



UNITED
NATIONS

GMB/070/0009/10

UNIT ON APARTHEID

DEPARTMENT OF POLITICAL AND SECURITY COUNCIL AFFAIRS

08/74

No. 20/74

NOTES AND DOCUMENTS*

August 1974

BASIC FACTS ON THE REPUBLIC OF SOUTH AFRICA AND THE POLICY OF APARTHEID

by

Julian R. Friedman

[Note: This paper was prepared for the Unit by Julian R. Friedman, Professor of Political Science at the Maxwell Graduate School of Syracuse University, USA. Professor Friedman, who served as Assistant Secretary, Committee 1/2 at the United Nations Conference on International Organization at San Francisco in 1945, is the author of a number of articles and books on international law and politics. He has prepared papers on apartheid for United Nations Seminars held in Brasilia in September 1966 and in Kitwe in July-August 1967.

The views expressed are those of the author. Professor Friedman has been assisted by Ms. Diana Ellis, Ms. Yvonne Denise Gouzee, Ms. Juay Butterman, Mr. David Easterbrook and Mr. Jeffrey Crafts, all of Syracuse University.]

74-22941

* All material in these notes and documents may be freely reprinted.

Acknowledgement, together with a copy of the publication containing the reprint, would be appreciated.

CONTENTS

	<u>Page</u>
INTRODUCTION	1
I. POPULATION	4
II. EDUCATION	9
III. SOCIO-ECONOMIC PROFILE OF AFRICANS	13
IV. POLITICAL SYSTEM	20
V. AFRICAN POLITICAL MOVEMENTS	23
VI. <u>APARTHEID</u> IN OPERATION	25
VII. <u>APARTHEID</u> RESTRICTIONS ON THE LIBERTIES OF EUROPEANS	33
VIII. POLICE AND PRISONS	34
IX. BANTUSTANS	40
X. THE STATE OF THE ECONOMY	43
XI. <u>APARTHEID</u> FINANCE	45
XII. FOREIGN INVESTMENT	48
XIII. FOREIGN TRADE	52
XIV. MILITARY AND STRATEGIC DIMENSIONS OF <u>APARTHEID</u>	54
XV. FOREIGN RELATIONS	57

INTRODUCTION

1. The basic fact of apartheid is its victims. The casualty list includes the inhabitants, institutions, and future of South Africa. Chief Albert Luthuli, Nelson Mandela, the Sharpeville massacre and more recently the Carletonville massacre dead are among the most prominent known to the outside world. In reality, the entire population of the country without exception are victims. Africans have suffered every conceivable type of disaster from homicide to humiliation, from expropriation of land to grinding poverty, from brutal imprisonment or relentless persecution. Family life shattered, careers wrecked, education disrupted, and body in constant jeopardy, the vast majority are permanently maimed in one fashion or another. Africans are joined by the Coloured people, who encounter disabilities and indignities at every turn in the road. As an excuse for segregation, they are deprived of their historical political rights and their parentage. They are a people divested of hope. Under apartheid, Asians have experienced deprivation and degradation, magnifying and legalizing the discrimination they have long endured in South Africa. The human condition of all these peoples is misery in their own homeland.

2. None escapes victimization, not even the victimizers. Beneficiaries of dominance rarely see themselves, because of their exceptional vantagepoint, as victims of their own hand, of their own excesses, but today not even their position in the polity, economy, and society has afforded the European minority certainty of security and satisfaction. They, too, have been losers in stature and reputation, in values and opportunities for which prosperity and affluence have provided only partial compensation. Many opponents of apartheid have emigrated either under compulsion or voluntarily to other nations; the remaining Europeans live under the shadow of ministerial tyranny in circumstances of reduced and weakened judicial safeguards. Supporters of apartheid also pay a price in the loss of human sensitivity. Challenged to justify their ideology and conduct, they have to resort to evasive intellectual responses and erosive emotional reactions. They point to the beauty of their country and their attainments with pride only to be refused respect from most of the world's population.

3. Add to the scores of casualties the institutions of South Africa. The principal instrument of apartheid is the State, which is more than ever authoritarian, with elaborate surveillance and extreme severity in policing the lives of Africans, Coloured people and Asians and, more than ever, coercive in watching and monitoring European behavior for dissent, deviance, and defiance.

4. By no standard can the State be accepted as a democratic one. For a quarter of a century, with five more years ahead, a single white party has ruled the country; the other white parties, even with considerable popular support, have little chance for victory. The Nationalist Party has used the government as its weapon of intimidation and imposition. While the polity has by no means completely yielded its standards of courtroom justice, political malaise runs deep.

5. Economic institutions have supposedly constituted the bright side of the otherwise dismal situation. However, they have not escaped the weight of apartheid that distorts and twists them as well. Development and growth have been noteworthy, but there are dubious characteristics that leave economic observers uneasy and critical. Industrialization has proceeded along lines that generate many capital and labour problems for future generations to carry as

heavy burdens. Foreign investors demand high dividends in exchange for their involvement with apartheid. African and other workers have already set their sights on much improved conditions of employment and are willing to strike for their fair share at very great personal risk. From a declining mining sector, gold has on many occasions rescued the South African economy from tight squeezes. That economy, however, artfully relieved of common social obligations today must face an enormous social overhead tomorrow.

6. It goes without saying that the nation's response to ethnic group relations is grossly inadequate in the contemporary world. It is not exclusively a South African phenomenon for which the Europeans of South Africa may in isolation provide their own exclusive solution. Under apartheid, relations among human beings of different origins are mainly avoided rather than confronted and treated automatically as something to be legislated or administered out of existence. Steeped in fear and, in part, fantasy, this posture has simply arrested social maturation of all South Africans, and diminished the capability of the entire society to come to grips with its pressing, painful problems that can no longer be swept under the carpet. For years to come, ethnic group relations will plague South Africans as a highly salient issue, the resolution of which through mutual and peaceful adjustment is likely to become more and more remote.

7. Victimization is manifest in physical, psychic, and moral ruin. It is measurable in both quantity and quality of destruction. In South Africa the pernicious and corrosive consequences of apartheid are overt and epidemic. In this context, therefore, apartheid can be defined as a set of policies and practices that excel in the production of victims. This definition synchronizes completely with the realist version of apartheid that it is a historically accumulative and purposeful system of racial containment consisting of four distinctive yet converging dimensions: racial prejudice and discrimination; racial segregation and separation; economic exploitation of natural and human resources, and legal, administrative, and police terror.

8. This study endeavors to illuminate the system of apartheid in South Africa now, the realities of today as distinct from the "promised land" prophesied by the apartheidists. Description rather than prescription is its major thrust. It intends to bring into sharp focus what is happening to the peoples of South Africa at the present time, what they are compelled to endure at this moment, what are the human costs incurred in the pursuit of apartheid.

9. South Africa has one face but wears several masks. It is the contorted face of racial containment thinly disguised with the transparent masks of "parallel progress" and "separate development". Racial containment is a less familiar term than the more widely utilized phrases of racial discrimination, racial segregation, racial domination. It incorporates their meanings but extends semantically and symbolically beyond them. In the Republic, all peoples are being surrounded by walls of containment. They are assigned and confined under varying degrees of coercion to containers according to their "race". However, the Europeans have arrogated to themselves the master roles of gatekeepers, regulating exits and entrances as will best meet their desires. Thus racial containment means control under conditions of compulsion, apartheid reflecting the aspiration and determination of the "white" minority to rule over the African, Coloured and Asian people who comprise the majority of the population.

10. To portray apartheid in this fashion ordinarily exasperates and offends its ardent advocates. They strongly feel that they are designing for South Africans the best of all worlds: to the Europeans security from being "swamped" by a non-white majority alleged to be too backward technologically and too insensitive culturally for participation in a modernized and developed society; to the Africans, progress and in any case protection against alleged unscrupulous practices of Asians; to the Coloureds, dignity that goes with an identity of their own; and to the Asian community, with safeguards against retaliation by the Africans.

11. If apartheid is intended to relieve apprehensions in a "multi-racial" state eventually, none of the peoples seems very comfortable under its aegis today. It is obvious from the resort to extreme police and military measures that the Europeans feel more anxiety and fear than ever. It is obvious from the deprivations and brutalities encountered in daily life that the Africans know no peace. It is obvious from the personal restrictions imposed on them that Coloureds are being denied dignity and, as time goes on, are losing all hope for decent treatment. As for the Asians, it is obvious from the economic and political pressures directed against them they are more vulnerable than ever, threatened not so much by Africans as by the régime itself.

12. For the outside world the anxious face of South Africa wears masks of prosperity and gaiety. The image thus projected and amplified by propaganda is loudly applauded in some circles. Nonetheless, racial containment is the reality of apartheid. As it is implemented, all of its elements become fused and inseparable. Thus "separate development" cannot be divorced from the use of force to drive Africans from "white" areas into the "homelands", nor restricted to the Africans. The social engineering of "parallel progress" has become the social engineering of coercion, and it is coercion, not development that prevails.

13. Where coercion is let loose in the land, the power structure is prone to escalate propaganda in its own defence. In this respect the Government of South Africa is acting true to form. Its propaganda machine operates continually. That is not to say that all information originating in South Africa feigns accuracy but is actually the opposite. Excellent sources of accurate data on the state of human affairs in South Africa are accessible. So far the information area has escaped total censorship, with which such régimes are frequently identified.

14. Whenever possible, this study has drawn upon South African sources, including the Bureau of Statistics; the 1971 and 1973 Yearbook issued by Da Gama Publishers, Johannesburg; periodicals and monographs sponsored by banks, universities, and the Institute of Race Relations, press and various Government agencies, as well as the Information Service of South Africa in the United States. In addition, many of the documents of the United Nations Unit on Apartheid have proved invaluable and deserve full acknowledgment. A rigorous attempt has been made to preserve the continuity, consistency, and constancy of time series, but considerable technical difficulty has been encountered, as indicated in specific instances in the pages that follow.

I. POPULATION

1. In 1974 seven million more persons live under apartheid than did in 1960. At present the estimated population of South Africa (excluding Namibia) is 23,000,000. The 1960 census reported the population at 16,022,797, the 1970 census 21,448,169. Contributing to this increase were surviving new borns and immigrants. The size of the population today would have been even greater had the additions not been offset in part by death, with noticeably high infant and maternal mortality among Africans, and emigration.

2. The Republic of South Africa ranks fourth in size of population among States on the African continent, after Nigeria, Egypt, and Ethiopia. In comparative terms, its population is equivalent in numbers to that of Canada and Colombia.

3. The Republic's African population is the largest in southern Africa and second largest south of the equator. In West Africa only Nigeria exceeds South Africa in this respect, while in East Africa the United Republic of Tanzania comes closest but still falls short of the total in South Africa.

4. African inhabitants of South Africa outnumber the Europeans four to one; non-Europeans taken together outnumber the Europeans five and one-half to one. In all provinces the non-Europeans comprise the majority; in all the Europeans are in the minority. Although 80 per cent of the European inhabitants reside in the urban areas, non-Europeans constitute the majority of urban residents as a whole and in nine of the ten more important cities. More Africans live outside rather than inside the "Bantu homelands", and of these people the majority maintain residences or find shelter in the urban areas. Despite apartheid, Africans predominate in the Johannesburg urban area, Coloureds in the Cape Town urban area, and Asians in the Durban urban area, allowing for the fact that these populations have been compelled to reside in specially designated settlement areas.

5. Europeans in South Africa, amounting to less than twenty per cent of the country's inhabitants, constitute the largest European population in Africa and the only one in excess of a million persons. Over ninety per cent of the Europeans permanently residing in Africa are to be found in the Republic. Although most Europeans are urban, only in Pretoria, of all the major cities, are there more Europeans than there are Africans, Asians and Coloured people together. Small in number as is the European population, individually through corporate enterprises, and the Government, it possesses over eighty per cent of the land.

6. Population Census: ^{1/}

	<u>1960</u>	<u>1970</u>	<u>mid-1972 (est.)</u>
Africans	10,927,923	15,057,952	16,217,000
Coloureds	1,509,258	2,018,453	2,144,000
Asians	477,125	620,436	668,000
Whites (Europeans)	<u>3,088,492</u>	<u>3,751,328</u>	<u>3,960,000</u>
Total:	16,002,798	21,448,169	22,989,000

^{1/} Data available in United Nations, Unit on Apartheid, Population of South Africa. New York, United Nations, 1971; Statesman's Yearbook, 1973-74.

7. Fifty-two per cent of the South African population is classified as rural, forty-eight per cent urban. Although the majority of Africans reside in the rural areas, they outnumber all other "races" in the urban areas, as the following table demonstrates:

	<u>Urban</u> 1970	<u>Rural</u>
Africans	4,989,371	10,068,581
Coloureds	1,494,490	523,963
Asians	535,536	81,900
Whites	3,257,805	493,523

8. After twenty years of apartheid more Africans still live outside the homelands than within such areas: 53.5% outside the homelands, that is, in the white areas. While this tally represents a percentage decline since 1960, absolute numbers are greater. This decline has continued but in both sectors, the population has increased. The white areas do not yield their Africans to the homelands too readily and the homelands in turn lack the carrying capacity to sustain the growing African population. In the "white areas" the population is distributed as follows:

	<u>Urban</u> 1970	<u>Rural</u>
Africans	4,407,015	3,653,758
Coloureds	1,488,928	516,397
Asians	538,341	78,654
Whites	3,247,246	483,705

9. Population by Selected Cities: *

Johannesburg	<u>1960</u>	<u>1970</u>
Africans	626,366	803,511
Coloureds	58,555	82,551
Asians	27,467	39,312
Whites	398,517	482,589
	<u>1,110,905</u>	<u>1,407,963</u>

Cape Town		
Africans	75,200	107,877
Coloureds	417,881	598,952
Asians	8,975	11,263
Whites	305,155	378,505
	<u>807,211</u>	<u>1,096,597</u>

Durban		
Africans	206,318	224,209
Coloureds	26,979	43,396
Asians	231,219	195,883
Whites	195,418	267,777
	<u>659,934</u>	<u>721,265</u>

* Over the years boundaries of cities are altered. Under apartheid populations have been shifted beyond city limits. Figures for the entire metropolitan area are rarely available.

