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FOURTH SESSION OF THE FIFTH KWAZULU LEGISLATIVE ASSEMBLY

CONTINUATION OF
POLICY & PROCEEDINGS
BY THE CHIEF MINISTER

MARCH 1992

Mr Speaker, Honourable Members, I will return to make a number of observations about the ANC and its role in politics today after I have completed my report back to this House on what I have done and said on behalf of Black South Africa in the outside world.

In November I went to Munich and Bonn after I had been to Switzerland and Belgium. In Munich I addressed the Hanns Seidel Foundation Franz Josef Strauss Symposium. The paper I addressed was headed "Southern Africa at the Cross Roads - Conflict and Co-operation."

As a departure point I said:

"With this broad sub-continental focus one could trace the development of violence over time to internal national causes and African causes and finally locate it in the conflict between the Communist-Socialist world and the capitalist world. There would be a lot to tease out in this focus and indeed it would be important to do so.

Instead, I choose to look at Southern African conflict with a focus on what has been happening in South Africa in recent times. I do so because in a very real sense, conflict and violence in Southern Africa as such has led to radical changes in vast areas of Southern and Central Africa. But as violence did whatever it did do in running its course 'in Mozambique, Zimbabwe, Zambia and Malawi, South African violence was isolated. It was detached from the rest of Africa and violence in South Africa became the focal point of interest with every country in Southern and Central Africa having a stake in the violence game."

I pointed out that the ANC was party to drawing the whole of Southern Africa into a conflict situation in South Africa. It set up its headquarters in Lusaka. It established military bases in Tanzania and Mocambique and it used Swaziland and Botswana for infiltration routes into South Africa.

I said:

"Whatever was said to the contrary, Zambia, Zimbabwe and Botswana played host to the ANC's military personnel and made it possible for the transportation of arms and ammunition to these countries into South Africa.

Then there was the South African Government's violent backlash with cross-border raids taking on more than hot pursuit dimensions. Pre-emptive raids were made on Mozambique, Zimbabwe, Botswana and Zambia. These countries began paying prices for playing host to those involved in violence in South Africa. And the armed struggle went on and the retaliations went on and there were no developing prospects of victories through violence. Countries began paying prices for an armed struggle which was not achieving anything."

I pointed out, however, that African States surrounding South Africa had to push back the frontiers of violence and gave South Africa the additional geographic immunity which made successful armed struggle impossible. I reminded the audience that there was the Nkomati Accord and Mozambique's withdrawal of permission to the ANC to use its territory for military purposes. Swaziland had not permitted military bases and neither had Botswana nor later, Zimbabwe. I emphasised that ultimately that left South Africa free to decide whether it wanted revolution or not. I said:

"Indeed, had Black South Africa wanted war there would have been war and had they wanted revolution, there would have been revolution. I knew that I could swing the whole armed struggle away from the defeats and stalemates it was meeting, and I knew that I could lead Inkatha into the armed struggle and make it the death of apartheid.

I examined that option very carefully. I had to because I was under tremendous pressure to lead Inkatha and KwaZulu into the armed struggle. I was under pressure from revolutionaries outside South Africa, and I was under pressure to provide the logistic support inside South Africa which revolutionaries needed from all sorts of organisations inside the country and in the outside world.

Some of this pressure was very difficult to resist because it came with deep moral endorsement from people I admired and by important churchmen in the world.

In the final analysis, however, I had to hear what Inkatha's membership was saying. Inkatha was founded very specifically to give the exiled ANC an internal partner which it could use to develop whatever it could develop in collaboration with people inside the country who were working above the ground, opposing apartheid through democratic means."

I pointed out that Inkatha was launched flying the colours of liberation and singing old liberation songs and chanting old liberation slogans. From its very first month of existence I raised Black South Africa's consciousness of the ANC. I quoted banned literature and made known the views of leaders in exile like Mr Oliver Tambo and I always quoted extensively from Dr Mandela's

writings. I pointed out, Mr Speaker, Honourable Members that the Inkatha grew phenomenally in membership because my line of giving people in this country an opportunity to champion old causes and hallowed values appealed to the masses. It was this Inkatha growing rapidly which emphatically said no to the armed struggle. We were on the ground in the country and we knew the score. I said:

".... the IFP's membership knew that liberated zones would not be established in South Africa. The typography of South Africa is different to that in Mocambique, Zimbabwe and Angola. Its demography is also different. It is not a place where a successful bush war could be fought. Black South Africans knew this and they voted with their feet against the armed struggle."

I reminded the audience that Black South Africans were correct. They knew the armed struggle would fail and it did fail.

Mr. Speaker, Honourable Members, I am dwelling for a few moments on what I said in Munich because one of the current issues in South Africa today is that of the continuation of Umkhonto weSizwe. Chris Hani and Joe Modise strut around as though they head a powerful liberation army which will form the basis of South Africa's Defence Force and even control the police and all security forces. This is absurd. Nowhere in the history of Africa's struggle for liberation has there ever been an army of such ill-repute when it came to military campaigns and military victories. There was not one military campaign in South Africa. I told the Munich audience:

"At no stage for more than a quarter of a century during which the armed struggle was pursued, was any road or rail network rendered inoperable. South Africa's electricity and water supply systems were never rendered inoperable. No factory ever stopped producing because of revolutionary violence.

Black South Africans saw ever-increasingly that violence inside their country was shifting away from hard military targets towards soft civilian targets and they rejected this move.

