

# COMMENT

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**I**T is about time that General Magnus Malan, the Minister of Defence, took action against the shadowy operatives in his now-disgraced "hit squad", the CCB.

Malan has announced he has fired the CCB's managing director and 27 other agents who refused to accept retrenchment offers.

He is also going to sue some of the former "hit men" in court for the return of missing files of some of their internal operations.

He also announced the Defence Force would help former CCB members to apply for indemnity from prosecution. Malan said that ANC members were getting indemnity and "it is only right that our own people should be looked after".

All of this is a classic case of too little, too late. It is typical of the sort of delay and foot-shuffling over important matters on the part of the Government which has led to the present high levels of suspicion and the breakdown of trust.

What Malan has now done should have been done months ago when the CCB first stood exposed for what it was - a unit that would not stop at murder to achieve its aims.

The fact that he waited so long to move only reinforced the opinion among the masses of people that the security establishment was continuing to operate the way it always had done in spite of the Government's own talk of reform and negotiation.

While he cannot stand accused of being disloyal to his own men, Malan must most certainly take the blame for much of the confusion and crisis now surrounding the future of negotiations.

And what makes matters even worse is that it seems nothing much is going to be done about him for now.

**T**HE extension of emergency regulations to Katlehong, Vosloorus and Tokoza is bound to be a controversial and unpleasant thing for the people who live there.

But it is worth bearing in mind that this was done only after waves of violence which made those places a hell.

*Sowetan* has said before that it does not seem as if peace is something which is simply going to happen by itself.

Peace is something which, in an ironic way, has to be fought for.

Peace is everybody's responsibility.

And the sooner the people take that responsibility seriously and present a united front of opposition to the men with guns and pangas, the sooner the emergency regulations can be lifted again.



## Violence sparked by hit squads

HIT squad or vigilante activities allegedly initiated by the security forces had contributed to the inter-community violence at the Brits township of Oukasie, a Lawyers for Human Rights Commission of Inquiry has found.

The commission's report was released at a media conference in Pretoria yesterday.

The commission, chaired by LHR's national director, Mr Brian Currin, found the government's decision to physically destroy Oukasie and relocate its 16 000 residents in order to "consolidate the Bantustans" had been the starting point of the violence, which caused the death of three people.

"By regarding the violence as politically motivated and refusing to be drawn into the conflict, the court in effect decriminalised the violence and at least unwittingly contributed towards the state of anarchy in Oukasie," the commission found.

It was reported to the commission that the Security Police openly associated themselves with certain individual leaders, appearing to confirm rumours of bias.

Said the report: "It was alleged that members of the SA Police approached a resident in an attempt to recruit him to their ranks."

— Sapa.

Friday 12 April 1991

THE CITIZEN

# Zambia to use SA port until railway strike ends

LUSAKA. — Zambia Consolidated Copper Mines (ZCCM) says it will continue shipping copper exports through East London until a strike on the Tanzania-Zambia Railway (Tazara) ends.

Zambia normally avoids South African routes for political and cost reasons, but it started to use the East London route again last week when 3 000 Tazara employees on the Zambian end of the railway went on strike for 100 percent wage increases.

ZCCM also exports through the Mozambican

port of Beira and via Namibia to the South African port of Walvis Bay.

A ZCCM official said he would not say how much more copper would be re-routed in addition to the 6 300 tons which had been sent to East London by Tuesday.

The official said about 3 600 tons of copper was still stranded in wagons along the Tazara, on the Zambian side.

"We cannot go to pick up this copper because to retrieve it and redirect it will be very costly," he said.

Tazara officials could

not be reached for comment but Zambia's official newspapers said no agreement had been reached with the workers' union.

A ZCCM official had earlier anticipated the strike would have ended by yesterday.

At least 30 000 tons of copper is exported down the Tazara monthly.

Another strike that has closed Zambia's only oil refinery has caused fuel shortages in the country, but a ZCCM official said company operations had not been affected so far.

"We use up to 60 per-

cent of Zambia's oil imports and are the first ones to feel the shortage when it comes," he said, "but that does not immediately cripple our operations because we have stockpiles which do become difficult to accumulate after a shortage".

A strike for higher wages at the refinery went into its ninth day yesterday.

Long queues of buses and trucks formed at most of the service stations in Lusaka.

Union sources said talks between management and union leaders on the strike at the Indeni refinery in the Copperbelt town of Ndola were deadlocked, with workers demanding an 85 percent wage increase. Management has offered 20 percent.

Indeni can produce 1.1 million tons of processed oil annually but has been operating below capacity since the Gulf crisis broke in August. Zambia has no oil reserves because of the refinery's limited capacity and the lack of foreign exchange to buy crude in bulk.

The country obtained its oil from Kuwait on concessional terms before Iraq invaded the northern Gulf emirate.

Officials of the Zambia Industrial and Mining Corporation, the state-owned holding company under which Indeni falls, have held emergency meetings but so far have issued no statements.

Oil industry sources said it was expected to take two weeks for fuel supplies to return to normal after refinery operations resumed. — Sapa-Reuter.

## Daveyton incident: 31 appear in court

Citizen Reporter

THIRTY-one African National Congress (ANC) members appeared briefly in the Benoni Regional Court yesterday in connection with an incident in Daveyton last month in which ANC

supporters allegedly clashed with police.

Twelve alleged ANC supporters and a policeman, Lance-Sergeant P J van Wyk (24), were killed in the incident, which also left 29 people, including two policemen, injured.

Thirty-five people were

arrested in connection with the clash, and have been charged with murder, alternatively public violence, as well as attempted murder.

The Magistrate, Mr L C Kotze, postponed the matter to April 22 for further investigation and a possible bail application.

Four of the accused, injured in the clash, could not appear in court and are presently being treated for gunshot wounds in the Boksburg-Benoni and Far East Rand Hospitals.

The accused who appeared in court are being detained at the Daveyton police cells.

The prosecutor was Mr C Coetzee, and the defence was Mr A Cachalia.



John Patten

Viewpoint X

Mercury 12/04/91

# The ANC ultimatum: a tactical mistake ... and a serious error of judgement too

AS THE DUST settles after the African National Congress ultimatum to the Government last week, it is worth assessing what the organisation has gained and what it has lost through its surprise shock tactic.

The ultimatum has been variously interpreted, but has almost universally been viewed as an error of judgement, by political analysts inside the country and in diplomatic circles.

It has been seen as a call for help from the receiving end of violence. Some see it as the result of a bungled campaign of using violence which is now backfiring. Others consider it the outcome of an internal power struggle won by the hawks. It has also been interpreted as a miscalculated power play against the Government from a perceived position of strength (not nearly as strong as imagined) to win more ground before constitutional negotiations begin.

These negative interpretations are the views of political pundits assessing the ultimatum against the yardstick of Government and diplomatic efforts to achieve a political settlement for the country as soon as possible. But the verdict is probably far less negative — in fact, it could be decidedly beneficial to the ANC — among the grassroots disfranchised masses.

Just as Muslim extremists were able to claim a victory for Saddam Hussein out of the ruins of the Gulf war, so grassroots supporters of the ANC can claim a victory out of the ultimatum. The victory in both cases is of a different sort from the way political experts would weigh it, but a victory in black activist terms nevertheless.

What the ANC has achieved through jolting the Government with its May 9 ultimatum is: to be seen to stand up to the Government as at least its equal and even seek to dictate the terms of future negotiations, making it clear to

ANC followers that the ANC controls whether the talks go on or not.

It was an attempt to grab the initiative, not for the purposes of speeding up the political transition away from an apartheid society, but to solidify support behind the ANC among the politically helpless who wish to see a show of strength and defiance in keeping with their mood. The ANC ultimatum was at its best a gesture in tune with the mood of war-ravaged underdogs, and likely to heighten their support.

That is a plus for the ANC. Among its potential supporters, it wins points for rocking the boat of the Government. If the negotiation process (or even the goodwill that had been built up) suffered, that can always be written off against the belief that the de Klerk régime is in any case a fruit ripe to fall from the tree of power, and that a strongly motivated ANC waiting in the wings is better than a reasonable one working for

a settlement where undefined compromises are going to be wrung from them.

What the ANC would like most of all is to come to the negotiation table in an indisputably dominant political position. Mr Robert Mugabe and Mr Joshua Nkomo achieved it through Lancaster House, although it only became apparent in the subsequent general election how dominant Mr Mugabe really was over all others. Swapo achieved it in Namibia, even though its support fell short of being able to steamroller its policies through the constituent assembly. The ANC wants at least a similar advantage so it can steer if not dictate the course of constitution-making.

While the ultimatum probably increased and solidified support of the radical masses by its sudden attempted political hold-up, the ANC will probably not succeed in sidelining the Inkatha Freedom Party through this action. In fact, Inkatha scores better

than the ANC as a result of the ANC action, because the ultimatum makes it look as if the ANC cannot stand the pace in the underground war with Inkatha adherents and has been forced to run to the Government in an attempt to change the rules to save itself. That demonstrates Inkatha strength.

It is something the ANC should have thought harder about before launching into this disruptive action, but there are other things also it should have thought harder about. The leadership opted for closing ranks with the radicalised grassroots, but at great expense.

It seriously alienated power groups it had spent months persuading of its reasonableness. The ultimatum must have greatly heightened Government suspicions of ANC *bona fides* in the negotiation process on one score alone — that it is all very well for different political groupings to make demands (even tough demands), but if the meeting

of those demands is made the condition of further participation, then the equality of the participants has been destroyed.

Similarly the ANC has greatly disappointed the international community, which has at differing speeds come to accept the ANC as a vital element in the South African political settlement plan. Where the ANC has guided international opinion very largely on pressure tactics on the Government to bring about change, it suddenly made a false move which destroys confidence in its leadership abilities and raises doubts about its real intentions.

The ANC has shaken the South African political community to its roots with its ultimatum, from which it is now attempting to make a tactical withdrawal, but it has lost overall position through its action, which confirms that the ultimatum was a tactical mistake and a serious error of judgement.

16/1/11



16/1/11

12/04/91  
MAGNUM  
Government cool to ANC 'ultimatum'

By Chris Whitfield  
Political Correspondent

CAPE TOWN—The Government, apparently confident that the negotiation process is still on track in spite of the ANC's 'open letter' to President de Klerk, has indicated that it will not take any immediate steps to meet the demands.

However, Constitutional Development Minister Gerrit Viljoen indicated yesterday that the Government was prepared to discuss several of the demands — as it always had been.

Mr de Klerk would be responding fully to the letter be-

fore the May 9 deadline, he indicated.

Dr Viljoen described the letter as 'counter-productive' and speculated that the organisation might have been trying to buy time to sort out its organisational problems.

He told a Press conference the ultimatum had come 'out of the blue'.

Only days earlier ANC deputy president Nelson Mandela had held an 'apparently ami-

cable' meeting with Inkatha Freedom Party president Mangosuthu Buthelezi, yet the letter contained 'three or four attacks on Inkatha'.

The impression this sort of behaviour gave rise to was that this was not 'the Mr Mandela we have got to know'.

The question to be asked was whether Mr Mandela 'is a free agent or is he coming under the pressure of internal tension in the movement and radicals in the leadership core'.

He believed the crisis sparked by the letter had strained the relationship between Mr Mandela and Mr de Klerk, but felt that 'the interpersonal chemistry is strong enough to survive this strain'.

The violence sweeping the country was 'very worrying and disconcerting' and the Government was deeply concerned about it, said Dr Viljoen.

He thought the ANC might be trying to seize the 'driver's seat' and buy time to sort out its organisational problems.



# ANC homes

# blasted

*Sowetan 12 April 1991*

**Girl (7) hurt  
as grenades  
hit 3 homes**

**A SEVEN-YEAR-OLD girl was among three people injured when three homes of ANC Youth League members were damaged in separate pre-dawn hand-grenade attacks yesterday.**

The AYL members are the organisation's president Oupa Motingoa (27), projects officer Eric Ngwane (21) and Gabriel

**By NKOPANE MAKOBANE**

Lelake (19).

The attacks, in Munsieville, Krugersdorp, shattered windows in all three houses while the walls of two of them cracked.

The first attack at 3.15am was at the home of Mrs Dora Motingoa, which was slightly damaged by a grenade thrown through a window. No one was injured.

The second attack took place about 15 minutes later at the home of Mr Johannes Lelake. Another

● To Page 2



## Girl (7) hurt in attack

From Page 1

grenade was thrown into his house. His son, Gabriel, was injured in the leg and back.

The third attack occurred at 3.35am at Mrs Evelyn Ngwane's home. A grenade was also thrown into the house.

Her two daughters, Athalia (7) and Olga (16), were injured. Athalia sustained head injuries and has been admitted to Leratong Hospital.

Olga was injured in the arm and knee and has been discharged from hospital.

A spokesman for the West Rand police yesterday confirmed the attacks.


She said police were still investigating and could at this stage not say if the attacks were politically motivated.

### Baffled

Oupa said they were still baffled by the attacks. They did not know who was responsible.

"We are conducting our own investigations. However, we cannot rule out the possibility that some elements are trying to intimidate us because of our activism.

"We also cannot dismiss the fact that there may be people who would like to create disharmony in the township. These people may be feeling unhappy that calm is currently reigning in the area," he said.



Mr Johannes Lelake looks through one of the windows that were shattered when a handgrenade exploded at his home yesterday. He and his four-year-old son Vincent were lucky to escape unhurt.

Pic: SELLO MOTSEPE



## BUSINESS

# ANC may hit the wall of tax

The African National Congress' "People's Budget" has stirred up a storm bigger than the ANC expected with an overreaction by business and other groups. However, the ANC is swimming against the tax reform tide, reports **REG RUMNEY**

**L**IKE nationalisation before them, the proposals for greater tax revenue in the African National Congress' "People's Budget" have enraged business.

The South African Chamber of Business, for instance, reacted angrily this week to the idea of new taxes — a capital gains tax, progressive property taxes, a minimum business tax, and a capital transfer tax.

The difference is that the ANC's ideas move the debate into a much more fruitful area than nationalisation.

Tax, after all, is by its nature redistributive. Argument should be about how tax revenue should be raised, how much, and where it should be spent.

Tito Mboweni of the ANC's Department of Economic Policy stresses the article does not represent official ANC policy, nor DEP policy, and was written to raise the possibility of using the fiscus to engage in certain social development projects.

Nevertheless, emanating as it does from the DEP it is bound to be — and has been — taken seriously.

The suggestions in a nutshell are:

- That the government's share of the economy as measured by the gross domestic product gradually be raised to 35 percent from its present 25 percent over a period of five years — given a growth in the economy of 3 percent a year.

- The deficit before borrowing be raised to 5 percent, instead of the International Monetary Fund (IMF) benchmark of 3 percent. This and the measure above, it is suggested, will raise R40-billion extra over five years.

Some economists will also take exception to the idea of raising the deficit on the grounds that this is inflationary.

- Savings be made by cutting back on spending on apartheid structures to gain an amount of 5 percent of budgeted revenue, or R3 750-million a year. Over five years, it is suggested that this will raise another R18 750-million.

To take the last point first, the amount to be saved is more likely to be a percentage of budgeted expenditure, since it is apartheid spending rather than revenue that is being saved. Also, whatever savings are achieved may well be a one-off rather than recurring.

