries.

Chuks Iloegbunam

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OBJECTIVES OF DEVELOPMENT

Development from within: Survival in Rural Africa

(Edited by Taylor, D R Fraser & Mackenzie, Fiona Routledge)

A collection of studies focussing on approaches to rural development and confined to quite small, local experiments - local farmer organisations in Ziinba bwe, the co-operative credit union movement and salt co-operatives in Ghana, household based tree planting activities for fuelwood in rural Kenya, the informal sector in Tanzania - and so on. The overall message of this book, and indeed, of other studies now coming from Africa is that local communities know much better- and always have known much better - how to tackle their problems with central governments which descend upon them from time to time with grandiose schemes which, too often in any case, depend upon inputs from such agencies as the World Bank and so readily become top heavy with managers and experts and aid personnell

Development is not about that kind of activity which is concerned primarily with international politics: bargains between aid recipients and aid donors that have all too little to do with the people on the ground. Some of the most interesting breakthroughs in development have been pioneered by small communities who have known what they want but have needed what Julius Nyerere referred to, in his Arusha Declaration, as "catalyst" aid: that is, small inputs which lnakepossible, or atleast make easier, local initiatives. The almost cataclysmic failure of most aid can be seen in the debt servicing figures: in Ghana in 1989 between 70 to 75 per cent of export earnings went to service debts, a ratio that makes nonsense of any claims that financial inputs have assisted development. Figures just published in Britain demonstrate that roughly four times as much money comes back to Britain in the form of debt servicing and repayments as goes out from Britain to the same countries in the form of official aid. With economic prospects for the 1990s looking generally gloomy the right approach to development must be one that emphasises the local initiative and does not depend upon aid inputs. As Taylor states in his conclusion: "A basic objective of development from within is to allow local people to become the subject, not the object, of development strategies." And not before time..J

MODERN ETHIOPIA

Zewde, Bahru History of Modern Ethiopia 1855-1974 (Edited by James Currey)

A timely short history that will be invaluable to students. Ethiopia has an ancient history but wisely the

author has confined himself to the modern period of just over 100 years in which the country's 19th century rulers expanded their power and the Country's boundaries, faced up to their limitations in relation to the encroaching Europeans in masterly fashion after they had defeated the Italians at Adwa in 1896 (not making the mistake of imagining that one victory had made them invincible), and then largely failed to come to terms with the modern world under the last Emperor, Haile-Sellase, whom the author shows to have been so pre-occupied with power for its sake that he missed many opportunities, especially after his return following the defeat of the Italians in 1941, to modernise his country and so evade the fate that in fact he earned in 1974. The Greater Ethiopia of this period was always a fragile creation, dependent upon the military Control exercised from the centre as we are likely to learn in the aftermath of Mengistu's downfall. Political fragmentation and the European presence formed the setting for modern Ethiopia's history. Today there is every likelihood of a return to increased fragmentation with the hiving off of Eritrea and other demands for regional autonomy although there is nothing new in this pattern. There is an historical inaccuracy on page 166: Sir Samuel Hoare was British Foreign Secretary, not the Prime Minister.

KEEPING THE PEACE

The Blue Helmets: A review of United Nations peace-keeping (United Nations)

A second edition, updated, of this extremely useful handbook of UN peace-keeping operations which has been given new point because of the renewed readiness of the major powers to use the United Nations' mechanisms in the wake of Gorbachev's perestroika and the ending of the Cold War. In the years 1988 and 1989 the United Nations Security Council set up five new peace-keeping operations (only 13 such Operations had been established in Africa from 1948 to 1992 over the preceding 41 years). The maintenance of world peace was what the United Nations was established to do in the first place, a fact that is sometimes ignored behind the welter of other "development" activities that the world body has undertaken. Before the new operations that were established in 1988 and 1989 half the UN peace-keeping effort was directed at the Arab-Israeli conflicts while the balance dealt with Lebanon (Closely related to Yemen, the Dominican Republic, the Congo (now Zaire), West New Guinea and Cyprus. Since

1988 the United Nations has become involved in peace-keeping operations in Afghanistan, Iran and Iraq, Angola, Namibia and Central America.

Given the likelihood that much of the world during the 1990s will be highly politically volatile in the aftermath of the ending of the Cold War the fact that the major powers are now behaving in a far more positive fashion towards the United Nations constitutes a plus that may prove of immense importance.

