18

Ulanda Nngomnyomp, o wokonakala, embuthwen; agUNESIKHATHI eside uby. dlelwang buka i Ovisj awo, \hat{a} \200\231 kusho uMnuz Khumalo othe kwase kungy 1978 kwenzeka lokhu, ; &nald Hadepe ma--African Nationa] (ANC) Congress . i eMgungundlovu. 8aleyominyakq Yokusungy. Iwa kwayo iNkatha Yayesekeu. nde nalesisikhyly Uqhuba uMnuz Khumajg 5. uthij kufanele thi.indaba Yonakala besengqu- eNkathenj. : ngquthelenj yami Uthi bese bede bexhumana, g waze wayg oLundj eyoba_ yiabuyele kweNkatha, ;. ngakhulj nje kuphela ngesibalo sabalandeli, ikhula futhj pj - Babebong sekunesidingo S0kuba iNkatha yedlulele ni sesibilj sokukhula kwayo, i be nezinhlelo Zemibhidlan hile. Uthj be

Editor-in-Chief ,
APDRY_SDALE v JCB HOBDAY
122 St Georgeâ\200\231s St, Cape Town 8000 488-4911

- SA needs .. â\200\234interim rule: - right now 7

NEXT week will see the start of what is probably the last white-

- dominated parliament in our country.
- The old order, irredeemably, is passing

into oblivion. We stand on the fringe of

power-sharing with all races $\hat{a}\200\224$ real and -

meaningful power-sharing \hat{a} 200\224 \hat{a} \200\230whatever form that new dispensation may take.

_As it is, there is likely to be an element of informal power-sharing with $a\200\230$ black leaders immediately Parliament gets down to business on January 27.

The expectation among many MPs is that the government will have to consult the ANC and other groups involved $\hat{a}\geq00\geq30$ in Codesa during the forthcoming session. While many people believe it is within

Codesaâ $\200\231$ s brief to make laws, that is not -

SO.

Democratic Partyâ\200\231s Dr Zach de Beer said this week, it would be foolish for Parliament to -try to introduce legislation to which the Codesa majority was opposed. . e Dr De Beer, who is also chairman of Codesaâ\200\231s management committee, said - this meant it was almost certain that - the Cabinet would have to consult bodies like the ANC before trying to pass laws. ° B â\200\230

But, at the same time, as the

In addition, whatever decisions are agreed at Codesa will have to be given

- legality through an Act of Parliament.

So what we virtually have, at this time of movement to a democratic constitution, is a Parliament without the power to make its own decisions. And, should it have to co-opt other groups to assist in ratifying such decisions, would that not suggest that what exists here is an interim government of a kind

- ~ already?
- Dr De Beer concedes that may be so. Right. Why, then, do we not $a\200\230$ get on
- . With the process, and sooner rather than

later? Why not by general agreement appoint, for argumentâ\200\231s sake, Thabo Mbeki of the ANC as Minister without Portfolio .and dispatch him on a diplomatic mission to sell the New South Africa abroad?:

Why not let Steve Tswete, who probably has done more to integrate

-South African sport than anyone since '~ Peter Hain, loose with a similar

mandate? Why not grasp that sort of initiative?

The point is that South Africa is in a period of great fluidity in which the old, tired structures of the apartheid era have all but collapsed. We no longer need to deliberate about change,

- wondering whether or not it is to come.

What is needed now is stable, resolute, dynamic government able to restore confidence, build a new national identity and, most important, get the economy moving again. This can only be done by a government that is more broadly representative, able to unite the populace behind it $a\200\224$ in short, a government of national unity.

It does not matter that it may be introduced on an ad hoc and gradual basis during the coming parliamentary session. Indeed, perhaps a step-by-step process of achieving co-operative government is the right way to do it. And, certainly, there is enough flexibility within the current

parliamentary system to permit this process to be developed constitutionally.

Thrashing out an agreement on the nature of the new constitution will naturally take a little time. Holding elections or a referendum is also something that cannot be done overnight. These are complex matters and intricate procedures.:

But it will all be so much easier against a background of co-operation that is seen to be working. The sensible thing to do now is to oil the wheels that eventually will bring a peaceful and lasting solution. And the more South Africans who are able to participate in making that final transition, the quicker $a\200\224$ and more effectively $a\200\224$ it will be achieved. Y ob il e

in-thilding the credibility of the mainly Zulu Inkatha movement since its inception in 1974, according to the former intelligence officer who implemented the operation.