It is not the R40-billion that should exercise our minds, nor the savings on scrapping apartheid spending but the implications of an increase in the tax take to 35 percent of the economy and the increase in the deficit before

## ANC'S PROPOSED NEW SPENDING OVER FIVE YEARS

● Housing — capital subsidy of R12 000 for 1,2-million houses	R14,4-billion
● Upgrading of 250 townships, R20-million a township	R5-billion
● Employment training scheme — R500 a trainee on 2-million trainees a year	R5-billion
● Land reform — establish 150 000 small farmers	R6,5-billion
● Rural infrastructure — short-term work for 1-million people	R300-million
● Primary health clinics	R300-million
● Adult literacy — training for 1-million community-based trainers	R550-million
● Education — school building and teacher training	R7,5-billion
● School feeding scheme — R100 for 5-million primary school pupils a year	R2,5-billion
● Feeding scheme for pregnant mothers	R2,5-billion
● Equalising pensions	R11-billion
● Industrial restructuring and export (Research and Development)	R3,2-billion
<b>Total</b>	<b>R58,75-billion</b>

borrowing.

Economist Lieb Loots of the University of the Western Cape has contributed to the economic debate from the leftwing perspective and has made suggestions to the ANC on the issue of the Budget.

Loots considers it an important condition for the tax take to be increased that the 3 percent growth be achieved. If the economy is stagnant we should exercise caution in building that stake, he believes. If such growth isn't possible, the government's arguments that sanctions are harming the economy have no validity.

But even if the 3 percent a year average growth is achieved, how does the eventual 35 percent figure compare with other countries? The answer, according to figures supplied by the South African Fiscal Association, is that it compares well with developed countries, but poorly with countries which could be considered in the same boat as South Africa. For example, according to Safa, in 1987 the average tax take of general government as a percentage of GDP in OECD countries was 38,8 percent.

Turkey's tax take as a percentage of GDP was 24 percent; the figure for Portugal is 31,4 percent, and for Spain 33 percent.

In perhaps oversimple terms there has to be a tradeoff between economic development and social spending. As a country becomes wealthier, so conventional economic thinking goes, it can afford to spend more on social benefits. Not only is South Africa not as developed as Canada, where tax revenue comprised 34,5 percent

of GDP in 1987, but a significant portion of its tax revenue comes from social security taxes, which are a form of saving for a rainy day; 4,6 percent of Canada's total tax revenue is social security tax, as opposed to South Africa's 0,4 percent. The disparity is greater elsewhere: 20,5 percent of total tax revenue in the Netherlands is social security tax, for a total of 48 percent of the GDP as general government tax revenue.

(The ANC's proposals refer to the "widening of the income tax base" to 35 percent. That is clearly an error and should be the widening of the total tax base.)

In a developing phase a country must collectively *vasbyt* and turn its attention to growth. So while housing, for instance, is socially beneficial, it doesn't generate growth in the sense of bringing money into the country, though it might create jobs while the houses are being built. In raising money through a deficit of 5 percent and pumping it into the economy, such moves could also be regarded as inflationary.

Here Mboweni and Loots point out some of the money will be spent on growth-producing investments — eg the R3 200-million on industrial restructuring and export.

On the subject of increasing the deficit before borrowing, Loots also believes that some of the deficit could be funded by outside money, eg World Bank loans. This would not crowd out the capital markets, which anyway are not overburdened at the moment. Moreover, he points out that the government is using borrowed

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# Negotiation the way to lasting peace

## Viljoen

**By Brian Stuart**  
CAPE TOWN. — Negotiation was inevitable because it offered the only hope of achieving lasting peace and stability, and this must be recognised by the ANC, Dr Gerrit Viljoen, Minister of Constitutional Development, said at a media briefing yesterday.

Dr Viljoen disclosed that the State President, Mr F W de Klerk, had been seeking a tripartite meeting with ANC deputy president Mr Nelson Mandela and Inkatha Freedom Party leader Dr Mangosuthu Buthelezi, but had so far not received a "positive response".

He said Mr De Klerk was expected to issue a "considered response" to the ANC's open letter to him in due course. "As you know the President, he would not wait until May 9."

Reacting to the ANC ultimatum, Dr Viljoen said the ANC could not revert to "armed struggle" because as a strategy it would not work and because of the pain and suffering it would inflict on people and the economic consequences. Violence,

in itself, only stressed the need for negotiation.

The ANC had already found it necessary to explain its ultimatum, and in some respects appeared to be softening its attitude. "But if there is something to be explained, please come along and explain it," Dr Viljoen added.

The government did not doubt that the ANC was concerned about the level of violence. All leaders, including government leaders, were similarly concerned.

"We don't doubt for a single moment their concern in this matter. But what we do reject is their diagnosis of the causes, and especially the way in which they shift all blame onto the other parties."

The first time he had heard the ANC concede that their followers were also involved in the violence was at the January meeting between Inkatha Freedom Party leader, Dr Mangosuthu Buthelezi, and ANC deputy president, Mr Nelson Mandela.

"I haven't heard them often acknowledge that

their people are involved. I think this is the thing that really worries the government about the ANC."

In spite of the fact that the leaders of the ANC were aware of Mr De Klerk's suggestion of a tripartite meeting last Friday, "there was, out of the blue, a reaction by way of what amounts to an ultimatum," Mr Viljoen said.

Since nothing had happened to justify such drastic action, and it came at a time when Mr Mandela and Dr Buthelezi had spoken of reconciliation. It raised the question as to whether Mr Mandela was a free agent or was acting under pressure from radicals within the ANC leadership corps.

"This is not the Mr Mandela we have come to know so far in promoting discussion and negotiation," said Dr Viljoen.

"There is no workable alternative to negotiation. If we deviate from this road, in the end we will merely have to come together on this road on talks with one another to find solutions.

"When the ANC and the government decided to seek a solution through peaceful negotiation, they did so because both recognised that practice had shown that violence and the exercise of force did not provide solutions that work or which were lasting."

Dr Viljoen said it appeared some people within the ANC had not accepted the statement by ANC leaders on January 8 that they accepted an All-Party Conference.

He referred to a document entitled "Guidelines and strategy and tactics of the ANC", in which the ANC said it was losing the tactical initiative to the government, and that it had not moved fast enough to establish its organisational machinery and adapting to the new terrain.

There was a reasonable suspicion that the ANC was trying to improve its image or to buy time in order to solve its internal organisational problems.

"But it is really a serious matter to risk the whole peace process by this method of an ultimatum, just in order to strengthen one's own political position," said Dr Viljoen.

Dr Viljoen said Mr Kobie Coetsee, Minister of Justice, had been doing his utmost to complete the indemnity process and the release of prisoners by April 30. By its ultimatum, the ANC appeared to be delaying the date for a response to the negotiation initiative beyond that date to the May 9 deadline.

Asked whether he expected a firm ANC commitment to negotiation before its congress in June, Dr Viljoen said: "It is possible but not very likely."



**T**HE saying about keeping your head when all about you are losing theirs can be aptly applied to the uproar surrounding the ANC's ultimatum to government on township violence.

When Inkatha president Mangosuthu Buthelezi draws analogies with stroking the head of a black mamba, when editorial writers border on hysteria, when respected national figures talk of emigrating, the conclusion is inescapable that the national psyche has been profoundly undermined.

But although it is clear that public confidence in the negotiation process has been shaken as never before, the outrage that has followed the ANC's threat to call off talks does not stand up to closer scrutiny.

The key to understanding this lies in the context and motivations for the ANC's newly found hardline position. On the broadest level, the ANC perceives itself as having lost the "strategic advantage". A little-publicised but highly revealing ANC document titled Guidelines on Strategy and Tactics of the ANC makes this disarmingly honest self-perception clear.

**B**etween passages of self-aggrandisement, a refreshingly forthright comment is made: "In the months particularly after the August 1990 Pretoria summit ... the regime utilised the terrain of negotiations more effectively than the liberation movement ...."

"Combined with the devastating campaign of violence against African communities, this led to situations in which the liberation movement was losing the tactical initiative to the regime," the document continues.

Seen from this perspective, the ANC's ultimatum is not so much a serious attempt to force the resignation of two senior government Ministers, as an aggressive bid to gain, or regain, the strategic high ground.

# ANC ultimatum no cause for hysteria or despondency

*Business Day 12 April 1991*

**TIM COHEN**

This might partly explain the motivation for the ultimatum, but the ANC is faced with more pressing concerns. It has operated openly in the country for more than a year, but despite being extremely popular and having a highly regarded leadership, its internal organisation is poor. Membership drives have not come close to reaching targets, never mind expectations. The same strategy and tactics document does not mince words on this point: "... our movement has not been fast enough in establishing machinery and adapting to the new terrain of struggle".

In addition, the membership that does exist is more than a little critical of the ageing leaders. Justified or not, the feeling exists that the leadership is not sufficiently responsive to grassroots members' demands. This was well demonstrated by the tongue-lashing the organisation's hierarchy got from the floor at the ANC's consultative conference last year. And since then the feeling has intensified.

With elections for national leadership positions little more than a month away, there is plenty of incentive for incumbent office bearers to flex their muscles.

The ANC's members, and prospective members, require the leadership to force concessions out of government to demonstrate the movement's political prowess.

This might force the ANC to take steps it might otherwise hesitate to take, and which might have unfortunate consequences. But clearly the leadership feels it has no choice but to absorb the consequences as best it can.

**A**nother point to consider is that the ultimatum brings the ANC closer to the PAC's anti-negotiations stance, which could ensure a successful meeting between the two organisations in Harare this month.

From this perspective, the ANC's ultimatum should be welcomed because it constitutes a recognition by the leadership that it is responsible for its actions, and not at liberty to ignore its members.

The ultimatum is an expression of the necessity for internal democracy which, despite its poorly conceived nature, mitigates against the cabal style of leadership the ANC has sometimes been guilty of.

Negotiations with an organisation

which does not have the support of its members would be useless. A strong negotiating partner is to everybody's advantage.

The ANC's mistake was to paint itself into a corner by making demands it must have known government could not accede to. The ANC ultimatum says: "If by 9 May 1991 these demands have not been met the ANC shall: (a) suspend any further discussion with the government on the All Party Congress; and (b) suspend all exchanges with the government on the future constitution of our country." By putting the ultimatum this way, the ANC has allowed itself no escape. If by May 9 Ministers Magnus Malan and Adriaan Vlok are still in office, and if the ANC wants to govern at some point in the future, a humiliating climb-down is the only recourse.

But even here, the ANC's position is not as inflexible as it seems. At the media conference where the ANC put its demands, one of the first questions deputy president Nelson Mandela was asked was what would happen if government went quite a long way to meeting the demands, but did not give in to all of them. Mandela said it was premature to discuss this

question, but significantly, added that the ANC would study government's response carefully. "If the government responds to us in a satisfactory way, then of course we will discuss that."

There is another reason for reining in hysteria about the ultimatum, and that is the ANC's stated reason for issuing it — government inaction on township violence. ANC information department head Pallo Jordan is right in pointing out that police reactions to the murder of whites and the murder of township residents have been grotesquely different. He is right to point out that Vlok and Malan are responsible to SA taxpayers, black and white. And the ANC is right to highlight some of the more unsavoury activities of the SAP and the SADF.

That the ANC is not particularly helpful in suggesting ways of achieving peace or overly enthusiastic about maintaining it, is not at issue here; the fact is that government is ultimately responsible for keeping the peace. As one ANC member has said, whites are peculiarly indifferent to killings in townships, while blacks are forced to live with them. Government all too easily throws up its hands at the scale of the problem.

The ANC was guilty of poor judgment in the uncompromising way it phrased its ultimatum. And it indulged in some quite unnecessary and dangerous derogatory comments about Inkatha. It also made the negotiation process a hostage to its demands, turning it into a political bargaining chip for all parties.

**B**ut its move is not inexplicable and ought not to cause despondency. The negotiations were always likely to be fraught with difficulties. It is quite possible that a setback could derail the whole process, but the ultimatum incident does not fall into that category.

One Belfast citizen reportedly said of her home town that anyone who was not confused did not understand what was going on. Another replied: "Ah well, they say it's not as bad as they say it is."



**COMMENT**

# Sharp shock

**I**T's rich. In the same breath as his call for South Africa to increase its exports of manufactured goods, Thabo Mbeki blames economic mismanagement for the two-thirds cut in the proportion of our manufactured goods exports between 1960 and 1989. Some South Africans might be forgiven the nagging question of how much of that "economic mismanagement" can be blamed on sanctions endorsed by Mbeki's ANC.

Perhaps that was an unfair dig. There has been more than one constraint on exports of manufactured goods. And the very fact that Mbeki realises this country needs to shift beyond its role as an exporter of raw materials and semi-processed primary products is encouraging.

We can't blame the ANC and other anti-apartheid organisations for South Africa's laager mentality — the mentality that persuaded us to emphasise export replacement and self-sufficiency at any cost. The laager mentality derived principally from a visceral fear by one sector of being swamped in the pre-De Klerk decades.

But the laager mentality — even though it provided the spin-offs of Sasol with its technological superiority at considerable cost in protection and Armscor with its locally developed high-tech skills — is outdated. And we now have the spectacle of the ANC and the government, through the IDC, agreeing on that fact.

The difference is that the ANC

tends instinctively towards the creed of central economic controls while the IDC is proposing the re-born economics of protection removal. The IDC's aim is to stimulate the free-enterprise competition needed to have our manufacturers out fighting for shares in the international marketplace.

The IDC's tariff-cutting proposals are, so far, only up for discussion. We will doubtlessly have dozens of manufacturers pleading for special consideration. And it's almost inevitable that we shall have manufacturers pointing out that export giants such as Japan only achieved their positions from behind almost impenetrable trade barriers. But those will be special pleas that have to be ignored. The bottom line is that high tariffs cheat us all. They don't simply add to import inputs, but also allow inefficient local manufacturers to burden us with excessively high prices for locally made goods.

Decades of protection have failed to turn South Africa into much more than an exporter of primary goods. There has been some beneficiation, here and there — ferro-alloys are a good example. But we have not developed a broad range of hungry manufacturing industries which put exports before easy sales into the securely protected local market. If hungry export-based development is to be engendered, the complacent urgently need the competitive jolt that acceptance of the IDC's tariff-cutting proposals would give.



Viljoen keeps talks option open

# Govt digs in against ANC ultimatum

*Business Day 12/4/91*

CAPE TOWN — Government indicated yesterday that it would not reduce pressure on the ANC by offering it a "way out" of its threat to call off negotiations if demands made last week were not met.

However Constitutional Development Minister Gerrit Viljoen told a news conference following Wednesday's Cabinet meeting that government was prepared to discuss the ANC's seven demands and that President F W de Klerk would respond in due course.

Viljoen refused to say whether government regarded any of the demands as reasonable or what action could be taken to go some way to meet them.

Viljoen said it was for the ANC to decide what it would do if government did not meet its demands by May 9. The fact that ANC deputy president Nelson Mandela had had to embark on a personal journey to Cape Town to tell diplomats that the ultimatum was not in fact an ultimatum "showed the ANC had made a mistake".

However, more could be done by all parties concerned, including government, to improve the situation "but we need to sit down and discuss what we can do about it".

Viljoen said government was proceeding with all activities on the negotiation programme, keeping a cool head and being as rational as possible about the ultimatum.

BILLY PADDOCK

Viljoen said government did not plan to "bedevil or jeopardise" the negotiation process, despite the fact that the latest crisis "which had come out of the blue" had strained the special relationship between Mandela and De Klerk which had been very important for negotiations.

However he believed "the inter-personal chemistry (between them) is strong enough to survive this strain".

He disclosed there had been continuing contact between the ANC's national executive committee and the Cabinet on other matters since Friday's ultimatum and suggested there may have been contact on the demands as well.

He said negotiations were the only way to find lasting solutions. If the parties drifted off the negotiating track and resorted to their previous positions they would eventually end up back at the negotiation table.

Viljoen rejected the ANC's diagnosis of the violence and what he said was its continual shifting of the blame on to other parties.