9. Population by Selected Cities (cont.)

	<u>1960</u>	<u>1970</u>
Pretoria		
Africans	199,890	280,768
Coloureds	7,452	11,891
Asians	8,045	11,144
Whites	<u>207,202</u>	<u>325,923</u>
	422,590	629,726
Port Elizabeth		
Africans	133,833	181,525
Coloureds	61,460	97,593
Asians	4,084	4,935
Whites	<u>194,804</u>	<u>123,646</u>
	274,180	407,699

10. In none of the provinces is there a majority of Europeans, even with the exclusion of the Bantustan populations from the statistics: 2/

Cape Province

	Whites	Bantu	Asians	Coloureds	Total non-Whites	Total Population
1936	791,574	2,045,570	10,508	682,248	2,738,326	3,529,900
1946	870,149	2,336,973	15,174	829,128	3,181,275	4,051,424
1951	935,085	2,492,021	17,818	981,802	3,491,641	4,426,726
1960	1,003,207	2,990,947	18,477	1,330,089	4,339,513	5,342,720
1970	1,102,367	1,360,172	21,617	1,751,367	3,133,156	4,235,523

Natal

1936	190,549	1,553,629	183,661	18,629	1,755,919	1,946,468
1946	236,697	1,708,483	232,317	24,895	1,965,695	2,202,392
1951	274,240	1,810,102	299,491	31,485	2,141,078	2,415,318
1960	340,235	2,199,578	394,854	45,253	2,639,685	2,979,920
1970	442,499	1,116,499	514,810	66,836	1,697,667	2,140,166

Transvaal

1936	820,756	2,444,380	25,493	50,841	2,520,714	3,341,470
1946	1,063,121	3,122,173	37,758	59,986	3,219,917	4,283,038
1951	1,204,712	3,480,077	49,342	75,014	3,604,433	4,809,145
1960	1,468,305	4,633,378	63,787	108,007	4,805,172	6,273,477
1970	1,890,182	4,267,272	80,563	150,853	4,498,688	6,388,870

Orange Free State

1936	200,978	553,110	29	17,943	571,082	772,060
1946	202,077	662,930	11	14,053	676,994	879,071
1951	227,652	774,190	13	14,715	788,918	1,016,570
1960	276,745	1,083,886	7	25,909	1,109,802	1,386,547
1970	295,903	1,317,308	5	36,090	1,353,403	1,649,306

The 1970 Census includes Bantu Homelands figures of 7,034,125.

2/ State of South Africa Yearbook 1973, p. 47.

11. South Africa has augmented its population through immigration, the consequence of several relevant factors, including a vigorous campaign to attract whites to the Republic. 1972 saw the lowest level of immigration in ten years and the smallest number of emigrants since 1963. The overall increase has resulted from the following flows of persons: ^{3/}

	<u>No. of immigrants</u>	<u>No. of emigrants</u>	<u>Net Inflow or Outflow</u>
1948	35,631	7,534	+ 28,097
1960	9,789	12,612	- 2,823
1961	16,309	14,903	+ 1,406
1962	20,916	8,945	+ 11,971
1963	37,964	7,156	+ 30,808
1964	40,865	8,092	+ 32,773
1965	38,326	9,206	+ 29,120
1966	48,048	9,888	+ 38,160
1967	38,937	10,737	+ 28,200
1968	40,548	10,589	+ 29,959
1969	41,446	9,018	+ 32,428
1970	41,523	9,154	+ 32,369
1971	35,845	8,291	+ 27,554
1972	32,776	7,803	+ 24,973

12. Population growth and age composition of the population are directly affected by the extent of infant mortality. Differential rates prevail in South Africa: (per 1,000 live births)

<u>Year</u>	<u>Europeans</u>	<u>Coloured</u>	<u>Asians</u>
1967	24.1	136.3	54.7
1968	23.7	132.6	45.4
1969	23.0	134.5	38.1
1970	21.6	132.6	36.4
1971	20.9	122.1	35.6

Only estimates are available for Africans: 200-250 infant deaths per 1,000 live births. While some experts consider this estimate as exaggerated, other suggest that the rate may be as high as 450 infant deaths per 1,000 live births. A 1966 survey is reported as indicating that "half the children born in a typical African reserve in South Africa died before reaching the age of five years". ^{4/}

13. The medical care services system in South Africa is heavily apartheidist. There are separate facilities for the different "races". Indicative of the

^{3/} State of South Africa Yearbook, 1971, p. 93.

^{4/} The Star, Johannesburg, 10 May 1969, as cited in Hoffenberg, Raymond. "Inequality in Health Care in South Africa". Special Article. Unit on Apartheid. New York, United Nations, March 1970, p. 1; Republic of South Africa. Dept. of Statistics, Bulletin of Statistics, Vol. 7, No. 3, September 1973, 1.3.

system is the distribution of physicians for the different races in South Africa during 1972:

European	1:400	
Asian	1:900	
Coloured	1:6,200	
African	1:44,400	5/

5/ Cape Times, 27 May 1972, as reported in Horrell, M., 1973 Survey of Race Relations in South Africa, Johannesburg, Institute of Race Relations, p. 404. (European and other physicians see African patients, especially for the more specialized services.)

II. EDUCATION

1. Apartheidism has deeply penetrated every level of education from the pre-primary through the university, from elemental skill to professional training. Education of all "races" from school entry through post-graduate is oriented towards "separate development", especially "separate development" of Africans, Coloureds, and Asians. Residually, that means that whites are also being educated for their own separate development, except that their training, unlike that of the others, includes the skills to govern the state and manage the economy.

2. While the Ministry of Bantu Administration and Education insists that there is a policy of autonomy for African school districts, with school committees and boards to "control" schools and education in general in a specified area, all must comply with the policy of providing a "Bantu education" for the Africans. "The Department of Bantu Education, together with the various homeland departments, strives to afford opportunities for the Bantu to receive education and training that will equip them to take an effective place in the life of the Bantu communities of South Africa." 6/ Many skills vitally needed in a modern and developed nation are not taught in African educational institutions.

3. There are more African children in school than ever before. Whether their education is suitable for life in a modern, developed state is another question. With a sense of real achievement the Government points to the increasing literacy among Africans. In fact in this respect reference is to literacy in the "homeland" language, for which a written version has been developed in recent years. Neither English nor Afrikaans has "official" status in African primary schools, although without these languages Africans cannot participate in the full range of higher education or qualify for more advanced jobs in government, professions, or industry. Besides, there is such variation among the "homeland" languages as to impede communications among the Africans and generate further division among them.

4. Educational facilities for Africans have been expanded in the "homelands", including the development of two new universities at Turfloop and Ngoye in addition to Fort Hare. Construction costs are met in part by the central government, school boards, tribal authorities, municipalities, owners of farms, mining and industrial corporations, and religious bodies. The Bantu Trust carries the responsibility of financing school construction in the "homelands".

5. Given the available figures on the number of African pupils enrolled in schools and total expenditures for African education, average per pupil expenditure for Africans in 1972 is approximately R20. Obviously, the average per child of school age expenditure falls well below this sum. African education is funded through the homeland treasuries and the central government, which has replaced the outlays from the now abolished Special Bantu Education

6/ State of South Africa Yearbook 1971, p. 80.

Fund with payments from Consolidated Revenues. For 1972-73 altogether approximately R71 million (\$99.4 million) was allocated to education for the African population. By contrast education for Europeans, supported through direct national and provincial authorities expenditures, receives in excess of R300,000,000. The discrepancy in the outlays per African and European child of school age runs at least twenty-five to one in favor of the European. ^{7/}

6. The size of the African school population is as follows: ^{8/}

1960	-	1,518,063
1965	-	1,957,836
1966	-	2,111,886
1967	-	2,241,477
1968	-	2,397,152
1969	-	2,552,807
1970	-	2,748,635
1971	-	3,036,708

7. African enrollment in secondary schools: ^{9/}

1960	-	47,598
1965	-	66,568
1966	-	76,835
1967	-	86,109
1968	-	98,670
1969	-	106,945
1970	-	122,489
1971	-	139,922

8. Africans in university courses number as follows:

(a) Bantu universities at Fort Hare, Turfloop and Ngoye

1963	-	623
1964	-	756
1965	-	939
1966	-	1,161
1967	-	1,305
1968	-	1,430
1969	-	1,586
1970	-	2,022
1971	-	2,339
1972	-	2,816

^{7/} For additional information, Horrell, M. Survey of Race Relations in South Africa for 1972. Johannesburg. Institute of Race Relations, 1973.

^{8/} State of South Africa Yearbook 1971, p. 83;

^{9/} Ibid. Also utilized for these and subsequent data, State of the Union Yearbook 1957, and Statesman's Year-Book, 1970-1971 and 1973-1974.

(b) European universities (including the African medical education program at the University of Natal)

1954	-	200 (314 more at Fort Hare)
1969	-	168
1972	-	206

(c) Non-residential university

1954	-	1,086
1969	-	2,144
1972	-	3,341

9. Coloured enrollment in primary and secondary schools and universities:

(a) primary and secondary schools

1954	-	194,565 (ages 7-15)
1968	-	455,562
1972	-	555,238

(b) universities:

University of the Western Cape (Coloured)

1965	-	415
1966	-	503
1967	-	566
1968	-	655
1969	-	805
1970	-	936
1971	-	975
1972	-	1,241

European universities

1954	-	496 (239 non-residential, 36 at Fort
1969	-	1,097 (478 non-residential) /Hare)
1972	-	1,247 (324 non-residential)

teacher's training centres

1969	-	2,020
1972	-	3,406

10. Asian enrollment in primary and secondary schools and universities:

(a) primary and secondary schools

1954	-	65,627 (ages 7-15)
1968	-	157,891
1972	-	172,142

(b) universities:

University College at Durban

1965	-	973
1966	-	1,129
1967	-	1,258
1968	-	1,463
1969	-	1,714
1970	-	1,738
1971	-	1,710
1972	-	2,003

European universities

1954	-	725 (292 non-residential, 19 at Fort Hare)
1969	-	1,690
1972	-	2,636 (1,785 non-residential)

11. European enrollment in primary and secondary schools and universities:

(a) primary and secondary schools, other than vocational and industrial schools

1954	-	412,905 (ages 7-15)
1968	-	822,482
1972	-	876,939

(b) universities, other than technical colleges and teacher's training colleges

1954	-	22,956
1969	-	79,422
1972	-	84,232

III. SOCIO-ECONOMIC PROFILE OF AFRICANS

1. The 1972 per capita income of Africans in South Africa has approximately \$154. ^{10/} For 1970, 1968 and 1966 the amounts were \$146, \$137 and \$120 respectively. This increase in the income of Africans was largely negated by a very high rate of inflation which in many cases actually contributed to a decline in the real income of Africans. From 1966-1972 the Consumer Price Index rose 27.6%, while the cost of housing and food, which account for the greatest part of expenditures by Africans, rose 32%. ^{11/} Inflation accelerated in 1971-73. From June 1972 to June 1973 the Cost of Living rose 10.1%, food prices alone rising 16.5%. ^{12/}

2. In contrast to Africans, Europeans under apartheid have a much higher standard of living than was the case just six years ago. Taking inflation into account, the growth of European per capita income from 1966 to 1972 appears to have exceeded 23%, as follows:

1972	\$2,958
1970	2,548
1969	2,351
1968	2,213
1966	1,964
1960	1,375

^{10/} The accuracy of these statistics may be open to some question. However, the magnitudes are generally correct and suffice as significant indicators of the actual conditions in South Africa. These averages have been calculated by reference to (a) items constituting "current income" as found in the Table "Personal Income and Expenditure", South African Reserve Bank Quarterly Bulletin, December, 1973; (b) population statistics as reported in the 1960 and 1970 censuses of the South African Bureau of Statistics, Pretoria; (c) an estimate of 1972 population based on the growth rate of Africans (2.79%) and whites (1.40%) based on the Census; and (d) income distribution differentials, 19.8% as the African share and 73.4% as the European share of "remuneration of employees" and 10% as the African share and 85% as the European share of the remaining items of "current income". United Nations. Unit on Apartheid. Industrialization, Foreign Capital, and Forced Labor in South Africa. ST/PSCA/SER.A/10. New York, 1970. p. 15 and Financial Mail, Johannesburg, 18 April 1969. The 10-85 differential is a rough estimate in the absence of more precise information. Note should be taken of the fact that static differentials were assumed for the six-year period; many observers insist that the differences in social-economic status of Africans and Europeans widened geometrically during the decade.

^{11/} Table "Consumer Prices" in South African Reserve Bank Quarterly Bulletin, December 1973, p. S-85.

^{12/} "Report of the Fifty-Third Ordinary General Meeting" of the South African Reserve Bank, 1973, p.4.

