19 e 25

Death threat for Swazi Minister.

MBABANE - A Swazi Cabinet Minister, who was this week reported to have been pestered by men who wanted to steal his bath towel, yesterday said he had received death threats.

Transport and Communications Minister Mr Albert Shabangu caused controversy soon after his appointment early this year when he raised the fine for

Sowetan Africa News Service

abuse of government vehicles from R60 to R4 000. Sources at his Mbabane

home said at the weekend

that two men had made repeated attempts to obtain

his bath towel, first by say-

ing they had been sent by himtocollectitand then by trying to buy it.

~ Shabanguâ\200\231s maid said

the two offered her R2 000

if she would give them the towel, but she refused.

There was wide speculation in Swaziland that the men wanted to harm
Shabangu and had been
advised by asangomato get
his towel so that â\200\234mutiâ\200\231â\200\231
could be used on it.

Police

The incident was reported to the police and

yesterday Shabangu saidhe

had received calls about the

for

towel incident,. together with death threats. He said the caller told him his maid had saved his life by refusing to hand over the towel.

Teacher

Shabangu is a former teacher and was a forceful

- leaderof the teachers  $a\200\231$  trade

union before he became a Cabinet Minister.

Police said yesterday they are investigating the matter.:

SQ\QET\\*N

Ten held over taxi Killings

BOPHUTHATSWANA police have arrested 10 men in connection with the death of two taxi drivers who were shot and killed in Eersterus on Friday night.

The victims were apparently forced out of their vehicles, ordered to lie face-down and shot in the head. -

The two, Mr Charles Nkuna and his friend known only as Mr Nhlane, were allegedly killed by a  $200\234hit$  squad $200\231\200\231$  hired by

a member of a rival taxi association in .

Hammanskraal, according to Mr Sipho Mahlobo, president of the South African Taxi Association Peace Committee.

Nhlane and Nkuna were towing a minibus on the outskirts of Eersterus when they were stopped by unknown men.

The killings are believed to be linked to the conflict between the Soshanguve Long Distance Taxi Association, of which the two men were members, and the Lethabile Taxi Association.:

The dispute between the two organisations is over the route between Marabastad in Pretoria and Pietersburg.

Mahlobo said the peace committee had been involved in discussions with both taxj

By MONK NKOMO

associations to resolve their dispute.

 $\hat{a}\200\234$ We have established that this hit squad Was promised R10 000 if they killed the owner of the taxis operated by both men, and R5 000 if they eliminated his drivers,  $\hat{a}\200\235\hat{a}\200\231$ 

he said.

Bophuthatswana police spokesman Colonel David George confirmed the killings, but said he did not know more about the case or if any arrests had been made. 
â\200\234We found eight spent cartridges on the scene, â\200\235â\200\235 Mahlobo said.: 
Mahlobo said they conducted investigations immediately after the bodies were

discoveredon Saturday morning and found footprints on the scene belonging to a Mamelodi man who is an alleged member of the  $a\200\234hit$  squad $200\235a\200\231$ , He said they reported their findings to

the Bophuthatswana police in Temba,

Hammanskraal, who later arrested 10 men near a local fast-food outlet.

According to Mahlobo, police also confiscated three unlicensed firearms found in the suspects  $\hat{a}$  200\231 possession.

DALI MPOFU

ANC sacks

Dali Mpofu

Mr Dali Mpofu, Mrs Winnie Mandelaâ\200\231s former deputy in the ANCâ\200\231s social welfare

t, was dismissed from his position  $\hat{a}$ 200\234some time last week. $\hat{a}$ 200\235 $\hat{a}$ \200\231

ANC spokesman Ms Gill Marcus yester- day confirmed the dismissal.

She said he had been dismissed forinternal departmental matters.

Mpofu was romantically linked to Mrs Mandela in media reports when her husband Nelson announced their separation on April 13. But he has denied any intimate relationship with Mrs Mandela.

Mrs Mandela resigned as head of the social welfare department two days later. - Sapa.

s F'rompageâ\200\2301

the townships.

According to our investigations, Hillbrow police arrested five people but are not investigating' the in-

volvement of the group inâ\200\231

the violence in Alexandra.

The  $\hat{a}$ \200\230men were released:

on warning and are to ap-

pear in the Hillorow Magis- .

trateâ $\200\231s$  Court on M% 190n charges of assault

harm.

Bhengu says he kncws all the men who attacked

: ith in-

< -tent to do grievous bodily $\hat{a}\200\235$ 

The ring of death

him. He says they wanied

\* himtojointhemin akilling

spree they were conducting in Alexandra at the time. A police spokesman, Warrant Officer â\200\230A Pieke, said Bhengu had â\200\234been arrested previously for assaulting people. This could just be a revenge attackâ\200\231â\200\231. April 4, the date on which Bhengu was at-

tacked, saw the most infighting . ;. in » Alexandra. Y

tense:

He said in discussions with the squad, he had un-

derstood that they had been

\* flying killer squad.

involved in the killings in Alexandra for  $a\200\234$ at least

three weeks'â\200\231, almost bringing it to the time when serious outbreak of violence started on March 7. According to Bhengu, an organisation finances the operations. The Alexandra fighting was largely seen as township residents fighting hostel dwellers. Bhengu's information, however, in $a\200\234a\200\234dicates$  that the instigation may have been done by a { 5 ] ® See page 11 ;} - Advertisement-FORMER Natal flyweight and welterweight champion Mr Peter Nkosentle Bhengu (53) says he was offered R260 for every person he killed in : Ale\_xzindra when violence hit the area ' last month. â\200\231 : Bhengu, formerly of Chatham Court inJoubert Park, Johannesburg, refused the offer made to him by his flatmates, who worked as security guards. They boasted they had found a way of making money. s Later he was attacked with pangas and knives because he now knew  $\hat{a}200\234$ too much $\hat{a}200\231\hat{a}200\231$ , and left for dead. . Bhengu miraculously survived the vicious attack, which left him with impaired speech, hearing and sight. He was in a coma for about 17 days at the Hillbrow Hospital. He was later discharged but had to be admitted to Baragwanath Hospital the same day, after he had collapsed. 'S Hereponedthemanetlothepolioe.'lâ\200\230hepolioe arrested the men. When Bhengu later went (o the flat to collect his clothing, he found his attackers had been released. He ran away. e 1y  $\hat{a}$ 200\234His revelations suggest that Johannesburg $\hat{a}$ \200\231s

i¬\202ai¬\202andmayalsobeoneofthemanybasmusedby

 $\label{eq:control_control} \mbox{mobile killer squads sowing death and destruction} \mbox{in}$ 

' To page 2

â\200\224â\200\224eeâ\200\224â\200\224

VOS T FP

Mr@% %i¬\201 Ao s"i¬\202i¬\201i@

MAYRBE more Sand-  $\hat{a}$ 200\230tonians. should learn to  $\hat{a}$ \200\230speak an Afr1can lan-

guage.

For if you understood Xhosa this is-what you "would have heard chairman-of the

 $\hat{a}$ \200\230Alexandra Cieie.

Organisation Moses Mayeklso say, at the end of the May Day rally

held in the Alexandra'

Stadium: .

. "Gatsha (Buthelezx) is a criminal and should be

removed. Why docsnâ\200\231t he

come here and talk to
the hostel people?

Doesnâ\200\231t he know he is -

guilty?

2Youn  $i^2 201ust fwht In-kacha and get them out$ 

of Alex. You musrnt accept people being killed.  $a\200\230$ We want unity of the people, but not unity

1 with the VIOIent the .

know they're going to

have to move. "De Klerk and Gatsha

are criminals because' they didiâ\200\231t want to take

 $\hat{a}$ 200\230Inkdtha out so they . \_ didn $\hat{a}$ 200\231t come and discuss

all this with the people because they know they

are guilty.  $\hat{a}\200\235$  '~: "The v1olcnce is' a]1 2 class war, capitalist class . wants.to destabilise

\* workers. Down with cap~

italism, on to socialism! . We want an OAU inter-  $\,$ 

national momtormc

group. :

"The co mmun1ty in Alex must flcnt £OT power: Defence units must be supported by the people. People who are well trained MUST USE GUNS and chase out Inâ\200\224

pn $\mbox{in}\mbox{202}$  np their h-nusers and get: Inkatha out of Alex.

"Trained people must train others. They must

 $\hat{a}\200\230$ not just say  $\hat{a}\200\230$ I'm. well

trained so  $1\hat{a}\200\23111$  JLSt helv

my family $\hat{a}$ \200\231.

"IF all this can happcx1, the next step will be everyone will live in peace.â\200\235 - (Taken from a

" verbatim. transcnpt of
\_the speech.)

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h- \hat{A}£ ecoa\hat{A}».\hat{A}» hot seat pot yet reached\hat{a}200\231 agreement . .
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e Crrzen 13â\200\224 0%l s corruption k to peace: Hani

bldck

GOVERNMENT cor-

general Mr Chris Hani said yesterday.

In a statement to Sapa Mr Hani said: â\200\234Therefore, it is quite clear that the major decision to be taken at Codesa Two is the demand for the immediate and unconditional resignation of this illegitimate, corrupt, neo-fascist and decadent regime making way for an interim

Govtâ\200\231

ruption and its involve-

munist Party secretary- .

government of national unity which would pave the way for elections to a constituent assembly.

â\200\234These latest scandals, we believe, are only the tip of the iceberg. They clearly reveal a pattern of massive financial corruption that affects the entire fabric of government.

 $\hat{a}\200\234$ The victims are the poorest of the poor who are currently facing serious crises in housing, employment, health services and education,  $\hat{a}\200\235$  Mr Hani said.

The DP spokesmÃ@nâ\200\230

on Development Aid, Mr Peter Soal, said the fact that six civil ser-

. gross mismanagement

x4

vants could be the fall guys for billions of rands fraudulently misappropriated from the Department of Development Aid would not satisfy public anger.

He said in a statement  $\hat{a}\geq00\geq30$  that the government had to move swiftly to assure the public that it was committed to clean and open administration.

While the officials were pursued through the courts the politicians responsible . for this

had to accept responsibility for their ineptitude and resign. â\200\224

Sapa.

National

jected the

Award which the Turk-{ish Government said it would present to him on May 19.

In a statement in Jo- $\hat{A}$ ¢ hannesburg yesterday, 'the ANC <7  $\hat{a}$ \200\230t was! aware of the Turkish

Ataturk

Fmandela rejects
Turkish W&Eâ\200\231d

AFRICAN

Congress president Mr Nelson Mandela has re-

Government s nouncement - that it would make the award.

 $\hat{a}\200\234$  (But) the = ANC wishes to staic quite categorically that Mr Mandela has not accepted

. the Ataturk Award, and

has no plans to visit Tur-

xey.; 5 The ANCâ\200\231s atmudc

е

i reflect any nega-

of Kemal Ata-

turk, the rveformer and

founder of modern Tur-

key, the statement added.

" ANC publicity official Gill Marcus said Mr Mandelaâ\200\231s non-accept-

ance of the award effec-  $\hat{A}$ \$ tively meant he had  $\hat{a}$ 200\234re- & - yected or declined $\hat{a}$ \204¢ it:

â\200\230?&

roun

dswell

 $200\230\$  for an interim go

By Fred de Lange MOST Whites, Indians and Coloureds are not in favour of an interim government without a further test of the electorateâ\200\231s opinion while roughly half of Blacks feel the same way.

In a survey result issued by the HSRC in Pretoria yesterday, 2 000 respondents indicated that the overwhelming endorsement of negotiation and reform in the referendum was substantially due to fears of what would happen if Mr De Klerk lost and negotiation ceased.

Project leader Prof
Lawrence Schlemmer
said his analysis of the result of the survey proved
the referendum result was
not due to any particular
enthusiasm for the results
of negotiation.

Only about 25 percent

of Asians and Coloureds, 14 percent of Whites and 50 percent of Blacks favoured an interim government.

It appeared as if most party political supporters wanted some kind of elec-

tion to test support before such a government was formed.

Most respondents also felt that an interim government should contain as many parties as possible and few wanted to see such a government dominated by the ANC and the National Party.

Few respondents, including only 40 percent of the Black respondents, wanted such an interim government to take control of the security forces.

Professor Schlemmer said the main reason for the hesitation and lack of conviction among the respondents was as a result of perceptions of what life would be like in the new South Africa with only Black respondents being more positive than negative about the future.

He said much of this pessimism was unwar-ranted if one considered the views and sentiments of all South Africans concerning democratic checks and balances with most respondents supporting such measures.

In general there was a

great deal of tolerance

among the rank and file supporters of the different political parties and also a high degree of acceptance of direct ethnic representation in government.

A surprising element of the survey was the fact that there was division among Black on the abolishment of homelands.

Future Black voters also showed no consistent evidence of adhering to a strong socialist ideology although most wanted some kind of affirmative 'action.

Professor Schlemmer said it appeared as if the high degree of violence and extreme political views in South Africa were centred on a small group of highly politicised activists with ordinary people being much more amenable to find an equitable 'resolution of differences.

â\200\234The sooner all parties mobilise the real masses, bringing in' ordinary people, the sooner South Africans will realise that the future holds more promise than threat,â\200\235 he said.

disgraced Irish Catholic bishop has admitted the â\200\234grievous sinâ\200\235 of fathering a child but his American son, now a teenager, told of his pride at finally being acknowledged.

Dr Eamonn Casey also confessed that he once used church funds to make a payment to the boyâ\200\231s mother, although this sum had now been repaid.

American divorcee Annie Murphy (44), stunned Ireland last Friday when

 $\hat{a}\200\230\$ i¬\201isgracei¬\202 sed church funds

she said on radio that her 17-year-old son Peter was born after a  $a\200\234$ magical $a\200\235$  1970s love affair with Dr Casey.

## Celibacy

The scandal has rocked Catholic Ireland, sparking a debate about priestly celibacy and the use of church funds.

Dr Casey (65), resigned last week as Bishop of Galway, citing personal reasons, and left for the United States saying he planned to devote the rest of his life to missionary work.

 $\hat{a}\200\234I$  have sinned grievously against God and His church, and the clergy and all the people of the

dioceses of Galway and

Kerry, $\hat{a}$ \200\235 he said.

But 17-year-old high school student Peter Ea-

monn Murphy said from his Connecticut home this was a great moment.