$mmmmmma\200\231s$:

leader, Chief Gatsha Buthelezi, into longterm collaboration with the white reg-

This is the operation that the former personal assistant to Buthelezi, MZ Khumalo, is alleged to have backed. (see main story). \hat{a} 200\230:

The Central Intelligence Agency ofâ\200\235 America (CIA) participated on the fringes of the scheme, building Butheleziâ\200\231s image

among policymakers in the United States

and security funds for him, ;
Inhis first interview on the operation
since leaving the now defunct Bureau of

Uggr!r!y/ awa

~ State Security (Boss), Martin Dolinchek

said a rival to Buthelezi was set up to challenge him and then deliberately brought down in order to promote the Zulu leader as a force to be reckoned

with.

At about the same time Buthelezi began co-operation with Boss to the extent

~ that a scrambled telex line was installed between the intelligence service and the

Inkatha leader's office.

The aim of the strategy, drawn up by the State Security Council under Prime Minister John Vorster, was essentially the same as the policy to undermine the African National Congress exposed by

- . the recent revelations of secret govern-
- * ment funding of Inkatha. :

It centred on Buthelezi's political rival, Charles Hlengwa, his number two in the KwaZulu Territory Administra-

Α

$\alpha\200\224-q$ N :

tion. J 4 Mâ $\200\2317$ â $\200\231q$ fxngmg down the organisation it had pmmotedmduthesunetimenixhg

Hlengwa felt his power threatened by Inkatha and wrote to the then Bantu administration offering his services if he were allowed to become chief of his homeland carved out of Southern KwaZ-ulu. Boss established an office in Durban, and Martin Dolinchek was delegated to help Hlengwa form a rival to Inkatha, called Umkhonto kaShaka.

â\200\230I ran Umkhonto kaShaka on behalf. of military intelligence and Boss. We printed their membership cards, we bought them a Volkswagen minibus, we ran their bank accounts. Hlengwaâ\200\231s speeches arrived by telex from Pretoria,â\200\231 he said,

As Umkhonto kaShaka's strength grew, so Chief Buthelezi protested it was a tool of the government.,

Boss then leaked copies of Umkhonto kaShakaâ\200\231s bank accounts to the press

Burhekzi'smml)dindukuidkeep-inngengwaindledlrklbmnlheopeni¬\201onwucnlcidbecauuhewuledto

.believe he was being promoted as an

alternative to the Inkatha leader. Buthelezi was allegedly aware of the strategy.

 $\hat{a}\200\230$ Chief Buthelezi knew what our strategy was ... Buthelezi was a willing collaborator, he was willing.

â\200\230The Zulu king was against him at that stage, so were rural people because dlekinâ\200\230gsaidso.Butbytlletimewe finished with Umkhonto kaShaka and we had finished embarrassing the King, by that time, in 1976, Inkatha got strong, Buthelezi had become within KwaZulu and already he was challenging other bantustan leaders,â\200\231 Dolinchek said.]

d CIA groomed Gatshaâ\200\231

At the same time, Buthelezi was regularly meeting Edward Fugun, CIA station chief in Durban.

According to Dolinchek, the CIA loosely operated with Boss in the stratcgy, devising valuable promotion for Buthelezi abroad. !

Umkhonto kaShaka died within a year of its birth, but by that time Buthelezi had already increased his collaboration with the intelligence services,

 $\hat{a}\200\230$ Boss established an office in Em-

'pmgmiWiththe'specinlpmposuof

working with Chicf Butheleziâ\200\231s Inkatha

. office in the KwaZulu capital, Ulundi. It

only undertook Aany investigation of an intelligence nature which engmned from $% \left(1\right) =\left(1\right) \left(1\right) \left($

- Chief Butheleziâ $\200\231s$ office.

 $\hat{a}\200\230$ Chief Buthelezi had direct, scrambled telex contact with our Empangeni office, $\hat{a}\200\231$ Dolinchek said, :

The Pan-Africanist Congress faces a \hat{A} S E _ political and diplomatic storm over against policemen has alarmed the . its apparent withdrawal from the peacemakers. And yet the PAC has \hat{a} 200\234peace process and the continuation a peace message which appears to. of its armed struggle. Its military have been lost or to have fallen on wing \hat{a} 200\231s latest assassination campaign degf ears amid the din of political

6We would
- prefer the
â\200\234ballot to the
bullet, and
that is the
political o
thrust of the
PACâ\200\231s
. me
Mâ\200\230 Barney Desai, a l;awye,r and
WAL o Piescntive eaommitioers
returned:to South Africa two-yem:s ago:

: controversy. He _Spokesman spe a face-to-face i Weekend Argus Correspondent ESTERHUYSE.

