


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FEBRUARY 1988



**ARUSHA CONFERENCE
ANC CALLS ON THE WORLD**

SECHABA

FEBRUARY 1988

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Front Cover: The picture shows President Tambo at Arusha in December 1987.

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THE SPIRIT OF ARUSHA IS A CHALLENGE TO US

We have just begun a new year, a year that follows closely on the footsteps of the 75th anniversary of the ANC, which will forever be remembered as the year Comrade Govan Mbeki was released from 24 years of incarceration. Some people think this release will lead to the release of Comrade Nelson Mandela and all other political prisoners. May be they are right. But a word of caution: We should not be complacent. There is a big battle going on around Govan Mbeki.

For us this release has been a victory, for the Botha regime it is a tactical retreat so as to deliver even harsher blows. The Botha regime has failed dismally to defeat our people and we, the people, are not yet strong enough to defeat the Botha regime. That is why they call it a "test case" — to test our strength. We say Govan Mbeki is released but not yet free. Let us use this occasion of his release to demand the freedom of Govan Mbeki and all our gaol-ed comrades and our people.

The second important occasion was the Conference held in Arusha, Tanzania, on December 1st-4th, 1987. This was an historic Conference, called by the ANC, under the theme: **Peoples of the World Unite Against Apartheid for a Democratic South Africa**. More than 60 countries were represented at Arusha and there were more than 500 delegates. The ANC had called the progressive people throughout the world to come and devise new forms of struggle under the new conditions.

Never before has a national liberation movement called such a conference on its own; there were representatives from capitalist countries, the socialist world, non-aligned movement and leaders and activists of the anti-apartheid forces and movements.

The Conference demonstrated that whilst the racist regime is isolated, our struggle — the ANC and the mass democratic movement — enjoys the support of the overwhelming majority of

humanity. The Conference recognised that the racist regime is illegitimate and therefore it is necessary to impose people's sanctions in order to compel the intransigent Western governments to impose mandatory and comprehensive sanctions. Support for SWAPO, ANC and the Front Line states is a pre-condition for the successful implementation of people's sanctions.

The representatives of the mass democratic movement in South Africa who were courageous in attending and addressing the Conference electrified the Conference with their accounts of the brutality of apartheid and the heroic militant resistance of our people and their mass democratic and trade union movement.

The opening speech by Mwalimu Julius Nyerere, a legendary figure in Africa and Chairman of the Chama Cha Mapinduzi Party was inspiring. So was the Chairmanship of Ahmed Salim Salim, Deputy Prime Minister and Minister for Defence. Both Tanzanian leaders stressed the leading role of the ANC in the struggle. The delegates were warmly welcomed by the Tanzanians. The warm reception expressed itself and was emphasised at a mass rally after the Conference. This was attended by over 10 000 people. This was internal solidarity in action. Without the support of the Tanzanians, it would have been impossible to hold this conference.

All the delegates present came back convinced that this was a successful event. They benefited from it. So did the ANC. We got to know what the different forces in various parts of the world are doing. We learnt a lot from our allies, friends and supporters.

This is solidarity in action: the identity of interests of people united in action by their desire to rid the world of colonialism, racism and national oppression. The question is always put: How long will apartheid survive? It will continue to survive as long as we allow it.

PRETORIA'S WAR IN ANGOLA

By Marga Holness



In early August 1987, the Angolan Government once again showed the seriousness and flexibility of its efforts to contribute to a peaceful settlement in Southern Africa by presenting to South Africa, through US intermediaries, a draft global agreement — to be signed by Angola, South Africa, Cuba and SWAPO, under the aegis of the five permanent members of the UN Security Council — to hasten the independence of Namibia, based on the UN plan and Security Council Resolution 435, and to establish peace in southern Angola. Pretoria's only response was to step up its armed aggression against Angola that same month, launching air and ground attacks in the southern provinces of Kuando Kubango and Cunene.

Pretoria was confirming its opposition to a process of peaceful independence in Namibia. It was also making clear its determination to use military means to seek to establish a role for its UNITA proxies, not only in the negotiations but in the government of Angola. It knew it could count on the support of the Reagan administration, which backs its goal of imposing UNITA on the Angolan people.

Indeed, for the first time in years of uninterrupted South African aggression, Pretoria's generals have openly admitted that their forces are in Angola to save the UNITA terrorists from defeat. On November 11th, more than three months after the start of the invasion, South African army chief, Jannie Geldenhuys, announced that the SADF had intervened to stop the Angolan armed forces, FAPLA, from "capturing" their own Kuando Kubango Province. The following day, South African Defence Minister, Magnus Malan, said they had had to decide whether "to accept the defeat of Savimbi or halt Russian aggression." This was because, as Malan put it, "Savimbi cherishes the same values as those held by South Africa."

Such official acknowledgement by the apartheid authorities of their close military and ideological bond with UNITA was not to the liking of UNITA chief, Jonas Savimbi. At a press conference on November 12th — mounted under the auspices of the SADF at Jamba, his propaganda base on the Namibian border — Savimbi said he was "very surprised" by South Africa's announcement that it had intervened in support of UNITA, and suggested that South Africa's generals wished to "share the credit for UNITA's successes." He also affirmed that the battle was over, his commanders were all with him in Jamba, and FAPLA had been put to flight by a victorious UNITA.

Over the ensuing days, however, Pretoria announced a growing number of SADF deaths in Angola, revealing that the battle was by no means over, that Savimbi's commanders had no part to play in it and that continued SADF action was deemed necessary to prevent UNITA's total defeat.

South Africa's unprecedented admission of what the Angolan authorities had long

denounced — that UNITA is merely a tool of Pretoria's strategy in the region and a part of its war machine — was motivated by growing anxiety and anger within South Africa over high SADF casualties sustained in battles with FAPLA. There was mounting public pressure for a full explanation of what was happening in Angola, and the South African press was protesting that no one was being told the truth. Even *The Citizen*, a newspaper close to the regime, wrote that "the sacrifices which our young men have to make require that their families — and the South African nation — be told what is going on." In view of the need to explain to the families of dead conscripts how it was that their loved ones were dying in a foreign land thousands of miles from South Africa, the habitual boosting of the propaganda image of even such a loyal ally as Savimbi became a secondary consideration.

Appeal to US Paranoia

Because it could not admit that South Africans were dying in battles with FAPLA, Pretoria claimed that the clashes were with "Russian and Cuban forces". This was also an attempt to internationalise the conflict, a direct appeal to cold war paranoia in the US. The myth of a 'civil war' in Angola having thus been exploded, world opinion was being asked to believe that a direct East-West confrontation was taking place there. FAPLA's growing success in defending Angolan territory and independence was being depicted as a 'communist onslaught'. "Russia's ultimate target is South Africa," Malan said in his statement, adding that South Africa, as "the regional power," was defending its own 'national interests and security' in Angola.

Apart from the arrogance of this pronouncement, which showed typical contempt for the sovereignty and interests of the Angolan people, Malan had once again confirmed that UNITA, far from being a 'nationalist movement,' as claimed in extreme right-wing circles in the West, is regarded as intrinsic to the defence of the 'national interests and security' of the apartheid regime.

Pretoria Contradicts Its Own Propaganda

Not only was Pretoria contradicting UNITA propaganda, it was contradicting its own. It first announced that it was when FAPLA forces were "on the run" that "Soviet military advisers and Cuban troops, using tanks, fighter aircraft and ground-to-air missiles, entered the battle". Yet Magnus Malan, addressing the Transvaal Congress of the National Party on November 14th, said that the Cuban troops "left the MPLA forces in the lurch". So while FAPLA were said to be "on the run," the Cuban forces had "deserted" and "cannot be regarded as a factor in Southern Africa," according to Malan. One is left wondering what can be the so-called 'threat' posed to South

Africa's distant borders by all these allegedly fleeing forces. The only possible reason for such amazingly muddled statements is that the apartheid regime had no way of explaining why there were no Soviet or Cuban casualties in what were said to be battles with the armed forces of those countries.

Lie was being piled upon lie simply to conceal the fact that FAPLA's growing fighting capability and use of sophisticated equipment — acquired in response to 13 years of continued South African aggression — had brought about a shift in the balance of forces in the region. In an article in October entitled "Angolans winning in the air," the right-wing British newspaper, *The Sunday Telegraph*, wrote:



Two friends enjoy a drink together: Pik Botha, Pretoria Minister of Foreign Affairs, with Jonas Savimbi of UNITA

"For the first time Black African pilots have been taking on their South African counterparts in the air — pitting advanced Mig 23s against the older and slower Mirages which form the backbone of the South African air force."

It will be recalled that UNITA announced in 1983, and again in 1984, that it was about to seize power in Luanda, the Angolan capital, and that by late 1985 the SADF had to intervene directly to save UNITA from defeat by FAPLA in Kuando Kubango Province, the remote and sparsely-inhabited south-eastern corner of Angola bordering on Namibia. Despite Savimbi's meeting with US President Reagan immediately afterwards and US promises of military aid to the proxies of Pretoria, two years later direct SADF intervention in Kuando Kubango has again been crucial to the survival of the terrorist group, as South Africa itself admits.

P W Botha Enters Angola Illegally

Evidence of difficulties the Pretoria regime faces as a result of the new military balance was the revelation in mid-November that President Botha and several of his ministers had recently entered Angola illegally to boost the flagging morale of SADF conscripts there. That a head of state should thus violate the principles of international law and engage in midnight adventures inside a sovereign country far from his country's borders is merely additional proof of the apartheid regime's total disregard for universally accepted norms. As an Angolan press commentary pointed out, Pieter Botha had made himself an "outlaw".