The ultimatum was not justified, particularly after Inkatha leader Mangosuthu Buthelezi and Mandela responded positively to the idea of forming a troika to address the violence. "It was a complete somer-

□ To Page 2

## Govt digs in

□ From Page 1

sault by the ANC in dealing with matters that were on the agenda", and the Mandela of Friday was not the Mandela government had been dealing with the past year, Viljoen said.

"The question arises: is Mr Mandela acting as a free agent or is he coming under pressure of internal tensions in the movement and radicals in the leadership core?"

He said a confidential ANC document-Guidelines on Strategy and Tactics clearly indicated the ANC acknowledged that it was losing the tactical initiative and it appeared that the ultimatum was a delaying tactic to try regain the initiative and sort out its internal problems.

"It is a serious matter to risk the whole peace process through this method just to

strengthen one's own political position."

TIM COHEN reports ANC spokesman Saki Macozoma said yesterday "it may well be" that no exiles would return by the May 9 deadline set in the ANC's ultimatum. The ANC's national executive had not taken a decision to halt the return of exiles.

Macozoma said he had "no idea" why the third group of about 115 ANC exiles expected to arrive in Johannesburg yesterday had not arrived.

He said the ANC was suspicious of Viljoen's statements that government would fulfil its obligations in respect of exiles and political prisoners by the end of April, saying that there were still many political prisoners in jail.

● See Page 6





This is the type of activity which has kept young people out of the classroom and resulted in a lack of discipline and in a breakdown in parental control.



12/4/91  
The  
Natal Witness

## Greater accord ✓

**T**he public airing of differences between the leadership of the ANC and the IFP is hardly conducive to the creation of a stable and peaceful country. Both Mandela and Buthelezi command tremendous media attention, and they should, therefore, measure their words with exceptional care. It is pointless to make conciliatory phone calls after hurtful speeches have been made.

Furthermore, the ANC and the IFP are not the only parties that have an agenda on what the new South Africa should look like. A climate should be created in which all parties should have an opportunity to put forward their programmes for open debate.

Soon after President de Klerk assumed office he stated that his door was open to all; there was no need to knock it down. It is to be hoped that in the days ahead all political leaders will aim for rational discussion rather than violent confrontation which, sadly, is the prime cause of the tragic loss of life throughout the country. If the latter situation continues, there will be no winners in the game of "political chicken", which some leaders persist in playing.



# Aids and the future

Natal witness

12 March 1991

THE impact of Aids is likely to become one of the most urgent problems facing the new South Africa. One alarming forecast made by André Spier of the Aids Policy Group is that as many as 10 million South Africans of all races may possibly die in the next decade or two, and that a possible four out of every ten people are likely to be infected by the virus.

While attention still focuses largely on the black population explosion in the country, some forecasters predict that there might be an actual fall in the population after the year 2000. The Nedbank economist Edward Osborn has warned employers to become less concerned about coping with the growth in population and to begin facing up to the possibility that by the year 2000 there could be a nil above-the-age of 15 population growth, and a further rapid growth of Aids in the adult population.


A similar prognostication was made by Graham Prentice, a corporate actuary with Old Mutual, who estimated that the country's adult population would peak at just under 25 million by the end of this decade, but because of Aids deaths it would fall back to its present level of 20 million a decade later. By then, 40 percent of the adult population might be expected to be HIV positive, leaving an adult population of only 13 million.

These bleak prognostications are based on the present rapid spread of Aids. Already 168 000 South Africans are HIV positive, and the number has been doubling every eight months, according to official figures.


The number of babies born with Aids soared by 811 percent in 1990, while the number of adult sufferers increased by 215 percent. The alarming growth in baby victims is attributed by Dr Murray Short, head of communicable diseases in KwaZulu, to the transmission of the disease by mothers to their unborn children.

Mr Osborn foresaw a time in the not distant future when the state would be unable to afford the cost of treating Aids victims. This fear has also been voiced by the minister of planning who said that unless a cure was found, South

## The rising toll



● Researchers estimate that for each person with Aids there are between 10 and 100 people who are HIV positive



Cumulative Aids cases reported to WHO.  
Real total estimated at 400,000

Africa would not be able to afford the cost of hospitalising sufferers.

Already, the cash-stripped hospital services are having to divert resources to dealing with Aids victims. In Natal, alone, the cost for this service rose to over R10 million in the first seven months of 1990, with similar burdens borne by the three other provinces, making a probable total of R40 million. And this, at a

time, when hospital budgets especially for the black population are insufficient to meet the cost of treating non-Aids patients, let alone what is required to provide for much-needed expansion of hospital services if the treatment received by blacks is to be equalised with whites.



The present cost of treating one Aids patient is between R100 000 and R125 000. Extrapolating from this figure into the next century, it would mean annual costs rising to over R100 billion, an impossible burden on the state whose present national budget amounts to only about R75 billion.

Sanlam, one of the country's largest insurance companies, has set aside about R400 million as a reserve fund to deal with future Aids

claims. Others are expected to follow this example.

Fears have been expressed that Aids might be spread further by the 135 000 South African exiles who have been living in countries with exceptionally high HIV rates. A proposal that all returning exiles should be vetted on their return has proved controversial; but Azapo has given its support to returning exiles being tested for the HIV virus. At the same time it warned that the debate over whether Aids was "a white or a black disease" had produced cynicism among Africans. It was essential, Azapo said, that account should be taken of such feelings in publicity material urging the need for "safe sex".

African leaders — led by Archbishop Tutu,

Dr Nthato Motlana and ANC leaders like Walter Sisulu — have thrown their full weight behind the campaign to take preventative action against the spread of Aids, now recognised as a national crisis. However, researchers into the Aids virus and epidemiologists complain that the funds being provided by the state to combat the spread of Aids is grossly inadequate.

The deaths of two doctors from Aids, after they were infected by needle scratches during treatment of Aids victims, led to the resignation of six foreign doctors who were on contract to Durban's King Edward VIII hospital. The hospital's medical director fears that because of this development it might prove difficult to recruit more foreign doctors to complement the number of hospital interns needed to provide an effective service.

The present debate over the likely impact of Aids on future population growth has sparked off a controversy over how much finance is needed to provide housing, schools and hospitals for the anticipated population growth, and to make up for the neglect during the apartheid era.

According to the Urban Foundation the need is to plan for a population of 60 million, including a black metropolitan population of 32 million, by 2010. This projection is strongly challenged by banking economists like Edward Osborn, who insist that if proper account is taken of the Aids factor, the size of the population is not likely to be higher than 40 million.

Their argument is that a difference of 20 million makes it "totally wrong and wasteful to plan housing and urban development for numbers that will not materialise in this time span". If the population is to be no higher than at present, Osborn suggests that the emphasis should be on reconstruction and upliftment of standards, rather than planning for an expansion that is unlikely to take place. It would be better, he concludes, to concentrate resources on reconstructing and improving existing black townships by improving such facilities as water supplies, sewerage disposal, road and lighting. He also advises employers to plan for a reduced available labour force by developing labour-saving production methods.

Critics of this view fear that, if taken seriously, a post-apartheid government could be persuaded to lower the amount of resources to be diverted to provide adequately for the needs of the black population.


• Colin Legum is a African scholar and former South African journalist now based in London.




# A CRY FOR PEACE!

ANC Deputy President, Nelson Mandela said:

*"The success of the peace process depends, above all, on mutual trust between the major actors and confidence in the peace process by their supporters. Every single demand we have made is designed to restore confidence in the peace process. It is not too late. If the government shows a reasonable response to our reasonable demands we, on our side, will not be found wanting".*



THE AFRICAN NATIONAL CONGRESS  
HAS PLACED THESE REASONABLE DEMANDS  
BEFORE THE GOVERNMENT  
TO SAVE THE PEACE PROCESS  
AND ADDRESS THE CRISIS IN OUR COUNTRY



## WE SAY:

- THERE SHOULD BE NO CARRYING OF WEAPONS - TRADITIONAL OR OTHERWISE - AT PUBLIC GATHERINGS
- REMOVAL FROM PUBLIC OFFICE OF MINISTERS ADRIAAN VLOK AND GENERAL MALAN, AND THE DISMISSAL OF ALL SADF AND SAP PERSONNEL INVOLVED IN CCB AND OTHER HIT SQUADS
- ALL COUNTER-INSURGENCY UNITS SUCH AS THE CCB, ASKARIS, KOEVOET ETC SHOULD BE PUBLICLY DISBANDED



- ALL POLICE PERSONNEL IMPLICATED IN MASSACRES SUCH AS AT SEBOKENG BE SUSPENDED, LEGAL PROCEEDINGS BE INSTITUTED AGAINST THEM AND AN INDEPENDENT COMMISSION OF INQUIRY INVESTIGATE THE DAVEYTON AND OTHER MASSACRES
- THE SAP AND SADF GIVE ASSURANCES THAT THEY WILL USE CIVILISED METHODS OF CROWD CONTROL, AND THAT THERE WILL BE NO ISSUING OF LIVE AMMUNITION ON SUCH OCCASIONS
- EFFECTIVE MEASURES TO PHASE OUT THE HOSTEL SYSTEM AND LABOUR COMPOUNDS AND BEGIN PROVIDING PROPER FAMILY UNITS AND SINGLE OCCUPANCY FLATS
- AN INDEPENDENT COMMISSION OF INQUIRY BE ESTABLISHED TO LOOK INTO COMPLAINTS OF MISCONDUCT BY THE POLICE AND SECURITY FORCES

**ALMOST 10,000 PEOPLE HAVE DIED SINCE 1984**  
**IN 1990 ALONE 2,900 PEOPLE DIED**  
**SO FAR THIS YEAR ALMOST 600 PEOPLE HAVE ALREADY LOST THEIR LIVES**  
**THIS IS THE SCALE OF THE CRISIS FACING OUR COUNTRY**  
**NEGOTIATIONS CAN ONLY SUCCEED IF THE VIOLENCE IS ENDED**  
**AS A MATTER OF URGENCY**

**THE PEOPLE OF SOUTH AFRICA**  
**WANT PEACE NOW**

Issued by the Department of Information and Publicity PO Box 61884 Marshalltown 2307

12-18/4/91  
N/Motion



# Letter scuttled talks with Inkatha, claims Buthelezi

By CARMEL RICKARD: Durban

A MEETING of the Inkatha central committee this weekend will determine Inkatha's conditions for continued peace talks with the African National Congress.

In the wake of the ANC's ultimatum to the government, Inkatha president Mangosuthu Buthelezi said he believed critical references to Inkatha in the open letter effectively scuttled talks between his organisation and the ANC. His declaration prompted several top ANC officials to say Ullandi was reading more into the letter than was intended.

Inkatha's view is that the ANC's decision to call off the next round of discussions originally scheduled for yesterday backs its interpretation that the

open letter was intended to break the talks. ANC officials said the talks were "postponed" as the date was inconvenient, but that another date would be suggested. Inkatha officials felt calling off the talks at the same time as the letter was issued was more than a coincidence and was a further indication the ANC wanted to break relations.

On Wednesday ANC deputy president Nelson Mandela phoned Buthelezi to reiterate the ANC position — that the "open letter" was directed at government inaction and not at Inkatha.

After the conversation the ANC issued a statement that the two leaders had agreed to use their "personal authority" to maintain relations between the two organisations. However, Buthelezi subsequently challenged this as

an incomplete record of what had been agreed.

In a separate statement issued shortly after the ANC comment, Buthelezi said during their conversation he had maintained that only the executives of the two parties could take the necessary steps towards "rectifying the very difficult position into which the 'open letter' thrust IFP/ANC relations".

Inkatha's central committee will consider the letter and decide on the party's response during its meeting on Sunday. In all likelihood it will demand a meeting between its members and the ANC's national executive committee as the minimum condition for continuing talks.

Buthelezi said it was his view that the two executives should meet and have an "examination of what the ANC's real intentions are".

This could pave the way for a large-scale meeting between the two executives along the line of the talks held in Durban on January 29.

Such a condition could put the ANC's executive in a difficult position — there is strong speculation the ANC letter was partly motivated by the NEC perception that members blamed Inkatha for much of the violence in Natal and the Transvaal.

If this is correct it could well be difficult for the ANC to agree at this stage to another full-scale, widely publicised meeting with Inkatha.

12-18/4/91

W/Maul



## BUSINESS

# ANC may hit the wall of tax

The African National Congress' "People's Budget" has stirred up a storm bigger than the ANC expected with an overreaction by business and other groups. However, the ANC is swimming against the tax reform tide, reports **REG RUMNEY**

LIKE nationalisation before them, the proposals for greater tax revenue in the African National Congress' "People's Budget" have enraged business.

The South African Chamber of Business, for instance, reacted angrily this week to the idea of new taxes — a capital gains tax, progressive property taxes, a minimum business tax, and a capital transfer tax.

The difference is that the ANC's ideas move the debate into a much more fruitful area than nationalisation.

Tax, after all, is by its nature redistributive. Argument should be about how tax revenue should be raised, how much, and where it should be spent.

Tito Mboweni of the ANC's Department of Economic Policy stresses the article does not represent official ANC policy, nor DEP policy, and was written to raise the possibility of using the fiscus to engage in certain social development projects.

Nevertheless, emanating as it does from the DEP it is bound to be — and has been — taken seriously.

The suggestions in a nutshell are:

- That the government's share of the economy as measured by the gross domestic product gradually be raised to 35 percent from its present 25 percent over a period of five years — given a growth in the economy of 3 percent a year.

- The deficit before borrowing be raised to 5 percent, instead of the International Monetary Fund (IMF) benchmark of 3 percent. This and the measure above, it is suggested, will raise R40-billion extra over five years.

Some economists will also take exception to the idea of raising the deficit on the grounds that this is inflationary.

- Savings be made by cutting back on spending on apartheid structures to gain an amount of 6 percent of budgeted revenue, or R3 750-million a year. Over five years, it is suggested, this will raise another R18 750-million.

To take the last point first, the amount to be saved is more likely to be a percentage of budgeted expenditure, since it is apartheid spending rather than revenue that is being saved. Also, whatever savings are achieved may well be a one-off rather than recurring.

It is not the R40-billion that should exercise our minds, nor the savings on scrapping apartheid spending but the implications of an increase in the tax take to 35 percent of the economy and the increase in the deficit before

## ANC'S PROPOSED NEW SPENDING OVER FIVE YEARS

● Housing — capital subsidy of R12 000 for 1,2-million houses	R14,4-billion
● Upgrading of 250 townships, R20-million a township	R5-billion
● Employment training scheme — R500 a trainee on 2-million trainees a year	R5-billion
● Land reform — establish 150 000 small farmers	R6,5-billion
● Rural infrastructure — short-term work for 1-million people	R300-million
● Primary health clinics	R300-million
● Adult literacy — training for 1-million community-based trainers	R550-million
● Education — school building and teacher training	R7,5-billion
● School feeding scheme — R100 for 5-million primary school pupils a year	R2,5-billion
● Feeding scheme for pregnant mothers	R2,5-billion
● Equalising pensions	R11-billion
● Industrial restructuring and export (Research and Development)	R3,2-billion
<b>Total</b>	<b>R58,75-billion</b>

borrowing.

Economist Lieb Loots of the University of the Western Cape has contributed to the economic debate from the leftwing perspective and has made suggestions to the ANC on the issue of the Budget.

Loots considers it an important condition for the tax take to be increased that the 3 percent growth be achieved. If the economy is stagnant we should exercise caution in building that stake, he believes. If such growth isn't possible, the government's arguments that sanctions are hampering the economy have no validity.

