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Special report compiled by the Information Department, in response to the numerous requests from organisation for information on this subject. It should be noted that this paper represents a draft version of a far more extensive project, which will be completed in the near future. As such, it should be considered as no more than a working paper. It is not intended for distribution. J

INTRODUCTION

Inkatha - the national cultural liberation movement - led by Chief Gatsha Buthelezi of KwaZulu - is almost always in the headlines today. As an organisation, it claims to represent well over one million members, have branches all over Natal and in other parts of the country, and describes itself as the 'most powerful' of all the forces opposing the South African government.

But, as an organisation, it is something of an unknown. What is heard and seen of it is mainly in the form of its head - Chief Buthelezi - who was appointed by the South African government in the mid-70's to run KwaZulu, one of the most populous of South Africa's bantustans. Furthermore, Inkatha is something of an enigma. Some of its policies appear to conflict with its actions.- For example, while Buthelezi has publicly refused to have anything to do with 'the four pillars of apartheid' after meeting State President P.W. Botha, his base is a homeland. While Inkatha claims to be a 'non-violent' organisation, using 'peaceful means' to achieve its aims, an increasing number of incidents involving Inkatha 'impis' (Zulu supporters armed with spears and other weapons), are being reported. x

As a political force as well, Inkatha is difficult to assess. With its claims of a massive membership, its often radical rhetoric, its influence in Natal-and in national political forums such as the so-called Black Alliance and the Convention Alliance, Inkatha holds much of the public eye. However, Inkatha membership as a whole has never been mobilised into a single action. South Africa has never seen the coherence of its one million plus members in united action for a particular end. So Inkatha is presented as something of a latent force in South African politics - ready to be mobilised at the right word from its leader. k

The Community Resource and Information Center decided to research this phenomenon that rose, like some giant phoenix, out of nowhere to a position of prominence in the political arena. In the entire political history of South Africa, no black political

organisation has been able to claim over a million supporters - not the Industrial and Commercial Workers' Union in the 1920's which grew so rapidly that not even its officials could cope; not any union or union federation since then; not the African National Congress, which has led the resistance struggle for over 70 years and is the most popular of all political parties in South Africa despite its banning. The United Democratic Front has the support of over 2 million people - but they are not formal card carrying members because it is a Front of over 600 organisations.

Our investigations were drawn from research and interviews carried out over a number of years. Our findings as to the strength, the claims, the coherence and the policies of Inkatha are summarised as follows:

T_HI-3 msron'y g INKATHA

Inkatha was originally founded in 1922 by King Solomon ka Dinizulu, late uncle of Chief Gathsa Buthelezi, present chief minister in Kwazulu and president of Inkatha. This original version of Inkatha was a cultural movement aiming at the preservation of Zulu heritage. Inkatha ya ka Zulu- mobilised popular support for the monarchy through the resuscitation of traditional forms. It arose in a situation of sharpening class conflict due to proletarianisation of the Zulus, social stratification in Zululand, the activities of the Industrial and Commercial Workers' Union, and the power vacuum left by the suppression of the Zulu Royal Family. Inkatha seemed to present itself as a bulwark against these dangers through its preservation of chieftaindom and African communalism.

eHowever, the movement became defunct in a couple of years as emissaries embezzled the funds they collected. There was an initial attempt by Buthelezi to revive Inkatha in the 1960's. He was approached by King Cyprion, then head of the 'Zulu nation' to reform Inkatha. But Cyprion withdrew his support after intimating that Buthelezi was ambitious and would try to assert himself through Inkatha. Only in March, 1975 was Inkatha again revived under a changed name: no longer Inkatha Ya KaZulu, but Inkatha ye Nkululeko ye Sizwe : "for the freedom of the nation". Whilst the old body was committed solely to Zulu objectives, the new body extended its objectives to National'cultural liberation within South Africa as a whole.

ETHNICITY

The 1975 constitution stated that "a member of the movement shall not be qualified to be a candidate of the office of President (or executive) of the Movement unless he is a citizen of KwaZulu who under the KwaZulu constitution qualified for election to the office of Chief Minister". This therefore made automatic Buthelezi's appointment as head of Inkatha. Policies also had to

be agreed to by the homeland's 'legislative assembly' and all KwaZulu cabinet minister's are automatically executive members of the movement.

However, in July 1979, Inkatha scrapped 19 of its 20 constitutional references to KwaZulu, its people, institutions and language. Both "Zulu" and "African" were replaced by "black". The "Zulus-only" clause for membership of the Central Committee was scrapped and the King was no longer automatically Patron-in-Chief. By that time, however, Inkatha had assumed a predominantly Zulu character and membership.

While the movement insists that it is non-racial in approach and composition, it exhibits a notable tendency to find non-Zulu agitators behind any anti-Inkatha moves, and the movement's main support is drawn from the KwaZulu bantustan and its surrounding areas where there are large concentrations of Zulu-speaking people moved there by the government in the name of 'separate development'. Constant reference is made by Inkatha to a Zulu heritage, Zulu tradition, and loyalty to a Zulu nation.

Although ethnic terminology was largely eliminated in the constitution, there has undoubtedly been a conflation of Zulu speaking people and "the people" as a whole. Inkatha members have insisted in interviews that although ethnicity had been abused by the South African state, there are real differences in cultural and historical terms. The use by Inkatha of the chiefs in KwaZulu reinforces this emphasis on 'tribalism', as do the numerous references made in speeches by Buthelezi to the time when "the Zulu nation was independent".

'In an interview, Chief Buthelezi, when asked why a Zulu cultural organisation was taken as the basis for a liberation movement, stated: "You might as well ask me why a Zulu founded the ANC ... surely I'm based where I am and politics is the art of the possible. And I used what was available in the context of where history has located me. Inkatha sprung in KwaZulu ... I happen to be a Zulu and I happen to be located there, and the people I wanted to mobilise - I was not going to mobilise people in a vacuum..." He has also accepted 'the reality of using KwaZulu merely as a base and as a springboard to get where we want to be.' In 1977 Dr. Bhengu, a prominent Inkatha official, claimed that possible ties to other homeland leaders were being set up as a method of attracting non-Zulu members.

AIMS AND OBJECTIVES OF INKATHA

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The aims and objectives of the movement are stated as follows: Firstly, to foster black unity through co-operation with all progressive African and other Nationalist Movements and political parties which work for the eradication of racialism, colonialism, neo-colonialism, imperialism and discrimination. Secondly, to foster the traditions of the people and promote the spiritual, economic, educational and political development of the black

people. Other aims are concerned with the abolition of forms of discrimination and segregation based on tribe, clan, sex, colour or creed, all forms of corruption, exploitation and intimidation, and ensuring the acceptance of the principles of equal opportunity and treatment for all people in all walks of life. The other aims refer to economic matters: Inkatha states its aim as the securing of "the most efficient production and equitable distribution of the wealth of the nation in the best interests of the people". It also aims to "protect, encourage and promote trade, commerce, industry, agriculture and conservation of natural resources ... and encourage all citizens to participate in all sectors of the economy".