The ratio of European to African per capita income reached 19.2:1 in 1972, while in 1970 it was 17.5:1. Thus the spread between the two populations seems to be growing instead of narrowing and may even amount to a 20:1 ratio. ^{13/}

3. In the late 60s the wage gap between African and European workers grew wider, as indicated by the following figures showing the trend for the two sectors of employment in which the wage gap is widest and narrowest:

RATIO OF WHITE TO AFRICAN WAGES

	<u>1969</u>	<u>1971</u>
<u>Mining</u>	18.9:1	19.9:1 ^{14/}
<u>Manufacturing</u>	<u>1960</u> 5.3:1	<u>1970</u> 6:1 ^{15/}

4. Indications that the majority of Africans are living at below subsistence level is ascertained by reference to what is known as the Poverty Datum Line. For example, the all-white Association of Chambers of Commerce established in 1970 that the head of a family of 5 living in Soweto, the African township outside Johannesburg, needed a minimum monthly wage of R87.12 (R1045.44 per annum). The Urban Bantu Council (African) noted that for a reasonable standard of living R117.82 per month (R1413.84 per annum) was needed. A random sample of African households in Johannesburg conducted by the Bureau of Market Research, University of South Africa, found the median household income to be R876.50 per annum. ^{16/}

5. The lowest per capita income of Africans derives from farming, including laboring and service on European farms. Subsistence crops absorb the energies of the great majority of Africans in the Bantustans and elsewhere in rural South Africa, but the rewards, while essential, are meagre. In 1970, 36.6% of the African labour force was employed in the agriculture, forestry, and fishing sector, about the same as a decade ago. The total average income in cash and kind for agricultural workers, according to the 1962 agricultural census, was between

^{13/} The Times of London stated on 27 April 1971 that "White per capita incomes are now 20 times African incomes and the gap is growing."

^{14/} Table 2.2.1 "Labor - Employment - Mining and quarrying - Total, and Table 2.3.1. "Labor - Earnings - Mining and quarrying" in Bulletin of Statistics, September 1973, Department of Statistics, Pretoria.

^{15/} 1973 State of South Africa Yearbook pp. 241-242.

^{16/} Cyril B. Pearce, "Black Participation in Building the South African Economy," in South Africa International, IV, July 1973, pp. 27-8. 1 rand is equivalent to \$1.40.

R4 (\$5.60) and R6 (\$8.40) per month. ^{17/} These figures include the wages of women and children, which are often employed in this sector. In 1969, the Managing Director of Market Research Africa estimated the average wage for an adult male farmworker as no more than R7 (\$9.88) per month. ^{18/} This represents less than 1/3 of what Africans earn in the mining sector, and less than 1/6 of what they earn in manufacturing. One writer has noted "...in agriculture African real wages today are often below the level of sixty years ago." ^{19/} Farm Labourers are, nevertheless, strictly tied to their form of employment by laws which make desertion a criminal offense, the absence of adequate educational facilities, and the lack of opportunities to earn cash. Farm workers under apartheid are not covered by Unemployment Insurance or Workmen's Compensation Laws. There is no minimum wage, and no statistical records are kept by the government of standards of accommodation and feeding. Apartheid in this way virtually guarantees to the European farmers direct availability of a cheap labour pool.

6. Mining utilized barely 11% of the employed African labour force in 1970, as compared to 14% a decade ago. ^{20/} Although profits in the industry have continued to climb, mining as a whole has declined in its relative contribution to the GNP. ^{21/} In the last sixty years profits have been used to increase European wages, but the same is not true of African wages. This is strikingly illustrated by the increased ratio of European to African wages despite the upgrading of some Africans to fill more skilled positions. In the mining industry, "average cash earnings of whites were in real terms 70% higher in 1969 than in 1911, most of the rise having come since WWII," while African wages showed no rise at all. ^{22/} A strict industrial colour bar has been maintained since the 20s which has kept the ratio of African to white employment at a steady 8:1. This policy has fostered the continued use of Africans as low-paid, unskilled labour. 80% of the African mineworkers work underground. ^{23/} Low African wages are also the result of an unlimited supply of low-wage unskilled (but not always inexperienced) African labour drawn from ever more distant places outside the Republic where alternative earning opportunities open for Africans are low. ^{24/} 67.5% of Africans working in the mines come from outside the Republic - especially Lesotho and Mozambique. ^{25/}

^{17/} Dept. of Statistics, Pretoria

^{18/} Roslyne Ainslie, Masters and Serfs: Farm Labor in South Africa (London: International Defense and Aid Fund, 1973)

^{19/} The Times, London, 26 April 1971. Also New York Times, 10 November 1971.

^{20/} Bulletin of Statistics, Sept. 1973, Department of Statistics, Pretoria, Table 2.1.1.

^{21/} State of South Africa Yearbook 1973, pp. 110, 96.

^{22/} Anne Ratcliffe, "Labor in the South African Gold Mines", South African Journal of Economics, XLI, September 1973, p. 260

^{23/} State of South Africa Yearbook 1973, p. 122.

^{24/} Ratcliffe, p. 261.

^{25/} 1973 Yearbook, p. 122.

7. Economists agree that the employment of large numbers of unskilled, low-paid, migrant labour has led to inefficiency in the mining industry and an increase in cost. ^{26/} More than 20% of African miners are newcomers each year. ^{27/} The recent rise in the world price of gold and the influence of the 1972-3 African strikes has brought this issue to the attention of Apartheidists, and some efforts have been made to increase training of Africans and their upgrading into more highly skilled jobs. ^{28/}

8. In manufacturing and construction African wage rates are substantially in excess of those in agriculture and mining. According to the South African Government, African employment in this sector did not increase between 1960 and 1970, representing 12% of the African labour force in both years. ^{29/} Other sources have indicated that in fact African employment in these industries expanded radically during the decade. ^{30/} Sources agree that within most manufacturing industries the proportion of Africans has increased - especially in the steel industry, textiles and chemical industry. ^{31/}

^{26/} Ratcliffe, p. 268

^{27/} 1973 Yearbook, p. 121.

^{28/} Rand Daily Mail, 2 and 4 July 1973.

^{29/} This conflicts with data published elsewhere and may be explained by the note to table 2.1.1. in the Bulletin of Statistics September 1973, Pretoria: "Owing to the fact that the classifications of industries and occupations was not in all cases identical for the respective census years (1960 and 1970), the data for the various years are not strictly comparable."

^{30/} Houghton, D. Hobart. "Dynamics of South Africa's Economic Growth," South Africa International, Vol. II, No. 1, July 1971, p. 44.

EMPLOYMENT 1970				
	All <u>Races</u>	<u>Whites</u>	<u>Africans</u>	<u>Coloureds and Asians</u>
	(in thousands)			
1. Agriculture forestry and fishing	1,980	115	1,680	185
2. Mining	676	63	606	7
3. Manufacturing and construction	1,539	336	882	321
4. Wholesale and retail trade	452	193	187	72
5. Transport and communications	279	149	110	20
6. Public authorities	649	238	336	75
7. Other services	1,465	301	990	174
Totals:	7,040	1,395	4,791	854

^{31/} 1973 Yearbook, Bulletin of Statistics

9. As with agriculture and mining, the great bulk of the lowest paying jobs in manufacturing and construction are held by Africans, although in recent years a small number have, in face of the growing need for skilled workers, moved into semi-skilled and even skilled positions. This has resulted in increased African productivity in the industry, and significantly increased production in manufacturing and construction as a whole. ^{32/} However, rarely are Africans paid the rate for the job. ^{33/} None holds a managerial post in any enterprise funded by domestic European or foreign capital, nor are Africans placed in positions to supervise European workmen. This state of affairs is of deep concern to industrial and financial circles. Professor Steenkamp has noted, "If South Africa wishes to maintain a satisfactory rate of material progress, to that peace may reign in the Republic and all its peoples may live in greater comfort, the Black and brown peoples will have to play a role of increasing significance in the national economy. ^{34/} Professor D. Hobart Houghton has recently observed: "Only if South Africa's human potential is fully utilized and given adequate education and technical training can the future growth of the economy be assured." ^{35/} Apartheidists are most reluctant to accept this view.

10. In low income countries where income supplements in the form of social services and provisions of shelter and sustenance are the rule, income statistics tend to be partially misleading. In South Africa, public social services for Africans are segregated and minimal and thus constitute no major supplement for most of the Africans. "Total Government spending on all services for Africans, seventy-five per cent of the population, is now running at a level of approximately 165 millions, five per cent of all Government expenditures, and probably less than the African share of direct and indirect taxes." ^{36/} As for the receipt of "barter" income (i.e., payment in kind), it is specifically identified with and symbolizes employment at the lowest wage levels, farm and menial labour, mining, and domestic service. It is ordinarily subsistence fare and, translated into cash terms, adds little absolute value to sub-poverty line income levels.

11. South Africa contains a few wealthy Africans, some even wealthier than moderately well-to-do Europeans, as do all the countries in Africa. The number, very small, includes physicians, lawyers, and other professionals. There are also in South Africa Africans who are as indigent and ill-housed as can be found elsewhere in the poorest nations of the African continent. The number is very large.

^{32/} "Report of the Fifty-Third Ordinary General Meeting" of the South African Reserve Bank, 1973, p. 7.

^{33/} Kane-Berman, John and Horner, Dudley. Report on the Polaroid Experiment (South African Institute of Race Relations, Johannesburg, 1971).

^{34/} W. F. J. Steenkamp, "Cardinal Aspects of South Africa's Development Problem," South Africa International, IV (July 1973) p. 33.

^{35/} Houghton, D. Hobart, op. cit.

^{36/} The Times, London, 27 April 1971.

12. At the same time South Africa, by distinct contrast with other African nations, lacks cadres of African political leaders, senior civil servants, company directors, and organization executives who earn high income and serve their countries in crucial posts at home and abroad. A small number of Africans in official positions in the Transkei and other Bantustans are relatively well rewarded, but nowhere in South Africa do the African "elites" enjoy the social standing of Africans "elites" in other African nations.

13. As the Government claims, South Africa affords Africans a per capita income equal to or in excess of that possessed in the other African States, but not necessarily in all. What is surely more pertinent is the glaring fact of the remarkably low level of African income in the continent's only, as the South African Government also claims, modernized, developed, and economically diversified country. With a more equitable distribution of income, there could be no question about Africans of South Africa enjoying the highest per capita income in Africa. However, apartheid today makes it almost certain that in proportion to the wealth and potentialities of the country, this goal cannot be reached, thus negating the claim to this effect.

14. Late in 1972, African workers withdrew their labour from several companies and in January, 1973 African dock and textile workers in Natal walked off their jobs in protest against very low wages and poor conditions of employment and amenities. Subsequently, work stoppages spread to other industries in other provinces, including the gold mines. In view of the law prohibiting strikes by Africans and denying the right of collective bargaining, the actions represented a significant break with the immediate past. Strikers have been charged with violations of various statutes, but the Government has pressed charges quite weakly in most instances. It has appeared anxious to have the workers return to their jobs without delay. Its response was "conciliatory", although in February, 1974 it issued banning orders against several trade union organizers and agents in the Durban area. ^{37/} On the matter of the use of Africans as skilled and semi-skilled workers, the Government announced that this is for the employers to arrange in co-operation with the European trade unions, a position foreshadowed in Minister of Finance Dietrichs' budget address in March, 1972, and reiterated a year later, when he introduced his 1973 budget. Agreements were reached with the European trade unions in the heavy industries, including iron and steel, mining, and engineering that open the way for changing patterns of African employment. ^{38/} Parliament in 1973 also enacted an amendment to the Bantu Labour Relations Act that virtually legalizes work stoppages by Africans in certain situations once various remedial efforts have failed.

15. Domestic and international inflation has proved to be an effective ally of the African workers. Leaders of South African public and private enterprise and foreign companies are anxious to improve overall productivity, that is to say, cut basic costs of labour. Their program includes:

^{37/} Rand Daily Mail, 2 February 1974.

^{38/} Rand Daily Mail, Johannesburg, 2 July 1973; 13 September 1973; 11 December 1973.

- (a) better utilization of African workers;
- (b) upgrading African workers to replace European workers with greater skills, which are in short supply;
- (c) training for African workers;
- (d) "Owenism", that is, campaign against absenteeism among African workers by more amenities on the job, reduction of "petty" apartheid, support of African family life, better housing and transportation, and similar measures.

16. Labour and trade union conditions in South Africa have come under close scrutiny by the British Trade Union Congress and the House of Commons. Both affirmed the existence of deplorable treatment of African workers. A deputation of the Trade Union Congress visited South Africa and upon return to London recommended that assistance be extended to African workers for the development of trade unions. The House of Commons through the trade and industry subcommittee of a select committee on expenditures ascertained that a substantial number of African workers employed by many British companies in South Africa received earnings that were below the "poverty datum line". In March, 1974 report, the committee stressed the need for a code of conduct to guide these firms in raising wages for their African workers. During the past three years foreign companies, as well as domestic enterprises, have boosted wages and broadened earning opportunities for Africans and Coloureds, less for strictly humanitarian reasons than as an effort to retain labour in short supply. While Africans have benefitted from these steps, the discrepancy between African and European incomes continues to inflate.

17. Of the 5,800,000 Africans reported as gainfully employed (2,561,923 in the 1971 "work force"), over 400,000 are immigrants. In 1973, while it is rumored that there are a million immigrants in South Africa legally and illegally, the African immigrant profile was as follows:

Mozambique	121,708
Malawi	131,291
Lesotho	131,749
Botswana	31,960
Swaziland	10,108
Rhodesia	6,200
Zambia	638
Angola	154
others	7,340

IV. POLITICAL SYSTEM

1. South Africa is a unitary, elitist, parliamentary, republican state, adapted to secure the supremacy of the white population. Its governments include the Republic Government, provincial governments of the Cape, Natal, Transvaal, and Orange Free State, territorial governments of the "homelands", and diverse municipal and local authorities, all subject to the Act to Constitute the Republic of South Africa, N° 32, of 1961 that has superseded the amended South Africa Act of 1909 as the principal constitutional instrument, statutes of Parliament, and orders of the State President and government ministers. Legislative enactments and administrative decisions of all other bodies are essentially derivative and secondary.

2. The Republic Government consists of the State President, Prime Minister and Cabinet, Parliament of two houses, executive departments, courts, and various statutory agencies. The State President is elected in an electoral college, while the Prime Minister holds his position as a result of being the leader of the majority party in the Parliament. Government from top to bottom revolves around the Prime Minister, although his power depends heavily on his own political standing within his party and in the white electorate in the nation as a whole.