Guy Arnold

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FORUM PAPER

CONTINENTAL GOALS

Obstacles to economic development in Africa and the way forward

BY EGHOSA OSAGIE

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intu the major world markets,
Professor Eghosa Osagie is a lecturer
in the Nigerian National Institute for
Policy Studies, Kuru. Plateau State

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Atrieran cmmtries gives cause for concern.
current economic condititm in
Living conditions have declined, massive
and continuous depreciation 0f currencies
create a nightmare of inflation and desta-
bilising currency speculation, the social
sectors in countries implementing struc-
tural adjustment programmes suffer from
relative depriviatiun, gross national incomes
have declined absolutely and large num-
bers of young graduates and professionals
roam the streets in search of non-existent
jobs: Tn Compound this rather gloomy
picture, large amounts of scarce fnreign
exchange are employed to service an ever-
increasing stack of external debt. In these
ciremnstances, there is need for Africa to
try out a continental African strategy for
the resolution of these problems.
Africa Forum o 12 0 N01 0 1992

Several African countries made plans in the 1980s to improve the socio-economic conditions of their citizens. These plans were at different levels. First, there are the National Development Plans introduced periodically by governments. Second, there are plans at the subregional level designed to raise the level of co-operation at the supranational level. Third are plans at the continental level, such as the Lagos Plan of Action and AAFSAI) which are designed to change the strategy for African economic transformation. In the second half of the 1980s, some 30 African countries introduced and were implementing World Bank-type structural adjustment programmes.

Factors working to frustrate African economic advance include the following:

Political instability: Change in regime almost invariably led to dismantling of plans and programmes. In their eagerness to justify their intervention in the national political arena, military regimes discredit and abandon civilian plans to which they sometimes return. This problem occurs when military regimes succeed civilian regimes. The arbitrary approach to decision-making favoured by the military ensures that policy instability or discontinuity goes hand in hand with political instability.

Lack of popular involvement: Major national interest groups, with the exception of the business class represented by the Chambers of Commerce and Industries, are neither consulted nor meaningfully involved in the formulation and implementation of plans. In most cases, decisions are taken at the national level and lower tiers of government are called upon to implement them. In several African countries, the very basic task of organising the people into meaningful interest groups capable of participating in the implementation of plans and programmes, is yet to be undertaken. When properly set up, such interest groups should not only receive directives from above, but should have channels of communications to government so that their suggestions can be made available to government before plans are formulated.

Inadequate executive capacity: The statistical basis of most plans is faulty and inadequate. This may be due to poor record-keeping and paucity of professionalism in African bureaucracies. This may lead to poor costing and over-estimation of benefits derived from projects, leading to their abandonment. Another factor in poor executive capacity is the lack of co-operation and co-ordination between ministries and related organs of government as officials fight to protect their bureaucratic "empires" and keep what they consider their fair share of publicity. This shortcoming results in expensive waste and avoidable duplication. A further consideration in poor executive capacity, is the low level of accountability in many African public sector enterprises and institutions. Government is often considered as a childless mother to

be milked until it collapses. COX'CTHIDCHI subventions are cleverly diverted into private pockets and the objectives underlying the allocation of such funds are not realised. Until public sector officials change their attitude to government money and resources, plans and projects introduced by African governments will continue to be poorly and incompletely executed

Commitment to SAP: The adoption of SAP by successive African governments in the second half of the 1980s was accompanied by the abandonment of the first Lagos Plan of Action, and then (if National Development Plans as they were practiced since independence. Indeed, National Development Plans were, in a country such as Nigeria, replaced by three-year rolling plans within the context (if perspective planning, and Ministries of Economic Planning were routinely merged with more powerful ministries of Finance. These developments are not surprising as the underlying philosophy of SAP is the reduction in the exercise of discretionary economic policy by government reflected in the promotion

The intellectual leadership of Africa has yet to arise and it shows the way to

1. stability, self-sustaining economic development and stability, within in a democratic framework

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a of market forces to the role of decision-makers in national economic affairs. In addition, SAPs are responsible for the slow down of the tempo of economic integration in the 1980s. Each country struggled to manage short-term economic crises and negotiate with foreign creditors for the re-scheduling of external debts. In these circumstances, African countries somehow forget their treaty obligations to foster economic co-operation and co-ordination with sister members at economic communities. The irony of all this is that no African country has successfully implemented SAP as the programmes are extended, requiring frequent amendment to reduce the pains of adjustment.