But even if the 3 percent a year average growth is achieved, how does the eventual 35 percent figure compare with other countries? The answer, according to figures supplied by the South African Fiscal Association, is that it compares well with developed countries, but poorly with countries which could be considered in the same boat as South Africa. For example, according to Safa, in 1987 the average tax take of general government as a percentage of GDP in OECD countries was 38,8 percent.

Turkey's tax take as a percentage of GDP was 24 percent; the figure for Portugal is 31,4 percent, and for Spain 33 percent.

In perhaps oversimple terms there has to be a tradeoff between economic development and social spending. As a country becomes wealthier, so conventional economic thinking goes, it can afford to spend more on social benefits. Not only is South Africa not as developed as Canada, where tax revenue comprised 34,5 percent

of GDP in 1987, but a significant portion of its tax revenue comes from social security taxes, which are a form of saving for a rainy day; 4,6 percent of Canada's total tax revenue is social security tax, as opposed to South Africa's 0,4 percent. The disparity is greater elsewhere: 20,5 percent of total tax revenue in the Netherlands is social security tax, for a total of 48 percent of the GDP as general government tax revenue.

(The ANC's proposals refer to the "widening of the income tax base" to 35 percent. That is clearly an error and should be the widening of the total tax base.)

In a developing phase a country must collectively *vastly* and turn its attention to growth. So while housing, for instance, is socially beneficial, it doesn't generate growth in the sense of bringing money into the country, though it might create jobs while the houses are being built. In raising money through a deficit of 5 percent and pumping it into the economy, such moves could also be regarded as inflationary.

Here Mboweni and Loots point out some of the money will be spent on growth-producing investments — eg the R3 200-million on industrial restructuring and export.

On the subject of increasing the deficit before borrowing, Loots also believes that some of the deficit could be funded by outside money, eg World Bank loans. This would not crowd out the capital markets, which anyway are not overburdened at the moment. Moreover, he points out that the government is using borrowed

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THE INDEPENDENT PAPER FOR  
A CHANGING SOUTH AFRICA

THE

## WEEKLY MAIL

Volume 7, Number 14. April 12 to 18 1991

Sticking to the  
spirit of the letter

It is easy to deride aspects of the African National Congress' open letter to President FW de Klerk. Why make firm demands with definite deadlines and then back off from them a few days later? Why take sideswipes at

Inkatha? Why make demands that are unlikely to be met, such as the dismissal of specific cabinet ministers? Why not manage the issue better, by briefing ambassadors, journalists and other politicians beforehand?

All of these are easy criticisms, and they have been made repeatedly by commentators in the last few days.

However, all of them skirt the real issue, which is that negotiations are impossible until the government shows that it is serious about stopping township violence.

For some time now, it has been apparent that there are nefarious forces fomenting the conflict; it has also been obvious that there are a few things that have to be done urgently to stem it, such as disarming those involved in the violence. The government, however, has stood passively and watched while the situation worsened.

Fear that the government was powerless to act has given way to suspicion that it has ulterior motives for not doing so. It may be simply the case that the responsible officials, such as Minister of Law and Order Adriaan Vlok, are too ineffectual to take the necessary firm action; but it may be that they view the destruction of their opponents in the same way they viewed the destabilisation of neighbouring countries in the 1980s. It seems increasingly likely that elements of the state are giving free rein to those they trained for years in the task of destabilising government opponents.

You would think, however, that their experience in countries like Mozambique would have shown them what a terrible toll this takes on the whole sub-continent and how mutually destructive it is for all parties in the long run.

It was inevitable that the African National Congress insist that something be done speedily and effectively. Not to do so would be to ignore its membership, a path of political suicide.

Commentators have been quick to put the ANC action down to the dominance of hard-liners who don't particularly like negotiations; or internal organisational chaos that forces them to use delaying tactics. Such elaborate theories are not necessary: the ANC is simply responding to an overwhelming demand from its supporters.

The ANC laid out seven steps that need to be taken for the government to show that it is taking seriously the problem of violence: the outlawing of traditional weapons; the dismissal of ministers Vlok and Malan; the public disarming of covert counter-insurgency units; the immediate suspension from duty of all police officers involved in recent shooting incidents that are under investigation; assurances about police and army behaviour in crowd control; the phasing out of hostels; and the establishment of an independent inquiry into complaints about the security forces.

These demands are not unreasonable (this newspaper has itself made each one of them during the past few months), even if one can question the tactical wisdom of naming specific ministers or setting firm deadlines for all demands to be met.

The key question now is how to move forward and avoid a deadlock at this point. It is clear that two things are necessary: the government needs to find a way of indicating dramatically and irrefutably that it is serious about stopping the violence; and the ANC needs to be flexible about the details of its demands, keeping open the way forward by holding to the spirit — but not the letter — of its open letter.



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W/Mail

## 'Bolt from the blue' rattles establishment media psyche

By MARK GEVISSER

THE African National Congress has a cheek calling for the resignation of Vlok and Malah. It is guilty of either buffoonery or political madness. It has shifted the goalposts and scuttled the peace process. It has bungled so badly that even Chris Barnard is leaving the country.

These are the views of the mainstream South African media. Almost every paper in the country spoke, this week, of the irreparable harm the ANC ultimatum has done to the image of the movement and to peace.

Perhaps the *Sunday Star* got to the root of media-rage when it wrote that "whatever the reason for the ANC's apparent change of heart, the move is ill-advised — a skittish white community, unnerved by escalating political violence and general crime, can only lose faith in black leaders and rally to the Right".

The mainstream media tends to reflect the anxieties and neuroses of precisely that "skittish white community".

One press commentator wrote, for example, that the ANC ultimatum "shows no awareness of (or respect for) the extent to which the negotiations process in South Africa is held together by the national psyche". He said the ANC ultimatum "has shattered that trusting psychology, offering in its place only psychosis".

But perhaps the only trust that has been shattered is that which protects white South Africa from the psychotic violence that has always ruled 80 percent of this country. While the ANC has unquestionably lost much white support in the past week, evidence points to the fact that the ANC's recent hard-line stance is very popular with its own most loyal constituency: urban black people who have borne the brunt of the current violence.

The ANC was caught in a Catch-22 situation: if it kept on playing the trusting collaborator to a regime that is regarded — rightly or wrongly — in the townships as being the root of anarchy, it would lose even more support in the black community; if it took a stand against the regime it could risk plunging the townships even further into this anarchy, and it almost definitely would alienate potential white supporters.

Faced with this choice, it is not surprising which option it followed. Perhaps the actual stand it took — the ultimatum — was foolish or politically unsavvy. But it was certainly not a "bolt from the blue", as a journalist labelled it on *Agenda*.

But if the media bears responsibility for an unbalanced "skittish white" response to the ANC ultimatum, then the ANC bears equal responsibility for not putting the media in touch — effectively — with the township sentiment that spawned its decision.

For if the ANC has betrayed one major flaw in this ruckus, it is not that it is a warmongering agent of destabilisation. It is, more simply, that it has not yet learnt how to handle the media.

The movement might have been following the directive of "the people" in issuing the ultimatum, but the fact remains, in this country, that the link between "the people" and its leaders is an often-conservative mainstream media, always sceptical when it comes to the ANC.

But even if the ultimatum did shatter the very fragile support that the ANC has garnered in the mainly white establishment, it did not shatter a fragile South African psyche. Rather, like a particularly lucid and terrifying moment in a long, convoluted session of psychotherapy, it exposed a psyche that has already been shattered by violence and that is groping for a solution.



# ANC 'cowboys' won't beat Inkatha to the draw

**M**USA Myeni, Inkatha Freedom Party executive member and head of international relations, has a warning for the African National Congress following last week's ultimatum to the government: The cowboy approach will be met by cowboys.

What this means, he explains, is that if the ANC wants to start the armed struggle again and make targets of white people and Inkatha "we will not sit by. So we are headed for a bloody situation.

Make no mistake. Don't think the 600 AK-47s that were delivered in the Transvaal in January and all the other weapons that the ANC has will make the world around.

"You need people to operate them. The people that you have are not made of steel. They are made of blood and flesh. They will kill some of us, but some of them will be killed."

As he speaks, a white piano tinkles away from the corner of the Johannesburg Sun coffee shop. It's cocktail hour. The migrant workers' hostels of Alexandra and the civil servants' hostels of Sandton are visible through the window. Myeni, sunglasses dipping out of his top suit pocket, and IFP leader Mangosuthu Buthelezi are warning about seem as stark as the Kindsch frontier.

A rising star in the organisation, Myeni — who has a Masters degree in international relations from the University of Geneva — has been holding court in the coffee shop all day.

He explains how his party has been on an organisational drive, particularly in the Transvaal, where it has come face to face with the ANC, resulting in the internecine conflict that threatens to sabotage peace in South Africa.


Inkatha is growing at a phenomenal rate, not because we are trying to destroy the ANC, but because we are giving the country what it wants." He defines this, broadly, as multiparty democracy and a free market economy.

Such sweet sentiments do not accord with the ANC's depiction of the IFP in its recent letter to President FW de Klerk.

Clearly pointing a finger of blame at the IFP, the ANC isolated a pattern in which almost every instance of violence ... a coup of individuals, drawn from a specific area of the country, sharing a common language and publicly identifying themselves with a specific political party have established control over a migrant work-

If the ANC carries out its ultimatum then the country is heading for a bloody situation, warns Musa Myeni.

**PHILLIP VAN NIEKERK** spoke to the Inkatha Freedom Party executive member



Musa Myeni ... civil war warning

er's hostel through acts of intimidation."

The ANC letter claimed that they use red headbands for common identification and "supported by others of like purpose, bussed in from other areas, they then stage a provocative armed demonstration through the township, escorted by police."

Myeni counters that the problem is that the ANC does not like the IFP to hold rallies on its turf. "Why is it that whenever Inkatha wants to have a rally, then the ANC jumps and wants to have its own rally? Have you heard of one case where the ANC has been attacked while having their own rally?"

"When our guys hit back, then the whole world says look at them. There is a big cry about cultural weapons. But these are ordinary workers who are being attacked just

because they are Zulus by Xhosas hiding behind the ANC flag."

In Alexandra, he claims, the ANC took a decision on the Wednesday before the Inkatha launch to disrupt it because the ANC leadership felt it was not in their interests to have the IFP launched publicly on the home base of Moses Mayekiso and Alfred Nzo.

"The comrades called people out of their homes, warning that Inkatha is coming. On the night of March 8 Mr Ndzuza of 18th Avenue was hacked to death and necklaced for being a member of Inkatha.

"The comrades moved on to 10th Avenue, attacking a certain Mr Dube who escaped, alerting other members of the IFP that they were being attacked. The hostel only got involved the following day.

"The message that reached the hostel was that Zulus were being attacked in the township, so Zulus inside the hostel started attacking Xhosas inside the hostel and those Zulus known to be ANC members also escaped the hostel and ran away.

"Then a lot of Zulus came in from the township into the hostel. We had more than 15 000 men inside the hostel and 8 000 outside the hostel. We were trying to calm them down the whole weekend."

But what of the use of rooidoeke, the badge of identification of IFP supporters in the hostels?

"It is normal for every regiment to be identified by the colour of its shield," he explains. "Last year Zulus were identified as Zulus for attack so they wanted to identify themselves — so that they don't kill their own people. They have at times killed their own people — one guy in Alex was killed because he wasn't wearing his red band."

"They have identified ANC members wearing red bands and pretending to be IFP like that and they've ended up terribly."

Changing gear, Myeni estimates that more than 40 000 whites have joined Inkatha in the Transvaal alone, emphasising the point by waving at a besuited executive on his way in to the coffee shop. "Ja, ja. Hoe gaan dit?" Myeni smiles to the suit who signals back.

"That's another member."


Inkatha's Sandton branch is to be launched in a few weeks with a big rally. Myeni assures that Inkatha won't be bussing people in from the rural areas for the launch.



H/Nation

# ANC ULTIMATUM:

12-18/4/91



# SUPPORT GROWS

**T**HE ANC's seven-point ultimatum to FW de Klerk to halt five years of township violence that has claimed more than 6 000 lives, has prompted a groundswell of support from major political formations outside government. The PAC, SACP, homeland leaders, trade unions, and Lawyers for Human Rights (LHR) have all backed the ANC's May 9 ultimatum, which demands that the government halt the township carnage or jeopardise negotiations.

Consultative Business Movement (CBM) and the National African Federated Chamber of Commerce (Nafcoc), however, have yet to respond as it becomes increasingly clear that to reject the ANC's ultimatum out of hand would amount to condoning the violence. The PAC said: "We support the position taken by the ANC as it emphasises the position that says all pre-

conditions for negotiations set in the Harare Declaration as endorsed by the international community, particularly the United Nations, must be unilaterally met by the illegitimate government." Transkel has expressed its full support for the ANC's ultimatum and has re-iterated the organisation's demands.

## Discuss

KaNgwane acting-chief minister and Inyandza National Movement deputy president Mangisi Zitha said the two parties, the ANC and the government, should discuss their differences amicably and not let the negotiations process fail. Cosatu said it fully

supported the seven points, demanded by the ANC as the absolute minimum needed to end the violence. In a meeting between the organisation's national executive committee and its Youth League (ANCYL) this week, it was resolved that thorough ground preparations must be made in case the government failed to address the demands by the May 9 deadline. The SACP's Internal Leadership Group fully endorsed the

demands made by the ANC in its open letter to De Klerk at a meeting last weekend, and further demanded that SACP Central Committee member Ronnie Kasrils and all those associated with Operation Vula be granted full indemnity. Meanwhile the LHR put the blame for the "crisis facing the negotiations process" squarely on the government's shoulders for failing to end the township violence. "The failure by security forces to dis-

arm parties in the conflict is a serious omission which amounts to an encouragement to acts of violence," said LHR director Peter Mothle. In supporting the ANC's demands, the ANC Women's League said: "It is senseless of us to continue talking while people are getting killed." The Congress of Traditional Leaders of SA (Contralesa) has called the ANC's demands "fair and reasonable".

It has also emerged that ANC deputy president Nelson Mandela had, because of his increasing dissatisfaction with the government, advised his national executive committee as far back as September last year to pull out of the pre-negotiations talks.

And as support for the ANC's position mounted, defence minister Magnus Malan fired 28 members of the Civil Co-operation Bureau (CCB), including the former head of the clandestine military unit, Joe Verser. One of the ANC's demands is for Malan's dismissal and the complete dismantling of the CCB.

Major business formations such as the





**QUESTION:** Why does Joe Slovo, who has a view on most matters economic, not have a view on the bond rate?

**Answer:** Because when he moved into a new Jo'burg house costing R180 000, the sale was straight cash.

## ANC and Inkatha youth plan to meet

W/Mail 12-18/4/91

By GLENDA DANIELS

THE African National Congress Youth League is for the first time considering meeting the Inkatha Youth Brigade in an anxious bid to bring peace to the townships.

The youth league has not extended a formal invitation yet but sees the meeting as an urgent matter, the organisation said this week.

The initial reaction of Inkatha Youth Brigade chairman Themba Khoza was: "We don't know anything about this, it must be a dream. How can I comment on something I have not heard of? Will I see it for the first time in the newspapers?"

Later, Khoza said: "This is a positive move by the ANC Youth League, and where we can talk we will but where we can't then we can't."

He elaborated: "There are ways of stopping violence; some of their strategies will be different, like the formation of defence units which we believe will create an more explosive situation in the townships. We oppose this and when we meet them we will tell them this."

Khoza said he had problems with "agendas", saying that while this was the first time the youth would meet there had been meetings between the ANC and Inkatha where this "problem" arose.

"The whole matter needs a method about who will work out agendas and where meetings will be staged," said Khoza.