3. Parliament is bicameral with all seats reserved exclusively for whites. Senators are indirectly elected. **The Senate, with its provincial representatives and appointees of the ruling party, lends itself to the technique of "packing",** as happened in the constitutional controversy of the 1950s when Coloured voters were removed from the common electoral roll. The lower house, House of Assembly, is elected by white voters only. Africans and Coloureds having been entirely removed from the "common rolls". No longer are these peoples represented in any way in the House or actually in the Parliament at all. Their exclusion is complete. Provincial councils exist, but Africans, Coloureds, and Asians are excluded from membership. For the Africans there are the Transkei Legislative Council and other homeland and urban advisory councils subject to the initiating and veto powers of the Minister of Bantu Administration and his administrators. The Coloureds have been granted representation in the Coloured Persons Representative Council formed in 1969 under 1964 legislation, the price being that they yield their seats in municipal councils. None of these bodies is sovereign in any respect. Only Parliament is sovereign and, thus, as the governing body, is the instrument of the white population.

4. National elections are conducted under a party system from which Africans, Coloureds, and Asians are excluded. The following table summarizes the results in the elections for the House of Assembly since 1948:

	<u>1948</u>	<u>1953</u>	<u>1958</u>	<u>1961</u>	<u>1966</u>	<u>1970</u>	<u>1974</u>
Total number of seats	153	159	163	156	170	166	169
<u>National Party</u>							
Votes polled	401,834	598,718	642,069	370,431	776,766	820,968	636,585
Number and per cent of seats won	79(52%)	94(59%)	103(63%)	105(67%)	126(76%)	117(70%)	112(72%)
<u>United Party</u>							
Votes polled	524,230	576,474	503,639	302,875	490,971	561,647	363,459
Number and per cent of seats won	65(42%)	57(36%)	53(33%)	45(29%)	39(23%)	47(28%)	41(24%)
<u>Progressive Party</u> (formed in 1959)							
Votes polled				69,042	41,065	51,760	58,768
Number and per cent of seats won				1(1%)	1(1%)	1(1%)	6(4%)
<u>National Union</u>							
Votes polled				35,903	-	-	
Number and per cent of seats won				1(1%)	-	-	
<u>Herstigte Nasionale Party</u>							
Votes polled	-	-	-	-	-	53,763	39,568
Number and per cent of seats won	-	-	-	-	-	0	0
<u>Democratic Party</u> (formed in 1973)							
Votes polled							10,449
Number and per cent of seats won							0
<u>Afrikaner Party</u>							
Votes polled	41,885	-	-	-	-	-	
Number and per cent of seats won	9(6%)	-	-	-	-	-	
<u>Native Representatives</u>	3	3	3	abolished			
<u>Coloureds' Representatives</u>	-	-	4	4	4	abolished	

5. On 24 April 1974, the Europeans elected 122 Nationalist Party candidates to the House of Assembly, assuring the continuation of Mr. Vorster's régime. The apartheidists regained some ground lost in 1970. However, the highlight of the election was the victory of the Progressive Party, that now holds 5 additional seats to the one held by Mrs. Helen Suzman. These seats were won from the United Party, the official Opposition in the House.

6. In the general election of April, 1970, the National Party (government majority) triumphed but less successfully than in 1966. It won 117 seats, 9 less than in 1966, thus breaking its record of increasing majorities in the House. The opposition United Party picked up 8 seats in 3 of the 4 provinces. The Nationalists dropped in popular vote from 58% to 54.4%, its highly critical ex-ally, Herzog faction in the new Herstigte Nasionale Party, polling the difference. The popularity of the United and Progressive parties remained steady percentage-wise.

7. The National Party is led by Prime Minister B.J. Vorster. Originally the voice of militant Afrikaner nationalism, as much directed against British imperialism as the Africans, the party emerged in its present form in 1934. Victorious in the 1948 election, it formed the Union Government, with Dr. D.F. Malan as Prime Minister, succeeded in office by Mr. J.G. Strijdom, Dr. H.F. Verwoerd (assassinated in 1966), and Mr. B.J. Vorster. Its campaign centers on apartheid. Its concern for constitutionalism is slight, if it exists at all, and human rights have steadily diminished in South Africa during its rule. Party policy supports national economic development through state capital and organizations, as well as domestic and foreign private enterprises. It has electorally adjusted to the trends of urbanization and has expanded its appeal to all whites, not merely the Afrikaner voters. 39/

8. The United Party, led by Sir de Villiers Graaf, has long been considered to be the voice of the English-speaking white communities, although as a coalition it was the party of Jan Smuts and other moderate Afrikaner spokesmen. Over twenty years in opposition, it supports the "civilized" racial segregation and discrimination. However, it stands for constitutional rule, challenging the legality of police state practices and defending judicial due process. Party leadership is highly critical of apartheid-homeland policy on the grounds that it is impractical and endangers economic growth of the nation. Divisiveness over strategy has electorally weakened the party until the 1970 election.

9. Herstigte Nasionale Party is a perennial in South African politics in various versions. The nation has a history of minor parties that alternate between coalition politics and "true believer" Christian national dogma. The tendency for them is to advocate extreme forms of Afrikaner nationalism, even deploring "liberal" attitudes of the Nationalists towards the Africans, Asians, and Coloureds. They reject the notion that non-Afrikaans-speaking people can be legitimate South African nationalists.

10. Neither the Liberal Party of Alan Paton nor the Communist Party is a participant in electoral politics any longer.

39/ See Stultz, Newell. "South Africa under Verwoerd," Journal of Modern African Studies, Vol. 7, N° 1, 1969, pp. 3-20.

V. AFRICAN POLITICAL MOVEMENTS

1. Nationwide political parties of Africans except in the "homelands" are proscribed in South Africa. None is in any case permitted to contest elections for seats in the Parliament or provincial legislatures. The right of political assembly outside the "homelands" and African townships is refused to Africans. Wherever political gatherings do occur, they are subject to close police scrutiny.

2. In 1973, African students raised their voices in protest against the university policies of the government, as well as against apartheid in general. In response banning orders were served on the African leaders of the South African Students Organization and the Black Peoples Conference as well as the officers of the National Union of South African Students, based largely at the English-speaking universities. Dr. Manas Buthelezi, Director of the Christian Institute, Natal, was also ordered restricted, although his restrictions were subsequently removed. ^{40/}

3. All segments of the African anti-apartheid and nationalist movement have been driven underground or forced to function abroad in a grossly weakened condition. Proscribed and harrassed, their leaders and members jailed, detained and assaulted, they have been denied participation in overt and legal political processes. Since 1960 both the African National Congress and the Pan Africanist Congress, which in their days articulated the political aspirations and demands of Africans, know only the status of outlaws in the Republic.

4. The oldest of the African political movements and born out of the South African Native Congress, the African National Congress had been reformist and conciliatory. It resorted to campaigns to "defy unjust laws", for example, by burning passes or urging boycotts modeled after the Montgomery bus boycott under the leadership of the late Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr. Its tactics for years entailed no more than non-violent acts and passive resistance, but as the situation became more desperate, it appeared to become more militant, at least in rhetoric. At the peak of its strength it advocated "one man one vote" and sought a political and social order in which all South Africans would participate as equals. Its leaders included the late chief Albert Lutuli, recipient of the 1960 Nobel Peace Prize. Mild-mannered, patient, Chief Lutuli, considerate of other peoples, was compelled to endure a trial for treason. Acquitted, he was restricted to his home under police surveillance. Two African lawyers, Oliver Tambo and Nelson Mandela, served the African National Congress in high office, for which they paid a very heavy price personally. Oliver Tambo lives in exile, while Mandela, convicted of sabotage as the leader of Umkonto We Sizwe (Spear of the Nation) suffers life imprisonment.

5. Formed in 1959, after internal disharmony within the African National Congress, the Pan Africanist Congress addressed its protest against specific evils, the pass laws in particular. Originally it adopted a programme of rights for all, of government of Africans, by Africans, and for Africans. Having organized a massive demonstration of unusual proportions in Cape Town, its leaders, Robert M. Sobukwe, Potlako Leballo, and others were arrested. Sobukwe was imprisoned on Robben Island for years and having completed his sentence has remained in detention and then restriction, even when he offered repeatedly to quit the country. Leballo departed from South Africa, finding a haven in Dar es Salaam.

^{40/} The Star, Johannesburg, weekly airmail edition, 1 June 1974

6. Once the Government proscribed the African National Congress and Pan Africanist Congress, Africans resorted to legal opposition through the device of the All-in African Congress, which called for a one day stay at home in 1961. Official reaction was to put the army on alert. Subsequently, the congresses were reputed to have formed underground organizations, identified as the "Spear of the Nation" and Pogo, for sabotage and violent resistance. In recent years, claims and counterclaims, official and unofficial, have indicated the sporadic presence of African guerrilla units, but evidence as to their very existence or composition and sources of support is meagre. The Government has admitted the commission of sabotage, meeting actual and alleged acts of violence with full measures of violence on its own part.

VI. APARTHEID IN OPERATION

1. Apartheid is a historically accumulative and purposeful system of racial containment. Its operational components, each with its own experiential profile and time-frame, fall into four distinctive yet converging categories: a) racial prejudice and discrimination; b) racial segregation and separation; c) economic exploitation of natural and human resources; and d) legal, administrative, and police terror. Associated with each is a set of functions and instruments. Some are viewed as essential mainly to the attainment of apartheid; others are the ingredients par excellence of apartheid. For example, its proponents would have the world believe that the genuine apartheid is racial separation, terror being simply a means to perfect the end. In reality the terror, whatever the intentions of its white perpetrators, is also the true apartheid, perhaps its most indestructible component, on which it is dependent for its continuation.

2. Racial prejudice is an attitude, a sentiment; racial discrimination is an act, a measure taken to the disadvantage of its victim. Together, they serve the following functions for racial containment: 41

- a) sustain among Europeans a personal and communal sense of superiority;
- b) stereotype and denigrate the capabilities of Africans, Coloureds, and Asians;
- c) protect status and jobs for Europeans on the basis of colour regardless of integrity and ability;
- d) sharpen stratification of the society to the degree that a caste system can be maintained;
- e) retard life-chances and restrict opportunities for the advancement of Africans, Coloureds and Asians;
- f) deny the validity of the principle of equality in relations among people.

A sample of the numerous instruments utilized in this facet of the system include:

- a) South Africa Act of 1909 and the Republic of South Africa Constitution Act of 1961 - restricts membership in the Parliament to whites;
- b) Land Act No.27 of 1912 - denies Africans right of ownership in land;
- c) Mines and Works Amendment Act (Colour Bar Act) of 1927 - reserves employment for whites;

41/ Lewin, Julius. The Struggle for Racial Equality London, Longmans, 1967), p.2.

d) educational expenditures - for every dollar spent on the education of an African twenty to twenty-five dollars have been spent on the education of a white child;

e) Apprenticeship Act. No.37 of 1944 - closes training opportunities for Africans and other non-Europeans;

f) Reservation of Separate Amenities Act No.49 of 1953 - permits public facilities and transportation to be reserved for the exclusive use of any race without provision for equality of such facilities;

g) Native (Abolition of Passes and Coordination of Documents) Act No.67 of 1952 - requires persons to possess and carry reference books containing identity, tax receipts, etc., but applied mainly to Africans and with severe penalties, often leading to deportation to the homelands;

h) Native Labour (Settlement of Disputes) Act No.48 of 1953 - prohibits trade unions among African workers and denies to them the right to strike possessed by white workers.

3. Racial segregation and separation denote distance among peoples spatially, socially, empathetically, and morally. Between them walls exist or are raised, and relationships are confined to groups or communities rather than persons subject to controls imposed by the Republic Government. For apartheid racial separation carries the following assignments:

a) sever such ties between Europeans and non-Europeans that are perceived as providing no advantages to the Europeans;

b) undercut the status of the Africans as South Africans;

c) weaken African claims to equal treatment and fair shares of the land and resources of the country;

d) expand opportunities for manipulation of Africans, Coloureds, and Asians by Europeans;

e) deny certain Europeans political allies from among Africans, Coloureds and Asians;

f) indoctrinate Africans, Coloureds, and Asians with the values of apartheid and thus induce acquiescence;

g) create African nations and Coloured and Asian communities to serve as racial containers.

The tools and techniques fashioned to implement this function of apartheid are illustrated by the following items:^{42/}

^{42/} United Nations, Apartheid in Practice. New York, United Nations, Office of Public Information, 1971, an excellent review of apartheid, prepared for the Unit on Apartheid by Professor Leslie Rubin.

a) Group Areas Act No.41 of 1950 - requires that the population be assigned to separate areas and territories;

b) Population Registration Act of 1950 - compels persons to obtain a racial classification and be registered accordingly;

c) Bantu (African) Education Act of 1955 - transfers responsibility for the provision of education from the provincial education authorities to the Department of Bantu Education - compels Africans to attend African schools;

d) Prohibition of Mixed Marriage Act of 1949 - converts into a criminal act marriage between persons of different races, enforcing a caste system;

e) Immorality Act of 1957 - converts into a criminal act sexual intercourse between persons of different races;

f) Promotion of Bantu Self-Government Act of 1959 - authorizes the Minister of Bantu Administration to provide for "home rule" in the homelands;

g) Bantu Laws Amendment Act of 1964 - removes all rights of Africans in areas outside the homelands;

h) Bantu Homelands Citizenship Act of 1969 - creates citizenship for Africans by homelands;

i) social, recreational, and sports clubs - cater exclusively to whites, Africans, Coloureds, and Asians, fostering "racial solidarity";

j) Reservation of Separate Amenities Act of 1953 - public buildings and facilities in "white" areas - use denied to Africans, Coloured, and Asians for marriages, celebrations, and other social purposes;

k) provincial and municipal ordinances that require total segregation in respect to transportation;

l) Bantu Universities Act of 1959 - restricts Africans in respect to the universities they may attend;

m) ministerial orders and department regulations - require separation in the provision of medical and nursing services; separate facilities in places of employment, libraries, theatres, stores, etc.