A meeting of Front Line leaders in Luanda, on November 16th, condemned Botha's illegal entry into Angola and called for international support to defeat the "open war of invasion, aggression, occupation and destabilisation by South Africa." In an address to the meeting, Angolan President Jose Eduardo dos Santos revealed that 3 000 South African troops, backed by armoured vehicles, fighter planes and artillery, were inside Angola engaged in fierce fighting with FAPLA, and that a fur-

ther 30 000 South African troops, supported by 435 tanks, 80 jets and more than 400 artillery pieces, were being massed on Angola's border with illegally-occupied Namibia.

The current invasion has dealt a final blow to Pretoria's propaganda claim that there are two wars in Angola — the already disproved myth of a 'civil war' between FAPLA and UNITA, and another war between the SADF and SWAPO.

South Africa has always sought to present its military operations in Angola as being against SWAPO targets. On November 2nd, in its first intimation that SADF forces were dying in battles with FAPLA, Pretoria announced that 150 SWAPO members were killed in a "pre-emptive strike" on a "SWAPO base" vaguely said to be "north of Ovambo" (northern Namibia). During the same operation, it added, ten members of the SADF were killed.

The 'Russian and Cuban' Fable

President Sam Nujoma of SWAPO angrily denounced this as "the same kind of deceit and lies that Pretoria always tells when it wants to cover up its military aggression against Angola." The Windhoek weekly, *The Namibian*, called it a "mystery raid" and, quoting British press sources, suggested that "the SADF may be disguising the circumstances of South African casualties." Just over a week later, South Africa dropped the story that the fighting was with SWAPO and came up with the 'Russian and Cuban' fable.

Further difficulties for Pretoria were revelations that Namibian troops in the so-called South West African Territorial Force, an integral part of the SADF, had refused to fight in Angola. Under the front page headline, "Mutiny as troops say no to Angola," the *South African Weekly Mail* of November 20th reported:

"More than 400 members of 101 Battalion of the SWA Territorial Force have mutinied by refusing to fight inside Angola on the side of Jonas Savimbi's UNITA movement". They were said to have "gone on strike" at Oshakati, in Namibia, and Mavinga, in Angola, and



Forces of FAPLA, the Angolan army, defend their country



many were reportedly arrested. The newspaper added that members of the unit "were given UNITA uniforms before going into Angola" and quoted a soldier who had resigned. He accused the SADF of using 101 Battalion members as "UNITA mercenaries against our will." There were also reports of mutiny in 102 Battalion.

These units are said to have taken the brunt of the fighting, as did 32, or Buffalo, Battalion, made up of former members of the defunct FNLA, with mercenary NCOs from various countries and South African commanders. They are put in the front line to minimise White South African casualties. More than 320 SADF deaths were announced by the Angolan authorities. The SADF had admitted to 35 deaths by November. The apparent discrepancy in the figures stems from the fact that there seems to be no place for Black casualties in SADF statistics.

An urgent meeting of the UN Security Council was held at Angola's request. On November 25th, the Council adopted Resolution 602 demanding that "South Africa cease immediately its acts of aggression against the People's Republic of Angola and unconditionally withdraw all its forces occupying Angolan territory, as well as scrupulously respect the sovereignty, air space, territorial integrity and independence of Angola." It demanded that South Africa withdraw its forces by December 10th and asked the UN Secretary-General to monitor this process. The fact that the resolution was adopted unanimously — even the US voted for it — proves that, irrespective of propaganda statements in Washington and elsewhere, no one gives serious credence to South Africa's claims of clashes with 'Soviet and Cuban forces' in Angola. There had been Angolan and Soviet denials, and *The New York Times* quoted Western diplomats in Luanda who said "this picture is false".

Pretoria Rejects Security Council Decision

The apartheid regime immediately reacted to the Security Council decision by ar-

rogantly rejecting it. South Africa's ambassador to the UN told the Council he was authorised by his regime to state that South Africa was prepared to withdraw its troops from southern Angola from December 9th if all other foreign troops were also withdrawn from Angola. In other words, 'linkage' — making South Africa's withdrawal from Namibia dependent on the withdrawal of Cuban forces from Angola — had now been made the condition for South Africa's withdrawal from Angola itself. Pretoria's lawlessness and contempt for the most elementary norms of international conduct know no bounds. It acts as if it could claim some kind of sovereignty over Angolan territory. This must be what Malan meant when he insisted on the apartheid regime's "right" to formulate "the ground rules for interaction in the region", and when, during a December visit to Switzerland, he cautioned the West to beware of its "post-colonial and racist guilt."

On December 5th, five days before the UN deadline, General Jannie Geldenhuys announced that South Africa had started to withdraw its troops from Angola. One can only speculate on the reasons for the apparent turnabout — perhaps Western pressure or internal factors. Predictably it was a lie. Military sources in Angola announced on November 9th that combined SADF troops and UNITA groups were moving northwards, indicating that the invaders had no intention of withdrawing from Angola. South Africa's main objective, the sources said, was to occupy Cuito Cuanavale in Kuando Kubango Province, a strategic position in view of its airstrip.

The deadline passed amid reports of continued South African aggression. On December 12th a UN mission arrived in Angola and visited the south to check if Pretoria had complied with Resolution 602. The mission's findings were included in a report presented to the Security Council by UN Secretary-General Javier Perez de Cuellar, who told the Council that South African forces continued to occupy parts of southern Angola and were engaged in widespread military action. He said Pretoria had not given the UN any timetable for the withdrawal of its troops from Angola.



Soldiers of the People's Liberation Army of Namibia with a Buffel combat vehicle captured from the SADF, October 1987

Undeclared War: Hardship and Heroism

Accordingly, the Security Council adopted another resolution on December 23rd — also unanimous — which condemned South Africa for its continued occupation, demanding a timetable for its total withdrawal and confirmation of the fulfilment of that timetable. The Secretary-General was again asked to monitor South African compliance and report back.

An official military source in Luanda subsequently announced that on December 26th, a South African plane was shot down and another hit while bombing the Cuito Cuanavale area, bringing to more than 40 the number of aircraft, including two unmanned spy planes, brought down by FAPLA since the start of the invasion. The source gave details of continued South African troop movements, airspace violations, long-range artillery bombardments, attacks on villages and Angolan troop positions, and a bombing raid in the Baixa Longa area, south-east of Cuito Cuanavale, in which 15 civilians were killed and five injured.

Angola is setting an example of heroic resistance and challenging the military might of the apartheid regime. Yet it is paying a terrible price in lives lost, human suffering and setbacks to development efforts to benefit its people. Because western countries refuse to take effective action against the apartheid regime and Washington directly supports its criminal action in Angola, Pretoria continues to defy the international community by refusing to end its illegal occupation of Namibia and its undeclared war against Angola.

Under these circumstances, the Angolan authorities have repeatedly stated that the only guarantee of peace will be the abolition of the apartheid regime in South Africa itself. When that happens — and it is only a question of time — the peoples of the region will know who were their friends and who their enemies during the years of terrible hardship and bitter sacrifice needed to ensure a future of peace, progress and social justice throughout Southern Africa.

THE SUREST WAY TO PEOPLE'S POWER

A RESPONSE TO BRENDA STALKER

By Thando Zuma

In the January 8th message of 1980, the National Executive Committee of the ANC said that the decade of the eighties was a "decade of freedom." This slogan posed many challenges to all South African revolutionaries to intensify the offensive against the apartheid regime on all fronts in order that during this decade we bring to reality our aspirations of national democracy. Most historians will indeed agree that the eighties have seen the most determined onslaught by all of us, the oppressed, against the regime. This decade of freedom is fast coming to an end; the nineties are only twenty-three months away!

Since 1980, the ANC has held a major consultative conference at Kabwe in 1985. In a real sense, decisions at Kabwe are the most important that our movement has taken since the Morogoro Conference. This does not mean that our movement had not taken any decisions in the interim. On the contrary, it means that Morogoro and Kabwe are the two most important gatherings that the ANC has had since its banning by the regime, and as such, decisions at Kabwe form the main policy guidelines for our movement as a whole in the contemporary period. In relation to the overall strategy and tactics of the revolution, the perspective of people's war is the most important. (For a detailed discussion of this, see Mzala's articles in *Sechaba*, December 1986 and April 1987.)

This brings me to the article in the November 1987 issue of *Sechaba*, in which Comrade Brenda Stalker discusses what she sees as a confusion in our movement on the road to state power. This confusion, we are informed, arises because of the emergence in our revolution of the strategy of talking to as wide a range of people from South Africa as is possible, thus creating a broad front against the anti-apartheid regime. In Comrade Brenda's words:

"It seems to me that the liberation movement needs to clarify, in the present circumstances, what our approach is to the question of the conquering of state power." (p. 18)

The need to undertake this clarification is made the more important because:

"It would be an error, both from the theoretical as well as the practical point of view, to counterpose 'talks' and the 'conquering of state power.'" (p. 18)

The question could be asked here as to who in the liberation movement has been counterposing these 'talks' with the question of seizure of power by the people. Comrade Brenda informs us that:

"In the period from about 1983, culminating in the Consultative Conference of the ANC in June 1985, the conception of conquering of power, in particular in connection with the question of insurrection, played a considerable role in liberation thinking. This was reflected in the various publications of the movement, including Sechaba ... and this concern was, indeed, quite clearly to be seen at the Consultative Conference itself." (p. 18)

Here Comrade Brenda treats the important question of insurrection and people's war as just a "concern." Yet the very nature of our struggle raises these issues as of fundamental importance. The seizure of power by the people is, after all, the central point of departure of the struggle, and, as such, cannot be reduced to the level of "concern" by this or that comrade. Does the strategy of 'talks' mean that we are abandoning the perspective of insurrection and people's war? Not at all. But Comrade Brenda sees an apparent shift in our emphasis, and she says that:

"... important sectors of the liberation movement have been paying growing attention to ... the place of 'talks' in our general strategy ..."