In 1984, Buthelezi outlined Inkatha's strategy for the year, and stated that much African political action was a response to white initiatives and was protest orientated. While strategy did not preclude protest politics, he said, this did not provide the main thrust. He said that Inkatha needed to concentrate on making geographic gains in certain regions of Natal where there was opposition to it, such as Lamontville, and on consolidating its branches. This was to be one of internal consolidation of Inkatha's power, in order to emerge as a revitalised black political force prepared for the fray in 1985. He was referring of course to the new South African constitution, and stated that if Indian and coloured people participated in the elections to the new tricameral parliament they would be guilty of a "mammoth betrayal" of Africans.

Inkatha has stated its commitment to achieving radical change through non-violent means and mobilising the people against apartheid. It encourages "responsible" foreign investments in South Africa and aid in the economic development of formal and informal sectors.

Delegates at the tenth general conference in June 1984 condemned violence by Africans against other Africans, and resolved to work towards negotiation with the government on a "man to man basis". Inkatha also welcomed the Nkomati accord on the grounds that it would strengthen rather than weaken, opposition to apartheid. Mr Bhengu, an Inkatha Central Committee member, said that the accord had confirmed the validity of the movement's 'non-violent' approach. Addressing about 10 000 people at Inkatha's annual rally in Soweto in April 1984, Chief Buthelezi said that whites falsely imagined that the accord was the solution to all South Africa's problems while many Africans in South Africa had expected too much from neighbouring states and that it was mistaken "to expect our brothers and sisters in independent states to achieve what is our task to achieve for ourselves". Chief Buthelezi sent a letter to the president of Mozambique, Mr Samora Machel, saying that the future destinies of South and Southern Africa were in "the hands of the South African people and not those of the ANC's mission in exile". .

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Inkatha's 'multi-strategy' approach forms the essence of Inkatha rhetoric. In many of his speeches, Buthelezi argues that there is room for apartheid to be attacked from as many sides as possible - external, internal, through armed struggle, through trade unions, or simply through blacks uniting as a racially oppressed people. The multi-strategy approach is the justification for Inkatha's participation in the Bantustan structures, for its refusal to support a disinvestment campaign, and for its policy of 'constructive negotiation' rather than 'protest politics'.

Secondly, this multi-strategy approach which is both 'revolutionary and reactionary' is held together by the charismatic leadership of Chief Buthelezi, who makes reference to his Zulu ancestors at the same time as reminding people that he was a member of the ANC Youth League.

Thirdly, there is the alleged 'thuggery' of Inkatha. There are numerous examples of the use of violence against black opponents of the movement. A number of interviews with Inkatha members revealed that Inkatha has taken a vow to kill Reverend Xundu, a political leader in Lamontville and member of the Joint Rent Action Committee in Durban. It was argued that Rev. Xundu had used the rent crisis in Lamontville in 1983 to gain political power.

Despite Inkatha's insistence on its non-violent approach, this has only applied to the question of armed struggle against the 'state. The Youth Service Corps is an institutionalisation of Inkatha's use of violence against political opponents. The Corps has systematically and consciously been established as Inkatha's 'armed wing', with Youths being sent for para-military training under Inkatha's banner. In addition, the actions of Inkatha during the 1980 schools boycott and at the University of Zululand, reinforce the argument that, while Inkatha condemns the use of violence as a means of overthrowing the government and seize power for the majority, it is more than prepared to use violence to crush opposition to itself.

Fourthly, great emphasis is placed on the youth of the movement. The emphasis of the movement as a whole on discipline is translated in the Inkatha youth into a near fanatical loyalty to Buthelezi and the 'Zulu nation'. However, as we shall see later, Inkatha's ageism in practice is a contradictory factor in its publically stated emphasis on the youth.

Fifthly, Inkatha is vehemently anti-Marxist. Buthelezi insists that Inkatha embodies the ideals of the ANC that was formed in 1912, and that the ANC has been taken over by communists who have perverted its struggle and are using it for the wrong ends.

Sixthly, Inkatha 'preaches the gospel of development - for us, development equals liberation'. In an interview of a publication in Inhlabamkhosi, Mr Nkhehli stated that the aims of the Bureau for

Community Development and Youth Affairs embodies "the promotion of the development of the people based on self-help and self-reliance principles'. Implicit in the movement's corporativist approach is a fear of the development of a revolutionary class consciousness on the part of the organised working class. Its 'gospel of development', therefore, portrays workers' interests as synonymous with capitalism by stressing the need for conciliation and harmony between capital and labour, by denouncing the working class' political activities and the conscientisation of the working class. It therefore aims to neutralise the potential of workers to develop their own organisations, thereby ensuring that working class control is not asserted within the movement. This is important when one considers that the majority of KwaZulu's population is migrant workers - arguably the most exploited people in the world at the moment.

Seventhly, in attempting to undermine the basic poverty that may itself undermine support for Inkatha, the KwaZulu administration and Inkatha claim to have started a series of self-help projects in the rural areas, a literacy training project and training of young Inkatha activists in basic rural development skills. In this sense, Inkatha is trying - from a highly impoverished base which the apartheid system created - to show what Inkatha can do for its members.

In the course of this study we shall see how effective Inkatha is in carrying out these seven professed policies, and to what extent it maintains the 'spirit' of its own constitution.

MEMBERSHIP AND STRUCTURE OF THE ORGANISATION

The large majority of Inkatha's membership is Zulu-speaking, although non-Zulus have been eligible for membership. It is in practise tribally centered, with its centre of gravity in KwaZulu. In 1980, only 203 out of its claimed 946 branches were in urban areas, and of these, only 36 branches were outside Natal. The areas where these branches were said to be all contained large numbers of Zulu-speaking people.

Inkatha members are organised at the lowest level into branches, of a minimum of 30 members, and related to local political boundaries, township wards, or headmen's wards in rural areas. Meetings are supposed to be regular and at least once a fortnight and their role is to lobby for change at the local level.

Branches run projects such as creches, gardening, bulk buying, growing co-operatives and development projects. Each branch may form subcommittees to deal with the programmes of the Central Committee's subcommittees. Overlapping branch structures, are the Women's Brigades and Youth Brigades.

Approved and registered branches are organised into constituencies which coincide in rural areas with a chief's area of authority. Constituency officials have direct responsibility towards branches within their area. Representatives of branches, Women's Brigades and Youth Brigades are made at Constituency Executive Councils and the Constituency Annual Conference. Constituencies are organised into regional bodies and a regional headquarters is formed for any area specified by the Central Committee. The regional committee supervises the activities of the constituencies and organises public meetings and seminars. Each region holds an annual conference of representatives from constituencies, branches and brigades.

At the head of Inkatha is the Central Committee consisting of not less than 25 members and includes the president, secretary general, 20 members elected at the AGM and 3 members nominated by the president. It co-ordinates the activities of the entire movement.

Inkatha also has a National Council which consists of the Central Committee of Inkatha, the KwaZulu Legislative Assembly, 6 representatives elected by trade unions, district chairmen, representatives of Youth and Women's Brigades, and from each affiliated organisation. Membership is on both an individual and affiliate basis; All members were paying a joining fee of R3.00 and an annual fee of R2.00 in 1983. (we don't have more recent figures). Youth Brigade members were paying 50 cents, chiefs R11.00 per annum and all members of the KLA were expected to pay , 5% of their salaries monthly.