Lack of political commitment: Many African governments were not politically committed to the plans made in the 1980s. Some saw the Lagos Plan of Action as rhetoric for self-reliance and continental economic integration. The political will necessary for the surrender of part of national sovereignty to a common supranational institution was largely absent in the West African subregion. Hence, ECOWAS

experienced little or no progress until recent Changes in Europe gingered the political authorities to make some prugress

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trade liberalization and monetary integration. The international economic environment was clearly hostile to African countries in the light of and conditioned by the institutions and rules of the international economic system. It is arguable that no effective concerted effort was made by African countries before the 1970s to make necessary changes for reform of the major international financial institutions. A case in point here is the Second Amendment of the Articles of Agreement of the International Monetary Fund (IMF) in 1978 which failed to reflect the views of Africa with regard to conditionality and floating exchange rates. The economic recession in the late 1970s and early 1980s had adversely affected African countries. The recession reduced demand for the exports of Africa, which in turn led to reductions in export prices for countries depending heavily on a single market export item such as crude oil in Nigeria, copper in Zambia and cocoa in Ghana, drops in export prices sharply reduced export earnings and eventually changes in regime almost invariably led to dismantling of plans and programmes; in their eagerness to justify intervention in politics, military regimes discredit and abandon civilian plans. The relatively large balance of payments deficits, these deficits were financed by running down international reserves or increasing liabilities to external creditors. Another factor which contributed to the maintenance of a hostile international economic environment, in the 1970s, was the substitution of natural raw materials by synthetics and coarser materials in the use of certain raw materials in the developed countries. These developments also produced sharp drops in African export prices as well as in quantities produced. These developments created budget and external deficits requiring external borrowing or the abandonment of ongoing capital projects. Increasingly, social services such as education and health were the first casualties of stabilization or adjustment programmes. The development and transformation of Africa requires a solid foundation of good educational and health systems. A crippled, ill-equipped, poorly educated and malnourished population cannot be expected to be successful in the socio-economic transformation of its society. Floating currencies and rising interest rates in creditor countries create a hostile international African environment. Appreciation of the US Dollar environment for (in which most African debts are denominated) in the IMF, and currency depreciation must African countries implementing structural adjustment programmes,

significantly raised the domestic currency value (it African external debts. This raised the debt service ratios and left relatively limited financial resources for socio-economic development and transformation. In addition, in countries not satisfying the basic preconditions for use of exchange rate changes to attain set macro-economic objectives, devaluation has actually worsened the balance of payments position, and indirectly compounded the external debt problem. In all countries implementing structural adjustment programmes, devaluation has raised the cost structure and the rate of inflation and limited the rate of capacity utilization in industry as consumers earning declining real incomes boycott some goods and services, and as producer purchases of machinery, equipment and raw materials are limited by the high domestic price (of foreign currency). This slows down the rate of socio-economic transformations and development.

The principle of conditionality governing the extension of credit by the IMF to member countries is not favourable to African countries. The policies that African countries are expected to introduce before they enjoy IMF facilities (eg devaluation, trade liberalization, removal of subsidies) tend to compound the problems which made the countries approach the fund in the first place. The major industrial countries and the international financial institutions seem irrevocably committed to conditionality. Unless a change in attitude occurs in the near future, Conditionality will remain a major source of problems for African countries.

AFRICAN development

strategies have changed since independence. In the early years after independence, there was a general preference for an industrialisation strategy based on import substitution. These were incorporated into national development plans and financed by loans from the industrial countries of the North. These donor countries proposed this strategy because it enabled them to sell their machinery and other industrial inputs to the recipient countries: Aid or loans, then, were, often, tied to the purchase of goods produced in donor countries. Also in the years immediately after independence, donor countries sent advisers to African countries who ensured that development strategies worked out by young inexperienced bureaucrats conformed with the views of donor countries. In the 1980s, due to the rise of conservative politicians to power in the West, the development strategy favoured by the major donors changed. No longer satisfied with simply selling industrial inputs to Africa, donors preferred to own productive enterprises. They, therefore, proposed: limiting the role of the public sector through privatisation.