The violence then which was launched with such high hopes and was made the primary means of bringing about radical change in South Africa by revolutionaries, was actually launched in vain. It did not bring about the toppling of the South African Government. It did not produce martyrs who died for great victories."

Mr Speaker, Honourable Members, we are today struggling enormously because of the ANC's failed military options. When they could not make any headway as a military force and only suffered reverse after reverse as the South African Government and the Defence Force became stronger after each time they attacked it, the ANC started to set Black brother against Black brother. In the early 80's, Mr Speaker, Honourable Members, the ANC turned to change the classical armed struggle into what they called "a people's war".

They encouraged our young school children to burn their schools and to hound their teachers down under the influence of the slogan "Liberation Today, Education Tomorrow". In ANC broadcasts from Radio Freedom in Addis Ababa the ANC daily resorted Black South Africa, and the youth in particular, to form armed units and to spread violence from the townships into white areas and into industrial areas. They urged workers to destroy equipment and factories and urged Black activists to seize arms from white suburban homes and from the police.

A whole cult of violence and destruction was implanted in the hearts and in the mind of ANC followers. It is that cult of violence which has cost us so dearly and which has left behind it the killings and the burnings and the destruction of property that so hideously mars the image of Black South Africa today.

I told the Munich audience:

"And now we have to deal with the aftermath of violence which includes the cult of intolerance in Black South African society. We also have to deal with a whole modern younger generation which has grown up in situations of township conflict which revolutionary violence produced without gaining significant victories against apartheid. Conflict has been real in South Africa; violence has been real and we are now dealing with that reality."

I pointed out that violence and poverty were two sources of real dangers for the negotiation process. I pointed out that in the South African climate the ANC's commitment to mass action politics is extremely dangerous.

Mr Speaker, Honourable Members, Dr Mandela was at it again on Friday and Saturday threatening to take the kind of mass action that would if necessary destroy the South African economy. That is unutterably irresponsible unless you are finally committed to produce chaos because that is the only way you will be able to establish a Socialist one party State.

In Munich I warned that:

"Mass action politics is dangerous in explosive situations which so characterise South Africa today. There must be the laying down of arms. There must be the cessation of confrontation leading to violence. There must be a very much stronger movement towards the politics of negotiation and the recognition that you cannot negotiate in the midst of violence."

Mr Speaker, from Munich I went to Bonn where I had discussions with Mr Lutz Stavenhagen, Minister in the Office of the Chancellor. I also addressed members of the Konrad Adenauer Foundation. In the Chancellor's office I called for a reduction of violence and the disbanding of Umkhonto we Sizwe. I praised the National Peace

Accord and urged the West German Government to exert pressure on all organisations producing violence in South Africa and particularly on the ANC which still retained its private army.

At the Konrad Adenauer Foundation we talked about the need to look at the reduction of violence and poverty and the introduction of a political system in which there would be the maximum devolution of power with checks and balances built in the political system to

stop the growth of Draconian powers around future governments as being that which we should be pre-occupied with.

Mr Speaker, Honourable Members, I conclude my report back on my trips overseas by reporting on a very hard working and intensely rewarding trip I paid to the United States in February this vyear. My itinerary was as follows:

Monday 3rd February

Dinner with Mr & Mrs Marzullo and Mr & Mrs Peters

at Marco
Island

Tuesday 4th February

10 am. Interview with Ea

gle - local subsidiary paper of New
York Times

12 noon - 2.00 pm. Private luncheon for 25-30 people given at

the Hideaway Beach Club. Address: "The Present Realities in
SAII

2.30 pm. Naples Times interview

3.00 pm. Interview by editor of Naples Times - a major local
g paper for a major newspaper story

4.00. â\200\230%o S.00 pm. Meeting with radio, TV, press people.
Introductory remarks by Dr Buthelezi followed by questions

700 = 10,00 pm. Reception and dinner for 125-150 people to

be co-hosted by Mr and Mrs SG Marzullo and Mr and Mrs Leslie
Peters. Address after dinner

Wednesday 5th February

Departure for West Palm Beach, arriving at 10 am

2.00 - 4.00 pm. Major address to 600 to 1 000 people. "Can a

Multi-Party Democratic Non-racial Society evolve peacefully in
South Africa." ;

4.00 to 5.30 pm. Reception

6.30 pm. Boca Raton, Florida. Reverend Harold Steven, Bible

town. Address to approximately 1 000 to 1 500 people: "What
is happening in sa"

8.00 pm Private dinner, West Palm Beach

Thursday 6th February

9.30 to 10.30 am. Interview with Editorial Board, West Palm Beach

3.00 pm Depart for Ormond Beach, Florida
Dinner with Mr and Mrs Merrell

Friday 7th February

12 noon. Lunch at the Halifax Club, Tiger Bay Club Meeting

1.30 - 2.00 pm: Press Conference at the Halifax Club for invited press

230 pm. Meet with the Editorial Board of the Daytona Beach News Journal.

3.30 pm. Television interview WCEU - Television show, "Viewpoint"

6.30 - 7.30 pm. Reception at the Halifax Club.