Affiliate membership is allowed to organisations which 'have interests that are consistent with Inkatha objectives; such

organisations include the Witwatersrand TAXi Association, Inyanda, NAFCOC, the KwaZulu School Inspector's Association and the Natal African Teachers' Union.

Chief Buthelezi announced in June 1984 that Inkatha had 984 117 paid-up members and 2 013 branches, and predicted that membership figures would rise to a million within months. He claimed that Inkatha Yenkululeko Yesizwe (the National Cultural Liberation Movement) was the largest African political movement in the history of South Africa.

But these claims to membership are debatable. Firstly, it is widely claimed that members are coerced into joining Inkatha. Hard evidence is very difficult to come by: Inkatha officials are very careful not to be caught forcing people to join, and people who have been coerced into joining are fearful of retaliation if they told their story. Because of the identity between the KwaZulu homeland structures and Inkatha, it has often 'been claimed that the administration is used to forcibly recruit people into the organisation. For example, as early as 1977, Mr G. L. Steyn, the then secretary of the department of Education in KwaZulu, 'advised' teachers that 'it would be in your interests' to join Inkatha, intimating that it would be a prerequisite for a teaching post in KwaZulu. More openly, however, the KLA has made it a prerequisite to be an Inkatha member before granting someone a trading licence.

While it is difficult to prove, many workers tell of being unable to get jobs without an Inkatha membership card. All migrant workers (who form the bulk of KwaZulu's population) have to go through labour bureaux' to get jobs in 'white' South Africa. According to some workers, unless a worker can display an Inkatha membership card with all their other documents, he or she will never get a job. Thus workseekers will join Inkatha for the sole purpose of getting a membership card so they can get work.. Once they have the card in their possession, they do not rejoin annually as they are supposed to. This may explain why, since its inception, the Inkatha leadership has issued directives to the branches to be more efficient in collecting dues. And it would explain why Inkatha's annual income through subscriptions never matches its claims of membership. And it would explain why Inkatha is very often broke, and why it also has to raise money from outside KwaZulu, and sometimes outside South Africa. But even if Inkatha is given the benefit of the doubt, and does have a million members or more, clearly much of this membership is coerced. Through the system of local chiefs and headmen, - a traditional system which the apartheid government has kept intact as a form of ethnic control - there is a lot of control over :the women, the old, the youth and the unemployed who are locked into the rural areas. A chief controls everything in tribal life - -from marriages through to granting land to whether someone can go and work to punishment for contraventions of tribal law. And'the chiefs are, in turn, both controlled by Inkatha and supporters of it. So their capacity to 'recruit' members is phenomenal.

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For many others, Inkatha membership is a 'passport to work' in the two largest sectors of employment - the migrant labour system and the government bureaucracy - and a passport to a trading licence as well as to access to Inkatha's 'development schemes'. The question that this poses is whether Inkatha is a democratic organisation. If there is coercion - as many alledge - what room is there for criticism and internal democracy? Again, many alledge that there is none. Any challenge to Buthelezi is taken as a challenge to the very movement itself. For ten years now, many Inkatha officials who have built up sufficient support inside the organisation are purged - first was Barney Dladla, the Executive Councillor for Community Affairs who was popular among workers and regarded as something of a 'leftist'. Professor Bhengu, the General Secretary of Inkatha, was dismissed from his posts and denied Inkatha membership after, said Buthelezi, building up a 'large coterie of disciples' amongst students at his expense. There has also been trouble between Buthelezi and the monarchy. King Goodwill of the Zulus had met with a number of chiefs unhappy with Buthelezi, and they discussed forming an opposition party to Inkatha. Buthelezi threatened to resign as KLA head if Goodwill 'got involved in party politics'. The King backed down. And so on it goes. Buthelezi's opponents in KwaZulu politics .have never lasted long, which has added fuel to the accusation that the distinction between Buthelezi and Inkatha is non-existent. Buthelezi, it can be argued, IS Inkatha.

In fact, one of the lengthy studies done of Inkatha analyses its structures and functioning in detail and concludes that there is in the organisation a personality cult of such proportions. that it is on the verge of fascism. All the structures - from the para-military youth brigades up to the central executive - is structured around Buthelezi. It argues that it is he who makes decisions, he who determines policy, he who makes most of the public speeches, and almost exclusively he who appears in the press. Any person who challenges that limelight, it is argued, becomes a threat to the personality cult. i

REFORMISM OR CONSERVATISM

After 1976 there has been aJvisible shift to conservatism on the part of Buthelezi regarding the relationship between the Bantustan areas and the rest of South Africa. In 1982, the Buthelezi Commission revealed this in the alliance formed between Inkatha and business interests in Natal.

The Commission Report was subtitled "The requirements for stability and development in KwaZulu/Natal". The compositions of the Commission, which represented a wide range of business interests, and the report itself reflect Inkatha's increasingly pro-capitalist economic ideology, and its accommodation of business interest. Pupils are encouraged to get "as much education as possible" so that they can carry the struggle for liberation "into the marketplace", and Buthelezi stated in a

speech in 1977 that :

"each occasion when a black man manages to be in a position to establish any business is an auspicious occasion, not only for himself or his family, but also for the entire community ... striking a blow for us in the liberation struggle now being waged by blacks."

The Buthelezi Commission. was the culmination of a long trend towards increasingly reformist constitutional proposals and accommodation of business interests. In early 1980, the KwaZulu Legislative Assembly announced plans to appoint a Commission to inquire into proposals for a political future of Natal. The proposal was back by the NRP and the PFP and by the commercial, industrial and agricultural-interests they represented. The Report, released in mid 1982 is subtitled : "The requirements for stability and development in KwaZulu and Natal". Business interests were widely represented on the Commission.

The Commission stated that "the high levels of economic and political discontent and significant extent of expressed militancy among Black South Africans in particular, indicate the urgency of our situation in South Africa and in the region of KwaZulu/Natal. Popular sentiments appear to be such as to create a climate which will encourage, justify and protect groups aiming at creating instability in the country. While a revolutionary situation has not yet emerged in general terms within the population inside South Africa, developments appear to point in that direction. The importance of legitimate internal Black political organisations like Inkatha and others in directing Black South African political sentiments along peaceful and constructive lines cannot be over-emphasized. ... We are convinced ... that these surveys reveal a possibility of political progress which majorities of rank-and-file Black, White, Coloured and Indian South Africans can accept as a creative compromise, in order to secure the stability which the future development of this region requires". .

The second volume of the Buthelezi Commission states that "the region of KwaZulu/Natal is not likely to escape the effects of prevailing conditions in the Republic as a whole. We are particularly mindful of the fact that one Black leader of moderate and co-operative inclinations with a wide base of legitimacy (Chief Buthelezi and Inkatha) should not have his position undermined by heightened radical mobilisation resulting from rising expectations without corresponding reform in national politics. The most valuable political resource for stability and peace is the quality : and effectiveness of Black leadership and we feel bound to make such proposals as will protect the position of the leadership that exists ... elementary nationality must lead the central government to the conclusion that balanced change should commence somewhere. Regional options could be a sensible start. KwaZulu/Natal must be given the opportunity to acquire

developed and decentralised powers, enabling constitutional and socio-political progress towards longer-run stability to be negotiated within the region itself".

