

This briefing is intended to give you some idea of Savimbi's tour to the United States in February this year. The pressclippings are taken primarily from American newspapers - particularly the Washington Post and the New York Times, and are useful in that they give us some indication of how Savimbi and the Angolan Government are perceived internationally.

Savimbi's tour was a great success for UNITA. He received a dangerously favourable reception - with the Reagan Administration granting him a demi-god/freedom-fighter status. They treated him as a head of state, provided him a private session with Reagan, another with Schultz and a third with Secretary of Defense, Caspar Weinberger. Savimbi was granted a platform with Bush, Kirkpatrick, Falwell, Afghani rebels and Nicaraguan Contras, and wined and dired with the editorial boards of all the American major newspapers and the staffs of such highly reputed tanks of reaction as The Heritage Foundation, the Centre for Strategic and International Studies, and Freedom House in New York.

Thusfar, the Reagan Administration has publicly promised him at least \$10-15 million in covert, military aid, plus millions in military or 'humanitarian' assistance.

Anti-aparthied organisations in the United States were busy meanwhile mounting a counter-propaganda campaign around Savimbi and the role of South Africa in the region. They organised demonstrations, press conferences, lobbying and briefings on the issue. John Stockwell, former head of the CIA Angola task force played a key role, giving press conferences, speaking at rallies and lobbying Congress, in his exposure of some of the facts about the history of the CIA's covert actions in Angola.

SAVINBI'S SCHEDME

U.S. VISIT

January 28, Tuesday . 8:00 - 10:00 10:00 - 12:00 12:00 -- 2:00 2:00 -4:00 4:00 -6:00 Arrival, Washington, DC (U) 6:00 -8:00 President Reagan's State of the Union January 29, Wednesday 8:00 - 10:00 . 10:00 - 12:00 Meetings with State, DOD, CIA (U) 12:00 - 2:00 Meetings 2:00 - 4:00 4:00 - 6:00 6:00 - 8:00 ABC Niteline January 30, Thursday 8:00 - 10:00 10:00 - 12:00 Executive Branch until 4:00 p.m. (B) 12:00 - 2:00 SFRC-S-C? 2:00 - 4:00 4:00 - 6:00 McNeil-Lehrer (B) 6:00 - 8:00

Page Two January 31, Priday 7:00 - 8:00 A.M. News Shows (B) 8:00 - 10:00 Carnegie Endowment (U) 10:00 - 12:00 10:15-11:15 Evans and Novak (B) 12:00 - 2:00 Luncheon, National Press Club (B) 2:30-3:30 John McLaughlin, One-On-One 2:00 -4:00 4:00 - 6:00 4:00-4:30 Doyle McMannis, Los Angeles Times 6:00 - 8:00 (C-PAC) Dinner (U) was: Hilton Pebruary 1, Saturday 7:00 - 8:00 (Press interviews, all.day (B)) 8:00 - 10:00 10:00 - 12:00 Meeting with Editorial Board of Radio Marti 12:00 - 2:00 Luncheon with National Black Heritage Observance Council (B) TIME MAGIZIME EDITORIAL AD 2:00 - 4:00 WOA informal briefing Black Press ?? 4:00 - 6:00 6:00 - 8:00 Pebruary 2, Sunday 7:00 - 8:00 (Press interviews all day) 8:00 - 10:00 10:00 - 12:00 12:00 - 2:00 Brunch with Black Press 2:00 - 4:00 4:00 - 6:00 6:00 - 8:00 Dinner - BMSK

Page Three Pebruary 3, Monday 7:00 - 8:00 8:00 - 10:00 Washington Post Editorial Board, Jim Hoglan 10:00-11:00 Jet/Ebony Interview 10:00 - 12:00 12:00 -2:00 Luncheon, Cuban American Poundation (B) Hill meetings until 6:00 SERC 6:00 - 8:00 Private Dinner Conservative Caucus, Howard Phillips (U) pruary 4, Tuesday 7:00 - 8:00 7:30-10:00 Breakfast (Voice of America) Portuguese, French, English 8:00 - 10:00 10:00 - 12:00 10:30-12:00 Senate meetings (B/ASC) HFAC 12:00 - 2:00 Senate Luncheon (CB/ASC) 2:00 - 4:00 3:30-5:30 American Enterprise Institute (U) 4:00 - 6:00 6:00 - 8:00 American Security Council uary 5, Wednesday 7:00 - 8:00 Breakfast sponsored by American Security Council on the Hill 8:00 - 10:00 9:00 Republican Conference (B/ASC) -meeting with members 10:00 - 12:00 Meetings with individual members of Congress (including Black Caucus members) until 6:00 2:00 -4:00 -

AFL-CIO Dinner (U)

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6:00 - 8:00

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	10:00 -	12:00	
	12:00 -		Luncheon, Washington Times, Editorial Board, Ed Nealon
	2:00 -	4:00	3:00-5:00 Georgetown CSIS
	4:00 -	6:00	
	6:00 -	8:00	Heritage Foundation Reception
Febr	7:00 -	Friday 8:00	Depart for New York (U)
	8:00 -	10:00	Breakfast, Council on Foreign Relations, until 9:30
	10:00 -		NYT Editorial Board.
	12:00 -		Editorial Board Interviews WSJ: [13]
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Jonas Savimbi: Big Welcome For a Bad Bet

By Sanford J. Ungar

N AFRICAN guerrilla leader named Jonas Savimbi will arrive in Washington this week on a tour aimed at aining U.S. support for his guerrilla war against the Soviet-backed regime in Angola. His goal, in simple terms, is to become America's "contra" in Africa.


Savimbi is a charismatic African politician. But his guerrilla movement cannot win and he does not deserve U.S. financial support or sympathy.

Savimbi's march on Washington this week highlights his astonishing transformation from Chinese-supported revolutionary to conservative-backed "freedom fighter." Barely six years ago he could not get an appointment even with the assistant secretary of state for African affairs, because Congress had passed a law forbidding American covert involvement with his forces in the Angolan civil war. But this week, Savimbi has an excellent chance for a private meeting with President Reagan in the Oval Office.

The Clark Amendment, which prevented is forces from gaining American aid, was

Sanford J. Ungar, author of "Africa: The People and Politics of an Emerging Continent," is dean of the school of communication at The American University.

See SAVIMBI, B4, Col. 1



ORDE ELIASON - AGENCE FRANCE PRESSE

repealed last year. So now he will be paraded through Congress as the American candidate for leadership not only of Angola, but perhaps all of southern Africa. He will be portrayed as the one man who can give Cuban troops a bloody nose and help restore American influence and prestige there. Tonight, Savimbi's new high profile will be evident to 40 million viewers in a scheduled appearance on CBS's "Sixty, Minutes."

.. The trouble is that Savimbi simply isn't what his best American friends believe or wish he could be. "Savimbi is a master at telling people what they want to hear," says John Marcum, professor of political science at the University of California at Santa Cruz and one of the leading U.S. experts on Angola. "He has a quality of delivering a message in a way that pleases the ear of the listener."

Today that skill is being used to court American support, but in the past it has been employed to stir up sentiment against the United States.

Furthermore, Savimbi built much of his power base by overtly appealing to blacknationalist attitudes and antiwhite bias among some of Angola's tribal groups. His tactics are every bit as brutal and repressive as those of the government now in power in Angola — if not more so.

He has proudly claimed to have attacked the installations of American and other Western companies. And he has lost most of his support from other African nations by collaborating with the white minority regime in South Africa.

Besides, UNITA is far from winning. In fact, U.S. aid to Savimbi now would prolong rather than shorten the Angolan war, and it would increase rather than end the Cuban presence in Angola.

The United States has no business taking a position on either side of this civil war. There is little in Angola's internal conflict that has anything to do with American national interests. And the risks are many. Funding Savimbi now would put the United States into a de facto military alliance with South Africa. That would violate the declared policy of the Reagan administration and would also alienate America's good friends elsewhere in Africa.

Thave met Jonas Savimbi during his previous visits to the United States, and I L have been greatly impressed with his political and rhetorical skills. He is a gen-: uinely charismatic figure whose eyes seem alive with fire when he talks of the struggle in Angola. He speaks superb English (along with, it is said, Portuguese, French, and several other languages), and he is particularly adept at playing to the American fear of Fidel Castro, whose troops prop up Savimbi's enemy.

Other journalists who have visited him in the bush inside Angola — it is easy to arrange trips from South Africa or Namibia on South African planes - have been even more dazzled by Savimbi. They have heard him give dramatic, spellbinding orations to "party congresses" of his supporters, and they have been taken with his apparent will-

ingness to stay at his fighters' side in their most difficult moments - rather than' spending much of his time in fancy restaurants in European capitals, as the leaders of But in 1964 the rivalry between Roberto other Third World nationalist movements have sometimes been known to do.

Nonetheless, it is one thing to recognize the mystique of Jonas Savimbi and quite , another to commit American prestige and deficit financing - to his cause. Those who would bankroll him as an American surrogate in southern Africa would do well to examine the recent history of Angola and Savimbi's own record.

avimbi's involvement in the tangled politics and the violent struggle for Control of Angola goes back to the early 1960s. That was more than 10 years before the country became independent, fol-

lowing a revolution in Lisbon, and thrust into the unenviable position of a pawn in the East-West struggle. Although many students of African politics see Savimbi as an opportunist who adjusts his ideology to the needs of the moment, most still recognize him as a genuine Angolan nationalist - a man whose record and credentials as an opponent of colonialism entitle him to some role in his country's fu-

A member of the Ovimbundu tribe (which makes up about a third of Angola's population), Savimbi was born in the country's central highlands in 1934 to a family that one Protestant missionary described as being of "exceedingly humble, primitive, pagan background." Nonetheless, he graduated at the top of his high school class, and the missionaries, who saw great promise in him, sent him to Portugal for advanced

Before long, however, he was being harassed by dictator Antonio Salazar's secret police for his political activities on behalf of Angolan independence, and so he fled to Switzerland in 1960, enrolling in the political science department at the University of Lausanne.

According to one State Department document that has frequently been quoted, Savimbi turned up at the American Embassy in Bern early in 1961, declared that he had been inspired by a speech by then-United Nations ambassador Adlai Stevenson in favor of self-determination for all peoples of the world, and introduced himself as "the future president of Angola."

Within months of making his ambitions known to U.S. diplomats, Savimbi had gone off to Leopoldville (now Kinshasa), the capital of the newly independent Belgian Congo (now Zaire), to join Holden Roberto, the

Savimbi's American backers believe that Angola is a place where stand up to the Soviet Union. It is on the strength of these conservative hopes that Savimbi is winging to Washington.

leader of a generally pro-Western organization called the National Front for the Liberation of Angola (FNLA).

The FNLA was being aided and encouraged by the United States as an alternative to the Soviet-supported Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola (MPLA). (It seemed unlikely to the superpowers that Portuguese colonial rule could last much longer on a continent where so many other countries were setting their possessions free, and in this period Washington and

Moscow were characteristically choosing up sides among the new and future nations of

and Savimbi came to a head, and Savimbi broke away from the FNLA. Two years later, he brought together his own cadres and formed a "third force," UNITA - the National Union for the Total Independence of Angola. Savimbi found help from China, among others, and UNITA managed to play its own unpredictable part in the war against the Portuguese.

As independence approached in 1975, the military struggle in Angola turned into a tripartite civil war among the nationalist groups, and that doomed the prospect of open, fair elections. To the surprise of many outside observers, UNITA actually outlasted the FNLA, which, despite help from

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the U.S. Central Intelligence Agency, crum- South Africa became known, he lost much bled before the Soviet- and Cuban-aided

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Meanwhile, South Africa, concerned about the effects of the civil war on its neighboring territory of Namibia, had also intervened in Angola. Inevitably, the South Africans offered to help Savimbi, and he

accepted. The MPLA managed to establish 1 government in Angola's capital of Luanda late in 1975, and it has stayed in power since then with the support of a Cuban military and civilian contingent now estima ed at between 25,000 and 35,000. But UNITA has also sustained its guerrilla struggle against the MPLA, with money and supplies from South Africa, for more than 10 years. Savimbi generally claims to control at least a third of the area of the vast country.

Last year, even as economic sauctions were being voted against South Africa, hardliners in both houses of Congress were successful in getting the law prohibiting American involvement in the Angolan civil war repealed. Savimbi's American backers believe that Angola is a place where the United States can stand up to the Soviet Union. It is on the strength of these conservative hopes — that America can get back into the fray as a player in Angola -- that Savimbi is winging to Washington.

ut before Savimbi is allowed to leave town triumphantly with a chunk of the American treasury, it would be a good idea to take a realistic look at the ran who would be our newest African client.

Savimbi does not have the credible second as a moderate, democratic, pro- American figure that is so often cited on his behalf by his supporters in both parties here.

On the contrary, he built his reputation during the late 1960s and early 1970s as a fervid anti-capitalist, anti-American revolutionary. "No progressive action is possible with men who serve American interests . . . the notorious agents of imperialism," he said at the time of his break with Roberto. Among his leading supporters in the years that followed were Mao Tse-tung Che Guevara, and Gamal Abdel Nasser.

During those same years, Savimbi dre " a distinction between his own movement and the MPLA on the basis of their racial co nposition, denouncing the MPLA for its no clusion of, and alleged domination by, white radicals and mestizos (people of mixed race)

who had accepted Portuguese citizenship. Roughly one-tenth of the million people who live in the capital city of Luanda are white or mestizo, and the MPLA regime, whatever its other flaws, is multiracia in composition. "Given Savimbi's past statements on racial issues, (the whites and mestizos) all quiver at the thought of his corning to power," says Gerald J. Bender, professor of international relations at the University of Southern California and an advocate of American diplomatic recognition of the An-

UNITA has in fact been criticized for its brutal tactics in the Angolan countryside. In classic guerrilla fashion, its acknowledged goals are to grind the Angolan economy to a halt, prevent development, and destroy agriculture - all to stir up discontent with

Among the foreigners taken prisoner during UNITA attacks in recent years have been many missionaries and church workers. Just last month, in an incident reported by the Brazilian Embassy in Angola and three religious organizations, five Baptist church workers were killed, three wounded and two women carried off by Savimbi's

situation in Angola is that the MPLA gov. ernment finds that it needs the Cubans to help protect Gulf Oil rigs and storage tanks from threats by the South Africans and the

dependence the Organization of African Unity (OAU) was sharply divided on the 3sue of whether to recognize the MPLA or some FNLA/UNITA coalition as the legitimate government in Angola. But as soon as the nature of Savimbi's connections with

of his support elsewhere on the continent.

Savimbi travels to and from Angola primarily through South Africa and South-African-controlled Namibia; his headquarters in Jamba are only 18 miles from the Namibian border. The government in Pretoria is proud of its connection with UNITA, claiming that it proves South Africa's ability to work with the "right" kind of black African leader. In fact, Savimbi was an honored guest at the inauguration of State President P. W. Botha in 1984. To this day, most African governments depict Savimbi as a South African puppet.

Further American assistance to Savimbi. overt or covert, will not lead to withdrawal of the Cuban forces in Angola.

On the contrary, every South African intervention on UNITA's side in the past has caused an increase in the number of Cubans. There is no reason to think that American aid would produce a different result. In recent meetings, Angolan President Jose Eduardo dos Santos has reportedly warned Chester A. Crocker, assistant secretary of state for African affairs, of that fact, and he has frankly asked the Reagan administration not to push Angola into a greater dependence on the Soviet Union.

The Angolan leadership claims it would like to send the Cubans home gradually and take a more truly non-aligned posture in foreign policy. But the regime insists that this is impossible so long as UNITA continues its military efforts and South Africa continues to invade Angolan territory at will.

Savimbi is not on the verge of winning the power struggle in Angola, and few outside observers, including the American intelligence community, believe he has any chance of doing so at any time in the near future.

Then-CIA director William Colby estimated in the mid-1970s that it would take some \$100 million in outside aid for the-"pro-Western" forces to prevail in Angola, and the United States put in about \$14 million before the Clark amendment took ef-

Today, U.S. officials estimate that if the MPLA were strengthened and substantially

greater Soviet-funded Cuban assistance were offered, even \$200 or \$300 million far more than anyone is suggesting the United States might be able to provide would probably not do the job. With or without an infusion of U.S. funds, the Angolan civil war is locked in a stalemate.

onas Savimbi's visit to Washington, then, has little to do with the real prospects for peace in southern Africa, and a great deal to do with American politics;

Two significant forces are arrayed on Savimbi's side: liberal Democrats who believe they have to demonstrate their ability to support a tough, anti-Soviet foreign policy; and conservative Republicans who, having voted last summer for economic sanctions against South Africa, have been under pressure to take some other persuasive, anti-communist steps in the region.


An example of the former is 85-year-old Rep. Claude Pepper (D-Fla.), who has an increasing number of anti-Castro Cuban exiles in his district demanding he take a tougher stand.

An example of the later is 50-year-old Rep. Jack Kemp, (R-N.Y.), who was warned by some of his bedrock conservative supporters that his vote for South African sanctions could cost him the GOP presidential nomination in 1988.

Pepper and Kemp make an interesting coalition, but they are crafting bad foreign policy. To be wary of some of what the MPLA has done and to wish for an end to the Cuban presence in southern Africa does not require support for a harsh and unprincipled guerrilla leader about whom the American government and people actually know very little. To be skeptical and cautious with Savimbi does not imply endorsement of the regime in Luanda.

It is fine to treat Savimbi to some good, old-fashioned, all-American hospitality; we, have done as much for many unsavory types from all over the world in recent years. But if we offer him new aid - either "overt" or "covert," however it is packaged - the people of Africa, as usual, will be the biggest losers of all.

THE ENDLESS ANGOLA WAR



ormerly a Portuguese colony, Angola achieved independence in 1975 after two decades of nationalist rebellion and guerrillla warfare. By the end of 1976, one of the factions — the Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola (MPLA) had gained control of the country with the aid of Cuban technical and military expertise. The MLPA proclaimed establishment of the People's Republic of Angola and transformed itself into an orthodox Marxist-Leninist party.

Despite MLPA's victory, the rival National Union for the Total Independence of Angola (UNITA) under Jonas Savimbi continued to wage . guerrilla war against the government with considerable help from South Africa. In 1976, after disclosure of

made numerous land and air incursions into Angola, ostensibly in pursuit of Angolan-based guerrillas fighting South Africa's continuing occupation of Namibia (South-West in Namibla after a UN-supervised cease-fire and elections. South Africa and the United States insist that a South African pullout from Namibia withdrawal of Cuban troops from

In 1984, UNITA appeared on the with Soviet and Portuguese help -

Last year Congress repealed the Clark Amendment, and in November President Reagan indicated he favors resuming aid to UNITA despite warnings from Angola that such action would endanger American economic interests there and damage prospects for peace in southern Africa.

While Angola (population about 8,3. million) has substantial agricultural, petroleum and mineral resources, its economy and its transportation and . communications networks have been severely disrupted by the decades of warfare, the high cost of defense and a shortage of skilled workers.

covert CIA aid to UNITA, Congress passed the "Clark Amendment" banning further assistance. Over the years, South Africa has

Africa). Angola supports independence must be preceded or accompanied by

Angola. verge of a military breakthrough but in subsequent months the government turned the tide against the rebels.

golan government. Although Savimbi has been wise enough to alter his pro-Marxist, antiwhite rhetoric when it is expedient to do so, the UN'TA slogan remains "Socialism, Negritude, Democracy, and Nonalignment." No one really knows what his policies would be if he we'e to come to power. As The Washington Post's Leon Dash reported in 1977 atter spending seven months with UNITA forces in the bush, "Savimbi is an enigma, a man on whom many labels can stick - brillian; charismatic, affable, unyielding, forgiving, temporizing, Machiavellian, opportunistic, lying, nationalistic, Marxist, Maoist, pro-Western and socialist."

Savimbi is miscast as a "freedom fighte." defending Western ideals against a herek Marxist regime.

the government.