 $\hat{a}\200\234$ This is incredible. I could not have asked for anything more. I am

- dumbfounded, and I am

very proud,  $\hat{a}\200\235$  he said.  $\hat{a}\200\234$ It shows he is willing to ad-

mit his mistakes. I'm very .

happy.â\200\235

\_ ties

Wednesday 13j $\ddot{}$  201\_a'y- \_1 935 shop had

Annie Murphy, of Ridgefield, Connecticut, was also delighted. Initial reaction in Ireland was that the statement was a necessary clarification and there were hopes now in the church that the statement would close the scandal.

The controversy surrounding Dr Casey, a
bishop since 1969, has
also caused fears the
churchâ\200\231s moral authority
could be diminished at a
time when Ireland is agonising about whether to
relax a constitutional ban

+on abortion.

Dr Casey is regarded in the church as a liberal and

 $\hat{a}\200\230$  caused a stir in 1981 by

urging Ireland to sever with the United States over its policy on El Salvador. He refused to meet then president Ronald Reagan when he visited Ireland.

Divorce

Ms Murphy said she met Dr Casey in Ireland

 $\tilde{}$ in 1973 when he was

Bishop of Kerry, shortly after her own  $a\200\234$ bad div-

orceâ $\200\235$  in the United States.

She said the baby was born in Dublin, where she lived for a time in a home for unmarried mothers.

Dr Casey at first offered â\200\234belligerently and
grudginglyâ\200\235 to make child
support payments of 100
dollars (R290) a month
then raised the sum to 175
after Ms Murphy threatened to take the child to
Rome and have him declared a ward of the
church, she said.

Dr Casey said he needed prayer and guidance  $\hat{a}\200\234$ before reaching a final decision about how I can set about helping the hurt I have caused to Annie and Peter $\hat{a}\200\235$ .  $\hat{a}\200\224$  Sapa-Reuter.

Tukkies Right-wingers claim SAP â\200\230spyâ\200\231 movey

â\200\2244

â\200\230Wednesday +13-May 1992

By Fred de Lange &

RIGHT-wing students at the University of Pretoria yesterday claimed that the security police had launched a covert operation to infiltrate the various Right-wing organisations at the campus and had offered state

funds to further the

cause of such organisations.

Dexter, mouthpiece of the â\200\234Vrye Afrikaners op Tuksâ\200\235, yesterday claimed that at least three security policemen approached the various Right-wing organisations on campus and attempted to infiltrate them.

The three, Warrant Officer Johann Hattingh, Tommie Kruger (rank notâ\200\231 known), and a woman known only as Jenny, allegedly tried te sow division among Right-wing groups and promised to make money available

from State funds for in-

formation on other organisations.

The editor of Dexter,
Mr Ernst Rex, yesterday
said the first contact from
the security police came a
week before Christmas in
1990 when he was approached by Tommy
Kruger â\200\224 who introduced himself as Hannes
â\200\224 and was told that the
security police had infiltrated the Conservative
Party branch on the campus.:

Early in January, Mr Rex visited the South African Police and complained to senior officers about the way in which  $a\200\234$ Hannes $a\200\235$  was trying to sow division. The police $a\200\231$ , denied that Hannes was a policeman but said they knew who he was and would stop his activities.

During May 1991, a man who introduced himself as Tommy Kruger and who identified himself as a journalist working at a news agency claimed that he knew of a number of security policemen who had infiltrated Right-wing organisations.

Mr Kruger later admitted that he was a security policeman and later that month he introduced Jenny to the Right-wing organisation and offered to make money available to them.

During the next year the three allegedly claimed that there were a

. number of security police-

men supporting the Right-wing and that this group would assist to make sure that the Right-wing organisations - at Tuks would not be infiltrated.

They allegedly offered bugs to be used to spy on suspicious people and urged Right-wingers lo investigate Left-wing organisations on the cam-

pus.

Mr Rex said yesterday that it appeared as if the policemen were trying to keep the government of the day in power and to make political profit out | of the Right-wing:

\_ He feltthat shouldhis. be- trues!thé polied wereâ\200\231

" exceeding their dutiesiand |

aims and were a danger to |
democracy in South Africa. :

In its reaction yesterday, police headquarters in Pretoria said it had taken note of the allegations and normally did comment on such allegations.

The police wished to

point out, however, that the- use of collaborators was a wide-spread practice in security services throughout the world and that such actions fell within the terms of Article 5 of the Police Act.

"  $\hat{a}\200\234$ It would therefore be unfair to create a perception that the South African Police are involved in political acli\'itic-\).  $\hat{a}\200\230 = \hat{A}\$  must also be accept-

ed that the police do not

spy on legal organisations or political parties but that attention is given to

individuals involved in il-

legal activities, notv.vgth-

standing their political connections,  $\hat{a} \geq 200 \geq 35$  the South African Police said.

Doy News 12-05- 92

- Corruption â\200\230shocksâ\200\231 KCommunist Party

## y News Reporter

THE South African Communist Party says the recent scandals involving Government officials will hamper the way forward for a peaceful negotiated settlement.

In a statement, the SACP said  $\hat{a}\200\234$ the shocking disclosures of Government corruption and in- $\hat{a}\200\230$ volvement in the murder and assassination of political activists  $\hat{a}\200\235$  had confirmed their view that  $\hat{a}\200\234$ the De Klerk regime was a major obstacle to peace and a negotiated settlement  $\hat{a}\200\235...$ 

Joining the joint call by the African National Congress Members of Parliament and the Conservative Party, the Communist Party called for the Governmentâ\200\231s â\200\234immediate and unconditional tionâ\200\235.

 $\hat{a}\200\230$ The SACP said the latest scandals were  $\hat{a}\200\234$ the tip of the iceberg $\hat{a}\200\235$  and  $\hat{a}\200\234$ clearly revealed

a pattern of massive financial corruption that affects the entire fabric of government.

 $\hat{a}\200\234$ The victims are the poor who are currently facing serious crisis in housing, employment, health services as well as education.

â\200\234The Trust Feed verdict and the written proof of State instructions for the murder of Matthew Goniwe were no exceptions, but part of a cynical glan to eliminate the ANC,

ACP and other community leaders on a systematic basis. $\hat{a}$ 200\235

Attacking the recent release of KwaZulu policeman Khethani Shange, whom a judge called â\200\230â\200\234a monster in a clothesâ\200\235, the SACP claimed countless people remained incarcerated as political prison-

ers  $\hat{a}200\234$ contrary to agreements between the Government and the ANC. $\hat{a}200\235$ 

olicemanâ\200\231s -

Bikht alleged ANC metfibers in court over killing of woman

Pietermaritzburg Bureau

EIGHT alleged members of the African National Congress at Enhlalakahle, Greytown, apgeared in the Pietermaritzburg upreme Court yesterday in -connection with the killing of a woman who was suspected of ;upporting the Inkatha Freedom m B

y.; It was revealed in court that  $tAh\hat{A}$ \$ (\:rictlm was a member of the

The accused, whose ages ranged btftween 1g and 22, v::re ap | y part of a group that in g.:;;teml)ex' last year allegedly assaulted and repeatedly stabbed Miss Thembisile Vietoria Mthembu (20) after seeing her close to the HL&H compound near Greytown â\200\224 which

frequented by Inkatha Freedom Party supporters.

Thereafter Miss Mthembu was seen in Zig Zag Road, Enh-lalakahle, and was accosted and assaulted before being taken to a house in the township.

- At the house it was established that Miss Mthembu was on the list of people suspected of supporting Inkatha and it was

egedly decided to kill her.

The charge is that the eight accused and others formed two

oups and waited for her to

eave the house. She tried to flee from the groups, but she was caught and they took turns stabbing her.

She died on the scene from multiple injuries.;

The eight, appearing before

Mr Justice McLaren, all pleaded not guilty to the charge.

Proceeding

ANC WOMEN O APPEAR a

COURT

TWENTY-TWO members of the African National Congress womenâ\200\231s league who were arrested outside the Durban offices of the British Consulate and the United States Consulate-General yesterday were due to H) pear in the Durban

agistrate $\hat{a}$ \200\231s Court today.

The women, from Imbali township, Pietermaritzburg, face charges of trespassing.

The women attempted to stage a sit-in at the consulates and wanted to hand over memoranda asking the British and US governments to put pressure on the South African Government to withdraw the Defence Forceâ\200\231s 32 Battalion, the South African Policeâ\200\231s Riot Unit and the Kwa-Zulu Police from Imbali township.:

The women were refused entry into the diplomatic offices and later arrested.â\200\224Crime Reporter

Break-in: dog
tackles man

AN ALLEGED burglar was tackled by a police patrol dog after breaking into a panelbeating workshop in Sydney Road, Durban, last night. Lieutenant-Colonel Dickie Pieterse, regional co-ordinator of Dog Units in Natal, said today that the alarm at Durban Panel Beaters went off and a security company investigated.

Warrant Officer
Dennis Crew, of the Dog
Unit, arrived at the
scene and released his
dog, Rex, who tackled a
man.â\200\224Crime Reporter

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News

(3 B Fo2

" Shangeâ\200\231s release: the secrecy persists

HETHANI Richard Shangeâ\200\231s fame as a released prisoner dates back to early 1990 when he twice led attacks on the Gu-

mede home in KwaMashu, situ-

ated 500 metres from the local police station.

Five people were murdered.

Shange was both a member of the Inkatha Freedom Party and the KwaZulu Police.

At the time KwaMashu was deeply divided, and plagued by political violence.

While African National Congress supporters danced with joy at the release of Nelson Mandela, IFP supporters looked on with displeasure and fear. .

On May 29, 1991, Mr Acting Justice Gordon convicted Shange of murder and three cases of attempted murder, sending him to jail for 27

~ years.;

Why was a convicted murderer released nine months after he started a 27-year jail term?

MARTIN CHALLENOR, Political Correspondent of The Daily News, reports.

 $a\200\224$ :

Mr Justice Gordon described Shange as a cold-blooded murderer, and as  $a\200\234$ an agressive person who at-

tacks his enemy first, enjoys being

popular as a killer, and that people fear  $him a \ 200 \ 235$ .

Shange was a  $a\200\234$ beast in a police-mana $200\231$ s clothes who was one of the main players in the reign of terror

in KwaMashuâ\200\235, Mr Justice Gordon

said. -

At the time, the South African Government was involved in intricate dealings with the ANC on the release of political prisoners. President de Klerk was anxious to complete the release because it was the last remaining pre-condition Washington had imposed before President George Bush would lift sanctions.

Included in the agreement be-

tween the ANC and the Government -

on the release of prisoners was a paragraph that said:  $\hat{a}\geq00\geq34$ Whereas a large number of prisoners do not qualify for release according to the categories and the guidelines, cognisance is taken of the fact that the Government is making proposals for special and substantial remission of sentence which may include parole in certain case. $\hat{a}\geq00\geq35$ 

The Government used this provision to release 41 security force members in jail, 13 ANC members, 10 IFP members and two old-age prisoners.;

Mr Kobie Coetsee, then Minister of Correctional Services, signed the papers on July 4 to release Shange and the other security force mem-

bers but, in keeping with the Government  $200\231$ s golden rule of saying nothing and hoping nobody found out, made no attempt to explain the fairness aspect.

Murder is murder. But if ANC murderers go free in the name of seeking a new South Africa, then the doctrine of fairness implies that people on the Governmentâ\200\231s side who killed deserved equal treatment. - \_

It was only last week, when the Democratic Party MPs started asking questions about Shange, that the release of the 66 prisoners this way become known.

Still the secrecy persists. Shange | should â\200\230have been released on May! 29, but a computer error let him out | on February 14. 3

He had a job arranged before he was released, according to his parole conditions. There is thus a suspicion and fear that he is back in policeman  $200\231$  clothes. :

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 $a\200\224$   $a\200\224-a\200\224$  - e

 $\hat{a}\200\231m\& ANA\_/$ ; /stws (8=8 50

â\200\230Masses show
moderation
about future

WHILE the politicians squabble in Codesa,

xtreme cau-

tion rules ordinary South Africans are remarkably

South Afri- agreed on the major issues facing the new

cans, dictat- South Africa. A recent survey shows that ing their views to- South Africans are leaning to the centre of wards negotiations, the political spectrum and their hopes and an interim govern- fears are so common that they could force: ment, constitutional hardline political parties into reconsidering

principles and an ,
eventual open democ- VASANTHA ANGAMUTHU and SUSAN
racy. : MILLER report.

the HSRC â\200\230shows that Â\$ South Africans are not â\200\234wildly excitedâ\200\235 about the new South Africa; that they generally hold similar views and are not as polarised as the leadership of the political organisations and parties they may

sugport.

their positions.

forces;

B Black people were only moderately positive in their expectations of the new South Africa;

B Whites were generally pessimistic about the future,

B There is strong support among all South

finding an equitable resolution of differences.â\200\235 Professor Schlemmer said that the sooner all parties mobilised â\200\234the real massesâ\200\235, bringing in ordinary people, the sooner South Africans will realise that the future holds more promise

rofessor Lawrence Africans for a devolution than threat. Schlemmer, a managing of power to lower tiers of The findings of support director at the HSRC, government, closer to for political parties put said the recent referent he people; the ANC and the Nation-

dum results in no way
indicated any particular
enthusiasm for negotia-

B Political rights and Iiberties are well endorsed;

al Party at the top end of
the poll. )
The survey results sig-

tions.

The HSRC survey (which excluded the TBVC states) showed that about 25 percent of Indians and coloureds, roughly 50 percent of blacks and about 15 percent of whites want an interim government as

soon as possible.

He added that most party political supporters, black and white, would like to see some further test of opinion before the interim government is established.

Other survey findings: B Very few people said they would like to see a big party  $a\200\234$ cartel $a\200\235$  be-

tween the ANC;

B Very few people. would like to see the interim government taking control of the security

â\200\230B There is a high degree of acceptance of direct ethnic representation in Government;
B There is no over-whelming view among blacks that homelands should be abolished;
B There is no consistent evidence of strong â\200\234so-cialistâ\200\235 ideology among future black voters;
B Strong sentiments fa-

vouring affirmative action  $a\200\224$  both by ANC and NP supporters  $a\200\224$  exists.

Professor Schlemmer said that extreme political views, the current violence and political agression were being perpetrated by highly politicised activists, both black and white.