This shift, she says, has arisen because of contacts the movement has had with a wide range of forces from inside South Africa. But this shift has been most manifest amongst certain "liberation movement circles." (p. 18) Such an apparent shift:

"... may have led to a suggestion that the liberation movement has jettisoned its goal of conquering state power."

I don't see anyway how this "suggestion" could have arisen, but if it did it could have

been most unfortunate, because fundamental policy changes relating to the conduct of our struggle are decided upon by Conference, and in between Conferences by the National Executive Committee (NEC). Policy changes are not, in the ANC, decided upon by "sectors" or "liberation circles," indeed we have no sectors or circles, but structures, regions, units and so on.

Dynamic of the Struggle

It is completely incorrect and misleading to claim that:

"... the concern with the concept of conquering of state power, centring on the period 1983-85 ... represents, from the historical point of view, an absolutely justified concern. It was linked to the beginning of a genuinely revolutionary or ... insurrectionary upsurge of South Africa's Black people which opened in the second half of 1984." (p. 18)

As I have already said, the struggle by itself is for the seizure of power, and this has not just emerged in 1983! The comrade here has completely misunderstood the nature, tempo and history of the struggle. The question of the emergence and growth of political communes and people's committees is a dynamic of that struggle, and correctly points "to a qualitatively new level of" struggle, which Comrade Brenda calls "a historical activity" (whatever that means).

Comrade Brenda has also misunderstood the whole political meaning of the present upsurge in the country. What is the meaning of "organs of people's power" and how does this relate to "the seizure of political power by the people"? Here is the confusion:

"The most recent developments in the political situation in South Africa indicate that while the general slogan of 'conquering of state power' (or 'people's power') was sufficient at the earlier stage and pointed to actual or possible developments through an understanding of the objective conditions in South Africa, in itself, it is not adequate at the present stage."

The earlier stage here refers to 1983-85. What Comrade Brenda is saying here is very wrong. The emphasis in our struggle to people's power did not just come about in 1983 but has always been the focal question of our struggle. The developments in 1984-87, in particular, have ushered in new possibilities of a quicker seizure of power. The slogan, **Forward to People's Power** must be understood in terms of the central question of our revolution, which is the attainment of freedom and national democracy given meaning by the Freedom Charter. The slogan does not just mean the establishment of people's committees, or shall I say street committees ... it is much broader than that. In my opinion, people's power will be fully realised without 'state' hindrance in the future society, where, indeed, **The People Shall Govern**. The question of "conquering of state power" will always be relevant to our struggle as long as the apartheid regime exists, and cannot be confined to the period 1983-85.

Overthrowing Apartheid

For some reason, Comrade Brenda seems to think that "conquering of state power"

and "overthrowing apartheid" mean different things. In my opinion they don't. It is not possible to conquer state power without overthrowing apartheid. Comrade Brenda says:

"As far as the certain 'qualification' ... of our goal of conquering of state power, it relates to the fact that we do not demand that the people must conquer state power in 'one blow,' i.e. in just one (historical) phase of the struggle. We are centring our demands and programme on the overthrow of apartheid." (p. 20)

It looks like "conquering" has to do with delivering "one blow" against the ruling class, and "overthrowing apartheid" has to do with a protracted struggle. This is where Comrade Brenda goes completely off course. Let me say, by the way, that the ANC does not make demands on the people, as is being suggested in the quotation above. The ANC as the organisation of the people leads the struggle against the apartheid regime. When demands are made at any particular point in time, they are made against the regime: for example, we demand the release of Comrade Nelson Mandela and all political prisoners.



What are the motive forces of the South African revolutionary struggle? Comrade Brenda has a dangerous answer to this question. She says that:

"Exactly how it (apartheid) is overthrown, with the aid of what political and social forces, that we are not specifying and, indeed, in South Africa's objective conditions, we cannot specify." (p. 20)

If "aid" here is used to mean not assistance but those who participate in the struggle, I am beginning to doubt whether the writer is a member of the ANC who has understood the very existence of the movement.

Motive Forces Of Our Revolution

Don't we know who the motive forces of our revolution are? Let me refer to the *Strategy and Tactics* of the ANC, whose relevance today cannot be challenged (this does not mean that we have not developed it further because of the evolving revolutionary situation in the country):

"What of the forces of liberation? Here too we are called upon to examine the most fundamental features of our situation which serves to mould our revolutionary strategy and tactics. The main content of the present stage of the South African revolution is the liberation of the largest and most oppressed group — the African people ... This is the mainspring and it must not be weakened ... The national character of the struggle must therefore dominate our approach. But it is a national struggle taking place in a different context from those which characterised the early struggle against colonialism ... It is also happening in a new kind of South Africa in which there is a large and well-developed working class ... in which the independent expressions of the working people — their political organs and trade unions — are very much part of the liberation front." (p.22)

The document goes further to discuss the role of the Indian, Coloured and White revolutionaries in the struggle. About the

working class in particular, the document says:

"Its political organisations — and the trade unions — have played a fundamental role in shaping and advancing our revolutionary course ... Its militancy and political consciousness as a revolutionary class will play no small part in our victory and in the construction of a real people's South Africa." (pp. 22-3)

Thus, in my opinion, there should be no doubt about the forces which are poised to destroy apartheid and construct a new society. These revolutionary forces are the main bedrock, which must always be strengthened. As is clearly set out in our "four pillars of struggle" (that is, the underground political and military structures of the ANC, mass action, armed struggle and international solidarity) we see these revolutionary forces working together in a systematic strategy aimed at crushing the apartheid regime. But there must never be any doubt as to the primary role that has to be played by the oppressed people themselves in the struggle.

What About 'Talks'?

What about the other forces that we hold discussions with like the IDASA group, or NAFCOC for that matter? What is their role? Does it mean that when we talk to them we are abandoning people's war and insurrection? First of all, why did the PFP, IDASA or NAFCOC come to meet the ANC? By 1981, when there was a successful boycott of the republic celebrations amidst an escalating armed offensive by Umkhonto We Sizwe, it became clear that the ruling class was facing an unprecedented organised offensive from the people. There was fast and growing realignment of forces inside the country, including the trade union movement.

The main characteristic feature of this renewed people's offensive was the growing unity in action, that is, mass action, and increasingly sophisticated and telling blows by the People's Army. To cut a long historical analysis short, let me just say that the 1984-87 mass upsurge in our country, combined with armed struggle and international action, drove the ruling class into

an unprecedented 'organic' crisis. This crisis resulted in many soul-searchings by a wide range of political forces, from Gavin Relly, Slabbert, Stellenbosch academics, and so on. One thing needs emphasis, though, and that is the role of the revolutionary forces in causing this soul-searching. Some of these chaps were even talking about the search for a solution to the crisis. Remember that, for example, in 1986, the once strong South African rand was worth only 35 US cents, the stock exchange was closed and Gerhard de Kock went around the imperialist capitals arranging a suitable repayment of debts. The crisis had hit hard.

ANC the Solution

Concomitantly with the crisis, the ANC emerged as the only force capable of bringing peace to our country. Granted, the solution to the crisis meant different things to non-revolutionaries from what it means to us. The important thing, however, was that the apartheid regime was seen as the cause of the crisis, and a solution had to be found. It is understandable why the pilgrimages to Lusaka began, on the part of people kept ignorant by apartheid propaganda and lies about the ANC.

Some of the powerful class forces, like Anglo-American, were probably hopeful that they would make us change our minds on a number of crucial issues pertaining to the future economic structure of our country, and on the question of armed struggle in favour of the so-called peaceful solution. (See *Black and Gold: Tycoons, Revolutionaries and Apartheid* by Anthony Sampson, and the review of the book in the July 1987 issue of *Sechaba*.) Some of these 'pilgrims' genuinely wanted to know about the ANC in order to be freed from the propaganda of the ruling class.

These people could not have come to the ANC if they did not realise that the ANC enjoyed the support of the masses and was seriously involved in a bitter struggle to overthrow apartheid.

Two things of prime importance emerged during these discussions between the ANC and the 'pilgrims.' Firstly, the ANC explained to these people why armed strug-

gle was so crucial in the strategy of liberation. Although the 'pilgrims' were not expected to stand on rooftops and declare their adoption of the armed struggle, at least most of them (check the joint statements) understood why the ANC adopted armed struggle as an important weapon of the people.

The 'Pilgrims' Discover the Reality

This was very important at a time when the regime was branding the ANC a violent organisation and demanding that we must renounce violence, imposing the same demand as a condition for the release of our leadership in prison. Secondly, most of the 'pilgrims' agreed that the ANC was the leader of the revolution — which was important for the 'pilgrims' though they had to travel so long to discover a reality that is easy to see amongst the people!

What do the 'pilgrims' do when they get home? The answer should be that they find ways and means of fighting against apartheid wherever they are. Whether they go home and fight or not is up to them; for us at least we have played our role. The editorial in *The African Communist*, Fourth Quarter 1987 summarises these 'talks' or discussions beautifully, as follows:

"One of the main aims of the ANC is not to destroy the Whites or drive them into the sea, but to win them round to support for the principle of majority rule. The greater the contact the ANC has with all section of the South African population, the greater will be the extent of its influence, because nobody who has real contact with the membership of the ANC can fail to be impressed by their patriotism ... their dedication to the principles of democracy, their political tolerance and maturity."