The Commission proposed that after a number of stages, the entire area of KwaZulu/Natal be brought under a single government. It stressed that the KwaZulu/Natal Region should not entail independence from the Republic and that an autonomous KwaZulu/Natal should constitutionally always form part of the broader South African context with forms of representation and participation in the Central Government.

On the issue of "one man one vote", Buthelezi dismissed it as unrealistic and power sharing based upon it as simplistic. South Africa might have to "pass through phases to accommodate white fears, and other minority interests".

Buthelezi's relation with the South African Government

In January 1984, Chief Buthelezi refused an invitation to a working lunch with the prime minister, Mr PW Botha, leaders of several homelands, and members of the special cabinet committee to discuss a programme for considering African constitutional development. Mr Botha and Chief Buthelezi had last spoken in 1980 in a meeting which was reported to have ended in an angry exchange of views. Chief Buthelezi had subsequently said his declining of the invitation was because Zulu tradition did not permit him to 'break bread' with Mr Botha until their personal differences were settled. Mr Botha replied in parliament that he also had traditions, one of which was that he did not lie down when someone trampled on him.

In April that same year, Mr Botha invited Chief Buthelezi to resume negotiations with the government, despite personal differences between them, but added that he would not beg. Also speaking in April, Chief Buthelezi said that the National Party did not accept the legitimacy of African democratic opposition to apartheid. He added that he would discuss only 'real challenges' with Mr Botha.

In December, the two men met unofficially in Stellenbosch. A statement issued by the office of the state president described the meeting as a 'detailed and open-hearted discussion' on a wide range of issues. A spokesman for the KwaZulu government said that the two leaders had 'agreed to disagree' and that Chief Buthelezi had reiterated that he would continue to have nothing to do with institutions that fell within the "four corners of apartheid", although he would continue ruling one of the homelands.

The NRP and the Egg ;

Chief Buthelezi said in a speech in 1984 that the criticism of Inkatha's stand against the new constitution by the New Republic Party in parliament was "Zulu-bashing". He said that the NRP was a "dying white political viper spitting racist venom".

Dr Frank Mdlalose, the national chairman of Inkatha said in 1984

that the Progressive Federal Party was 'hesitant' about embracing Inkatha as its partner in opposition politics. He said that if the PFP's role as a parliamentary opposition was to be given political weight, then it needed to ally itself with Inkatha and the KwaZulu legislative assembly.

TRADE UNIONS AND THE LABOUR MOVEMENT

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Inkatha clearly feels threatened by the strength of the labour movement. In 1978, Buthelezi spelt out his position on unions and workers: 'The interests of workers are comprehended in a three-way interaction (by Inkatha). On the one hand, one has the state; on the other hand one has the employers; and thirdly, one has worker organisation. Worker organisations have particular vested interests which do not comprehend the totality of society. Inkatha and the unions have common cause. The constitution of Inkatha makes it possible for trade unions to become affiliate members. Where trade unions do not exist, or where they are too narrowly ideological and assume upon their shoulders responsibilities which are political, Inkatha will have to look to the interests of its members who rank amongst the workers affected.'

In other words, Buthelezi argues for workers to confine themselves to economic issues, to stay away from the political sphere which belongs to Inkatha, and for unions to steer off the 'ideological' course. However, in South Africa, the distinction between political and economic interests is blurred. And Buthelezi's arguments for maintaining the 'industrial peace' in South Africa have continually been repeated - and extended to imply that strike action and armed resistance are similar strategies (which he deplors): 'I warned industrialists and investors again and again that if they do not engage trade unionism ... labour will grab capital and do with it what they will. I have warned that blood will flow if unions are not permitted to run the responsible course they are compelled to follow in order to serve the workers.' i

In 1980, a year of record strikes, Buthelezi said: 'Certain trade unions here and abroad regard us as a threat to trade unionism. As our people have no trade unions, we are interested and see ourselves as having a role in the field of organised labour.' At a SABA rally he said: 'In places such as the Transvaal and Natal trade unions would simply not be able to stage a general strike without the full involvement of Inkatha.' As we know, several successful mass strikes have taken place - even as early as 1976 on the Rand - as well as in 1984 in the Transvaal (which Inkatha vehemently opposed) and 1985 in Port Elizabeth. National stoppages have been successfully called (for example, the Aggett stoppage and the Raditsela stoppage to protest their deaths in detention) in the face of Inkatha opposition.

Later, Inkatha changed its approach from wishing to establish its own unions to developing relations with the existing unions. It

suggested to unions that they meet to discuss joint action - including the monitoring of employment codes and the development of strategic use of workers' consumer power to bring results. Despite this, however, Inkatha has refused to support consecutive consumer boycotts - from the successful Fattis and Monis boycott to the Red Meat boycott to last year's Simba Chips boycott to the current consumer boycott aimed at pressurising the Chambers of Industry to force the army and police to withdraw from the townships.

But, in 1984, Chief Buthelezi commented that all too often in the past, political organisations had attempted to use the trade union movement as subservient bodies to achieve their ends, but Inkatha was not prepared to manipulate and dictate to trade unions. He warned of the potential bargaining power of African workers and consumers in the "politics of negotiation".

In July 1984, speaking at a rally in Johannesburg, Chief Buthelezi criticised the government's policy of separating urban from rural Africans. He complimented domestic servants who generally lived in the backyards of white suburbs and hostel dwellers for not "losing their cool" despite the horrible conditions they were living in.

Dr Dhlomo said last year that it should not be forgotten that the majority of Inkatha members were workers who belonged to a variety of South African trade unions. Although Inkatha did not actively campaign for unions to affiliate, it would welcome any unions which decided to join.

In May 1984 the National Sugar and Refining and Allied Industries Employees' Union, with a claimed membership of 13 000, affiliated to Inkatha.

FOREIGN INVESTMENT

While Inkatha is now putting much energy into attracting foreign investment to South Africa and opposing the disinvestment lobbies, a few years ago, it did not regard it as 'a make or break issue.' It supports investment 'in order to provide employment opportunities and economic participation, not exploitation, in the whole of South Africa.' Buthelezi has for a long time been an advocate of 'enlightened investment' - which is defined as companies keeping to the investment codes of conduct. Buthelezi has even gone to the extent of using Marx and Lenin to support his investment argument. .

Buthelezi's argument too, states that "when I, who speak from within the country and not from comfort in exile; when I hear the voices of my people pleading for food, clothing and housing, I cannot ignore them for Utopian ends. I ask the people what they would prefer: investment and jobs or disinvestment and no jobs. They answer that they want jobs and this is why I must play the politics of reality. This is not by stand, but the stand of

millions of blacks".

However, it must be borne in mind that foreign investment was one of the crucial factors which enabled the South African regime to survive the post-Sharpeville crisis; while it is true that foreign investment increases the growth rate of the country, it does not mean that the benefits of growth accrue to all people of the country; foreign investment supplies the necessary growth rate to be able to increase the power and size of the state apparatus. Furthermore, the unemployment figures, lack of housing, extreme levels of poverty in KwaZulu are clear indications of this.