¢ We want fully
democratic
proceedings,
which is an
alternative to
violence.9

esai: A stowawayâ\200\231s rise to

after. 27 years in exile. p A

 $a\200\234$:He left South $a\200\230$ Africa-in 1963 as a

stowaway in a cargo ship at the height :

of 2 stormy period in the early antiaparthe \tilde{A} oi _struggle. The previous year

Mr Desai $\hat{a}\200\230$ had been elected 'to the Cape - Town 'City $\hat{a}\200\231$ Council, but as-a banned to take his-

personâ\200\230he was"not allowed seat_..--â\200\230 - . "R AN $\,$

council chamber. SR 20

He was then president of the .Coloured Peopleâ $\200\231s$

rested for allegedly defying his banning $a\200\234$ order by $a\200\230$ presiding $a\200\230$ over a meeting $a\200\231$ of ongress and was ar- bail and went into exile. 'He went to London where he became a barrister and senior practitioner -at $\hat{a}\200\230$ the Criminal Bar. He also became an $.a\200\230$ executive member. of -the Black Law $a\200\230$ yers $a\200\231$ -Association.and in-1983-85 he served on the race relations committee of the Bar Council. ; oured Peopleâ\200\231s Congress had dissolved itself and joined the PAC. Mr Desai became an executive member of the PAC-in-exile, and represented the PAC at many-conferences in Europe and Af-. Nalited S â\200\234rica.-When he returned to South Africa on February 10, 1990, he became PAC cohis executive committee. He. jum%eq * | \hat{a} 200\234+:- Meanwhile, in South Africa, the Col-F the peacé messélg.éâ\200\230,v as-conveyed by PAC publicity secretary Barney Desai, is genuine \hat{a} \200\224 and there is no reason to believe it is not $a\200\224$ -then all the players in the drama of South Africaâ\200\231s transformation should urgently take note of it. . What-Mr Desai told Weekend Argus this week explains why the PAC withdrew from the peace process and why it is continuing its armed struggle. Whatever the merits or demerits of his argument, the jnost significant part of the message conveyed:by Mr Desai is: The PAC wants peace; it wants a\$fully democratic peace process and a democratiq government; it is not an aggressive, racist organisation; the controversial slogan One settler, 0% (bullet with which the PAC has been lahelled ignot PAC policy but merely a war-time .1

says may well be considered by the peacemakers
as constructive criticism :of -their efforts so far,

with a view to making the process more accept-

```
This, in summarised form, is how the interview
went: R )
M What prospect.is there for future PAC
participation in Codesa? What will make
the PAC re-enter the:peace process?
â\200\230Mr Desai: Our perception at a preparatory meet-
ing held before the first Codesa talks last month
was that there was a cut-and-dried agreement
+ | -*slogan-brought to SoutLrica from Zimbabwe; ~ |
iLheclaims. .. G ko .
;. What, then, is the PAC\hat{a}200\231s problem and why is it
a\200\234no longer-among the key players in the peace -
process? Mr Desai outlinesâ\200\230his organisationâ\200\231s
case in his refli&s to questions â\200\224 and what he
principally between the ANC and the regime (the .
government). That led to our withdrawal. Our
view is that Codesaâ\200\230canâ\200\231t deliver a constituent as--.
sembly because—the regime is not in favour.of
`.one,—and by .a.process of a\200\234sufficient.consensusa\204$ "
.such.an assembly would be blocked. In any event, -
N ot P
ETuE K
. the undemocratic nature of.CÃOdesaâ\200\231s repi'esÃObta-}~
tion makes us sceptical of its role â\200\224.itfincludes
representatives without a proven constituency.
The PAC will be prepared to re-enter the
peace .process only when it is satisfied that fully
democratic proceedings â\200\224 the alternative to vio-
lence \hat{a}200\224 are being adhered to. We would prefer
the ballot to the bullet, and that is the political
thrust of the PAC\hat{a}200\231s message internally.
B How do you justify a policy of shooting
policemen? And how does this telate to
the controversial slogan \hat{a}200\2340ne settler, one
bulletâ\200\235. (Here Mr Desal was referred to
media reports that the PACâ\200\231s mllltar|y
wing, the Azanian Peopleâ\200\231s Army (Apia),
claimed responsibility for the recent
murder â\200\230of two Soweto policemen and
for a rifle and handgrenade attack on
police at Lady Grey, in the north-
eastern Cape.) 34 : g o
Mr Desai: Both the PAC and the ANC were com-
mitted to armed struggle. Both were.iynbanned: -
afier-31 years. The .- continued its; commit-
```

able to all. - s

```
u-o_ix.v
```

MES.