7.30 pm. VIP Dinner and address at the Halifax Club: 30 to 40 people. "My role in the new post-apartheid SA"

Saturday 8th February

12 noon. Luncheon at the residence of Mr & Mrs Gosney

4.15 pm Arrive at Daytona Beach Municipal Airport

9.12 pm. Arrive Dallas

Sunday 9th February

10.15 - 11.00 -am, Address to congregation, Church of the Incarnation, Great Hall followed by questions and answers. 800 to 1 000 attendees

1230 P, Informal meeting with Dr Halloway, President Langston University

3.00 - 4.00 pm. Interview with the Dallas Morning News

5.30 pm. Meeting with Mrs St John Garwood

530 pm. Reception and buffet dinner at the home of Mr and Mrs Vance Miller with approximately 100 guests

Monday 10th February

8.00 - 9.00 am. Radio interview/call-in programme from the public, Don Evans show, Station KPBC

10.315 am. St Phillips Academy, Episcopal School. Speak to student body of 181, 6-10 years and teachers and parents

11415 -am: Press Conference, Dallas Doubletree Hotel at Campbell Center

12,00 . = 2,00 pm Luncheon. Host: Public Affairs Luncheon Club, with members and VIP guests and approximately 150 area students. Address followed by questions and answers

2530 pm. Meeting with the Editorial Board of Dallas Morning News

4.00 - 5.00 pm. David Gold Show radio programme. 60 minute interview and call-in

6i30 = 7.30 â\200\230pu. TV interview, Channel 13, PBS. Dennis McCuiston Show tape interview, 1live audience participation. This 1is the second highest PBS show in Dallas, syndicated throughout Texas

8.00 pm Private dinner with CALTEX Executives

Tuesday 111th February

7.00 am Depart hotel for airport

10.18 am. Arrive in San Francisco

11.15 aw- >~ 12+15 pm. Meeting and luncheon with Examiner Editorial Board. Address "Constitutional Developments in SA: What does the future hold?" followed by questions. Attendance of 300-400 people

2.15 - 3.15 pm. Lincoln High School. Attendance of 800

6.00 - 8.00 pm. VIP Reception

8.00 pm Depart for the airport

9.00 pm Depart for Los Angeles

10.00 pm Arrive in Los Angeles

11.00 pm Arrive at Hotel

Wednesday 12th February

8.00 to 9.00 am. Breakfast meeting with Editorial Board of the Los Angeles Times

9.30 - 10.00 am. TV interviews

10.00 - 13+00 â\200\230am. Interview with Michael Jackson Show by telephone. This is a KABC Radio Talkshow that is on the air daily. Mr Jackson is an internationally renowned host who has won 7 Emmy and 4 Golden Mike Awards as well as numerous other accolades. Mr Jackson lived in South Africa and worked for the SABC. He has entertained listeners for 22 years of KABC talk radio

11.00 - 11.30 am. Los Angeles World Affairs Council sponsored Press Conference

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11230 = 12 .00 pm. Los Angeles World Affairs Council private Reception with members of the Council's Board of Directors and other prominent Council members followed by luncheon address and question and answer session with the audience

1.45 pm. Student briefing with Los Angeles area high school students

3:00)~ 4.00 pm. Interview with the Diane Glazer Show. This programme is syndicated over cable TV. Mrs Glazer has interviewed countless public figures including Dr Kissinger, Prime Minister Shamir, Baron Rothschild and Mrs Jeane Kirkpatrick. She is a member of the World Affairs Council's

Board of Directors

Reception organised by Dr Sipo Mzimela

9.00 am Depart for the airport

10.10 pm Depart for Washington DC

Thursday 13th February

6.00 am Arrive at hotel

11.30 am. Meeting at the State Department with Mr Hank Cohen, Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs

Luncheon at the State Department

2.00 pm Depart hotel for 10 minute interview to be aired in its entirety on CNN's international programme

4.00 - 6.00 pm. Cato Institute Conference on "Constitutional Provisions to Safeguard a Free Market Economy." 200 people in attendance

6.00 - 7.00 pm. Reception at the Capital Hilton for 200 people

Friday 14th February

Breakfast meeting with businessmen

6.00 pm Depart Washington

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Mr Speaker, Honourable Members, my last report back to this House on my trips overseas is on the trip I undertook to the United States in February this year, that was I think my most successful trip ever to the United States.

Everywhere I went, I found that people, institutions and organisations were admitting that they had to re-assess the South African situation. Some of them were re-assessing the situation here because they recognised that they were wrong in previous years when they thought that only the accommodation of revolutionary threats and the complete economic isolation of South Africa could possibly bring about an end to apartheid. They now see that indeed it was internal non-violent opposition to apartheid and the process of negotiation which has now commenced that will establish a fair and just society in this country.

There are, of course, those who continue to listen to ANC propaganda despite that fact that negotiations are now happening which has proved that the ANC was so wrong for so long.

Ultimately perhaps it does not matter why people are re-assessing this country as long as they do so. As long as people now see that it is non-violence and negotiation which will succeed and as long as they see that violence in society must be curbed and organisations and political movements such as the ANC which keeps a private army on the ready and which uses confrontationism alive through reliance on mass action are very wrong, then there is some hope.

They must see, for example, Dr Mandela is dangerously wrong in doing what he is doing now - threatening mass action and the destruction of the economy when he does not get his way with regard to price increases on basic food stuffs. We are all, of course, very concerned with the possible addition of VAT on food prices against the background of escalating poverty amongst our people.

The KwaZulu Government and the IFP also vehemently oppose increases in basic food prices which hit the poorest of the poor the hardest. However to go as far as destroying the economy is patently irresponsible. If the economy is destroyed in trying to keep prices down, we will end up with the kind of run-away inflation which has reached 500 to 1000% per annum figures in South America.