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tisation and commercialisation; foreign trade liberalization to facilitate the demise of inefficient parastatal industries; massive devaluation of local currencies to limit capacity utilization of existing factories and raise their cost structure and debt-equity swap schemes to facilitate the takeover (if local firms by foreign creditors. It is important that these ideas are incorporated in World Bank/IMF structural adjustment programmes which are now being implemented by some 30 African countries, GENERALLY, African development strategies are donor-driven for a number of reasons First, the analytical ability of national bureaucrats is limited. In some countries, reluctance, to co-opt experts from institutions of higher education and research institutes to help design development strategies, robs African countries of the technical resources available in individual countries for the production of high quality documents for development purposes. The realisation by African bureaucrats of their own limitations makes them favourably disposed to expect better documents and strategies to be produced by donor countries. Second, donor institutions and countries are generally agreed regarding development strategies and programmes and, often, confront each debtor country during debt rescheduling sessions. The vast disparity between the highly experienced officials of donor institutions and the relatively inexperienced African officials ensures that the donors often, if not always, have their way. The mass media could be used to find out the views and preferences of the major interest groups in society. Governments could then seek ways of integrating some of these into their own programmes, plans and policies. Most important, interest groups such as workers, women's groups, professional and youths, should be organised to own and manage productive enterprises. In addition, these societal groups could become shareholders in basic strategic industries along with government to ensure that such industries are not mismanaged. Finally, accountability can be enhanced in Africa by leaders setting good examples in financial management and by punishing Officials who enrich themselves at the expense of their country. Africa has to awake from its centuries-old slumber. Time is running out. The intellectual leadership of Africa has to arise and show the way to stability, self-sustaining economic development and stability within Africa Forum 0 V) I 2 o No 1 o 1992 in a democratic framework. In pursuit of these goals, African governments must be made to realise that there is no meaningful

alternative to economic and monetary integration. From recent and planned developments, Africa can be said to be set for rapid economic and social transformation. The Kampala Forum in May last year, was attended by Africa's intellectual and political leaders, and highlighted the issues and the strategy presented at the 1991 OAU Summit in Abuja. It African political leaders summon the required political will to implement the Abuja Declaration, the continent will experience tremendous economic development and transformation in the last decade of this remarkable century. Africa will then have come of age to play a leading role in international affairs. In the 21st century, Africa will realise its world-historic destiny.

In some countries, government officials are reluctant to implement plans, programmes and strategies worked out by their ministries and parastatals. In some cases, due to some inexplicable reason, key officials favour donor strategies and impose them on their countries.

Third, donors place highest premium on the ability to recover their loans and the realisation of maximum opportunities for profitable economic transactions by their citizens. In this regard, they naturally propose strategies which facilitate debt-service even when such strategies stultify growth and transformation of debtor countries.

Fourth, donors defend the interests of their countries. They therefore seek to impose development strategies which benefit their nationals. They recommend ideological paths in agreement with that preferred by their country and, therefore, seek ideological partners who will remain ever dependent on them.

Structural adjustment programmes in the fashion of the World Bank and IMF have dominated the African policy landscape. These were essentially medium-term packages of policies designed to tackle the problems of external imbalance, budget deficits, declining national product and inflation. They are anti-interventionist in orientation as they call for reduction in both public sector size and expenditure, more reliance on market forces in the allocation of resources and the elimination of subsidies. Regarding the external trade sector, SAP calls for devaluation of the local currency and dismantling of foreign trade controls. The stabilisation aspect of the A crippled, dissatisfied, poorly educated and malnourished population cannot be expected to be successful in the socio-economic transformation of its society.

Not enough effort was made before the 1980s to push for reform of the major international financial institutions programme usually takes the form of tight fiscal and monetary policies with emphasis placed on deregulation of the monetary sector which, often, results in excessively high interest rates and credit restrictions. The reliance of the typical African market forces seems to ignore the basic requirements for the return to that type of primitive capitalism. The requirements are: the absence of monopoly elements in the economy; the absence of externalities and the absence of public goods. None of these conditions is satisfied in any African economy.

The impact of the implementation of SAPs in African economies is the increasing disintegration of these economies as each strives to implement programmes to address policies and resolve short-term

crises. As these problems take over the attention

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in all countries, spares the time to consider a collective African approach to the issue of structural adjustment and the resolution of short-term economic crises. In addition, implementation of SAPs has displaced the commitment to economic integration in each of Africa's subregions. The Lagos Plan of Action was virtually forgotten. Due to the detrimental effects of devaluation on production/ high interest rates and the removal of subsidies on farm inputs and on petroleum products, SAP has had negative impact on gross national product in African

countries. It is, indeed, plausible to argue that a complete reversal of policy actions referred to above could stimulate African production in a remarkable way.