BIENVENUE AMUSEZ= VOUS £ T QN. {

ez (89 B

. ment, sayi - gle until ¢

The ANC, ¢ armed stru bly has be: In essen the bullet On the want to s quite cieabasic poli

-7 The slog filtered do

sociation v Union) dur (SA goverr. Force is ! miust be ¢ can be sa! volvemen! tion of bla:

.bly the m

country. We dete

~Klerk te b

Apla op

- : :military ¢}
- .. armed str
- .. policemen;
-] Where there cl
- 1 CANC, an

```
Mr Desai:
Front. We)
ed at the

dated to

convene i
demand f;
nation. T!
the â\200\230ANC,
unity amg
nore that
subscribe
assembly |

As far
```

and the /

B &) § o'

et 2

£

Ugonyuluk obeyisikhulu seNkatha

â\200\230â\200\234NGAJOYINA iNkatha ngoba ngangifuna ukusebenzela inkululeko yomuntu omnyama. Ngayishiya ngoba ngazizwa ngingehlukene nosebenzela i-South African Defence Force (SADF). Ngaqala ngikukholwa okushiwo yiNkatha ukuthi isebenzela umphakathi wentando yeningi ngezindlela ezinokuthula. Ngokungena shi, kwaya ngokungikhanyela ukuthi ngangisetshenziselwa ukuphehla ukungqubuzana kwabamnyama, ukukhubaza izinhlangano zangempela nokwenza ukuba isimo sighubeke kanje singaguquki.â\200\231

Lawa ngamazwi kaMnuz Mbongeni Khumalo, owake waba ngumholi onohlonze weYouth Brigade yeNkatha, futhi elilunga loMgwamanda walenhlangano esikhathini esiyiminyaka emithathu.

Isinqumo sikaMnuz Khumalo sokuphumela obala nalendaba sisuswe ngukuhlaselwa kwakhe ephephandabeni elingumlomo weNkatha eNatal Ilanga obuthi uMnuz Khumalo usebenzela i-African National Congress, ukhokhelwe ukupotshozela iWeekly Mail izimfihlo
ngeNkatha. Uyakuphika lokhu,
futhi uhlongoza ukulithathela izinyathelo zomthetho leliphephandaba.

Emuva kokuxoshwa eNkatheni ngo 1978, wahehwa nguDr Mangosuthu Buthelezi ugobo ukuba abuyele eNkatheni, wabekwa njengomsizi kamgqugquzeli kazwelonke weYouth Brigade ngo 1987.

Emibuthanweni yeNkatha, uDr Buthelezi ubemethula ngegholo, esho ukuthi inhlangano ihlabene ngokumthola. Lokhu kwakuphezu kokuba umbholi weNkatha wayekwazi kahle ukuthi uMnuz Khumalo wayeke walahlwa ngamacala amancane obugebengu.

Ngo 1989, ngesikhathi umgqugquzeli kazwelonke wentsha yeNkatha uMnuz Ntwe
Mafole evalelwa ejele ngokuhlasela acekele phansi ngomlilo, uMnuz Khumalo nguyena owathatha izintambo wasebenza
njengomgqugquzeli kazwelonke obambile. Wayegale eba yisethameli nje emihlanganweni
â\200\230yoMgwamanda, wabe eseba lilunga eliphelele _emuva
kwalokhu.

Uthe eshiya ngoMarch ngonyaka odlule, ubesecikeke engasafuni lutho.

Ukholwa ngukuthi ngaphandle kofuqufuqu nobugili bukaDr Buthelezi kwezepolitiki,
nangosizo olukhulu noselunesikhathi eside lweSouth African
Police nophiko lomshoshapha

\EM Rranieer le/tfu

luka ng

UMNUZ Mbongeni Khumalo obengumsizi kamgqondisi kazwelonke kwiNkatha Youth Brigade.

nsi lombutho wezempi (Military Intelligence), iNkatha ngabe kade yazibunela.

Ukholwa ngempela ukuthi uDr Buthelezi wazi kahle ngo-hlobo, nangobungako bokwe-sekwa inhlangano ayiphethe e-kuthola kwabombutho wezoku-phepha, nanokuthi abantu abasondelene nomholi weNkatha -ikakhulukazi unobhala wakhe

_onguMnuz MZ Khumalo, baso-

ndelene kakhulu nabeMilitary
Intelligence.

UMZ, ochazwa nguMnuz Khumalo njengomuntu ozinikele kakhulu, nomsebenzela amahora angu 24 umgashi wakhe, nyaka odlule ngesikhathi kudalulwa ihlazo lokuxhaswa kwe-Nkatha isinyenyela ngamaBhunu. Wasishiya isikhundla sakhe, kodwa usaghubeka nokusebenzela iNkatha futhi usahola uma uMnuz Mbongeni Khumalo ebheka nje.