And one of the sharpest ironies of the

allegedly pro-American UNITA forces. Savimbi is not the popular pan-African politician that he often claims to be.

It is true that in the period just after in-

STOP U.S. SUPPORT FOR SOUTH AFRICA'S WAR IN ANGOLA!

DEMONSTRATION

PROTEST JONAS SAVIMBI'S VISIT TO THE U.S.!!!

DATE: 31 JANUARY 1986

TIME: 11:30 AM - 2:30 PM

JONAS SAVIMBI, LEADER OF UNITA (THE NATIONAL UNION FOR THE TOTAL INDEPENDENCE OF ANGOLA), A SOUTH AFRICAN SUPPORTED TERRORIST GROUP, IS VISITING THE U.S. TO OBTAIN U.S. AID FOR HIS WAR AGAINST ANGOLA. WE ARE PROTESTING TO SAY NO TO U.S. AID TO UNITA WHICH IS AID TO SOUTH AFRICA!!!

PLACE: NATIONAL PRESS BUILDING (529 14th STREET, N.W.)

> FOR MORE INFORMATION, CONTACT: THE WASHINGTON OFFICE ON AFRICA (202) 546-7961

Angola Rebel Chief to Receive U.S. Praise, and Possibly Aid

Savimbi Arriving for Busy Two-Week Visit

By David B. Ottaway and Patrick E. Tyler Washington Post Staff Writers

In what is becoming a crescendo to the acrimonious debate over U.S. policy toward Angola, Washington is preparing to play host for two weeks to the man who stands in the center of the controversy—a burly, bearded guerrilla chieftain of considerable charm named Jonas Mal-

heiro Savimbi.

Ileralded by President Reagan as an exemplary "freedom fighter" and embraced by conservatives as "the Che Guevara of the right," Savimbi is vilified as a "terrorist" by the Soviet and Cuban-backed Marxist government he has fought for a decade. To most of black Africa, he is a "stoog f. South Africa's white rulers.

Whatever he is, Savimbi is about to officially and publicly receive the blessings of the administration—including the personal benediction of President Reagan and Secretary of State George P. Shultz, who will heap praise on the Angolan rebel as the leader of a grand anticommunist crusade.

Conservative groups, such as the Heritage Foundation, the American Conservative Union and the American Security Council, are orchestrating a welcome for Savimbi unlike anything Washington has ever seen for an African guerrilla leader. After his arrival Tuesday, Savimbi will use his appearances before the groups and elsewhere as a platform from which to launch his plea for military and nonmilitary assistance from the United States.

Black, Manafort, Stone and Kelly, a public relations and lobbying firm with a \$600,000 contract to represent limbi's UNITA group, is



JONAS SAVIMBI
... "Che Guevara of the right"

helping to stage-manage much of the visit with a goal of exposing him to "all segments" of the U.S. foreign policy community, a spokesman for the firm said. It has arranged a whirlwind schedule of government and congressional appointments, as well as media and think tank appearances.

Savimbi is already assured a Sunday night segment on CBS' "60 Minutes," followed by appearances on ABC's "Nightline" and PBS' "MacNeil/Lehrer NewsHour," as well a possible cover story in Time magazine. He is giving the keynote speech at the Washington banquet of the American Conservative

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Union one night after Reagan addresses the group.

Virtually every East Coast think tank from the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace in Washington to the Council on Foreign Relations in New York has scheduled seminars, meetings or chats with Savimbi.

As an indication of Savimbi's ascent to the top of the administration's foreign policy agenda, the UNITA leader is scheduled to give the National Security Council staff a private briefing on the battlefield status of his guerrilla war; he also will make a closed-door speech to State Department officials.

The questions of whether Savimbi will receive U.S. aid and whether it will be delivered overtly or covertly remain undecided and hotly debated. The White House has submitted to the House and Senate Intelligence Committees an initial plan for \$10 million to \$15 million in covert military aid to be funneled to Savimbi through the Central Intelligence Agency.

Savimbi's supporters in Congress, however, want to turn the administration's proposal from a covert to an overt program, partly because they object to the CIA's surreptitious involvement in Third World conflicts and partly because they favor a larger appropriation to Savimbi than that proposed in the administration's covert plan.

Leading the pro-Savimbi campaign in the House has been Rep. Mark D. Siljander, a conservative Republican from Michigan, who has gathered 109 cosponsors for a bill that would provide Savimbi's National Union for the Total Independence of Angola (UNITA) with \$27 million in open military assistance.

In the Senate, Malcolm Wallop (R-Wyo.) on Dec. 10 introduced an amendment cosponsored with 12 colleagues that would have authorized \$50 million in military and other assistance to Savimbi, although the measure died for procedural! reasons.

On the same day, three key Senate members tried to pass a resolution of support for Savimbi intended to lead to an aid program.

Senate Majority Leader Robert J. Dole (R-Kan.), Sen. Richard G. Lugar (R-Ind.), chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, and Sen. David F. Durenberger (R-Minn.), chairman of the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, sponsored the measure, which favored providing "material assistance" to Savimbi early this year if the Marxist Angolan government refused to engage in "good faith negotiations" with UNITA and continued to prepare a new offensive against the guerrillas. The resolution was defeated 39 to 58.

Both supporters and opponents of aid to Savimbi seem to agree on one thing, however: a decision to support him will have repercussions on U.S. foreign policy far beyond Angola. Advocates say it will send a strong message to Moscow of U.S. resolve to "roll back" communism by aiding guerrillas fighting Soviet client states. In this context, they see the U.S. commitment as a crucial test of the so-called Reagan Doctrine.

Opponents of aid to Savimbi argue that direct U.S. involvement in his struggle will draw the United States into a damaging alliance with South Africa, now UNITA's chief backer, and make the U.S. role of a neutral mediator in the region's

disputes impossible.

In November, 101 House members wrote President Reagan expressing strong opposition to renewed U.S. involvement in the Angolan conflict and urging him not to aid Savimbi. "U.S. involvement in this conflict, whether direct or indirect, covert or overt, would damage our relations with governments throughout Africa and undermine fundamental U.S. policy objectives in southern Africa," they said.

Far from promoting national reconciliation or a withdrawal of the estimated 35,000 Cuban troops stationed in Angola, the opponents argue, U.S. aid to UNITA is certain to escalate the war, increase the Soviet and Cuban commitment to the Angolan government and doom hopes for settlement of the interlocking disputes setting South Africa against its black neighbors.

Both sides also tend to agree that a decision to aid Savimbi will ring the death knell for the administration's 6-year-old policy toward southern Africa of "constructive engagement," one that has sought to rely on quiet diplomacy to nudge South Africa toward reform of its apartheid system and lessen tensions between it and black Africa.

Assistant Secretary of State Chester A. Crocker, architect of the "constructive engagement" policy, has just returned from a new round of talks with Angolan and South African officials in the search for a negotiated end to southern Africa's problems. His trip is widely regarded as the last U.S. attempt at a breakthrough before providing Savimbi with some form of aid. Crocker has given no public indication he achieved any progress.

political forces of reform cannot meet the challenge, we can expect a major political realignment such as occurred in midnineteenth century America, when the two old parties refused to face the reality of slavery.

MARCHING WITH PRETORIA

Reagan's Real Aims In South Africa

THOMAS J. DOWNEY

his week Angolan rebel leader Jonas Savimbi will be in Washington seeking Congressional support for his group, Unita. Savimbi's visit, which will include a lecture to the Heritage Foundation on February 6, can be seen as the kickoff of an Administration effort to redefine its South Africa policy. Most legislators hought the battle over how best to oppose the apartheid regime had ended last September 9, when President Reagan, dramatically reversing his position, signed an executive order that imposed limited economic sanctions on the government of South Africa. To many observers, it was at least a partial victory for those opposed to apartheid, and the beginning of the end of the Reagan policy of "constructive engagement."

However, there are a number of initiatives before Congress that, though few people have seen the connection, are of a piece with constructive engagement. Last summer the House of Representatives repealed the Clark amendment prohibiting aid to Unita forces, which are attempting, with South Africa's help, to overthrow the government of Angola. Now Congress is considering a number of bills to grant "humanitarian" and military assistance to Unita. It also has legislation pending to supply the forces of Renamo, which, also supported by South Africa, seeks to overthrow the government of Mozambique. And in an interview with The New York Times on January 25, Secretary of State George Shultz called on Congress to pass a general resolution expressing moral support for Unita.

When the Reagan Administration came to Washington in 1981 it had a broad agenda for southern Africa. It sought to end the conflict in Namibia and effect a decolonization of that territory. It also wanted to spur the departure of the Cubans from Angola and end the cross-border violence throughout the region. Finally, and most obviously, it endorsed the South African government's program of mild reforms of apartheid within the existing political and economic structure.

Those aims were pursued by giving direct and indirect support to South Africa. The indirect support was intended to be quiet. When, in March 1981, Adm. Willem du Plessis

Thomas J. Downey is a Democratic Representative from New York. He is co-chair of the Ad Hoc Monitoring Group on Southern Africa.

and Lieut. Gen. P.W. van der Westhuizen, the chief of staff for intelligence of the South African Defense Forces, became the first high-ranking South African military officers to visit the United States since 1974, their trip was secret, ostensibly made without the approval or knowledge of the State Department. But it was widely seen as a sign of the Reagan Administration's desire to forge closer ties with the apartheid regime. Two months later Foreign Minister Roelof (Pik) Botha made an official visit to the United States. Within five months of Reagan's taking office there were clear signs that constructive engagement meant a closer relationship with the racist regime.

. The direct support took the form of continued opposition to sanctions. In the aftermath of the massive South African invasion of southern Angola in August 1981, the United States was the only one among North American and Western European nations working for a Namibian settlement that did not denounce the action. The next month the United States vetoed a U.N. Security Council resolution condemning the invasion. In 1982 the United States worked overtime to secure a \$1.1 billion loan for South Africa from the International Monetary Fund, even though the government was raising the military stakes in the region and there was little evidence of change within the country.

During its first four years, the Administration opposed U.N. Security Council motions against South Africa and fought Congressional attempts to impose sanctions. At each stage the public was told that the Administration's efforts to bring about change in South Africa were quietly yielding results.

In fact, there is precious little to show for five years of coddling apartheid. The attempts to jolly Pretoria along were almost embarrassing in their naïveté. Last August, for example, the United States and South Africa met in Vienna to solidify U.S. support for the South African government's latest attempts to promote limited reform. Returning from Vienna, Administration officials promised peace in our time in South Africa and said that President P.W. Botha would announce major reforms in apartheid in a speech to his party on August 15. But in that speech Botha directed a stinging rebuke to the Administration: "I find it unacceptable to be confronted in this manner with an accomplished fact. This is not my way of doing it, and the sooner these gentlemen accept it, the better." The South African President went on to outline a program of business as usual for apartheid.

Ever tolerant, the Administration, via an anonymous pokesperson, suggested that the South African government was "shoot[ing] itself in the foot," and said that the White House hoped that the speech would be clarified in the weeks to come. No one in the South African government came forward to do so, however. Why? Because there was no ambiguity.

As Botha's speech demonstrated, constructive engagement is a one-way street. The South African government is not even grateful for the five-year breathing space it has had. Where is the change that was promised?

· Since the end of last year the international and South African business community has applied unprecedented pressure for change on Pretoria, to little effect. According

to the Lawyers' Committee for Civil Rights Under Law, more than 10,800 people have been detained in South Africa since January 1985. Most of those detentions have come since the state of emergency was declared, on July 20. During the third week of November, thirty-three blacks were killed, thirteen of them in Mamelodi, outside Pretoria, when police fired into a crowd of 50,000 Africans protesting rent increases. Fourteen people were killed in rioting outside Queenstown in the Eastern Cape. In the fifteen months since the present crisis erupted, more than 1,000 deaths have been officially recorded by the government.

It is against this backdrop that the renewed effort to provide assistance to Unita must be seen. At the time of the debate on the Clark amendment, some of those who supported its repeal argued that they did not favor funding Unita. They simply wished to untie the President's hands and remove a problematic restriction on U.S. foreign policy in the region. No aid to Unita was envisioned. Now it is clear that the repeal of the amendment was the first step down the road toward active U.S. intervention on the side of South Africa in the regional struggle.

Because constructive engagement has been seen by the public simply in terms of South Africa—that is, as a way of opposing apartheid—those involved in the policy debate have tended to treat the Unita issue as separate from the question of South African internal policies. But constructive engagement is directed at the entire region. The United States is lining up with Botha in an attempt to impose a supposedly more stable order in southern Africa. Pretoria's August 1981 attack on Angola was not an isolated incident. That same year South African commandos raided Maputo, the capital of Mozambique, and Pretoria increased its support for the rebels of the Mozambican National Resistance, the name by which Renamo is formally known. In 1982, Renamo forces destroyed a major refinery in Mozambique. South African troops carried out a helicopter attack on Maseru, the capital of Lesotho, in which forty-two people were killed. Angola endured a South African occupation of its southern territory for three years. South Africa was clearly on the offensive. The Administration has fully backed Pretoria's tactic of denying foreign havens to the opponents of apartheid.

By late 1983, South African military pressure, together with economic crises in some of the front-line states and famine in the region, had left the neighboring countries in an extremely vulnerable position. The United States stepped into the breach and acted as mediator between South Africa and its victims. In February 1984, under U.S. auspices, the Angolans and the South Africans concluded the Lusaka Agreement, which set up a joint commission to monitor the disengagement of South African troops from southern Angola. The following month, with the United States again playing the role of midwife, the Nkomati Accord was negotiated between South Africa and Mozambique. That treaty aimed to halt South African support for rebels attempting to overthrow the Mozambican government and to end South African attacks on economic targets in Mozam-

bique. In return, the Mozambican government agreed to prohibit military activity of the African National Congress from bases inside its territory.

. The South African withdrawal from Angola provided for in the Lusaka Agreement supposedly indicated that the protració negotiations on independence for Namibia were nearing completion. Yet almost two years later South Africa continues its incursions into Angola, and Namibia is no neaser independence than it was in 1984, or indeed in 1981, when constructive engagement was conceived. In the past year. South Africa has renewed its support for Mozambican rebels, in violation of the Nkomati Accord. And the Admir istration may be preparing for a more direct intervention by supporting groups such as Unita and Renamo. On No tember 23, The Washington Post reported that the Administration was considering a two-pronged policy of covert action and diplomatic pressure against the government of Angola. This more aggressive policy represents an attempt to justify continued support for the Botha regime by focusing on the Cuban presence in Angola at a time when events in South Africa are moving toward increasingly violent confrontations.

Description the stage is set for an important foreign policy confrontation that will affect U.S. policy in Africa for decades to come. Congress is sharply divided on the question of providing aid to Unita, and public attention has not yet been focused on the debate, largely because Unita's supporters have been able to divorce the group from the apartheid regime in the media. The American Republic I oundation (established by the College Republican National Committee), the American Angolan Public Affair's Council and the lobbying firm of Black, Manafort, Stone & Kelly have mounted an expensive campaign to refurbish Unita's



tarnished image. They have met with some success: a favorable profile of Savimbi appeared in The New York Times on November 9, and a pro-Unita film, The Challenger, was shown on Capitol Hill on November 8 in a House committee room.

As long as the spotlight is shifted away from constructive engagement and the aggressive nature of apartheid, the Administration will be successful in its attempt to save the Botha government.

Norman Podhoretz

Savimbi's Promise

As the leader of UNITA, the first of the guerrilla rebellions that have in recent years been turning the tables on Soviet imperialism in the Third World, Jonas Savimbi ought to be having an easy time of it with the Reagan administration.

After all, in enunciating what has come to be known as the Reagan Doctrine, the president has said that the United States "must not break faith with those who are risking their lives on every continent to defy Soviet-supported aggression." If any-. one qualifies under that doctrine, it is Savimbi. For more than a decade now, and with no help at all from the United States, he has been at war with the communist government installed in Angola in 1975 and still propped up by Cuban troops and Soviet arms.

Yet whereas the administration, acting in strict accord with the Reagan Doctrine, has begun intensifying its efforts to get military aid to the contras, who are fighting against the communist regime in Nicaragua, it remains opposed to military aid for UNITA, which is doing exactly the same thing in Angola.

A while back there was a certain amount of overt talk about giving covert aid to UNITA. Now the most the administration is willing to ask for is a congressional resolution of moral support. As for the military aid Savimbi has just arrived in Washington to seek, a "senior official" announces that "military solutions to the region's problems are not viable and that a negotiated agreement is the only way to attain peace and stability."

Behind this pronouncement, reeking of the sickly age of Jimmy Carter, is a complicated plan involving the withdrawal of the Cubans from Angola in exchange for the withdrawal of South African forces from Namibia.

"This fine-spun scheme had the usual fate of all exquisite policy," said Edmund Burke about the steps the British govern-, ment took to avert a rebellion in the American colonies. The count is not yet fully in on the State Departments's strategy for getting the Cubans out of Angola & but it too will almost certainly suffer "the usual fate of all exquisite policy."

Where "exquisite policy" is bound to fail in getting the Cubans out, however, can military pressures succeed?

Savimbi's strategy, as he outlines it in an article in the current issue of Policy Review, is not to defeat the Cubans in some local version of Dien Bien Phu. It is, rather, "to raise the costs of the for- ... eign occupation of Angola until the, Cubans and the Soviets can no longer bear the burden." This means denying "the colonial forces the revenues that fi-... nance their occupation" and inflicting as many casualties as possible on Castro's troops.

:: A measure of how effective this classical guerrilla strategy has been is the fact that the Cubans and their Soviet officers have recently begun trying to force Savimbi into abandoning it and to fight a. conventional war instead. Thus the question of whether Savimbi can keep up the pressures now turns on whether he will. get the antitank and antiaircraft wearons he needs to cope with the new Soviet-Cuban offensive tactics.

In quarters other than the State Department, the main objection to Savimbi is that he is tainted by association with the Republic of South Africa. And, in fact, Savimbi does get aid from the Pretoria government. Pretoria helps him because he is helping to contain Soviet expansion-.. ism in Africa; and Savimbi accepts it because he is in no position to refuse assist-

ance from anyone.

But to accuse this man and the move-. ment he leads of supporting apartheid is as absurd as it is defamatory. These are black Africans who first took arms against Portuguese colonial rule and , then saw their fight for national liberation betrayed by a minority of Angolan communists who handed their country over to the Cubans and the Soviets. What Savimbi and his people are fighting for now against the new colonial rulers. . of Angola is the same independence they ... were fighting for against the Portuguese and that was stolen from them by the communists 11 years ago.

One of the interesting features of .. Savimbi's career as a revolutionary nationalist is that he got his training in .. China under Mao Tse-tung in the 1960s. ... There, he now says, he not only "learned how to fight and win a guerrilla , war"; he also learned "how not to run an economy or a nation." His goals, accordingly, are to establish a "democratic and .

free Angola."

Of course, all parties bidding for American sympathy, including communists, describe their objectives in just such terms. Ho Chi Minh actually paraphrased our Declaration of Independence in drafting his own declaration of ... independence for Vietnam; Fidel Castro at first called himself a Jeffersonian Democrat; the Sandinistas promised free : elections and other democratic institutions in Nicaragua.

Yet the very people who are always so eager to take those promises at face value when they come from communists ; now scoff at an anticommunist such as Savimbi in spite of the fact that, by contrast with communists everywhere, he has done nothing to forfeit his claim to good faith when he speaks of democracy

and freedom.

At a minimum, then, Savimbi deserves the benefit of the doubt even from liberals-or at least those liberals who still think the United States has an interest in the fight against Soviet imperialism.

But from the Reagan administration, Savimbi deserves more than the benefit of the doubt-and certainly more than . empty expressions of pious support. That the administration opposes giving him military aid violates the president's stated determination not to "break faith ... with those who are risking their lives to ... defy Soviet-supported aggression." It is also nothing less than a moral and political disgrace.