 $\hat{a}\200\234$ The real grassroots, the rank and file, are much more amenable to

esi

ge

nificantly marginalised the Democratic Party, the Conservative Party, other right-wing organisations, the Pan Africanist Congress and the Azanian Peoplesâ\200\231 Organisation as having very little, if any support among the wider South African population.

Professor Johann Mouton, a general manager at the HSRC, said that South Africans will vote the ANC into power if a general election was held today.

However support for the National Party among Indians and coloureds particularly has almost doubled in the past three years.

Despite this, the NP would only get about 25 percent of the votes as

AMONG the crowds, the resu

Its of the referendum was not a mandate

for change. A survey by the HSRC shows that most people have little

opposed to the ANC at between 40 to 45 percent.

The Inkatha Freedom Party would come in third at around 10 percent.

Professor Mouton said that support for organisations to the far left was confined to the better educated Sotho speakers and metropolitan Xhosa, Swazi and Ndebele speakers.

Overall the ANC would poll two-thirds of the black support in the country, the IFP 12 to 15 percent and the NP between three and five percent.

Between 15 and 18 per-

cent of those polled were uncertain about which way they would vote as compared to the 30 to 40 percent in the beginning of 1991 a 200 224 possibly because black respondents were more willing to voice their -opinions about political matters or because they had made up their minds to side with the ANC.

Professor Schlemmer said that the support for organisations and parties had more or less peaked.

The ANC, as an example, enjoyed close to 70 percent support in a survey conducted soon after its unbanning.

Professor Schlemmer said this could be attributed to the  $a\200\230a\200\234$ newness factor $a\200\235$ , and that most people had more or less

decided which way to go when voting.

Some organisations have dismissed the find-ings of the survey, especially those whose support appears to be far below their expectations.

National spokesman for the Azanian Peopleâ\200\231s Organisation, Strini Moodley, said the survey was â\200\234highly suspectâ\200\235 and that Azapo would not take it seriously.

 $\hat{a}\200\234$ Schlemmer has always been guilty of using

the academic trick of research to support his own theories. It is re-

markable that people

who conduct them, more often than not, reflect their own views.â\200\235

Mr Moodley was sceptical of the survey findings that the NP support among blacks had grown.

â\200\234The vast majority of people in this country have clear evidence of NP involvement in violence, from the Trust Feed findings and the release of policemen who have killed, the Development Aid scandal, the fact that they have

enthusiasm for negotiations and are not wild about an interim government at this stage, prefering to see a further test of opinion.

messed up the Budget, and the high rate of unemployment.

 $\hat{a}\200\234I$  cannot for the life of me understand how people are going to want to support a party that is responsible for all of this,  $\hat{a}\200\235$  Mr Moodley said.

Kim Hodgeson, a spokesman for the Inka-tha Institute, said they viewed surveys like the HSRC one with scepticism because the results could be  $a\200\234$ slanted $200\235$  by

who was doing the interviewing.

 $\hat{a}\200\2340n$  the Reef, for instance, people would be too scared to say they

## Qâ\200\230

no survey so far has gone into the hostels on the Reef where almost all the hostel-dwellers are IFP supporters,  $\hat{a}\200\235$  he said.

Mr Hodgeson said he accepted the survey might indicate trends inj politics and that the IFP was â\200\234gearing itself up to mobilise in the Indian, coloured and white areasâ\200\235 and stated that it had attracted some sup-| port amongst â\200\230Sotho and Xhosa-speakers. '.

Mr Frank Le Roux of) the Conservative Party] said the CP was involved in a profound study of political development after March 17.

supported the IFP and

â\200\224 U ) TPTE Nay /\/EW;

8-S -7

HE once-frosty relations be-

tween Kenya and South Africa

are undergoing a transforma-

tion that some Kenyans believe could result in the creation of a formidable trade alliance.

The new relationship has come at a fortunate time for the Government of President Daniel arap Moi. With inflation runling at about 22 percent, with the budget hugely in deficit and with the manufacturing, agricultural and tourist sectors all depressed, Kenya was on the look-out for new markets and trading partners.

The air links that were resumed in December 1990 after a break of 28 years opened some avenues for entrepreneurs of both countries. There has been a continuing exchange of visits and some business agreements, including the multi-million-dollar joint venture between Johannesburg-based M-Net and Kenyaâ\200\231s only privately-owned television station, RTN Channel 62.

M-Net is reported to have taken a 50 percent stake in RTN in a Rll-million deal that is described here as the biggest joint . venture between Kenya and South Africa so far. As a result, Kenyans are expecting to - receive entertainment programmes from  $\frac{3}{200}$ 

The deal was followed by the signing of a trade agreement in January between the South African Foreign Trade Organisation and the Kenya Association of Manufacturers, aimedâ\200\231at facilitating relationships in the industrial sector and paving the way for joint ventures.

Immediately afterwards, two separate visits were made to South Africa by officials of the Kenya National Chamber of Commerce and Industry, and the Government-supported Investment Promotion Centre.

The chamber chairman, Francis Ma--

The courtship of two of Africaâ\200\231s economic giants, South Africa and Kenya, is beginning to produce results and could lead to a strong partnership.

JOE KHAMISI in Nairobi reports for

charié, says Kenya and South Africa are onâ\200\231

 $\hat{a}\200\234$ the way to greater heights $\hat{a}\200\235$  while John Mwangeka of the centre says Kenya is destined to be South Africa $\hat{a}\200\231$ s trade gateway to East and Central Africa.

 $\hat{a}\200\234$ South Africa has the most advanced economy on the continent and, therefore, presents many opportunities to the rest of Africa,  $\hat{a}\200\235$  Mr Mwangeka says.

It should be noted, however, that despite official Kenyan Government embargoes, some underground trade between the two countries has been going on for years.

Available figures show that in 1989, Kenya exported to South Airica goods worth more than R1,7 million, w\_hilg it imported products worth more than R1 mil lion from South Africa. Most of Kenyaâ\200\231s exports were sodium carbonate, a by-product of soda ash which reportedly accounted for 40 percent of the total figure.

From South Africa, Kenya bought coal for its cement factories and steel products.

Nicholas Gor, chairman of the Kenya External Trade Authority, the Governmentâ\200\231s international business watchdog, says most of the South African businessmen who have visited Kenya since air links were established have expressed interest mainly in the fields of hardware, food processing and tourism.

South African-manufactured interior and exterior wall coatings are already gracing the Hilton Hotel, Jomo Kenyatta Airport and the new Meridien Hotel; Cape wines are toasting weddings and corporate func-

Strong partnership possible after frosty Nairobi-Pretoria relations

'Opportunities for Africa from advanced economy

tions and travel packages to South Africa are being advertised in the news media almost daily.

Mr Gor said, however, that there was a need for market surveys to determine the :yhole range of available trading possibiliies.

 $\hat{a}\200\234B$ oth Kenyan and South African businessmen need a clearer picture of existing possibilities and this can only be achieved through comprehensive market surveys,  $\hat{a}\200\235$  he said.

Despite the optimism, growing fears are

being expressed in Kenyan business and Government circles that the opening of trade could tip the balance in favour of Pretoria. These fears were fuelled by a speech here by the Secretary of the Preferential Trade Area , Dr Nbingu wa Muthari ku, who advised businessmen in the trade region to be cautious of South African moves to woo them with large business opportunities.

He said a lot of African businessmen had not analysed the South African market or their own potential and had, therefore, become targets of what he called  $a\200\234$ that country $a\200\231$ s business psychology $a\200\235$ .

Dr Muthariku, a Malawian, said:  $\hat{a}\200\234$ South Africa has developed a strategy of the romance of the unknown and a lot of our business people have been attracted by this withour realising the consequences.  $\hat{a}\200\235$ 

Most businessmen here believe that much of what will come out of the Kenya-South African alliance will depend on the political stability in both countries.

They say that while there has been a tremendous interest in Kenya from South African businessmen, very few tangible commitments have been made and deals sealed. South African investors are believed to be awaiting the outcome of the multi-party elections that are due to be held in Kenya within the next 12 months.

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-CAPE TOWN \hat{a}200\224 The lifting of arins sanc-
- tions would make little difference to SA olitical St2
+ SA Defence Force chief-of-staff finance force R4 112m (4247 the 1 R82TM
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230ef%ay-(85%) and ome(rs 'mos), a^200^231m; (15?,;%.,).:
owever, he &l not believe ar s boy- < o s
ucotts would be lifted soon and po'mted out .mltfeggf\:n&e;&egggszzf beenn m:xntaxngd
=%that arms sanctions were still being en- 2 A%
4â\200\231t9rced against Namibia. Even if they were ggg;:h::r;;hi¬\201logfgnbiâ\200\234tiâ
\200\230:\alpha\200\234{\?;\alpha\200\230:\begin{align*} \alpha\201it?:t t&z \\ \alpha\201it?:t \text{}
Jifted, many of the best type of weapons or pudget this year would have beer about
\hat{a}200\234SA conditions Wers produced in the cou%\hat{a}\200\235 - R1THS ihd about Ridbn if the 19
90 esti-
try, be said at a news briefing. mates had been maintained.
LT : It was however R9,705bn, 2 decline in
diers currently were deployedmtownshxps J y B e
e bad veen SO tme during Sâ\200\230}a«}otï¬\201??ï¬\201eiâ\200\230ozaâ\200\231\{%sâ\200
\231ui¬\201zi¬\202t it Secott te
qn: rsafd :i)ouimliill;o;\n of nt%m% aÃ@ecret gross domestic product (GDP)- .
24 383m Specia\ defence account was In 1989, defence absorbed 15,7% of t_.he
spent on line-function intelligence and EggÃ@etn::\hat{a}\200\230g:63;7;,0 \hat{A}^{\circ};\hat{A}£("$\hat{A}$\hat{A}$) d
z;â\200\230gï¬\202:epe;:;â\200\230;i
e. : â\200\230the
The remainder of the account, all of during the current financial year com-
'which was fully audited both internally pared with 56,8% in 1988
'and by the Auditor-General, was spent 00 « Murray saiditwasa misconception that
i the special defence account had plenty ®
slush funds to spend on secret projects-
= Although he would not give details on \setminus -
A Cabu}et committee had been examin-
how the SADFâ\200\231s capital budget during the . !
i r was anocated, he ing stat.e income and expendxture pver
'said a new tank cost in the region of R15m next five years
â\200\234and a new fighter aircraft between R125m groups. The defence grouP had drawn up 2
'and R150mM. five-year plan with various spending an
However, Murray said 54% of the de- strateglC optio
\hat{a}200\230fence pudget of R9 705m during the1992/93 Every cen of defence pudget was
\hat{a}200\230financial year was for operating costs such fully audited by he Auditor General bu
as clothing, rations, computer services, the disclosure of - the specia defence
\hat{a}200\230fuel and spares, and 46% for capital costs account had to be agre by the Auditor-
\hat{a}\200\230 such as aircraft, tanks, ships, ammunition, General and President. 4
â\200\230spares, maintenance and the special de- He said the Cabinet had laid down stra-
.fence account. ' tegic guidelines r the SADF 18 years ago, -
© He said the army ould receive including an internal pol'mcal settlement
' i 332% of th . '):
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 $a\200\230I'$ he last Ilew years nave 7o The Star Wednesday May  $\AM8$ as 15 ; deed been a triumph for dem cratic capitalism. and its pros; by ' pects today are much brighters Genghis Khan wifh helicopte o> than they have peen for a long or for that matter Ivan thg  $T_i$ .E:  $\hat{a} \geq 200 \geq 30$  i my understanding; rible with a functioning Internalaf : Revenue Service. To add to thiss} - dernity, 1 Tâ\2027 armoury of power control over:t that â\200\234new < the economy  $a\200\224$  that is, control4 systems  $a\200\235$  will emer of the livelihood of all or even® iorgseeal; le future. Eithe the great majority of the popuTsf talism will survive, or socialls lation  $\hat{a}\200\224$  is to bring about 2= will return in one form O 8T quantum leap in power. ; ; Such power is difficult if notsy impossible to reconcile with deZ>f mocracy. Socialism can only be\*\* established by a titanic act o expropriation. But, given tHes:  $\hat{\mathbf{A}}^{\boldsymbol{\varphi}}$  all the wor cpntdition of humaill- life in so< the prospects for democracysp ciety, property. will i i e : p : spri¥1g ;1) lp ggair);. inevitabIgay are quxte: bright. O The socialist expropriatio  $\hat{a} \geq 00 \leq 34 =$ therefore, cannot be a one-time=5§ only event. It must be reiterats ed over and over again. . ::i-:' Socialism requires eternalâ\200\231 : vigilance. Such permanent e £ propriation, however, cannot gk democratically administeres:% Those who are to be expropria§  $\hat{a}$ 200\230ed will organise and resist.  $\hat{A}$ ¢ tatorship is the only politicaksH solution to this problem. ¥ If one understands thesaly basic structural facts about 3¢ modern society, the talk of a-3Mi $a\200\234$ third way $a\200\235$  between capitalism $a\200\231$ @ and socialism makes no sen et at all. There is no  $a\200\234$ third way $a\200\231s =$ There are, to be sure, modifigh cations of the first and the secyy ond  $a\200\234$ ways $a\200\235$ . There are varian{Sa® of capitalism, as there haves been variants of socialism. 17 I If one prefers to speak of  $&4\hat{a}\200\231$  $\hat{a}$ \200\234mixed economy $\hat{a}$ \200\235, every empirgd; ically existent economy issah  $a\200\234$ mixed $a\200\235$  in the sense that therdSy

is some combination of marke 3 forces and State interventions. %

\_ Capitalism has shown an ems during capacity to produce hiSse torically unprecedented wealthSH and to allow huge masses ofes people to benefit from this. SOX¥E cialism has shown itself to be B an unmitigated economic angall political disaster. As democracygs requires a capitalist foundation % this foundation appears securg:p for the foreseeable future. Dem® ocratic capitalism thus appear3ep to be the only way to go.

L e Swee 6uant\_um

Pravin Gordhan . . . seen as the officlal  $\hat{a}$ 200\230voice of Codesa". .