The ANC Youth League said this week that because recent meetings between the ANC and Inkatha have led to an escalation of violence rather than peace they would rather have meetings "on the ground". Khoza said this "was a fine idea".

Media officer Parks Mankahlana said the ANC hoped to do this by encouraging their branches to meet the Inkatha Youth Brigade branches in the different townships and discuss ways of making peace together.

"It is our belief that discussions on the ground, provided there is genuine commitment on all sides to eliminate violence, will result in peace among our people."


While the Youth League will be encouraging both sides to meet in a peace bid, it will also continue to support ANC campaigns like the demand for a constituent assembly and an interim government. It will also have its own focuses, one of which will be an Aids campaign.



W/Mail

## DEREK BAUER'S WORLD

12-18/4/91





# Letter scuttled talks with Inkatha, claims Buthelezi

By CARMEL RICKARD: Durban

A MEETING of the Inkatha central committee this weekend will determine Inkatha's conditions for continued peace talks with the African National Congress.

In the wake of the ANC's ultimatum to the government, Inkatha president Mangosuthu Buthelezi said he believed critical references to Inkatha in the open letter effectively scuttled talks between his organisation and the ANC. His declaration prompted several top ANC officials to say Umdl was reading more into the letter than was intended.

Inkatha's view is that the ANC's decision to call off the next round of discussions originally scheduled for yesterday backs its interpretation that the

open letter was intended to break the talks. ANC officials said the talks were "postponed" as the date was inconvenient, but that another date would be suggested. Inkatha officials felt calling off the talks at the same time as the letter was issued was more than a coincidence and was a further indication the ANC wanted to break relations.

On Wednesday ANC deputy president Nelson Mandela phoned Buthelezi to reiterate the ANC position — that the "open letter" was directed at government inaction and not at Inkatha.

After the conversation the ANC issued a statement that the two leaders had agreed to use their "personal authority" to maintain relations between the two organisations. However, Bu-

thelezi subsequently challenged this as an incomplete record of what had been agreed.

In a separate statement issued shortly after the ANC comment, Buthelezi said during their conversation he had maintained that only the executives of the two parties could take the necessary steps towards "rectifying the very difficult position into which the 'open letter' thrust I/P/ANC relations".

Inkatha's central committee will consider the letter and decide on the party's response during its meeting on Sunday. In all likelihood it will demand a meeting between its members and the ANC's national executive committee as the minimum condition for continuing talks.

Buthelezi said it was his view that the two executives should meet and have an "examination of what the ANC's real intentions are".

This could pave the way for a large-scale meeting between the two executives along the line of the talks held in Durban on January 29.

Such a condition could put the ANC's executive in a difficult position — there is strong speculation the ANC letter was partly motivated by the NEC perception that members blamed Inkatha for much of the violence in Natal and the Transvaal.

If this is correct it could well be difficult for the ANC to agree at this stage to another full-scale, widely publicised meeting with Inkatha.

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a demonstration against militarisation and conscription outside the display. After a few minutes Military Police confiscated their placards and pamphlets (which argued against militarisation, the CCB and military conscription).

Good reason to look alarmed ... Arinscor's lethal new helicopter is lurking in the background

Photograph: KEVIN CARTER

for all the actions of his department. Dr Max Coleman of the Human Rights Commission said Malan's "bluster in parliament is a smoke-screen to give the impression that he's doing something about the CCB".

# All-party conference will end the bloodshed

From PAGE ONE

lence and security, it would be impossible to make progress on other levels. "It's crazy to think you're going to talk about constitutions and a new education system and land reform while people are hacking away at each other in the townships."

He said that while the ANC had raised a "very, very valid problem", the organisation had miscalculated by deflecting the problem of violence on to whether or not Vlok or Malan would resign.

"Things have got to get back on the road," he said. "What would seem to be necessary to make progress on the other levels would be to have some kind of discussion — an all-party discussion on the question of stability — prior to a multi-party conference or an interim government, where we could all get together and work out what we can do."

The proposal is that all parties with a stake in the violence, either as alleged

perpetrators or as victims, get together behind closed doors. "There are many agents of violence. The question would be asked: how do we carve up this territory?"

"The conference could confront issues like the third force, like criminal elements, like warlords, like factions."

IFP president Chief Mangosuthu Buthelezi yesterday welcomed the concept of an all-party conference on violence. "I would personally support the notion of an urgent all-party conference involving the South African government, the ANC and the PAC to discuss violence and raise issues and attempt to sort out differences."

"I would have to consult the central committee of the IFP but I have no doubt that they would have no problem with supporting the notion of such dis-

cussions behind closed doors to precede any further negotiations on the country's future."

ANC spokesman Pello Jordan said: "We would hope that Dr Stubbart would inform the ANC formally about the proposal before any ANC policy decision can be taken."

Constitutional Development Minister Gerrit Viljoen replied that he had "no response" to the proposal.

But the proposal did win provisional backing from the Pan Africanist Congress. The organisation's spokesman, Barney Desai, said: "The PAC are seriously disturbed at the rate of the violence in the townships."

"Any discussion between all parties involved specifically to curb the nature of the violence which is getting out of hand would be welcome."

"The fact is that the PAC has been minimally involved in the violence, but maximally concerned with it."

General Bantu Holomisa, head of the

Military Council of the Transkei, has made a number of recommendations to end the violence, among them a "big Indaba of heads of existing government structures and leaders of political organisations to be convened prior to any envisaged multi-party conference".

This Indaba, Holomisa said, would thrash out the issue of violence and unanimously endorse the implementation of those recommendations acceptable to them contained in a plan to be presented by all chiefs of security forces and military wings of political organisations.

Azanian People's Organisation general secretary Pandelani Nefolovhde rejected the notion of a conference if the government is to be involved.

"We consider the government as being responsible for orchestrating the violence," he said. "In respect of the solution, we believe it can only be found first and foremost by the black groups in the townships."

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# ANC's Youth League faces problems

THE ANC Youth League has not yet recruited half the members it had expected to by now.

And, the earliest it expects to convene its national inaugural congress is late July or August.

"Our recruitment drive and the building of organisation on the ground has not reached the expected level," said ANCYL secretary Rapu Molekane.

This assessment was made after the first meeting involving the ANCYL's provisional secretariat and representatives from each of the league's 14 regions, which was held last week in Durban.

"It was the desire of the secretariat that by April 6, the date set originally for our congress, we should have signed up 500 000 members; a halfway mark towards signing more than one million members," he added.

But the present paid-up national membership of the Youth League stands at 210 605, while the signed up membership is 250 000.

ANCYL organiser Kgaogelo

Lekhorro said that there were four main obstacles to building the Youth League:

- lack of resources
- the ongoing violence
- the bureaucracy involved in setting up branches
- the league's failure to recruit in learning institutions and industries.

## Obstacle

The lack of resources was perhaps the most serious obstacle, said Lekhorro. Organisers did not have the money necessary to travel to branches to ensure that they were launched, or to set up structures in areas where there were no youth organisations.

The Youth League is expected to meet the ANC soon to discuss the question of raising its own funds.

The violence, which at present has affected seven of the 14 regions, has also disrupted recruitment.

"This is particularly the case in Northern Natal, where it is not possible for the ANC to hold meetings without being attacked," said Lekhorro.

"The way we have gone about forming the Youth League - by consulting youth formations in all the different areas to make sure that they are involved in the process - has also slowed down recruitment," said Lekhorro.

"Before we even established provisional branch and regional structures, youth organisations - particularly progressive youth structures - had to meet and discuss the procedure.

"Then Provisional Local Youth Committees (PLYC's) had to be set up by the regional structures, and only then could recruitment start.

"These bureaucratic processes slowed down the building of our organisation."

The fourth stumbling block, according to Lekhorro, was the fact that the ANCYL still had to make inroads into schools, technikons, universities and industries.

Organising in these sectors, he said, involved consultation with organisations such as Cosas, Samsco, Nusas

and Cosatu.

"We have to convene national meetings to discuss these questions and this takes time to arrange. It is only now that we are making a breakthrough in reaching an understanding with Samsco, for example, on how to approach the campuses."

Lekhorro also pointed out that times had changed from the heightened mobilisation of the mid-1980s.

"We are living in a different era to the mid-Eighties when the youth was mobilised around a programme of mass action, and would respond to popular national calls such as the isolation of the police or the resignation of councillors.

## Negotiations

"In the present era we are confronted with the duty of defining activities in keeping with the present process of negotiations."

To speed up the process of formally constituting the ANCYL at its national congress, last week's meeting resolved that all regions should aim to launch by the end of May.

However regions can only launch over 50 percent of the PLYCs in the region have launched. At this stage the Northern Transvaal, Eastern Transvaal and PWV regions are closest to launching.

The ANCYL has also declared the period from May 16 until June 16 as the "month of youth mobilisation and organisation". ANCYL branches in all regions are expected to host mass activities, and one particular focus of the period will be health education especially Aids.

May 31, June 1 and June 16 will be days of mass youth action for a constituent assembly and interim government.

During the period leading to the launch the ANCYL will also be tackling its relationship with the ANC. At present the Youth League is represented on almost all regional ANC executives, but it has no representation at a national level.

In addition the definition of autonomy needs to be more carefully worked out by the two structures.

17/1/1991  
12-18/4/91



# ANC aims at mayhem, says Buthelezi

THE ANC's warning on the suspension of talks if the government did not take measures to end the violence before May 9 was aimed at creating mayhem in the country, Inkatha Freedom Party (IFP) president, Chief Mangosuthu Buthelezi, said last night.

Speaking on the SABC-TV actuality programme "Agenda", Chief Buthelezi said the ANC's ultimatum, contained in an open letter to State President De Klerk, did not coincide with endeavours towards peaceful negotiations.

The IFP leader felt there might be a pressure

group within the ANC which at times "almost throttled" its deputy president, Mr Nelson Mandela, and which had not abandoned the idea of revolution and of seizing power.

He repeated his disappointment at the letter as "all of us were poised to get into (peace) talks".

He claimed the alleged cancellation of an April 11 ANC/IFP meeting was not accidental, but a deliberate action by the ANC levelled at the IFP.

However, he added: "If Mr De Klerk asks us to talk to each other today or tomorrow, I will do so."

Chief Buthelezi said it was ironic that people with AK-47 and grenade arms caches throughout the country and in self-governing territories should complain about IFP supporters carrying so-called traditional weapons.

"Being a Zulu, the King and I carry traditional weapons. The demands to disarm us — is that not a declaration of war?" he asked. — Sapa.

## ANC readies for 'Inkatha attack'

SHARPEVILLE. — An Inkatha "war cabinet", operating in the Transvaal, has planned an attack any moment now against the ANC in five Vaal townships, an ANC leader in Sharpeville alleged yesterday.

As a result of information at its disposal, the ANC on Wednesday night set up "defence units" in the five townships, a tense and exhausted chairman of the

ANC branch in Sharpeville, Mr Siza Bennett Rani, said.

These "defence units" operated mainly at night, patrolling the streets in small numbers, as well as being positioned at all the township entrances, where they searched any suspicious-looking cars.

As the local ANC chairman, Mr Rani had also informed Sharpeville's police, who in turn had informed their seniors. — Sapa.

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# Negotiation the way to lasting peace — Viljoen

By Brian Stuart  
CAPE TOWN. — Negotiation was inevitable because it offered the only hope of achieving lasting peace and stability, and this must be recognised by the ANC, Dr Gerrit Viljoen, Minister of Constitutional Development, said at a media briefing yesterday.

Dr Viljoen disclosed that the State President, Mr F W de Klerk, had been seeking a tripartite meeting with ANC deputy president Mr Nelson Mandela and Inkatha Freedom Party leader Dr Mangosuthu Buthelezi, but had so far not received a "positive response".

He said Mr De Klerk was expected to issue a "considered response" to the ANC's open letter to him in due course. "As you know the President, he would not wait until May 9."

Reacting to the ANC ultimatum, Dr Viljoen said the ANC could not revert to "armed struggle" because as a strategy it would not work and because of the pain and suf-

fering it would inflict on people and the economic consequences. Violence, in itself, only stressed the need for negotiation.

The ANC had already found it necessary to explain its ultimatum, and in some respects appeared to be softening its attitude. "But if there is something to be explained, please come along and explain it," Dr Viljoen added.

The government did not doubt that the ANC was concerned about the level of violence. All leaders, including government leaders, were similarly concerned.

"We don't doubt for a single moment their concern in this matter. But what we do reject is their diagnosis of the causes, and especially the way in which they shift all blame onto the other parties."

The first time he had heard the ANC concede that their followers were also involved in the violence was at the January meeting between Inkatha Freedom Party leader, Dr

Mangosuthu Buthelezi, and ANC deputy president, Mr Nelson Mandela.

"I haven't heard them often acknowledge that their people are involved. I think this is the thing that really worries the government about the ANC."

In spite of the fact that the leaders of the ANC were aware of Mr De Klerk's suggestion of a tripartite meeting last Friday, "there was, out of the blue, a reaction by way of what amounts to an ultimatum," Mr Viljoen said.

Since nothing had happened to justify such drastic action, and it came at a time when Mr Mandela and Dr Buthelezi had spoken of reconciliation. It raised the question as to whether Mr Mandela was a free agent or was acting under pressure from radicals within the ANC leadership corps.

"This is not the Mr Mandela we have come to know so far in promoting discussion and negotia-

tion," said Dr Viljoen.

"There is no workable alternative to negotiation. If we deviate from this road, in the end we will merely have to come together on this road on talks with one another to find solutions."

"When the ANC and the government decided to seek a solution through peaceful negotiations, they did so because both recognised that practice had shown that violence and the exercise of force did not provide solutions that work or which were lasting."

Dr Viljoen said it appeared some people within the ANC had not accepted the statement by ANC leaders on January 8 that they accepted an All-Party Conference.

He referred to a document entitled "Guidelines and strategy and tactics of the ANC", in which the ANC said it was losing the tactical initiative to the government, and that it had not moved fast enough to establish its organisational machinery and adapting to the new terrain.

There was a reasonable suspicion that the ANC was trying to improve its image or to buy time in order to solve its internal organisational problems.

"But it is really a serious matter to risk the whole peace process by this method of an ultimatum, just in order to strengthen one's own political position."

Dr Viljoen said Mr Kobie Coetsee, Minister of Justice, had been doing his utmost to complete the indemnity process and the release of prisoners by April 30. By its ultimatum, the ANC appeared to be delaying the date for a response to the negotiation initiative beyond that date to the May 9 deadline.



It also complains about the police taking sides and from time to time calls for the police to be removed.

It also denigrates the police and the army to the point where township dwellers have lost confidence in both.

If the government is not going to use the police and the army to end violence, who is it going to use?

Two of the ANC's demands are for the banning of "traditional weapons" at public assemblies, processions and rallies, and a demand that the police not be issued with live ammunition at mass meetings.

Even if "traditional weapons" were outlawed, the fighting would continue, for the simple reason that much of the mayhem has not been caused at public assemblies, processions and rallies but by direct attack on opponents, by ambushes and by outright warfare. "Traditional weapons" may have been used in some clashes, but far more deaths have been caused by AK-47s and other weapons that the ANC has never asked the government to ban, since its own supporters use them.

Besides, the ANC has its hidden arms caches and won't hand them over.

As for the police not being issued with live ammunition, we think the ANC must be joking.

The police, a large number of whom have been killed in politically motivated attacks, cannot be expected without arms to confront mobs running into thousands and often carrying dangerous weapons.

If the mobs turned on the unarmed police and killed them, would the ANC accept responsibility?

What we have seen is ANC-Inkatha, Xhosa-Zulu clashes of awful magnitude that have caused 2 000 deaths in the past year.