In addition, SAP has stimulated inflation in the African economy. Factors responsible for this are progressive devaluations of national currencies, removal of subsidies on key industrial inputs, commercialisa-

tion encouraging enter-
prises to raise user
charges in the search for
profits and the increase
in magnitudes of budget deficits arising
from the effects of the other pro-inflation
policies,
Moreover, exchange rate stability en-
joyed by the continent before the interme-
diation at Q/XII, has been lost. As the programme
searches for the now increasingly elusive
"realistic" exchange rate. The short supply
of foreign exchange by central banks to cur-
rency fluctuations, the relatively free hand
granted to dealers to speculate against local
currencies and the general preference for
foreign currency by most economic trans-
actions ensure continued depreciation of
local currencies. Most African currencies
are now undervalued/ but this has not at-
tracted foreign currency to Africa as expec-
tation of continued currency depreciation
has, in fact, encouraged the outflow of
scarce foreign exchange.

After the introduction of SAPs, debt
service payments in terms of the local cur-
rency rise in proportion to the percentage
of devaluation. Debt-service as a propor-
tion of exports, government revenue and
total foreign exchange earnings, also rises
to unsustainable and unrealistic levels. This
development encourages African calls for
debt repudiation, debt forgiveness and
default. The structure of African economy
has not been significantly affected by SAP.
Monocultures remain monocultures; diver-
sification has been stultified by excessively
high interest rates; de-industrialisation and
the retreat from less primitive agricultural
implements and tools have been widely
observed.

ROBABI.Y the most important
positive effect of SAP in Africa is
the encouraging increased local
sourcing of industrial inputs. This has in-
creased local demand for agricultural and
mineral production, thus fostering increased
inter-industry linkages in individual Afri-
can economies. Also the prohibitive do-
mestic currency prices of machines and
equipment have encouraged the local fab-
rication of rudimentary machines and equip-
ment which should be encouraged by the
government and co-ordinated at the sub-
regional level.

Annual budgetary allocations to the social
sector dropped significantly in Africa. This
is done usually to reduce budget deficits.
This is possible because, unlike the military
and other influential sectors, education and
health have no strong lobbyists to protect
their interests. But this neglect is doubly
tragic in the sense that eventual economic
recovery depends on the strength of the
education and health sectors. Future com-
petitiveness of nations depends on techno-
logical innovation which is impossible
without a strong educational system. In
addition, labour productivity depends on
the health of national labour forces.
Environmentally benign development

processes protect the environment while at the same time promoting economic development. It protects the soil from erosion and prevents deforestation arising from indiscriminate felling of trees during mining and agricultural activities. In addition, it protects wetlands by discouraging indiscriminate damming of rivers which may lead to the drying up of wetlands which support the production of fruits, vegetables, wheat, onions, beans, garlic and birds which migrate there seasonally. An environmentally benign development process would encourage the reforestation of arid Sahelian areas, a process which checks desertification, encourages rainfall and in the future produces wood products.

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The lack of an environmentally benign development process and policy permits the destruction of the environment, such as the over-exploitation of forest areas for timber without providing for reforestation, bulldozing of tropical rain forests for large-scale mechanised agriculture which destroys fertile top soil, excessive use of fertilisers, pesticides and herbicides which have adverse effects on soils and eventually on people. The construction of large dams as in Kano State in Nigeria affects the flow of rivers downstream through Bornu State to Lake Chad, where the water level is also reduced by dams built on rivers flowing to from neighbouring Central African Republic and Cameroon Tiga Dam in Kano State, has the potential of drying up the Hadeiji-Nguru wetlands, thus destroying the rich vegetable, rice and wheat-growing areas. African countries have been implementing environmentally hostile programmes since independence and, especially during the period of the implementation of structural adjustment programmes which put premium on stark economic considerations and market forces, to the detriment of environmental factors. It is, therefore, clear that the adverse consequences of the lack of environmentally benign development, will be experienced in the future in Africa unless remedial action and policies are introduced now. Such remedial policies would include discouraging large-scale mechanised farms, substitution of chemical fertilizers with organic manure, well-planned programmes of reforestation and protection for wetlands through deterring the construction of large-scale dams. Human-centred development considers the welfare of people as the ultimate goal of development policies and programmes. It seeks to protect living standards, pays particular attention to health, education and housing. It is particularly concerned about the welfare of vulnerable groups in society such as the aged, children, lactating mothers, students and the disabled, for whom special programmes may be provided.