RAVIN Gordhanâ\200\231s name was well known in activist circles a long time ago, but now the whole country hangs on his wqrds as the â\200\234voice of Codesaâ\200\235. Mr Gordhan â\200\224 known as

" â\200\234PGâ\200\235, to his friends â\200\224 succeed-

ed Democratic Party leader Dr Zach de Beer as management committee chairman on Jan-

 $a\200\230$ uary 20. Sifice then he has sum-

marised and interpreted for the nation all the goings-on in working groups  $\hat{a}\geq 00\geq 24$  and sounded positive notes when deadlocks seemed inevitable.

It is a task which seems to the liking of the man whose friendly face and softly spoken style belie a background of steely political commitment.;

Ае

jump i;i/}"o Codes

 $\hat{a}$ \200\230transitional arrangements.

 $a\hat{a}\200\231s$  hot s

eat

Mr Gordhan, a longstanding 'coqesa has a knack of catapulting political figures Into the national limelight  $\hat{a}$ 200\224

executive member of the Natal | Indian Congress, was a natural choice on the management '

Athe late

st Is Pravin Gordhan, chalrman of the management committee. On the eve of Codesa 2, Political Reporter ESTHER WAUGH profiles the man.

committee and the Codesa - working group thrashing but] But there is more to  $a\200\234PGa\200\235$  than the Vula connection. The Besides the NIC, however, his 43-year-old is a founder mem:; name was connected with  $a\200\2340p$ - ber of the Durban Housing Aceration Vula $a\200\235$   $a\200\224$  the operation tion Committee, and in 1976 was

which the Government por- involved in organising Indign trayed as an insurrectionary communities, which led to civic plot by the South African Com- ! organisations being formed in munist Party. Mr Gordhan! the area. . spent close to four months in He is also part of a campaigp detention in 1990 in connection -for a democratic Durban and is with Operation Vula.  $\hat{a}\200\230$ involved in the Cato Manor:de;

velopment for the development of nonracial housing.

Mr Gordhan was alsp a member of the first Peopleâ $\200\231s$  Education Committee and is now on the ANCâ $\200\231s$  education committee.

He was a member of the Release Mandela Committee and assisted in launching the United Democratic Front in Natal.

He is also a member of the  ${\tt ANC}$  and is a chairman of a

local SACP branch.â\200\231 ;

And yes, he has'been a mem: ber of the ANC underground fo: more than 10 years, doing  $\hat{a}200\234p\hat{A}$ «.

litical workâ $\200\235$ . At University  $\[^2a\200\234$ of Durban

Westville in the 1970s  $\hat{a}$ \200\224 wher he studied as a pharmacist -

Mr Gordhan says he develope.. a  $\hat{a}200\230\hat{a}200\234$ democratic conscioushess $\hat{a}200\231$ 

\_.and  $a\200\234$ Congress orientation $a\200\235$ .

. Mr Gordhan worked as

â\200\224â\200\224â\200\224 0

connection with the Inanda uï¬\201.

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rest and again in 1990 in cog il

nection with Operation Vula,

pharmaciét at Durbanâ\200\231s King

Edward Hospital unti} Novembex\_-. 1981. when he was held in . solitary ' confinement for 161 .

days in terms of section 6 of the Terrorism Act.

After the first month in detention, Mr Gordhan was told he had been fired from his job as a result of  $a\200\234$  alleged incompetence  $a\200\235$ .

On his release almost six molnlhls later, he was banned and placed under house for 13 months. i

Mr Gordhan was detained again for a month in 1985 in

During his last spell in detef

tion, Mr Gordhan said he repeay 1

tedly wrote to Adriaan Vlok;

then Minister of Law and Ordeg ="

telling him that negotiation.
had begun. i
- Negotiations had always beefi

possible and viable, dependidj'

on the extent the Government\*}i

was prepared to relinquish m nopoly of power, he said.

He ' describes his quantup leap from the ANC to being the second South Africaâ\200\231s first real negih'ating forum as not a  $a\200\234$ total disconcerting | experience bu certainly a new experienceâ\200\235, .

ï¬\201â\200\230n'

OES political democracy depend upon a market economy? The evidence sug-

gests three simple, but far-

reaching propositions.

First, there has been no case of E:litical democracy that has not

en a market economy â\200\224 in other words, there has been no case of democratic socialism. Second, there have been numerous non-democratic market economies. Third, when market economies are successful over a period of time, democratising pressures are generated.

One must be clear about terms. Someone will propose Sweden as a case of democratic socialism, but it is not. Capitalism and socialism must be understood as two alternative modern systems of production  $a\200\224$  as the Marxists have always.done  $a\200\224$  the one based on market forces and private ownership of at least the  $a\200\234$ commanding heights $a\200\235$  of the economy, the other based on political control mechanisms and on public ownership of the  $a\200\234$ commanding heights $\hat{a}$ 200\235. There is no  $\hat{a}$ \200\234third way $\hat{a}$ \200\235; there are only different versions and modifications of the two models.

1

Does political democracy require private property? If so, how much of it? Answer to the first question: Almost certainly yes. Answer to the second: No one knows for sure.

We do know the extremes. Social-

ism, the maximal role of the state in -

the economy, makes democracy impossible and ruins the economy. At the other pole, at least under modern conditions, a minimalist, laissezfaire state is empirically impossible. Some will certainly mention Hong Kong. It is no such thing, but rather a very efficient, if thoroughly undemocratic, conspiracy of Chinese businessmen and British civil servants.

In between there seems to be a good deal of leeway  $a\200\224$  say, between the US, a relatively modest case of state intervention, and much more statist cases like Japan or even

. France â\200\224 all market economies, all

\_democracies. The libertarian view that each step i public ownership is a step towards

ï¬\201uS/NESS

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in the direction of

Dny

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capitalism
1S a precondition

- for democracy

PETER BERGER

despotism is not borne out by the evidence. -

Probably, it is important to ask about not so much the degree of state intervention as the nature of the intervention. Does state intervention move with market forces or against them? Arguably, the Japanese state intervenes in the economy without undermining market dynamics; by contrast, some argue that the evoluing EC bureaucracy will damage the market economy. .:

Capitalism is a necessary but not sufficient precondition for democracy. But democracy is not a precondition for capitalism. The East Asian economic success stories show a vigorous capitalist dynamic. The â\200\234four little dragonsâ\200\235 of South Korea, Taiwan, Hong Kong and Singapore

â\200\230unfolded under non-democratic re-

gimes. Indeed, one might ask how many Western societies could be called democracies in our sense at the time they took off into modern capitalism.;

n view of this, an intelligent argument has even been made that democracy is not suitable for the

eriod when capitalism is first estab ished, though it is likely to emerge after a time of successful capitalist development. These considerations

- are uncomfortable and uncertain;

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how they are eventually concluded has far-reaching policy implications. More certainly, however, there is no great mystery as to why capitalism is necessary for democracy. It provides the social space within which individuals, groups and entire institutional complexes can develop independent of state control. Conversely, the correlation between socialism and dictatorship can be explained, precisely, by the absence of such space in a socialist system.

If one understands these basic structural facts about a modern society, the talk of a  $\hat{a}200\234$ third way $\hat{a}200\235$  between capitalism and socialism makes no sense at all. If one prefers to speak of a  $\hat{a}200\234$ mixed economy $\hat{a}200\235$ , every economy is  $\hat{a}200\234$ mixed $\hat{a}200\235$  in the sense that there is some combination of market forces and state interventions. If one keeps in mind the notion of the  $\hat{a}200\234$ commanding heights $\hat{a}200\235$ , it is not difficult to decide whether one is looking at a modification of the capitalist or the socialist  $\hat{a}200\234$ way $\hat{a}200\235$ .

In current political parlance,  $a\geq 00$  and  $a\leq 00$  and  $a\leq 00$  and  $a\leq 00$  and  $a\leq 00$  are the language of redistribution ist popu-

lism. And, typically, it occurs in

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countries that can ill afford a lot of redistribution because the rich are few and donâ\200\231t have all that much to take away from, so that redistribution means the destruction of the very middle class upon which economic growth depends.

Socialismâ\200\231s enormous intellectual

- and political defeat has fuelled a

mood of triumphalism among those who believe in democracy and capitalism. But a squirt of cold water on this happy mood might be in order.

In terms of an empirically oriented, rational mind the conclusions are compelling. Democratic capitalism appears to be the only way to go. But this argument hinges on one highly questionable presupposition  $\hat{a} \geq 00 \geq 24$  that the course of history is determined by rational minds.

It is not hard to imagine scenarios -

that would make democratic capitalism very vulnerable. This is most clearly the case in the societies that once comprised the Soviet empire now engaged in the transition from socialism to capitalism.

- Not only will this transition involve massive dislocation and suffering at least in the short run, but we do not yet fully understand all the components of this transition and there is no sure policy prescription for managing it. It would be foothar-

dy to bet on democracyâ $200\231s$  survival. It is also far from certain that the

â\200\230transition will occur in all these soci-

eties, no. matter whether under democratic or non-democratic auspices. Capitalism may quickly come

to be associated with soaring infla-

tion and unemployment, severe material hardships, collapse of public order and political chaos. Arguments about the prospects of capitalism in the longer run will be of little comfort and some form of â\200\234emergency socialismâ\200\235 could be reimposed.

Similar scenarios are equally possible in many less developed countries now moving toward a market economy. The costs of economic take-off cannot be avoided. In such situations, rational arguments do not have much weight and few people are going to be interested in pondering the â\200\234lessons of historyâ\200\235.

Further, while socialism is highl irrational in terms of societyâ\200\231s well-being, it can be very rational in terms of an elite in charge of society. To use quasi-Marxist language, a command economy immiserates the masses but it can very efficiently enrich the commanders.

Finall it would even be premature to lay pessimism to rest in the advanced capitalist societies of Europe and North America. There

continues to exist a bureaucracy seeking to stifle enterprise.

New utopias are springing up. Thus there is a feminist path to socialism, and an environmentalist one. Both would create a maze of entitlements and regulations that would mean state control over the dynamics of the market and finally the latterâ\200\231s stagnation.:

We do not know at what point state intervention in a market economy tilts the latter into a spiral of decline; we do know there must be such a

int; the moment when we discover
it may well be the moment when it is
too late to do anything about it.

[] Berger is director of the Institute for the Study of Economic Culture at Boston University. These are edited excerpts from a public lecture delivered last night under the auspices of the Urban Foundation.

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COMMENT AT

## \_ Shoddy

: ¥ DOING nothing this week, â\200\230 President de Klerk ensured that the new South Africa will be just like the old: robbed " plind by its own officials. By saying " pothing, the message he sends is that officials must be expe ~ divert public millions for private gain; there is thus little point in pursuing those who do it or dismissing Ministers who fail to stop it. 1t is a shoddy legacy, unexpect: \* from a man whose presidency has

principle. The scandal is pr

- the 'corruption-ridd
- NP rule; how it was handled would
- . say much about the present govern-
- \* ment $\hat{a}$ 200\231s view of the past and would

inevitably set 2 norm for the gov-

- . ernment of the future. President de
- ; Klerk has fallen back on the exam-

les of his predecessors: brazen it out, do as little as you have to, and hope it will 90 away..

Are no examples to be made after officials squa lions, and P ibly billions, of tax-payersâ\200\231 money? Are no efforts to be made to recover any of this money from them or the private contrac-

tors with whom they conspired? Are most of those involved in this loss of

public money, whether through dishonesty or incompetence, \$\200\230\to keep their jobs? Officials have been Suspended (on full pay?) and transferred; if other scand thing to go by, some will be retired early with lucrative benefits. How many have been fired?

The prosecutions so far have been singularly unsuccessful; charges against 17 officials withdrawn, six

ndered and stole mil-

als are any-

acquitted, none convicted and six or so cases still outstanding. This out of a department 2 judge found to be so rotten it had to be disbanded and provided a string of examples where action was warranted.

The judge also found that from 1984 onwards the departmentâ\200\231s top management knew of the problems. He found no indication that effective or successful steps were taken to reverse the situation. From 1984 to 1989, Gerrit Viljoen was the Min\_ister responsible for this depart-

\_were rife; he may have tried to stop ~it, but the judgeâ\200\231s yerdict on his efforts is damning. If Viljoen resisted a suggestion for a commission of inquiry in 1988, how many more millions were pilfered between then

~ and 1990, when a parliamentaxâ\200\230y committee insisted on an investigation? How can Viljoen keep his Cabinet post? : Where are the promises to open this matter  $a\200\234$ to the boneâ\200\235 and to prosecute every last person involved? Where is the demand for

' of officials

under him?