But, in the midst of all these discussions, what have been the developments in the terrain of struggle that may warrant a change of strategy and tactics of the liberation movement? The reality is that, if anything, the ruling class has intensified its repression against the people in the face of a mounting and deepening crisis. The

state of emergency still exists, numerous activists are still being held in apartheid dungeons, activists are still being hunted down by the vigilantes and Inkatha thugs, the army and police are still being expanded, the bantustan system still exists, and so on and so on. In short, the cause of our painful struggle is still there, and so for us the battle cry still is: *MAYIHLOME!* — Let us go to war!

Is There Basis for Confusion?

So is there any basis for comrades to be confused and in need of clarification as to "the road to state power"? Can we really conclude, as does Comrade Brenda, that:

"What emerges out of such consideration, it should be clear, is not the centring of the liberation struggle in our country on the strategy of 'general insurrection.' That would mean, indeed, that we would be centring our alliance strategy on the revolutionary democrats alone ... Our general strategy is geared to mobilising the broadest front of forces as well as to the utilisation of oppositional stances at the level of the ruling class." (p. 20)

I think this shows Comrade Brenda's own confusion more than anything else. Mobilising the broadest front does not mean that we forget the main revolutionary forces — that would be the most dangerous mistake a revolutionary movement can ever make.

It should be clear that the more we intensify our offensive against the ruling class, the more the crisis will deepen, and the better placed we will be to "conquer state power." This intensification, in my opinion, means escalating the people's war, culminating in an insurrection. This task falls on all revolutionaries led by the ANC.

Decade of Liberation

"It is clear to all of us ... that we have the possibility actually to make this our Decade of Liberation," said President Tambo in his political report at Kabwe in 1985. He went further to say, "That requires that we must, in fact and in practice, accomplish the strategic tasks that we have set ourselves

and which our strategic objective of the seizure of power demands."

The key words here are "strategic tasks" that are set by the forces of liberation and the motive forces of our revolution. First:

"The key to our further advance is organisation ... We need a strong organisation of revolutionaries because, without it, it will be impossible to raise the struggle to greater heights in a planned and systematic fashion. Without such a strong revolutionary organisation, we cannot take advantage of the uprisings ... which are a reality of the mass offensive of our people."

This "key" is the most important and sensitive aspect of the struggle, because we have to make careful and painstaking planning and training of these revolutionaries. In other words, we have, as Lenin wrote in *What Is To Be Done?*, to "raise the amateurs to the level of revolutionaries."

An Organisation Of Revolutionaries

Lenin and his comrades in the Russian revolution had to face up to this issue and they came to this conclusion: "Give us an organisation of revolutionaries and we will overturn Russia." Such an organisation of revolutionaries must not be made up of people who are "flabby and shaky on questions of theory ... (who are) inexperienced and clumsy in (their) professional art — the art of combating the political police." Lenin went further in developing this question of an organisation of revolutionaries, to argue as follows:

"I mean professional revolutionaries, irrespective of whether they have developed from amongst the students or working men ..."

It is pertinent here to ask, in case people like Comrade Brenda get confused by this issue: what about democracy in the struggle if we concentrate on building an organisation of revolutionaries? Are we not after all struggling for a democratic society, and shouldn't we learn to practise democracy in the process of struggle? —

what with the 'workerists' and the ultra-left generally making hullabaloo about what is supposed to be the lack of democracy in the mass democratic movement, all except in the trade unions.

Democracy in the Movement

Here is how Lenin responded to the criticism. He argued that to concentrate all secret functions in the hands of as small a number of professional revolutionaries as possible did not mean that the latter would "do all the thinking for all" and that the rank and file would take no active part in the movement. He added:

"The active and widespread participation of the masses will not suffer; on the contrary, it will benefit by the fact that a dozen experienced revolutionaries, trained professionally no less than the police, will centralise all the secret aspects of the work."

In the Russian revolution, this approach was proven correct by the Great October Socialist Revolution. As the NEC political report says, we have to face up to this task more than ever before in the South African revolution.

This organisation of revolutionaries (or the underground, as we call it in our situation) is therefore the most important strategic question and responsibility facing a theorist/strategist of the South African revolution, so that we can better "accelerate" the offensive for the "conquering of state power." It is through the organisation of revolutionaries that we can better be able to raise the level of our struggle to People's War, culminating in an insurrection — that is, the seizure of power by a risen people. I think it is very important to re-emphasise what we mean by people's war in our approach to the South African revolution.

In the ANC, our understanding of a people's war was summed up by the Commission on Strategy and Tactics at Kabwe in 1985. It described a people's war as:

"... a war in which a liberation army becomes rooted amongst the people, who progressively participate actively

in the armed struggle both politically and militarily, including the possibility of engaging in partial or general insurrection ... Such a struggle will lead inevitably to a liberation situation in which our plan and aim must be the seizure of power through a general insurrection (or whatever ways may present themselves). What will count in such a situation will be our capacity to take advantage of that revolutionary situation. Unless we have the necessary forces and means at our disposal, there is no way we can succeed, and the opportunity will pass us by."

Thus, in my opinion, Kabwe decisions on this question are very relevant today, irrespective of how many get-togethers we hold, or discussions of the Dakar type. The perspective has not changed — it is that of people's war and insurrection. In this context, the statement on negotiations made by the NEC of the ANC on October 9th 1987 is an important policy guideline, and in particular its emphasis as follows:

"There is, as yet, no prospect for genuine negotiations because the Botha regime continues to believe that it can maintain the apartheid system through force and terror. We therefore have no choice but to intensify the mass political and armed struggle for the overthrow of the illegal apartheid regime and the transfer of power to the people."

So we are not changing our strategy, there is no confusion here — unless people create confusions for themselves and then claim that the masses are confused and need clarification, yet it is they who are confusing themselves and in the process try to confuse our people.

The battle-cry still is: Mayihlome! All for the Front! and Forward to People's War for People's Power! This is the sure road to state power in South Africa.

DECLARATION ADOPTED "PEOPLES OF THE WORLD FOR A DEMOCRATIC ARUSHA — DEC

1. Conference reaffirms that apartheid is a **crime against humanity**. It has persisted for too long. It must go.
2. We, representing millions upon millions of people throughout the world, are outraged by the continuing brutality, inhumanity and aggressiveness of the apartheid regime which results in death, suffering and insecurity for the peoples of Southern Africa. No one — not even young children — can escape the evil shadow of this monstrous denial of everything human and civilised.
3. The savagery of Botha's regime has failed to cow the people of South Africa into submission. Millions have demonstrated their fierce commitment to fulfilling the task of freeing themselves. We feel inspired by the unquenchable spirit and courage of the people of South Africa, confirmed by those who came from the belly of the beast to bear testimony.
4. We, together with the people of the world, condemn the apartheid system as illegitimate. It cannot be reformed: it must be abolished.
5. This criminal regime launches economic, military and political aggression against the Front Line States and continues its illegal occupation of Namibia. It is a source of tension, conflict and a threat to international peace and security.
6. The unprecedented vigour and depth of the struggle in South Africa against the apartheid regime has given birth to a powerful mass political and trade union movement and the emergence of an alternative democratic power.
7. The issue of political power is central to the conflict in South Africa. On the one side stands the Botha regime, its allies and supporters, seeking to perpetuate the monopoly of power in the hands of the White minority. On the other side stand the ANC, the mass democratic movement and their allies and supporters, who are fighting for the transfer of power to the people.
8. The perspective of a future democratic South Africa is set out in the Freedom Charter which is supported by the overwhelming majority of the people of that country.
9. The Botha regime is not interested in entering into genuine negotiations to end the inhuman system of racism and apartheid. Any negotiations would have to address the central question of political power and not how to give apartheid a more acceptable face. Such negotiations must have as their objective the transformation of South Africa into a united, democratic and non-racial country.

D AT THE CONFERENCE D AGAINST APARTHEID IC SOUTH AFRICA" EMBER 1-4 1987

10. The people of South Africa have the right to pursue their struggle for democracy, self-determination and genuine independence against this brutal and illegitimate regime and to use all methods of struggle — including armed resistance — to achieve this end.
11. The people of South Africa require the further intensification of international solidarity, and all who come from outside that country have a duty to continue to search for the most effective methods of increasing support and assistance for the ANC, its allies and the mass democratic movement.
12. It is imperative that the international community imposes comprehensive and mandatory sanctions on racist South Africa.
13. We have a duty to defeat the severe press censorship imposed by Pretoria. A fuller exposure of the brutality of the apartheid regime and the continuing resistance of the people would move greater numbers of people throughout the world to act against that evil system.
14. We are obliged to fight for the immediate release of all political prisoners and detainees without conditions. We welcome the release of Govan Mbeki, after 24 years of incarceration, as a victory for the forces of change both inside and outside South Africa. His release should inspire all humanity to step up the national and international campaign for the release of Nelson Mandela and all other political prisoners and detainees.
15. We urge all governments, international organisations and solidarity movements to act in support of those who are risking their liberty and lives in the struggle for a non-racial, united, democratic South Africa.
16. With renewed vigour and determination we declare our commitment to continue the fight to put an end to apartheid, the illegal occupation of Namibia and the destabilisation of the neighbouring states. There is no doubt that the people of Namibia and South Africa, led by SWAPO and the ANC, shall be victorious.

Peoples of the World Unite Against Apartheid for a Democratic South Africa, an Independent Namibia and Peace in Southern Africa!

UNITRA —

PROFILE OF A BANTUSTAN UNIVERSITY

By Russell

In the previous two issues of *Sechaba*, recent events in the Transkei, and in particular the departure of the Mantanzima brothers from the centre stage of the bantustan, were discussed at some length. The discussion undertook to place these developments in their context, and to assess their import for future struggle in the region. In continuation of that theme, the article which follows will attempt to sketch a profile of the University of Transkei (UNITRA), which has provided a focal point for resistance in the bantustan over the past five years.