A lack of human-centred development considers as relevant only hard economic calculations and principles, and is not concerned if the development process results in the impoverishment of people. It is not concerned if whole sectors of the economy go under during adjustment periods, nor is it worried about education, health or if transport systems are destroyed in the process of implementing market-oriented adjustment programmes. The most important effect of this orientation to development, is that the potential for recovery and eventual growth of national economies is seriously endangered. An important part of human-centred development is popular participation in the development process which requires the recognition by governments of interest groups or "key" forces of society as partners with government in the

formulation and implementation of policies. Associations of farmers, workers, students, professionals and ethnic groups could be organised for effective consultation with government to promote and facilitate popular participation in the development process.

The absence of this participation implies that popular interest groups are considered as potential sources of political and economic unrest. They are, therefore, banned or ignored. In multi-ethnic countries, unfair treatment of minorities generates political agitation and unrest, and have, in some cases, led to calls for political disintegration. The effects of lack of popular participation in the development process is the undermining of accountability in the execution of public sector capital projects and the views and preferences of the people being routinely ignored by government. This results in political unrest, generated by the mistreatment of ethnic and religious minorities, scarce national resources are diverted from development projects to the security arms of the state. In a number of cases, these resources are wasted in expensive civil wars.

INDUSTRIALISA-

TION is important as it enhances self-reliance and produces relatively high value-added. In addition, it provides ample opportunities for the appropriate application of scientific and technological innovations to promote higher levels of productivity efficiency.

For Africa to make rapid economic progress, it has to develop a critical attitude to received theoretical models of development which assume objective African conditions.

A realistic strategy would have special roles for industrialisation, aggressive use of science and technology to promote technological innovations and involvement of social groups in productive activity and in policy formulation and implementation.

Agriculture-allied industrialisation strategy

(ALIS) would tend to appeal to African policymakers (is the continent is largely agricultural and as the strategy provides ample opportunity for forward and backward linkages. This strategy is also suitable to realize self-reliance to which many African countries are now committed. But there are limitations to the

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African countries have
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independence, especially
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structural adjustment
programmes which put
premium on stark
economic considerations
and market forces

The policies that African countries are expected to introduce before they enjoy IMF facilities tend to compound the problems which made the countries approach the fund in the first place; the major industrial countries and the international financial institutions seem irredeemably committed to pursue the same strategy. It is considered

that, as national policy. Specifically, as soon as the opportunities for processing must with agricultural output are exhausted, the strategy runs out of steam. For self-sustained growth and meaningful transformation at national economies, it would be necessary to develop basic industries such as petrochemicals, iron and steel, and plastics/ which is, under current African conditions, optimally organised as the subregional (economic community level).

The agriculture-allied industrialisation strategy is not suitable as a national strategy but it could be employed, at the grassroots level, to coincide with the local government tier. This strategy, by stimulating agricultural production and stimulating backward and forward linkages with the aid of rudimentary autonomously-sourced machinery and equipment, would provide a solid base for the African economy. There would be need for financial subventions and subsidies from government and the booming sector to help establish such an African economic base.

The Import Substitution Industrialisation Strategy (ISIS) has been adopted by many African countries as their national industrialisation strategy. The idea is for countries to produce what they used to import in large quantities, usually behind relatively high protectionist walls. The flaws in this strategy were that its implementors did not insist on local sourcing (it industrial inputs, high quality was not insisted on as excess demand ensured that whatever was produced was purchased, and high import duties encouraged smuggling of imports into Africa, a development which encouraged the growth of parallel foreign exchange markets.

Generally, ISIS is not suitable as a national strategy in Africa. However, the relationship

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lively large countries, with vast markets, may implement it provided certain conditions are met. These are: local sourcing of industrial inputs, relatively low tariffs to make industries competitive and the active utilization of science and technology to keep industries competitive. For success to be attained, the 1915 could be used as subregional or economic community strategy along with conditions spelled out for the large countries. In both cases, it would have to be dynamic and provisions should be made for progressive import tariff reductions and for the most efficient firms and

industries to move into export markets
The export-led industrialisation strategy (ELIS) seems to be the strategy favoured by the Asian industrialized nations. This requires the production of high-quality products with up-to-date technology by competitive firms. The Japanese approach is instructive. It is characterised by very demanding standards, low capital costs due to high savings rates which encourage large scale entrepreneurship and heavy competition all of which result in the production of outstanding products. At the international level, product dumping increases the demand for Japanese goods, which in turn eliminates foreign competition. This encourages volume production in Japan and eventual long-term market domination and brand name image-building. This approach is not suitable for Africa because it plays down production to meet local requirements of manufactures and food. Its acceptance may discourage opportunities open to Africa through the import-substitution strategy at the sub-regional level.