- Development Aid is not a sad aberration or an apartheid folly, as President de Klerk .allow§ his Min-

done not"\201a\200\230mg to ensure thdt controls are any better, now or in the future.;

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Dear Sir, \hat{A}® ' nes \hat{a}00\224 if he had conducted his search I AM delighted to see that yo in recent days in the precincts, once allowed Mr Joe Slovo to con ute u : venerable, of Parliament and the monthly column to your newspaper i , Union Buildings \hat{a}200\224 would have had (Business Day, May 8). We n : much success.
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know our antagonist if we are to & > : JACK CURTIS

defeat him. . e The real error in Mr Slovoâ\200\231s com- PO Box 1138 play much greater con sideration for ; Morwaod

 $200\230Mr$  Slovo makes some valid points  $\tilde{\}$  ment is the reference to a  $200\230quick 200\235$  Jo'b 2000 the real rights of individuals than do . ooo 0

in his article and then Spoils them bâ\200\234ck. GOOd -and succhful busi- o' burg the soci alists with their references to oy

with his analysis. He states, for ex- nesses, including those of the Oppen- EVE (011) 836'0 805 a social justice which is generauy\_ Dear Sir, . R

ample:  $\hat{a}\200\234$ Capital, if it is true to itself, heimers and Ruperts to whom he; neither social nor just. PE\_RHA?S Simon willson, author of

gives as little to the social fund as it refers, will only survive and pros' $\mbox{i}\mbox{-}\mbox{200}$  \230rl ; p C HOWARD articles in praise of Barend du Ples-

can get away with. This is its legal "over the long term by acting within cialists are wor se people than cap- Oaklands sis (Business Day, April 27 and May

C\d  $\hat{a}\200\234$ moral $\hat{a}\200\231$  Tight in current ethics the law and ethically towards their (ta lists, but because the structure of  $\hat{A}$ \$), could consider the other side of

Sut if making a quick buck is the employees, customers, Su prliers and socialist society af fords much great- | the Minister's legacy: after more

beginning and end of morality and the community in general. The quick -  $\operatorname{er}$  opportunities f or corruption. 1 Dear Sir, . than two years of recession,  $\operatorname{com}$ -

social obligation, you'll pardonus!or buck is therefore not their style. would back the  $\hat{A} \ll g$  elf-interest $\hat{a} \geq 00 \geq 300$  years ago the philos- pany and personal taxation rem ain

trying to find another way in search Even if they were ethically comfort- Rembrandt or Angl o American opher Diogenes was seen walking at unacceptably hi h levels; burden-

of social justice. $\hat{a}200\235$  able with it, and Mr Slovo advances oup any day to advance the wel- through the streets of Athens  $\hat{a}200\224$  then Som $\hat{a}202$  VAT legislation; taxpayer i no evidence in support of this view, it fare of the people of this country in its lining years as the seat of ;;unding.oi-loo 000 :edundant;but em-

would be contrary to their own best - against the we \_intentioned activi- philosophical eminence, political \_ployed bureaucrats; and a discredit-  $\frac{1}{2}$ 

interests. : ties of a bunch of bureaucrats. wisdom, economic probity and social  $% \left( 1\right) =\left( 1\right) +\left( 1\right) +\left$ 

Contrast this with Business Dayâ\200\231s There has been a strong effort concern  $\hat{a}\200\224$  carrying a lantern in It would seem that this Minister $\hat{a}\200\231s$ 

framework of laws. He does not ad- the Department of De- from the socialist camp to ridicul e broad daylight. On being asked what ~demisels the result of running out of

vance the lot of his fellows by trying P! Aid scandal the same Adam Smith $\hat{a}$ 200\231s  $\hat{a}$ \234invisible han:  $\hat{A}$ » and he was looking for he replied:  $\hat{a}$ \200\234I am rope rather than wea lth.

to do good for them in his business day. There 1s a supreme example of todisparage the work of writers such seeking an honest man. $\hat{a}$ \200\235 It is not . S D FORBES activities. This however, isnot tosay socialism at work, and of the oppor- as Frederick H ayek. However, not recorded if he found one. : Randburg

that he should not, as many reviled tunities it provides to venal officials y Smith and Hay ek been Reflecting on the continuing rev- O While pseudonyms are sometimes capitalists do, contribute  $\mbox{i}\mbox{-}\mbox{201nat}$ ; cially to feather their own nests. Similar p! correct , by the failure of elationsofc b ti d lemrtabnl:1. corrm shottfld tsa $\mbox{i}\mbox{-}\mbox{-}\mbox{202}$  out of his own pocket and of his own practices have been rife throughout socialism and suc cess Of liberal soci- criminal collusion in government s and give their , a stree

time to many deserving causes. - - the socialist world, not because So- Sties, but in their writing they dis- Canks, one wonders whether Dioge- dress and o daytime 000

Editor reserves the right to shorten letters. ePpNT neecwvw

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S e VLo o e

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he said at news briefing: mal d been maintain®
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Hie said about 100m e t  $\hat{A}^{\circ}$  1n 1989, d 15,7% of the

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The inder O t, all of during the current financial year, com-

the accoun

\which was fully audited both internally pared with 56.8% in 1988

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urrent financial year Was allocated, he ing state income and expenditure over the 'said a new tank cost in the regior A Rism » next AV years and had appointed 12  $a\geq 0$ 0 and a new fighter aircraft between Rizom 8 rOUPS The defence group had drawn up @  $a\geq 0$ 0 and R150m. five-year plan with various spending and

. However, Murray said 54% of the de- strategic options. .

 $\hat{a}\200\230$  fence budget of R9 705m duriog the 1992/93 Every cent of the defence pudget was \financial year was for operating costs such fully audited by the Audiwr-(\end{a}) eneral but

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jfuel and  $a\200\230$  and 46% for capital costs account had to be agreed by the Auditorsuch as aircraft tanks, ships, unition, Gener ident 35 8

12 Ma=s. 1993}

## THE CITIZEN

WE are not surprised that the special debate on corruption in the now defunct Depart-

'  $\hat{a}$ 200\230ment of Development Aid ended like a damp squib.

The Opposition wants the government to dismiss Ministers or resign itself, but it is not the

 $\[ \]$  201 $\[ \]$  201 $\[ \]$  of things that happens here, even if such scandals might topple governments overseas.

Besides, Dr Gerrit Viljoen, who was shifted from Development Aid to Constitutional Development, has given up Constitutional Development for State Affairs and no longer has a department to control.

The stresses and strains of running Constitutional Development and at the same time leading the government  $200\231s$  team at Codesa have left him exhausted and he has a month  $200\231s$  sick leave.

Government speakers in the debate came to his defence, saying that he had taken the legal and disciplinary steps where evidence justified it.

However, judging by the disclosures in the Pickard Commissionâ\200\231s report, neither Dr Vil- | joen, nor Dr Stoffel van der Merwe, his successor at Development Aid, nor the final Minister in charge of that badly managed department, Mr Jacob de Villiers, can escape their shares of blame for what happened.

Mr De Villiers, now Minister of Regional and Land Affairs, admits that the report has revealed a sad story of dishonesty, corruption, theft, negligence and unauthorised conduct.

Yet he pleads that unravelling irregularities is a complicated process.

This is no excuse for allowing the situation to continue over so many years without three Ministers being able to put a stop to it.

Sad to say, of the 32 police dockets opened against former employees of the department, only six criminal cases are outstanding  $a\200\224$  and there have been no convictions in the cases

\_heard so far (six cases went to trial and the

y -accused were acquitted; the Attorney-Gen\* eral withdrew 17 cases).

We think it quite amazing that a scandal that cost taxpayers many millions, perhaps billions, of rands can end without any major  $\hat{a}$ 200\224 and successful  $\hat{a}$ 200\224 prosecution so far.

 $\hat{a}$ \202 $\neg$  government is riding out the storm.

It cannot be successfully challenged in Parliament nor is there any other way in which the Opposition can force the issue.

However, taken in conjunction with the allegations that instructions were given via the

;State Security Council that three Eastern

/Cape activists be  $\hat{a}\200\234$ permanently removed from society as a matter of urgency $\hat{a}\200\235$   $\hat{a}\200\224$  and

This is happening virtually on the eve of Codesa II.

It is not only the Opposition that has been exploiting the government  $200\231s$  discomfiture  $200\224$  the ANC, too, is making capital out of it.

Mr De Klerk, who in less than three years has

That to pick up scandals that might have shaken any other leader, is in the invidious position of having to answer for scandals that originated even before he took office.:

Nevertheless, he has always been willing to have matters probed in ghe interests of clean administration.;

In the case of the assassination of Mr Matthew Goniwe and three others, he has instructed that the Goniwe inquest be reopened by Eastern Cape Judge-President, Mr Justice N Z Zietsman.

In the case of the Department of Development Aid, he acted swiftly after the Pickard Commission reported last year by abolishing the department.

But corruption in that defunct department still reeks and needs some kind of special political aerosol to clear the stink away.

Mr De Klerk must again demonstrate not only that he is a man of integrity  $\hat{a}\200\224$  which goes without saying  $\hat{a}\200\224$  but that he will not tolerate bad administration, corruption or incompetence either in government or in the public service. :

Heghas achieved  $\hat{a}\200\230$ the

store 1t as speedily as possible.

they and another activist were shortly afterwards murdered  $\hat{a}$ 200\224 the government is facing a credibility crisis. \

Established 1887 South Africa $\hat{a}$ 200\231s largest daily newspaper

Crossing the race divid

HE DECISION by the  $a\200\230$ 

ic Party to give priority

cruitment of black members is a

'sign of the times. No political party, however impressive its past : achievement and however noble its ideals, -can survive today without black support.

Blacks will comprise the biggest racial

component of an electorate of 20 million or

~ more in the new South Africa. Political parties without black members will wither away and die. The DP, threatened with absorption by the ANC on the left and the NP on the right, is particularly vulnerable. ~ It is no coincidence that the DP drive for black members, launched at the weekend, comes barely a week after the new Transvaal leader of the Nationalists, Pik Botha, - set the same priority for the NP. Blacks, once ignored by white political parties, will be wooed as never before in months ahead.

These developments are welcome. The more that party-political affiliations cut across race and language, the better South Africaâ\200\231s chances will be of avoiding the destructive forces of racial bigotry in the testing times ahead. By the same token, the ANCâ\200\231s commitment to improve its standing in the white, coloured and Indian communities is to be welcomed.

A tough road lies ahead for DP and NP proselytisers. The DP, by its own admission, barely has enough resources to woo white voters. The NP, however sincere its rejection of apartheid, is burdened by its past policy of white supremacy.;

Experience so far has not been auspicious: last year DP members were driven out of school in Mashishing, near Lydenburg, by ANC zealots; only last week an NP meeting at Huhudi, near Vryburg, was broken up by ANC militants.

The search for black members will bring the DP and NP face to face with the culture of intolerance which festered d the heyday of apartheid. These parties  $200\231$  presence in townships should give the ANC an opportunity to preach tolerance to its youthful enthusiasts.

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- D : thing as  $a\200\234$ market socialism $a\200\235$   $a\200\224$  AP aeve te \_at least the  $a\200\234$ commanding tlt:l:gimportant enterprises Te- ~ops a dynamism that wil 1 in-  $a\200\230$ ular (and real) elections, and a
- heights  $\hat{a}$  200\235 of the economy; the T oublic ownership but creasingly threaten the much b ody of (real) civil rights and
- \_ other based on politicalbii¬\201:ofi¬\201trol gnl?;â\200\230:egt;:guwith each oâ\200\230; her ~ less productive socialist sector liberti . Both institutiogxlxls serve mechanisms and on publ own- ynder market forces. Theoreti- o the\_gevelopment that keeps to limit State power.
- i ,er\_shlpâ\200\235of the â\200\234commanding cally, such a system can be the Beijing ger ontocracy awake Put in elegant philosophical
- $|\hat{a}\rangle 200\rangle 230$  heights  $\hat{a}\rangle 200\rangle 235$ . G e Yined. Two societies that at night. language, the first in stitution

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Political democracy requires makes sure that periodically the bastards can be thrown out

Currently in SA under the auspices of the Urban Foundation, PROFESSOR PETER BERGER, director of the Institute for the

Study of Economic Cul-

ture, Boston University,

gave a speech last night

in Johannesburg in which

he argued that democrat-

! ic capitalism was the

~ route to go. The following

is an edited version of his speech.

Professor Peter Berger . soclialism  $\hat{a}$ \200\224 the maximal role of the State in the economy  $\hat{a}$ \200\224 makes democracy Iimpossible and ruins—the economy.

even France  $\hat{a}\200\224$  all market economies, all democracies.

â\200\230Probably it is important to ask about, not so much the degree of State intervention, as the nature of it. More specifically: does State intervention in the economy move with market forces or against them?

Thus, arguably, the Japanese State intervenes in the economy \* without undermining the dynamics of the market; by contrast, the argument has been made that the evolving bureaucracy of the European Community (the â\200\234Brussels syndromeâ\200\235) will damage the workings of the

describe the relation between democracy and capitalism is to say that is asymmetrical.

" Put simply: capitalism is a

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â\200\2302. .

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precondition for'-democra'cy"

(put more precisely, a neces:

sary but not sufficient condi- -

ton); but democracy is not a precondition for capitalism. This, it seems, is what the empirical evidence indicates.

I regret this; I would much prefer a symmetrical relation, where the two institutional arrangements could be seen as the two sides of the same coin of liberty. Alas, they are not.

The major contemporary falsification of the symmetrical view. (the classical libertarian one) is constituted by the east

 $\tilde{A} @ \ \hat{A}^\circ$  \_Asian economic success stories. market economy. One way to

Here we have a vigorous capitalist dynami¢, still far from its apex, in some ways more successful than the Western case. Every one of the post-

World-War 2 success stories  $\hat{a}$ 200\224 notably South Korea, Taiwan, Hong Kong and Singapore  $\hat{a}$ 200\224 unfolded under non-democratic regimes.

As to Japan, it has been a democracy since World War 2, but the period when it first established a successful capitalism, the Meiji period, was anything but democratic in its political system. One might ask how many of -thÃ@â\200\231 Western societies could be called democracies in

our sense at'the time they took

off into modern capitalism  $a\200\224$  hardly England in the 18th century, the country where: it all

started. The United States,.in" this as in many other matters,

may be exceptional. In view of this evidence, an intelligent argument has even

been made to the effect that democracy is not the regime best suited for the period when capitalism is first established, though it is the regime most likely to emerge after a time of successful capitalist development. There is no great mystery as to why capitalism is necessary for democracy.

It provides the social space within which: individuals, groups and entire institutional complexes can develop independently of State control.

Conversely, the empirical correlation between socialism and dictatorship can be explained, preciselya, by the absence of such social space in a socialist system. The anti-democratic effect of socialism is structural in origin, and not just the result of some variety of totalitarian ideology (such as Marxism-Leninism).

## Inspire

To be sure, totalitarian ideas, such as that of society as an allembracing fraternity or of the party as the infallible embodiment of the force of history, have served to legitimate socialist dictatorships and to inspire their cadres. But socialism would make democracy highly unlikely even in the absence of such ideas.

The explanation for this is simple: While there have been socialist Utopias envisaging the control of the economy by independent association of producers (such was the syndicalist vision), these have remained just that  $a^200^24$  Utopias, empirically unrealisable, except perhaps in small communities (such as the kibbutz or the  $a^200^24$  intentional communities  $a^200^23$  of American sectarianism) or over short periods of time (as in the Soviets right after the Bolshevik revolution).

Under modern conditions, given the complexity of a modern or even a modernising economy, socialism invariably means control of the economy by the State. In other words, the State is the only â\200\234availableâ\200\235 control mechanism other than the market.

But because of technology, the State is already a fearsome agglomeration of power. Even the most restrained, democratic State today has more power at its disposal than the most efficient despotisms of pre-modern times.