4. Economic exploitation of natural and human resources entails directed and rigorous utilization of land, mineral sites, and labour for the attainment of an expanding Gross National Product (GNP). It provides for profitable returns for domestic and foreign investments, thus attracting capital for a fuller economic development of the Republic. It serves apartheid in the following ways:

a) attains rising standard of living and increased personal wealth of Europeans, thus widening social-economic distance between Europeans and non-Europeans;

b) perpetuates the manpower pool of cheap labour;

c) facilitates the growth of domestic industry, hence lessening the Republic's dependence on imports and laying the foundation for a self-sufficient weapons industry;

d) draws foreign investment, not solely to augment local sources of capital, but also to acquire overseas economic allies for the preservation of white supremacy and rule;

e) perpetuates and even magnifies socio-economic differences between South Africa and other African States so as to reinforce differences within the Republic. In pursuit of these objectives the public authorities and management have availed themselves of the following instruments:

a) Bantu Labour Regulations Act of 1911 - compels African workers to accept employment on pain of criminal penalties;

b) Mines and Works Amendment of 1927 - prohibits the issuance of certificates of competency to Africans and Asians;

c) Bantu (Urban Areas) Consolidation Act of 1945 - empowers labour officers to issue and terminate working permits of Africans;

d) Bantu Labour (Settlement of Disputes) Act of 1953 - prohibits strikes by Africans;

e) Industrial Conciliation Act of 1956 - prohibits "mixed" trade unions, permitting them only in special cases and where the elected officers are white;

f) ministerial orders and departmental regulations - reserve jobs for whites and deny available employment to Africans and Coloureds except by specific order of the Government; also require that for certain products a high proportion of South Africa-made parts be used;

g) Permanent Committee for the Location of Industries - assists industries to find locations consistent with the development programme, including locations near homelands with "high potential of Bantu labour";

h) Industrial Development Corporation - provides buildings and other factory facilities to attract industrial enterprises to areas set aside for this purpose;

i) mine workers recruitment agencies - marshall non-South African labour force consisting of younger men whose lives are totally organized for them by company officials;

j) Chamber of Mines - coordinates the mining industries and represents the groups and companies in matters such as conditions of employment, labour disputes, supply of electricity, availability of equipment, etc.

5. Legal, administrative, and police terror supplies the apartheidist system with "muscle", sometimes persecutory, sometimes Carthaginian. Like violence in many political experiences, it starts as a "necessity" in the eyes of the authorities, a specific tactic at a specific moment in a specific circumstance only to acquire a long life and a commanding position in its own right. In South Africa it has become institutionalized as human rights have been downgraded. Its inherence in, and inseparability from, apartheid is revealed in its utilities:

a) destroy the will among Africans, Coloureds, and Asians as well as the European opposition, to resist the imposition of apartheid;

b) immobilize Africans, Coloureds, and Asians as far as political activities are concerned;

c) destroy independent leadership among Africans, Coloureds, and Asians;

d) curtail circulation of ideas and information of a political nature;

e) isolate Africans from external support, as well as cross-community assistance;

f) unify the European communities against the common enemy, under Nationalist leadership;

g) magnify European "authority" and engender the confidence of whites in the regime;

h) counter "liberalistic" tendencies.

The weaponry of terror, deployed under the sanction of law, reflects both careful planning and instant improvisation:^{43/}

a) around the clock but especially middle-of-the-night police raids in the African urban locations to enforce the pass laws - impress on the Africans the insecurity of their position;

b) Suppression of Communism Act No. 44 of 1950 - unleashes the police to suppress dissent by linking opposition to apartheid with the furtherance of Communist objectives.

^{43/} United Nations, Unit on Apartheid. Repressive Legislation of the Republic of South Africa. ST/PSCA/SER.A/7. New York, United Nations, 1969.

c) Bantu Administration Act No.38 of 1927 as amended - empowers the State President to remove and banish Africans in the public interest;

d) Public Safety Act No.3 of 1953 - authorizes the declaration of emergencies and government by decree;

e) Criminal Law Amendment Act No.8 of 1953 - penalizes political protest, including exercise of speech to change of public policy and law;

f) Criminal Procedure Act No.56 of 1955 -- as amended in 1965, permits detention for 180 days without trial;

g) Riotous Assembly Act No.17 of 1956 - permits extensive restrictions on freedom of assembly;

h) Unlawful Organizations Act No.34 of 1960 - empowers the State President to declare organizations unlawful and dissolve them by proclamation;

i) Publications and Entertainment Act No.26 of 1963 - specifies as a criminal offence the freedom of the press where a newspaper strongly criticizes apartheid as unjust;

j) General Law Amendment Act No.76 of 1962 - broadens the range of illegal acts of "sabotage";

k) General Law Amendment Act No.37 of 1963 - authorizes the detention of persons without trial for repeated periods of 90 days;

l) Terrorism Act No.83 of 1967 - establishes the crime of "terrorism" so loosely defined as to leave the Government virtually a free hand to prosecute anyone it so wishes, narrows the right of habeas corpus, and substantially eliminates the defence of double jeopardy;

m) ministerial orders under wide variety of laws - forbid publication of information, seize papers and literature, deny and confiscate passports, prohibit re-entry into South Africa, and institute criminal libel proceedings;

n) police investigations and surveillance - harass and intimidate victims as much as to collect evidence of crimes and produce a "chilling effect" on the population as far as the exercise of rights are concerned;

o) "third degree" police interrogations and harsh prison treatment - punish victims without judicial due process, in addition to extracting confessions of alleged criminal activity, especially membership in illegal organization, aiding and abetting suspected saboteurs, terrorists, etc.;

p) prosecutions based on unsubstantiated indictments and flimsy evidence - discredit acquitted individuals and impose heavy defence costs on the opponents of apartheid;

q) restrictions on movement on individuals and pressure on employers - deprive persons of their livelihood;

r) Bureau of State Security - gathers information and advises the Prime Minister on all aspects of security, including subversion, conspiracy, etc.;

s) Prisons Act of 1959 - restricts the publication of information on prison conditions and prisoners, including treatment of political and other inmates.

6. Many measures initiated by the Republic Government against dissenters and opponents are designed to provide the authorities with a flexible response to acts of defiance. It is a striking fact that the rise in such acts coincides with the deliberate implementation of apartheid.

7. So calamitous an order and system as apartheid has a self-fulfilling momentum of its own, a relentless need for victims. It creates its own opportunities for a show of force and thrives on additional excuses for more intimidation and curtailment. Thus in 1974, the Riotous Assemblies Act No. 17 of 1956, underwent amendment to permit a police officer to close down any meeting, not just a gathering of 12 or more persons. Also enacted was the Affected Organizations Act, No. 31 of 1974, that authorizes the Government to declare organizations as "affected organizations", thereby prohibiting them from receiving financial contributions or gifts from abroad, under pain of extremely heavy punishments. If, for some reason, a minister cannot bring himself to have an organization declared to be "communist", he can under the latest legislation have the President of the Republic declare an organization "affected", that is, to be "engaged in politics with aid from abroad". The law puts in jeopardy such bodies as the National Union of South African Students, Christian Institute and the Institute of Race Relations, to mention only a few. 44/

8. Some misconceptions about apartheid can be cleared up in a few explanatory statements. It is not purely a theoretical, intellectual, ideological, or theological construct; it is far more an aggregate of what South Africans have actually done or are presently doing to one another in every day life. It is not the exclusive invention of only one segment of the European population, namely, Afrikaners, but all have contributed to the experiences and practices out of which it has evolved. It is not a certain or logical off-shoot of Afrikaner nationalism notwithstanding Nationalist claims to the contrary. After centuries of European aggrandizement it is an almost inescapable outgrowth of the aggressiveness, religious piety, and search for security and wealth that the European communities have persistently manifested.

9. In Johannesburg and a few other localities, municipal governments have taken or propose to take steps to reduce day to day "petty" apartheid in the transportation system, use of libraries, and access to other public facilities. The press has carried pictures of Africans in the libraries and seeking assistance from the European staff. The Prime Minister warned in Parliament on 8 February:

"Where such amenities are not prescribed by law, but the arrangement thereof vests in city councils, the Government will constantly keep an eye on the position and, should city councils' intended steps cause friction or disturb the peace, the Government will not hesitate to intervene and to rectify the situation." 45/

As the local authorities afford Africans a chance to slip under the "colour bar", the can do little to counter the Nationalist Government general policy on apartheid. The government itself is taking some credit for the modification of the economic "racial" barrier on the labour market. Its approach to "petty" apartheid emphasizes "selectiveness".

45/ House of Assembly Debates (Hansard), Questions and Answers, 8 February 1974
Column 26.

VII. APARTHEID RESTRICTIONS ON THE LIBERTIES OF EUROPEANS

1. While the Africans, Coloureds, and Asians are presumably the major victims of apartheid, in fact the basic liberties of Europeans have also been progressively curtailed. Explicit restrictions under law and by ministerial and police actions extend to:

- a) freedom to choose an area of residence;
- b) freedom not to be classified and identified by "race";
- c) freedom to marry a person of one's own choice;
- d) freedom to engage in personal and private conduct as a consulting adult;
- e) freedom to engage in business or practice professions in areas of one's choice;
- f) freedom to assemble or even visit with friends and other persons;
- g) freedom to select candidates for the Parliament and other legislative bodies;
- h) freedom to travel throughout South Africa;
- i) freedom to enjoy a speedy trial upon detention;
- j) freedom to enjoy the privacy of one's home without invasion by the police;
- k) freedom of speech on public policy;
- l) freedom to travel abroad;
- m) freedom to contribute to charities of one's choice and assist the needy;
- n) freedom to read publications;
- o) freedom to attend churches of one's preference;
- p) freedom to bargain collectively on the labour market;
- q) freedom to assign employees to jobs and tasks;
- r) freedom to house employees on one's own property;
- s) freedom to negotiate the sale or purchase of real property; and
- t) freedom to select students for schools and universities.

2. Virtually every Government action in the name of apartheid during the past two years has entailed interference with the property, liberties, and opportunities overtly claimed by the Europeans. For example, land consolidation to satisfy commitments to the "homelands" has resulted in forced disposal of possessions by European farmers, who protested vigorously this form of compulsory removal. The Publications and Entertainments Act No. 26 of 1963, as amended by Act No. 85 of 1969 and Act No. 32 of 1971 hangs over every publication, object (drawing, print, statue, etc.), film, recording, and "public entertainment", with powers of a Publications Control Board to proscribe and the Attorney General to authorize prosecution. Moreover, the Government has kept ready for implementation sets of recommendations for the control of the press that have originated from commissions and committees of its appointees. Among the key features is the proposal to abolish appeals to the Supreme Court for a review of administrative discretion in this area.

VIII. POLICE AND PRISONS

1. In 1971 the composition of the South Africa police was as follows: ^{46/}

	<u>Officers</u>	<u>Non-Commissioned Officers</u>	<u>Constables</u>
White	1,703	6,674	8,397
Coloured	7	250	1,150
Asians	3	139	590
Bantus	11	2,036	11,148

2. Of special relevance to the political situation is the existence of the Criminal Investigation Division, as well as military intelligence. Testimony given at trials and evidence at hearings indicate that the use of undercover agents is a common practice in the enforcement of apartheid laws, especially for "political crimes".

3. South Africa ranks very high among countries in the world with respect to the percentage of population under sentence. The following tables, taken from a recently published book entitled Justice in South Africa, ^{47/} reveal that in 1969 over three persons in every hundred belonged to the prison population or could be imprisoned for offenses and crimes at the discretion of the courts. Presumably these statistics tend to exclude detainees, or some portion of them, who are held by the South African police for "questioning". Moreover, there are many Africans who are exiled or banished to the homelands when discovered to be in residence illegally throughout the provinces and in urban centres. It is common practice to deport family members with no "papers" from such areas.

^{46/} Statesman's Yearbook 1973-1974.

^{47/} Sachs, Albie, Justice in South Africa, (Berkeley and Los Angeles, University of California Press, 1973).