UMnuz Mbongeni Khumalo ugale ukubona ukuthi kukhona okushaya amanzi eNkatheni e-muva kancane nje kokubuyela kwakhe kuyona, lapho ebeva-mise ukubona â\200\231izincwasimende eziyindidaâ\200\231â\200\231 zizohola emahhovisi eNkatha oLundi, kodwa kungathi kazenzi lutho.

Kamuva wathola ukuthi laba yilawo malunga eNkatha

(& e//â\200\230fâ\200\2311

ezimfihlo

£y

angu-200 agegeshwa yiSADF e-Caprivi Strip eNamibia nakwa-Israel ngo-1986. Emuva kwemi-nyaka emibili yena uMnuz Khumalo ugegeshe leligembu kwezepolitiki eMatikulu, waku-gaphela nokuthi lingabantu a-bazigogile kakhulu nabahlahla-mbile kwezepolitiki.

Echitha okushiwo nguMengameli FW de Klerk ukuthi leligembu lagegeshelwa *â\200\230ezokuphepha nokuvikelwa kwezikhulu,â\200\235â\200\231 uMnuz Khumalo uthi leligembu lagegeshwa ikakhulukazi ngezindlela zokubulala abantu nangokubamba impi
yobushokobezi.

[mbizo ye-ANC Iphazanyiswe

o 7 /? | wucingo ngÃ@bhomu-mbumbuly

ETHEKWINI. - Umhlangano obuhambisana nomgubho we-African National Congress (ANC) ePhayindane ngeledlule, uke wabambezeleka ukuba uqale ngesikhathi kuzwakala ukuthi kunebhomu elicushwe ehholo lomhilangano obukulo, : Kulomhlangano isi- Lekota. N $\mbox{"}$ 301aphambl kokhulumi sosuku beky- kuba kuqale umhlanganguMnuz. M. "Terror" NO, umuntu mumbe ozi-T 5 â\200\224 bize ngokuthi uyilunga le-AWB ushaye ucingo wathi kunebhomu elithukuswe kulelihholo. Kuthathe isikhatlï¬\201q esingangamahora amab: ukuba umhlangano uqale kusaphenyisiswa ehholo. Ngesikhathi usuqalile .umhlangano emuva kokuba sekutholakele ukuthi akukho bhomu, izigagayi ze-AWB bezimemeza zibhikisha ngaphandle endaweni ethe gekelele nehholo. Lox11â\200\230ihlag ano bekuowoku; a iminyaka Ielrglgu-80 ig; AuANC yasungu-Iwa. Ubuhanjelwe ngabantu abalinganiselwa ku-200,

f(wenzeka lokhu-nje, izinggqwembe ze-ANC eba%glwanckwe ezinda-weni ezithile zibikezela lomhlangano, zitholakele

sezibhalwe amagama athi
"AWB.

PACâ\200\231s path to peace

adds gris

F the peace message, as con-

veyed by PAC publicity sec-

retary Barney Desai, is genuine $a\200\224$ and there is no reason to believe it is not $a\200\224$ then all the players in the drama of South Africa $200\231$ s transformation should urgently take note of it.

What Mr Desai told Weekend Argus this week explains why the PAC withdrew from the peace process and why it is continuing its armed struggle.

Whatever the merits or demerits of his argument, the most significant 1Part of the message conveyed by Mr Desai is: The PAC wants peace; it wants a fully democratic peace process and a democratic government; it is not an aggressive, racist organisation; the controversial slogan One

settler, one bullet with which the PAC has been labelled \hat{A} not PAC policy but merely a war-time

slogan brought to-South-Afrieca from Zimbabwe,
he claims.

What, then, is the PACâ\200\231s problem and why is it no longer among the key players in the peace process? Mr Desai outlines his organisationâ\200\231s case in his replies to questions â\200\224 and what he says may well be considered by the peacemakers as constructive criticism of their efforts so far, with a view to making the process more acceptable to all. j

This, in summarised form, is how the interview went: \hat{a} \200\230

B What prospect is there for future PAC participation in Codesa? What will make the PAC re-enter the peace process?

Mr Desai: Our perce})tion at a preparatory meeting held before the first Codesa talks last month was that there was a cut-and-dried agreement principally between the ANC and the regime (the government). That led to our withdrawal. Our view is that Codesa canâ\200\231t deliver a constituent as-

sembly because the regime is not in favour of

one, and by a process of $a\200\234$ sufficient consensus $a\200\235$ such an assembly would be blocked. In any event,

o th

the undemocratic nature of Codesaâ\200\231s representation makes us sceptical of its role $a\200\224$ it includes representatives without a proven constituency.