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Msr. 7057 2/7/86 Angola and American Aid

Norman Podhoretz, in his piece "Savimbi's Promise" [op-ed, Jan. 29], has once again demonstrated his inability to grasp the intricacies of foreign affairs, preferring to view all international events in "U.S. versus Soviet" terms.

UNITA leader Jonas Savimbi is no great democrat; he is an expedient and ruthless leader of a guerrilla group. His so-called democracy would consist of his personal ascendancy to a government dominated by his own ethnic group, the Ovimbundu. For all its many faults, the present MPLA government in Luanada has been multiethnic in composition, and has largely avoided the often deadly tribal conflicts that have plagued many other African states.

Mr. Savimbi is also no great fan of America. His comments about U.S. "imperialism" in Africa are well-documented. And America's only real economic interest in Angola, the Gulf Oil installation in Cabinda, has been a target of UNITA attacks. The irony in the fact that Gulf is now being defended by Cuban troops against guerrillas he supports is obviously too much for Mr. Podhoretz's narrow mind set to comprehend; he simply ignores the issue entirely.

Mr. Savimbi, though he certainly is no devotee of apartheid, is practiced at licking Pretoria's boots in exchange for aid. He comes and goes through South Africa and its fiefdom of Namibia, and even attended P. W. Botha's coronation as South Africa's "State President" in 1984. Most African leaders view him as little more than an agent of South African mischief in Angola, and any U.S. aid to Mr. Savimbi would be seen throughout Africa as active American support of South African objectives in the region. Aid to UNITA, therefore, could have a disastrous effect on our relations with black

Africa, while offering us little or no legitimate gain.

The MPLA government is none too thrilled with the continued Cuban presence in Angola, but U.S. aid to Mr. Sayimbi would mandate its continuance. Angolan President dos Santos worked with the United States and South Africa on a plan that would have phased out the Cuban forces in exchange for the freedom of Namibia and an end to border raids by South Africa. This plan fell through when South African agents were caught trying to sabotage the Gulf plant. Provided with the evidence to back up: Mr. dos Santos' claim that Cuban help was necessary to protect Angola from South African aggression, the U.S. Congress inexplicably repealed the Clark Amendment, thus opening the gates for the administration to start, sending aid to Mr. Savimbi.

U.S. help for Savimbi, whether overt or covert, would obviously do nothing to remove the Cubans from southern Africa. A much more sensible approach would be the one the United States has used so successfully in Mozambique: recognize the present government, encourage the country to open up economically and ideologically to the West and pressure South Africa to quit arming guerrillas who systematically devastate the economy and create a perceived need for Soviet or Cuban assistance.

C.IRISTOPHER MIDURA Washington

David Ottaway's article on Angola [Feb. 1] notes that Assistant Secretary of State Chester A. Crocker has advised companies to start thinking about "U.S. national interests" as well as their own corporate ones. This puts the vaunted private sector in an unusual bind.

First, there is the problem of determining what U.S. national interests

are in southern Africa in general and Angola in particular. The present "ring-around-the-rosy" with Jonas Savimbi has little apparent connection with the administration's "tough" stand on apartheid in 1985 or with the "strong support" for neighboring governments in the region:

Second, why should private U.S. firms have to keep a watchful eye on national interests in Angola, but not on national interests in Russia, China, etc.? Is the Angolan form of socialism so much more dangerous to the United States because of its Cuban tang?

What Mr. Crocker and this administration should do is develop a coherent policy on southern Africa—and stick to

JAMES S. FRIEDLANDER
McLean

MARY McGRORY

An Alibi for Proxy Wars

Gramm-Rudman-Hollings, the crazy budget-cutting contraption recently installed on Capitol Hill by people who admit they can't cut the budget without the help of a mechanical arm on the ax.

The damage it will do to domestic programs has been amply documented in recent weeks. But its peaceful uses may be appreciated if it can foil some of the preposterous foreign adventures put forward by President Reagan.

Take, for instance, the campaign to resume financing of Angolan guerrilla Jonas Savimbi, who is in town peddling "democracy" for his native country. Aid to the Angolan rebels was outlawed in 1975 by the so-called Clark Amendment, which put Angola off-limits after a clumsy CIA intervention there failed. (Last year, Congress repealed the Clark Amendment.)

But Reagan and his far-right followers, deprived of the thrill of direct anticommunist action, passionately promote proxy wars against Angola and Nicaragua, seeking to fill rebel war chests in both countries.

The Angola policy goes against reason, history—and U.S. business interests. David Rockefeller, for one, is vigorously opposed. But the Reaganites think that funding Savimbi will somehow result in the withdrawal of the Cuban troops who were brought in to save the government from defeat by the guerillas—and stayed on to guard the Chevron/Gulf Oil installations, which are periodically sabotaged by Savimbi and his South African allies.

Savimbi, a big, handsome, round-eyed opportunist, is making the rounds in Washington under the auspices of one of its high-powered public relations firms, Black, Manafort, Stone and Kelly, which is charging him \$600,000 for changing his image and his prospects. If plans for some \$15 million in aid succeed, American taxpayers will have the dubious pleasure of helping pay the bill for being conned.

Savimbi did well at the White House with President Reagan, who promised him "the most effective aid" he could. He is being lionized by the far right.

At the Conservative Political Action Conference banquet last week, former U.N. ambassador Jeane J. Kirkpatrick introduced him as "one of the few authentic heroes of our time."

To others, he appears more like a character in one of those darkly satiric

African novels by Evelyn Waugh. The conservatives' favorite "freedom fighter" was trained in guerrilla warfare in communist China, and at one time in his life was more antiwhite than antired. But his media chaperones have taught him to profess a mania for democracy.

In a breakfast visit with Washington Post editors and writers, Savimbi demonstrated considerable swagger. He said that the Gulf Oil Company (now part of Chevron), which has been getting along just fine with the Marxist rulers of Angola, would have to stop lobbying against his cause if it doesn't want to get blown up by his forces.

He also said he would not send a diplomatic representative to South Africa unless it abandoned apartheid. Other black states regard Savimbi as the puppet of the South Africans.

The administration once wanted to negotiate an end to the region's impasse, seeking the simultaneous withdrawal of Cuban troops from Angola and South African troops from neighboring Namibia. But these efforts were apparently dumped when the president backed aid to Savimbi, saying he would prefer the covert kind. It may be his way of expressing resentment at being forced to impose sanctions on South Africa.

Congress is bracing for his call to arms. Can it oppose funding "freedom fighters" and beat the "soft on communism" rap?
Gramm-Rudman-Hollings is the only alibi in sight.

The administration defiantly proposes about \$100 million for the faltering Nicaraguan contras. By starting the bidding high, it hopes to get a minimum \$30 million in humanitarian aid and perhaps the same amount or more for lethal stuff. There, as well, it has spurned negotiations. The Contadora countries, which seek a nonviolent settlement, have been put down hard.

Many Democrats agonize that they cannot get away with voting against both Savimbi and the contras. The one thing that may stiffen them is the thought of having to cut schools and playgrounds in their home districts—and, for heaven's sake, their own staffs.

It is possible that in the coming debates, we will see people diving for the cover of Gramm-Rudman-Hollings, professing a militant anticommunism while turning out their pockets to show there is nothing there to finance "the march of folly" abroad.

Secret Letter to Shultz Asks Arms for Savimbi

Senators Seeking Commitment on Angola

By Patrick Tyler
Washington Post Staff Writer

Late last week, Senate Majority Leader Robert J. Dole (R-Kan.) wrote a classified letter to Secretary of State George P. Shultz attempting to secretly clarify one of those nuances of foreign policy that leaders are often loath to put in writing.

The letter, a copy of which was made available to The Washington Post, demonstrates the intricate pulling and tugging between the Senate's conservative wing and the Reagan administration over the most effective way to support the anticommunist "freedom fighters" President Reagan has identified in a growing list of Third World countries.

The administration last month notified the House and Senate intelligence oversight committees that it plans to give covert assistance to Angolan guerrilla leader Jonas Savimbi, who last week completed a tour of Washington and New York to seek U.S. support for his fight against the Marxist gov-

ernment of Angola. The notification was by secret presidential "finding" under the National Security Act.

In late January, Shultz asked Senate leaders to give the administration an expression of support so the Central Intelligence Agency could proceed with the covert aid. Dole obliged by drafting a resolution urging U.S. support for Savimbi.

No such expression of support is required by law, but shrewd political instincts persuaded Reagan's national security advisers of the need for what some call "political cover" before they involved the United States in another CIA-backed paramilitary operation against a foreign power.

Despite the appearance of support for Savimbi in the upper reaches of the administration, a number of Savimbi's strongest supporters in the Senate suspected that other members of the administration would like to derail the covert operation, and last week they expressed their doubts to Dole.

Their chief concern was that the

administration would lend only moral support or some form of military assistance that fell short of Savimbi's critical needs: antitank and antiaircraft weapons to fight Soviet armor.

At a private lunch with Savimbi Feb. 5, Dole and a group of senators, most of them conservatives, developed a strategy to lock the administration into a commitment to give Savimbi what he says he needs.

The following letter, classified "secret" by Dole's staff because it implicitly refers to the pending covert operation, according to Republican Senate sources, is a gambit that is believed to have paid off for Savimbi.

Republican sources said this week that the White House and State Department are considering redrafting the president's secret "finding" for transmission to the Senate, but this time the presidential document would specifically call for providing Savimbi with lethal weapons to combat Soviet-built tanks and to shoot down Soviet-built assault helicopters.

The letter was signed by senators Dole, John Heinz (R-Pa.), Steve Symms (R-Idaho), William V. Roth Jr. (R-Del.), Mitch McConnell (R-Ky.), Orrin G. Hatch (R-Utah), Rohert W. Kasten Jr. (R-Wis.), Pete Wilson (R-Calif.), Jeremiah Denton (R-Ala.), James A. McClure (R-Idaho) and Phil Gramm (R-Texas).

ALM-CULTUM, MITHITIEN AND FONESTMY

READING BETWEEN THE LINES

This paragraph acknowledges that the administration's goal is to use paramilitary pressure to force the Marxist regime to negotiate the withdrawal of all Cuban troops and Soviet advisers from Angola in return for South Africa's withdrawal of forces from Namibia.

This paragraph states the senators' belief that supplying arms is the way to help . Savimbi and suggests that the administration needs to get specific on this point. This paragraph, according to sources, is the reason the letter was classified. For U.S. senators to openly discuss the provision of lethal weapons to rebel forces in a sovereign nation might violate not only Angola's national sensibilities. but also those of neighboring Zaire and Zambia, through which CIA aid would have to pass to reach Savimbi.

Finally, the senators make a subtle, politically artful proposal. They say they are willing to provide what has been called the "political cover" the administration wants for the CIA operation, . but only if the administration states in concrete terms (through some private channel) that the assistance will include antitank and antimissile weapons. They also raise the threat that the Senate would go ahead openly to provide Savimbi with antiarmor weapons if assurances are not forthcoming.

BOB DOLE

United States Senate

WASHINGTON OC 20510

February 6, 1986

The Honorable George ?. Shultz Secretary of State Department of State Washington, D.C. 20520

Dear Mr. Secretary:

· With the imminence of a new Communist offensive in Angola, it is imperative that the United States begin immediately to provide concrete assistance to the Angolan democratic resistance forces, under the leadership of UNITA and Dr. Jonas Savimbi.

Such assistance is needed to achieve the goals we all seek in Angola -- an end to the massive Soviet and Cuban troop presence and a negotiated political settlement. We understand that the President wishes to provide such assistance, and it would be consistent with your own public statements of the need to provide "effective" aid to the democratic resistance.

To meet the threat posed by the Communist offensive, such assistance must include defensive weaponry effective against the massive, modern weaponry provided to the MPLA by the Soviet Union, such as tanks and attack helicopters.

If you believe it would be useful, we are prepared to introduce and seek speedy passage of a Senate resolution of support for UNITA. We would do so, though, only on the firm assurance that it was part of, and not a substitute for, an overall strategy to provide vitally needed and to the democratic resistance on a timely basis. Absent such an assurance, we are prepared to press for Congressional action to initiate a program of effective material assistance to UNITA.

Sincerely yours

BOB DOLE United States Senate

Angola's PR War wasn. 1857 2/7/86.

The war in Angola is getting meaner and meaner. On one side is our ally, Jonas Savimbi and his UNITA guerrillas. The immediate target of their fight--ing is the Marxist government, which is supported by Cuban troops and Soviet advisers. Now both sides have escalated the fight. They have hired Washington public relations firms.

For something like \$600,000 Savimbi has armed himself with Black, Manafort, Stone & Kelly, which not only does public relations, but lobbying and, for all I know, windows as well. In an interview, Savimbi said he was waiting to see how well Black, Manafort, Stone & Kelly perform before signing a contract with them, but he claimed—almost patting his pocket that his movement controls 80 percent of Angola's diamond production. The check is all but in the mail.

The Angola government has responded in kind. The Marxist regime has secured the services of Gray and Co., whose chairman, Robert Keith - Gray, headed President Reagan's inaugural committee and once worked in the Eisenhower White House. The Angolans are, for the moment, going month

to month with Gray, at an initial rate of \$20,000 per. Diamonds may be a girl's best friend, but it's likely Gray insisted on cash.

We may assume that this fight between Washington's premier Republican PR firms will be bloody and protracted (Roger Stone, a partner in Black, Manafort is known for taking no prisoners) and may come down to desperate restaurant-to-restaurant eating along K Street. We may also assume that, diamonds or no diamonds, should the United Staes resume aid to Savimbi. some of the money will come right to Black, Manafort, et al. And, finally, we may assume that when Washington's most illustrious Republican public relations firm takes a Marxist government as a client something is totally wacko.

That something is U.S. policy in southern Africa. It is so chaotic, so confusing and so illogical that not only can our national interest not be discerned, but it's also possible to break bread on either side of it and claim, as Gray does, that he is in total consonance with it. (He, too, would like to see Cuban and Soviets troops leave Angola.)

President Reagan mentioned Angola

in his State of the Union speech—"You are not alone, freedom fighters." But he did not mention that his freedom fighters were allied with South Africa and had, on occasion, served as Pretoria's bounty hunters in nearby Namibia. The flowery rhetoric failed to mention that Savimbi is viewed elsewhere in Africa as South Africa's stooge. Like details concerning the budget, such information was probably deemed not quite ready for prime time.

Indeed, the administration's reflexive anticommunism has all but obliterated familiar political labels. Liberalism argues that U.S. policy should be independent of corporate interests. In Angola, though, it is the conservative administration that makes that case. It has suggested to Gulf Oil that it get out of Angola. Poor Gulf. Once it was the corporate personification of the conservative Mellon and Pew families; now it must turn to liberals for solace: can't it stay in Angola and make a buck?

No, says the administration with nary a suggestion that it appreciates corporations to do in Angola (get out) er's got to eat, doesn't he?

precisely the opposite of what it has asked them to do in South Africa (stay in). Constructive Engagement in South Africa becomes Destructive Engagement in Angola-all the more so since South Africa, with the alleged help of UNITA, has attemped to destroy Gulf's Angola installations.

Much of the world must look at this performance with consternation. It seems that what really gets the United States angry is not raw, repressive racists, but Marxists-even those with Gulf credit cards. Especially in black Africa, we are proving that given a choice between racism and Marxism, we will choose racism any day. At the very least, we know more about it.

The fight between two of Washington's better-known public relations firm is an apt metaphor for a policy that's degenerated into confusion. Where the administration proclaims universal rights and wrongs and the moral obligation to underwrite an insurgency, PR men will take you to lunch to argue just the opposite. Like most other Washingthe irony of its answer. In its anticom- ton issues, the war in Angola has bemunist zeal, it has asked American come tax deductible. A freedom fight-

DIA Alone. In Optimism For Savimbi


CIA, State Dept. Fear UNITA Failure

> By David B. Ottaway and Patrick Tyler

Washington Post Staff Writers

Two of the three U.S. intelligence agencies have concluded that the pro-Western guerrilla movement led by Jonas Savimbi has no chance of winning on the battlefield against the Marxist Angolan government and little prospect of joining a coalition, according to congressional and intelligence sources.

Nevertheless, the sole agency that predicts a possible military and political victory by Savimbi--the . Pentagon's Defense Intelligence Agency—has for several months shared intelligence information with



UNITA leader Jonas Savimbi speaking at the Heritage Foundation yesterday.

him and provided communications support to his guerrillas, according

to Pentagon and other sources. One source said the intelligencesharing and other nonlethal aid, which reportedly began in December, was the first part of a twostage covert assistance program approved by President Reagan and his national security advisers last November. Savimbi, who has been lobbying for U.S. military aid here since early last week, has met with Secretary of Defense Caspar W. Weinberger and held three sessions--two of them hastily squeezed into his hectic lobbying schedule this week-with DIA officials to receive fresh intelligence reports and discuss his specific military needs, these sources say.

See SAVIMBI, A22, Col. 1

A22 FRIDAY, FEBRUARY 7, 1986

THE WASHINGTON POST

DOD Hopeful That Savimbi Will Prevail

SAVIMBL, From A1

· Contrary to the DIA's optimistic assessment of Savimbi's prospects, the Central Intelligence Agency and the State Department Bureau of Intelligence and Research have concluded that he "can't win and can't force a coalition government" on the Marxist leaders in Luanda, according to two sources familiar with the evaluations of all three intelligence agencies.

The DIA holds the view that Savimbi could prevail if he holds on long enough to provoke dissension within the Luanda government and triggers a military coup that would favor his cause, one source said.

The conflicting assessments of Savimbi's prospects by analysts of the CIA, DIA and Bureau of Intelligence have come in the midst of an intense debate within the administration and Congress over whether the United States should resume its involvement, after a decade of abstinence, in the Angolan civil war.

One intelligence source said the three agencies were not only divided among themselves in their assessments but in some cases "the lower level was not agreeing with the top" within individual agencies. Some judgments at the top on these issues appeared to reflect "political wishful thinking" rather than "hardnosed, on-the-ground assessments, the source said.

CIA Director William J. Casey was previously reported among those in the administration most supportive of proposals to provide Savimbi with assistance in his struggle. Savimbi lunched with Casey last week and also met with CIA officials who are involved in planning U.S. covert support for his guerrilla forces, according to one informed source.

CIA analysts, however, believe the proposed level of U.S. military aid for Savimbi's struggle is insufficient to make a difference in the military equation on the ground or force any change in the Marxist

government's refusal to discuss a coalition with the rebels.

The Reagan administration has approved an initial \$10 million to \$15 million covert military aid program, but congressional conservatives want a much larger U.S. commitment of either covert or overt aid. A major administration objective in helping Savimbi is to urge the Angolan government to accept reconciliation with Savimbi and give his National Union for the Total Independence of Angola (UNITA) a place in the government.

Savimbi was one of two pro-Western leaders aided by the United States at the start of the Angolan civil war in 1975, when the CIA spent \$32 million trying to pre-. vent the Marxist faction from seizing power. However, in January 1976. Congress passed legislation ending CIA involvement in the war.

As in the mid-1970s, the administration, Congress and the intelligence community are again deeply

divided over the wisdom of entanglement in the Angolan conflict.

Conservatives have cast the Savimbi aid issue in terms of an ultimate test of the so-called "Reagan Doctrine," the administration's declared objective of aiding anticommunist "freedom fighters" in their struggles against Soviet- and Cuban-backed governments.

"The Reagan Doctrine pretty much hinges on Angola," remarked a House conservative staffer involved in the campaign to help Savimbi.

"It will also set a precedent for the contras," he added, referring to the administration's recently announced plan to ask Congress for up to \$100 million in military and other aid for the U.S.-backed anticommunist forces fighting the Sandinista government in Nicaragua.

Opponents of U.S. involvement in Angola, who include 500 academic specialists on Africa who have pe-

See SAVIMBI, A23, Col. 1

DIA Alding UIVIIA Despite Skepticism

SAVIMBI, From A22

titioned Congress to block aid to Savimbi, are warning that the United States is heading for an entangling, and inevitably damaging, alliance with South Africa that will have repercussions for American foreign policy in black Africa.