Inkatha has often pointed to how foreign investors in KwaZulu have created jobs and a livelihood for its people and income for the country which will stimulate economic growth and further jobs. However, if we study this situation closely, the facts do not bear this out very well. Take the example of Akzo Chemicals in KwaZulu. Its total investment amounted to R3 150 000. The chemical process, however, is fully automated and with only 35 blacks being employed, which increased to 45 in the second year of the project. Akzo Chemie, the parent company, is a subsidiary of the Dutch multinational Akzo Chemie BV which belongs to the Akzo group of companies which employs some 100 000 people in 160 companies in 45 countries. However, not only did Akzo provide minimal employment because of its capital intensive nature, but it took advantage of government decentralisation policies to pay low taxes while taking out high profits. So the reality of foreign investment is somewhat different to the reasoning of Buthelezi's arguments. 1

But perhaps one of the best services the homeland chiefs are rendering to the government, is in allowing themselves to be used for the encouragement of foreign investment in South Africa and in the Bantustans themselves.

A resolution urging foreign investment in South Africa was adopted at an Inkatha rally in Soweto in April 1984. The resolution condemned certain leaders in exile and other 'self-appointed' leaders for propagating disinvestment without getting the approval of the people.

Inkatha gives foreign investment credibility through its attempt to monitor the codes of conduct in foreign industries. It endorsed the Sullivan Codes, the EEC code, and those accepted by the British and Canadian parliaments in 1978. But in fact, from 1978, the Women and Youth Brigades took on the task of collecting information on various industries. At the same time, Inkatha threatened pressure on companies not holding to the employment codes. Inkatha has never taken any action against multinationals; and it is well known that many multinationals abuse such codes. For this reason, many have criticised Inkatha's lack of sincerity and commitment to the abolition of labour malpractice.

During a meeting with General Alexander Haig, the former American

secretary of state, Chief Buthelezi said that the US's constructive engagement policy should consist of material and diplomatic support for responsible African forces working to bring about change through non-violent means.

In September 1984, Chief Buthelezi attacked the leader of the British Labour Party, Mr Neil Kinnock, for making "pie-in-the-sky" promises to the African National Congress. Chief Buthelezi said that black South Africans were no longer impressed by the promises of British politicians that were not delivered once the parties came into power. Mr Kinnock had committed a future Labour government to comprehensive ,economic sanctions against South Africa, and promised material support to the ANC, during a speech marking the 25th anniversaryt of the British anti-apartheid movement in June.

(SEE ADDENDUM: BUTHELEZI SPEECHES ON FOREIGN INVESTMENT)

UNDERSTANDING iNKATHA SUPPORTERS

A. MOBILISATION

Since Inkatha's rural support is largely mobilised through the chiefs, patronage is manipulated extensively to gain support for Inkatha. Chiefs and Inkatha personnel (through their interlocking with the KwaZulu Legislative Assembly - KLA) have the power to distribute resources. This is a large factor influencing Inkatha support. It is perceived by the rank and file that one can get land, housing and reference books far more easily by becoming an Inkatha member. Taking out KwaZulu citizenship may give one access to certain resources: land is allocated only to those with Londger's Permits attained through KwaZulu citizenship.

A domestic worker interviewed by a social science graduate said that the Chief in her area - Emolweni - was recruiting Inkatha members and that many people had joined "because we are frightened. We maybe do not get a house or a reference book if we are not members".

In resettled areas, it is impossible to gain access to resources if one is not a member of Inkatha. Inkatha provides the administrative link between resettled communities and the Ulundi administration. Ulundi relies on the Inkatha hierarchy to articulate the needs of these people.

Another factor which must be considered in assessing support for Inkatha is that initially, it promoted itself as the internal wing of the ANC, situating itself in the traditions of the ANC, indentifying itself as a continuation of the movement. It adopted the colours, songs and slogans of the ANC. In 1980 this position changed, however, with the schools boycotts, when Inkatha attacked viciously the position of students. We shall discuss .this later however, under "Inkatha and the ANC".

The coercion involved in recruitment to Inkatha is clearly highlighted in relation to teachers and civil servants. Teachers are expected to join, and Inkatha has imposed sanctions on teachers who do not mobilize Inkatha Youth Groups, or encourage "appropriate orientation" amongst the young.

Civil servants too, are under pressure to conform to the Inkatha line: in May 1978, a KLA ruling declared that civil servants' standing in Inkatha would have to be accounted for when the Public Service Commission assess them for promotion.

Perhaps one of the main reasons for Inkatha's strength is the fact that the entire KLA is constituted by Inkatha members.

Furthermore, all the members of the Cabinet are senior officials of Inkatha.

B. BUTHELEZI AS A POPULAR LEADER

There is little doubt that Buthelezi's own personal popularity is an extremely influential factor in the support for Inkatha. He became acting chief of the 30 000 members of the Buthelezi tribe in 1953 and loyalty to him by the Zulus stems from the fact that the Buthelezi family have been the traditional Prime-Ministers of Zululand. He is extremely charismatic - an essential feature of any populist movement for the purpose of uniting numerous ideological strands and groups together in the figure of a leader who embodies the movement.

Gatsha Buthelezi is the personification of publicly relevant symbols, both ethnic and nationalist, having as he does a flamboyant manner of speech, and a syncretistic style of dress - alternatively Afro, Zulu and European.

He is idolised, and is seen by many of the people as a Messiah. In an interview, Chief Buthelezi, when asked what he thought it was about his leadership of Inkatha that seems to inspire either hero-worship or else vehement mistrust and opposition, responded: "You could also ask what it was about Jesus Christ or Mahatma Ghandi..."

Where several years ago, one could affectionately refer to "Gatsha", this is no longer allowed - it is now 'His Excellency', or the 'Honourable Chief Minister'.

Every newspaper article or letter which questions Inkatha or Buthelezi's leadership, or which Inkatha feels has misrepresented the movement's views, is responded to swiftly, usually in the form of a letter which is signed by Buthelezi. And criticisms within Inkatha of Buthelezi are simply not tolerated, as we have seen.

Inkatha members speak of Buthelezi's 'pragmatism' and 'realistic leadership', and accept unquestioningly his assurances that the movement has by no means used all components of its 'multi-faceted' approach against the apartheid government. He speaks on many platforms, and his speeches are translated, reproduced and made widely available. His official title is on every speech; President of Inkatha, Chief Minister of KwaZulu and Chairman of the South African Black Alliance, and his speeches are generally full of powerful analogies and rousing phrases.

C. "EDUCATION FOR NATIONHOOD"

Inkatha uses its interlocking with the KwaZulu government machinery most clearly with evidence in KwaZulu's education system which represents a calculated attempt at mobilising strong support from black youth for Inkatha aims.

In 1976, Inkatha resolved to introduce its own "Education for nationhood" into the schools to counter radicalism from the urban

areas. Since 1978, teachers have been required to make time available for pupils to participate in the activities of the Youth Brigades. Buthelezi said of it:

"The Inkatha syllabus was done by some of the best educationalists we have in Natal. In fact, not Natal alone, I think that even some ATASA (African Teachers Association of S.A.) members were involved in it. It was worked out by the best university graduates, professors, lecturers and teachers. Some were Inkatha members; others were not. The subject is called UBUNTU/BOTHO. If you say Inkatha syllabus we do not object. It deals with all liberation movements - with the ANC, the PAC, with black leaders in the history of Southern Africa. It is not Inkatha indoctrination in any sense. It may be the Inkatha approach to education ... Is it indoctrination to teach them about that?"