If the government is to end that violence, it must have the support of both the ANC and Inkatha and its security forces must be assisted, not undermined.

If the row over the ANC's open letter shows one thing, it is that the ANC talks with a forked tongue.

Until it makes up its mind — to help bring law and order to the townships by seeing that its supporters desist from violence, by implementing the peace accord with Inkatha, and by accepting Chief Buthelezi as a major player — there will be no peace.

## THE CITIZEN COMMENT

12/4/91

### Contradictory

THE ANC blames the government for the continuing violence.

ANC deputy president Nelson Mandela, presenting the open-letter ultimatum to the government last week, said it was inconceivable that the authorities lacked the capacity to stop faction fighting.

He suggested the Minister of Law and Order, Mr Adriaan Vlok, and the Minister of Defence, General Magnus Malan, were indirectly responsible for 8 000 deaths since September 1984, when Black factional fighting erupted on a large scale.

The open letter said the government's attitude to the violence reflected either "cynical irresponsibility or is evidence of connivance at acts of organised terror in the hope that they will succeed in destroying or seriously crippling the ANC".

The letter also accused the Inkatha Freedom Party of being responsible, with the help of the police, for invading townships where it had previously commanded no support.

The cycle of violence was aimed at inflating the image of Inkatha "from that of a minor to the rank of the third major player in the political arena".

At a meeting with foreign envoys this week, Mr Mandela said the township violence was becoming a national disaster, and if the government failed to react more seriously, the ANC would stick to its ultimatum.

A clear signal from the government that it was prepared to take major steps to end the violence was essential, Mr Mandela added.

The ANC is a most contradictory organisation.

It wants action by the government, yet it doesn't want action by the government.

Let's explain:

The ANC wants the troops out of the townships.



**T**HE saying about keeping your head when all about you are losing theirs can be aptly applied to the uproar surrounding the ANC's ultimatum to government on township violence.

When Inkatha president Mangosuthu Buthelezi draws analogies with stroking the head of a black mamba, when editorial writers border on hysteria, when respected national figures talk of emigrating, the conclusion is inescapable that the national psyche has been profoundly undermined.

But although it is clear that public confidence in the negotiation process has been shaken as never before, the outrage that has followed the ANC's threat to call off talks does not stand up to closer scrutiny.

The key to understanding this lies in the context and motivations for the ANC's new hardline position. On the broadest level, the ANC perceives itself as having lost the "strategic advantage".

A little-publicised but highly revealing ANC document titled Guidelines on Strategy and Tactics of the ANC makes this disarmingly honest self-perception clear.

**B**etween passages of self-aggrandisement, a refreshingly forthright comment is made: "In the months particularly after the August 1990 Pretoria summit ... the regime utilised the terrain of negotiations more effectively than the liberation movement...."

"Combined with the devastating campaign of violence against African communities, this led to situations in which the liberation movement was losing the tactical initiative to the regime," the document continues.

Seen from this perspective, the ANC's ultimatum is not so much a serious attempt to force the resignation of two senior government Ministers, as an aggressive bid to gain, or regain, the strategic high ground.

This might partly explain the mo-

# ANC ultimatum no cause for hysteria or despondency

12/4/91 TIM COHEN B/Day

tivation for the ultimatum, but the ANC is faced with more pressing concerns. It has operated openly in the country for more than a year, but despite being extremely popular and having a highly regarded leadership, its internal organisation is poor.

Membership drives have not come close to reaching targets, never mind expectations. The same strategy and tactics document does not mince words on this point: "... our movement has not been fast enough in establishing machinery and adapting to the new terrain of struggle".

In addition, the membership that does exist is more than a little critical of the ageing leaders. Justified or not, the feeling exists that the leadership is not sufficiently responsive to grassroots members' demands. This was well demonstrated by the tongue-lashing the organisation's hierarchy got from the floor at the ANC's consultative conference last year. And since then the feeling has intensified.

With elections for national leadership positions little more than a month away, there is plenty of incentive for incumbent office bearers to flex their muscles.

The ANC's members, and prospec-

tive members, require the leadership to force concessions out of government to demonstrate the movement's political prowess. This might force the ANC to take steps it might otherwise hesitate to take, and which might have unfortunate consequences. But clearly the leadership feels it has no choice but to absorb the consequences as best it can.

**A**nother point to consider is that the ultimatum brings the ANC closer to the PAC's anti-negotiations stance, which could ensure a successful meeting between the two organisations in Harare next week.

From this perspective, the ANC's ultimatum constitutes a recognition by the leadership that it is responsible for its actions, and not at liberty to ignore its members.

The ultimatum is an expression of the necessity for internal democracy which, despite its poorly conceived nature, mitigates against the cabal style of leadership of which the ANC has sometimes been guilty.

Negotiations with an organisation which does not have the support of its members would be useless. A

strong negotiating partner is to everybody's advantage.

The ANC's mistake was to paint itself into a corner by making demands to which it must have known government could not accede.

The ANC ultimatum says: "If by 9 May 1991 these demands have not been met the ANC shall: (a) suspend any further discussion with the government on the All Party Congress; and (b) suspend all exchanges with the government on the future constitution of our country."

By putting the ultimatum this way, the ANC has allowed itself no escape. If by May 9 Ministers Magnus Malan and Adriaan Vlok are still in office, and if the ANC wants to govern at some point in the future, a humiliating climb-down is the only recourse.

But even here, the ANC's position is not as inflexible as it seems. At the news conference where the ANC put its demands, one of the first questions deputy president Nelson Mandela was asked was what would happen if government went quite a long way to meeting the demands, but did not give in to all of them.

Mandela said it was premature to discuss this question, but significantly, added that the ANC would study

government's response carefully. "If the government responds to us in a satisfactory way, then of course we will discuss that."

There is another reason for reining in hysteria about the ultimatum, and that is the ANC's stated reason for issuing it — government inaction on township violence. ANC Information department head Pallo Jordan is right in pointing out that police reactions to the murder of whites and the murder of township residents have been grotesquely different. He is also right to point out that Vlok and Malan are responsible to SA taxpayers, black and white. And the ANC is right to highlight some of the more unsavoury activities of the SAP and the SADF.

That the ANC is not particularly helpful in suggesting ways of achieving peace or overly enthusiastic about maintaining it, is not at issue here; the fact is that government is ultimately responsible for keeping the peace. As one ANC member has said, whites are peculiarly indifferent to killings in townships, while blacks are forced to live with them. Government all too easily throws up its hands at the scale of the problem.

The ANC was guilty of poor judgment in the uncompromising way it phrased its ultimatum. And it indulged in some quite unnecessary and dangerous derogatory comments about Inkatha. It also made the negotiation process a hostage to its demands, turning it into a political bargaining chip for all parties.

**B**ut its move is not inexplicable and ought not to cause despondency. The negotiations were always likely to be fraught with difficulties. It is quite possible that a setback could derail the whole process, but the ultimatum incident does not fall into that category.

One Belfast citizen reportedly said of her home town that anyone who was not confused did not understand what was going on. Another replied: "Ah well, they say it's not as bad as they say it is."



B/Day 12/4/91

## Schwarz gets Bush sanctions pledge

WASHINGTON — SA's new US ambassador, Harry Schwarz said yesterday he had assured President George Bush that Pretoria would have fulfilled all five sanctions-lifting conditions of the Comprehensive Anti-Apartheid Act (CAAA) by the third week in June.

Bush in turn is understood to have given a clear signal that he would move to lift the CAAA sanctions in their entirety once all the conditions had been met, suggesting that the administration will not attempt to quibble over interpretations even at the risk of a Congressional outcry.

The exchange took place during a 15-minute meeting at the White House as Schwarz formally presented his creden-

SIMON BARBER

tials to Bush. Schwarz's assurance that all CAAA conditions would be met in June appears to have echoed a personal message from President F W de Klerk which Schwarz delivered to Bush.

In a formal statement to Schwarz, Bush said that he was "confident that the process of profound change now underway will be fully realised" and "the time has come to encourage and assist the emerging new SA".

Bush said: "I am immensely impressed with the dramatic progress achieved in the past year."

☐ To Page 2

## Schwarz

The administration officially holds that three conditions have been met and is awaiting the final release of all political prisoners and the repeal of the Group Areas and Population Registration Acts.

Officials have said that the legislation repealing the Population Registration Act tabled this week appears to satisfy the CAAA requirement that no similarly intended measures be imposed in its place.

☐ From Page 1

Schwarz appeared pleased with the meeting, but was barred by protocol from discussing details of the conversation. He did, however, note that he and Bush had compared notes on their Second World War flying experiences.

At an embassy reception following the White House ceremony, Schwarz indicated that he would push for more from the US than an end to sanctions.



**COMMENT**

# Sharp shock

**I**T's rich. In the same breath as his call for South Africa to increase its exports of manufactured goods, Thabo Mbeki blames economic mismanagement for the two-thirds cut in the proportion of our manufactured goods exports between 1960 and 1989. Some South Africans might be forgiven the nagging question of how much of that "economic mismanagement" can be blamed on sanctions endorsed by Mbeki's ANC.

Perhaps that was an unfair dig. There has been more than one constraint on exports of manufactured goods. And the very fact that Mbeki realises this country needs to shift beyond its role as an exporter of raw materials and semi-processed primary products is encouraging.

We can't blame the ANC and other anti-apartheid organisations for South Africa's laager mentality — the mentality that persuaded us to emphasise export replacement and self-sufficiency at any cost. The laager mentality derived principally from a visceral fear by one sector of being swamped in the pre-De Klerk decades.

But the laager mentality — even though it provided the spin-offs of Sasol with its technological superiority at considerable cost in protection and Armscor with its locally developed high-tech skills — is outdated. And we now have the spectacle of the ANC and the government, through the IDC, agreeing on that fact.

The difference is that the ANC

tends instinctively towards the creed of central economic controls while the IDC is proposing the reborn economics of protection removal. The IDC's aim is to stimulate the free-enterprise competition needed to have our manufacturers out fighting for shares in the international marketplace.

The IDC's tariff-cutting proposals are, so far, only up for discussion. We will doubtlessly have dozens of manufacturers pleading for special consideration. And it's almost inevitable that we shall have manufacturers pointing out that export giants such as Japan only achieved their positions from behind almost impenetrable trade barriers. But those will be special pleas that have to be ignored. The bottom line is that high tariffs cheat us all. They don't simply add to import inputs, but also allow inefficient local manufacturers to burden us with excessively high prices for locally made goods.

Decades of protection have failed to turn South Africa into much more than an exporter of primary goods. There has been some beneficiation, here and there — ferro-alloys are a good example. But we have not developed a broad range of hungry manufacturing industries which put exports before easy sales into the securely protected local market. If hungry export-based development is to be engendered, the complacent urgently need the competitive jolt that acceptance of the IDC's tariff-cutting proposals would give.



# Govt digs in against ANC ultimatum \*

CAPE TOWN — Government indicated yesterday that it would not reduce pressure on the ANC by offering it a "way out" of its threat to call off negotiations if demands made last week were not met.

However, Constitutional Development Minister Gerrit Viljoen told a news conference following Wednesday's Cabinet meeting that government was prepared to discuss the ANC's seven demands, and that President F W de Klerk would respond in due course.

Viljoen refused to say whether government regarded any of the demands as reasonable, or what action could be taken to go some way towards meeting them.

He said it was for the ANC to decide what it would do if government did not meet its demands by May 9. The fact that ANC deputy president Nelson Mandela had had to embark on a personal journey to Cape Town to tell diplomats that the ultimatum was not in fact an ultimatum showed the ANC had "made a mistake".

However, more could be done by all parties concerned, including government, to improve the situation — "but we need to sit down and discuss what we can do about it".

Viljoen said government was proceeding with all activities on the negotiation programme, keeping a cool head and being as

BILLY PADDOCK

rational as possible about the ultimatum.

Government did not plan to "bedevil or jeopardise" the negotiation process, despite the fact that the latest crisis "which had come out of the blue" had strained the special relationship between Mandela and De Klerk which had been very important for negotiations.

However, Viljoen believed "the interpersonal chemistry (between them) is strong enough to survive this strain".

He disclosed there had been continuing contact between the ANC's national executive committee and the Cabinet on other matters since Friday's ultimatum, and suggested there might have been contact on the demands as well.

He said negotiations were inevitable and the only way to find lasting solutions. If the parties drifted off the negotiating track and resorted to their previous positions they would eventually end up back at the negotiation table at some later stage.

Viljoen had no doubt that the ANC was genuinely worried about violence, but he rejected the ANC's diagnosis of that violence and what he said was its continual shifting of the blame on to other parties.

The ultimatum was not justified, particularly after Inkatha Freedom Party

□ To Page 2

## Govt digs in

leader Mangosuthu Buthelezi and Mandela responded positively to the idea of forming a troika to address the violence. "It was a complete somersault by the ANC in dealing with matters that were on the agenda", and the Mandela of Friday was not the Mandela government had been dealing with for the past year, Viljoen said.

"The question arises: is Mr Mandela acting as a free agent, or is he coming under

□ From Page 1

pressure from internal tensions in the movement and radicals in the leadership core?"

Our Political Staff reports that the ANC is to unveil its constitutional principles at a function in Cape Town today.

The principles could give a clearer insight into the ANC's proposals to be put before the multiparty conference.

● See Page 6

THE administrative structures of all departments at ANC headquarters in the Zambian capital of Lusaka have been transferred to Johannesburg after 30 years. Only a few staff members remain to wind up affairs.



# Education breakdown is the result of lack of order

LACK of discipline and the absence of parental control had led to the breakdown in black education.

Mr Patrick Doms of the Council for Black Education Research said this at a seminar on the "Crisis in Black Education and Its Implications for Human Resource Development" held at Wilgespruit Fellowship Centre.

The seminar was part of the Ubuntu Social Development Institute update programme.

It was also addressed by Mr Buntu Mfenyana of the USDI and Mr George Negota of the Black Managers Forum.

The crux of the presentation was not solely on the failures of black education and its chaotic state but on its relationship with human resource development.

Doms argued that black education was not in a "crisis" situation but was experiencing a breakdown.

Expounding on this syndrome, Doms said parents had lost control of their children. The children no longer attended school and were independent of their parents.

He said discipline was an integral part of any education system.

In black education, however, most black pupils did not have discipline as a result of the breakdown of family control.

He said the word "crisis" was made common by the media when referring to the state in which black education was in.

However, quoting from the works of Louis Althusser, Gramsci and social writers Bowles and Gintis, Doms said the "crisis" was only as far as big business and the reproduction of labour were concerned.

He said big business needed a stable workforce and the chaotic state of black education was not conducive to producing the required disciplined labour.

Doms said a relationship existed between big business and the reproduction of labour power.

He said capital was not getting the stable and disciplined workforce it expected from schools.

## Skills

In capitalist states, the reproduction of the productive forces had been achieved more and more outside production.

Quoting Althusser, Doms said although there was apprenticeship training within production itself, this reproduction of the skills of labour power tended to be on the decrease.

The dangling question was what do children learn at school, he said.

In his book, *Ideology and Ideological State Apparatus*, Althusser notes that besides techniques and knowledge they gain at school, children also learn the rules of good behaviour - the attitudes that should be observed by every agent in the division of labour.

Discussing it more scientifically, Althusser says the reproduction of labour power required not only a reproduction of its skills, but also a reproduction of its submission to the rules of the established order.

# Parents 'have lost control'

By DON



SEOKANE

From this assertion, Doms said the crisis really started in 1953 when Bantu Education was introduced.

One of its major aims was to manipulate the minds of young people.

Mfenyana said this was the contradiction of

capitalism because it had not provided the incentive to learn.