The University of Transkei was initially conceived as an offshoot of the University of Fort Hare, so in late 1975 and early 1976 a number of academics from that institution were seconded to Umtata in order to establish a branch campus. This development, however, was short-lived. Following the dictates of apartheid ethnic separatism, one of the first pieces of legislation passed by the bantustan 'parliament' after its 'independence' in October 1976, was the "University of Transkei Act," which constituted the embryonic institution as a fully autonomous university with effect from January 1977.

A University as Symbol of Bantustan 'Independence'

For both Pretoria and the Matanzimas, a university was taken to be a visible symbol of Transkei 'independence' along with the other perceived prerequisites of statehood: a flag, postage stamps, a 'presidential palace' and a casino. In a somewhat crude

attempt to affirm the 'independence' of the Transkei, the apartheid regime undertook to finance the construction of a lavish multi-million rand campus on the outskirts of Umtata.

From the outset, image was to be of central importance in the establishment of the university. While fortunes were spent on Venetian tiling and veneer, the library was devoid of books, and recreational facilities for students were non-existent. So important was this projection of image deemed to be, that Kaiser Matanzima ordered the campus to be moved from its initially planned location to a site abutting the national road, where, he hoped, it would be admired by all who passed through the bantustan.

In addition to its symbolic significance, the university was intended to train the officials necessary to replace the White bureaucrats who had left the bantustan at 'independence.' In pursuit of that objective, it was overtly elitist. Suffering under the legacy of Bantu Education, primary and secondary schooling in the Transkei remains notoriously poor, and scarcely 25 per

cent of the population is currently literate. Yet, despite the pressing need for more schools and better facilities throughout the region, the University of Transkei consumed 70 per cent of the bantustan education budget from 1978 to 1983.

UNITRA As An 'Open' University

In an endeavour to attract reputable academics both internationally as well as locally, a concerted effort was made to portray UNITRA as an 'open' university, 'irrevocably committed to upholding academic freedom'. However, while the talk was of a progressive university, politically independent and free of racial prejudice, those appointed to senior positions, including the principal, Professor Ben van der Merwe, were predominantly White reactionary supporters of the National Party. At the same time, a large proportion of the teaching staff comprised seconded academics, who were generally the dead wood of Afrikaans universities. This ensured, in its earliest phases at least, that the university would be unlikely to develop beyond bush college status.

In addition, the Public Security Act, promulgated in 1977, had prescribed rigid limits to the 'openness' of UNITRA, stipulating, among other restrictions, that it was a criminal offence for students to miss lectures without permission, or to absent themselves at any time from their university residences other than to attend classes. Though seldom invoked in the early years of the existence of the university, this Act was subsequently applied extensively in attempts to crush student revolt in the bantustan.

Student Mobilisation

At its inception the student body at UNITRA was conservative, drawn largely from the ranks of civil servants seeking to advance their careers with additional qualifications. The majority of these were part-time students in their thirties and forties; with grants from the 'government', they were among the early beneficiaries of the 'independence' of the bantustan. Student

affairs during this period were as a consequence apolitical, and revolved primarily around social issues and leisure activities.

By 1980 however, the composition of the student body had changed considerably. Part-time students were by now outnumbered by full-timers, the majority of whom were high school graduates in their late teens and early twenties. A core of these students had, in a variety of ways, developed a political awareness of issues in the bantustan and their broader relationship to events in the country as a whole. Thus, in mid-1980, students at UNITRA, together with a number of Transkeian schools, joined in the country-wide schools boycott. The response of the bantustan authorities was swift and brutal, and soldiers from the bantustan army forcibly ended the boycott by whipping students back to class.

Student mobilisation received a setback in the years immediately after this initial resistance. The university administration went to great lengths to depoliticise activities and restore the complicity of the late seventies. Their initial efforts were successful and a succession of student leaders were selected by the administration, which also controlled student meetings and elections. Foremost amongst these co-opted student 'leaders' was Liston Ntshongwana, who subsequently emerged as Kaiser Matanzima's heir apparent, before his arrest this year by the Transkei Defence Force. Ntshongwana dedicated his time as president of the Students' Representative Council to the misappropriation of SRC funds and the pursuit of pleasure. In this he was abetted by the Academic Registrar S D Majokweni, who not only controlled the SRC funds, but also frustrated the efforts of other students to challenge Ntshongwana's leadership. The political mobilisation of students was further constrained by the presence of informers who were known to exist within student ranks as well as among the teaching staff.

The setback nevertheless was of short duration. A growth in the student body to 2 500 students coincided with a growing political awareness. At the same time, the recruitment of a number of more progressive academics offset the existing conservatism of the staff, and fostered a more

open and critical attitude among students. Students in turn became less prepared to accept the authoritarian style of the administration, or to tolerate the poor services provided for them in the hostels.

A New SRC

In September 1983, following the exposure, in May, of Ntshongwana's corruption, the student body elected a new SRC under the presidency of Zamikhaya Mbalu. From its inception, this SRC demonstrated real leadership combined with a sound political understanding of events within UNITRA and within the bantustan as a whole. Organising students initially around practical issues, food boycotts were mounted in late 1983 and early 1984 in response to the poor quality and rising costs of hostel food.

Following their successes in extracting concessions from the administration during the food boycotts, student leaders extend-

ed the horizon of student activity to encompass national issues and developments. Thus representatives were sent to the formation of the UDF (subsequently outlawed in the Transkei), contacts were made with other universities and protests were organised against the constitutional reform proposals.

The Battle Commences

The growing defiance and militancy of the student body clearly unnerved the reactionary authorities of the university, and a number of attempts were made to intimidate the SRC. The academic registrar, Majokweni, in particular, threatened that continued defiance would lead to "serious trouble." At the same time, the principal, van der Merwe, launched an attack on members of staff whom he believed to be inciting the students. In an unprecedented move he used the occasion of the UNITRA graduation ceremony to publicly attack



Bathandwa Ndondo

members of staff who "taught Marxism," and in particular he singled out the professor of sociology, Herbert Vilakazi, as a supporter of revolution. Copies of his speech were leaked prior to graduation day, enabling students, in response, to circulate anonymous pamphlets at the ceremony, accusing the principal of misappropriating university funds and of acting as an agent of Pretoria.

Four days later, Mbalu, president of the SRC, Batandwa Ndondo, the vice-president, and two other student leaders were detained. The students boycotted lectures in protest against the complicity of the university in the arrests (Majokweni had organised for the transport of the students to security police offices). The bantustan authorities responded by cordoning off the university, and proclaiming a state of emergency. A series of attempts to force students back to class culminated in a tear gas attack and a police baton charge among stacks of books in the library. The attack failed to break the boycott, but it set in motion a chain of events which have established the pattern of student relationships with the bantustan authorities ever since.

Immediately following the baton charge, four lecturers, including the dean and vice-dean of the Faculty of Arts, were deported (the number subsequently grew to eight) and the university was closed. Attempts to force the students to sign an oath of obedience as a precondition to readmission were contested by students in court and found to be unlawful, and the university was ordered to pay costs.

Repression of Students

Kaiser Matanzima, as chancellor of UNITRA, was incensed at the students' rebellion and ordered his police to use as much force as necessary to quell their revolt. Student meetings were broken up by force and students arrested in their hundreds. In one dawn raid on the men's hostel, students were beaten in their beds (one lost an eye) and the entire residence of some 250 students were arrested and detained for nearly three months. Most were beaten again while in detention. Following

this, Matanzima ordered that in future no 'foreign' (that is, non-Transkeian) students would be readmitted to UNITRA. In the intervening period the SRC leaders were expelled from the university, and the academic year ended in chaos; few students wrote exams and still fewer passed. The 'openness' of UNITRA has been exposed once and for all.

Despite the bantustan authorities' hope that the spirit of defiance at UNITRA had been stamped out in 1984, their success was only partial. The academic body had undoubtedly suffered from the events of 1984. More progressive staff were lost through deportation, a number of others resigned and those that remained had been thoroughly intimidated. From this period onwards, the academic body manifested a notable shift to the right, a tendency that has been reinforced through the consistent recruitment of academics from Asian and African countries. Essentially mercenary in outlook, such academics are consistently apolitical and contribute nothing to the struggle. These individuals — predominantly from Ghana, Uganda, Sri Lanka and India — currently comprise some 20 per cent of the teaching staff at UNITRA.

Students Fight On

However, while the academic staff had been effectively silenced, the student body remained defiant, and resistance continued throughout 1985 with a series of stayaways, pamphlet campaigns and demonstrations. The police responded with still more violence and more detentions, arresting over 100 students in July and a further 150 in October. Of particular concern to the bantustan leaders during this period (and, it must be stated, to Pretoria as well) was the evidence of increasing ANC activity in the region and on the university campus in particular.

In July 1985 the bulk fuel depot in Umtata was destroyed by MK combatants. Authorities responded by promulgating new emergency laws and imposing a curfew, but failed to apprehend any suspects. In a frustrated and desperate bid to reassert their control, the bantustan security police arrested the now expelled

SRC vice-president, Bathandwa Ndondo, and assassinated him in broad daylight and in full view of numerous witnesses. The former SRC president, Mbalu, was simultaneously arrested and brutally tortured. In a brazen admission of this practice of 'death without trial', Kaiser Matanzima remarked in a public address shortly afterwards that Ndondo had been killed because of his involvement in the fuel depot blast. Despite the fact that their identities are known, Ndondo's murderers have never been brought to trial.