In 1979, "Inkatha" was introduced as a one hour per week compulsory subject at all levels of schooling. The Inkatha syllabus is a far-reaching and all embracing attempt at preparing KwaZulu schoolchildren for their "role in the liberation struggle". The establishment of a syllabus with its emphasis on the youth with avenues for channelling growing political awareness and the need for political participation and involvement is intended to draw them into Inkatha structures. It covers the history of the movement, organisational structure, the role of the "leaders and the led", the role of the Youth Brigade, discipline and conduct of Inkatha members, and the importance of the constitution, Inkatha rallies, leadership and training. The Modern Lifestyles section deals with rural and urban life, economic development and the need for African business enterprise. Practicals include singing, dancing and self-defence. The nature of Inkatha ideology to which the youth are exposed is mediated partly by an appeal through traditional customs and norms. Through the Inkatha syllabus, Inkatha attempts to mould and harness the black youth into the force needed for the strategy of Inkatha developed by the petty bourgeois and conservative traditional leadership of KwaZulu.

Inkatha Education seems to be a strong factor in explaining the support of the movement's young members. During the 1980 School Boycotts which spread nation-wide, only 36 out of KwaZulu's 2 000 schools were affected (mainly those in Kwa Mashu) and this seems to indicate the success of Inkatha's inculcation of its disciplinarian and authoritarian strategy.

In 1976 the nationwide student unrest did not affect Natal schools at all. Inkatha took credit for the relative peace in Natal. Addressing the Inkatha Youth Brigade at Mahlabatini in July 1977, Buthelezi said that he would be "failing in my duty if I did not take this opportunity to thank the youth for managing to maintain a balance, despite the political traumas of 1976 and 1977. I am proud of your commitment to the struggle for

liberation ... the fact that you did not resort to acts of arson sisters in the struggle ... I know just what kind of pressures you were subjected to in attempts to persuade you to indulge in acts of violence ... I know how some fire-eaters amongst our loquacious self-acclaimed revolutionaries denigrate you". There was in fact an increase in the level of political consciousness of pupils in KwaMashu and Umlazi in the period from 1976 to 1980, because it is quite clear that Inkatha failed not only to successfully assert its 'restraining influence' over the schoolchildren in 1980, but that the attitude of supposed reluctance towards destruction of buildings and property changed radically.

From mid-1977, there were a number of incidents where students protested against various school regulations. In June 1978, pupils protested at at least three KwaZulu schools, which culminated in the death of one teacher and severe injury to a second at St Augustine's school near Nqutu. Shortly thereafter, Soweto pupils at a nearby high school were assaulted and threatened with death by KwaZulu pupils. this vicious turn of events can be traced to a single factor - the insistence by the KwaZulu administration that all the unrest taking place in the schools, minor as it was, was the work of 'troublemakers' from other areas, and that the pupils' grievances were not valid in themselves. Rumours were sweeping the Natal schools to the effect that the province was going to be 'set alight' by Soweto pupils. The movement's implacable refusal to accord any legitimacy to the pupils' grievances and its insistence on placing the blame for the unrest on 'agitators' placed it firmly in opposition to progressive students' actions and demands.

In February 1979, pupils at the KwaMakhuta High School near Amamzintoti boycotted classes, and the police were called in by school officials. Following the violent confrontation with the police, Dr Dhlomo ordered the closure of the school and announced that pupils would have to apply for readmission. This was obviously a means of isolating and refusing admission to 'troublemakers'. There was no tolerance whatsoever of the destruction of school property, and those who were prepared to destroy school buildings and facilities were accused by Inkatha of being the enemies of the struggle for liberation, and would be treated as such.

Boycotts continued throughout May, with Inkatha disrupting 'and attempting to intimidate meetings of the students who were planning and discussing the boycott. At one meeting held in the KwaMashu sports stadium, addressed by Buthelezi, a KwaMashu , minister, Rev. W.B. Mbambo was severely injured after being attacked by 200 impis for allegedly being one of those behind the school boycott. A KwaMashu Councillor, Mrs Mguni was attacked by the Inkatha Womens' Brigade - accused of being behind the boycott. At that same meeting, police opened fire into a group of approximately three hundred pupils, killing one student, and

severely wounding another. Buthelezi subsequently denied that any violence had been used against students.

In his presidential speech to Inkatha in June 1980, Buthelezi made some acknowledgement that, in the light of the continuing boycotts, the education for nationhood programme had not achieved what Inkatha had hoped it would:

"It is quite clear to me that our teachers have failed to inculcate in our youth the right attitude to our struggle. They have failed to elicit from the youth that sense of commitment which adds to our total strength in unity ...

Every school inspector must become increasingly involved in bringing the message of Inkatha to the people ... school inspectors should forge links in the chains which bind pupils, teachers, parents and authority into a task force for liberation. Our communities must produce more viable parent/teacher associations. Our branches have failed to tackle this most important aspect of liberation ... In the matter of education we are failing".

It seemed too that at the height of the boycott, the discipline and loyalty of Youth Brigade members had wavered. This, together with the failure of Inkatha to break the boycott, prompted the formation of the paramilitary Youth Service Corps.

D. YOUTH

In 1982, Inkatha opened its "Youth Service Corps for 'Social Reconstruction". The project's aims were "to equip the youth with skills so that they can go back to their communities as innovators and pioneer change". They were to be the "reserve of the movement and (were to) play the vanguard role of upholding and consolidating the gains of the movement".

There is an Executive Committee of the Youth Brigade which comprises a Chairman, who also serves as Youth Brigade Secretary and is appointed by Buthelezi in consultation with the Central Committee; the Executive Secretary; the Treasurer; and five other officers who are elected at a General Conference of the Youth Brigade.

The role of the Youth Brigade Secretary, as defined in the constitution of the Brigade, is to supervise the activities of the Youth Brigade; formulate and execute plans for the activities of the youth of the movement, and .

(4) (c) "shall act at all times in accordance with the directions of the President of the movement or of the Central Committee and in accordance with approved policy; .

(d) "...shall carry out all duties of the movement as directed by the President of the movement".

The Women's Brigade alike, has the specific brief of playing "an instructive role" in the mobilisation of women and in the

"upbringing of the children towards the objectives of the movement". .

However, the attitude of chauvinism of Inkatha takes the form of ageism within the movement. Despite the Youth Brigade's stated aim of playing a "vanguard role", it is quite clear that the direction of the movement as a whole emanates from a small group within Inkatha leadership. This is the case both for ideological positions, as well as for actions and programmes undertaken by the movement. Steve Biko spoke about Inkatha as being an organisation of "oldies" :

"We oppose Gatsha. He dilutes the cause by operating on a government platform. Because of this I see the danger of division among blacks. But we hope to avoid a real split on the basis of the BPC's great appeal to the younger generation. Gatsha is supported by oldies, for good reason, since Gatsha protects the stability that the older persons need. But we are young. We do not look upon the solution to injustice as an expectation but a duty. here lies the dilemma of the old: between duty and bread".

