

5M9 PO. Box 61884  
Mnrshnlltown. 3  
Thlz834-5301/8  
Fax:834-1019  
Telex: 421252  
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l , V/S-t Suucr Succl  
. Johannesburg  
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AFRICAN  
NATIONAL CONGRESS

Ogen Letter to 32356 nggideht De Klerk and His Cabinet from the  
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tie a Executive Comm'

1.0. since the. outbreak of violence that began in Natal the  
country has, witnessed a scale of bloodletting hitherto  
unknown.53timetee provided by agencies who have been monitoring  
the situation place the numbers of those who have lost their  
lives in excess of 5,000.(11

Since the signing of the accord between the ANC and the Inkatha  
Freedom Party on 29 January 1991, the scale of violence has not  
diminished. On the contrary, it has assumed a more organised and  
systematic chereoter.ln many parts of Natal the violence has  
taken on a random character, to an extent that it can be regarded  
as directed against the community itself.

Death and the destruction of homes and property on such a scale  
would be considered a national disaster in any sane society. The  
scale of the human tragedy alone provides sufficient motivation  
for us to address you with our grave concerns.

1,;. Throughout the period in question there have been clearly  
discernible patterns in this unfolding violence that indicates  
disturbing features which by now should have been noted and be  
pre-occupying the attention: of the authorities.We are, like many  
others, alarmed at the degree of inaction on the part of the  
authorities.

1.2. In almost every instance of violence that has erupted on the  
Reef, for example, the following pattern has emerged. A group of  
individuals, drawn from a specific area of the country, sharing  
a common language and publicly identifying themselves with a  
specific political party have established control over a migrant  
lebourere' hostel through not: of intimidation. Those who would  
not submit to such pressure are subsequently driven out of the  
hostel. These individuals constitute themselves into a group,  
with insignia for common identification (usually a red head  
band). Supported by others of like purpose, buseed in from other  
areas, they then stage a provocative armed demonstration through  
the township, escorted by the police.

1.3. without exception, the townships that have suttered armed  
demonstrations did not previously have any visible presence of  
the Inkethe Freedom Perty.In all the cases in question the

The People Shall Govern!  
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1.4. In at least five separate incidents, all of which occurred on the Reef during the past nine months, armed gangs of men have launched well organised and coordinated attacks against commuters on the trains between the townships and Johannesburg city centre; on the homes of bereaved families during funeral vigils; and on selected hotels. Those responsible for these actions are distinguished by their remarkable capacity to evade detection by the police and other security services. In each of these instances the authorities were advised well in advance of the attacks and precautionary measures were taken, but they failed to do so.

Force, who had been called to the scene to contain a potentially explosive situation, opened fire on a crowd, killing four persons and inflicting grave injuries on several others. '

probability of violence by township residents end.vere patrolling the streets.A group of residents, concerned, because of the armed demonstration,eesembled on an open space to discuss their response. The Police opened fire on this group in en unprovoked attack, causing the deaths of at least 12 persons.

The Police have made counter claims to the effect that they were under attack. Based on previous experience we have reason to place confidence in these claims.

An alarming feature of the violence is the role being played by the Kwa-zulu Police in support of armed groups in launching

attacks an specific arees. In January 1991 a large contingent of armed men, reinforced by the Kwe-Zulu Police invaded the Ndwendwe tree at Osindisweni and made off with 30 head of cattle.

1.7. There has been a startling increase in the use of automatic weepens, assault rifles and other firearms on the Reef since september 1990. Despite repeated extort: on the part of the ANC, civlcs and other demecratic bodies to assist the Police and other government intelligence services with information pertaining to these arms and the trade in arms, not a single arrest has been made and not a single arms cache uncovered, nor has the supply line been interrupted. The apparent incapacity of the South Azrican authorities in this regard beggars description.

2.0. It is violent Li'um um. ubsuxvntiun and shut of ether: that- the peaks in these waves of violence coincide uncennily with ANC-launched campaigns and with mass campaign: launched by other elements of the democratic movement.

Recent prone

democratic and unpopular structures

population by government, indicate that it is their intention to resist expressians of opposition ta these bodies by a resort to armed intimidation and violence. (21 Direct links between such expressed intentions and the acts of violence that have occurred have been drawn by this same individual. The cancerted effort to draw councillors into the ranks of Inkatha Freedom Party with the promise that it will protect them against mass pressure, also suggests the intention of using violence to ward off demands that councillors resign. i

It is the considered opinion of the ANC that it is inconceivable that the authorities lack the eepacity or the skill to prevent rhn violent deeds we have enunrated. We suspect that, at best, the feeble response on the part of the state betrays an absence or will to take measures adequate to avert violence, detect and bring the guilty parties to justice, because the perpetrators of this violence are providing a line of detence tor government institutiens that would otherwise have been rendered dysfunctisnel.

2.1. Since the outbreak of this current cycle of violence there has been an avalanche of charges of Police partielity, connivence and complicity in acts of violence. hpart from shrill denials trem the relevant ministry, no adequate explanation has been forthcoming regarding the acts or omiseiens o: the authorities.

It is evident that the killings, meimings end beatings that have occurred have greatly inflamed feeling: at ethnic antagonism among various sections of the African people; have distracted public attention from the root causes of poverty, hunger, deprivation and went in our country, and have rendered it more difficult to achieve united action among the African people to: generally accepted and commendable goals.

Those responsible for fomenting this violence have the clear intention of sewing divisions and staking up a psychosis of feet,

insecurity and mutual distrust among the African people. At the same-time, they hope to prey on the worst fears and prejudices of white compatriots and thus make them more apprehensive about a democratic transformation.