Dr Mandela is not looking at the interests of the poorest of the poor when he talks like that. He is only posturing for party political gain.

It is reminiscent of the kind of posturing that was evident in the ANC's Open Letter to the State President in April last year. Then the ANC made preposterous demands which could not be met and were indeed not met. The ANC was playing to its grumbling galleries. The ANC's leadership is faced with deep divisions in its ranks. They have the Harry Gwala factor which is totally confrontationist and is destructive of relationships the ANC could possibly establish between itself and the IFP and the National Party. They also have the Chris Hani factor which is totally committed to militarism in the ANC and to its emergence as the only organisation contending for power.

In re-assessing South Africa, Americans must realise that this confrontation militarism and power-grabbing dimensions of the ANC have now become intolerable. Re-assessing South Africa and knowing that apartheid is doomed and South Africa must be re-integrated into the international community, is actually not enough. Unless pressure is reversed by bringing international pressure against the ANC and destructive tactics using violence and confrontation we will have a very rough passage ahead. It will be rough anyway, but this assessment by the international community will add very problematic dimensions to what we have to face.

I found that wherever I went in the United States there were signs of the ANC losing face because of the way in which Dr Mandela is conducting himself. When he embraced Colonel Gadaffi and backed Iraq against Kuwait, and when he publicly embraced Yasser Arafat, he distanced himself and the ANC very considerably from important opinion-makers in the United States. When he went on to proclaim Fidel Castro as a hero and praised Cuba for its contribution to mankind, he went just too far for a great many more Americans.

I am not saying that the tide has turned and that KwaZulu and the IFP will now have an easy time soliciting American support. All I am saying is that a re-think is taking place which was very evident to me when I was there in February.

Mr Speaker, Honourable Members, I will not now go into detail about everything I said to everybody. My message to the outside world is much the same wherever I go because there is only one South African situation which must be told as it is wherever I go. However, I wish to present to Honourable Members, the text of what I said when I met Mr Hank Cohen, Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs.

Until fairly recently the United States never had a Southern Africa policy. It was only during Mr Ronald Reagan's term of office as President that the United States began developing a policy towards us at all. Until then we were too insignificant and what we did did not have many implications for US vested interests.

First Dr Chester Crocker, and laterally Mr Hank Cohen have been responsible for the development of Southern African policy and the development of American interests in this sub-continent. It is therefore important, Mr Speaker, Honourable Members, to know what I said to Mr Cohen. My Memorandum was as follows:

MEMORANDUM FOR PRESENTATION TO MR HANK COHEN
ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF STATE AFRICAN AFFAIRS
BY MANGOSUTHU BUTHELEZI, CHIEF MINISTER OF KWAZULU
AND PRESIDENT OF INKATHA FREEDOM PARTY

WASHINGTON. 13TH FEBRUARY 1992

Mr Cohen, I am very pleased to have this opportunity of updating you on Inkatha Freedom Party's current thinking about the South African situation and CODESA.

I start by making a general statement. I and Inkatha Freedom Party are deeply committed both to make the National Peace Accord work and to do everything we can to ensure that CODESA leads to successful negotiations about the constitutional future of South Africa.

Where we differ with other political parties on principle and procedure, we differ because of this commitment. We want to add what we can add to ensure that we achieve the successes which the world is expecting us to achieve.

In general, we have major concerns with both the implementation of the provisions of the National Peace Accord and with the ongoing work of CODESA.

We state quite clearly that the continuing insistence of the ANC that Umkhonto we Sizwe remains intact is quite unacceptable. Umkhonto is a private army and it is quite intolerable that the ANC expect us to sit down and negotiate with them and to reach agreements about peace and democracy while they themselves continue to maintain an army which has caches of arms and ammunition secreted around South Africa.

Both at the National Peace Convention on the 14th September and on other occasions, Dr Nelson Mandela has stated that if the Peace Accord fails or if negotiations fail, the ANC will resort to mass action. While statements are more ambiguous about Umkhonto, what Mrs Winnie Mandela and Mr Chris Hani say about Umkhonto and possibly "going back to the bush", remain unchallenged and uncorrected by the ANC. Quite clearly the ANC intends keeping Umkhonto intact because from its point of view it may have further use for it.

On the question of the armed struggle and Umkhonto, we object most strenuously because negotiations between the Government and the ANC on the DF Malan Accord and the provisions about the disbanding of Umkhonto, take place behind closed doors. We do not know what is actually being said by whom and we do not know what positions are being adopted by whom.

All we know is that Umkhonto remains a problem. The State President quite clearly anticipated that the issue would be settled before the National Peace Accord on the 14th

September. His statement at CODESA itself in December was that the Government is frustrated in its negotiations with the ANC. Â© I find it quite intolerable that something of such

national importance can remain the private property of the ANC and Government, as though the rest of South Africa had no say in the matter. :

The IFP has waited patiently for the Government and the ANC to complete their negotiations and follow the protocol agreed to

in the DF Malan Minute. We were not disruptive in negotiations leading to National Peace Convention on the 14th September. We accepted the Government's bona fides that it

was handling the matter and would reach finality with the ANC. We are now somewhat disturbed because the very categorical statement by Dr Mandela at CODESA and other places that the

ANC will never disband Umkhonto leads us to believe that our patience will not be rewarded with a negotiated settlement of the issue.