Imagine Caligula with an empire-wide computer network, or

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: â\200\230quantum leap in

Such power is difficult i ¥

expropriation., ABï¬\201t, given th ondition of human-life in ¢ ty, property. W inevit ' The socialist  $\hat{a}\200\230$ expropriatio therefore, canno be a one-time only event. It must be reiteral  $a\200\230$ ed over and over again. . & Socialism requires ete - vigilance. Such perm rent ex \* propriation, however, cannot b " democratically administerel \_ Those who are to be expropria "ed will organise and resist. Di tatorship is the only politicalish solution to this problem. 3§ 1f one understands thest pasic structural facts about modern society, the talk of & $a\200\234$ third way $a\200\235$  between capitalis  $\hat{a}$ 200\230and socialism makes no sen at all. There is no  $a\200\234$ third way There are, to be sure, modif: cations of the first and the s ond  $a\200\234$ ways $a\200\235$ : The ari of capitalis been variants If one prefers to Spe  $\hat{a}$ \200\234mixed economy $\hat{a}$ \200\235, every em i ically existent economy .  $\tilde{a}\200\234\text{mixed}\200\235$  in the sense that then is some combination of marke  $a\200\230$  forces and State interventions. Capitalism has shown an  $\hat{a} \geq 02 \text{-}1$ during capacity to produce hi " toricall; unpyec'edented weall

- and to allow huge masses  $% \left( 1\right) =\left( 1\right) ^{2}$ 

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Professor Peter Berger .

role of the State in th

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economy  $\hat{a}\200\224$  makes de-

mocracy impossible and ruins the economy.

and British civil servants.

In between, once more, there  $\tilde{\ }$  seems to be a good deal of leeway  $\hat{a}\200\224$  say, between the United States, a relatively modest case of State intervention, and much more statist cases like Japan or even France  $\hat{a}\200\224$  all market

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pre-modern times.

Imagine Caliguia with an em-

pire-wide computer network, or

Genghis Khan with helicopters,

or for that matter Ivan the Terrible with a functioning Internal

Revenue Service. ~ '
To add to this armoury of

power control over the econ-

omy â\200\224 that is, control of the livelihood of all or even the \* great majority of the population â\200\224 is to bring about a quantum leap in power. 54
\_ Such power is difficult if not impossible to reconcile with der mocracy. e!
\_ Socialism can only be estabr â\200\230lished by a titanic act of expro-

human life in society, property

But, given the condition o&

priation.

will inevitably spring up again.:
 The socialist expropriation,

therefore, cannot be a one-time:  $\tilde{\ }$  only event. Py )

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OES political democra-CY . Tequire or depend upon â\200\230a market economy? Here is possibly

not called for. \_ g . The answer is  $\hat{a}^200^234yes\hat{a}^200^235$ . The evidence overwhelmingly suggests it.

three simple but propositions.

~ \_One: There has been no case

of political democracy that has

not been a market economy. Or,

~-if one prefers a sharper formu-

[..democratic socialism.

., Two: There have been numer,;ous cases of non-democratic
â\200\234â\200\234market economies. Three: When market econobmies are successful over a
â\200\230}'speriod of time, democraticising
- pressures are generated. -

;7 Later, I will look at some pospa sible explanations of these emi-pirical findings but, clearly, one f "cannot discuss any of this unless lwone is clear about the terms one is using. Thus, someone will ''') propose Sweden as a case of democratic socialism. It is no osuch thing.!

By these definitions, Sweden (even in the heyday - of â\200\230Social | Democratic governance) cannot be called socialist. The confusion here is between production ad distribution. . g,

Sweden, like most of the

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other northern European demo-
Char Â>ooc.qn ?Qaâ\200\230\c.. 2
cracies, developed generous
welfare states \hat{a}\200\224 that is, very
f distribu-
3; i^2 2010 i^2 201 \hat{A} , ! e ro , QL7
4'there are only-different . ver-
a\200\2347sions and modifications of the
**two alternative models. :
Does political democracy re-
7\hat{a}\200\230quire private property, and if
#1180, how much of it?;
. The answer to the first ques-
*tion is almost certainly a\200\234yesa\200\235.
viThe answer to the second â\200\230ques-
v ' \hat{a}\200\234tion: no one knows for sure. g | R P IR b et I Y CAVES S 3
L) | . y
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one question where caution is
That evidence makes possible
far-reaching -
ks lation, there has been no case of -
.threaten the much
ive socialist sector \hat{a}\200\224 the de- .
The question here is whether
there could be a market econ-
omy without. private property;
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the question

ket economy having already been answered positively.

Put differently, the question is whether there could be such a thing as  $\hat{a}\200\234$ market socialism $\hat{a}\200\235$   $\hat{a}\200\224$ the important  $\hat{a}$ 200\230enterprises remaining in public ownership but competing - with each other under market forces.

Theoretically, such can be imagined.

Two societies that ran experiments with  $\hat{a}$ 200\234market socialism $\hat{a}$ \200\235 for ;30 years were Yugoslavia

 $\hat{a}$ \200\230and Hungary. Both failed.

Can one explain the failure? Probably.; 3

The entrepreneurial risk-taking and the financial controls
over these risks (say, the businessman who starts an enterprise and the banker who loans
him the start-up capital) depend
on the motives ' of private
owners â\200\224 not so much because
of the joys of ownership as such,

< but because of the control that

ownership bestows when it is legally secure.

Improbable

. The manager of a socialist

enterprise who is told by the economic command centres  $a\200\224$  which own his firm and which in a real sense own him (since, outside the command structure, there are no (worthwhile jobs)  $a\200\224$  to go out and act as an entrepreneur is in fact told to do the impossible or at least the highly improbable: to stimulate capitalist entrepreneurship. g

In practice,  $\hat{a}\200\230$ it seems, this simply doesn $\hat{a}\200\231$ t work. What does work, up to a point, is releasing sectors of a socialist economy to private enterprise. .

This occurred in both Y slavia and Hungary, and it ha been happening quite successfully in China.:

What also happens in such cases, though; is that the capitalist sector develops a dynamism that will increasingly less product-

velopment that keeps the Beijing gerontocracy = awake . at
night.ii il o

Political democracy requires a market economy, and a market economy requires private property. But how much of it? In other words, what segments of the economy may be held in public ownership - before the

RSN o isriv 5 Mg

of whether political democracy requires a mar-

a system

basis of democracy is threatened?

- It stands to reason that there
must be a threshold somewhere
which, if crossed, threatens democracy. s :

But it seems to me that present knowledge does not permit us to mark the spot. = Fii)

Comparison between existing capitalist democracies (say, between countries like Austria and Switzerland, with quite different levels of public ownership) suggests that there is a good deal of leeway.

- The libertarian view that each step in the direction of public ownership is a step towards despotism is not borne out by the evidence.

On the other hand, given the empirical linkage between democracy and capitalism, policymakers would be well-advised to be cautious if moved to expand public ownership.:

This leads  $\hat{a}200\230$ logically to the more general question, about the limitations on the State and its role in the economy required by democracy:.  $\hat{a}200\230$ 

On a basic level, the notion of

- democracy depends on a limitation of State power.
- . The commonsensical definition of democracy defines deâ\200\230mocracy in terms of two institutions â\200\224 regular (and real) elections, and a body of (real) civil rights and liberties.

Both institutions serve to limit State power.

Put in elegant \_philosophical - language, the first institution makes sure that periodically the bastards can be thrown out of office, and the other makes sure that there are some things the bastards cannot do while they are in office. Vi

. However, when it comes to  $% \left\{ 1\right\} =\left\{ 1\right\}$ 

the question of limiting the role of the State in the economy, we are back to the insight that there must be a threshold some-where, but that we are not sure -just where it is. .

We do know the extremes, Socialism, the maximal role of the State in the economy, makes democracy impossible and ruins the economy. i bE

At the other pole, at least  $a\geq 00\geq 30$  under modern conditions, a - minimalist, laissez-faire role

of the State is empirically im-

possible, and there is no such

case. ol 81

Someone will certainly tion Honï¬\201 Kong. It is no

thing, but'rather an e
thoroughly undem cr
spiracy of Chinese businessn

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g v THE STAR 18 May /199 . Black leaders must move firmly to crush this destructive force, writes Mike Siluma thnicity

OT a moment too soon,

: the National Peace Com-

mittee (NPC) is to act

against political leaders who make inflammatory state-ments in contravention of the National Peace Accord.

.That matters have come to a stage where the NPC found it necessary to take such a step is a. timely reminder of the crucial role that black leaders \(\frac{a}{200}\)224 whose followers are, after all, the ones being maimed and murdered in political violence \(\frac{a}{200}\)224 have to play in efforts to stem the carnage.

In particular, black political | leaders need to address a phenomenon that is assuming a greater importance in the fighting â\200\224 the manipulation for political gain of ! ethnicity to fan violence among blacks.

Recent events suggest that, despite urbanisation and heightened political consciousness among blacks, ethnicity remains a potent force and a useful tool in the hands of those seeking to delay

the advent of democracy,  $\tilde{A}@r$  to build a political base among blacks ahead of elections for the first non-racial government. Consider the following:

@ A mob rampages through a part of Soweto, killing 10 people and injuring an unknown number. Residents blame the bloody mayhem on Xhosa-speaking men from a nearby squatter camp. The attackers, according to press reports, sought out Zulu speakers for attack.

 $\tilde{\ }$  QA public claim, later proved by

the Goldstone Commission to be unfounded, by senior Inkatha Freedom Party leadership of arms being stockpiled in their  $\frac{3}{200}$  for attacks on Zulu-speakers and hostel inmates in the PWV area.

@ An IFP ultimatum to Pretoria to, among other things, halt  $\hat{a}$ 200\234the killing of Zulus $\hat{a}$ 200\235 on trains on the Reef.

@ A recent investigation by the Independent Board of Inquiry into Informal Repression which found

that eyewitnesses and survivors of train violence had consistently described the attackers as Zuluspeaking.

® An elderly preacher is killed after being thrown from a moving train, apparently for no other reason than that he conducted a sermon in Xhosa. .

But what do these incidents tell us? That (as some Right-leaning commentators argue) on the eve of transition to democracy Zuluspeaking South Africans have suddenly discovered that they have unique and separate political and cultural interests which can only be advanced through the annihilation of their non-Zulu-speaking black compatriots?

Or that the reading of the funeral rites for apartheid has rekindled in Xhosa speakers some atavistic, anti-Zulu sentiment which drives them to crave for Zulu blood? â\200\231

Far from it. If either were the case, South Africaâ $\200\231s$  townships, especially in the metropolitan

areas, would long ago have been turned into wastelands.

What the incidents do tell us, though, is that ethnicity is emerging as a factor in the violence, sowing suspicion and hostility.

It is this which recently drove Zulu-speaking journalist Mondli Makhanya to write in the Weekly Mail: â\200\234As a non-ethnic-minded Zulu I am often perturbed by (the IFPâ\200\231s) abuse of Zulunesss to further its narrow political goals.

 $\hat{a}\200\234$ Terrified Reef township residents often shout  $\hat{a}\200\230$ the Zulus are coming $\hat{a}\200\231$  as they flee from ma-

 $\hat{a}\200\230$  rauding Inkatha impis. Civie and

<code>"\2010litlcal</code> activists often refer to ostel dwellers as  $a\200\230$ the Zulus $a\200\231$ , regardless of the fact that a large proportion of their censtituency

belongs to this tribe. $\hat{a}\200\235$ :

Mr Makhanyaâ\200\231s desperate plea for a more sober analysis of the conflict, and for the de-tribalisation of what is essentially a political feud, will have been received with much sympathy by many with a finger on the townshipsâ\200\231 po-

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used to fanviolence

litical pulse.

- One of them is Institute for â\200\230Multiparty Democracy executive chairman Oscar Dlomo, who points out that for many years political violence in Natal has been mainly between Zulu-speaking people divided by political allegiances.

 $a\200\234$ Casting the conflict in ethnic

or tribal terms is dangerous in (that it can actually contribute to the violence. The police are sometimes guilty of this. Also, there is the unfortunate situation where some politicians are casting the violence in ethnic terms. This is poisoning the attitudes of people, \(\hat{a}\)\235 said Dr Dlomo.

The director of the Project for

/

the Study of Violence at the University of the Witwatersrand, Lloyd Vogelman, thinks that ethnicity is  $a\200\234a$  major factor, often central to the violence  $a\200\235$ .

 $a\200\234$ What is happening is that as

ple become fearful of the vio-

ence they withdraw into ethnic
nationalism, which is not unique

â\200\230UOT) RIDPISUOD

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I Hit sauads: how much more

THE lxe for joint control of : the security forces is now incontrovertible. :

â\200\230For months, President de Klerk and his Ministers have been dismissing evidence of police involvement in the violence with the argument that these were aberrations, that every police force in the world has its â\200\234few rotten applesâ\200\235, but the SAP as a whole is strietly impartial and firmly committed to a peace-keeping role.

Now we have documentary evidence in the Matthew Goniwe case of an established procedure for authorising political assassinations involving the very highest councils of government.

It is not clear whether the signal message sent to the State Security Council proposing that Goniwe and his friends be â\200\234permanently removed from societyâ\200\235 was ever discussed by that body, which was headed by President Botha, and included Pik Botha, General Magnus Malan and Kobie Coetsee of the present Cabinet.

President de Klerk insists it was not, and this is probably correct given the need-not-to-know

- a toxic T-shirt to Donald Woodsâ\200\231s
- ~ small daughter, to the more sys-
- . tematic and ideological opera-
- $\tilde{}$  tions of the  $\hat{a}\200\23180s$  when the CCB

 $a\200\230$ hung a baboon foetus outside Bish-

op mond Tutuâ\200\231s home, poisoned the Rev Frank Chikaneâ\200\231s clothing, switched lawyer Dullah

' Omarâ $\200\231$ s heart pills to give him a

coronary attack, and went in for
selective assassinations. :

There was the blowing up of Albie Sachs, the assassination of

~ Ruth First, Jeanette Schoon and â\200\234her daughter, Griffiths and Victoria enge, Fabian Ribeiro, Goniwe and his colleagues, David Webster, and many more.

There was sgipor\_t\_ for Renamo to. destabilise Mozamibique as an ANC base, the bombs in Zim-babwe, death squad raids into Swaziland, a clandestine  $=c\hat{A}$ \$\phiam-

ign to destabilise Swapo in the gl.amibian elections, Inkathagate, the Trust Feeds massacre and its evidence of support for Inkatha in destabilising the legalised ANC inside South Africa. And now the Weekly Mail revelations.