Besides, this strategy requires high levels of technology (and highly capital-intensive methods of production. African conditions

do not now have, at their disposal, the necessary sophisticated technology or the aggressive drive to compete in export markets to make this strategy realistic.

African countries still depend heavily on imports to satisfy local requirements. It would, therefore, in the circumstances, be preferable for Africa to choose the import-substitution strategy of industrialisation at the sub-regional level than to use resources to produce for highly competitive markets abroad.

African economies have two main sectors, private and the public. Shortly after independence, many African countries expanded their public sectors in line with the desire to industrialise and provide social and economic infrastructure. In several countries, this expansion in the public sector went beyond the normal sectors so classified and incorporated some directly productive enterprises which in the absence of sufficient private sector investment were established by African governments. The operation of public sector enterprises was subject to a number of shortcomings. Government officials regularly interfered with day-to-day management of enterprises. Poor financial management, low levels of accountability and nepotism were additional factors operating against the profitability of African public enterprises. By the 1980s/ the dismal financial record of public enterprises convinced both government officials and scholars that some reforms were necessary.

Structural adjustment programmes incorporated privatisation and commercialisation programmes designed to reduce the size of the public sector and make whatever remained independent of sub-

x'entions from government. The result would
he that a successful implementation of pri-
vatisation would enhance the role and size
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Of the private sector which in the process becomes the engine of development.

The reduced role of the public sector is in order as we seek to avoid the abuses to which public sector enterprises have been subjected. African countries should, however, avoid passing enterprises to extra-African interests. In addition, the public sector should concentrate its scarce resources on infrastructure and a few carefully selected basic industries. Provision should be made for efficient management and accountability in the significantly reduced public sector.

If the private sector is to play a leading role in African economies, much has to be done. First, the major participants have to be identified to ensure popular participation. We may include CO-operatives, communal enterprises and interest group enterprises. As much as possible, local grassroots economic activity should be controlled by local people if we are to minimise inter-communal strife. The role of foreign capital should as much as possible be limited to the acquisition of up-to-date technology and correspondence relations with foreign banks. Under no circumstances should foreign capital be allowed to dominate the productive sectors of the African economy.

The proponents of indiscriminate privatisation do not care much about the need to regulate private sector activity. They seem to have unlimited faith in the allocative and price determination functions of the free market system. But they fail to realise that free market capitalism is incompatible with the existence of major monopoly elements in many sectors, public goods and externalities all of which feature in African economies. In view of these considerations, African governments should continue to exercise discretionary regulatory power over the private sector and disregard the demands for deregulation if the interests of citizens are to be protected.

Conclusion

The 1980s were distinguished by a deluge of economic problems in Africa and the application of emergency measures, including structural adjustment measures to resolve them. As has been pointed out by many students of the African economy, SAP is based on theoretical foundations which are unrealistic in the African context. Thus a forced implementation of SAP has created some constraints to Africa's socio-economic development and transformation. The policy aspects of SAP which create constraints are: unrealistically high interest rates (frustrating investment to promote economic growth); excessive devaluation of local currencies which are left significantly undervalued (frustrating capital inflow, raising costs of production, depressing local purchasing power and undermining confidence in the local currency, thus generating a spirit of uncertainty); trade liberalization leading to the closure of local

manufacturing enterprises. To overcome these Constraints, aspects of structural adjustment programmes such as high interest rates and undervaluation of currencies must be abandoned.

Another important constraint to manufacturing in Africa is small market size in many countries. Both the Lagos Plan of Action and AAF/SAP call for self-reliance and economic integration. As analysed in the main body of the report, Africa should as a matter of urgency, adopt an import-substitution industrialisation strategy at the subregional level and judiciously utilise the fruits of science and technology to support this approach.

Another constraint to Africa's socio-economic transformation is the limited application of the latest technological innovations which adversely affects the competitiveness of African producers. This constraint is further supported by almost hostile attitudes of African policy-makers to research and its findings. To overcome this constraint, African governments should provide incentives to enterprises commercialising research findings and provide additional opportunities through publicity in the mass media for new and superior production processes to be brought to the attention of producers. In addition, extension services should be extended.

Another obstacle to socio-economic transformation in Africa is the reluctance to produce goods and services. Transactors rather prefer to trade and execute contracts. Removal of this constraint requires the lowering of bureaucratic impediments to production of goods and services and the raising of fiscal disincentives to distributive trade and contract work.