The debate within the intelligence community has centered on a number of interrelated issues, including Soviet intentions in Angola, Savimbi's military and political prospects, and his strategy in seeking to battle the military pressure on his forces.

Savimbi and his conservative backers here have made much of the growing Soviet and Cuban involvement in the war on behalf of the Angolan government. The pro-UNITA voices point to the arrival of \$2 billion in Soviet arms, the increase in the number of Cuban troops to 35,000 and the peril of annihilation that UNITA forces face

from an expected large government offensive this spring.

CIA Director Casey reportedly believes Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev was personally responsible for upping the Soviet-bloc ante in Angola, according to intelligence sources. U.S. analysts say, however, that the Soviet arms buildup and increase in Cuban troops began in early 1984 and was mostly completed by the time Gorbachev came to power last March.

Savimbi and his backers here also argue that the Soviets and Angola's Marxist rulers are responsible for the recent escalation. But U.S. intelligence sources say there is strong evidence that the Angolan government has been responding to an initial UNITA escalation that began in 1983. That UNITA escalation was supported by considerable South African military and logistical aid, and was launched with the publicly declared intent of massing 20,000 guerrillas in Luanda

Province by the end of 1984 for a major attack on the capital.

Savimbi made such good progress in spreading his guerrilla war from his stronghold in southeast Angola to the northeast and northern parts of the country that South Africa's military intelligence had concluded that his forces stood a good chance of achieving a military victory, according to one U.S. intelligence scurce.

One well-informed source said that the recent DIA support for Savimbi has included upgraded communications equipment as part of the nordethal phase of covert assistance. Details of that equipment unavailable, although were Savimbi's geographically dispersed forces are believed to need radio equipment to link them together.

The DIA, which reportedly has ties to South African military intelligence, adopted this view, the source said. The Pentagon agency still holds that UNITA has the po-

United States and others, to fight government forces to a stalemate.

The argument being made by some DIA and other intelligence analysts is that there is "a very strong likelihood" of such a stalemate and a "fairly strong" prospect for a coalition government including UNITA, the source added.

Other CIA analysts have concluded, however, that UNITA does not have the military strength to create such a stalemate, particularly with the Soviets and Cubans increasingly committed to the Marxist central Angolan government. They believe Savimbi is being drawn into a conventional-style war of defending fixed positions, especially his headquarters in Jamba, and that such battle tactics may be catastrophic to his forces.

These analysts say Savimbi should give up this strategy and return to a more mobile style of warfare in which U.S. antiaircraft missiles and antitank guns-the main two items he is seeking from ; the United States-would not be so crucial to UNITA's survival.

Savimbi says U.S. arms would spur negotiations

By Edward Neilan
THE WASHINGTON TIMES

2/7/86

Guerrilla leader Jonas Savimbi said yesterday that if the United States comes through with the "most effective" aid promised by President Reagan, his troops could force the Soviet and Cubanbacked Marxist government of Angola to the negotiating table within a year.

On the other hand, he said, "If the aim of the administration is to give us maximum exposure, a high profile and nothing more, we will return home more endangered, more vulnerable than before."

"Timing is all-important," Mr. Savimbi, president of the National Union for the Total Independence of Angola (UNITA), told a luncheon meeting of senior editors and writers at The Washington Times.

"We need the aid, including the right equipment, right now ... before April when a Soviet offensive is coming. July would be too late," he said.

The "right equipment" that Mr. Savimbi wants includes anti-tank and anti-aircraft missiles — "100 to 200 missiles are needed" — to blunt the anticipated Soviet-backed and led (with 1,500 Soviet military advisers) offensive.

"This equipment we need would cost between \$50. to \$60 million," Mr. Savimbi said. "We will leave it to the Congress to decide whether the aid delivery is overt or covert," he said.

The UNITA leader, whose forces have been fighting Portuguese and Soviet colonialism for 20 years, said he didn't need humanitarian aid. "We didn't come all the way over here to ask for boots and bandages," he said.

"We explained completely what we wanted and we are going back with a firm commitment from President Reagan," Mr. Savimbi said.

"The impact of American assistance to us will convince European countries to help us more," he added. All of the doctors working with UNITA are from Spain, France and Italy, he said.

Mr. Savimbi emphasized that "strengthening UNITA" was the only way to get the Angolan government to the negotiating table. "If we don't continue the pressure on the government in Luanda, we will lose everything," he said. "If we go back from Washington with nothing

"We need the aid, including the right equipment, right now... before April when a Soviet offensive is coming. July would be too late." The "right equipment" that Mr. Savimbi wants includes anti-tank and anti-aircraft missiles.

we will satisfy only our enemies."

The UNITA leader, on the final day of his Washington visit, said that "What is being promised now . . . if done two years ago, total victory would have been possible." He added that Moscow had greatly reinforced government military strength in the last two years.

Mr. Savimbi said he had repeatedly told Chester Crocker, assistant secretary of state for African affairs, that the only way to get the Angolan government to talk is from a position of strength. "He may try to continue to talk but the facts of life are that he's not going to get the MPLA [Angolan government] to the table unless they're forced," Mr. Savimbi said.

UNITA's position was that "all of the Cuban troops" must leave Angola as well as the 1,500 Soviets, 1,500 East Germans and 2,000 North Koreans, the leader said. There are an estimated 35,000 Cuban troops in Angola today.

Mr. Savimbi characterized his visit here as "very successful." He said that before arrival he was not sure of Secretary of State George Shultz's attitude, but he was present when the president pledged "most effective" aid and Mr. Shultz agreed. The UNITA leader said the issue of royalties from the Chevron-Gulf installation at Cabinda was raised only by Mr. Crocker.

He said one of the fringe benefits of the visit was "a number of positive signals which we have received from our




Photo by Kevin Gilbert The Washington Times

Jonas Savimbi

friends in other countries while we were here."

As for criticism that UNITA is a stooge for South Africa, Mr. Savimbi said he is definitely against apartheid. "We don't understand apartheid but we understand South Africa," he said. "When I ask for some ammunition they (South Africa) provide it if they can. There is no fixed budget of military aid."

More important than South African support, Mr. Savimbi said, was the fact that "12 black African countries support us." As has been the case before other forums, he declined to name the states which supported UNITA.

One of the disappointments of his visit here, he said, was the refusal of Congressional Black Caucus members and some other black leaders to meet with him:

"It is a pity that in such a democratic country, the caucus does not have the courage to come forward and debate with me," Mr. Savimbi said. Requested meetings with Rep. William Gray, Democrat from Pennsylvania, Delegate Walter Fauntroy, District of Columbia Democrat, and TransAfrica leader Randall Robinson were "on again, off again" and no meetings were held.

"Their false statements made publicly about UNITA show they don't have the facts," said Mr. Savimbi, adding: "It is interesting that here where there is the freedom to debate, there is also the freedom to run away."

Savimbi Visit Puzzles Southern Africans

By Glenn Frankel Washington Post Foreign Service

HARARE, Zimbabwe, Feb. 2-To the black-ruled nations perched uneasily on South Africa's borders, the Reagan administration's foreign policy in this volatile region appears to have come unhinged with last week's embrace of Angolan rebel leader Jonas Savimbi.

On the Indian Ocean side of southern Africa, Washington is now supporting the Marxist-oriented government of Mozambique, which

ANALYSIS

is battling anticommunist guerrillas. Admindistration officials have

justified this as part of its policy of "constructive engagement" with all the states of southern Africa.

on the Atlantic side, "condive engagement" has given anticommunist fervor. Washington has decided to aid rebel leader Savimbi, who also gets military aid from Pretoria, in his efforts to overthrow a Marxist government that bears a striking resemblance to that of Mozambique.

While in Mozambique the administration has committed more than -\$5 million to rebuild a railway line: that is vital to regional transportation, in Angola it plans to help rebels who have destroyed another key regional railroad.

The seeming contradiction is baffling and frightening to the region's black governments. Having stood by helplessly as the government of Lesotho, one of their number, fell two weeks ago under heavy South African pressure, many fear that they may be next and that the United States will do little or nothing to protect them.

Their fears and confusion were splay last week at a conference here of nine southern African states-Mozambique, Angola, Botswana, Swaziland, Lesotho, Zambia, Tanzania, Malawi and Zimba-. bwe—with 37 other nations, including the United States, to discuss ruled neighbor.

South Africa prefers to view it-



JONAS SAVIMBI ... ties to Pretoria rankle neighbors

self as the region's economic big brother, but its black neighbors see it as having a stranglehold on their economies. Nearly 80 percent of trade in the region's five landlocked states flows through South African ports, railways and roads, and three ' rely on South Africa for all of their oil supplies. It also supplies work for migrants.

Although little was said publicly, some delegates clearly were upset that U.S. representatives were discussing economic development here while President Reagan was extending a warm welcome to a rebel movement that has destroyed a significant portion of the region's in-1 frastructure of roads and railways.

U.S. support for Savimbi, said Simba Makoni, the regional official who organized the gathering, was "misdirected and very costly both for our region and for the people of An-

Makoni is executive secretary of the nine states' Southern Africa Development Coordinating Conference. He said support for Savimbi's movement would only prolong the bush war that has impoverished Angola and undermined regional develop-. ment for more than two decades.

"There will be no development, how to wean this region from eco. no stability, no western democracy, nomic dependence on its white was free enterprises system to talker tion who claim that their only goal about," said Makoni of the stated, in southern Africa is the achieve-U.S. goals, "It will only result in

further suffering for the poor people of Angola."

The administration has told congressional intelligence committees it is considering an initial outlay of up to \$15 million in covert aid to Savimb's National Union for the Total Independence of Angola, while conservative Republican lawmakers are pushing for \$27 million in overt aid.

The Angolan representative here, l'edro de Castro Van-Dunem, Cabinet minister in charge of energy and a senior member of the ruling Politburo, said his government estimated that Savimbi's rebel movement and periodic South African military operations inside Angola had cost more than \$10 billion in ruined infrastructure during the past decade.

The Reagan administration contends that it seeks to play the role of "honest broker" in the region, promoting dialogue between South Africa and its black neighbors and encouraging both sides to talk out their disputes.

Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs Chester A. Crocker became unpopular early with the proposal that independence for the South African-controlled territory of Nanibia be linked to the withdrawal of Cuban troops from neighboring Angola. Many African leaders would like to see the Cubans quit Angola but view the linkage as injecting cold war issues into the matter of independence for Africa's sole remaining colony.

Despite those objections, many southern African states gradually came to accept Crocker's claim that the administration was seeking warmer ties around the region. The developing entente between Washington and Mozambique, along with Crocker's efforts to negotiate a peace settlement between Angola and South Africa, persuaded many to accept his sincerity, if not his policy.

But many Africans say aid to Savimbi runs sharply counter to Crocker's claimed policy and threatens to damage American standing here. Zimbabwe's Ministry of Foreign Affairs issued a weekend statement saying Savimbi's visit to the White House "must, once again, call into doubt the sincerity and, indeed, the morality of those within the present American administra-

See AFRICA, A20, Col. 6

U.S. Reception Of Savimbi Found Puzzling

AFRICA, From A17

ment of peace, justice and equality for all."

The conference delegates reportedly had agreed to avoid this subject. But strong denunciations are likely to be heard Monday, when the region's foreign ministers meet in Lusaka, Zambia.

The one official to raise publicly the charge of U.S. collusion with South Africa was conference chairman Peter Mmusi, one of the most conservative black leaders here. Mmusi is vice president of Botswana, one of Africa's few multiparty democracies, a nation that is under growing pressure from neighboring South Africa to prevent infiltration by black South African rebels seeking to overthrow white rule.

American diplomats here argued that what are known as the "frontline states" would do better to use their influence to persuade the Angolan government to negotiate a peace settlement with Savimbi's UNITA rather than criticizing the United States.

"The Soviets pour in \$2 billion in weapons to Angola and no one here criticizes them for interfering, yet when we talk about giving a token sum to a legitimate nationalist movement, we get accused of destabilizing the entire region," said Mark Edelman, assistant Africa administrator for the Agency for laternational Development, who led the U.S. delegation.

While many privately recognize Savimvi as a genuine black nationalist and some maintain ties to his movement, most believe that he has been tainted by his reliance on South African money and military assistance.

Covert UNITA Aid Opposed on Hill

Intelligence Panel Chairmen Say Any Such Help Should Be Open

By David B. Ottaway
Washington Post Staff Writer 1/27

The chairmen of the Senate and House intelligence committees have decided to oppose covert military assistance to noncommunist forces fighting in Angola and are urging the Reagan administration instead to seek to convince Congress of the need for an open assistance program.

The bipartisan advice from Sen. David F. Durenberger (R-Minn.), chairman of the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, and his counterpart in the House, Rep. Lee H. Hamilton (D-Ind.), came as the administration indicated yesterday that it still prefers a new covert-aid program to the National Union for

the Total Independence of Angola (UNITA) headed by Jonas Savimbi, who arrives in Washington today for an intensive two-week lobbying campaign for U.S. support.

Durenberger said in an interview yesterday that he felt "fairly strongly" that any U.S. aid to UNITA "ought to be overt" and approved by Congress. He said he is pressing the administration "to go that route."

That sentiment was echoed by Sen. Patrick J. Leahy (D-Vt.), ranking minority member of the Senate intelligence committee, who said, "If we're going to get involved in these kinds of activities, then we ought to do it overtly, not covertly."

Hamilton concurred, saying that such "a major policy decision" re-

quires full congressional debate and approval.

That resistance from senior congressional leadership is likely to make the administration's pursuit of covert aid for UNITA more difficult. The administration has submitted to the intelligence committees a proposal for an initial \$10 million to \$15 million in covert military and other assistance to Savimbi. Yesterday, White House deputy press spokesman Edward P. Djerejian suggested that the administration still favors the covert approach.

Although the administration would welcome an expression of public support from Congress for

See COVERT, A12, Col. 1

Hill Chairmen Oppose Covert Assistance to UNITA

COVERT, From A1

Savimbi, he said, "what we in the administration have in mind clearly is more than just moral support for UNITA."

"The administration is seeking all appropriate support for UNITA which will be effective. We are working with Congress toward this end," he said.

State Department spokesman Bernard Kalb, signaling White House opposition to congressional proposals for up to \$50 million in open U.S. aid to Savimbi in his decade-long fight against the Marxist regime in Angola, said the administration "does not believe that legislation mandating aid to UNITA

would be an effective way to proceed."

A senior White House official said yesterday that Reagan intends to publicly embrace the goals of Savimbi during his visit. "Then you've created a measure of public pressure on yourself not to stand aside and let things go under" when Savimbi may be involved in more intense fighting later this year, the official said.

Underlying opposition to covert aid is congressional unease over the expanding role of the Central Intelligence Agency in open-ended guerrilla wars against Soviet- and Cuban-backed regimes. Many members of Congress question whether such activities are appropriate for

the CIA. They also voice concern that resources and energy will be diverted from the agency's primary task of gathering and evaluating intelligence.

Reflecting on the congressional concern, Hamilton said, "If you want to provide money to Savimbi, you ought to make the request to Congress and have an open debate. It's an important significant departure with great ramifications [for the United States] beyond Savimbi and Angola.

"That kind of decision ought not to be submitted to a few members of Congress who do not have the power to disapprove," he added, referring to his committee's legal inability to stop CIA operations.

Leahy and Hamilton limited their comments to their feelings about how Congress should deal with the issue in general and avoided discussion of the administration's proposal now before their committees. Leahy said he had no position yet on whether the United States should give any aid to Savimbi.

Some Republican members of the Senate intelligence committee now appear to favor the approach spelled out in a resolution submitted Dec. 10 by Senate Majority Leader Robert J. Dole (R-Kan.) and five cosponsors, including Durenberger, that would make U.S. aid for UNITA and possible economic sanctions against Angola later this

year dependent upon the Angolan government's policies.

If Angola's Marxist leadership refuses to engage in "good-faith negotiations" with UNITA and continues preparations for a new military offensive against Savimbi, the resolution said, "then the Senate would support the provision early in 1986 of material assistance to UNITA and would impose economic sanctions against those sectors of the Angolan economy which provide resources to support the Cuban troop presence."

The latter refers to Angolan oil exports, which mostly go to the United States. The United States, with \$1.1 billion in 1984, was Angola's largest trading partner.



REP. LEE H. HAMILTON ... "you ought to have open debate"

Angola Bars Coalition With Rebels

WASH. 705T. 1/24

By David B. Ottaway
Washington Post Staff Writer

Angola's Marxist government is not prepared to enter a coalition with noncommunist opposition forces led by Jonas Savimbi, an Angolan envoy said yesterday, warning the Reagan administration that it would be backing "a loser" if it decides to provide him with military or other assistance.

A national coalition government is "out," Angolan Foreign Trade Minister Ismael Gaspar-Martins said, because Savimbi's National Union for the Total Independence of Angola (UNITA) is regarded by the government as "an offshoot of South Africa" and is not a "national" movement.

"It's like telling you, 'All right, let's form a world government, bring Mr. Gorbachev and Mr. Reagan together and let them create a national government.' It cannot be done," Gaspar-Martins said.

The Reagan administration has been seeking a reconciliation between the Angolan government and UNITA as part of an overall settlement of various conflicts in southern Africa.

In addition, several senators have indicated that their decision on whether to back an administration proposal for military and other aid to UNITA would depend partly on the government's willingness to negotiate with Savimbi.

Gaspar-Martins, a foreign-policy adviser to President Jose Eduardo dos Santos, said his visit only a few days before Savimbi's arrival here to lobby for U.S. military assistance was purely a "coincidence."

But he went out of his way to make known his government's views on the congressional debate under way over the administration's proposal to begin providing covert aid to UNITA.

Gaspar-Martins warned that such a U.S. commitment to Savimbi is bound to have a negative impact on U.S.-brokered negotiations between his government and South Africa for withdrawal of Cuban troops from Angola and independence for South African-administered Namibia. But he did not say Angola would break off the talks.

He said Angola, in the latest discussions with Assistant Secretary of State Chester A. Crocker, has renewed an offer to withdraw Cuban troops from the southern part of the country and send most of them home but is not ready to make more concessions.

Angola is awaiting word from Crocker, who has just returned from South Africa, as to whether South Africa has new proposals regarding its withdrawal from Namibia and a schedule for independence elections there.

Gaspar-Martins also sought to dissuade Congress and the administration from making a commitment militarily or politically to Savimbi. He said UNITA forces have repeatedly engaged in the kind of terrorist activities against civilian targets in a guerrilla war against the central government that the Reagan administration has been condemning elsewhere.

He noted that, at its summit last summer, the Organization of African Unity criticized Savimbi's movement and U.S. proposals to begin aiding it. U.S. aid would be condemned as "a very unfriendly act not only against Angola but the rest of Africa," he said.

"I think the United States is backing the loser. Savimbi is a loser. He cannot win," Gaspar-Martins said.

"To us, you know, he is called 'Judas' Savimbi because of his treason, linking himself to South Africa," he said.

Why we should aid Savimbi

anford Ungar wrote recently in The Washington Post that Jonas Savimbi, the charismatic leader of Angola's freedom fighters, is a "bad bet." Mr. Ungar, who is a well-known liberal activist masquerading as a journalist, is flat out, unequivocally wrong.

Not only is Mr. Savimbi a good bet, he and his forces, known as UNITA (the National Union for the Total Independence of Angola), are the key to turning back the Soviet assault on southern Africa.

The pivotal flaw of Mr. Ungar's analysis is that he does not see the war in Angola for what it is - a struggle against Soviet colonialism - but as a "civil war" unrelated to U.S. national security interests. Mr. Ungar says UNITA is undeserving of U.S. support and that Mr. Savimbi's forces cannot win. He is wrong on both counts.

How can any clear-thinking person describe a war waged against an indigenous population by 35,000 armed Cuban invaders assisted by several thousand Soviet and East German "advisers" as a civil war?