Itâ\200\231s a long, long thread of official venality and violence. Yet the repeated exposures yield nothing,

### m A

orinciple with which political eaders usually insulate themselves from such matters. The decision to authorise the assassinations was most likely taken somewhere in the Secretariat of more than 100 securocrats,;

But the members of the State Security Council must have known that political assassinations were thtaking place and tacitly condoned

em. .

Nor is this surprising. In 1985, when Goniwe, Fort Calata, Spar-row Mkonto and Sicela Mh&?lll.i were killed, mutilated and burned, the State Security Council was Operating according to its \(\frac{a}{200}\234\total\) strategy\(\frac{a}{200}\235\), '

This was based largely on the writings of an American military strategist, John J MecCuen, who specified in his book,  $\hat{a} \geq 00 \geq 34$ The Art of Counter-Revolutionary War $\hat{a} \geq 00 \geq 35$ , that the first step in counter-insurgency operations was to smash the  $\hat{a} \geq 00 \geq 34$ Trevolutionary $\hat{a} \geq 00 \geq 35$  organisation by, among other things, identifying and eliminating key leaders.

It would appear, therefore, that the assassinations carried out in 1985 were not done by  $a\200\234$ rotten

1992,

: Allister Sparks applesâ\200\235 but by trained hit squads acting on orders from above, in accordance with approved policy. This must now be placed in context with the large accumulation of evidence indicating that such hit squad activity is continuing â\200\224 the latest being the Weekly Mailâ\200\231s disclosure of a secret police base in Sebokeng linked to the planning of assassinations in the Vaal area. It must be linked, too, to the ri-

â\200\230diculously premature release of

some policemen sentenced to long prison terms for political murders, which points implicitly to a sense of obligation to these men on the part of their superiors. There is, in fact, what Judge Rudolph Erasmus of the Info Inquiry would have called \( \frac{a}{200} \)234a golden thread\( \frac{2}{200} \)235 running through all the incidents \( \frac{a}{200} \)224 from such dirty tricks

 $a\200\230$ as the smashing of Alan Paton $a\200\231$ s

car windscreen and the sending of

The evidence disappears into some cosmic black hole in Pretoria and there is no response other than bland assurances.

Even at the height of the latest appalling revelations, the lack of concern continued. The Minister of Law and Order appointed Willem Krugel, the surviving assessor in the discredited Delmas case, declared a mistrial by the Appeal Court, to. investigate the allegations of a police cover-up in the Trust Feeds case â\200\224 a choice about as sensitive to public perceptions as choosing a juror in the Rodney King case to investigate

the Los Angeles riots.

To cap it all, right after the Trust Feeds verdict the notorious 32 Batallion, fresh from allegations of wanton violence in Phola Park, was sent into the Maritzburg area where Trust Feeds is located, provoking mass protests that culminated in a state of emergency being declared there by the end of last week.

We canâ $\200\231t$  go on like this, We

 $can \hat{a} 200 \ 231t$  have peace this way  $\hat{a} 200 \ 224$  and

we can  $200\231$ t build a new nation without peace.

hat to do about it? We need a

cleansing, but we  $a\200\230$ can $a\200\231$ t haye a Nuremburg trial because thought of that would send those now in power scrambling away from the negotiating table.

Perhaps, as in post-Pinochet

~ Chile, we could have a Commis-

sion on Human Rights Abuses that would publish its findings but impose no punishments. Yet even that has its perils, as Ariel Dorfman warns in his explosive play,  $\frac{3}{200}$  and the Maidena \200\235, which has just won the top Olivier Award in Britain.

Dorfman, himself a Chilean who was persecuted under Pinochet

\* and had friends tortured and as-

sassinated, believes it is essential that a nation be able to face and articulate the dark side of its experiences.

At the very least, the Government must stop pretending there is no problem. The evidence is too overwhelming. Mr de Klerk must acknowledge it and with his Codesa partners begin structuring an

"agreed form of joint control of the

police, the military  $\hat{a}$ 200\224 and, not least, the entire intelligence gathering apparatus. 0

DUMISANI MAKHAYE looks at the @e of Umkhonto we Sizwe e Nl AVIERCot Y

No disbanding under apa

HERE are growing rumblings about the existence of private armies in South Africa. These reverberate from the Union Buildings to the Parliamentary building in Cape Town and are echoed in Ulundi and in some sectors of the established media.

The common theme is that the ANC must disband Umkhonto we Sizwe (MK) in order to level the political ground. - When the ANC refuses, it is portrayed as having bad faith. This is politics and politics is science. We need to g0 deeper than what is shown on the surface with regard to the question of private armies.

From its very inception
Umkhonto We Sizwe was perceived as a national liberation
army of the National Liberation
Movement headed by the ANC.
It drew its cadres at all levels
from democrats from all different racial groups not simply for
logistical reasons but as a matter of principle- op. - ema ntopi s

It is important to emphasise at this point that the struggle of | the oppressed majority in South Africa is not a struggle for civil rights, nor a struggle against only racism like say the struggle of the Hispanic people or African-Americans in the U SA.

is basically a national liber-

, le and for national self-determination even though the struggle for civil rights and against racism forms part of it.

1t is a struggle against colonialism within the South African context where the coloniser and the colonised share the common borders. What happened in 1910 was not a process of decolonisation but a change of one coloniser to the other.

The conditions of the black majority remained basically the same. Such a situation also happened in countries like Tangan-

. yika where colonialism changed

hands from Germany to Britain.

The difference with the South African situation might be the

question of form but not the essence.

It has been necessary to dig this background because the historical place of Umkhonto we Sizwe: is located within that historical context.

Umkhonto we Sizwe was formed after all avenues for a peaceful change had been closed with the pbanning of the ANC and the marshalling of the

. security forces by the state to

crush by all forms of resistance. Its historical mission was the defence of not only ANC members or supporters but all the oppressed people regardless of their political affiliation..

This might sound ridiculous for those who have never experienced the political culture from within. To illustrate the point, let us take a classical hypothetical situation.;

Suppose at the height of the State of Emergency the Inkatha Freedom Party  $\hat{a}\200\230$  organised a mass demonstration against

 $a\200\230$ that State of Emergency. Sup:

pose there was 2 well-equipped MK unit in that vicinity and the police attacked the IFP demonstrators.

It would have been within the prief of that MK unit to react in defence of those demonstrators jirrespective of their political affiliation.

Unfortunately, organisations like Inkatha have been funded by the Department of Military Intelligence. Its cadres have been trained by the SADF in the Caprivi Strip: Matigulu and elsewhere. Its mass meetings have been organised and funded by the SADF with an aim of countering the growth and influence of the ANC and other organisations. All this is well documented in the Inkathagate

Scandal.

The revelations in the recent Trust Feed trial and the find-

 $\hat{a}\200\230$ ings of the Goldstone Commis-

sion in Mooi River are testimony to the collusion between the IFP and South Afri-

@qc i

can security forces. In a way the organisational independence of the IFP is questionable. Therefore it cannot expect protection by MK. This is not of the making of the ANC. Anyway, it does not need protection from. anyone for it hob-nobs with the security forces of apartheid.

1t is clear that the De Klerk and KwaZzZulu governments want to achieve by other means what they failed to achieve in the last 30 years a\200\224 the destruction of MK. They expect the ANC to assist them in that plan.

The problem $\hat{a}$ 200\230with the De

Klerk government is that it re-

gards the SADF as a national army. The voteless majority of South Africans disputes this. The SADF and SAPâ\200\231s raison dâ\200\231etre is 'to uphold and defend the South African constitution and laws emanating from the white-only Parliament. The black majority are statutorily excluded from any meanin

of their lives. They are o eratin  $o:\{tg\ de\ %\ 3$ 

a white tribal army. black officers are there simply for logistical reasons and window-dressing. They implement

orders from their white senior

officers.

More than\_this, the coming into office of the National Party

saw some radical changes in the

officers corps of the Defence

Force. The majority of capable officers who had distinguished themselves in World War 11 were unceremoniously removed or retired. Their places were taken by those who were ardent supporters of the policy of apartheid and the National Party. Therefore the SADF is not only a white tribal army, but also a private army of the National Party. Similarly, for all practical purposes whe KwaZulu Police are a tribal private army of the Inkatha Free?m Party. Whoev-

er doubts this must go to the

Paga L

in the government

. constitution. ere. fore the SADF and the SAP are  $\ensuremath{\mathsf{The}}$  few

~

~ people of Umiazi, KwaMashu

and elsewhere and learn from their practical experiences with regard to the KwaZulu Police. Why are they guarding houses of only the IFP leaders and not those of any other political organisation? Yet they are paid through the tax of all the people regardless of their political affiliation.

The ANC upholds the letter and spirit of the Groote Schuur, Pretoria and more especially, the DF Malan Minutes. It is therefore puzzling that the De Klerk government should at this hour be raising questions about MK as if there have never been any discussion on that question. — i

1t is clear that De Klerk is already electioneering on this question. But one feels that it is

- being irresponsible of him to use

such a sensitive national issue
just for electioneering.
1t is clear that there are many

â\200\230armed formations in South

Africa. The position of thâ\200\230Ã@:â\200\2341\N% $\mbox{i}\mbox{$^{2}$}$ .

 $200\230$  on this question is known. Thi  $200\$  ANC cannot, disband MK while

the apartheid regime is still in  $a\200\230$  power.

The reality is that the integration of these armed formations cannot take place under the National Party government

- ' which has its own private army
- " the SADF. This integration can only take place under- the auspices of an Interim Government of National Unity. In fact, it is those who delay the formation of an Interim Government who are the cause of the con-

tinuing existence of private armies in Squth Africa. The new. army of a democratic South | Africa will not pay allegiance to any political party but to the people as a whole. Its main

will be to defend the democratic constitution and the sovereignty of the people as a whole.

Dumisani Makhaye Is head of the ANCâ\200\231s Department of Information and Publicity in Southern Natal.

THE NATAL

MERCURY Open hand\_/

Mixed feeling

T WO FINDINGS stand

the many from the Human Sciences Research Councilâ\200\231s latest opinion survey. One is that the ANC remains the strongest political - organisation, and the other is that pessimism about the future remains

high among whites, but to a surpris-

Ing degree also among other races.

The findings are not, unexpected. The survey was done in February, and even with Codesa approaching its second plenary session, uncertainty remains the order of the day. It is understandable, for moving from white minority rule to a non-racial democracy in a society as predominantly black and with a history like ours is a giant leap by any standards.:

It is clear from the breakdown of support for the various parties that the racial prejudice on which apartheid thrived  $\hat{a} \geq 00 \geq 24$  and which it inspired  $\hat{a} \geq 00 \geq 24$  1s still at work, although it is beginning to work in somewhat different ways. Thus, while the ANC can

hope for about 45% of the over-all

vote with the help of two-thirds of the black electorate, it is different for the Nationalists. Their 25% of the over-all vote comes more from the coloured people (66%) and Asians (57%) than from whites (563%).

The survey was done before the referendum, but research analyst Professor Lawrence Schlemmer believes the big  $a\200\230$ Yes $a\200\231$  vote was more from fear of what might happen if President de Klerk lost than from actual enthusiasm for reform. :

The survey was concentrated mainly in the urban and peri-urban areas, which is to the disadvantage of both the Conservative Party and

the Inkatha Freedom Party, whose strongest Support is in the rural areas. However, while the IFP is given only 10% of the over-all vote, in

the rural Zulu community it remains

a substantial factor.

As the transition process moves to interim rule, it would be well for the negotiators to keep these divisions  $\hat{a} \geq 00 \geq 24$  and fears  $\hat{a} \geq 00 \geq 24$  in mind. It makes it all the more important that as many parties as possible are made part of the process, serving reconciliation rather than aggravating division.

ist Matthew Goniwe and his com-

panions died, and although suspicions were aroused at the time of his death, it is only now that Transkei leader Major-General Bantu Holomisa has released a document purporting to implicate thf: State Security Council in an assassination plan that the matter is being taken further. ':

The potentially damning document was released at a critical time for negotiations, and through a homeland leader linked to the ANC, suggesting political stage management. The fact that General Holomisa is still withholding what he says is a  $\frac{3}{200}\frac{34}{100}$  further evidence of SA state involvement in plans to as-: sassinate Transkei nationals adds to  $\hat{A}^{\circ}$  that impression. !

If Mr Goniwe was assassinated, and the SA Government did plot to assassinate other activists, these are matters that should be exposed without further delay.

The alleged Kkillings took place in

I T IS seven years since ANC activ-

' circumstances of low-level warfare

between ANC guerillas and SA security forces. Today, as negotiations for a new order make progress, the country does not need an overhang pf past war crimes to be released in dribs and drabs for political convenience. It needs to clear the air so all can face the future with a new resolve to leave an ugly past behind.

MICHAEL HARTNACK reports from Harare 7z /L5, Jhwcory p. of - o<

Ruling by consent

lent unrest in both Malawi and Zimbabwe offer some useful reflections for the whole of Africa on the fundamental

THE recent outbursts of vio-

problem of violence and coer-

'cion in all its subtle forms.

There is also something worth noting for the liberal, humanitarian, anti-authoritarian  $a\200\234$ tradition $a\200\235$  which runs through all

our societies, although it has no-

where achieved such stature as in South Africa.

In Blantyre, Lilongwe and Limbe, at least 38 people were

' killed in three days of rioting

which was unprecedented in the 30-year heavy-handed rule of life-president Hastings Kamuzu Banda.

In Harare and Bulawayo, President Robert Mugabeâ\200\231s para-military riot squads fought running battles with university students. Although the Zanu(PF) government is now, obviously, adrift without any

. ideological or moral direction,

the students are in a similar quandary. While their woes about being unable to make ends meet are real enough, they prevaricate between the Marx-

ist-Leninist cliches they learned

at school and western anti-communist jargon, when trying to piece their discontent into a coherent philosophical whole. Zanu(PF) has no theory left to justify its right to coerce, but no opponent has much of a credible one with which to challenge it. This could prove either a blessing or a curse depending on whether all ten million of us

want or need to be coerced in

future. '

President Banda, conservatively estimated to be within 87 and 93 years old, has been a curious phenomenon in African politics, an exception proving the rule. He was the only national messiah whose moral batteries did not need constant recharging by white sycophants during his years in power. The loss of international righteousness involved in his establish-

ment of diplomatic ties with

Pretoria was, in his eyes, well worth South Africaâ\200\231s multi-million rands aid.