There seems to be some signs of strain between Inkatha leadership and the younger members of the movement. One Youth Brigade leader remarked that

"the attitude among the youth is that we are not positively aggressive enough to provoke a reaction from the powers that be ... they would say that we have been maintaining a low profile for far too long now".

Buthlezi said in an interview:

"Inkatha is responsive to the demands of the youth and youth in Inkatha is responsive to the demands of adults. There is in Inkatha no formal clash between the Youth Brigade and adult membership".

Nevertheless, Mafole asserted importantly that

"the youth will push the movement to the left, and the leadership will have to respond favourably".

Dhlomo agreed with this, remarking that

"the youth are pushing the leadership - we accept the militancy of the youth as a natural fact ... it is difficult to say how far the leadership is willing to be pushed."

The Youth Brigade exists to carry out the directives of Inkatha leadership. In essence, Inkatha attempts to assert its ideology of a conservative, multi-strategy approach to the struggle for liberation over the youth, from whom it demands absolute loyalty. It is Inkatha's aim to have a Youth Brigade branch in every KwaZulu school. To this end, apart from the mandatory teaching of "Inkatha" and time allowed for Youth Brigade meetings and

activities, Inkatha documents are sent to every school. In order to establish a branch, the National Organiser requests the district inspector to grant him time "to talk about Inkatha to the pupils". There must be a minimum of thirty members before a branch is formally constituted. It is then officially inaugurated, and members are permitted to wear the Inkatha uniform.

In April 1984, the Inkatha Youth Brigade claimed a membership of more than 350 000. Chief Buthelezi said that Inkatha's youth wing alone outnumbered any other single organisation in the country. One motivation for the camp's establishment followed the Kwa Mashu school boycotts. Buthelezi drafted a resolution that Youth Preparedness programmes should be established in order to prevent a recurrence of militancy in the schools. After the boycotts he told the Inkatha annual meeting: "I think we need to Create well-disciplined and regimented impis in every Inkatha region". The Youth Camp is run along paramilitary lines. According to an Inkatha official, Zondi :

"The camp is headed by the camp commander...because we realised that this undertaking needed to be run along the lines of paramilitarism. So it is run along a paramilitary approach in order to ensure the necessary degree of discipline among the trainees which is essential for disciplined work. To mobilise such members would be pretty difficult without the enforcement of discipline of some kind, similar to. that of normal National Servicemen. Because we are, in fact creating an army for development with this movement and Service Corps for Social Reconstruction. When Buthelezi visits the camp, he inspects them in military fashion".

The camp trainees wear their own uniform with the colours of the movement, and are constituted into sections, brigades and companies. Although they have no actual military training as such, they have cadets and a lot of physical training (from 4 am to 7 am) and the rest of the day is taken up with lectures. Discipline is enforced through Section, Brigade and Company leaders and through the Camp Commander. The lectures concentrate on agriculture, brick and block making, building skills, literacy training methods, bookkeeping and elementary mechanics.

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In its efforts to overcome the divide and rule tactics in terms of black-white relations, the Youth Brigade has made overtures to the Afrikaner Studente Bond (A38), to a group of Stellenbosch students with whom it has formed the South African Youth Foundation (SAYF), and to the PFP Youth.

The effort to make contact with the A88 was unsuccessful. The A83 Congress in 1981 was addressed by Mkhize, chairman of the Youth

Brigade. According to Mafole , the Inkatha delegation members were treated as "foreigners in their own land". A number of the ASB delegates walked out during Mkhize's speech, and shortly afterwards the Congress voted against a motion calling for black participation in the President's Council.

A. The South African Youth Foundation

Formed in August 1981, the aim of the foundation is to "improve relations and co-operation between black and white youth, because the future of the country is in the hands of the young". The inaugural meeting was addressed by Dr Koornhof, the then Minister of Co-operation and Development, Mr Gibson Thula, Inkatha representative in Soweto, and Dr Dhlomo. Projects undertaken by the foundation have included the appointment of white members to conduct winter school classes at the University of Zululand. The Foundation held a five day Leadership Seminar at the University of Stellenbosch in December 1981, which was attended by twenty four students from fifteen universities in South Africa. The seminar was "apolitical" and SAYF trustee Frans Roelofse told reporters that

"We believe the leadership seminar has made a definite contribution to the quality of life in Southern Africa."

B. Progressive Federal Party

Connections have been made between the Youth Brigade and the PFP Youth, corresponding to growing links between Inkatha and the PFP, especially over the issue of the President's Council and the referendum about the New Constitution. In 1981, for example, a joint statement was released by the leaders of the Youth Brigade, Labour Party Youth and the PFP Youth, accusing the National Party of jeopardising the future of all South Africans through its policy of racial discrimination.

The main thrust of these initiatives by the Youth Brigade is "trust building", and the involvement of youth groups in joint projects. A University Exchange Programme was initiated by the Bureau for Community Development and Youth Affairs, where West German students will live and work in rural areas in KwaZulu. It seems that the projects relate to "overcoming rural poverty and backward education" in KwaZulu.

The precise nature of activities undertaken by Youth Brigade branches is unclear, and seems to vary from branch to branch. However, it has been possible to ascertain that activities include literacy training projects, and creating 'centres' for the community. Members of the Civil Servants' Youth Brigade branch in Ulundi, formed in 1983, participated in the Ndundulu Fire Disaster Relief Project, and were discussing possibilities of raising money to assist projects of a similar nature in future.

The recent growth in Inkatha was concentrated in the urban areas, for Inkatha regarded urban support as an important political resource, and sought to consolidate a township base. To do this, it was prepared to participate in Community Council elections - a fact which horrified most people in the townships. The government controlled councils have always been regarded as 'toy telephones' since the time they were created in the 1940's as urban blacks' only political avenue in South African government politics. Community councils have seldom managed to attract even ten percent of urban black votes. Inkatha has no general principled stand against participation in state structures: in 1978-79 it adopted a "possibly yes - possibly no" stance, and Inkatha contributed to the high percentage polls in Natal with enthusiastic participation.

Buthelezi said in 1980 at a meeting:

"I say to you bluntly: Do not be ashamed to enter the fray at the level of community councils ... they... are not the vehicles of individual enrichment. They must be turned into chariots which rush us into battle ... I can see in the short and medium term, blacks pouring their strength into the community council system and so joining one council to another so that the very structure of division is turned into a mechanism of unity".

In Natal, Inkatha participated in Community Council elections, and in 1983 in Umlazi and KwaMashu, the Councils consisted predominantly of Inkatha members. An interview with a taxi driver explained that Inkatha dominates the Community Councils. "The people who are not Inkatha yet, have no chance at all of fighting because Inkatha is a sort of lion against a cat. It's either you surrender or just you walk your own way..." Hes said that formerly Umlazi had other organisations, particularly the previous Residents' Association. "Now, here at Umlazi, we have only one organisation. In fact, I can't say they're an organisation: that is Inkatha, everybody's Inkatha here. We haven't got many organisation; we have only one thing - Inkatha". Inkatha's predominance in Umlazi can be explained by the fact that the South African State allows it to operate. The previous , progressive and very strong Umlazi Residents Association was smashed by the State and George Sithole, its leader, is presently on Robben Island. Inkatha has not been subject to state harassment at all.