Student activism and resistance continued throughout 1986 despite continuing repression. In May over 500 students were arrested in response to protests and stayaways, and in October security police clamped down on the Institute for Management and Development Studies, the last remaining bastion of free thought at UNITRA. Senior staff, along with a number of student assistants, were arrested or deported on charges of collaboration with ANC cadres.

By 1987, although more subdued than in earlier years, student activism had become entrenched into a tradition of resistance. Despite the permanence of security police on campus and the imposition of rigid restrictions on student activities, periodic stayaways and demonstrations continue to challenge and taunt the bantustan rulers. Students, for example, staged demonstrations to commemorate the deaths of Biko and Ndondo, despite police warnings which culminated in over fifty arrests.

Following the retirement of van der Merwe, developments at UNITRA during 1987 are of particular interest, because they coincide with the first year in office of the new principal, Professor Wiseman Nkuhlu. Nkuhlu, a former PAC Robben Islander in the early sixties, had had a stint as acting principal in 1983, but had failed to live up to student expectations in both his honesty and his leadership. He remains, in many respects, more problematic than his predecessor, who was unambiguously Afrikaner nationalist and pro-apartheid. Despite an outpouring of Africanist rhetoric, Nkuhlu has been thoroughly co-opted by the apartheid regime, serving as a director on the board of its Development Bank. A purveyor of Pretoria's new

apolitical language of technocracy, he extols the merits of the free market system as a solution to South Africa's problems, and exhorts his students to enter into business on graduating. Notwithstanding his reputation among reactionary White circles, however, his impact on student opinion is likely to extend only to the most politically naive.

Future Struggles

Nkuhlu's presence, together with the removal of the Matanzima brothers, nevertheless will, in the short run at least, ease conditions on the campus and permit a regrouping and strengthening of the student body. The decision to rescind the deportation orders of members of staff expelled in 1984 might also open the way for more progressive academics to return to the university. However, despite the opportunities that these new developments have opened up, it would be a mistake to conclude that they herald a new and progressive era at UNITRA. Stella Sigcau,* the Transkei's new 'prime minister', remains a product of the bantustan system and will be unlikely to accommodate or tolerate any challenge to her rule. It is noteworthy, for example, that despite a flurry of excitement in the liberal press over her recent 'reforms', no steps have been taken to repeal the draconian Public Security Act — the mainstay of bantustan leaders' power.

The struggle of student activists at UNITRA during the past five years has been a heroic one. Despite appalling repression from the bantustan police, they have refused to submit and have steadfastly persisted in their fight to expose the sham 'independence' of the Transkei and the brutality and corrupt dealings of its puppet rulers. In so doing they have carried the torch for freedom fighters throughout the region. Through their courage, they have inspired others — brothers, sisters, parents and elders — to take up the struggle for real independence and to fight for the total destruction of the apartheid state.

*Editor's note: This article was written before the most recent developments in the Transkei.

In April 1979, the White House set up a public organisation known as the Consortium for the Study of Intelligence, to boost the declining fortunes of the CIA and restore its reputation. The organisation had many top CIA officials, academics, leading analysts and 'experts' on international law and politics as members. As one of its points of conclusion, the consortium agreed that the 1980s would be witness to a broad expansion of CIA paramilitary operations in the form of vigilante groups, death or assassination squads, religious sects and so on, throughout the world.

VIGILANTES: STATE-SPONSORED VIOLENCE

By J Mathebula



'Witdoeke' attack while the police look on

Soon after assuming office in 1980, President Reagan set about this task by increasing financial allocations to the CIA and by broadening its rights and scope for carrying out subversive operations. He did this by signing executive order No. 12333 on December 4th, 1981, which had the effect of considerably reducing the oversight of

the CIA by the US Congress. In South Africa, this development was reflected about three years later, between June and October 1983, when the extremely repressive puppet regime of Lennox Sebe unleashed vigilante groups to sow havoc and terror against the residents of Mdantsane township, during their long and heroic bus

boycott campaign.

It is therefore clear that the vigilantes and secret death squads used by the illegal South African racist minority regime and its puppet authorities wage war at grassroots level, and also constitute a form of psychological warfare. In this warfare, the organised habits and opinions of certain elements from the downtrodden rural masses, the urban unemployed, the lumpen proletariat, and even prison inmates, are manipulated by the apartheid security forces against the popular and democratic movement and in support of the interests of the 'intelligent' and exploiting White community.

Quite often, reactionary propaganda is not recognised for what it really is — a form of violence committed against the soul and mind, with the clear aim of making the oppressed and exploited more docile and amenable to control by the ruling class. Though it is a less direct and overt form of violence, this type of propaganda, used as psychological warfare, can be as ruthless and efficient as a unit of combat troops, with as devastating an effect.

Since it aims at achieving the unthinking and uncritical obedience of the vast majority of the population by appealing to emotions and prejudices rather than to reason, belief and intelligence, propaganda can lead many people to commit atrocities and support the wrong cause, which it leaves unchallenged. This becomes dangerous when truth and falsehood are manipulated at will as the occasion arises, and the old principle of Josef Goebbels, Hitler's Minister of Propaganda, that the best lies are made from half-truths, is put into practice.

In the most recent period of upheaval, the first systematic and official use of vigilantes with a clear-cut political motive was in 1983, when Lennox Sebe publicly called on his few supporters to form vigilante groups, under the direction of his security forces, and offered them official vehicles for use against the popular and democratic movement, in order to defend from downfall his bloody and corrupt regime. The link between this puppet regime and the police on the one hand and the vigilantes on the other was revealed in October 1985, by Lennox

Sebe himself, when he threatened to evict from their homes those who refused to help in suppressing the popular revolt by joining the vigilante groups; and vowed to hunt them down like wild animals.

The Transkei bantustan puppet authorities were not to be outdone by their counterparts in the Ciskei. On September 24th 1985, Bathandwa Ndondo, a 22-year-old co-ordinator of a village health project in Cala and a former Vice-President of the Students' Representative Council at the University of the Transkei, was abducted and later pumped with eight bullets at point-blank range in broad daylight by a death squad composed of members of the Transkei security police. Although onlookers witnessed with their own eyes the perpetration of this brutal murder, and the head of the Transkei CID has officially declared that he knows the killers, no one has been brought to court for this murder of a known opponent of the apartheid regime and its puppets.

Instead, before the end of that day, the local police station commander was given an order to release the killers and open a murder dossier. Incredibly, the ludicrous investigation started with a raid on the homes of the eyewitnesses, and ended with their banishment to the most remote parts of the bantustan. About a month after this, Dumisa Ntsebeza, a Cala lawyer representing the Ndondo family, Lungisile Ntsebeza, his adopted brother, and Victor Ngaleka, who lived with Bathandwa and was the last person to see him alive before the abduction, were also detained, tortured and on their release suffered the same fate. As if this were not enough, the police death squad is now continuing the endless persecution and harassment of the Ndondo family.

Atrocities Subsidised

The deaths of Richard Turner, Griffiths Mxenge, Matthew Goniwe, Fort Calata, Sparrow Mkhonto, Sicelo Mhlawuli, Victoria Mxenge, Bathandwa Ndondo and Peter Nchabeleng — to name a few of the many who have died in mysterious conditions at the hands of the police and the secret death squads — are a clear indica-

tion that the apartheid regime has decided to sanction the direct murder of its opponents as a matter of state policy and has also agreed to subsidise such atrocities at an increasing rate and to provide the murderers with all the support and protection they need.

As residents and youth continued to mobilise into various civic, parents' and youth organisations demanding an end to corruption, repression, high rents, taxes and an end to despotic rule in the second biggest and most populous bantustan in the country, the Lebowa puppet authorities also decided to breed right-wing vigilante groups in a futile attempt to harass and terrorise into submission the popular and democratic movement.



A victim of vigilante attacks

Prominent among these right-wing terrorist groups is an A-team vigilante squad which, in close collaboration with the SADF, SAP and Lebowa police, has been launching an open campaign of terror and intimidation against democratic and progressive forces, mostly affiliated to the UDF, in the bantustan. In most of the acts of terror, the members of the A-team have in fact turned out to be members of the South African Defence Force, the South African Police and the Lebowa Police, masquerading as taxi-drivers or members of civic and youth organisations, and out to

provoke the residents into exposing their political allegiance, for which they have been immediately assaulted.

Forces Behind the Vigilantes

Throughout the bantustan, and particularly in Seshego, near Pietersburg, there is irrefutable evidence that the police vigilante squads have been acting under direct instructions from the Lebowa puppet authorities, individual MPs and one or two local businessmen.

For instance, at the beginning of July 1987, *The New Nation* revealed that an unnamed White civil servant in the Lebowa puppet government, a supporter of the Afrikaner Weerstandsbeweging, had, over the past year, been involved in vigilante activities against members of progressive organisations in and around the bantustan. According to a leader of the Eastern Transvaal Youth Congress (EYCO), the AWB member was seen with Chief Lepidus Mogane at a parents' meeting in May 1986, when the villagers were requested to pay R10 each to ensure "that the comrades were wiped out." It is reported that the AWB member was also involved in a clash between the AWB and students, in which Albert Mashigo, a Standard Eight pupil at Kadishi village, lost an eye. He is now accused of having transported a vigilante group in a Lebowa 'government' vehicle during attacks against the homes of the president, vice-president and general secretary of EYCO, on June 18th 1987.

What is most disturbing and distressing about the murderous activities of the SADF, SAP, Lebowa and Gazankulu police since early 1986 is to see the puppet authorities of both bantustans allowing themselves to be used by the apartheid regime in fanning the flames of tribal hostility between two communities which, as anthropological and historical records testify, have been living together peacefully and have also developed strong and important social and family ties between themselves over many decades. It is important to mention this because, to many an outsider, the supposedly tribal conflict between the Pedi and the Shangaan may conjure up an image of so-called 'Black on Black conflict' in South Africa.