Because of his extraordinary background as a London general practitioner (his was no bogus honorary doctorate), because he had assimilated European culture so much he had forgotten his mother tongue, Dr Banda enjoyed the sort of towering sense of moral and intellectual superiority over his subjects that the archetypical colonial administrators did.

The first moral is that politicians need a dynamic ideological base to persist in the business of coercion, whether in government or opposition.

The second moral lies in the nature of the society, in how much coercion it requires or will tolerate.

President Banda had the good fortune to rule over a state which is, by African standards, remarkably homogenous in tribal terms (although there have been some regional tensions).

Now, warns a western diplo-

mat, the perennially placid

Malawians for the first time

 $\hat{a}\200\230$ since 1962  $\hat{a}\200\234$ have the fire in their

eyes. $\hat{a}$ 200\235 This sudden abandon-

ment of the  $\hat{a}\200\230\hat{a}\200\230$ don $\hat{a}\200\231$ t rock the boat $\hat{a}\200\235$  attitude could be terrifyingly destructive or excitingly constructive, depending how Malawians play things.

Africa has no shortage of poli- -

ticians with  $\hat{a}$ 200\234fire in their eyes $\hat{a}$ 200\235 and their capacity for mischief is endless.

A classic example is Zimbabweâ\200\231s Dr Herbert Ushewokunze, President Mugabeâ\200\231s seemingly indestructible lieutenant who has caused havoc, successively, at the ministries of health, home affairs (where he controlled the police), transport, and latterly energy and water resources.

President Mugabe deserves sympathy if he feels what Dr Ushewokunze has cost the national economy is cheap compared with the damage he might do if denied office. Clearly, if that is how all ten million of us aspire to behave, any government is going to have to employ a great degree of coercion to maintain order, and it will have to acquire or evolve a belief system to justify this use of force.

Africaâ\200\231s problems have frequently been blamed on Marxist-Leninism or  $a\200\230a\200\230$ African socialism. $a\200\235$  The contrasting experiences of Zimbabwe and Malawi  $a\200\224$  ideologically so different yet so similar in end result  $a\200\224$  reveal this to be an illusion created by propaganda. The

real problem is endemic vio- -

lence, the need for coercion, the costly manner of coercion.

Our  $a\200\230a\200\230liberal$  traditions $a\200\231a\200\231$  should have been able to expose the truth and mitigate the situa-

or coercion

tion. Sadly, they made a Aeries of grave tactical blunders/
First, they idealised tife rising forces of opposition (such as Dr Banda, in Rhodesian federal

" days), condoning their violence

until a nation-wide pattern of beCxlah0 D g d " Dre etn institutionalised by womenâ\200\231s leagues, party thugs, and â\200\234intel-ligence cadres.â\200\235

Second, many representatives

of the â\200\234liberal traditionâ\200\235 prematurely threw in their lot with one or other African nationalist faction. Sometimes they acted from the noble ideal of promoting inter-racial unity or attempting to moderate extremist forces.

Sometimes they acted to satisfy their long-frustrated ambitions for  $a\200\234$ real $a\200\235$  political power after decades of seemingly futile opposition.

But when their chosen faction could no longer escape the challenges of violence and coercion, these representatives of the liberal tradition found themselves unwitting associates to some ugly incidents. They were seen to have blood on their hands, and lost their moral authority to continue protesting.

The liberal tradition can survive without aspiring to power, concentrating on cultivating its humanitarian, anti-authoritarian ideals throughout the national life, so power rests less on coercion and more on intelligent consent. If we can reform the violent tendencies in societies, government will be easier to reform, and economic improvement should follow.

NATAL Mereury 13 /sâ\200\230 /92/ INSIGHT The Natal Mer

PATRICK LEEMAN reports on a nationwide HSRC survey – e  $\frac{200}{2300}$  rush into inferim governmenta  $\frac{200}{231}$ 

NLY 14% OF WHITES appear to

want an interim government as soon

as possible. Only 25% of Asians and coloured people fall into this category and even black views are divided on the issue.

This point is made by Prof Lawrence Schlemmer, a general manager of the Human Sciences Research Council, in the latest edition of its quarterly report, Information Update.

Prof Schlemmer says most party political supporters, black and white, would

like to see some further test of opinion be- $a\200\231$  fore the interim govenn}gent is fully and .

formally established.

The academic analysed the results of 2 000 replies after personal interviews were conducted around the country and came to the conclusion that most whites,

" Asians and coloured people view an interim government with some trepidation at present.

He says the overwhelming endorsement of negotiation and reform in the March referendum was due very substantially to fears of what would happen if State President FW de Klerk lost and negotiation ceased. It was not due to any particular enthusiasm for the results of negotiation.

Prof Schlemmer maintains that popular

views on the composition of an interim government, once established, is that it

\* should contain as many parties as possi-

ble, even including the Conservative Party.

Generally, very few people would like to see a big party  $\hat{a}\200\234$ cartel $\hat{a}\200\235$  between the African National Congress and the National Party.

He says very few people, among them only 40% of blacks, would like to see the

interim government taking control of the security forces.

Prof Schlemmer says black people are more positive than negative about life in the  $\hat{a}200\234$ new South Africa $\hat{a}200\235$  but only moderately so.  $\hat{a}200\230$ 

He says whites are generally very pessimistic about political, social and economic conditions in the future while Asians and coloured people are varied in their expectations.

The researcher says there appears to be majority support in all constituencies for

 $\tilde{a}$  what he terms  $\hat{a}$  200\234democratic checks and

balances. $\hat{a}$ \200\235 .

There is also strong support among all South Africans for devolution of power to lower tiers of government closer to the people.

Prof Schlemmer says supporters of what might be the largest future party, the ANC, are most inclined to favour exclusive government by a majority party, but even they would see the need for curbs on pewer and protection of minority interests.

He says that, suprisingly, black people are divided about the future of the homelands and there is no overwhelming majority view that they should be abolished.

Prof Schlemmer finds that there is no consistent evidence of strong  $a\200\230a\200\234$ socialist $a\200\235$  ideology among future black voters.

Strong sentiments in favour of affirma-

~ tive action exist, but such sentiments are

not more consistently held by ANC, SACP or PAC supporters than by government supporters.

 $\hat{a}\200\234$ Why then does it seem that so many political factions, by their actions and the current violence, display extreme views, intl?slerance and political aggression?, $\hat{a}\200\235$  he e ;

 $\hat{a}\200\234$ The answer lies in the fact that these people are highly politicised activists, black and white.

 $\hat{a}\200\234$ The real  $\hat{a}\200\230$ grassroots $\hat{a}\200\231$ , the rank and file, are much more amenable to finding an equitable resolution of differences. $\hat{a}\200\235$ :

Prof Schlemmer concludes that the

sooner all parties mobilise the real masses, bringing in ordinary people, the

sooner South Africans will realise that the future holds more promise than threat.

Using the results of the same survey, Dr Johann Mouton, another general manager of the HSRC, says that the Conservative Party would probably poll in the region of 30% of the white vote in a general election.:

He says the support for the Democratic Party reached a new low of 3% in February compared to the average of 6% obtained throughout 1991.

The only substantial DP support  $\hat{a}\200\224\ 10\%$   $\hat{a}\200\224$  is found among English-speaking

whites in the metropolitan areas, accord-

ing to Dr Mouton.

" As far as support for black leaders is concerned, the academic says Mr Nelson Mandela polled 65% of the black vote, Dr Mangosutho Buthelezi 11%, other black leaders 6% and Mr de Klerk 5%.

Mandelaâ\200\231s support is highest among Xhosa-speaking blacks  $\hat{a}\200\224$  80%,  $\hat{a}\200\224$  and Dr Butheleziâ\200\231s biggest constituency is among the rural Zulu population  $\hat{a}\200\224$  43%.

Dr Mouton says support for the KwaZulu Chief Minister remains at only 8% among metropolitan Zulu-speakers.

#### Forum <

### å\200\2300pportunistâ\200\231;?g(

SIR  $\hat{a}\200\224$  So ... the  $\hat{a}\200\234$ Honourable $\hat{a}\200\235$  R F Botha has now been the RSA $\hat{a}\200\231$ s Minister of Foreign Affairs for 15 years. : :

Pik Botha has always been a leftist and shameless panderer to blacks. Recently, how-ever, on the flight back from Abuja he excelled himself when he demonstrated to the world where his devotion and Sympathies lie ili); 'disporting himself to the press in a dash-

Although this behaviour makes one feel sick, it is not surprising if his political background is taken into consideration.

Mr Botha has always been an opponent of so-called apartheid. Being a shrewd political â\200\230 opportunist, however, he managed to become NP member of Parliament for Wonderboom on the grounds of his professed support for that selfsame apartheid, both big and small â\200\224 Immorality Act, Mixed Marriages Act, Group Areas Act, Separate Amenities Act, Population Registration Act, the lot.

Thus was introduced into the NP the technique of the  $a\200\234$ political big lie $a\200\235$  as an exact science. It is worthwhile remembering that it was he who, when confronted with the fact that he had lied about the funding of the IFP, said it was irrelevant. To Pik Botha, then, the

## + truth is irrelevant!

After b,ecom!nug an MP he rapidly made a name for himself by the way in which he exerted himself to sell out the whites and destroy everything that, rightly or wrongly, was intended to protect them.

- . The so-called  $\hat{a}200\234$  successes  $\hat{a}200\235$  he achieved in the field .of foreign affairs, were the fruits of his efficiency as a master of the sell-out. Rhodesia to Mugabe, South-West Africa to Swapo, the RSA to the communist-controlled
- . ANC. At one stage he even  $\hat{a}$ 200\230tried to sell out the Mozambican resistance movement, Renamo, to the hardened communistic Frelimo r $\hat{A}$ 0gime. :
- a  $i^2$ 202nger to establish anything that could benefit the nation that he belongs to. He is indeed a tragic Afrikaner litician who has descended like a bird o ill omen on the Afrikaner in his hour of crisis.

Ostensibly unaware of his own roots, he has

To Pik Botha, therefore, F W de Klerk is a godsend! 3 o g Umhlanga JL BUYS  $\,$ 

'MICHAEL HARTNACK reports from Harare

13 Mad /1992

Ruling by consent  $a\200\234a\200\224$  or coercion

lent unrest in both Malawi

and Zimbabwe offer some useful reflections for the whole of Africa on the fundamental . problem of violence and coercion in all its subtle forms. There is also something worth noting for the liberal, humanitarian, anti-authoritarian â\200\234traditionâ\200\235 which runs through all our societies, although it has nowhere achieved such stature as in South Africa.

In Blantyre, Lilongwe and Limbe, at least 38 people were killed in three days of rioting which was unprecedented in the 30-year heavy-handed rule of life-president Hastings Kamuzu Banda. -;

In Harare and Bulawayo, President Robert Mugabeâ\200\231s para-military riot squads fought running battles with university students. Although the Zanu (PF) government is now, obviously, adrift without any ideological or moral direction, the students are in a similar quandary. While their woes about being unable to make ends meet are real enough, they prevaricate between the Marxist-Leninist cliches they learned at school and western anti-communist jargon, when trying to piece their discontent into a coherent philosophical whole.

Zanu(PF) has no theory left to justify its right to coerce, but no opponent has much of a credible one with which to challenge it. This could prove either a blessing or a curse depending on whether all ten million of us want or need to be coerced in future.

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President Banda had the good fortune to rule over a state

 $a\200\230$ which is, by African standards,

remarkably homogenous in tribal terms (although there have been some regional tensions). Now, warns a western diplomat, the perennially placid Malawians for the first time since  $1962 \ a\200\234$ have the fire in their eyes. $a\200\235$  This sudden abandon-

ment of the  $a\200\230a\200\234dona\200\231t$  rock the boat  $a\200\235$  attitude could be terrifyingly destructive or excitingly constructive, depending how Malawians play things.

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A classic example is Zimbabweâ\200\231s Dr Herbert Ushewokunze, President Mugabeâ\200\231s seemingly indestructible lieutenant who has caused havoc, successively, at the ministries of health, home affairs (where he controlled the police), transport, and latterly energy and water resources.

President Mugabe deserves sympathy if he feels what Dr Ushewokunze has cost the national economy is cheap compared with the damage he might do if denied office. Clearly, if that is how all ten million of us aspire to behave, any government is going to have to employ a great degree of coercion to maintain order, and it will have to acquire or evolve a belief system to justify this use of force.

Africaâ\200\231s problems have frequently been blamed on Marxist-Leninism or  $\hat{a}\200\230\hat{a}\200\230$ African socialism. $\hat{a}\200\235$  The contrasting experiences of Zimbabwe and Malawi  $\hat{a}\200\224$  ideologically so different yet so similar in end result  $\hat{a}\200\224$  reveal this to be an illusion

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real problem is endemic violence, the need for coercion, the costly manner of coercion. - Our  $\hat{a}200\230\hat{a}200\230$ liberal traditions $\hat{a}200\231\hat{a}200\231$  should have been able to expose the truth and mitigate the situa-

tion. Sadly, they made a series of grave tactical blunders.

First, they idealised the rising forces of opposition (such as Dr Banda, in Rhodesian federal days), condoning their violence until a nation-wide pattern of T Dok Ohab ol (0 D6 e institutionalised by womenâ\200\231s leagues, party thugs, and â\200\234intel-ligence cadres.â\200\235

Second, many representatives of the  $\hat{a}200\234$ liberal tradition $\hat{a}200\235$  prematurely threw in their lot with one or other African nationalist faction. Sometimes they acted from the noble ideal of promoting inter-racial unity or attempting to moderate extremist forces. .

Sometimes they acted to sat- ' isfy their long-frustrated ambitions for  $a\200\234$ real $a\200\235$  political power after decades of seemingly futile opposition.;

But when their chosen facti:)n could no longer escape the challenges of violence and coercion, these representatives of the liberal tradition found themselves unwitting associates to some ugly incidents. They were seen to have blood on their hands, and lost their moral authority to continue protesting.

The liberal tradition can survive without aspiring to power, concentrating on cultivating its humanitarian, anti-authoritarian ideals throughout the national life, so power rests less on coercion and more on intelligent consent. If we can reform the violent tendencies in societies, government will be easier to reform, and economic improvement should follow.