Admissions to Prison for Selected Years 1912 to 1969 ^{48/}

Year	Population of South Africa	Total Admissions (including remands)	Column 3 as % of Column 2	Admissions on Sentence
1912	6,100,000	120,894	2%	95,822
1922	7,100,000	127,875	1.8%	96,722
1932	8,300,000	202,276	2.4%	172,555
1942	10,800,000	199,708	1.9%	151,922
1952	13,500,000	265,000	2%	201,000
1962	17,200,000	461,000	2.7%	347,000
1965	18,500,000	411,000	2.3%	285,000
1968	19,800,000	665,000	3.4%	486,000
1969	20,300,000	658,000	3.2%	496,000

^{48/} Ibid., p. 178

Distribution According to Race, Sex and Length of Sentence of Convicted Persons

Admitted to Prison in the Year Ended 30 June 1969 49/

Sentence	White		African		Asian		Coloured		Total
	Male	Female	Male	Female	Male	Female	Male	Female	
Death	1	--	83	1	2	--	19	1	107
Life imprisonment	--	--	12	--	--	--	1	--	13
Intermediate sentence	105	6	838	25	6	--	233	10	1,223
Prevention of crime (5 - 8 years)	91	9	1,132	51	6	--	356	11	1,656
Corrective training (2 - 4 years) 2 yrs & over	170 280	9 18	2,444 5,680	111 172	13 25	2 4	645 1,181	37 49	3,431 7,409
Over 6 mths under two years	669	23	16,092	1,562	119	3	2,850	167	21,485
Over 4 months up to 6 months	661	41	27,094	3,542	104	5	4,181	285	35,913
Over 1 month up to 4 months	1,595	97	116,746	25,719	354	27	11,631	2,312	158,481
Up to 1 month	3,613	346	181,918	40,682	850	87	30,225	7,992	265,713
Periodical imprison- ment	122	--	42	2	3	1	31	--	201
Corporal punishment only	26	--	354	--	--	--	-59	---	439
TOTAL	7,333	549	352,435	71,867	1,482	129	51,412	10,864	496,071
First offenders under 6 months	1,852	171	149,631	24,830	902	12	9,590	2,878	189,886

Persons in Custody as at 30 June 1969, Classified by Race, Sex and Length of Sentence 50/

Sentenced Prisoners	Whites		Africans		Asians		Coloured		TOTAL
	Male	Female	Male	Female	Male	Female	Male	Female	
Death	1	--	49		2	--	13	--	65
Life	15	1	305	10	3	--	30	1	365
Indeterminate	609	8	5,420	65	49	--	2,102	37	8,290
Preventive	395	7	5,123	143	38	--	2,069	57	7,832
Corrective	372	21	5,258	220	39	--	2,079	85	8,075
2 years and over	640	14	13,697	356	108	2	2,983	75	17,875
Over 6 under 24 months	379	11	9,098	765	62	3	1,376	65	11,759
Over 4 up to 6 months	162	1	6,026	892	41	3	883	82	8,090
Over 1 up to 4 months	131	6	4,210	1,115	20	3	603	139	6,227
Up to 1 month	84	11	3,835	920	39	1	698	264	5,852
Corporal punishment only	--	--	2	--	--	--	2	--	4
Sub-total	2,788	80	53,023	4,486	401	13	12,838	805	74,434
Awaiting trial	454	18	10,696	1,052	74	3	1,901	164	14,362
Sundry other	8	--	7	12	1	--	11	--	39
TOTAL	3,250	98	63,726	5,550	476	16	14,750	969	88,835

The Total Population of Each Racial Group in South Africa
Compared With the Population of Such Groups in Prison in 1969 * 51/

	Africans	Whites	Coloured	Asians
% of the total population of South Africa	68	19	10	3
% of admissions under sentence for year ended 30.6.1969	85.5	1.5	12.5	0.3
% of persons in prison as at 30.6.1969	78.5	3	18.5	0.3

51/ Ibid., p. 182

The total size of each race group was based on population estimates by Bureau of Statistics for mid-1967, quoted in SAIRR 1967, p. 19. The percentage calculations are by the writer, rounded off to the nearest 0.5 per cent, except for the figures for Asian prisoners which are to the nearest 0.1 per cent.

NUMBER OF PRISONERS: 1964^{52/}

	<u>No. of Prisoners</u>	<u>Total Population</u>
South Africa	297,000	18,000,000
England and Wales	53,000	46,000,000

^{52/} Ibid., p. 187.

IX. BANTUSTANS

1. Apartheidist policy calls for the full development of "homelands" for the Africans according to their tribal affiliations. Under the Bantu Homelands Citizenship Act of 1970 all Africans are to be citizens of their respective homelands, whether or not they reside in these areas. Independence in some form is to evolve eventually under the guiding hand of the Minister of Bantu Administration. When Chief Kaiser Matanzima of the Transkei suggested in April, 1971, that the attainment of independence be accelerated, officials expressed disapproval. However, the Chief's defence of separate development was received with approbation. Government concern over the homelands dimension of apartheid has reached a level where the Prime Minister and staff held unusual private conversations with Bantustan officials in December, 1971 ^{53/} and with the eight chief ministers in March, 1973.

2. Homelands consist of eight areas - some consolidated, others non-contiguous - designated specifically for African occupation. They are: Transkei, Ciskei, KwaZulu, Bophuthatswana, Lebowa, Gazankulu, Venda, Swazi and Basotho Qua Qua. They consist of "inalienable" African lands under the Land Act No. 27 of 1913 augmented by purchases through the Bantu Trust Account under the Bantu Trust and Land Act No. 18 of 1936.

3. Bantustan development has encountered major obstacles. From the outset only 12% of the land area of South Africa, after 40 years of land transfer, was to be available for 70% of the nation's population. Many of the areas are sharply deficient in water supply, as well as fertile land. No steps have been taken to incorporate income-producing mineral sites into the homelands. None has a very sound industrial base. The Government's Bantu Investment Corporation has backed small enterprises, but the number of new jobs for Africans has been well below needs. Few industrial enterprises have located along the borders of the homelands, supplying employment for 100,000 Africans. Five-year development plans, the second covering the period 1966-1971, have been burdened by inflation and funding delays. Agriculture is stagnant.

4. Homeland authorities have been created through such apartheidist legislation as the Bantu Authorities Act of 1951, Promotion of Bantu Self-Government Act No. 46 of 1959, Transkei Constitution Act of 1963. For economic development the Republic Government created in 1959 the Bantu Investment Corporation and the Bantu Homelands Development Corporation in 1965 and obtained passage in Parliament of the Promotion of Economic Development of the Homelands Act in 1968.

^{53/} New York Times, 12 December 1971. New York Times, 7 March 1973. p. 6.

5. The first full-fledged homeland is the Transkei. Zululand possesses the same status, while the Ciskei, Venda and Shangaan homeland are close behind in the attainment of apartheid version of "self-government", with a parliament replacing an assembly. The constitutional government of the Transkei has an identity of its own but is still subject to dictation by the Republic Government. It enjoys delegated powers just as other powers are specifically denied to it. The Legislative Assembly contains 109 members, 45 elected; the remainder are chiefs appointed to their posts by the Republic Government. Parties exist, and party differences are manifest, Chief Kaiser Matanzima's party endorsing full separate development "with equality" and the opposition at times articulating anti-apartheid sentiments. Supported by the appointed chiefs, Chief Matanzima reached his position of Chief Minister in 1963 and retained it after the election of 1968.

6. In the past decade the Republic Government through the Administrator for the Transkei turned over certain public and social services to the territorial authority. Emphasizing self-government, the central government has mainly conferred greater measures of self-reliance in local matters on the Transkei government. In any case the senior staff consists of white officials seconded from the Republic Government. Moreover, the Pretoria Government controls the purse strings by its powers of subvention, review, and audit.

7. "Transkei, a Showplace of Apartheid, Lags in Everything but Segregation" reports the New York Times six months after The Times (London) carried two critical articles on the same theme. ^{54/} The people of the Transkei are suffering from the lack of employment, land shortage, low levels of agricultural production, inflation, and inadequacy of housing and social and public services. By contrast, the construction of homeland government and university buildings has progressed rapidly.

8. In view of the present economic capabilities of the homelands, total sustenance of the African population is obviously out of the question. Otherwise, the severest over-population would prevail. Currently less than half resides within the boundaries. Far more live and work in the remainder of the Republic, in urban areas and on white farms. At any time they may be compelled to settle in the homelands, but at this time such a move is unrealistic. All are, however, designated or to be designated citizens of Bantustans, regardless of their own wishes. Those who have left the homelands for employment elsewhere in South Africa are denied the opportunity to be accompanied by family. ^{55/} However, their financial remittances are essential for the local economies, and this source of support is in fact critical.

9. By law the Bantustans are subsidiary units of the Republic of South Africa. By no stretch of the imagination are they separate independent entities with an international status of their own. Officially the administrations within them are creations of the South African Government, which has extended to them varying degrees of home rule. In the past year Mr. Vorster's ministers have spoken of reaching stages of development where Africans are to replace some of the European civil servants. However, in the final analysis the Bantustans can be abolished by the Government in Pretoria. Such a move at this time for whatever the reason may be will be tantamount to a confession of failure for apartheid. It is unlikely, for the Nationalist Party is inextricably locked into the homeland policy.

^{54/} New York Times, 10 November 1971; The Times, London, 26 and 27 April 1971.

^{55/} United Nations, Unit on Apartheid. Bantustans in South Africa. Notes and Documents No. 26/70. New York, 1970. Horrell, Muriel. The African Reserves of South Africa. (Johannesburg, South African Institute of Race Relations, 1969).

10. The prevailing situation provides the Africans a modicum of political leverage that at present they possess nowhere else in the South African political system. Their political misfortunes in Johannesburg and other urban centres have compelled them to continue their campaigns through whichever channels are available to them. Thus, through the homelands African ministers, who are concerned with their own personal and political status, they are still able to articulate the goals and values that have sustained their movement for more than half a century.

11. As the Vorster régime has pressed for more "progress" in the Bantustans, the African ministers have in turn demanded more land for the people and a more suitable land consolidation arrangement. These officials have not only brought their complaints to Mr. Vorster, but they have started to carry them to the public at large. In November, 1973, the chief ministers of the Bantustans met in a homelands summit conference in East London, where on 10 November they issued a declaration of conscience. Among themselves they have discussed not only land matters but also federation of all the autonomous states, as well as raised questions about "independence". Chief Gatsha Buthelezi and Chief Kaiser Matanzima may not be widely accepted as authentic African nationalist leaders, but they are extending their concern to issues of national, not simply local dimensions. Pretoria is finding that it cannot depoliticize apartheid through the Bantustan policy. If one avenue is closed, then the opponents of European supremacy march towards their destination down the avenue that is open to them.

12. Officials of the Government have come to realize that they cannot prevent the homeland politicians from speaking out on "independence". In these same circles they have proposed to explore ways that the homelands can obtain economic and technical assistance from governments in western Europe. In May, 1974, Mr. Vorster and other ministers met with leaders from the Transkei for talks, in which the matter of "independence" appears to have been raised.

X. THE STATE OF THE ECONOMY

1. The economy of South Africa ranks high among the growth economies of the world. It is evident from the increase in Gross Domestic Product that expansion prevailed in the past twenty-five years. ^{56/}

GDP AT CURRENT PRICES (Value in million rand)

1946	-	1,751	1960	-	5,274
1947	-	1,932	1961	-	5,546
1948	-	2,136	1962	-	5,912
1949	-	2,290	1963	-	6,555
1950	-	2,662	1964	-	7,209
1951	-	2,909	1965	-	7,879
1952	-	3,116	1966	-	8,555
1953	-	3,537	1967	-	9,477
1954	-	3,808	1968	-	10,169
1955	-	4,025	1969	-	11,385
1956	-	4,339	1970	-	12,404
1957	-	4,583	1971	-	13,740
1958	-	4,711	1972	-	15,404
1959	-	4,993			

2. Inflation accompanied growth in the sixties. The real change in GDP at 1963 market prices is of more moderate proportions when GDP is not calculated on the basis of current prices. ^{57/}

GDP AT 1963 PRICES (Value in million rand)

1946	-	2,905	1960	-	5,551
1947	-	3,059	1961	-	5,735
1948	-	3,321	1962	-	6,054
1949	-	3,401	1963	-	6,547
1950	-	3,594	1964	-	6,986
1951	-	3,801	1965	-	7,448
1952	-	3,904	1966	-	7,799
1953	-	4,107	1967	-	8,394
1954	-	4,381	1968	-	8,716
1955	-	4,620	1969	-	9,336
1956	-	4,861	1970	-	9,755
1957	-	5,076	1971	-	10,145
1958	-	5,189	1972	-	10,483
1959	-	5,369			

^{56/} Table 1. South African Reserve Bank. "A Statistical Presentation of South Africa's National Accounts for the Period 1946 to 1970, "Supplement to the Quarterly Bulletin, June, 1971, South African Reserve Bank, Quarterly Bulletin, December 1973. S-68. The more recent figures are subject to revision based on subsequently more complete data.

^{57/} Ibid.

3. The strength of the apartheid economy rests not as heavily on its ability to attract foreign capital as on the remarkable rise in gross domestic saving, consisting of personal saving, corporate saving, current surplus of general government, and provision for depreciation. ^{58/}

GROSS DOMESTIC SAVING
(Value in million rand)

1946	-	218	1958	-	1,012
1947	-	178	1959	-	1,177
1948	-	236	1960	-	1,187
1949	-	311	1961	-	1,362
1950	-	516	1962	-	1,435
1951	-	501	1963	-	1,679
1952	-	592	1964	-	1,710
1953	-	681	1965	-	1,902
1954	-	803	1966	-	2,103
1955	-	869	1967	-	2,510
1956	-	973	1968	-	2,465
1957	-	1,059	1969	-	2,710
			1970	-	2,728
			1971	-	3,097
			1972	-	3,728

^{58/} South African Reserve Bank, Quarterly Bulletin, December 1973, p. S-77.

XI. APARTHEID FINANCE

1. Economic development, growth of publicly owned industries, expansion of public services, military expenditures, and inflation have shaped the finances of South Africa in the past twenty-five years. The government has pursued certain specific goals with vigour: a) decrease South Africa's dependence on world capital and markets; b) increase internal self-sufficiency in selected sectors; c) advance economic diversification; d) establish South Africa's economic presence in Africa south of the Sahara; e) fund apartheid and inaugurate an economic base for the Bantustans; f) improve the quality of living of the whites.

2. Public revenues have grown as follows: 59/
(Value in million rand)

1950	-	369
1955	-	647
1960	-	877
1961	-	879
1962	-	923
1963	-	1,204
1964	-	1,320
1965	-	1,421
1966	-	1,541
1967	-	1,829
1968	-	1,929
1969	-	2,196
1970	-	2,457
1971	-	2,666
1972	-	2,891

Principal sources of revenue, in order of importance, are 'income tax, 'excise, post and telephone, customs, interest, departmental receipts, non-resident shareholder's tax, national road fund, and **African taxation.** 60/

3. Public expenditures have grown as follows: 61/

1950	-	328
1955	-	501
1960	-	655
1961	-	702
1962	-	815
1963	-	898
1964	-	1,007
1965	-	1,125
1966	-	1,256
1967	-	1,355
1968	-	1,480
1969	-	1,697
1970	-	1,987
1971	-	2,345
1972	-	2,440

59/ "A Statistical Presentation of the South Africa's National Accounts for the Period of 1945 to 1970", op. cit.; Quarterly Bulletin, December 1973. S-78

60/ State of South Africa Yearbook 1971, pp. 193-194.