Puppets Threaten War


In October 1984, Gerrit Viljoen, then Minister of the Department of Co-operation, Development and Education, announced a complicated consolidation proposal for transferring 2 000 hectares from Gazankulu to 'White' South Africa and 7 000 hectares from Gazankulu to Lebowa. A Gazankulu chief in the Acornhoek area claimed back land which, though it belonged to Gazankulu, had been used by the Sotho people for many years without causing any friction whatever between them and the Shangaans. This claim led to conflict between Sothos and Shangaans in that area towards the end of 1984.

This conflict led to another in the Tzaneen area towards the end of February 1985. Toting a gun and threatening war against the Shangaans, one Nelson Ramodike, then Minister of Economic Affairs for the Lebowa bantustan, called upon the Sotho people to cut down the border fence put up by the apartheid regime between the Lebowa and Gazankulu bantustans. At the end of the day one person had been killed and about 100 more had suffered injuries which had to be treated in hospitals and clinics. More than 30 homes had been destroyed and five shops burned down and looted. Neither the Pretoria regime nor the bantustan authorities made any attempt to bring the Gazankulu chief and Nelson Ramodike to book for their role in instigating this supposedly inter-tribal conflict.

In direct contrast to the position and attitude of the apartheid regime and its puppet authorities in both Gazankulu and Lebowa, local church ministers and youth leaders did a marvellous job and succeeded in healing the wounds of this conflict. Talking about the clash, the Reverend T Maja of the Northern Transvaal Council of Churches pointed out that its real implications are far more sinister and sophisticated than simply a border conflict, and in addition declared that:

"It would certainly seem like the local politicians are being used to do the dirty work of apartheid and cause friction between the two groups. Pretoria has promised in Parliament that there would be no forced removals, so by giving backhand orders to cut the fence and stir up the people against each other, Pretoria could then step in and be seen to be the peacemaker by redefining the borders and using this as a weapon."

Now that the apartheid regime has failed to break the strong social and family ties between the two communities, and the residents and youth of both the Lebowa and Gazankulu bantustans have joined hands to wage a struggle against the common and hated enemy, we see Pretoria introducing a new element in the form of vigilante squads drawn mainly from the MNR bandit groups and Zimbabwe renegades to act against the popular and democratic movement in both territories.



Police stand back as the vigilantes attack in Crossroads

Lebowa and Gazankulu Democrats Under Attack

From March 14th 1986, when a vigilante squad in a car shot dead Malope, a member of Namakgale Youth Congress (NAYCO), the popular and democratic movement in the townships and villages of both Lebowa and Gazankulu has been selected as a target by the police and army of the regime, by the Lebowa police and the vigilante squads. The incident in which Malope was killed occurred shortly after the Lebowa police had opened fire on a group of people returning from an overnight vigil at the coffin of another police victim.

About a week later, on March 23rd, a group of Lebowa police and an armed vigilante squad composed of MNR bandits and Zimbabwe renegades stormed the local Lutheran church in Namakgale, near the town of Phalaborwa, and violently broke up a NAYCO meeting. Mavis Malatji, a 16-year-old girl, was shot dead, scores of people were injured and 29 were arrested as a result of this action. Following on this, tough battles ensued between residents and youth on one side and police and armed vigilante bandits on the other, and raged late into the night. Two policemen's houses were burned down and another stoned, and one bandit was killed when his car crashed after being stoned by the youths.

At about nine o'clock the same night, the armed bandit groups were seen driving around hunting the township youth. They went to a hotel owned by Jackson Mogodi, chairman of the Namakgale Parents' Crisis Committee (NPCC). On their arrival, they began shooting indiscriminately at people, and threw a hand-grenade into the hotel foyer, injuring many people and killing Aaron Mahlangu, a member of the Shiluvane Youth Congress (SYCO), who at the time was recovering from a bullet wound previously inflicted on him by the police. Later the same night, SADF helicopters hovered above the township in a show of force.

Hardly a week had passed when, on March 28th, seven youths — one the victim of a brutal assault by an armed vigilante bandit group a week before — were

murdered and 11 other people suffered injuries from a hand-grenade explosion. The hand-grenade was thrown by a group of bandits on to the veranda of a shebeen in Lulekani, a Gazankulu township near Namakgale in Lebowa. The incident happened without any provocation whatever from the residents or the youths. Shortly before the explosion, one of the bandits had simply complained that the residents of the township were against them.

The People Protest

In response to the wave of terror, residents and youth organisations of several townships in Lebowa decided to ban members of the SADF and the police from all hotels and shebeens in the bantustans, and went further to name parks and schools after Nelson Mandela, Oliver Tambo and other popular leaders of our country. In condemnation of the brutal reign of terror, NAYCO, together with the Mahwelereng Youth Congress (MAYCO) and Timothy Chere, a Lutheran churchman whose home was chemically bombed and who has received numerous anonymous death threats, declared:

"This merciless death by these terrorists cast a heavy shadow over the whole township of Lulekani ... These people know nothing about law and order, only how to perpetuate violence and disorder ... No solution to the political crisis can come through violence, especially when it is perpetrated by those who claim to be enforcing law and order."

In spite of the popular outrage at their presence and their murderous activities in the townships and villages of Lebowa, the army, the police and the vigilantes have continued to subject the residents' and progressive youth organisations to a spate of cowardly and criminal attacks which, by April of 1986, had brought about what the residents of the bantustan describe as virtually a state of civil war. The residents' worst fears were confirmed when two separate hand-grenade attacks were made against the homes of political activists in Mankweng near Pietersburg in April.

The victims of the attacks were two members of the UDF in the Northern Transvaal — Joyce Mabudafhasi, an executive member, and Ernest Mokaba, brother to Peter Mokaba, another executive member of the UDF there.

Peter Mokaba has been in and out of apartheid gaols since he was 15 years old. His first experience came in 1977, when he was detained in Pietersburg but released without charge. In 1982, he was arrested and sentenced to two years for furthering the aims of the ANC. He was detained again immediately on his release in September 1984, and charged with having undergone military training outside South Africa and transporting weapons back into the country. Found guilty, he was sentenced to seven years' imprisonment on Robben Island, but was released on March 1st 1985, after a successful appeal. In March 1987, South African youth honoured him when they elected him President of the South African Youth Congress (SAYCO).

It is strongly believed that the attack in which Ernest Mokaba got injured was in fact directed against his brother, Peter. Incredibly, the police decided to arrest not the perpetrators of the attack but three people who had rushed to help the victim's families — one an organiser for the Sekhukhuniland Youth Organisation, another the president of MAYCO.

Bandits and Thugs Imported

The use of MNR counter-revolutionaries and Zimbabwean renegades as vigilante hit squads to wage war against unarmed civilians and leaders of the popular and democratic movement is another major feature which characterises the vigilante groups.

The significance of this lies in the fact that, as people who fought against the liberation movement during and after the struggle for independence, and who managed to escape after suffering defeat, these people tend to believe they have nothing to lose, and are therefore quite prepared to fight to the last ditch for whatever money is paid to them by their masters in Pretoria. They are used together with the various regional or ethnic military units in the SADF — the 11th, 112th, 113th,

115th and 121st Battalions for Swazis, Vendas, Shangaans and Sothos in the north-eastern Transvaal, and the Zulus in northern Natal; and the armed forces of Bophuthatswana, the Ciskei, Transkei, Lebowa and Venda. This combination, far from being a mutual relationship of equal 'partners in defence,' is intended to turn the bantustans into territorial buffer zones and serve as a front-line counter-insurgency force against ANC guerrillas.



Bantustan troops in KwaNdebele

Politics In The Zion Christian Church

The fact that Bishop Lekganyane invited to the Easter gathering both P W Botha and his entourage and the puppet authorities of Gazankulu, Lebowa and Venda as well as the mayors of Pietersburg, Pretoria, Mamelodi and Thembisa, and that this was followed by such disturbing developments, seems to suggest that, contrary to past practice, the hierarchy of the ZCC has decided to introduce politics into the affairs of the largest African independent church. The fact that P W Botha made full political capital out of an event which otherwise could have been a quiet and happy gathering of humble and devoted Christians, and so attempted to mislead world opinion into thinking that he has a Black constituency, should not surprise nor please anyone.

At the secret launch of SAYCO in March 1987, EYCO charged that:

"The ZCC is also helping (Inkatha and Inyandza) and has been seen working alongside security forces. The ZCC bishop has promised the apartheid regime good recruitment."

The ZCC belongs to that family of churches that originated about 100 years ago as a protest movement against racial discrimination in the first mission churches. The invitation extended to P W Botha, not to mention the permission granted to him to use the church platform to deliver his political message, and the conferring on him, by the ZCC hierarchy, of honorary citizenship of Moria is both a blunder and a betrayal of the trust and respect bestowed on Bishop Lekganyane by his more than two million followers in South Africa. One must also bear in mind that the membership of the ZCC is almost completely drawn from the new migrant workers to the major urban areas, and from farm and rural workers in the north-eastern and western Transvaal, including the Lebowa, Gazankulu and Venda bantustans. This sector of our people has been rendered defenceless, rootless, hopeless and therefore the most vulnerable to exploitative laws such as the Labour Relations, Basic Conditions of Employment and Unemployment Insurance Acts, which do not apply to farm and rural workers.

The Council of African Independent Churches (CAIC), an umbrella body of many of the independent churches, clearly pointed this out earlier on, in December 1984, when it issued a statement jointly with ten other independent church associations. It said:

"We in the African independent churches are the poorest and most oppressed of South African society. We are the most affected by forced removals, resettlement, migrant labour, influx control laws and economic exploitation at the factory floor, and we constitute the greater part of workers in the country."