High costs of transportation and petroleum products have further increased the segmentation of African markets and raised production costs. To rapidly remove this constraint, negotiations between oil-producing and non-oil producing African countries should be initiated under the auspices of the Organization of African Unity (OAU) and urgent plans to exploit the vast hydroelectric and solar energy resources of Africa should be activated.

An additional constraint to African economic transformation is failure on the part of governments to involve their people in development programmes, a constraint which also manifests itself in low levels of financial accountability among officials. The removal of this constraint requires an appeal to African political leaders for a fae

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Human-centred

de velopment considers
the welfare of people as
the ultimate goal of
de velopment policies and
programmes. It seeks to
protect living standards,
pays particular attention
to health, education and
housing. It is particularly
concerned about the
welfare of vulnerable
groups in society

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The proponents of indiscriminate privatisation do not care much about the need to regulate private sector activity; they seem to have unlimited faith in the allocative and price determination functions of the free market system. The actions of interest groups and an appeal to the conscience of African leaders to be inured to consequences in financial management. Drawing upon the Lagos Plan of Action/ and the foregoing analysis in the body of this report, the priority areas in which Africa should concentrate its development efforts in the immediate future are as follows:

1. Self-reliance in food production and processing at grass roots level. This requires appropriate application of scientific and technological information made available to local farmers through extension workers and the mass media. This priority would ensure that Africa feeds itself.

2. Upgrading telecommunications and transportation facilities to encourage increased production and trade in Africa. In transportation, consideration should be given to the formation of subregional airways to replace inefficient national ones, the linking of colonially influenced national rail systems and providing missing links in trans-African road networks.

3. Import-substitution and industrialisation strategy implemented at the subregional level to solve the problems of small market size and integrate Africa in the industrial sector of the Common Market to coordinate the integration efforts of the subregional economic communities and encourage experiments in monetary integration.

4. Programme to link-up African researchers, thinkers and scholars to generate a constant flow of innovative and creative ideas to governments, the economic communities and the productive private sector. To promote rapid development and integration of science and technology in Africa's industrialisation:

(governments should promote through incentives the commercialisation of whatever worthwhile technological innovations are available:

5. The OAU should establish African Centres for the Application of Science and Technology where new production processes, information banks and prototypes would be made available to African producers.

6. An African-wide organisation should manage the transmission of scientific and technological information from the industrial countries to the African Centres for the Application of Science and Technology and through the Centres of African industrialists. There are important links between

development on the one hand and security, stability and cooperation on the other, as has been demonstrated in this report.

Development entails economic growth and transformation. An economy experiencing development enjoys growth in production of goods and services, rising standard of

equitable distribution of its fruits promotes economic stability as increases in production and availability of goods check inflation and unemployment, as well as contribute to improving the balance of payments position. Similarly, a country experiencing development is favourably disposed to entering, co-operation arrangements with neighbouring countries in the hope that its rate of development could be increased through such co-operation.

Another link is possible International co-operation, in the form of economic integration, produces gains for participating countries in the form of increased incomes and lower import prices. The enlarged market allows more rapid industrialisation which in turn produces a higher rate of development. Countries in a well-organised economic community have a better sense of security and stability in view of the co-ordination and harmonisation of policies and systems within the community.

To ensure effective popular participation and accountability in Africa's drive for recovery and transformation, the following should be taken into account:

Governments should identify and recognise for purposes of Consultation, the major interest groups in society. They could be consulted during policy formulation and meaningfully involved in policy implementation

The mass media could be used to find out the views and preferences of the major interest groups in society. Governments could then seek ways of integrating some

Accountability can be enhanced by

leaders setting good examples in financial management and by

punishment of officials

enriching themselves

at the expense of

their country

living, reduction in the rate of unemployment and in the degree of dependence on

other countries for vital supplies, Such a country enjoys a higher degree of security

as it is not heavily dependent on other

countries. It can feed itself, produce most of

the manufactures consumed by its citizens

and its citizens feel that their economic

security has been guaranteed. A country enjoying development is most likely to be

politically and economically stable. Without economic development, basic needs of

citizens are not likely to be met, interest

groups are hostile to programmes and plans

of governments and political instability is

endangered. Development accompanied by

with these into their own programmes, plans

and policies

Most important, interest groups such as

workers/ women's groups, professionals

and youths should be organised to own

and manage productive enterprises. In

addition these societal groups could become

share-owners in basic strategic industries

along with government to ensure

that such industries are not mismanaged

Finally, accountability can be enhanced in

Africa by leaders setting good examples in
financial management and by punishment
of officials enriching themselves at the
LWPCIISC of their country._1

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