According to the U.S. State Department, in the last 18 months the Soviets have unloaded some \$2 billion worth of military hardware in Angola, including MiG-23 and MiG-21 jets, MiG-24 helicopter gunships (the same weapon they use in their genocidal assault against the Afghan people) and T-62 and T-55 tanks, as well as trucks and armored personnel carriers.

Without Cuban troops and a massive amount of weapons supplied by the Soviet bloc, the illegitimate MPLA (Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola) regime would

collapse tomorrow. Mr. Ungar's portrayal of Mr. Savimbi as an "opportunist" is shameful. I have had the privilege of meeting Mr. Savimbi and have been exremely impressed by his honesty, integrity, religious commitment, and knowledge of international affairs. He is a renowned statesman who insists on sharing the same dangers and hardships as his troops. During his 20 years of fighting to liberate Angola, first from Portuguese control and later from the MPLA, he has traversed at least 30,000 kilometers on foot. He is an expert military strategist inspired by deeply held religious beliefs.

A hard-working man, Mr. Savimbi

senator from Utah.

rises at 4 a.m. and dresses in army fatigues instead of flamboyant attire. His oratory skills are second to none. It is easy to see why Mr. Savimbi has won the love and admiration of his troops.

Under the heroic leadership of Mr. Savimbi and Brig. Gen. Tito Chingunge, UNITA has developed into an extremely effective fighting force. When some 20,000 Cuban troops launched the first MPLA offensive against Mr. Savimbi in February of 1976, UNITA had less than 5,000 fighters. By March, only 67 were left. MPLA army commmanders claimed that the remaining "pockets" of "bandit" resistance would be wiped out within a matter

Today UNITA has 60,000 troops, including 34,000 guerrillas and 26,000 regulars, and controls a third of Angola.

Impressively, UNITA blunted a major two-pronged MPLA attack last fall - first at Cazombo, near the Angola-Zambia border, and then at Mavinga, a key UNITA stronghold only 200 miles northwest of its base at Jamba in southwestern Angola.

Mr. Savimbi reports that the assault was directly coordinated by Soviet officers, 15 to a brigade. Their aim was to continue their drive and crush Jamba itself. More than 5,000 MPLA soldiers drove toward Mavinga, fully equipped with armored personnel carriers, tanks, artillery, and air cover. Outnumbering the MPLA forces 4-to-1, UNITA forces surrounded the MPLA and halted the offensive 17 miles northwest of Mavinga.

Mr. Savimbi captures two-thirds of his weapons from the MPLA, so overall, UNITA is doing well in terms of weapons and supplies. However, like the Afghan mujahideen and the Nicaraguan "contras," Mr. Savimbi's freedom fighters desperately need anti-aircraft weapons to defend themselves against Soviet Hind helicopter gunships. These "flying tanks" are equipped with heavy machine guns and can fire anti-tank missiles and drop bombs.

Mr. Savimbi has said that if UNITA had had enough anti-aircraft missiles when the Soviets attacked Mavinga last October, his forces could have destroyed the entire Soviet high command. So the amount of aid needed to tip the scales in UNITA's favor is small compared to its potential returns.

Mr. Ungar calls Mr. Savimbi an "anti-capitalist, anti-American revolutionary." To the contrary, Mr. Savimbi advocates a mixed economy in which the peasants, not the state, own farm land.

he MPLA's wholesale nationalization program has transformed the oncethriving Angolan economy into a nightmare. Formerly a food exporter, Angola must now import a large portion of its food, while its diamond and gold mines, which once

ernment who seek a negotiated settlement and provide the MPLA with an incentive to end the war. If and when a negotiated settlement is reached, we will welcome Angola back into the world economy.

The battle for Angola is not a "civil war." It is a battle over ideologies: Soviet totalitarianism vs. freedom, self-determination, and democracy. U.S. aid to UNITA will send a strong signal to the world that the Reagan Doctrine is not mere words, that we are determined to help freedom fighters resist Communist hegemony.

If we turn a deaf ear to UNITA at this critical moment, other southern African nations will believe that we have abandoned them to the Soviets, just as the West abandoned Czechoslovakia and Eastern Europe to Hitler in 1938. It would be disastrous to the West for southern Africa - which contains vital strategic minerals and controls the Cape Sea route - to come under Soviet con-

Last July, Congress sent a strong political message by its overwhelming repeal of the 1976 Clark Amendment which prohibited aid to UNITA. The next logistical step is to translate this legislative mandate

into action. I have written a letter to President Reagan urging him to use his authority under the McCollum Amendment to make available nonlethal excess Department of Defense supplies to UNITA. Through my own private contacts with Mr. Savimbi, he has expressed a keen interest in obtaining such supplies

for his forces. This initiative would send a clear message to the people of Angola and the friends of freedom everywhere that the Reagan Doctrine is not mere rhetoric, that we back our expressions of solidarity with freedom fighters with tangible support.

The geopolitical stakes are enormous; the moral choice is clear. It would be a grave mistake to send Mr. Savimbi home empty-handed.



Jonas Savimbl

Orrin G. Hatch is a Republican

made Angola a wealthy country, are losing money. As Mr. Savimbi has stated, "Only the Communists could turn gold mining into a losing prop-

Mr. Ungar's apparent sympathy for Gulf-Chevron, which reportedly pumps \$1.5 billion directly into the illegitimate MPLA regime, defies logic. It is Gulf Oil - not UNITA that should be questioned about its commitment to freedom. Congress should investigate the implications of Gulf's operations in Cabinda, Angola's oil-rich province, in light of U.S. policy interests in the region.

Mr. Savimbi's goal is to pressure the MPLA into negotiation with UNITA, leading to free elections with a guarantee that the winner of the elections will govern Angola. It was the MPLA - not UNITA which abrogated the 1975 Alvor agreement, signed by the Portuguese, UNITA, the FNLA, and the MPLA, guaranteeing free elections.

U.S. aid will strengthen the hand of moderates within the MPLA gov-

ABROAD AT HOME | Anthony Lewis

Rhetoric and Reality

WASHINGTON onas Savimbi, leader of the Unita rebels in Angola and darling of the American right, is coming to Washington this week with ruffles and drums. He will see Secretary of War Or State Shultz, and very likely President Reagan. His admirers will hail him as a valiant fighter for democracy and enemy of Communism.

The Savimbi visit is an acute reminder of a familiar American phenomenon. That is the way a supposedly practical-minded people can mix up rhetoric and reality in foreign

policy.

In reality, Mr. Savimbi is an altogether unlikely conservative hero. When he was here five years ago, he said he favored a Maoist commune system for agriculture. He told The Wall Street Journal: "You can't apply capitalism in Africa." He has shown no interest in democracy in Unita. He uses terrorist methods, including the taking of hostages and the shooting down of civilian aircraft.

Over the years Mr. Savimbi has played many ideological tunes. He has embraced Marxism, called for black power, been supported by white South Africa. He is in fact a charismatic politician whose interest is in power and is not choosy about who or what helps him. There is nothing unusual or reprehensible about that. It just does not fit the American conservatives' description of him as a "freedom fighter."

What really attracts Jack Kemp and Jeane Kirkpatrick and the rest to Mr. Savimbi, of course, is that the Angolan Government he opposes is Marxist. Moreover, it is supported by some 30,000 Cuban troops. They were first called in 11 years ago, when South Africa invaded newly-independent Angola and tried to install Unita in power. They have remained to help oppose Unita and South African incursions.

The Cubans again raise the question of rhetoric and reality. The United States wants to see them out of Angola. What is the most effective

way to achieve that?

The hard-line conservatives here want to push the Cubans out by force of arms. That is, they want Mr. Savimbi to do so - with our help. Some in Congress want overt aid. The C.I.A. chief, William Casey, has been pushing for covert military support.

The alternative idea is diplomacy. The Reagan Administration has been trying for five years to work out a deal for the Cubans to leave Angola if and as South Africa leaves Namibia, the huge territory bordering Angola that it illegally occupies.

Which is more likely to get the Cubans out, war or diplomacy?

In Angola,

War has almost no chance of working: That is clear from experience. South Africa has given the Savimbi forces vast support, and used its own. men and planes in Angola. The result has been to make the Angolan Government call in more Cubans and become more reliant on Soviet weapons.

Indeed, the notion that American aid can turn the military tide and achieve victory for Unita is too silly > for rational discussion. Unless, that." is, the supporters of the idea foresee. full-scale U.S. intervention, including troops -- and that they deny.

Diplomacy is enormously difficult, given the mutual suspicions. No realist can be confident of a solution. But . there are reasons to think that one is possible

South Africa has accepted in principle a Western plan for its forces to leave Namibia and the territory to become independent. But South Africa has demanded that all Cubans leave. Angola in the same time frame, less, than a year. Angola offered to send . most of the Cubans home but insisted on keeping some in the north, notably to guard U.S. oil installations.

Last year Chester Crocker, Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs, proposed a compromise: 80 percent of the Cubans to leave in one ' year, the remaining 20 percent the next year. Angola has not said yes to that. But in recent meetings its leaders have hinted that they might agree. if South Africa sets a definite date to implement the plan for Namibia.

That record explains why Secretary Shultz wants to go on trying diplomacy. At least in words, the parties are not that far apart. South Africa just might finally agree to withdraw from Namibia - subject, of course, to Angola's then accepting the U.S. timetable for withdrawal of the Cubans.

The diplomatic route avoids the dangers of rhetorical fantasy. It does not plunge the United States into a quagmire in Angola. It does not make the U.S. a surrogate for South Africa.

But does President Reagan agree with his Secretary of State on the realistic course? We shall know better after the Savimbi visit.

Mr. Reagan and Angola 48. Times 1/28

Not long ago George Shultz gave a ringing speech about how America had the sacred duty to help people risking their lives to fight for freedom. So powerful was the message, so stirring the delivery, that many thought the secretary of state meant what he said. Daniel Ortega must have scanned the horizon for the U.S. fleet, and Mr. Shultz was accused of poisoning the atmosphere of detente.

Now it transpires that Mr. Shultz was just letting off steam. Does he want to help the pro-Western forces of UNITA in their fight against the Soviet-backed government of Angola? Sure he does. He's ready to give the bad guys the old one-two — huff and then puff. In an interview in Sunday's New York Times, Mr. Shultz says he opposes aid, but wants Congress to express itself "in a general way."

That is exactly what isn't required. The United States needs to be specific. It needs either to put up or shut up. The Reagan administration should back UNITA, not in a general way, but in no uncertain terms. Yet the White House says the president is undecided, the State Department says Mr. Shultz didn't mean what The Times reported, and all is a hopeless muddle.

With plans for a meeting Thursday with UNITA's Jonas Savimbi and the State of the Union address tonight, what better time for the president to give UNITA aid a ringing endorsement, thereby signaling the world — including the Soviet world — what the Reagan administration is about. At the moment, the world must wonder.

Mr. Savimbi needs guns, not rhetoric. The Soviet Union has furnished Angola more than \$1 billion in military assistance since

on their part. So does the presence of 35,000 Cuban troops. It must appear to many bystanders that the Communists have said "Boo!" and Washington has retreated.

What is more, Mr. Shultz's hesitancy to support UNITA with anything more than talk underscores a serious split within the administration. The State of the Union address, originally a muscular statement, was recast as a "cavalcade of cliches," as one Reagan staffer put it, in order to mollify Prime Minister Donald Regan and the Shultz cadres. Fortunately, the sinew was restored by, among others, Patrick Buchanan.

In all of this meandering, it again becomes apparent that many in the White House are ashamed of Ronald Reagan. He speaks out on abortion. They say "tone it down." He talks about backing the forces of freedom and democracy in the world. They say "clam up." They serve him ill. His administration should never be ashamed of the views that got Ronald Reagan elected, whether they concern domestic reform or rolling back the Soviet empire.

If Mr. Reagan is undecided about military aid to Angola, then his secretary of state should not suggest that he has made up his mind, no matter how strongly the secretary may favor a negotiated settlement.

Angola is one country where the anti-Marxists have a decent chance of winning. Nicaragua is another. Strong presidential support, backed by funds, could make 1986 the year when the exception that was Grenada became the rule.

Savimbi lobbies U.S. for UNITA support

By James Morrison THE WASHINGTON TIMES

As Jonas Savimbi launches a media and congressional assault on Washington today, his anti-communist forces in Angola are waiting out the rainy season and bracing for another possible government offensive.

The 10-year-old civil war between Mr. Savimbi's National Union for the lotal independence of Angola (UNITA) and the government of the Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola (MPLA) - backed by a Soviet arsenal and propped up by 35,000 Cuban troops - remains in a stalemate.

Said a State Department official: "Everyone assumes that if nothing changes, there is likely to be no military victory by either side for the foreseeable future.

"Right now there are no offensives. It's raining hard, and the government is not advancing. They are resupplying and gathering for the next storm."

ally good for the guerrillas" because they can operate without the logistical problems of moving an army around.

With 50,000 to 60,000 ill-equipped rebels, Mr. Savimbi has operated in virtually every part of the country except the capital of Luanda and the militarily reinforced oil fields of Cabinda. Recently UNITA claimed responsibility for a car bombing outside Cuban airline offices in Luanda, an indication that the rebels might have opened an urban offensive, the official said.

But UNITA faces overwhelming firepower from an army fortified by Soviet MiG fighters and tanks.

In addition to the Cuban troops, the MPLA has 100,000 Angolan soldiers in the regular army and militia and up to 1,500 Soviet and East Bloc military advisers, some of whom have led Angolan troops in combat, according to the State Department.

Mr. Savimbi plans to meet every major

He added that "the rainy season is usu- news organization, dine with political leaders and meet privately with President Reagan to press his case for aid.

His visit is designed to boost congressional efforts to supply \$54 million in military and humanitarian aid. But opponents have also mounted a campaign to discredit UNITA aid, saying that because South Africa is UNITA's biggest military backer, any U.S. aid would be seen by the rest of Africa as support for the whiteminority regime in Pretoria.

President Reagan has reportedly expressed support for providing \$15 million in secret military aid. But more formal congressional legislation for an aid package is opposed by U.S. Secretary of State George Shultz.

Mr. Shultz feels the latter would hamper U.S. efforts to negotiate an end to the civil war. UNITA's Washington supporters argue that military aid should be approved because the State Department has failed for almost five years to reach a political settlement.

Republican Sen. Richard Lugar of Indiana, chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, will introduce a joint resolution expressing "U.S. recognition and support" for Mr. Savimbi as a signal of "moral support," aides said.

New York Democrat Stephen Solarz, one of Congress' most vocal opponents of UNITA aid, argued that U.S. support would give the Angolan government an impetus to bring in even more Cuban

But Rep. Jack Kemp, a New York Republican, said, "They are freedom fighters and, in my view, it's both moral and pragmatic to support them."

Mr. Savimbi has not received U.S. aid since 1975, when his guerrillas were engaged in a civil war with the leftist faction that later took power.

Last July, Congress repealed a 10-yearold ban on aid to the rebels.

This story is based in part on wire service

The Anticommunists—

Edwin M. Yoder Jr.

Savimbi Fever

Jonas Savimbi, that charismatic African gentleman, has been making political and journalistic rounds in this city for the past week, all to an end Savimbi does not disguise: he wants us involved on his side—in Angola's civil war.

If he gets his way, it would be the sort of exercise that John Quincy Adams identified as "going abroad in search of monsters to destroy." But monster-hunters are very much in evidence in

Washington just now.

Angola, the former Portuguese colony in southern Africa, is of more than passing interest to armchair strategists. It shares a border with Namibia, which is ruled by South Africa; it is thus a party to the violent regional conflict over apartheid.

The control of Angola has been disputed for more than a decade between two factions, one avowedly "Marxist," the other-Savimbi'soriginally "Maoist." (As in Rhodesia, now Zimbabwe, it was the fashion for insurrectionary tribal factions to profess the flavor of their patron, Muscovite or Pekinese).

After more than a decade of struggle, the Marxists control the capital, some two thirds of Angola's huge land mass and the oil. Savimbi's crowd controls the southern third and the diamond mines—which may be why he can pay a Washington public-relations firm to manage his campaign for U.S. assistance.

It sounds like, and is, a dismally familiar tale. The United States long ago forfeited its slight chance to shape the post-colonial destiny of Angola at acceptable cost. NATO politics compelled us—the excuse was good, but it was costly—to

support Portuguese rule in Angola long after its natural term. The same considerations led usgrim analogy—to back the French attempt after 1945 to restore control in Indochina.

Nothing has happened in the past 10 years to break the Angolan impasse. The "Marxist" government is sustained by Cuban mercenaries and pleads the excuse of South Africa's strong-arm backing of Savimbi. The government isn't strong enough to crush Savimbi. Savimbi isn't strong enough to overthrow the government. Moreover, while there are high ideological pretensions on both sides, it is clearly an unresolved civil war.

But while little has happened in Angola during 10 years of deadlock, much has happened in Washington—including the advent of "neoconservative" ideologues to influence within the Reagan administration. The neoconservatives, with such folks as Jeane J. Kirkpatrick and Norman Podhoretz tooting the fugelhorns, have taken up Savimbi, sometime disciple of Mao, as their hero. Thomas Jefferson himself would blush to be extolled as Savimbi has been.

All Savimbi wants of us is open intervention military aid. Even if intervention made sense otherwise, who really believes that an institution so mercurial as Congress would invest enough, long enough, in Savimbi's war to make a success of it?


We can help him make a bigger nuisance of himself, both to the government and to the U.S. oil companies (ChevronGulf) whose governmentsanctioned facilities he brazenly threatens to sabotage. But that's about all.

As the reward for this quixotic gesture, we

would stand to reinforce the harmful impression in Africa that the United States is a mainstay of apartheid—as if it needed reinforcing. For Savimbi, owing to his alliance with Pretoria, is thought of as South Africa's cat's paw.

The Savimbi fever is typical of the infatuations of neoconservative foreign policy. It exhibits the two classic symptoms: The first is a recurring U.S. tendency to fawn, in a most undignified fashion, over any opportunist who pleads anticommunist credentials, even when the credentials are as thin as Savimbi's. The second, worse but related, is an inability to deal with political ambiguity. The politics of southern Africa are a complex weave of tribalism, self-interest, ideology and racial conflict; but by Savimbi-worshippers Angola is depicted as a battleground between right and wrong and light and darkness.

If Ronald Reagan really meant what he recently told the United Nations about the danger of regional conflicts, the United States should continue seeking to mediate Angola's civil war-not prolong it by unnecessarily choosing sides.



BY DAYNA SMITH-THE WASHINGTON POST

they themselves, fanatical Moslem fundamentalists

and the state of t

Then there are the contras battling the Sandinista regime in Nicaragua who, like the UNITA guerrillas in Angola, are not so much disparaged as defamed. As with the Poles and the Afghans, it is said

their own best interest to submit-even though

that they are, quixotically wish to fight.

that neither the contras nor UNITA can ever win. But whereas a patronizing shake of the head usually accompanies this kind of talk about the Solidarity "romantics" or the Afghan "fanatics," the same dismal forecast of prospects for the contras and UNITA is made with vindictive satisfaction. For the contras are smeared as fascists and the UNITA guerrillas as puppets of South Africa.

In addition to being denigrated as futile, resistance in each of these four cases has been disparaged as threatening to the United States.

With regard to Poland, the argument turned on the possibility of a confrontation between the Soviet Union and the United States that could escalate into World War III. With regard to Afghanistan, the danger is said to involve neighboring Pakistan, to whose defense we are committed by treaty. With regard to Angola, military aid to UNITA would obstruct allegedly promising American efforts to get the Cubans out by negotiation. With regard to Nicaragua, finally, it is claimed that supporting the contras could lead to direct military intervention.

As it happens, none of these arguments stands

up to careful scrutiny.