We are persuaded that the government's evident reluctance to act

with expedition and vigour against the instigators of this violence betrays the hope that their actions will rebound to the government's favour in the short and intermediate term.

2.2. The impact of this cycle of violence is that it has raised the costs/risks entailed in being a member of or or being identified with the ANC and its allies. In certain cities and rural areas it has resulted in 'no go areas' from which ANC members, activities and symbols are excluded, not by the law, but by gangs of hoodlums and vigilantes. This is designed to weaken the credibility of the state, limit its scope for growth and disintegrate its new legal structures.

This has proved a far more effective means of political repression than the legal measures previously employed by the state to crush the democratic opposition. Its aim is to inflate the image of the Inkatha Freedom Party from that of a minor to the rank of the third major player on the political arena.

2.3. The ARC is of the view that the government's equivocal attitude to the cycle of violence reflects either an attitude of cynical irresponsibility or is evidence of connivence at acts of organised terror in the hope that they will succeed in destabilising or crippling the ARC.

The government's inaction calls into serious question its true intentions and sincerity regarding the entire peace process and the democratisation of South Africa. In view of this the ANC demands:

e That the government take legislative measures during the current session of parliament to outlaw the carrying of weapons, traditional or otherwise, at public assemblies, processions, rallies, etc.

t The dismissal of Ministers Adrieen Vlok and General Magnus Helen from public office and the rustication of all the officers of the SAP and SAP who bear direct responsibility for the setting up, management, the crimes and misdemeanours at the C.C. B. and other hit squads.

e The visible, public dismantling and disarming of all special counter-insurgency units such as the Ixsharis, Battalion 32, the C.C.B., Keesee, the Z Squad, etc. and the establishment of a multi-party commission to oversee this process.

t The immediate suspension from duty of all Police officers and constables who were implicated in the massacres at Sebokeng on 22 March 1990 and the commencement of legal

preceding against them; the immediate suspension from duty of all the Police officers and constables responsible for the shootings in Daveyton, Benoni on 24 March 1991, pending a Commission of Inquiry into that incident.

e Satisfactory assurances that in future the SAP, BADF and other security organs will employ acceptable and civilised methods of crowd control; and that the issuance of live ammunition to the Police on such occasions shall be disallowed.

le Effective steps are taken to begin the process of phasing out the hostels and other labour compounds and transforming them into family units and single occupancy flats.

t The establishment of an independent Commission of Inquiry to receive, investigate and report on all complaints of misconduct by the Police and other security services.

2.4. It by 9 May 1991 these demands have not been met the ANC shall:

(3) Suspend any further discussion with the government on the All Party Congress; and

(b) Suspend all exchanges with the government on the future constitution of our country.

5 April 1991.

Aggagze: Roster of Significant Incidents of Police Inaction.

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1. 22 July 1990. Bebokeng, near Vereeniging. After an exchange or correspondence between the offices of: the law firm Cheadle, Thompson and Heyesom. the offices of General Erasmus of the SAP, and the Minister of Law and order, warning of the imminent danger of armed attack and violence in the event of an armed demonstration through the township by Inkatha supporters, the SAP did not disarm the Inkatha supporters; escorted them to a sports ground in the township, from where they launched an attack on the residents which resulted in the loss of at least 30 lives. To date no arrests have been made.

2. July 1990. After repeated warnings to the offices of General Erasmus, General van der Merwe and Minister Vlok, from the offices of the law firm Cheadle, Thompson and Keysom, that an attack was being planned against commuters on a train travelling from the city centre to Soweto, at Inhlazene station, no police were dispatched to the station to detect the attackers. An attack indeed occurred and Police who arrived on the scene later did not intervene. No arrests have been made.

3. 1 September 1990. At Tembisa and Thokoza suffered an armed attack by men wearing the red-headed-band recognition insignia. Witnesses to and victims of the attack attest to police complicity and have identified specific police officers as culpable. The SAP responded to the alarm raised four hours later.

4. 28 October 1990. Naledi. An armed attack was launched on the township residents by a gang of armed men, sporting the red head band recognition insignia. The Police had previously been warned to take preventative measures. 16 people killed and 33 injured.

6. 9 December 1990. Thoxoze. Police warned of an imminent attack on residents by Inkatha supporters; no deterrent action was taken. 9 people were subsequently killed, 58 were hospitalised, 47 of whom sustained gunshot wounds.

7. 12 January 1991. Sebokeng. A home-owner and minister of the church warned the Police of the clear and present threat of attack on mourners at a vigil. No deterrent action was taken. 35 people killed.

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8. Zonxi'zizwe aquatter camp. Until it was attacked in October 1929 EBB 855? 35g yeen a stronghold of the ANC. The attack, according to eyewitnesses and viEtims, wee coniuctei by inkethe supportars, wearing the red heed band for mutual recognition, with the support at the SAPaThe residents were 4;; evicted from their shacks, their goods confiscated end the shacks occupied by Inkethe supporters. Net a single former resident restored to his/her home and no arrests have been made.

9. 24 March 1991, Muchison. IFP aupporters tromlnyandezulu invaded Muchison. SADF drove the people out o: the area, permitting the IF? supporters to occupy the area. Deepite repeated appeal: the SAP have refused to assist the righttul home-owners in recovering ,their houses.

10. 26 March 1991, Alexandra Township. n bereaved ienily made repeated requests for Police protection against possible attack on a :unerel vigil attack. The township was under intensive Police patrols as a declared hunrest area', yet the Police took very feeble steps to secure the mourners and withdrew their guard after a few heura, When the attack indeed occurred. though the Police were within heering range they did not respond. 13 peeple were killed. - ,

5th April 1991.

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