We have therefore tabled our objections at the National Peace Secretariat and National Peace Committee levels and we will

pursue the issue at CODESA. We have already taken a firm stand in the drafting Sub-Committee charged with drawing up a Code of Conduct for the Defence Force. We have served notice

that we will not continue participating in the drafting work and will not sign any Code of Conduct for the Defence Force while the Umkhonto issue remains unresolved. We have already referred the matter to the Executive of the National Peace Committee.

For your information, I append a copy of details of incidences of violence committed against IFP members and supporters since the signing of the National Peace Accord on the 114th September 1991. I also attach a copy of a report providing details of the number of IFP office bearers who died violently in recent years.

The IFP continues to be targeted for violence. We must deal with violence and the continued existence of Umkhonto and what Dr Mandela, Mr Chris Hani and others say about it amounts to providing the perpetrators of violence with a charter which sanctions what they are doing.

I also want to express a number of concerns, and even grave misgivings, about CODESA and its proceedings. As you know, we were not signatories to the Declaration of Intent and I append a copy of the amendments to it which we have submitted for consideration.

I make the point that none of these amendments should occasion any difficulty for the South African Government, the National Party or the ANC. Nor should they occasion difficulty for any of the other participants in CODESA. Everything that anybody in CODESA wants to do under the aegis of the presently worded Declaration of Intent could in fact be done under the aegis of a Declaration of Intent as amended on the lines of our proposals. We are therefore not inhibiting what others want to do. We simply want to expand the scope which we feel we will need to table our proposals for a strong devolution of power and the constitutional separation of first, second and third tier levels of government.

In other words we are not adopting a difficult; non-negotiable stance which will inhibit the freedom of other political parties to pursue their own objectives in CODESA.

We have a somewhat more problematic reservation about CODESA than the wording of the Declaration of Intent. CODESA is just not sufficiently representative of the whole South African political spectrum to undertake the work it is committing itself to undertake.

It is well known that there has been a very strong and sometimes violent campaign against the IFP and KwaZulu aimed at achieving the dissolution of the KwaZulu Legislative

Assembly. The KwaZulu Legislative Assembly is a constitutional reality and it can only be altered by an Act of Parliament.

We of course base our whole position on the fact that KwaZulu had a status far greater than that of Lesotho, Swaziland and Botswana. Prior to the Act of Union in 1910, KwaZulu was a sovereign independent Kingdom. It is not a product of apartheid as are other self-governing regions in South Africa.

We have tabled a demand for the admission of His Majesty the King of the Zulus and his delegation as a full working delegation at CODESA. It is for us unthinkable that in this day and age KwaZulu and its citizens will again be subjected to arbitrary decisions about the very existence and future of KwaZulu.

We make the political point that CODESA reaches decisions on a consensus basis. There is no voting in CODESA. The number of delegates are irrelevant when it comes to the decision-making process in it. All we want is the right of His Majesty the King and a Zulu delegation to participate in debate about their future and to participate in any decisions that would affect its future. That is our democratic right and we are claiming it.

As traditional Prime Minister to the Zulu King, I could not attend CODESA meetings without appearing to abandon my King. I will remain with him and together we will mount a campaign

to have him and a delegation included in CODESA proceedings. We have tabled the matter at the Management Committee level of CODESA and we await the outcome of our submissions. I will not be able to attend CODESA if this matter remains unresolved.

Again, we state that we are not adopting any non-negotiable positions which inhibit any of the other delegations. The exclusion of His Majesty the King is purely politically motivated and he is not being excluded because of any South African national interests.

I have had discussions with the Conservative Party and I am doing whatever I can to persuade Dr Treurnicht to participate in CODESA. I have no alliance with Dr Treurnicht and the IFP has no alliance with the Conservative Party. We are not acting out any pre-arranged commitment between ourselves in making representations for the inclusion of the CP in CODESA.

I have stated very frequently that unless we bring about national reconciliation during the final phases of dismantling apartheid and establishing a new, non-racial, multi-party democracy, we will not end up with the national will to make the democratic constitution we adopt, work.

I really do warn against rushing ahead with constitutional changes which would in effect amount to political action against South Africa's right-wing parties. They are a political reality and they must be dealt with because it would be foolishness in the extreme not to do so.

CODESA is not representative of the Conservative party and parties even further to the right "a T AT b o nor.-. is ' it representative of parties on the left of the political spectrum. The PAC and AZAPO, amongst others, have not been drawn into CODESA proceedings. CODESA decisions could well be binding on those parties which participate in its proceedings and agree to decisions made, but they can certainly not be regarded as being binding on parties which are not participant in CODESAâ\200\231s proceedings.

CODESA has no constitutional or legal status which makes its proceedings binding on provincial governments, regional governments or political parties not represented on it.

The whole dquestion of the status of CODESA needs urgent attention. We are adopting very firm positions on the status of CODESA because we see the very real danger of CODESA being turned into a political arena rather than a forum about negotiations.

Here we have to bring into focus the irreconcilable differences between the ANC, the south African Government and ourselves on the question of how to proceed. We state our deep concern about the extent to which there is behind-the-scenes conniving between the government and the ANC to give the international community ongoing perceptions of negotiations at work incorporating what the outside world sees as the two prime political actors in the country. We regard the South African Government as having moved into working relationships with the ANC which are problematic for South Africa.

It is therefore not taking sides with the South African Government when we reject demands for a Constituent Assembly leading to an Interim Government which will act both as the government of the day and a constitutional making body.