The school, Althusser takes it further, teaches know-how but in forms which ensure subjection to the ruling ideology.

All the agents of production, exploitation and repression and what Karl Marx referred to as "the professionals of ideology" must be steeped in this ideology to perform their tasks "conscientiously".

According to Althusser, the reproduction of labour power reveals as its precondition not only the reproduction of its "skills" but also the reproduction of its subjection to the ruling ideology.

Subjection, he says, recognises the effective presence of another reality - ideology.

Doms said the parallel which could be drawn from the recognition of the presence of ideology was that black education had been the vehicle of manipulation of the young and their subjection to submit to the ruling ideology.

## 'Effects of Bantu Education has been disastrous'

He said the effects of Bantu Education on past generations of school-goers had been disastrous, not only to the black people, but also to big business.

That probably had been the reason why the De Lange Report was

hailed by big business and rejected by extra-parliamentary groups as "reforming apartheid education", he said.

The De Lange Commission of Inquiry was set up after the 1980 riots.

The end effects of the realisation of the manipulative nature of black education had brought it to a halt - and reduced schooling to sporadic attendance.

Of the "crisis" and "breakdown", it appeared one situation appeared first, then followed by another.

If black education had experienced a crisis, then it certainly was breaking down.

However, it does not seem proper to say that the breakdown was only on the part of family control, the education system on the whole is breaking down.



**T**HE ANC's open letter to President FW de Klerk has caused a storm of angry reaction. Almost everyone has blamed the ANC for endangering negotiations, making unreasonable demands and covering up its own internal problems.

This conventional wisdom, however, is based on a series of assumptions about the ANC — most of which are open to challenge.

**ASSUMPTION NUMBER ONE:** that the ANC is responsible for the current crisis in the negotiating process.

The reality, however, is that although the crisis was neither felt nor perceived by much of the media, it predates the ANC open letter. The letter was a response — and a belated one — to the real problem: the ongoing violence and the government's lack of response to it.

If talks are endangered, foreign investors scared and whites emigrating, it is because of the violence and instabil-

# Five reasons why the ANC

bility, not because the ANC has reacted to it.

It would have been suicidal for the ANC not to take this step. ANC branches in affected areas are reporting dismay from members that the ANC cannot protect them and horror that anyone should place faith in De Klerk's willingness or ability to stop it.

At ANC head-office there has also been a fundamental change in attitude towards De Klerk. Whereas previously a great deal of confidence was placed in the president's goodwill and his relationship with ANC leader Nelson Mandela, there is now a strong sense that De Klerk has been duplicitous in his dealings with the ANC.

Having watched De Klerk mouth a commitment to peace and the creation of a new culture of law and order, the

The ANC letter to President De Klerk has provoked an angry storm of protest.

Here **ANTON HARBER** takes a very different line

ANC has had to face up to the fact that he has done little about this. At best, he finds himself unable to; at worst, he is enjoying watching the violence from a distance, knowing that it takes a terrible toll on his opponents.

A few months ago, De Klerk was seen as a potential ally. Now he is seen as a crafty and ruthless rival who is prepared to give rein to those elements of the state that have always specialised in covert destabilisation of the govern-


ment's opposition. No longer can the ANC flirt with De Klerk as a negotiating "partner" and potential ally.

The ANC open letter came like a bolt from the blue for most of the media, and certainly most political commentators. For most ordinary ANC members, branches and regions, however, the only surprise was that the ANC had not done it sooner.

**ASSUMPTION NUMBER TWO:** that responsibility for ending the violence lies with the ANC

As much as the minister of law and order has tried in recent weeks to pass on this responsibility, it is he who controls the forces of law and order and it is he who has just been given billions of extra taxpayers' money to end it.

Organisations such as the ANC, Inkatha and the Pan Africanist Congress can



Adrian Vlok

certainly act to promote a new tolerance among their members — but this is long term and is not going to take effect quickly even with the best of intentions. More immediate measures lie in the hands of the authorities, such as arresting any armed person, charging

## open letter was right

anyone who makes bellicose statements and vigorous disciplining of policemen.

**ASSUMPTION NUMBER THREE:** it was outrageous to call for the dismissal of the ministers of defence and law and order.

The ANC are at the back of a long queue. There have been dozens of calls for action against Magnus Malan and Adrian Vlok.

Vlok recently rescued a little credibility for himself by announcing some changes to the police force, such as the disbanding of the security police and an end to segregated training. However, he still runs what is known as the Department of Defence, as his large corps of liaison officers spend all their time attempting to refute evidence of police partiality or complicity in violence.

Vlok remains an ineffectual minister, slow to wake up to the realities of the 1990s and supported only by the far-rightwing.

Malan's credibility is at an all-time low because of ongoing revelations about the Civil Co-operation Bureau and its finances. He is kept on largely because he backs De Klerk in the caucus and the president, who came to the job without a security force power base, does not have an obvious replacement who could be confident of commanding the respect of the armed forces.

However, dissatisfaction that De Klerk is unable to rein in his security forces has given way to suspicion that he is happy to give them the scope to undermine his opponents.

**ASSUMPTION NUMBER FOUR:** that it

is outrageous to call for the suspension of policemen involved in recent shooting incidents.

That this has not happened yet is likely to cause more outrage. It would be the first step towards the government signalling that it will not tolerate policemen who do not accept the political change that is taking place and the first step towards regaining public respect for the police.

**ASSUMPTION NUMBER FIVE:** that the open letter is a reflection of crisis, disorganisation and conflict within the ANC.

The ANC's rivals, notably Inkatha and the National Party, have been quick to accuse the ANC of disrupting the negotiating process for selfish and malicious reasons. Both have put forward the argument that the ANC is doing it

only to disguise their own internal problems. The conventional suggestion is that the ANC is wracked by internal disputes between moderates in favour of negotiations, such as Nelson Mandela, and hard-liners who aren't, such as Chris Hani.

The ANC undoubtedly has many serious internal problems and conflicts as the organisation moves from an externally based underground organisation to a conventional political party. However, last week's open letter goes beyond these issues: any group in control of ANC policies would probably have had to take this stand — unless they were to ride roughshod over the opinions of members.

That the ANC did so last week was a sign that the gap between members, branches and regions of the ANC and the head-office which is often seen to be aloof and not accountable — a gap which was so apparent at the organisation's conference last December — is probably closing.



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a demonstration against militarisation and conscription outside the display.

After a few minutes Military Police confiscated their placards and pamphlets (which argued against militarisation, the CCB and military conscription).

Good reason to look alarmed ... Armscor's lethal new helicopter is lurking in the background

Photograph: KEVIN CARTER

all Decatur, as minister, the death of the legal and political responsibility for all the actions of his department."

Dr Max Coleman of the Human Rights Commission said Malan's "bluster in parliament is a smoke-screen to give the impression that he's doing something about the CCB".

## All-party conference will end the bloodshed

From PAGE ONE

lence and security, it would be impossible to make progress on other levels. "It's crazy to think you're going to talk about consultations and a new education system and land reform while people are hacking away at each other in the townships."

He said that while the ANC had raised a "very, very valid problem", the organisation had miscalculated by deflecting the problem of violence on to whether or not Vlok or Malan would resign.

"Things have got to get back on the road," he said. "What would seem to be necessary to make progress on the other levels would be to have some kind of discussion — an all-party discussion on the question of stability — prior to a multi-party conference or an interim government, where we could all get together and work out what we can do."

The proposal is that all parties with a stake in the violence, either as alleged

perpetrators or as victims, get together behind closed doors. "There are many agents of violence. The question would be asked: how do we carve up this territory?"

"The conference could confront issues like the third force, like criminal elements, like warlords, like factions."

IFP president Chief Mangosuthu Buthezi yesterday welcomed the concept of an all-party conference on violence. "I would personally support the notion of an urgent all-party conference involving the South African government, the ANC and the PAC to discuss violence and raise issues and attempt to sort out differences."

"I would have to consult the central committee of the IFP but I have no doubt that they would have no problem with supporting the notion of such dis-

cussions behind closed doors to precede any further negotiations on the country's future."

ANC spokesman Pallo Jordan said: "We would hope that Dr Stubbart would inform the ANC formally about the proposal before any ANC policy decision can be taken."

Constitutional Development Minister Gerrit Viljoen replied that he had "no response" to the proposal.

But the proposal did win provisional backing from the Pan Africanist Congress. The organisation's spokesman, Barney Desai, said: "The PAC are seriously disturbed at the rate of the violence in the townships."

"Any discussion between all parties involved specifically to curb the nature of the violence which is getting out of hand would be welcome."

"The fact is that the PAC has been minimally involved in the violence, but maximally concerned with it."

General Bantu Holomisa, head of the

Military Council of the Transkei, has made a number of recommendations to end the violence, among them a "big indaba of heads of existing government structures and leaders of political organisations to be convened prior to any envisaged multi-party conference".

This indaba, Holomisa said, would thrash out the issue of violence and unanimously endorse the implementation of those recommendations acceptable to them contained in a plan to be presented by all chiefs of security forces and military wings of political organisations.

Azanian People's Organization general secretary Pandelani Nefolovhde rejected the notion of a conference if the government is to be involved.

"We consider the government as being responsible for orchestrating the violence," he said. "In respect of the solution, we believe it can only be found first and foremost by the black groups in the townships."

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THE INDEPENDENT PAPER FOR  
A CHANGING SOUTH AFRICATHE  
**WEEKLY MAIL**

Volume 7, Number 14. April 12 to 18 1991

**Sticking to the  
spirit of the letter**

**I**t is easy to deride aspects of the African National Congress' open letter to President FW de Klerk. Why make firm demands with definite deadlines and then back off from them a few days later? Why take sideswipes at

Inkatha? Why make demands that are unlikely to be met, such as the dismissal of specific cabinet ministers? Why not manage the issue better, by briefing ambassadors, journalists and other politicians beforehand?

All of these are easy criticisms, and they have been made repeatedly by commentators in the last few days.

However, all of them skirt the real issue, which is that negotiations are impossible until the government shows that it is serious about stopping township violence.

For some time now, it has been apparent that there are nefarious forces fomenting the conflict; it has also been obvious that there are a few things that have to be done urgently to stem it, such as disarming those involved in the violence. The government, however, has stood passively and watched while the situation worsened.

Fear that the government was powerless to act has given way to suspicion that it has ulterior motives for not doing so. It may be simply the case that the responsible officials, such as Minister of Law and Order Adriaan Vlok, are too ineffectual to take the necessary firm action; but it may be that they view the destruction of their opponents in the same way they viewed the destabilisation of neighbouring countries in the 1980s. It seems increasingly likely that elements of the state are giving free rein to those they trained for years in the task of destabilising government opponents.

You would think, however, that their experience in countries like Mozambique would have shown them what a terrible toll this takes on the whole sub-continent and how mutually destructive it is for all parties in the long run.

It was inevitable that the African National Congress insist that something be done speedily and effectively. Not to do so would be to ignore its membership, a path of political suicide.

Commentators have been quick to put the ANC action down to the dominance of hard-liners who don't particularly like negotiations; or internal organisational chaos that forces them to use delaying tactics. Such elaborate theories are not necessary: the ANC is simply responding to an overwhelming demand from its supporters.

The ANC laid out seven steps that need to be taken for the government to show that it is taking seriously the problem of violence: the outlawing of traditional weapons; the dismissal of ministers Vlok and Malan; the public disarming of covert counter-insurgency units; the immediate suspension from duty of all police officers involved in recent shooting incidents that are under investigation; assurances about police and army behaviour in crowd control; the phasing out of hostels; and the establishment of an independent inquiry into complaints about the security forces.

These demands are not unreasonable (this newspaper has itself made each one of them during the past few months), even if one can question the tactical wisdom of naming specific ministers or setting firm deadlines for all demands to be met.

The key question now is how to move forward and avoid a deadlock at this point. It is clear that two things are necessary: the government needs to find a way of indicating dramatically and irrefutably that it is serious about stopping the violence; and the ANC needs to be flexible about the details of its demands, keeping open the way forward by holding to the spirit — but not the letter — of its open letter.



■AN article by Carmel Rickard (WM March 1-7) asks whether Midlands chief Mhlabunzi-ma Maphumulo was an autocrat or an angel, referring to a document issued by Inkatha president Mangosuthu Buthelezi's office.

A resident of Maqongqo, I do not remember any autocratic deeds by the chieftain. He did not force people to join the ANC. Some people wanted to kill him, so he left the area.

GE, Weekly Mail, Box 260425, Excom 2023.  
to edit for clarity and space

During his absence we were forced to join Inkatha — to such an extent that, at school, Inkatha members forced us to join by ordering the principal to tell us to produce membership cards if we wanted to continue learning. We then followed him. — ES Kunene, Cumberwood

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W/Mail

■WHY I will vote for the African National Congress in any future election:

The ANC is black because it respects the rights of people of colour. The ANC is green because it will give all of the people land. The ANC is gold because its policies will create wealth. The ANC is red because it is not afraid to take from the rich what belongs to the poor. — Jason Roux, Linden




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DEREK BAUER'S WORLD



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# INSIDE OUT

Arthur Maimane: Parliament



## Buzz about the new boy on the block

**D**OUGLAS GIBSON was sworn in as the new boy on the parliamentary block, playing for the Democratic Party as its man for Yeoville, when parliament reconvened on Monday after the Easter recess. The first debate he heard as an MP — start of a new ambition? — was on the Budget, possibly the last drawn up by an exclusively white government.

His party's finance spokesman, Ken Andrew, advised Finance Minister Barend du Plessis that making "impassioned pleas" to others to end economically destructive actions like sanctions and strikes wasn't good enough. Not when the Nats still "allowed inefficiency, incompetence, maladministration and corruption to become the hallmarks" of their decades in power.

But, outside the joint chamber, the much more fascinating buzz was about extra-parliamentary events that occurred while MPs were taking it easy over Easter — events that started with Archbishop Desmond Tutu's sermon on Ash Wednesday condemning the "culture of violence" that's spreading in townships and warning that misdeeds can't always be blamed on apartheid. They reached a climax with the African National Congress' 35-day ultimatum to FW de Klerk — the only success of which might be to give embattled Defence Minister Magnus Malan a new lease of life in office. There wasn't even a thought of Law and Order Minister Adriaan Vlok being sacked before the ANC's demand for his and Malan's heads.

MPs' first reactions to His Grace's sermon — termed a voice in the wilderness — were to his second initiative: that it's time to consider lifting the sanctions the government blames for the shortcomings in its budgeting.

It's known that the Archbishop was in conclave with FW before *die baas* addressed the Aspen Institute seminar to make his case for lifting sanctions. He'll be repeating it this month in Ireland, the country Tutu flew to after their indaba. MPs point out it was on that morning the top cleric of the Anglican Church suggested a reconsideration of sanctions.

Only days earlier the Archbishop and two of his bishops had a session with Planning Minister Heruus Kriel about assistance for 500 evicted farm workers at Kei Road in the Cape and 1 500 refugees from Braaklaagte, Bophuthatswana, crammed into three churches in the township outside Zeerust.

His Grace came away from the meeting glowing with praise for Kriel whose "positive response" to the plight of the homeless had been a surprise "that's taken me aback". There's speculation in the corridors of power about this apparent rapprochement between the government and the Nobel Peace Prize winner who preached around the world for the sanctions that almost brought "the country to its knees", as Home Affairs Minister Gene Louw has admitted.

MPs wonder whether the thaw is a reason for the Archbishop's new campaigns being "a voice in the wilderness" — ignored by the ANC and scorned by Chief Mangosuthu Buthelezi.