True, the Soviets might have invaded Poland in 1982, just as they invaded Hungary in 1956 and Czechoslovakia in 1968. But obviously they preferred letting their Polish puppets handle the crisis (especially with a little help from us). In any event there was even less chance that a Soviet invasion would set off a general war in 1982 than there was in 1956 or 1968.

Nor is there any chance that the United States will be drawn into a war over Pakistan, or that the Cubans will be negotiated out of Angola if UNITA is defeated. As for intervention in Nicaragua, backing the contras is surely the best way to preclude the need for American troops.

But the merits of these particular arguments aside, the fact remains that in four separate instances, disparagement and defamation are directed at people who are resisting communist regimes. Instead of being admired and envied for their bravery, these people are either patronized or insulted. Instead of being encouraged, they are undermined. Instead of being thanked for taking on our common enemy, they are either dismissed as ineffective or rejected as unworthy allies.

In some cases, this can be explained by simple political partisanship—the belief (so hard to defend that it is rarely admitted in so many words) that the communists who rule Angola and Nicaragua are a better alternative than the forces opposing them.

But I suspect that the main reason for disparaging internal resistance to communist regimes is the uneasiness inspired by the sight of people who reject the idea that peace is the overriding value and who, as the saying goes, would rather die on their feet than live on their knees. Discrediting such people may well be a way of evading the questions they implicitly raise about the role that courage—or, rather, the loss of it—has played in the cancerous spread of the pacifist inclinations that now pervade our own political culture.

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Norman Podhoretz

Why the Hostility?

When Jonas Savimbi came to Washington in search of military aid for UNITA guerrillas fighting the communist regime in Angola, he reopened a debate that uncovered one of the most disquieting features of our current political culture. This is the disparaging and sometimes even hostile attitude that is directed nowadays toward any and all people—not just the UNITA guerrillas—who are willing to risk their lives in challenging communist rule.

Take, for example, the American response to the Polish crisis of 1981-82. When the Solidarity trade union, with massive popular backing, rose up to demand a liberalization of the system Poland has been forced to live under by its Soviet imperial masters, the immediate response here was a round of enthusiastic cheers. But the cheering was soon drowned out by anxious calls for caution.

The thing to do, we were told, was not to help Solidarity (by declaring Poland in default on its huge debt to various Western banks and thus keeping the economic crisis at the boil). On the contrary, the best course was to help Solidarity's oppressors (by giving the communist authorities the financial means to quiet the crisis). Otherwise there might be a Soviet invasion.

But what about the fact that so many Poles had heroically chosen to run the risk of an invasion? To the disparagers this only meant that again, as so often in their history, Poles were showing themselves to be a nation of irresponsible "romantics."

Another example of how people who resist communist rule are disparaged comes from the advocates of a negotiated settlement of the war in Afghanistan. Those Americans who support such a settlement say in effect that we should stop sending arms to the Afghans who have been struggling with extraordinary courage against the Soviet invaders of their country. After all, by arming the Afghans we only prolong a war they can never win. What we should do, according to this view, is press them in

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Oil Companies Cautioned On Business With Angola

Crocker Makes Appeal to 'U.S. National Interests' :. -

By David B. Ottaway
Washington Post Staff Writer

A top State Department official yesterday called upon American oil companies operating in Angola to "think about U.S. national interests" in continuing to do business with the Soviet- and Cuban-backed government there.

Assistant Secretary of State Chester A. Crocker, reporting on his latest visit to South Africa and Angola, said the companies should realize they are caught up not only in the Angolan civil war but "a rather hot political debate" in the United States about possible U.S. aid to noncommunist guerrillas fighting the Marxist Angolan government. "They should be thinking about U.S. national interests as well as their own corporate interests as they make their decisions," he said.

Crocker's warning came as the leader of the Angolan noncommunist rebels, Jonas Savimbi, arrived here for a two-week lob-bying campaign to gain U.S. multary and other aid for his movement. Savimbi was scheduled to meet with Secretary of State George P. Shultz and Secretary of Defense Caspar W. Weinberger today at the start of a round of meetings with administration officials, including President Reagan.

Crocker stopped short of asking American firms to leave Angola. But it was the first time a high-ranking State Department official has suggested that they might be acting against the national interest by helping to finance the Marxist government.

Gulf Oil Co., a subsidiary of Chevron, is Angola's major oil producer and provider of the government's \$2 billion in annual oil revenues. Yesterday, the Conservative Caucus, a Virginia-based interest group, held a news conference to discuss its month-old grassroots campaign to force Chevron to quit Angola.

Another U.S. oil company, Conoco, a division of Dupont, is about to sign an agreement with Angola for new off-shore oil exploration and production, according to sources close to the Angolan government. Conoco officials could not be reached.

CORRECTION

An incorrect date for the New York Consort of Viols concert was printed in Critics' Picks in Sunday's Show section. The Consort will play at noon Friday at the United Church, 1920 G St. NW.



Crocker: cites "hot political debate" over aid.

Chevron spokesman Stephen North indicated surprise at Crocker's remarks. "I can assure you that they have not talked to us in any way, shape or manner about what's we're doing there," he said. "We're there on the explicit understanding that it's okay to be there." North said the effect of the Conservative Caucus' campaign against Chevron so far had been "zero" and that the company had received "less than 3,000" protest, cards of 70,000 the group had sent to its supporters to mail to the oil company.

Crocker said he had "no breakthroughs" to report on his latest talks with Angolan, and South African officials regarding a negotiated withdrawal of Cuban troops from Angola and independence for neighboring South African-administered Namibia.

"Confidence between the parties remains low," he reported. But both the South African and Angolan governments asked him, to continue his mediating role, and he said he had relayed "some ideas" from the Angolans to the South Africans on ways to break the impasse.

Crocker indicated there was new flexibility on both sides that permits continuation of the U.S. search for a negotiated settlement. South Africa took a "significant step" in November by agreeing "in principle" to a U.S.-proposed timetable on Cuban withdrawal from South Africa and a South African withdrawal from Namibia.

The Angolans, in turn, had indicated that, "under certain conditions" they were prepared to move "substantially" beyond their present position, Crocker said, although he declined to elaborate.

Haynes Johnson's column will ap-

Soviets plan April attack in Angola, Savimbi says

By James Morrison and Tom Diaz THE WASHINGTON TIMES

2/4/86

The Soviet Union is planning to launch a new offensive in April against anti-Marxist rebels in Angola, guerrilla leader Jonas Savimbi said yesterday as he lobbied for military aid on Capitol Hill.

"We have come to ask your help so we can restore freedom to our country," Mr. Savimbi told a luncheon meeting of the Cuban-American National Foundation.

Mr. Savimbi, president of the National Union for the Total Independence of Angola (UNITA), said he needs anti-tank and anti-aircraft weapons to repel an expected offensive from the Angolan army, supported by 1,500 Russians and 35,000 Cubans, when the rainy season ends.

A State Department official said the United States has detected "some signs of resupply" that could point either to a planned Angolan army offensive or a consolidation of existing military lines.

Last year, UNITA, armed mostly with automatic rifles, defeated a massive offensive led by Soviet officers commanding sophisticated tanks, helicopter gunships and jet fighters.

Mr. Savimbi told The Washington Times, in an interview published yesterday, that he has a commitment of support from President Reagan, but he did not reveal any details of the promised aid.

The rebel leader, on a 10-day Washington visit, spent yesterday in press conferences, interviews and meetings with congressional leaders.

In other developments, Angolan President Eduardo dos Santos announced in the capital of Luanda that he had fired three Cabinet members and re-

placed them with three superministers who will oversee several departments of his Marxist government.

The move was seen in Washington as a sign that Mr. Dos Santos was strengthening his control over the government.

Radio Moscow also announced that So-

"We have an obligation to history to help others who are fighting for freedom," Mr. Pepper said.

viet, Cuban and Angolan officials met recently, presumably to discuss strategy, but gave few other details.

"One purpose of the meeting," said a State Department official, "was for Angola to be seen getting some support [in Moscow] while Savimbi was in Washington."

The meeting was held Jan. 27, the day before Mr. Savimbi arrived here, the official said.

Mr. Savimbi's luncheon was cosponsored by Rep. Claude Pepper, the Florida Democrat who has introduced a bill for \$27 million in humanitarian aid to the rebels, and attracted nine other members of Congress and Jeane Kirkpatrick, former U.S. ambassador to the United Nations.

"We have an obligation to history to help others who are fighting for freedom," Mr. Pepper said.

Mr. Savimbi met with other legislators in the afternoon, attended a reception in his honor hosted by Senate Majority Leader Robert Dole and dined with Howard Phillips and Duncan Sellars of the Conservative Caucus.

Mr. Savimbi, in a press conference with another congressional supporter, Republican Mark Siljander of Minnesota, criticized black congressmen for refusing to meet with him. The black rebel leader had hoped to meet with black legislators to explain why he accepts military aid from white-ruled South Africa.

"I have asked to see them so that we can compare [facts]," Mr. Savimbi said of the Congressional Black Caucus. "Why do they refuse to see me? ... Is that a democracy?"


Mr. Siljander, who has also submitted a bill for \$27 million in direct military aid to UNITA, said he was confident that some sort of timely U.S. military aid will be approved.

"I predict there will be aid in time for the next Soviet-Cuban offensive," he said. "I'm not sure whether it will be overt, covert, or both."

Mr. Siljander also said he planned to ask the Gulf-Chevron oil company to halt its Angolan operations voluntarily for a year. The U.S. oil company pumps an estimated \$2 billion a year into the Angolan economy, which Mr. Savimbi says allows the government to pay for the Cuban troops and Soviet weapons.

Asked whether he would approve of Mr. Savimbi's declaring Cabinda Gulf Oil Co. operations to be military targets if Gulf-Chevron refuses to stop lobbying against U.S. aid, Mr. Siljander said: "If they [Gulf-Chevron] are wise, intelligent, and reasonable, they will shut down for a year without putting any of us in the precarious position of answering that question."

Mr. Savimbi said he doubted that the Soviets and Cubans would escalate their aid to the Luanda government in response to American aid for UNITA.



Savimbi: Reagan promised 'most effective' aid

By James Morrison 1 /-THE WASHINGTON TIMES

President Reagan has given Jonas Savimbi his personal commitment to provide anti-Marxist rebels in Angola with the "most effective" aid, the guerrilla leader told The Washington Times yesterday.

Mr. Savimbi also told The Times that what he needed most was antitank and anti-aircraft weapons.

In a broad-ranging interview on Angolan war, Mr. Savimbi warned the Gulf-Chevron oil company that his forces would start attacking its oil facilities in Angola if the corporation continued trying to block rebel aid bills in Congress.

And he said his guerrillas had launched a new urban campaign of car bombings and other raids against Cuban and Soviet bloc targets, bringing the 10-year-old bush war to the cities.

Mr. Savimbi, whose Washington visit is as much an image-building campaign as a lobbying effort for U.S. aid, claimed support among 12 black African nations, a statement aimed at dispelling the frequent criticism that his forces are backed only by white-ruled South Africa. He would not name the countries, saying they would be criticized if their names were made public.

The 51-year-old leader of the National Union for the Total Independence of Angola (UNITA) said his 10-day trip to Washington, which

started last Tuesday, has been successful so far, especially compared to his last visit.

Following President Reagan's first election after a campaign in which he praised the Angolan rebels as freedom fighters, Mr. Savimbi received a "very cold reception" when he came to Washington.

"We expected President Reagan to support us in 1981 because during

Savimbi compares his campaign in Angola to the struggle for D.C. home rule. Page 5A.

his campaign he used UNITA as an example, saying we want to help UNITA. So we were surprised when we came here. We got a very cold reception," he said.

During this visit, he has been treated like a head of state, greeted at the White House by Mr. Reagan, received with diplomatic protocol at the State Department and assigned a special U.S. security detail to guard him.

He has arrived at a time of heightened debate over the Angolan civil war, one of the most curious wars being fought today.

UNITA is fighting a Marxist government, propped up by 35,000 Cuban troops and \$2 billion worth of Soviet weaponry. The government, which has no diplomatic relations with the United States, is funded by

see SAVIMBI, page 10A

SAVIMBI

From page 1A

American oil companies with the Chevron Corp., the parent company of Gulf, owning nearly half of the Angolan government oil facilities and pumping about \$2 billion a year into the economy.

Liberal opponents of Mr. Savimbi accused him of being a South African "stooge" because he receives his primary support from the Pretoria government. They have also argued that he does not deserve U.S. support because he is a secret Marx-

Conservatives, who have been mounting a campaign against Chevron-Gulf and in support of U.S. rebel aid, have been pressing the Reagan administration into helping UNITA.

The administration has been internally debating whether to fund Mr. Savimbi openly or secretly and whether U.S. support would torpedo any last hopes of a U.S.-mediated end to the Angolan war. The administration has reportedly proposed \$10 million to \$15 million in covert funds.

Mr. Savimbi said he believed the conservative pressure had helped and that the administration would provide the much-needed aid.

"I believe there is a commitment of aid. There were no figures discussed. But there is a commitment," he told The Washington Times. "The President said he wants to help us in the most effective way. And the most effective way is to give us the aid we are asking for."

Mr. Savimbi, who said he is staying out of the debate over secret or open aid, said he needs anti-tank and anti-aircraft weapons to combat Soviet-made tanks, MiG jet fighters and Hind 24 helicopter gunships, one of the most devastating weapons in the Angolan arsenal.

"The President was very warm. He was very positive," Mr. Savimbi said.

If his opponents succeed in blocking aid and Mr. Savimbi returns to the African bush empty handed, he said that will be a strong message to the Soviets and Cubans.

"If we come from here - after all the declarations from the administration - and there is no aid, that will invite the Russians to try to cripple UNITA," he said.

But Mr. Savimbi pledged that his 60,000 guerrillas would continue their war even without U.S. help.

One of the forces working against his aid, Mr. Savimbi said, are the corporate lobbyists of the American oil companies in Angola.

He threatened to attack their oil facilities if they continue their lobbying efforts but he pledged not to hurt American oil company workers.

"We want to make sure we will not kill Americans," he said, revealing that UNITA sympathizers employed by the oil companies can inform the

rebels when U.S. citizens are not at work so they can raid the facilities without endangering Americans.

There are no current plans to attack the oil fields, he said.

"But if they continue lobbying, then the case is serious," he said. "I'm telling them if they do not stop lobbying, then the decision [to attack the oil facilities] has to be made."

He said the U.S. oil companies there are "morally guilty" of aiding the Angolan government, but he explained that he understands that the oil executives are businessmen.

"Business is business," Mr. Savimbi said, explaining he has no objection to the oil companies continuing to operate. But when they lobby against UNITA aid on Capitol Hill, "they are not making business. They are making politics. If you take the risk of mixing business and politics, you take the political risks," he

Mr. Savimbi also explained a new rebel campaign against urban targets. Last week UNITA claimed responsibility for car bombings in Luanda, Angola's capital, that killed Cubans and East Germans.

"We don't want people to think of us as terrorist," he said. "But we want to start urban guerrilla warfare."

He said he must bring the war to the cities, through a "selective" campaign of car-bombings, explosives and sniper attacks, to force the Angolan government to reach a political settlement leading to democratic elections.

As his own lobbying efforts receive widespread media attention, his U.S. opponents have also begun their own campaign, which Mr. Savimbi said is "distorted."

He accused one of his most vocal opponents, John Stockwell, of lying. Mr. Stockwell, a former CIA agent who ran a secret U.S. operation in Angola until Congress stopped all aid in 1975, has tried to discredit Mr. Savimbi and accused him of continuing to receive CIA funds. Congress repealed its restriction on Angolan rebel aid last year.

Although Mr. Stockwell portrays himself as someone who knows the innermost working of UNITA, the rebel leader said the ex-CIA agent met him once for only three hours.

"He does not know me. He does not know UNITA," Mr. Savimbi said.

Addressing the most frequent criticism of his rebel movement, Mr. Savimbi said he receives aid from South Africa because it is offered. But he has always condemned South Africa's racial policies.

"When South Africa said we want to give you aid, we said thank you very much. But we condemned apartheid," he said.

"You must understand, it is the reality of war that when you are fighting and someone extends aid to you, you have to accept," he said.

Mr. Savimbi, is traveling on a diplomatic passport from an unidentified black African nation.

Savimbi gets help but no specifics

By Jeremiah O'Leary and Thomas D. Brandt THE WASHINGTON TIMES

President Reagan yesterday told Angolan rebel leader Jonas Savimbi the United States would help his forces in their war against the Marxist government but declined to describe what this support will be.

"The president is desirous of supporting the Savimbi movement and is looking at the situation with Congress to determine the best way of doing it," said White House Deputy Press Secretary Larry Speakes.

In Moscow, a Soviet government spokesman said last night that Soviet aid to the Marxist government might be increased if the United States gives military aid to the Savimbi forces.

On Capitol Hill, two leading supporters of Mr. Savimbi, Senate Majority Leader Robert Dole, Kansas Republican, and Foreign Relations Committee Chairman Richard Lugar, Indiana Republican, remained noncommittal on what form aid should take.

Sen. Lugar said the committee favors "strong moral support" for Mr. Savimbi. But he declined to discuss possible military aid with reporters yesterday after his panel held a closed-door meeting with Chester Crocker, assistant secretary of state for African affairs.

"Savimbi has broad support," Mr.
Lugar said. "Almost everybody is going to come out in favor of Savimbi."

Mr. Dole is working with Mr. Lugar and administration officials to

determine an appropriate aid package, though no decision has been made, according to Mr. Dole's spokesman, Walt Riker.

Mr. Savimbi spent about 20 minutes in the Oval Office with Mr. Reagan, Vice President George Bush, Secretary of State George P. Shultz and National Security Adviser John M. Poindexter.

The president ducked questions from reporters about whether he would give the leader of the UNITA rebel group more than a "pat on the back." But Mr. Reagan said, "We want to be very helpful to what Dr. Savimbi and his people are trying to do. What we're trying to arrive at is the best way to do it."

The administration and UNITA's supporters in Congress are thought to be moving cautiously on the aid issue partly to avoid a confrontation on Capitol Hill that could jeopardize even a covert aid program.

There have been numerous reports that the administration is developing a \$10 million to \$15 million aid package for Mr. Savimbi through the CIA, which requires no formal congressional approval.

Last year, Congress repealed a 10year-old law that had banned assistance.

However, the chairmen of the House and Senate intelligence committees, which have oversight over CIA operations, have both said recently that they prefer open aid to Angola.

The two panels do not have the legal authority to block a covert aid program, but it is extremely rare in Republican or Democratic administrations for the White House to ignore their views.

Thus one possibility under consideration, according to several congressional sources, is to pass a resolution of general support for UNITA both the House and Senate. But would approve no specific aid programs of a covert or overt nature.

The resolution would have two ad-



President Reagan and Angola rebel leader Jonas Savimbi meet in the White House Oval Office yesterday.

vantages. It would put Congress on record in support of UNITA and thus make it politically much easier to ignore the two intelligence committees. It would allow the covert aid to go through while allowing the United States to remain officially out the conflict.

For conservatives who are the strongest supporters of Mr. Savimbi, this is at best a fall-back strategy. They want an open program of military and non-military aid, and hope that Mr. Savimbi's current round of meetings in Washington will shift opinion in Congress.

Mr. Savimbi was equally vague in a brief encounter with reporters after the meeting with the president.

"I was received by the president of the United States and I have to say that first of all we support the statement of the president at the United Nations that regional conflicts should be dealt with because it is a problem. Also I want to thank the president for the warmth with which he has received me and my delegation," he said.

The UNITA leader said he was

"satisfied" but declined to answer any questions about what kind of aid he wanted from the United States and what American officials have promised him. "I think it is the president who knows what he wants to do," Mr. Savimbi said.

After the White House meeting, a senior administration official said, "The administration is not supporting mandatory aid to UNITA, but we think some form of support should be signaled."

President Reagan asked Mr. Savimbi what his views and goals are, the administration source said. The UNITA leader, he said, wants peaceful national reconciliation for Angola and believes it must be representative of all sectors of Angolan society.