The PAC will be prepared to re-enter the peace process only when it is satisfied that fully democratic proceedings $\hat{a} \geq 00 \geq 24$ the alternative to violence $\hat{a} \geq 00 \geq 24$ are being adhered to. We would prefer the ballot to the bullet, and that is the political thrust of the PAC $\hat{a} \geq 00 \geq 31$ s message internally.

B How do you justify a policy of shooting policemen? And how does this relate to the controversial slogan â\200\234One settler, one bulletâ\200\235. (Here Mr Desal was referred to media reports that the PACâ\200\231s mllltar|v wing, the Azanian Peopleâ\200\231s Army (Apla), claimed responsibility for the recent murder of two Soweto policemen and for a rifle and handgrenade attack on police at Lady Grey, in the northeastern Cape.)

Mr Desai: Both the PAC and the ANC were com-

mitted to armed struggle. Both were unbanned after 31 years. The PAC continued its commit-

B Where is the Patriotic Front? Why are there clashes between the PAC and the ANC, and what is the PACâ\200\231s role now? Mr Desai: We are still committed to the Patriotic Front. We are committed to the principles adopted at the Frontâ\200\231s conference, We have been mandated to revitalise the Patriotic Front and to reconvene it as soon as possible to strengthen the demand for national liberation and self-determination. There are sufficient forces, even within the ANC, that will want to achieve maximum

â\202¬

= military operations. We have not $\hat{a}200\230$ abandoned the armed struggle, and such incidents (attacks on policemen) must be seen in this context.

ment, saying it would continue the armed str! gle until the democratic process was in plad The ANC, on the other hand, has abandoned t! armed struggle, even before a constituent asse bly has been realised.

In essence, when we have achieved the ball the bullet will be abandoned.

On the slogan of $a\200\234$ one settler, one bullet $a\200\235$ want to say we have time and again made quite clear that this slogan is not founded in o basic policy documents. \:

The slogan originates from Zimbabwe and ha filtered down into our country because of our 3 sociation with Zanu (Zimbabwe African Nationa Union) during their war. Considering the regim (SA government) is an illegal regime, its Defenc Force is tainted with the same illegality an must be considered a private army. Indeed, can be said, according to revelations of its i volvement in and its encouragement and instigs tion of black on black violence, that this is prob bly the most serious problem we face in t country.

We detect a lack of will on the part of Mr $\,$ Klerk to bring these people to book. :

Apla operates separately from the PAC Âwirn'

unity among our people. We, therefore, cannot ignore that constituency within the ANC which still subscribes to the idea of an elected constituent assembly.

As far as continuing clashes between the PAC and the ANC are concerned, we must state that ANC cadres have been the grincipal perpetrators of violence against the PAC.

B Where does the PAC stand in relation to Inkatha?

Mr Desai: When we consider these revelations (about allefed security force involvement in vio-) lence) and Inkathaâ\200\231s involvement as surro, ates of the SADF, grave suspicions are i¬\202ftfi¬\202mgb'mh'e rue nature of Inkathaâ\200\231s role. As far as the PAC is concerned, we have not embraced Inkatha, but have in good faith offered oyr facilities as mediators betwggg Inkatha and the ANC.

B Does the PAC still want an interim government, and what kind of authority does it envisage?

Mr Desai: Our proposal is for a transitional au-

thority of limited duration which will oversee the elections for a constituent assembly. We seek

control (through a transitional authority) during this limited]period over the security forces, the

state-controlled media, and, in conjunction with the transitional authority, the international community $200\231s$ involvement in the elections to ensure they are free and fair,

The Pan-Africanist Congress faces a_ feas TG yame TS

political and diplomatic storm over its apparent withdrawal from the peace process and the cont|_nuat|on of its armed struggle. Its military wingâ\200\231s latest assassination campaign

6¢We would prefer the ballot to the bullet, and that is the political thrust of the PACâ\200\231S message...9

R Barney Desai, a lawyer and

a member of the PAC $\hat{a}\200\231s$ na-

tional executive committee, returned to South Africa two years ago after 27 years in exile.

He left South Africa-in 1963 as a stowaway in a cargo ship at the height of a stormy period in the early anti-apartheid struggle. The previous year Mr Desai had been elected to the Cape Town City Council, but as a banned person he was not allowed to take his

Feat: y A A

Barney Desai: A

At one stage h $\tilde{\text{A}}\textsc{0}$ was physically prevented by police from entering the council chamber.

He was then president of the Coloured Peopleâ $200\231s$ Congress and was arrested for allegedly defying his banning order by presiding over a meeting of his executive committee. He jumped

against policemen has alarmed the peacemakers. And yet the PAC has a peace message which appears to

have been lost or to have fallen on deaf ears amid the din of political

bail and went into exile.