61/ "A Statistical Presentation of South Africa's National Accounts..." op. cit., p. 38; Quarterly Bulletin. December 1973. S-78.

4. In a seven-year period the public debt of South Africa has increased by approximately 67 per cent, as follows: 62/

	1965	1966	1967	1968	1969	1970	1971
	(Value in million rand)						
Total Debt	3,222	3,396	3,770	4,218	4,881	5,212	5,448
Internal Debt	3,076	3,231	3,664	4,123	4,782	5,086	5,201
External Debt	147	165	126	95	99	126	247
Floating Debt	288	223	229	262	351	430	542
Funded Debt	2,935	3,172	3,541	3,956	4,530	4,782	4,906

5. For decades South Africa and gold have been synonymous. The nation's international financial standing has been strong. Trade deficits have been met out of current gold production, while reserves have grown more or less regularly except for a noteworthy drop in 1970;

GOLD AND FOREIGN EXCHANGE RESERVES 63/
(Value in million rand)

1960	-	206	1971	-	651
1961	-	292	1972	-	1,090
1962	-	521	1973:		
1963	-	607	January	-	1,124
1964	-	518	July	-	1,430
1965	-	480	September	-	1,243
1966	-	620			
1967	-	593			
1968	-	1,127			
1969	-	1,069			
1970	-	806			

6. The form of government in South Africa is unitary. However, functions are delegated to provincial governments which have identity and resources of their own. With the assent of the State President and under the direction of an administrator, they raise and spend public funds, as follows:

ESTIMATED PROVINCIAL REVENUE, 1969-1970 64/
(Value in thousand rand)

	Cape	Natal	Transvaal	Orange Free State
Direct Taxation	53,673	27,500	104,000	9,838
Motor Vehicle Licences	17,500	8,900	25,000	4,025
Licences	45	63	288	140
Race and Betting Tax	2,020	2,020	3,390	260
Entertainment Tax	1,300	-----	-----	290
Auction Dues	-----	80	-----	320
Educational Receipts	2,330	1,050	11,110	370
Hospital Receipts	7,301	5,150	7,702	1,140
Miscellaneous	1,744	961	3,866	1,639

62/ State of South Africa Yearbook, 1973. p. 197.

63/ "A Statistical Presentation of South Africa's Balance of Payments for the Period of 1945 to 1970", op. cit., p. 33. Quarterly Bulletin. December 1973. S-78.

64/ State of South Africa Yearbook 1971, pp. 30-31.

ESTIMATED PROVINCIAL EXPENDITURES

	<u>Cape</u>	<u>Natal</u>	<u>Transvaal</u>	<u>Orange Free State</u>
	(Value in thousand rand)			
General Administration	5,100	3,600	22,349	4,024
Education	60,959	22,792	87,409	20,455
Hospitals and Public Health	66,385	33,600	65,021	10,450
Roads, Bridges and Works	53,817	15,500	61,740	11,800
Miscellaneous Services	4,330	4,770	3,477	1,481
Interest and Redemption	25,682	6,700	14,020	3,345
National Road Fund	25,682	10,830	23,624	8,826
Capital Expenditure	-----	15,000	-----	6,600

ESTIMATED PROVINCIAL REVENUE AND EXPENDITURE IN 1972

REVENUE (R1,000) 65/

	<u>Cape Province</u>	<u>Natal</u>	<u>Transvaal</u>	<u>Orange Free State</u>
Direct taxation, total	—	—	—	—
Motor Vehicles (licences)	20,956	11,061	31,559	4,904
Racing and Betting Tax	2,662	3,133	5,189	330
Entertainment tax	695	—	—	389
Auction dues	—	127	1	410
Educational Receipts	2,222	1,009	5,121	433
Hospital Receipts	7,551	4,831	8,294	1,941
Miscellaneous Receipts	1,849	1,657	5,813	2,418

30

EXPENDITURE (R1,000) 1972

	<u>Cape Province</u>	<u>Natal</u>	<u>Transvaal</u>	<u>Orange Free State</u>
General Administration	8,800	6,019	32,567	3,559
Education	79,882	35,973	103,730	22,960
Hospitals and Public Health	82,547	35,733	71,415	12,939
Roads, Bridges and Works	92,663	24,693	75,346	18,910
Miscellaneous Services	5,755	5,323	1,983	1,920
Interest and Redemption	32,636	8,362	17,081	4,084
National Road Fund	16,136	15,605	15,886	—
Capital Expenditure	46,726	19,014	38,981	7,287

Source: Department of Statistics

XII. FOREIGN INVESTMENT

1. Foreign investment in South Africa bears an ascribable responsibility for apartheid. By no means the exclusive underwriters of apartheid, foreign investors are nonetheless to be counted among the bankers and providers of know-how for the present version of apartheid. Their roles are to be identified directly with a major corner-stone of racial containment, namely, economic exploitation as reflected in the high rate of earnings, profits being repatriated regularly or ploughed back into plant expansion or new enterprises, as has occurred repeatedly now that the investment base is sufficiently broad and diversified.

2. In addition, the growth of industrial substructure and superstructure through foreign investment and subsidiaries of parent companies in North America, Europe, and Japan has influenced the forms and practices but, contrary to optimistic forecast, has hardly eliminated the substance of apartheid. The older idea of apartheid as the way of life for a primarily rural society is, although still debated, dead. Thanks to foreign investment, it is the way of life for a modern, developed, urban society. Foreign investment has militated against the most extreme degree of racial separation, one of the key dimensions of apartheid, but has resulted in more sophisticated and somewhat deviant versions. For example, partial exceptions in employment are an outcome, although the pay rate remains racial.

3. In this context the contention that economic forces and technological requirements generated by foreign investment are likely to undo and eventually disassemble apartheid in an evolutionary way entails a serious misreading of the system in operation. Support that foreign investment has lent to the perpetuation of racial containment would appear to outweigh by far the anti-discriminatory side effects that are an episodic by-product of the investment. It would also appear that foreign investment has failed to cause any prominent or lesser apartheidist to disown and abandon apartheid.

4. The foreign liabilities of South Africa are as follows: 66/

(Value in million rand)

1963	-	3,011
1964	-	3,109
1965	-	3,398
1966	-	3,765
1967	-	3,905
1968	-	4,562
1969	-	4,990
1970	-	5,818
1971	-	7,033
1972	-	7,786

The currency/geographical area derivations are as follows: 67/

66/ South African Reserve Bank. "A Statistical Presentation of South Africa's Balance of Payment for the Period 1946 to 1970," Supplement to the Quarterly Bulletin, March, 1971, pp. 38-39. These figures exclude foreign liabilities of Botswana, Lesotho, and Swaziland, which the Quarterly Bulletin had previously incorporated in the total foreign liabilities of South Africa Quarterly Bulletin, December 1973, S-64 and p. 42

67/ Compiled from data in "A Statistical Presentation of South Africa's Balance of Payments ...", op. cit. and United Nations, Unit of Apartheid, Foreign Investment in the Republic of South Africa. ST/PSCA/SER.A/11. New York, United Nations, 1970. Figures for 1969 exclude foreign liabilities of Botswana, Lesotho, and Swaziland, which in large are obligations owed to Great Britain.

	1966	1967	1968	1969	1970	1971	1972
	(Value in million rands)						
Sterling Area	2,439	2,548	2,867	3,074	3,371	3,891	4,343
Dollar Area							
Intern. Organ.	152	140	138	59	123	215	235
United States and others	589	578	675	741	855	1,087	1,215
Western Europe	623	675	864	1,065	1,406	1,751	1,905
Other Areas	22	25	39	51	63	89	88
Total	3,825	3,996	4,583	4,990	5,818	7,033	7,781

5. Great Britain stands first in the queue of foreign investors in South Africa, a rank held through the nineteenth and twentieth century. It laid the foundation for its investment paramountcy during the period of British sovereignty and colonial rule in the country and has in the succeeding years augmented and diversified its holdings. They have continued to grow but not so rapidly as those of Western European investors. Over the past twenty-five years the preeminent place held by British capital has declined as a result of: a) growth of indigenous national capital, public and private; b) expansion of subsidiaries of American corporations; and c) phenomenal export of Western European-Common Market capital to South Africa.

6. British investment and financial operations extend to both the official and private sectors in South Africa. Over eighty per cent falls into the category of direct investment, substantially corporation-owned resources. Great Britain also participates in the funding operations of the South African Government, in addition to business enterprises.^{68/}

7. Barely more than one per cent of its total foreign investments, United States investment in South Africa constituted in 1969 over twenty-five per cent of American investment on the African continent. It also constituted almost fifteen per cent of the total direct foreign investment in South Africa. For 1969 the amount is estimated to be \$755,000,000, largely growing out of earnings reinvested through subsidiaries of the parent companies in the United States rather than fresh transfers of capital.^{69/} In 1965 estimates of United States investment in South Africa ran from \$400,000,000 to \$500,000,000.

8. Estimates of American investment in South Africa tend to minimize the totals. For years they exempted investment of Canadian corporations wholly or principally owned by business and financial enterprises in the United States. Ford of Canada is a noteworthy example. More recent estimates have neglected to take into account American investment in British and Western European companies

^{68/} For a more detailed analysis of British investment in South Africa, vide United Nations, Unit on Apartheid, Foreign Investment in the Republic of South Africa, op. cit.

^{69/} Horner, Dudley. United States Corporate Investment and Social Change in South Africa. (South African Institute of Race Relations, Johannesburg, 1971), p.1.

and banks that have invested substantial capital in manufacturing, processing, and refining plants and commercial operations in South Africa. Therefore, to estimate American investment in the Republic in excess of one billion dollars is reasonable.

9. In the world of multinational corporations and complexes, formal nationality is misleading with respect to origins, ownership, and, most important, decision-making and managerial prerogatives of capital. Clearly South Africa is an integral part of this world, as much as United States, Great Britain, Western Europe, and, to mention another partner, Japan.

10. Through various channels the Common Market nations have acquired a considerable stake in the South Africa economy, claiming in excess of twenty per cent of its foreign liabilities in 1969. These nations have concentrated on non-direct investment which seems to be related to banker and trade roles. While direct investment lags well behind the British involvement, it has rapidly but not completely closed the gap with American direct investment. In the past several years France and West Germany, as well as Switzerland, have made capital resources available to South Africa, thus providing the Republic with partial alternatives to the British and American capital markets.

11. High earnings in conditions of relative safety provide a powerful inducement for foreign investors to engage their capital in South Africa. "The earnings of companies from direct investments provide a measure of the importance of South Africa to British firms as well as an indication of its importance to Britain's balance of payments. Britain's earnings from direct investment in South Africa rose from \$81 million in 1960 to the record figure of \$181 million in 1968, and the ratio of earnings in South Africa to total earnings from 11 to 13% These proportions are considerably higher than the corresponding ratios of investment in South Africa to the total value of British private foreign investment (9 per cent at the end of 1965) - a fact which reflects the relatively high profitability of British investment in South Africa."^{70/} On American investment South Africa has provided a return from 17% to 21% annually in the past decade, the average rate of earnings for total United States overseas investment being 10% to 11%. ^{71/} The lower return rate is even associated with higher risk investment in several parts of the world where expropriation and nationalization of foreign properties are a constant threat.

12. South Africa's payments on foreign investment, excluding undistributed profits of foreign subsidiaries, have been calculated as follows for 1960 to 1968: ^{72/}

^{70/} United Nations, Unit on Apartheid. Foreign Investment ... op. cit., p. 23.

^{71/} Ibid., p. 27.

^{72/} Ibid., p. 24. Data derived from International Monetary Fund. Balance of Payment Yearbook, Vol. 22, May, 1971. Table C under South Africa.

Year	Total (Value in million dollars)	Total Investment	Other Investment
1960	263	153	111
1961	291	186	105
1962	267	157	111
1963	273	164	109
1964	307	191	116
1965	343	227	116
1966	361	235	126
1967	413	273	140
1968	470	329	141
1969	550	386	164
1970	574	381	193
1971	548	331	217
1972	572	350	222

XIII. FOREIGN TRADE

1. The basic features of South Africa's foreign trade over the past ten years include: a) imports to hasten internal economic development; b) exports (and re-exports) to sustain UDI (Unilateral Declaration of Independence) in Rhodesia in violation of the proclaimed international boycott; c) cultivation of African markets; d) diversification of trade relations so as to take advantage of Western Europe and Japan as sources of commodities; and e) in recent years, to cushion the inflationary consequences of the trade imbalance. In the early sixties percentage increases in imports exceeded those for exports; in the late sixties annual export increments outpaced annual import increments percentage-wise.

2. Its major trading partners have tended to ignore the international efforts and campaigns to boycott South Africa. The United States terminated direct arms sales, but South Africa obtained weapons and other equipment from European markets, as well as licences, franchise, and know-how to produce armaments locally. The South African market has enjoyed exceptional and irresistible magnetism, especially since its international obligations have been met out of its gold supply.