Opponents of aid to Mr. Savimbi say it would jeopardize the current U.S. efforts to negotiate an end to fighting in the region through the withdrawal of Cuban and South African troops.

The critics also say aid to UNITA would link the United States to South Africa, which provides UNITA's

main support.

That link would seriously damage:
U.S. relations with most other black
African nations, the opponents argue.

There are negotiations under way, the senior official said, and the United States has approached the Soviet Union, which has sent \$2 billion in aid to the Marxist Angolan government in the past two years.

The official said the administration does not think aid mandated by Congress would work and favors a resolution of support by the legislative branch for UNITA.

The State Department, through Mr. Shultz, has called for "effective and appropriate aid" but has not explained what this means. The administration believes it cannot win a vote for covert aid to UNITA and does not want a vote on open assistance to the anti-Marxist forces.

When the senior official asked reporters, "How are you going to get aid in there?" several reporters said, "Through South Africa." The official said, "That's not the desire of any of

Rebel Threatens U.S. Firms in Angola

By David B. Ottaway
Washington Post Staff Writer

Jonas Savimbi, the United States' longtime and close ally in the Angolan civil war, has presented policy-makers with a problem. He says that he intends to blow up U.S. oil firms operating in Angola.

At a news conference at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace here yesterday, the 51-year-old guerrilla leader confirmed his movement's intention to attack the Angolan facilities of Chevron/Gulf, but said exactly when is a question of "strategy" and "timing."

Chevron/Gulf and other U.S. oil firms for providing the Marxist government of Angola with the \$480 million that he says the government pays annually to Cuba for its estimated 35,000 troops and advisers in the African nation. Last May, Savimbi tried, with South African help, but failed to blow up Chevron/Gulf's installations.

Press Club luncheon, he said it was "morally wrong" and "unacceptable" for Chevron/Gulf to be providing money to the Soviets and Cubans for their backing of the Angolan government. "We think that we must stop Gulf," he said. But he later added, "I'm giving the assurance that American lives will not be endangered."

Chevron/Gulf has 687 employes in Angola, 150 of them Americans.

Savimbi, backed strongly by South Africa, has been pushed by the Reagan administration and the American conservative establishment as a model guerrilla figure in their campaign to promote anticommunist freedom fighters around the world.

The bearded guerrilla leader ar-

rived here Tuesday on a 10-day lobbying campaign for U.S. diplomatic and material support.

As in 1975-76 when the Central Intelligence Agency aided him and other pro-western forces with arms and training, Congress, the administration and the public are divided over the wisdom of U.S. involvement in Angola.

The debate is taking place against the background of a predicted military showdown this spring between the Angolan government and Savimbi's National Union for the Total Independence of Angola (UNITA).

Caught in the middle of what may become a major shift in U.S. policy toward Angola and all of Africa are U.S. oil companies, particularly Chevron/Gulf, the largest producer in Angola and chief source of Angola's \$2 billion in annual oil revenues. Texaco also has an interest there, and another U.S. oil firm, Conoco, is negotiating with the Angolan government to begin offshore exploration.

Chevron/Gulf alone, with a \$600 million investment in its Angolan installations, paid the central government almost \$600 million in taxes and royalties in 1985, according to a company spokesman. Its 49 percent share of production in the Cabinda offshore field amounts to 80,000 barrels a day, half of which is shipped to the United States.

Apparently aware of the squeeze between U.S. policy and U.S. economic interests, the administration is hinting at a major shift in its position on American business involvement in Angola. For a decade, it actively supported and encouraged U.S. firms to invest there, providing \$214 million in Export-Import loans and guarantees partly to Chevron/Gulf and partly to the Angolan government despite the

lack of U.S.-Angolan diplomatic re-

However, in a pointed warning Tuesday to U.S. firms there, Assistant Secretary of State Chester A. Crocker said the administration did not intend to say "through our export policies that there's any support of ours for the Angolan war effort." He advised the companies to start thinking about "U.S. national interests" as well as their own corporate ones.

Crocker's warning caught Chevron/Gulf by surprise. Chevron spokesman Stephen North said Wednesday the State Department had never communicated any change of policy to company officials, and "it's really very confusing." Yesterday, another Chevron/Gulf spokesman, G. Michael Marcy, said company representatives had been told by State Department officials—on the day Crocker was issuing his warning—that they regarded Chevron/Gulf's presence in Angola as "important" and hoped it could play "a helpful" role in achieving a settlement of disputes between Angola and South Africa.

Chevron/Gulf is in the process of using a \$96 million loan guarantee from the Export-Import Bank for expansion of its Angola activities and has placed contracts with 22 U.S. firms for services.

A senior administration official said Thursday "probably close to 100 U.S. firms" do business with the Angola.

The Export-Import Bank, a U.S. government institution, also seemed caught off guard by Crocker's warning. An official said the bank had not received "any change of signals" from the State Department. The bank is scheduled to disperse \$50 million in loans to the Angolan government and its state oil company, Sonangol.

Africans Criticize Savimbi Visit

Angola Seen Seeking More Soviet Aid if U.S. Backs Rebel

By Glenn Frankel Washington Post Foreign Service

HARARE, Zimbabwe, Jan.
31—A high-ranking Angolan official denounced the Reagan administration's support for visiting rebel leader Jonas Savimbi today, but he said Angola was willing to hold new talks with both the United States and South Africa to achieve regional peace.

Pedro de Castro Van-Dunem, a senior member of Angola's ruling Politburo, said Savimbi's visit to Washington would not change Angola's longstanding refusal to negotiate a political settlement with the rebel leader, whom it calls a tool of the South African government.

He said American support for Savimbi's rebel movement would only force Angola to seek more military aid from the Soviet Bloc, which already supplies billions of dollars worth of weaponry and approximately 30,000 Cuban troops and Soviet military advisers.

an economic summit meeting here between the southern African region's nine black-ruled nations and foreign aid donors that closed today with a strong attack on U.S. support for Savimbi by the meeting's chairman, Botswana Vice President Peter Mmusi.

Mmusi, one of the black leaders in the region most closely aligned with the West, expressed "dismay and disbelief" that President Reagan had invited Savimbi to the White House. He said U.S. aid to the rebel leader, who also receives military and logistical support from white-ruled South Africa, would "run counter to American profes-

sions of friendship and cooperation" with the region's black states.

"This clearly places the United States in league with South Africa in fomenting instability in this region," said Mmusi.

The meeting, called by the Southern Africa Development Co-ordination Conference, was held to discuss projects that would help wean the region's small black states from their economic dependence on South Africa. The nine members contended that South African-supported rebel movements in their territories have cost them nearly \$10 billion since 1980. Until Mmusi's statement, the conference had avoided comment on U.S. aid to Savimbi, which the region's black states strongly oppose.

Mmusi's statement angered the American delegates to the conference. The Americans were not given an opportunity to respond, but the delegation's leader, Mark Edelman, assistant Africa administrator of the Agency for International Development, said in an interview after the session that Mmusi's remarks were "gratuitous."

Edelman said it was wrong to suggest that "because the president of the United States decides to receive Jonas Savimbi on a private visit that in any way would reflect that we are quote, in bed, unquote, with the South Africans." The United States, he said, was still seeking to play the role of "honest broker" in the region and believed that there would be no peace in Angola until that government negotiates a political settlement with Savimbi's movement, the National Union for the Total Independence of Angola. It is usually known by its Portuguese initials, UNITA.

But Van-Dunem, who led the Angolan delegation here, said at a press conference his government would never hold talks or share power with Savimbi's movement, which he said was killing innocent civilians and crippling Angola's economy.

"We are open" to talk to Washington or Pretoria, he said, but "there can be no talks with people whose aim is purely to destroy the country."

Savimbi has waged a guerrilla war against the government ever since the Marxist Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola took power in 1975 with Cuban military aid. Congress last year repealed a ban on aid to Savimbi, and the Reagan administration has submitted to congressional intelligence committees a plan to send \$10 million to \$15 million in covert aid to UNITA.

Noting that a U.S. diplomatic mission under Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs Chester A. Crocker had visited Luanda three weeks ago, Van-Dunem said he could not understand how the United States could claim to support peace in Angola and at the same time aid the rebel movement.

Van-Dunem, who is also minister of energy and petroleum, said the conservative campaign in the United States to force American oil companies to pull out of Angola could have a serious impact on his country's economy if it succeeded. The Cabinda Gulf Co., a subsidiary of Chevron Corp., produces about 70 percent of Angola's oil in partnership with a state-run oil company. About 60 percent of the oil is sold to the United States.

Don't make a deal for covert aid, conservatives tell UNITA leader

By James Morrison
THE WASHINGTON TIMES

1/30

American conservatives have warned Jonas Savimbi not to accept any secret deals offered by the Reagan administration to ward off congressional debate in exchange for covert military aid to his Angolan rebels.

Savimbi aide and conveyed directly to Mr. Savimbi as the resistance leader met with Secretary of State George Shultz yesterday.

"We told him to avoid making any promises and making any deals," a source said.

Mr. Savimbi talked for more than an hour with Mr. Shultz, who has opposed congressional efforts to provide open aid to his National Union for the Total Independence of Angola (UNITA). Mr. Shultz also has remained silent on reported Reagan administration moves that imply backing for secret military aid.

Beginning his first full day of activities on a 10-day Washington visit, Mr. Savimbi also met with Defense Secretary Caspar Weinberger and received a rare standing ovation from a normally somber crowd of State Department and Foreign Service employees.

His plans for today include a meeting with President Reagan.

Late Tuesday, Mr. Shultz met privately with Senate Majority Leader Robert Dole shortly after the Kansas Republican decided to push for what a source called "something more than moral support" for the rebels. Earlier, Mr. Dole planned to introduce a resolution for only general congressional endorsement of UNITA's 10-year-old war to force free elections in Angola.

One source said the Shultz-Dole meeting was an exchange of ideas on the best strategy to pursue for rebel aid: Another source saw the meeting as a possible sign that Mr. Shultz might moderate his opposition to

congressional aid.

Lately, Mr. Shultz has called for "effective and appropriate" aid, without explaining what that means, and has asked Congress only to express moral support for the rebels.

Mr. Savimbi gave no hint of the contents of his private discussions with Mr. Shultz.

"I had a one-hour-and-10-minute discussion with the secretary of state, and I am satisfied. I hope there will be progress," Mr. Savimbi told reporters before he rode away to the Pentagon in his long, gray limousine.

When he arrived at the State Department, the bearded guerrilla leader was not wearing his trademark green fatigues. He was clad in a blue topcoat worn over a light gray Nehru suit, and he carried an ivory-handled, black enameled cane.

Mr. Savimbi, though not a head of state, was treated as such. He was accompanied by a U.S. security detail and greeted at the State Department by U.S. Chief of Protocol Selwa Roosevelt.



Angolan rebel leader Jonas Savimbi meets with Secretary George Shultz at

In an off-the-record speech following his meeting with Mr. Shultz, the dynamic guerrilla commander brought about two-thirds of an audi-

the State Department yesterday.

"If he was able to sway the Foreign Service, he will do all right with Congress," a State Department employee said. "This guy's bandwagon

Congress," a State Department employee said. "This guy's bandwagon is really rolling."

Mr. Savimbi was "candid and very blunt," the source said. The rebel leader said the Soviet Union has

blunt," the source said. The rebel leader said the Soviet Union has poured \$4 billion into Angola to prop up the government. He also said Russian officers now are directing the government struggle because the 35,000 Cuban troops in Angola are poor fighters and disenchanted with the war.

The rebel leader also attacked American oil companies operating in Angola because they are "financing the killing of our people."

The State Department added that Angolan-based American firms are helping the Marxist government there in its war against the insurgents.

"Much of the hard currency earned by the Angolan government with the help of these firms goes toward imports of military equipment and payment for the Cuban troops," a spokesman said. "This supports war rather than the search for peace"

Mr. Savimbi's visit here has sparked what one State Department official called an "ideological

superbowl," with conservatives demanding public aid for the guerrillas as a sign of U.S. support for freedom fighters and liberals calling Mr. Savimbi a secret communist or a "stooge" for South Africa.

"The issue to be decided this week is whether the United States will send him more than a Valentine card to fight the Soviet Union," said Howard Phillips, head of the Conservative Caucus.

Anti-Savimbi forces kicked off their campaign to block U.S. aid at a news conference featuring the former chief of the CIA's Angola Task Force.

John Stockwell, who quit the CIA in 1977 to write a bitterly critical book on CIA activities in Angola, claimed the Reagan administration already is secretly funding the rebels with up to \$15 million.

The anti-rebel campaign is sponsored by the Washington Office on Africa, the Congressional Black Caucus, the TransAfrica organization and 500 specialists on Africa at universities in 38 states and Washington.

While Mr. Savimbi lobbied Washington, his guerrillas announced they bombed a hotel occupied by Bulgarian technicians and killed 57 soldiers, including four Cubans; in a series of operations last weekend.

This story is based in part on wire service reports.

Using Savimbi To Stop Moscow

By Richard M. Moose

To understand the fuss being made in Washington over Jonas Savimbi, leader of the anti-Government forces in Angola, one must accept the curious reality that its significance relates not to Africa but to United States-Soviet relations. While an element of ambiguity surrounds the Administration's intentions, powerful forces are moving our Government toward intervention in the Angolan civil war. The ostensible purpose is to assist Mr. Savimbi's "freedom-fighters." The real purpose is to roll back what is seen as another Soviet expansionist threat. But intervention would fly in the face of the realities of the region and cast a fateful shadow over our relations with Moscow.

Mr. Savimbi's long journey to

The fuss is not over Africa

Washington began a decade ago with the struggle for power in post-independence Angola. In 1975, after failing in his bid for a leadership role in Angola's Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola, a Marxist party, and then being shunned by his former Maoist mentors, he attracted the favor of Henry A. Kissinger. In 1975, he described himself to visitors as "a New Testament socialist" and began taking money from the Central Intelligence Agency.

The following year those funds were cut off when Congress adopted the Clark Amendment prohibiting covert aid to Angola. After that, Mr. Savimbi's ideological metamorphosis was completed: Invariably identified as the "charismatic, fatigue-clad leader of the anti-Communist Unita guerrillas," he became the toast of many American politicians who by last summer had made aid for the National Union for the Total Independence of Angola a priority objective.

The key to unlocking this aid was repeal of the Clark Amendment. Once this barrier had fallen, there was no tenable line of defense for those in the Administration who opposed intervention. Ultimately, Secretary of

Richard M. Moose was Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs from 1977 to 1981.

State George P. Shultz endorsed aid to Unita in its fight against the Luanda Government, while continuing to negotiate with the Luanda authorities for a Cuban withdrawal.

Although aid to Mr. Savimbi is the putative aim of Mr. Savimbi's American friends, their real concern is this country's global posture toward the Soviet Union. It is manifested in their unstinting support for anti-Communist insurgencies. Indeed, they regard the possibility of an understanding with the M.P.L.A. - even if it led to the withdrawal of Cuban forces as anathema. They were outraged last fall when an African Marxist leader, President Samora Machel of Mozambique, was received by President Reagan. Mr. Savimbi's elaborate reception this week is their revenge. They hope by a show of force to strip away the ambiguity of the Administration's attitude toward anti-Communist insurgencies and to imprint their own aggressive philosophy on the conduct of our relations with the Soviet Union.

There is, however, some disagreement among Mr. Savimbi's supporters as to the purpose of intervention. Some advocate the pursuit of total military victory. Others speak merely of "raising the cost" or "bleeding the Soviets." Some otherwise thoughtful moderates have convinced themselves that strengthening Unita could promote reconciliation among the Angolan factions.

These are difficult objectives, each with its own implications, costs and risks. But so far there has been no. real national debate about Angola. Conservatives worry about the Russians; some of the rest of us worry about the Africans. Both concerns are legitimate; both can be accommodated in a rational policy framework.

The key element in such a framework is recognition that South Africa is the primary source of the region's instability and that the Communists are the main beneficiaries of that instability. By acting to end Pretoria's interference with its neighbors, we can effectively undercut the Soviet Union and realize the full potential of our own influence.

Ironically, the only thing the Russians can do for Angola (although they do it poorly) is the one thing America has been unwilling to do assist Angola in defending itself against South Africa. As for Angola's other needs - food, investment, trade, technology - no country has more to offer than the United States. Judged against this backdrop, an invitation for Mr. Savimbi to visit the White House is a ludicrously inappropriate substitute for a policy.

President Pledges to Help Savimbi

Angolan Guerrilla Leader Is Welcomed to the White House

By David B. Ottaway Washington Post Staff Writer

President Reagan welcomed anticommunist Angolan leader Jonas Savimbi to the White House yesterday and pledged that the United States would be "very helpful" to his fight against the Soviet-backed Marxist Angolan government.

"We want to be very helpful to what Dr. Savimbi and his people are trying to do and what we're trying to arrive at is the best way to do that," Reagan said as he posed for photographs with the Angolan leader in the Oval Office.

The president did not specify what kind of aid the administration intended to provide to Savimbi, who arrived here Tuesday on a 10-day lobbying campaign to win U.S. diplematic and military backing for his decade long struggle.

his 15-minute session with Reagan but declined to specify whether he had been promised any aid, and whether it would be overt or covert. "It is the president who knows what he is going to do," he said.

On Wednesday, Savimbi met with Secretary of State George P. Shultz for more than an hour. This was followed by a half-hour session with Defense Secretary Caspar W. Weinberger to discuss his military needs. Savimbi aides have said what they require most is antitank weapons and antiaircraft missiles.

Pentagon sources said Weinberger and his aides had discussed the possibility of providing Savimbi with nonlethal aid as an interim step under an amendment to the Defense Department authorization bill this fiscal year that allows it to provide excess supplies and equipment for relief purposes "around the world." Savimbi said he was satisfied by . The measure was intended initially

as a method to provide aid to Afghan refugees but has been interpreted by the Defense Department to allow shipments to other anticommunist guerrilla movements, according to the Pentagon sources.

Yesterday, Rep. Bill McCollum (R-Fla.), author of the amendment, ? and Sen. Orrin G. Hatch (R-Utah), a supporter of aid to Savimbi, sent a letter to Reagan urging him to use the measure to send immediately "substantial amounts" of excess Defense Department supplies, such as uniforms, boots, vehicles and medicine, to Savimbi's forces.

Administration officials have indicated they want to provide Savimbi with covert military assistance and other aid, and oppose a drive by conservatives to get congressional approval for open aid.

A senior administration official said Reagan and Savimbi had held See SAVIMBI, A31, Col 3

THE WASHINGTON POST

FRIDAY, JANUARY 31, 1986 A31

President Reagan meets with anticommunist Angolan leader Jonas Savimbi at the White House.

Reagan Vows to Help Savimbi

SAVIMBI, From A21

"a very positive exchange" in which the Angolan leader had made known "what his desires, what his goals are." Chief among these, the official said Savimbi told Reagan, was reconciliation between his movement and the Marxist Angolan government.

Reagan told Savimbi the United States had undertaken "a negotiated approach" to achieve this goal, including talks with the Soviet Union about "the Angolan situation." Reagan "will probably continue" to raise the issue at future superpower summit meetings, according to the official.

Reagan's warm welcome and support for Savimbi yesterday set the stage for the drive by conservative groups and other Savimbi backers to obtain U.S. assistance before an expected Angolan government offensive in the spring.

The official said the administration opposes congressional "legislation mandating aid" because of "diplomacy" and "practicality." Asked to elaborate, the official replied, "Well, how are you going to get aid in there, for example."

. It is not "the desire" of anyone in the administration to send U.S. aid to Savimbi through South Africa, which has supported the Angolan rebels for years, the official

This was the first hint that the administration may be planning to channel a proposed \$10 million to \$15 million in covert aid through Zaire, or another black African country, to avoid charges that the United States is colluding with South Africa by providing assistance to Savimbi. South Africa is presently his main outside backer and source of a and supplies.