He went to London where he became a barrister and senior practitioner at the Criminal Bar. He also became an executive member of the Black Lawyersâ\200\231 Association and in 1983-85 he served on the race relations committee of the Bar Council.

Meanwhile, in South Africa, the Col-

OF Uoper â\200\2242 %92

A¢ We want fully democratic proceedings, which is an alternative to violence. 9

stowawayâ\200\231s rise to

b

oured Peopleâ\200\231s Congress had dissolved itself and joined the PAC. Mr Desai became an executive member of the PAC-in-exile, and represented the PAC

at many conferences in Europe and Af-.

rica.

When he returned to South Africa on

7 ordinator in th

Imam Apdy)
unbanned lastage

February 10, 1990, he became PAC co-

e Western (3:1pe an

d subcPAC nationa] cong:::s
retary for Publicity anq

Sequently th elected h)i]m si informatiop,

Desai is

Rilling o 7 the Ico-author of a book, The the death jn dete}l'x;ion 22 years ago of

controversy. Here a top PAC - spokesman speaks on key issues in "a face-to-face interview with Weekend Argus Political Correspondent FRANS ESTERHUYSE.

6If we can achieve our goals - peacefully, it would be â\200\231 madness to pursue those goals throug conflict.'9

power

The Daily News

Timely signal from Mandela

HE countryâ\200\231s political malaise is such that even a

I lifting of remaining sanctions overnight would

probably do little to get the economy going in the '5 term. The near-endemic violence and the stalemate

een major political players is the strongest disincentive there could be to investment from overseas and to internal entrepreneurial effort. The people of South Africa have virtually imposed economic sanctions on themselves.

However, African National Congress leader Nelson Mandela has made a significant symbolic gesture which could contribute to resolving the political impasse. By signalling that the ANC is now prepared to call for a scrapping of sanctions once the machinery and timetable for elections have been established, he not only retreats from a fixed position $a\200\224$ inviting corresponding flexibility from those with whom he is to negotiate $a\200\224$ but signals just as strongly that the negotiating process is back on track and is seen to be irreversible. This is an important advance. And, even though the concession is likely to speed the lifting of sanctions by only a matter of months, he clears the way for a return to economic normality $a\200\224$ or a semblance of it $a\200\224$ once an interim government is functioning.

That is vitally important. The success of an interim government, as a stage toward full political normality, will

d largely on being able to deliver economic results of aWeasurable order which persuade those who tend toward extreme positions on both Left and Right that a centrist common endeavour does indeed offer a better future. And in such a situation mere months do count.

Mr Mandela rightly senses a widespread disillusionment with the failure of political leadership. He is taking steps to remedy it. $^{\prime}$

Air fare threat

JUST whose interests is the Competitions Board intended to serve, the public $200\231$ s or those of the Government and its parastatal bodies like South African Airways?

In what must be one of the most extraordinary recommendations ever made by a public watchdog

_committee, the Board last week advised SAA to increase its domestic fares immediately and again every six months until it shows a profit. Air travel might as a result become drastically more expensive.;

If there was an imminent danger of competing airlines going out of business and leaving the way open for a competition-free SAA to increase its fares, such a proposal might have some validity. 7

But competing airlines seem healthy enough and provide some vigorous competition. Indeed, rather than raise its prices, SAA claims it is intent upon improving its overall operating efficiency in order to make itself profitable once

more. Whether it succeeds or not, that is the way free markets expect airlines and other enterprises to compete. The Competitions Board has its priorities horribly wrong.

Church and state

IRRESPECTIVE of the current controversy over the private life of the Prince of Wales, Tory suggestions that the Church of England should be disestablished make sense. Its present standing as State Church harks back to the 16th century split with Rome and a no longer relevant religious struggle. It is anomalous that the Church should be answerable to a secular House of Commons and that the monarchy should be so closely identified with only one section of its subjects. Disestablishment would bring the

' British into line with continental monarchies.

NO_TH NG\WRONG: A file pict\;re of Piet Koornhof and his wife Lulu. :

7 bty N s
Koornhof confir
T â\200\230.â\200\230/8"07 o\ IR
friend 18 preghant |

CAPE TOWN: Piet Koornhof, a former senior Cabinet Minister and a former South African ambassador to Washington, has confirmed that his secretary and close companion, Marcelle Adams, is pregnant, but denied responsibility.

In an interview with an Afrikaanslanguage Cape Town daily, he said this was the reason he was supporting her. .

Die Burger's Washington correspondent quoted Dr Koornhof as saying

medical tests would prove he was not
the father of the child.)