3. South African foreign trade profile is reflected in the following data:^{73/}

<u>Year</u>	<u>Exports</u> (Value in million dollars)	<u>Imports</u>
1964	1405.3	2203.2
1965	1474.5	2461.2
1966	1667.9	2306.6
1967	1898.0	2689.7
1968	2009.4	2601.7
1969	2147.2	2991.7
1970	1988.0	3610.0
1971	2153.0	4046.0
1972	2636.0	3380.0

^{73/} Data from International Monetary Fund. "Direction of Trade", Supplement of the International Financial Statistics, 1964-1968, and March, 1970. For 1970, data obtained from IMF Balance of Payment Yearbook, Vol.22. There tends to be slight variations in "Direction of Trade" and "Balance of Payment" statistics; Vol. 25, March 1974. (Later edition contains revised time series as corrected based on more complete data)

4. The regular trading partners of South Africa are revealed in the International Monetary Fund statistics on directions of trade. Not all the countries represented in the following table are automatically partners in international commerce inasmuch as the countries are designated not as buyers and sellers but original sources of the commodities: 74/

SOUTH AFRICA - DIRECTIONS OF TRADE
(value in million dollars)

Countries	Imports, FOB			Exports		
	1969	1970	1971	1972	1971	1972
United Kingdom	699.39	784.78	938.80	764.10	918.7	985.6
United States of America	518.68	593.28	657.98	604.51	746.6	373.8
Federal Republic of Germany	410.08	521.39	572.41	534.40	907.4	542.3
France	85.67	124.67	146.60	128.54	242.5	220.1
Japan	263.79	309.64	408.96	345.60	596.5	537.4
Canada	74.29	98.67	66.22	53.41	52.8 (11 mos.)	78.6 (11 mos.)
Italy	118.80	146.16	147.30	122.14	178.3 (11 mos.)	143.7 (11 mos.)
Belgium	33.54	47.60	53.15	45.88	69.70(10 mos.)	169.2 (10 mos.)
Sweden	53.01	63.12	61.50	56.68	75.00	27.1
Switzerland	57.13	69.41	78.47	81.09	109.82	21.07
Australia	54.55	84.65	87.00	91.40	105.37 (9 mos.)	25.96 (9 mos.)
Netherlands	57.97	82.04	81.72	80.80		72.15
Hong Kong	22.45	27.14	29.49	20.24	41.19	44.09
Other trading partners of South Africa include Hong Kong, Taiwan, Spain, Brazil, Austria, Finland, Israel and Rhodesia.						51.18

EEC	1,421.70	1,729.56	1,965.55	1,699.78	400.14	1,039.38	997.29	1,242.93
Total	2,991.73	3,566.26	4,038.67	3,657.52	2,147.24	2,175.072	2,185.83	2,645.42

74/ International Monetary Fund. Direction of Trade Annual Report 1968-72. Washington D.C., 1973. pp.161-62
1973 data derived from International Monetary Fund. Direction of Trade (monthly), March 1974.

XIV. MILITARY AND STRATEGIC DIMENSIONS OF APARTHEID

1. The era of apartheid has been a period of military build-up in South Africa. Behind this development appear to be the following major considerations: (a) internal security based on capability to crush insurrections and deter and suppress guerilla warfare and mount a show of force to intimidate opponents of the regime; (b) external security in anticipation of possible intervention in the affairs of South Africa by other African States and "penetration" of southern Africa by Communism; (c) position of strength to sustain the alignment of South Africa with Rhodesia, Angola, and Mozambique; (d) posture to increase attractiveness of South Africa to NATO and the "free world" as an ally; and (e) status as a sovereign state and the leading power on the continent of Africa.

2. South Africa has pursued its armament programme with the assistance of Great Britain and France acting in non-conformity with the resolutions of the United Nations on apartheid. In Great Britain the sale of arms and vessels and Anglo-South African naval cooperation have generated very considerable political controversy. France is a source of aircraft and rocket design. As a consequence of foreign investment in industry, especially in metallurgical enterprises, vehicle and chemical plants, and petroleum refineries, South Africa has been progressing towards self-sufficiency in the production of weapons and munitions, including rockets.

3. The South African Government has deliberately conjured up and projected the image of South Africa as a vitally strategic base against Communism. On this score NATO circles have shown interest in its utility. General H.J. Kruls, formerly Chief of the General Staff, The Netherlands, has recently written:

"More than ever before have I been convinced that it is not South Africa which has to go on its knees to ask for ships and weapons and support, but the countries of NATO that must ask South Africa to do its utmost to maintain its position on the African continent and to assist the countries of Western Europe and North America not only to keep the sea lanes open, but to prevent further penetration into African countries. 75/

4. The appeal the bastion posture of South Africa has for western countries has recently been suggested in testimony before the Sub-Committee on National Security of the House of Representatives:

"One Western response to the so-called intrusion into the Indian Ocean of the Soviet Union is the development of South Africa and Portugal as Western proxies in the area. France, Britain and

75/ Kruls, H.J. "A Warning to NATO", South Africa International, Vol.II, N° 1, July, 1971, p. 2.

the United States have all recently contributed to the recent strategic strength of the white minority governments in southern Africa. Such actions will continue to exacerbate racial tension."^{76/}

5. Annual Military Expenditures of South Africa: ^{77/}

(Value in million dollars)

1964	-	375	1969	-	354
1965	-	320	1970	-	360
1966	-	331	1971	-	442
1967	-	370	1972	-	442
1968	-	356	1973	-	673

In the 1974-75 South African budget, the allocated defense expenditure is R702 million (\$912 million).

6. Armed services consist of any army, navy, and air force, personnel numbering, in 1973, 18,000 regulars and 92,000 in the Citizen Forces. In addition, the Commando forces number 75,000, organized and trained as a Home Guard. Of the regulars 10,000 are in the Army, 2,500 in the Navy, and 5,500 in the Air Force.^{78/} Defence Minister Fouché claimed in 1965 that South Africa could put 250,000 trained and well-armed men in the field without delay. During the past four years, about 70,000 persons had been trained and another 70,000 were in the reserves and 60,000 in the Commandos.

7. In December 1971, Defense Minister P.W. Botha announced that six corvettes equipped with guided missiles would be added to the naval defenses of the Cape Sea route. South Africa ordered seven Wasp helicopters from Great Britain, in 1971,^{79/} and a submarine from France, and expected to take delivery of it from France the following year.^{80/} Diversified fire power of the army has been achieved with locally manufactured weapons, as well as imports, while the air force has been strengthened with Mirage III, equipped with air to ground missiles.^{81/}

^{76/} U.S. House of Representatives. Committee on Foreign Affairs. The Indian Ocean: Political and Strategic Future. Hearings before the Subcommittee on National Security Policy and Scientific Developments. Washington: Government Printing Office, 1971, p. 128.

^{77/} Data for 1964-1970, inclusive, taken from U.S. State Department. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency. World Military Expenditures... Washington: Government Printing Office. 1970-1973 data from the Military Balance, 1971-1973 reports, published by the International Institute for Strategic Studies, London.

^{78/} The Military Balance, 1973-1974, see above.

^{79/} In May 1974, however, the British Prime Minister announced the revocation of the export licence for one of the helicopters which was still to be delivered to South Africa under the original agreement, negotiated with the previous Conservative Government.

^{80/} For details of the South Africa-France submarine settlement, see Cape Times, 20 April 1967.

^{81/} Africa Report, January 1966.

8. In 1973, as in earlier years, the South African Police joined with Rhodesian forces in counter-guerilla operations along the Zambesi River. This defence of Rhodesian frontiers is presumably part of the efforts to monitor all routes that infiltrators utilize to reach South Africa. Prime Minister Vorster and Mr. Ian Smith of Rhodesia discussed mutual problems relating to southern Africa at a meeting in Pretoria on 29 May 1974. The South African leader observed that "it is not in our interest that there should be chaos in any neighbouring country". 82/

82/ New York Times, 30 May 1974, p. 7.

XV. FOREIGN RELATIONS UNDER APARTHEID

1. South Africa maintains diplomatic relations with the following nations:^{83/}

Argentina	Germany, Federal Republic of	Panama
Australia	Greece	Paraguay
Austria	Guatemala	Peru
Belgium	Iran	Portugal
Bolivia	Israel	Rhodesia (special relations)
Brazil	Italy	
Canada	Japan	Spain
Chile	Luxembourg	Sweden
Costa Rica	Malawi	Switzerland
Denmark	Monaco	United Kingdom
El Salvador	Netherlands	United States
Finland	New Zealand	Uruguay
France	Norway	

South Africa has no diplomatic missions in the OAU nations other than Malawi. Nor do missions exist in the Soviet Union or the People's Republic of China.

2. South Africa belongs to the following international organizations:

World Health Organization
United Nations
International Atomic Energy Agency
International Monetary Fund
International Bank for Reconstruction and Development
International Finance Corporation
International Civil Aviation Organization
Universal Postal Union
International Telecommunication Union
World Meteorological Organization
General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade

In recent years it has terminated or lost its membership in the following international organizations:

International Labour Organisation
Food and Agricultural Organization
United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization

3. In the past two years South Africans have lost membership in various multinational associations, among the most important being the Association of Commonwealth Universities. They still continue to belong to such voluntary, professional, economic, and technical organizations as follows:^{84/}

^{83/} Statesman's Yearbook 1973-74.

^{84/} Yearbook of International Organizations, 14th edition, 1972-73, published by the Union of International Associations, Brussels, 1972.

International Airline Navigators Council (IANC)
International Amateur Athletic Federation (IAAF)
International Amateur Radio Union
International Association for Bridge and Structural Engineering a (IABSE)
International Association for Dental Research (IADR)
International Association for Social Progress (IASP)
International Association for Suicide Prevention (IASP)
International Association for the Prevention of Blindness (IAPS)
International Association for the Protection of Industrial Property (IAPIP)
International Association of Biological Oceanography (IABO)
International Association of Museums of Arms and Military History (IAMAM)
International Association of Music Libraries (IAML)
International Association of Physical Education and Sports for Girls
and Women
International Association of Universities
International Association of Wool Textile Laboratories
International Association of Y's Men's Clubs, Inc.
International Association on Water Pollution Research (IAWPR)
International Automobile Federation
International Bar Association
International Committee of Photobiology
International Confederation of Art Dealers
International Council for Bird Preservation (ICB)
International Council of Women (ICW)
International Council of Alcohol and Addictions (ICAA)
International Criminal Police Organization (Interpol) (ICPO)
International Dairy Federation (IDF)
International Dental Federation
International Federation for Home Economics
International Federation of Musicians
International Federation of Patent Agents
International Federation of Photographic Art
International Iron & Steel Institute
International Institute of Differing Civilizations
International Institute for Conservation of Historic and Artistic Works
International Hospital Federation
International Geographical Union
International Organization for Standardization
International Organization of Journalists
International Penal and Penitentiary Foundation
International Planned Parenthood Federation
International Recreation Association

(Continued)

International Road Federation
Rehabilitation International (ISRDI)
World Peace Through Law Center (WPTL)
World Good Will
World Federation of Democratic Youth
World Federation For the Protection of Animals
World Federation For Mental Health
World Council of Churches
World Chess Federation
World Academy of Art and Science (WAAS)
World Alliance of Young Men's Christian Associations (YMCA)

4. An original participant in the British Commonwealth of Nations South Africa surrendered its membership in 1961, largely over the continual criticism of apartheid and threats of expulsion. It preceded this step with a referendum on whether the Union of South Africa, then with Queen Elizabeth as its constitutional monarch, should become the Republic of South Africa. The outcome of this referendum on 5 October 1960, was as follows:

	<u>For</u>	<u>Against</u>
Cape	271,418	269,784
Transvaal	406,632	325,041
Natal	42,299	135,598
Orange Free State	110,171	33,438
South West Africa	19,938	12,017
Total	850,458	775,878
Majority:	74,580	

5. The conventional orientation of South Africa's foreign policy has been towards strengthening and diversifying relations with the "free world", especially the nations of Western Europe and North America. It has also upgraded its links with Portugal and the colonial governments in Angola and Mozambique and Rhodesia, for defensive purposes and to confront the Organization of African Unity with something of an alliance. "The National Party, and with it South Africa, is irrevocably committed to a path which leads straight into Africa. Commercially, politically, and even militarily, the Republic is setting its face toward the hinterland."^{85/} Recently the Republic appears to have attempted to create a presence among the African States. The independence of Botswana, Lesotho, and Swaziland, which had been opposed in South Africa early in the decade, is serving this purpose by virtue of their contiguity with South Africa and unavoidable dependence on this neighbour. In addition the Vorster Government extended its hand to President Hastings Banda of Malawi, who on August 16-20, 1971, paid an official state visit to South Africa, the first African head of state to be so received. This occasion followed an unofficial visit of Prime Minister Vorster to Malawi in May, 1970 and extension of foreign aid to Malawi. On November 20, 1970, South African Foreign Minister, Dr. H. Muller, architect of the "reach out" policy, signed a loan agreement with the Malagache Government during an official visit to the Malagasy Republic. Since the Malagache Government came to power in May 1972 and the referendum of October 1972, the new régime has postponed implementing decisions to broaden relations between the oceanic republic and South Africa.

6. During the 28th session of the General Assembly in 1973, eight resolutions on apartheid were adopted. The Malagasy Republic, Botswana, Lesotho, and Swaziland (with two abstentions) joined with the majority of the Assembly consistently, while Malawi voted with the majority only on two resolutions. Portugal, as ruler of the non-self-governing dependent territories of Mozambique and Angola in southern Africa, cast votes against three resolutions, abstaining on five. On 30 November 1973, the United Nations General Assembly, by a vote of 91 to 4 (26 abstentions) adopted the "Convention on the Suppression and Punishment of the Crime of Apartheid," which stipulates in Article I that "apartheid is a crime against humanity..."^{86/}

^{85/} South African Financial Gazette, 21 November 1969, quoted in Molteno, Robert. "South Africa and Black Africa," Round Table, No. 243, July 1971, p. 330.

^{86/} United Nations, Unit on Apartheid. Notes and Documents. "Resolutions on Apartheid Adopted by the United Nations General Assembly in 1973"; No. 23/73 December 1973; United Nations, Objective: Justice. vol. 6, no. 1 (Jan/Feb/Mar 1974) pp. 13-15.