We reject the ANCâ\200\231s call for a Constituent Assenmbly for June this year on very hard-headed practical grounds. A Constituent Assembly would make no sense unless it was an elected body. Quite clearly, there cannot be free and fair elections during the first half of this year and probably for quite some time to come.

The levels of violence are too high. There are very large regions of South Africa where violence is so prevalent that all normal political activity has to be suspended. There are no prospects of political parties being able to freely project their image and present their policies and options to a voting public.

The continued existence of Umkhonto and the ANCâ\200\231s public commitment in word and in deed to mass action tactics and strategies creates circumstances in which free and fair elections can just not be held. If you look at the detail of the violent attacks against the IFP in the documents I append, you will have to accept the point I am making. Political intimidation in black townships in South Africa is rife and levels of intimidation are prohibitively high and would not permit free and fair elections.

The ANC's rushing into demands for a Constituent Assembly makes sense to it and its allies. They are not worried about the levels of intimidation because they are committed to mass action which in our circumstances most certainly have never taken place without intimidation working to enforce compliance with the demand for action.

We have a far more fundamental objection against rushing into an elected Constituent Assembly. It is that the proposed action to do so forms part of a political approach outlined in the Harare Declaration. The ANC is committed to establishing itself as a major political party in winner-takes-all politics in all-or-nothing political battles.

We are seriously concerned about this. It is not the way forward. It is not the way to produce a reconciled South Africa. The assumptions which underlie the ANC's proposals

for the election of a Constituent Assembly before June this year are that any powerful government after apartheid could attend to national reconciliation as one of its objectives. We say this is wrong political thinking and dangerous in the extreme.

If the majority of every race group in South Africa does not end up being prepared to be governed the way they will be governed under a new constitution, we will have enormous problems on our hands. The South African situation is far more potentially explosive than was the case in any African State on the eve of its independence. We dare not risk counter-revolutionary backlashes and challenges to the new status quo by those who are logistically and strategically capable of mounting armed resistance which would make the best or worst that UNITA and Renamo could do look like child's play.

Quite clearly the issues at stake in the differences between the Government, the ANC and the IFP on the question of transitional arrangements threaten to turn CODESA into a tough political arena. That was not the intention. As far as I am concerned, the intention of the Preparatory Committee which is the parent body which gave birth to CODESA was to establish a discussion forum about negotiations. There was a need to discuss negotiation structures and the negotiation process that would be most suited to our South African circumstances.

I reiterate my earlier statement that it is our commitment to make CODESA work and it is our commitment to the politics of negotiation and to a non-violent solution to South Africa's problems, that is leading me to making the points I have made. I have not made the points I have made for party political gain. My concern is a South African concern.

We have always argued that the new South Africa must be governed into position. It is in the stability that this approach will create that we can achieve a transition from apartheid society to an open democracy with the maximum possible speed. Political adventurism in CODESA at this stage

and making CODESA a party political arena, will delay negotiations and frustrate all attempts to reach early settlements.

We made the proposal that negotiated changes had to be governed into position and that a new constitution would have to be introduced by an Act of Parliament, long before the National Party adopted this as their official position.

The IFP would be prepared to look at any serious proposals which the Government may make to bring about constitutional change in a two-phase approach by first amending the present Tricameral parliamentary constitution to make it possible for Blacks to have a say in decision-making about the running of the country in an interim period, and about how to proceed to a new democracy.

The ANC's claim that the Government cannot be both player and referee is spurious because under the circumstances which we are suggesting - and indeed the government is suggesting - the ANC, the National Party and the IFP - would all be in a similar position.

Politically, the course of action we are proposing is sensible because the South African Government can do nothing on its own without the ANC and the IFP concurring with what it does. Any unanimous decisions that are made in joint negotiations would have to be implemented. The Government could not possibly face a situation in which it was seen to deliberately frustrate the implementation of decisions reached in open and fair negotiations.

There is also the question of how best to ensure that negotiations remain as all-inclusive as possible. In terms of proposals now finding favour amongst most political parties that we should rely on proportional representation in voting for new constitutional structures, elections now for a Constituent Assembly will blow many small parties right out of political existence.

I do not want to appear to be negative about the present situation in South Africa. It is because I am positively inclined to believe that negotiations can be made to work that I raise the points that I am raising. I am raising points in support of the negotiation process.

There is so much going for us in South Africa that we must just have to succeed. There is a very strong groundswell demand that we succeed which is running across all race groups. We face the very advantageous circumstances that if we can get political parties to agree to a constitutional settlement in which there will be a strong downward devolution of power and the constitutional separation of the three tiers of government, elections will be unifying. This is what people want.

I believe we will find great support for proposals to entrench the constitutional separation of the three tier levels of government and the entrenchment of constitutionally protected separate tax bases for each Regional or State Authority.

There will be very substantial support for constitutional proposals to establish a new democracy on a market economy base. There is widespread recognition that only a responsibly run free enterprise system could produce the kind of wealth that any new government would require to govern for the benefit of the people.

There is widespread agreement that the poverty problem will have to be tackled as a high priority in the new South Africa. If we developed a national will to establish a democracy and make it work, we would be able to go on to mount a national fight against poverty, ignorance and disease. Without this fight being fought successfully, no government would last for any length of time. We simply have to ensure that whatever constitutional and political changes we make are compatible with sound economic and fiscal planning.

In broad terms, I see a non-racial, non-sexist, multi-party democracy resting on a free enterprise system as a logical outcome of all South African history. That is where South Africa has been heading towards ever since 1910. It is tragic that White racism has thwarted a national movement towards this final destiny for the country.