It seems that the hierarchy of the Zion Christian Church (ZCC), by far the largest and best known of the almost 4 000 African independent churches in South Africa, and some of its misguided members, have

decided to jump on the bandwagon to help the apartheid regime and bantustan puppet authorities to unleash a campaign of terror and repression against the popular and democratic movement. In 1985, Bishop Barnabas Legkanyane invited P W Botha and his entourage, which, significantly, included Dr Piet Koomhof, to address the ZCC annual Easter gathering at Moria, near Pietersburg. Almost two months after, about 80 ZCC members, nicknamed the Moria Defence Force, were called in to suppress a students' class boycott against lack of proper accommodation and food and for an end to corruption, at a boarding school at Morebathota. This was followed by the hijacking of the funeral of a ten-year-old child by the South African Police and some misguided members of the ZCC in Tzaneen during the first three months of 1986, and most recently by other ZCC members' forming a vigilante group to act against the popular and democratic movement on the East Rand.

That the ZCC hierarchy (unless something is done to reverse the trend) is set on a path of self-destruction and betrayal of the interests of its members, is clearly shown by its lack of response, when four policemen cold-bloodedly murdered one of its devout members, 13-year-old Moses Mope, in the township of Atteridgeville, Pretoria, early in 1986. Without any provocation, the policemen stopped their car and began chasing a group of boys belonging to a ZCC choir on their way to church. During the chase they caught up with Moses Mope, and though he identified himself as a ZCC member by his badge, and though he pleaded for mercy, he was savagely kicked and trampled upon and died shortly afterwards.

The death of this child clearly shows the random nature of many police attacks which have taken place in townships and villages throughout the country. The lack of response from the ZCC hierarchy is of course in deep contrast to the delegation of ZCC ministers who went to the local police station to protest against the murder, and to the active participation of a group of ZCC members in the mass funeral of the 13 residents of Mamelodi who were massacred on November 21st 1985.

BOOK REVIEW

Eddie Webster: *Cast in a Racial Mould — Labour Process and Trade Unionism in the Foundries*, Ravan Press, Johannesburg, 1985.

This is an important book in many ways, but particularly because it comes from one of the 'new left intelligentsia' in South Africa. The book, according to its author, is:

"The outcome of over a decade of teaching and research on race and labour in South Africa." (p. vi)

This work on the labour process and forms of workplace organisation in the South African foundries was originally his Ph.D. thesis.

The first thing about the book that naturally attracts an ANC political activist is that Webster acknowledges the assistance of our late comrade Judson Kuzwayo in his research, but unfortunately does not tell us in what way the assistance was rendered.

Why did Webster choose the foundries for his study? In the preface to the book he says that there are two reasons for this:

"Firstly, foundries form part of the largest industrial council in the country and provide an important, if not the most important, arena for contesting the changing pattern of industrial relations in South Africa. The second is one of access. The Transvaal is the centre of the engineering industry, and foundries in particular." (p. xii)

Eddie Webster teaches industrial sociology at the University of the Witwatersrand, and the craft union, the Iron Moulders' Society, kept its union records at the university library, hence the easy access to them, and Webster says that after the formation of the Metal and Allied Workers' Union branch in the Transvaal it

became easy for him to contact union leaders and members.

Webster is not new to readers of the literature of the national liberation movement or those who follow closely the developments in the so-called 'new left intelligentsia' in South Africa. He is on the editorial board of the *South African Labour Bulletin*, contributes articles to the *South African Review*, (published by the South African Research Services) and in one or two journals internationally, and has also edited *Essays in South African Labour History* (1978).

The book under review attempts to analyse the transformation of the labour process within the foundries and the metal industry as a whole, and in particular the emergence of what the author calls "worker organisations."

The book is easy to read and is not directed towards the intelligentsia but to general readers, particularly those in the trade union movement. It is divided into three main sections, containing eleven short chapters. Part I is called *The Colour of the Craft* and discusses the emergence of the foundries in the 1830s, the formation of the Iron Moulders' Society in 1896 and its dominance in the industry until the 1920s, the emergence of machinery ("machinofacture") and the gradual decline of craft unionism, which was dominated by White moulders.

He discusses also the impact of mass production in the foundries when, in 1936, Durban Falkirk was started. Both the first and second world wars had an accelerating impact on this industry as a result of war demands and trade disruptions in foreign supplies of metal products. With the emergence of "machinofacture," the process of de-skilling of moulders began.

Webster discusses at some length this process of transformation of the labour process, and concludes that:

"The process of mechanisation and job fragmentation since 1944 had turned the vast bulk of White wage earners into either supervisory and white collar workers, or semi-skilled machine operators with no bargaining power other than their colour." (p. 117)

This conclusion must be understood in relation to the wider developments within the political economy of that period.

In Parts II and III, Webster tries to discuss what he calls the *Crisis of Control in the Labour Process*, and *The Search for a New Form of Control in the Workplace*, in short, the immediate pre- and post-Wiehahn periods. The attempt by management to control the labour process before 1979, through the use of White supervisors and Black 'boss-boys' (indunas) was to falter badly in the early 1970s, because of the demands of the emerging Black labour movement. The crisis came to a head in 1973-4, when, for example, in December 1973 in Durban, there were dramatic strikes. The emerging unions are here discussed by Webster in the form of the Metal and Allied Workers' Union (MAWU), which was formed in Pietermaritzburg in April 1973.

The Search for a New Form of Control (in brief) discusses post-Wiehahn industrial

relations, particularly in relation to the metal industry. Webster spends a lot of time discussing the development of MAWU (understandably), the role of the International Metalworkers' Federation (IMF) and so on. He makes a pertinent comment about South African society:

"The contradictory nature of the Wiehahn/Rieckert strategy is now clear: attempts at deracialisation in the workplace, unless they are accompanied by deracialisation in the society at large, will lead to a widening, and not a narrowing, of demands in the workplace." (p. 193)

By "deracialisation of society at large," I assume he means national liberation of Black people including the Black working class.

The last chapter of the book is both the most interesting and the most controversial, and is entitled: *The Birth of a Working Class Politics*.

It is difficult to isolate the central politics of Eddie Webster's book from his approach generally, which now and again surfaces in his articles. Anybody who has read his articles in *South African Review* or elsewhere will see his obvious inclination towards what he calls "a working class politics," which is basically a sort of over-concentration on trade unionism and a dangerous neglect of the whole national democratic movement and in particular a



Metal workers

presumption that SACTU and the South African Communist Party are isolated from South African workers. I find it particularly disturbing that in the discussion on the development of MAWU there is now and again an emphasis on the so-called "independent worker position." (p. 149)

This "independent worker position" is said to emanate from the historical experience of SACTU. In a footnote, which relies heavily on Rob Lambert's article in *The South African Labour Bulletin*, 2/3, 1980, Webster

"Tactical caution was to develop into a critique of the nature of SACTU's alliance with the ANC (African National Congress). Lambert expresses this position most clearly (when he says) 'Because of SACTU's subordinate position, decisions to launch national strike campaigns were taken with little reference to the level of preparedness and maturity of working class organisations. It was the dominance of the ANC and SACP (South African Communist Party) in the alliance that finally led to the smashing of SACTU.'" (p. 155)

Is the suggestion here that SACTU would not have been harassed by the Vorster regime if it had not entered into an alliance with the ANC and SACP? Or is it being suggested that if the contemporary trade union movement distances itself from the liberation movement it will therefore survive state repression? The suggestion could be even more sinister — that is, it could be an attempt to create a division between the national democratic movement and trade unions, as if trade union members are not part of the struggle against the apartheid system.

Under the sub-title, 'Worker Control,' in Chapter 11, Webster discusses this in relation to MAWU, and explains what this union understood by the concept. He quotes from the union publication, which says:

"Our union fights for the principle that workers must control the organisation. We believe that workers alone know what they want. We will not allow people with other interests to control our organisation." (p. 258)

Democracy within the union? Yes ... But this

has indeed been misunderstood deliberately by many commentators and the 'new left intelligentsia.'

What about the birth of a working class politics that Webster talks about? He says:

"By establishing independent working class organisations, the emerging unions have created the embryo of a working class politics in South Africa. This can be seen most clearly in the evolving shop stewards' councils, which readily concern themselves with non-factory issues, pushing unions beyond pure-and-simple trade unionism. But it can also be seen in the growth of an organised challenge on the shop floor, which has widened the negotiable issues, pushing forward the indivisible frontier of control in the workplace. These demands extend beyond the workplace to include issues concerned with the reproduction of the workforce such as housing and pensions." (p. 279)

But how is this working class politics going to relate to the national democratic movement if alliances will result in state repression of trade unions, as we are told happened to SACTU? Webster does not provide an answer to this, but instead speculates as follows:

"The central issue now confronting the organised working class is the form and content of this (working class) politics." (p. 280)

Elsewhere, though, Webster has followed the discredited Forster approach (*New Force on the Shop Floor*, in *South African Review Two*, pp. 86-8).

Finally, I find difficulty with the sort of research methodology that Webster has used to write his last chapter. The choice of five metal workers for interviews and the use of those to make conclusions on "a working class politics" is unsatisfactory. Specific questions were asked, and so specific answers were obtained. For example, nowhere does Webster ask these workers their opinion of alliances ... and so on. Nevertheless, I think this book is worth reading, in particular for those who follow closely the developments of the trade union movement and of the 'new left intelligentsia.'

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SUPPORT FOR THE ANC

- Conference calls on the governments and peoples of the world to render direct political, financial and material support to the ANC and the South African mass democratic movement as a vital part of its contribution to the struggle for the birth of a democratic South Africa.
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