Buthelezi says clerics are "busybodies trying to be important in the eyes of the world by stepping in and trying to take charge of the peace process". An odd condemnation of people who're supposed to preach peace and goodwill among men. The chief was speaking at his own peace meeting with Nelson Mandela in Durban, where he proposed a troika — including himself, of course — to steer SA along the road to a peaceful egalitarian state.

But then, why, MPs are asking, was Buthelezi reviled by the ANC only days after his amicable talks with its deputy president? The national executive accused his Inkatha Freedom Party of instigating township violence to "inflate the image of the IEP from that of a minor to the rank of the third major player in the political arena".

Another puzzle for legislators is how much longer Mandela will allow himself to be bulldozed into corners — as they see it — by hard left members of the executive. It's only a few weeks since Mandela threatened "mass action" against governments that lifted sanctions before the ANC gave its permission. MPs still cannot believe the great man could think such a threat made diplomatic sense.

Days after embracing Buthelezi, he presided over a media conference at which the ultimatum to FW was declared — and the kwaZulu chief minister kicked in the teeth. And last Tuesday Mandela came down to Cape Town to tell ambassadors that the deadline might be stretched beyond May 9. That's seen as backing down — considering the ultimatum still had 29 days to run.



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## 'Bolt from the blue' rattles establishment media psyche

By MARK GEVISSER

THE African National Congress has a cheek calling for the resignation of Vlok and Malan. It is guilty of either buffoonery or political madness. It has shifted the goalposts and scuttled the peace process. It has bungled so badly that even Chris Barnard is leaving the country.

These are the views of the mainstream South African media. Almost every paper in the country spoke, this week, of the irreparable harm the ANC ultimatum has done to the image of the movement and to peace.

Perhaps the *Sunday Star* got to the root of media-rage when it wrote that "whatever the reason for the ANC's apparent change of heart, the move is ill-advised — a skittish white community, unnerved by escalating political violence and general crime, can only lose faith in black leaders and rally to the Right".

The mainstream media tends to reflect the anxieties and neuroses of precisely that "skittish white community".

One press commentator wrote, for example, that the ANC ultimatum "shows no awareness of (or respect for) the extent to which the negotiations process in South Africa is held together by the national psyche". He said the ANC ultimatum "has shattered that trusting psychology, offering in its place only psychosis".

But perhaps the only trust that has been shattered is that which protects white South Africa from the psychotic violence that has always ruled 80 percent of this country. While the ANC has unquestionably lost much white support in the past week, evidence points to the fact that the ANC's recent hard-line stance is very popular with its own most loyal constituency: urban black people who have borne the brunt of the current violence.

The ANC was caught in a Catch-22 situation: if it kept on playing the trusting collaborator to a regime that is regarded — rightly or wrongly — in the townships as being the root of anarchy, it would lose even more support in the black community; if it took a stand against the regime it could risk plunging the townships even further into this anarchy, and it almost definitely would alienate potential white supporters.

Faced with this choice, it is not surprising which option it followed. Perhaps the actual stand it took — the ultimatum — was foolish or politically unsavvy. But it was certainly not a "bolt from the blue", as a journalist labelled it on *Agenda*.

But if the media bears responsibility for an unbalanced "skittish white" response to the ANC ultimatum, then the ANC bears equal responsibility for not putting the media in touch — effectively — with the township sentiment that spawned its decision.

For if the ANC has betrayed one major flaw in this ruckus, it is not that it is a warmongering agent of destabilisation. It is, more simply, that it has not yet learnt how to handle the media.

The movement might have been following the directive of "the people" in issuing the ultimatum, but the fact remains, in this country, that the link between "the people" and its leaders is an often-conservative mainstream media, always sceptical when it comes to the ANC.

But even if the ultimatum did shatter the very fragile support that the ANC has garnered in the mainly white establishment, it did not shatter a fragile South African psyche. Rather, like a particularly lucid and terrifying moment in a long, convoluted session of psychotherapy, it exposed a psyche that has already been shattered by violence and that is groping for a solution.



# Letter scuttled talks with Inkatha, claims Buthelezi

By CARMEL RICKARD: Durban

A MEETING of the Inkatha central committee this weekend will determine Inkatha's conditions for continued peace talks with the African National Congress.

In the wake of the ANC's ultimatum to the government, Inkatha president Mangosuthu Buthelezi said he believed critical references to Inkatha in the open letter effectively scuttled talks between his organisation and the ANC. His declaration prompted several top ANC officials to say Umdl was reading more into the letter than was intended.

Inkatha's view is that the ANC's decision to call off the next round of discussions originally scheduled for yesterday backs its interpretation that the

open letter was intended to break the talks. ANC officials said the talks were "postponed" as the date was inconvenient, but that another date would be suggested. Inkatha officials felt calling off the talks at the same time as the letter was issued was more than a coincidence and was a further indication the ANC wanted to break relations.

On Wednesday ANC deputy president Nelson Mandela phoned Buthelezi to reiterate the ANC position — that the "open letter" was directed at government inaction and not at Inkatha.

After the conversation the ANC issued a statement that the two leaders had agreed to use their "personal authority" to maintain relations between the two organisations. However, Bu-

thelezi subsequently challenged this as an incomplete record of what had been agreed.

In a separate statement issued shortly after the ANC comment, Buthelezi said during their conversation he had maintained that only the executives of the two parties could take the necessary steps towards "rectifying the very difficult position into which the 'open letter' thrust IFF/ANC relations".

Inkatha's central committee will consider the letter and decide on the party's response during its meeting on Sunday. In all likelihood it will demand a meeting between its members and the ANC's national executive committee as the minimum condition for continuing talks.

Buthelezi said it was his view that the two executives should meet and have an "examination of what the ANC's real intentions are".

This could pave the way for a large-scale meeting between the two executives along the line of the talks held in Durban on January 29.

Such a condition could put the ANC's executive in a difficult position — there is strong speculation the ANC letter was partly motivated by the NEC perception that members blamed Inkatha for much of the violence in Natal and the Transvaal.

If this is correct it could well be difficult for the ANC to agree at this stage to another full-scale, widely publicised meeting with Inkatha.

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## reality

money to fund current spending, spending only 8 percent of the deficit on gross fixed investment. The deficit could be spent on fixed investment which will generate returns.

Loots believes the reaction to tax is overdone. Other countries have capital gains taxes, there are already forms of capital transfer tax in South Africa — eg the gift tax — and the minimum business tax on companies would only penalise inefficient companies or those avoiding tax.

Wealthier — if not wealthy — South Africans should not be too upset by the "soak the rich" rhetoric of the ANC budget article. It is likely that the ANC, like any other government, will run up against the wall of tax realities as other countries in similar positions have done. Simply, the trick of tax is to make people pay up and feel pleasant about it.

This, on the basis of the Sefa's figures is what has been happening in the Eighties. Overall tax revenue has increased, but the general impression is that individuals in Ronald Reagan and Maggie Thatcher's Western world have been paying less tax. Overall tax in the OECD countries rose from 24.9 percent in 1960 — the same as our present level — to 38.8 percent in 1987. This was achieved by lowering tax rates, while tightening up the collection.

Sefa fiscal thinktank chairman Marius van Blerck points out that tax reform is a careful strategy, and the overall tax burden does not necessarily drop with lower tax rates. On the other hand, countries which used high tax rates to achieve their objectives have had to back-track sharply. Five years ago Tanzania's top marginal rate was 95 percent, Sweden's was 86 percent. A few months ago Tanzania's top rate slithered down to 40 percent, and Sweden's dropped to a still high, but much lower, 50 percent.

## Standard reports on social responsibility

Weekly Mail Reporter

THIS year Standard Bank will probably spend more than R25-million before tax on "social projects of various kinds". In the past five years the group has spent some R90-million on social



# Vlok, Viljoen optimistic of solution to deadlock

By ARTHUR MAIMANIE Cape Town  
Two senior cabinet ministers have at separate media briefings this week blasted the African National Congress for its ultimatum but also expressed optimism that there will be an accommodation before May 9 when the ultimatum expires.

Constitutional Affairs Minister Gerit Viljoen and Law and Order Minister Adriaan Vlok said at their briefings there will be "a considered response" to the ultimatum from President FW de Klerk; but neither would say when that would be issued: before or after De Klerk's trip to Europe and ANC deputy president Nelson Mandela's to Japan and London.

The two leaders will have separate talks in London with Prime Minister John Major — who observers believe may help to resolve the deadlock.

Viljoen told the media on Thursday that the government was "shocked" by the ultimatum because the demands were a complete turn around by the ANC. Apart from its demand that Vlok and Defence Minister Magnus Malan be sacked, the other issues — such as random township violence — were already being discussed by their joint working groups.

The ultimatum, he said, did not sound like "the real Mandela" who was a "sophisticated and well-informed leader". Confusion within the ANC had led Mandela to deny that the demands were an ultimatum — and then have to explain it all to 14 ambassadors.

De Klerk was doing all he could to resolve difficulties, but there has not been "the positive response we expected" to his attempt to arrange a meeting with Mandela and Chief Mangosuthu Buthelezi. He wanted the three of them to discuss the "troika" proposed by the kwaZulu chief minister after his meeting with Mandela in Durban a fortnight ago. Viljoen would not say which of them had failed to respond, but it's known that when Mandela briefed the ambassadors he indicated that he was not interested in a "troika".

The ultimatum, he said, had strained the personal relationship between De Klerk and Mandela, but Viljoen was confident it would survive the present crisis.

After a lengthy attack on the ANC and Communist Party — accusing them of being a "common denominator" in the violence — Vlok claimed there was "a problem" about meeting the ANC demand to make "cultural weapons" illegal. He quoted a su-

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Not saved ... More than 100 squatter shacks were razed in Maseru park

Photograph KEVIN CARROLL

primo court judgment that declared it was "not an offence to possess a dangerous weapon if the possessor has no intention to use it for an illegal purpose". Police could not disarm people of "cultural weapons" without proof they intended to use them illegally.

But they were not as dangerous as the AK-47 rifles ANC cadres brought into South Africa that are "responsible for at least many of the killings". Both ministers say there will eventually have to be negotiations despite what Vlok termed "sabre-rattling" by the ANC which was only "stalling" to lengthen the process. Viljoen says that meanwhile the government will "retain the moral high ground" and also continue all possible communications with the ANC. He claimed the ultimatum was an attempt "to dictate the negotiations process and its schedule" but the ANC was "taking the peace process to improve its own" position.

Vlok claims there is a power struggle within the ANC with "the hawks and doves" positioning themselves for the leadership elections at its first national congress within South Africa. Viljoen says there's no alternative to negotiations and if the ANC withdraws after May 9, what would it do? Depend on "mass action" or return to the "armed struggle"? Vlok claims the government is "prepared for all eventualities" after the ultimatum expires.



■AN article by Carmel Rickard (WM March 1-7) asks whether Midlands chief Mhlabunzi-ma Maphumulo was an autocrat or an angel, referring to a document issued by Inkatha president Mangosuthu Buthelezi's office.

A resident of Maqongqo, I do not remember any autocratic deeds by the chieftain. He did not force people to join the ANC. Some people wanted to kill him, so he left the area.

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to edit for clarity and space

During his absence we were forced to join Inkatha — to such an extent that, at school, Inkatha members forced us to join by ordering the principal to tell us to produce membership cards if we wanted to continue learning. We then followed him. — ES Kunene, Cumberwood

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■WHY I will vote for the African National Congress in any future election:

The ANC is black because it respects the rights of people of colour. The ANC is green because it will give all of the people land. The ANC is gold because its policies will create wealth. The ANC is red because it is not afraid to take from the rich what belongs to the poor. — Jacob Zuma



# Mangope has broken his promises – ANC

THE Itsoseng branch of the ANC has accused homeland leader Lucas Mangope of reneging on his promise of free political activity when he abolished the State of Emergency in the homeland last month.

This follows the weekend detention of 60 public sector workers including dentists and a doctor in Itsoseng township near Lichtenburg. The majority of those detained are nurses and social workers.

The 60 briefly appeared in the Itsoseng magistrate's court on charges of attending an unlawful gathering in terms of the Internal Security Act.

The group was warned to appear again on April 24.

A spokesperson for the Itsoseng ANC branch accused the homeland police of being bent on maiming and possibly killing their members shortly before the arrests.

They allegedly charged into the Lutheran church, where the meeting was held, with sjamboks, batons and guns.

"There is increasing evidence that Mangope has either formed an alliance with the De Klerk government or taken it upon himself to prevent the growth of the ANC in the country," the statement said.

The ANC further warned the homeland leader that his "actions will spread and prolong the bloodshed that has

beset our country".

"In the interest of a peaceful end to apartheid, we call upon Mangope to stop the harassment and violent actions against the ANC and members of our communities," the statement added.

The Mafikeng Anti-Repression (Maref) Forum has lashed out at the Pretoria government for not indemnifying political prisoners in the homeland.

According to the organisation all those who were convicted following the 1988 coup in the homeland and those convicted for the Leeuwfontein and Braklaagte incidents should be released by April 30.

## Vigilantes blamed for violence

Violence in Kaitleng which claimed more than 18 lives since Sunday has been blamed on vigilantes hired by councillors to break the continuing rent and tariffs boycott.

According to a resident, Maureen Mokoena, violence erupted after a group of men wearing red headbands moved from house-to-house demanding rent receipts and saying councillors had conspired of lack of funds.

Civic Association of Southern Tswana vice-president Kgabo Msonkutu confirmed the harassment. Msonkutu said it was clear the vigilantes were employed by the councillors, the TPA and the government.

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## New Nation

### **An urgent necessity**

The demands and ultimatum the ANC has given the government is the most important development in recent months and has met with the exuberant support of the entire democratic movement and the masses of the people.

The ultimatum is an important signal that urgently needed to be made and represents the awakening of the movement to the realities on the ground - informed by the violence and a plethora of sinister efforts to generally undermine and misuse the negotiation process.

If successful this strategy would have ensured a particular outcome for the Nationalist government and its allies, and would have demobilised the rank and file members of the democratic movement.

We are democrats, fully committed to the democratic process, but our belief in democratic values must not lead to our people being made sacrificial lambs in the violence that is taking place.

That the ANC has chosen the response it has, means that it has heard the cry of the people and will in future be sensitive not to put the process of negotiations above the safety and wellbeing of the people.

The hysterical response to the ultimatum by the white mass media serves to underscore just how far apart black and white South Africans are from sharing a common, unifying perspective on the future of our country.

Or is it perhaps that, for many whites, the violence remains a remote collection of statistics that do not really touch the daily lives of their families and their communities.

Certainly, from the point of view of the majority of the people, this move by the ANC represents the beginning of the end of the state of drift that the movement was slowly sliding into.

The lessons for us from this experience must be clear and must illustrate that, however experienced and however big the mass support the movement commands, it needs to be constantly vigilant.

Those who have accused the ANC of attempting to scupper the talks are living in a fools paradise if they believe that negotiations is something that happens only at leadership level. They must understand surely that, in essence, negotiations represent the interests of the people.

After the signing of the Pretoria Minute, the ANC made it clear that it was suspending armed activity and was willing to make concessions precisely so that it would contribute towards the required climate for negotiations to take place.

It has therefore been astonishing for many of our people that no sooner was this pronouncement made when people were subjected to wave upon wave of violence.

What was the ANC then supposed to do? Neglect its own constituency and continue with talks as if nothing has happened while De Klerk, on the other hand, ensured the protection of his own constituency and alliance and took advantage of the space that he won in the violence.

In any event, the ANC leadership does not represent itself but those people who gave it the mandate to negotiate in the first place.

Lastly, we believe it is going to be important that the April 30 deadline and the May 9 ultimatum must be used for mass political mobilisation as the surest way of getting the talks back on track.