The closer we come to a negotiated settlement in South Africa, the more importance I attach to ensuring that political, constitutional and socio-economic changes in South Africa are made in such a way that South Africa becomes a gateway for the development of the rest of Southern Africa. We are not an island unto ourselves and the way we bring about change in South Africa will determine our preparedness and readiness and our ability to act as a catalyst for economic development on the whole sub-continent.

In conclusion, Mr Cohen, I want to express my appreciation for the way in which President Bush moved on the sanctions issue as soon as it became politically possible for him to do so. Nothing could be more unproductive both for political change, and for economic development, than the continued punitive economic isolation of South Africa.

We do not only need sanctions to be lifted, but we really do need programmes of substantial foreign investments which will bring in new technology and new management skills to the South African economy. It is now vital for South Africa's development and the economic development of the whole sub-continent, that closer economic ties are forged between the United States and South Africa.

We need to be politically and economically innovative in South Africa and perhaps the time has come to explore what can be done by the United States to stimulate greater South African participation in world markets and to stimulate programmes of mineral beneficiation benefits which will earn more foreign exchange for South Africa and which could well suit the needs of international trade balances and the strategy interests of the world's larger-scale corporations.

Mr Cohen there are a great many issues that I could have raised in this manner but I have confined myself to what I regard as the most current and urgent issues that we need to discuss. I hope that this Memorandum does help us to focus on matters of common concern in the discussions that we are going to have."

Mr Speaker, Honourable Members, I came back from the United States with a very much deepened awareness that a lot of work needs to be done to enable Americans to come to a fair assessment of what is taking place in South Africa.

Unfortunately, it can be extremely difficult while the ANC continues on its headlong rush towards the kind of confrontations which are going to be so destructive to the policy of negotiation.

Mr Speaker, Honourable Members, I want to pause now to deal with specific aspects of the ANC's threat to the negotiation process.

Unquestionably, the IFP/National Party and the ANC rank as the three most important players in the negotiation process. No matter how much committee work is done by other parties, and no matter how important a contribution other parties make to the debate, power resides in the IFP/National Party and the ANC. The task of implementing a new constitution will dominantly rest on these three parties because, in the final analysis, they will influence more individual voters in a referendum or an election, than all the other parties put together.

The relationship between these three role players is therefore of critical importance to the negotiation process. Some of the remarks which I have made during my Policy Speech this year, have had to be made because the ANC must be exposed for what it is - a political organisation using spoiling tactics to make party political gains.

It is truly tragic that the ANC has conducted itself in such a manner that I have just had to make the observations I have made. The extent to which there is an ANC vendetta against the IFP, headed by Dr Mandela, was very clearly seen in the Granada television show recently.

Mr Speaker, Honourable Members, it quite astounds me how a modern and respected television station in Britain could turn to making such a filthy piece of propaganda against the IFP and myself, as was the case in this television programme.

The programme starts with a view of the Ghost Mountain Inn near Mkuze, and the commentator states that this is where South African backed hit squads were trained.

We are told that the Government is aiming to kill Black opposition while talking reform.

The camera then switches to scenes in Bruntville, talking about the township as being under siege because the people in it support the ANC. The commentator says that seventeen men, women and children - who were supporters of the ANC - were killed in a massacre. 3L 1 stated that they were murdered by rival IFP members from migrant worker hostels. It is stated that the SAP witnessed the attacks but failed to prevent them.

Mr Speaker, Honourable Members, in the midst of this kind of image and hideous propaganda against the IFP, Dr Mandela then comes into focus. He, in talking about the Government, says that the Government has strong and well equipped security services. He says that if the government wanted to stop the violence they could do so in a day or two, but he adds that they have consistently failed to do so. Dr Mandela then says that during the last thirty years every general election was fought on the basis of the Security Forces of the country who were concerned in destroying the ANC because they were the enemy of the country.

The commentator then adds that the South African Government gave funds to the IFP because they wanted to build it up at the expense of the ANC.

The commentator tells the world that the IFP leader is the South African Government's kind of man, a leader of one of the homelands.

The commentary is that Inkatha supporters cause most of the violence and that IFP rallies are often funded by the Government, and that the rallies often lead to killing.

The commentary then sinks as low as I have ever seen or heard in all my life. The world is told that Inkatha killers target people in train attacks, in an attempt to try to make people too frightened to support the ANC openly.

We are then shown a visual of commuters singing hymns in the trains. The commentary adds that commuters in this hymn-singing compartment do not know when Inkatha might attack and if they were attacked they know they will get no help from the South African Police. The commentary adds that the Police do not only stand by, and watch the IFP kill people - they also ask them to do it

The world is given scenes of a squatter camp, and they are told that authorities have tried to get people to move by cutting off their water, and that they resorted to hire trained assassins to kill civic leaders. The world is also told that police go to jails to offer people freedom in return for killing those people that they want killed.

It is the lowest of the low in the Granada programme that the camera again focuses on Dr Mandela. He says that the Security Forces have taken over the violence and that they are using certain Black organisations in order to carry out the violence that they themselves want. He says their purpose is to prevent the ANC from taking over power in this country.

Mr Speaker, Honourable Members, the whole programme does not mention any other culprit of violence. It is solely concentrated on the IFP. When Dr Mandela says the Government is now using certain Black organisations to kill in the context of the programme, he is telling the world that the IFP is that organisation. They then bring Mbongeni Khumalo onto the show.