" South African Press reports have romgn&icaâ\200\2301ly_,-linked Dr Koomhq»fâ\200\231.pgi 23

year-old Miss Adams.

â\200\234Dr Koornhof's wife, Luluâ\200\231 Koornhof,

against her husband. Today, Die Burger

 $\hat{a}\200\230$ Koornhof as realising that reports and circumstances could have created the

impression that he had fathered Miss Adamsâ200231s baby. - 3

~ $\hat{a}\200\234$ The holy truth is that it is not my baby and that it cannot possibly be my baby, and any medical test will prove this. Those who claim this will be forced to realise how silly and dumb they~are. $\hat{a}\200\235$: I

tly withdrew divorce proceedings:

also quoted Dr -

He said it was physically impossible for Miss Adams to have a child by him. $a\geq00\leq34$ There was never a relationship of the kind which could have led to a

baby.â\200\235

Dr Koornhof said Miss Adams knew who had fathered the child, $\hat{a}200\234$ but he doesn $\hat{a}200\231$ t want to admit it $\hat{a}200\235$.

According to Dr Koornhof it was true he and Miss Adams had spent the two days after Christmas in his seaside at Langebaan, north of Cape}

```
and had shared the same bed- .
Other people had, however, been "
present. \hat{a}\200\234It\hat{a}\200\231s a bedroom that's part of |-
~a whole big set-up a\200\230..;'a\200\234ani^2\202.absolntelya\200\230#
nothing happened.â\200\235 g K
- Asked if it was an \(\alpha\)200\234open\(\alpha\)\235 bedroom,
Dr Koornhof replied: â\200\234Absolutely right,
NePaaâ\200\224 £ 0 < bl
" He added that Miss Adams \hat{a} \geq 00 \geq 34 suffered
anem ( d
providence allowed our
home
Town,
room.
And I,
what 1 believe to be right in the cir-
cumstances.\hat{a}\200\235 e
a\200\234If 1 have to pay a price for this, f;
will, no matter what, \hat{a}\200\235 the former am-
bassador and Cabinet Minister said
during
assment at a young age, and
to cross.
as a decent Christian, am doing
the interview in Houston, Texas.
В
```

ToPage3®

o maamrret:

gi¬\201 rnment

and IFP prepare

to to mend the'r four month rift

Daily News Correspondent

PRETORIA: The Government and the Inkatha Freedom Party prepare to mend their four-month rift in a bilateral meeting here today but their perspectives on the road back to multi-party talks remain widely at odds.

Constitutional Minister Roelf
Meyer played down these differences today stressing that the twoday meeting was aimed in the
broadest terms at the resumption
of multi-party talks. It was important not to begin talks today with a
fixed posmon, he said. -

 $\hat{a}\200\234$ The main issue is the future of multi-party talks, $\hat{a}\200\235$ he said.

Frank Mdlalose, IFP national chairman, has, however, insisted that the IFP is not entering todayâ\200\231s forum to talk about Codesa, but about the planning conference agreed to with the Government a week ago.

Since falling out with the Government over the Record of Understanding signed by the latter with the ANC on Se; tember 26, the IFP has rejected agreements reached at Codesa 2. It holds the position that a multi- party conference of review must examine these agreements before negotiations proper can begin again.

The Government and the African National Congress both take the

DR FRANK MDLALOSE Talks about conference

position that Codesa 2 agreements can be taken as a fait accompli when new multi-party negotiations begin.

Asked whether the differences between Government and IFP positions did not cast a pall over the resumed dialogue, Mr Meyer said cautiously: â\200\234We will have to hear

.them (the IFP). \hat{a} \200\235 -

Following the IFP talks and as efforts to resume multi-party negotiations intensify, the Government and ANC begin a six-day bosberaad on Wednesday.

Mr Meyer said the agenda followed from the bosberaad last month and that the only new item could be considered the agreement the Government reached in a meeting with the Concerned South Africans Group just over a week ago to hold a planning conference prior to multi-party talks.

He said reports that draft legislation aimed at the dismantling of the homelands was on the agenda were inaccurate.

The only draft legislation to be discussed with the ANC was that needed to prepare for the Transitional Executive Councils. If agreement could be reached across a wide political spectrum on enabling legislation for these bodies then the Government could proceed by proclamation, he said.

ANC spokesman Carl Niehaus said his organisation did not want to debate the agenda for the talks in public before they began. He confirmed that it would be logical to assume that the planning conference agreed to at the Cosag meeting could be on the agenda.

B ANC leader Nelson Mandela stressed in an interview with the Washington Post that there was no more time for politicians to point fingers at each other. The state of the South African economy demanded that progress be made towards an internal settlement.