Although some groups opposing U.S. aid

to Savimbi have suggested that covert aid has already begun flowing, a White House official said there was "still no official decision" and that the issue remains "a matter" of discussion within the administration and with Congress."

In a related development, the Senate Foreign Relations Committee held a closeddoor session yesterday to hear CIA and . State Department evaluations of the An-: golan war. Administration opposition to: public aid for Savimbi has left his congres- · sional supporters uncertain of what course to follow.

Administration officials have said they would welcome a congressional resolution of support for Savimbi. Senate Majority Leader Robert J. Dole (R-Kan.) in December introduced such a resolution but also proposed "material assistance" to Savimbi and economic sanctions against Angola.

Congressional sources said Dole was considering reintroducing the resolution but was still working with the administration and Savimbi supporters on the wording.

Twin shadows over the Harare indaba

SUPPORT for the Southern African Development Coordination Conference (SADCC) was one constructive way to react to the South African regime's policy of destabilising its neighbours, said Norway's development cooperation minister, Reidun Brunsletten, at the SADCC annual conference in Harare last week.

It was by far the most political of SADCC's annual conferences, and it was made political in large part by SADCC's foreign partners, who for the first time linked their aid to the need to resist South African attacks. There was even a military overtone when the president of the African Development Bank, B Ndiaye, said that the SADCC states had been forced to divert development resources to security, so more aid was needed to compensate.

The SADCC is the economic association of the nine majority ruled states of the region — Angola, Botswana, Lesotho, Malawi, Mozambique, Swaziland, Zambia, Tanzania and Zimbabwe. It was formed in 1980 to encourage economic cooperation and reduce dependence on South Africa.

At annual conferences where they meet with foreign partners, SADCC members have always tried to keep the emphasis on economic and development issues. This began to break down in 1983, but it was reinforced in 1984, just before the Nkomati and Lusaka accords, by which it seemed some rapprochement might be possible.

But Pretoria's renewed aggressiveness in 1985 dashed any such hopes.
The violations of Nkomati, invasions
of Angola, raids on Gaborone and
Maseru, and then the blockade of
Lesotho politicised SADCC's foreign
partners.

Not only did they promise more help, but they applauded SADCC's open and repeated calls for mandatory economic sanctions against South Africa. Among the SADCC members, there was not a whisper of dissent against calls for sanctions — not even from conservative governments such as Swaziland and Malawi, nor from the new government of Lesotho. All nodded in agreement when it was argued that sanctions would speed change in South Africa.

imposed, South Africa will retaliate against its neighbours — as the Lesotho blockade showed. Any such retaliation will be expensive. But SADCC estimates that destabilisation has already cost its members more than US \$10 000- million, so sanctions are seen as an investment in ending that much larger expense. Peter Mmusi, SADCC chairman and Botswana vice president, described the cost of sanctions to the SADCC as "like the pain of childbirth".

Two shadows lay over the meeting of South Africa's neighbours in Harare last

week. The shadow of apartheid and the shadow of Jonas Savimbi's successful visit to Washington. JOSEPH HANLON reports from Harare



'Unita's Jonas Savimbi ...
carefully timed his meeting
with President Reagan

Two other factors also politicised the conference. One was the continuing uprisings within South Africa. For the first time in five years, SADCC invited the liberation movements — the ANC, the PAC and Swapo — to its annual conference and gave them a big and public welcome. In previous years they had been invited only to the more political heads of state meetings and not the development-based annual conference.

The other was US president Ronald Reagan's meeting with Unita chief Jonas Savimbi, carefully timed for the opening day of the SADCC conference. The combination of covert and open US assistance to Unita seems likely to make Savimbi the biggest recipient of US aid in the SADCC region. The US also funds some SADCC projects, but that does not compensate.

"US actions run counter to its professions of friendship and cooperation with the independent states of Southern Africa. This places the United States clearly in league with South Africa in fomenting destabilisation in this region," Mmusi said in his closing speech.

The US delegation at the conference was livid, and is trying to cut off US aid to SADCC. But if it did so, other countries would step in. Indeed, the underlying message of this year's conference is that SADCC now has much more international backing to

were headed by ministers.

This backing comes not just because of South Africa, but also because SADCC in its short life has proved to be one of the more successful regional organisations. It has always stressed step-by-step cooperation involving concrete projects of mutual benefit, rather than trying to negotiate complex nine-nation agreements. Administration of sectors is devolved to member states - Mozambique for transport, Zimbabwe for agriculture, Angola for energy, etc, so SADCC needs no massive central bureaucracy and has only a modest headquarters in Gaborone.

Thus in a quiet way, railways and ports are being rehabilitated, while new electricity and telecommunications links are being built. In the past five years, SADCC has raised more than US \$2 500-million for its development projects.

Of course, even this has political dimensions: such diverse states as Malawi and Mozambique cooperate within SADCC in part because of the overriding threat of South Africa.

Similarly, SADCC's main foreign partners — the Nordic states, Netherlands, Italy and Canada — are precisely those countries which have few historic links or investments in the region and who are now looking for markets and sources of raw materials. The big three in South Africa — the US, Britain and West Germany — are only lukewarm on SADCC. But SADCC's many friends have money — for example, Italy, which has already provided more than US \$100- million, pledged another US \$50-million in Harare.

The strongest mark that SADCC has come of age was the signing last week of unique region-to-region cooperation agreements with the EEC and the Nordic States. The EEC accord gives SADCC de facto control of the disbursement of EEC regional funds for Southern Africa — US \$100-million — in the next five years. No other regional body anywhere has been given such a say in the use of EEC development assistance.

Similarly, the Nordic states, (Denmark, Finland, Iceland, Norway, and Sweden) have selected Southern Africa as a primary area of involvement and have signed a special agreement of productive sectors and of trade — both intra-SADCC and exports to the Nordic states. Private investment will be encouraged, and it is hoped that as Nordic firms pull out of South Africa, they will invest in SADCC instead.

When SADCC was founded six years ago, reducing dependence on-South Africa was seen as a long-term goal. Since then, some progress has been made. For example, fewer telephone calls now pass through Johannesburg. But in a macroeconomic survey published at the conference, SADCC admits that in the key transport sector dependence has actually increased. This is blamed on destabilisation which has closed down some railway lines in Mozambique, but also on what it calls "economic aggression". This involves ratecutting by SATS and the role of the South African-owned Renfreight the region's dominant freight forwarding compay "obstructing the movement of cargo through SADCC ports with a view to diverting it through South Africa."

There is a general assumption that sanctions are coming and that it is necessary to plan for South African retaliation and increased destabilisation. Each continued link with South Africa provides an opportunity for destabilisation and retaliation, and thus reducing dependence has taken on an urgent, practical necessity.

South Africa's recent actions brought the region's political realities home to SADCC's foreign partners as never before. And at the Harare

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Charisma man ... the image of Savimbi that conservative America favours: a man of the people, greeting local civilians

SAVIMBI and Reagan; Savimbi and Weinberger; Savimbi and Schultz; Savimbi in the New York Times; Savimbi in the Washington Post; Savimbi on three major political chat shows - the Angolan rebel leader more than held his own in the competition for media and official attention in the USA last week.

Six years ago, Savimbi couldn't get a meeting with the Assistant Secretary personality.

US lawmakers and the variety of embroiled in an increasingly bitter debate over the question of providing aid to Unita.

The issue is complex and the subsidiary debate over whether such aid should be provided covertly or overtly provides a positively bizarre element.

Simple explanations for Savimbi's sudden rise to favour abound. The fact that somebody spent \$600 000 (R1,3million) on the services of a leading firm of political lobbyists is one such troops that has become the ostensible Cubans in his Florida constituency. explanation.

At a press conference in New York Unita. on Thursday, John Stockwell, a American conservatives have never US conservatives support Savimbi imposed by the Clark Amendment on because they "make believe that he's a their ability to assist Unita. Their lobbies. charismatic leader, a big man and an dissatisfaction was expressed most

does not control 60 percent of the ionaire Lewis Lehrman, dissidents also opposed. For example, New York, already bitter debate. country and he's below average from Laos, Afghanistan and congressman Ted Weiss has submitted height,"

are more complex and important.

debate, the long-standing relationship Five weeks later, the House of Unita began as far back as 1974.

channelled aid worth \$60 000 package. by 1976.

After South Africa's abortive military aid. invasion of Angola in 1976, the Clark The apparent motivations for some banks, lent \$350-million (R777- administration to support the South between 1974 and 1976 and initial US Southern Africa specifically. support for South Africa's invasion accounts for MPLA's original request for Cuban military assistance.

vention by South Africa - both in Soviets. the form of direct SADF incursions the Cubans.

Reagan backed Savimbi to push out of State for African Affairs. Today, he is a fully fledged American the Cubans. Instead US lawmakers and the variety of lobbyists, newspapers and corporations that seek to influence them are he said the seek to influence them are he influence them are he influence them are he is a made suite that they won't budge

> Six years ago, no one in Washington would talk to Jonas Savimbi. This time round, the media wouldn't leave him alone. DAVID LEWIS reports from New York

And yet it is the presence of these weight of virulently anti-Castro argument in favour of renewing aid to

that day, hosted by Savimbi and with Savimbi during his visit. "Well, he's not an intellectual, he bankrolled by conservative mill-In the heat surrounding the current support and greeting from Reagan.

renewed covert aid to Unita.

congress proposing humanitarian and

Amendment prohibited any further of these proposals are complex and million) for cil exploration in Angola. African government. US aid to Unita. However, the aid bear little relationship to Angola or Accordingly, leading bankers like But if the conflict can be presented

The Pentagon proposal for military aid immediately preceded the

church groupings are strongly reconsider his decision. former CIA chief in Angola, said that been satisfied with the limitations opposed to aiding Savimbi as are some

Important liberal congressmen are Nicaragua met with Savimbi in Jamba a bill that would in effect reinstate the But the reasons for supporting him to form the Democratic International. Clark Amendment by prohibiting him to soldier on and, given conunced Lehrman attended, bearing a letter of further aid to any of the parties to the Angola conflict.

Powerful business interests are also the Cuban troops. between Savimbi and the USA is Representatives repealed the Clark oppposed to funding Unita. Chevron, often forgotten. US military aid to Amendment, opening the way for the company that owns the Cabinda oil interests, is predictably opposed.

the FNLA is held largely responsible number of proposals to aid Unita. In the sight of the taxes and royalties of government. The simple reason is that for the initial decision and ability of November, the Washington Post an American corporation buying Soviet arms and Cuban troops are an these two organisations to wage an reported that the CIA and the Cuban soldiers and Soviet arms that intolerable burden for an already Pentagon were seeking a massive they have taken to buying Chevron ravaged Angolan economy. The CIA is estimated to have \$200-million (R444-million) aid stock so as to persuade the corporation. The subtle reason revolves around to get rid of its \$600-million South Africa itself: as long as the (R133 000) to Unita and the FNLA Two bills are now coming before (R1 332-million) stake in Angola.

banks, including major American increasingly difficult for the US Chase Manhattan's David Rockefeller in global terms - another variant of also oppose aiding Savimbi.

Reagan/Gorbachev summit and was material aid to Savimbi at this stage, the South African government is It is continued US military inter- reportedly intended as a signal to the although its position is often highly enhanced. contradictory.

under pressure from the increasing of publicly warning Chevron that its conflict.

Picture: TREVOR SAMSON, AFP interests in Angola were in potential conflict with US national interests.

The State Department's strategy appears to be this: don't aid Unita just yet, but let the MPLA know that if it refuses to negotiate with Unita then the State Department will stand aside and let the conservatives have their way - the rough edge of constructive engagement.

The upshot of this is the administration's strong moral support for Unita. In last week's State of the Union address, Reagan said: "...you are not alone, freedom fighters. America will support with moral and material assistance your right not just to fight and die for freedom, but to fight and win freedom - to win freedom in Afghanistan, in Angola, in Cambodia and in Nicaragua."

Conspicuously absent was any mention of South Africa.

Translating this into concrete terms, Reagan has informed the House Select Committee on Intelligence of his decision to send \$15-million (R33million) of covert aid to Unita.

Under the law, the committee is entitled to advise the president, but it But the proponents of aid to Savimbi may not stop the operation. Last week, do not have it all their own way. Vocal the committee asked Reagan to

If Reagan goes ahead, the well organised Africanist and labour committee's only option, should it wish to pursue its opposition, would The Black Congressional Caucus is be the reinstatement of the Clark intellectual who controls 60 percent of theatrically on June 1 last year. On bitterly opposed and refused to meet Amendment, effectively tying the president's hands.

This would further intensify an

But \$15-million will not win the South African support, will necessitate the continued presence of

The aid seems to be self-defeating.

But it is also just possible that the In fact, covert CIA aid to Unita and Since then, there have been a Conservatives are so incensed by administration and the South African

South African conflict is defined in In July, a multinational coalition of strict civil rights terms, it will become

"us" versus "them" - then the ability The State Department also oppose of the US administration to support

The continued presence of the The bill for humanitarian aid is For example, although Schultz is on Cubans in the neighbourhood is the and in the form of aid to Unita - that sponsored by a liberal Democratic record as opposing aid now, Crocker only possibility for presenting the congressman, Claude Pepper, who is recently took the unprecedented step South Africa struggle as a Soviet-US

Savimbi hopes to deploy US missiles to halt IMPLA

JAMBA. — Guerrilla leader Dr Jonas Savimbi said he hoped to have US anti-tank and anti-aircraft missiles by April, to meet an expected government offensive.

Dr Savimbi told reporters at the weekend he had a "firm commitment" for military aid from the Reagan Administration, but that he was not certain when the aid would arrive and what form it would take. About 20 Western and South African reporters visited Dr Savimbi at his bush headquarters in south-eastern Angola.

The Unita leader said

no US military advisers would come to Angola. "We don't need American personnel. What we need — it is only material aid," he said.

Dr Savimbi rejected speculation in South African newspapers that Unita was considering the release of Cuban prisoners as part of possible agreements to free Nelson Mandela, or Captain Wynand du Toit, captured during a commando operation in Angola last year.

"Nobody has approached us yet. If we are approached . . . we may see if it has any merit," he

Unita claims to hold 10 captured Cubans and five Cuban deserters, and says it presently has no Soviet or other East Bloc prisoners.

Dr Savimbi returned this month from a 10-day visit to the United States, where he sought help in his fight against the Soviet and Cuban-backed Angolan Government. The United States has not provided military aid to anti-Marxist forces in the country since Unita lost a conventional civil war to the ruling Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola 10 years ago.

US news reports say the Reagan Administration plans to give Unita R21 to R32-million in covert military aid. Dr Savimbi said he did not discuss amounts of money in Washington, but that he was confident "that they have understood our needs".

"We said what we need is anti-tank and anti-aircraft missiles," Dr Savimbi said. "We got a firm commitment that aid is coming.

"We would not refuse any type of aid . . . but boots and aspirin are not the most likely to create a difference."

Dr Savimbi said the Reagan Administration promised to respond by April, when the rainy season ends in Southern Angola and Unita expects another major government offensive. Intelligence chief Brigadier Peregino Chindondo said the MPLA was already moving soldiers, tanks, planes and helicopter gunships to bases near Unita territory.

Unita reported heavy losses on both sides six months ago, after it repelled what it said was the biggest government campaign in a decade.

-- Sapa-AP.

Black activists es misled about Unita — claim

JAMBA. — Dr Jonas Savimbi has said some Black American civil rights activists oppose Unita because they are misled about the nature of the guerrilla movement.

But Dr Savimbi said at the weekend Black opposition did not impair his visit to the United States, which ended on February 6.

"Blacks have understood that those who used to organise them — they are not giving them the facts," Dr Savimbi told reporters at his bush headquarters in south-eastern Angola. "It is why Blacks did not accept to come into the street against me."

Opposition to Unita among US Blacks stems largely from Dr Savimbi's acceptance of support from South Africa. When asked about South African aid, Dr Savimbi says he opposes the South African policy of apartheid, but will take help from any source.

South Africa's control of South West Africa which borders Southern Angola, gives Unita an assured supply base and secure transport routes by road and air. Unita says it also receives aid from a number of unnamed African and Middle Eastern countries.

Dr Savimbi said the Rev Jesse Jackson, Mr Randall Robinson and other Black leaders were unable to mount effective protests against him during his 10-day stay in the United States.

"It will be much better if those leaders could come and discuss with me the issues of the liberation struggle and of the Black dignity that we have been fighting for, a long time, instead of listening to propaganda.. without knowing the facts," Dr Savimbi said.

"When I called on Black journalists, they came -120 to a luncheon that I gave, and we had a discussion."

-- Sapa-AP.

US 'declared war' with aid for Savimbi — Angola

LUANDA. — Angola said yesterday the Reagan Administration's decision to arm South African-backed Unita rebels amounted to a declaration of war on the Luanda government.

"It only can lead to an escalation of violence in Southern Africa as Washington continues to in-

crease co-operation with Pretoria," Angola's official radio added in a commentary.

Dr Chester Crocker, the US Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs, told a Congressional committee on Tuesday that "both moral and material assistance" would be given to the right-wing Unita movement led by Dr Jonas Savimbi.

Last month, Dr Savimbi visited Washington and was received by President Ronald Reagan at the White House.

Southern African states denounced Dr Savimbi's US visit and attacked the "red carpet" reception he was accorded.

Official Angolan media have carried commentaries almost daily since then, saying it was taken for granted that the US would now aid Unita covertly or overtly.

Luanda five weeks ago and was warned then by President Jose Eduardo dos Santos that his Marxist government would consider aid to Unita as being tantamount to a declaration of war, government officials said.

Unita was one of three movements that fought a civil war to gain power in Angola after independence from Portugal in 1975.

It has been fighting Dr Dos Santos' MPLA government ever since and controls wide areas in the south and east of the country with the support of South Africa.

The officials said Dr Crocker was also told that if Washington aided Unita, Luanda would look towards Cuba and the Soviet Union for more military assistance from them.

Presidential spokesman Mr Larry Speakes refused yesterday to discuss any details of US plans to aid Mr Jonas Savimbi's Unita forces fighting the Angolan Government.

"We've indicated, as Assistant Secretary (of State Dr Chester) Crocker did on Tuesday, that the decision-making process is moving forward, some decisions have been made, and we're working with congress on other decisions," Mr Speakes told reporters.

US aid on way for Unita to face

WASHINGTON. — The Reagan Administration said yesterday it had decided to provide military aid to Angolan rebels and that the "process is in motion" to do so before an expected Angolan government offensive in the spring.

"Certain decisions have been made to provide both moral and material assistance" to rebels fighting Angola's Marxist government, Dr Chester

WASHINGTON. — The CS-200 FF CITS IVC said yesterday it had acceptable of the contraction of the contraction

Crocker, the Administration's top African Affairs official, told a Congressional hearing.

"The decision has been made and the process is in motion," Dr Crocker said in response to persistent questioning from members of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee.

Senator Jesse Helms pressed Dr Crocker on whether the aid would "include weapons which are effective against the main threat to (Angolan) freedom fighters — I mean Soviet tanks, helicopter gunships".

"Will this aid include the weapons that they really need to win?" Mr Helms asked.

Dr Crocker, Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs, replied: "We want to be effective and that obviously covers the ground you have covered in your question."

According to congressional sources, the Administration has notified Congressional Intelligence committees of its intention to provide about R30-million military aid to Unita, chancelled through the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA).

These initial funds do not need Congressional approval, but funding any further CIA operation could be blocked by Congress, which is divided over aiding Unita.

The Angolan government has said it would consider US aid to Unita as tantamount to a declaration of war and would respond by asking for increased Cuban and Soviet aid.

Dr Crocker said Washington's top priority in Southern Africa remained its five-year effort to negotiate a peaceful settlement of regional conflict.

The effort involves independence for South West Africa and withdrawal from Angola of what Dr Crocker said was an estimated 35 000 Cuban troops backed by R4-billion of Soviet aid. —Sapa-Reuter.