He sits there, making statements about the Mkuze Training Camp, which are shameless lies. The picture he paints is of IFP picking strong supporters, sending them to Namibia for offensive training, then bringing them back to Mkuze to get further military training and education in what their purpose was.

After they have undergone political training, they are then sent out to murder people. The Granada programme then shows a visual of a police station where they say even serving policemen are afraid to go because of the notorious hit squads in it.

The programme then quotes from so-called human rights lawyers who link Inkatha with more than one hundred murders. The programme then sinks to another low and says that the Wesselton Black: Cats Gang was trained at Mkuze and is an IFP gang.

Mr Speaker, Honourable Members, at this point Dr Mandela again is shown telling the whole world that the Government has funded organisations which are hostile to the ANC, and they continue to do so even after the State President had given assurances that this would not happen.

Mr Speaker, Honourable Members, this really is too much. Enough is now enough. Dr Mandela has really stooped so low in making strong personal appearances in this kind of television garbage, that we must now do something about it.

Mr Speaker, Honourable Members, the National Peace Committee must be told that such propaganda as was used in this television programme, provides the aura in which the statements made by Dr Mandela can only be regarded as direct provocation which will result in further killing.

One can disagree with Dr Mandela when he makes brash political statements, or when he hugs and salutes the most notorious killers in the world. That is bad politics and bad taste, but what he did in this Granada programme amounts to killing talk, which is totally despicable.

Mr Speaker, Honourable Members, I want to state that opposed to this cheap and vicious propaganda, I actually have evidence of continued ANC intentions to kill IFP leaders.

I have spent quite some considerable time, during this Policy Speech, Mr Speaker, giving details of IFP leaders who have already died. This is not something from the past. They continue to die every week.

Mr Speaker, Honourable Members, recent information has come to my knowledge and been made available to me, which discloses an ANC decision to try and locate the two hundred members of the IFP who were trained at Mkuze to protect VIPs and government installations, and to hunt them down and to kill them.

I also have information regarding a hit squad who have been organised to operate from Eshowe to kill IFP leaders.

After Winnington Sabelo was murdered, I received additional information about the names of other IFP leaders who were also on the same hit list. '

Mr Speaker, Honourable Members, this is just not a matter of some ANC members taking the law into their own hands. It is a lot more than that. We saw this very clearly, just three weeks ago, when the ANC actually moved a Umkhonto platoon into the area to do the killing that took place. I have actually seen audio visuals in which truth of this assertion is made very clear.

Mr. Speaker, Honourable Members, quite clearly I am saying very serious things. One does not lightly make the assertions that I have made.

In the circumstances I cannot see how we can just swallow the shamelessness of Dr Mandela's behaviour in appearing in the Granada television programme, and for repeating things for the whole world to hear which the ANC has been saying in unfounded attacks against me and the IFP.

I would ask, Mr Speaker, how the State President could really expect me to sit down with Dr Mandela to talk about peace and constitutional matters, when he - who keeps a private army - sinks as low as he has sunk to gain political mileage against the IFP.

Our IFP Chairman, Dr Mdlalose, received a communication from Mr Cyril Ramapoosa formally proposing a meeting between the ANC's National Executive and the IFP Central Committee. A proposal was made that a small sub-committee be formed to go into details to draw up an agenda.

I must now, however, consult the constituencies of Members of this House and I must consult IFP members and IFP constituencies before taking any further steps forward in this regard.

Everywhere I go people are asking me what they must do because they are being killed. We have had to move towards establishing Self Protection Units. There are areas in which the bulk of local and regional populations live in total fear of their lives. We must help them. We just have no option.

The kind of things that Dr Mandela said in the Granada television programme must have been heard right around the world. They most . certainly will be heard in Black townships where feelings are running very high.

I really do not know how we can sit down in CODESA and continue negotiating about the future of South Africa with ANC delegates, when Dr Mandela and top ranking leaders from the ANC make these totally unfounded and hideously wrong statements about the IFP's culpability in the violence that is taking place.

There really can be no hope of normalising relationships between the political parties at CODESA while the ANC continues to make these despicable statements. Å¥

Deep down in Black South African society there is common ground between the IFP and ANC members. It is truly tragic that the ANC's leadership is terrified of this common ground.

The problem is that the common ground can only be found if both the IFP and the ANC come together to share democratic forces capable of making really major contributions to the development of a new South Africa.

It is the prospects of democracy actually working to iron out difficulties between the ANC and the IFP in the normalisation of their relationships that is leading the ANC to increase the violence against the IFP.

I speak with sober concern when I talk about what the ultimate consequences for the ANC's attitude could be. I personally, and a great number of Members of this House, Mr Speaker, who originally came out of the ANC background, are utterly disgusted at the organisation which used to be our own organisation.

Quite clearly we will just have to sit back and take stock and re-examine our approach to our involvement in the negotiation process.

Nothing is going to keep me and the KwaZulu Government, or the IFP, out of the negotiation process. I have struggled my whole life to establish the negotiation process as a central political force. 3 am not going to be the one that withdraws from negotiations. 3 will not be the one who will withdraw from +the National Peace Committee.

Mr Speaker, Honourable Members, I will be damned if I am going to enter the negotiation process and participate in National Peace initiatives only to be trampled on, to be sworn at, in the way Dr Mandela did in the Granada television programme which I have been telling you about.

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