But Inkatha's readiness to participate in government-created local administrative structures militates against support from the township youth and many residents who constitute a crucial political resource for any organisation claiming to be a liberation movement.

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Buthelezi insists that Inkatha embodies the ideals of the ANC that was formed in 1912. It also adopted the colours, adapted the uniform, and developed the rhetoric the ANC used during the Passive RESistance Campaign. Buthelezi has made it a point to co-opt as many ex-members of the ANC as possible into Inkatha - even into leadership positions within the movement. This includes Bishop Zulu, Selby Msimang, Lugongolo-Mtolo, Hyacinth Bhengu, and Buthelezi himself, amongst others.

From 1975, Inkatha claimed it had the blessings of the ANC, as well as representing a continuation of the tradition of the ANC from the 1950s. While it never at that stage challenged the ANC as the most powerful liberation force, it did however, insist on its status as an important liberation movement. In address riot-torn Soweto in 1976, Buthelezi said that the exiled liberation forces are "brothers committed to the same cause for liberation as ourselves. Proof of our sincerity is that we are officially engaged in dialogue with the ANC in exile and with the PAC in exile". In November 1976, he met Oliver Tambo in Nigeria, and in 1977, Potlaka Leballo of the PAC in Dar es Salaam. He insisted that their only differences were over strategies.

The next phase of Buthelezi's diplomatic claims was to insist on an equality with the ANC and PAC: "I am aware that the OAU recognises the ANC and PAC as organisations which represent South Africa, but for the average blacks, this recognition... does not contribute to the struggle at home." ... "It is the ANC's responsibility to millions of South Africans to give us the opportunity to avert ... a race war". Later he accused the ANC of not having "sought consensus before they committed themselves to lines of violent action".

By August 1979, Buthelezi was already "demanding recognition from the ANC". He also singled out an official of the London-based International Defence and Aid Fund, Horst Kleinschmidt, who he accused of being "a junior spokesman for the ANC", as being responsible for the remark that "I (Gatsha) am introducing into South African politics the Bishop Abel Muzorewa factor ... I demand from the ANC to say clearly whether what Kleinschmidt says is correct".

Buthelezi said too that "Our brothers and sisters in exile must understand that they will alienate themselves from us if they deal with international forces without consulting us and taking us into their confidence. They must own up to the fact that the people in the country are those they serve. If they represent themselves as South Africans they must not believe paternalistically to those of us who stay on in the country. If they cease to hear our voice, their attempts to be armed liberators will be turned into armed banditry ... We have seen: the havoc such armed banditry can do to the oppressed masses in Zimbabwe".

In October 1979, Chief Buthelezi and 17 members of Inkatha, including members of the KwaZulu cabinet and the leaders of the Youth and Women's Brigade spent over R30 000 for the honour of meeting an ANC delegation in London. Buthelezi claimed, among other things, that the ANC had acknowledged the legitimacy of Inkatha and its strategies for liberation, that the ANC and Inkatha would form a united front against apartheid, that the ANC endorsed Inkatha's use of a homeland platform, and that the ANC gave Inkatha the green light for fighting the community council elections. But in a signed statement, Oliver Tambo denied aspects which gave the impression that certain fundamental principles had been abolished. Obviously he could not be quoted by the press.

ANC sources were also reported as saying that Buthelezi was claiming endorsement for what in reality was merely dialogue. The decisive break with the ANC seems to have come after an Inkatha delegation met with the ANC representatives, including Oliver Tambo, in London in 1980. In June 1980, the ANC issued a statement condemning Buthelezi for the role played by Inkatha in beating up, detaining and harassing the children involved in the schools' boycott. This, in conjunction with his refusal to support the "Free Mandela Campaign" in 1980, led the ANC to publicly criticise Buthelezi.

A statement read out at a conference to launch the Freedom Day Rally in London stated what many people inside South Africa were thinking: : "Buthelezi has always publicly attacked the very pillars of our movement. More and more he has been identifying himself with the South African government. his action in calling on his impis to harass the children involved in the school boycott at KwaMashu, and for them to attend school, as well as the fact that he is not an enthusiastic supporter of the campaign to free Mandela show his attitude. His actions are not those of someone genuinely supporting our struggle".

Since then, Buthelezi has made constant implicit and explicit attacks on the ANC. In 1980, for example, he said that he must warn all political groupings 'inside and outside this country' that he would not stand by and watch as the suffering of his people was exploited for ideological ends. In March 1983, following the discovery of arms caches in Ulundi, Buthelezi claimed that the ANC was attempting to assassinate him. He stated that the Ulundi arms caches could lead to inter-ethnic conflict in South Africa, as the leadership of the ANC came from the Transkei, and asserted that the ANC wanted to provoke inter-ethnic conflict in South Africa, and thereby 'destroy the black liberation struggle in South Africa'. Three days after this outburst, the Inkatha Central Committee issued a statement strongly condemning the 'growing evidence' of the intention of the ANC to 'eliminate by violent means the Inkatha movement, its physical base at Ulundi and its leader, Chief Gatsha Buthelezi'. The statement said that Inkatha would tell blacks in South Africa that the ANC and not the 'white racist regime', had become their oppressors. The ANC categorically rejected the claims that it was trying to assassinate Buthelezi. The reason for the accusations

made by Inkatha can be located in the denunciation of Buthelezi by the ANC, which is likely to have had a detrimental effect on Buthelezi's popularity and credibility, since part of Buthelezi's popularity has been as a result of Inkatha portraying itself as the 'internal wing'.

Dr Dhlomo explained the tension between the ANC and Inkatha as having four aspects: firstly, the fact that the two movements follow different strategies which frequently clash; secondly, 'the degree of access to the oppressed masses causes strain' -

"Inkatha is an internal liberation movement in daily contact with the people; the ANC doesn't have this access. This causes tension because the ANC claims it is the sole authentic representative of black people in South Africa, but it is talking about people with whom it is not in touch... the ANC feels uncomfortable and jealous of a numerically powerful body like Inkatha."

Thirdly, there is a lack of contact between the two. Dhlomo stated that when the ANC decides on a strategy, such as disinvestment, it does not consult with Inkatha. "There is no planning and consolidation. Thus the ANC is bound to misinterpret Inkatha's political strategies". Finally, Dhlomo asserted that the tension is one of 'political one-upmanship', where the ANC thinks that it must be 'top dog'. Inkatha will not accept this, and 'the people of South Africa will have to choose their leaders in a free and fair election'.

There are numerous further examples where Inkatha has "attacked the ANC and accused it of engineering opposition to Inkatha. Buthelezi said in an interview that he had evidence to prove that the ANC had sent funds to a South African independent trade union to be used for the express purpose of undermining Inkatha. Relations with progressive political groupings within the country are also tense.

Thus not only has Inkatha increasingly taken an anti-marxist stand, but it also expresses an unprecedented chauvinism in its approach to the liberation struggle, as a result of its fear of a mass action that is not under its control and which therefore might achieve aims different to those of Inkatha. This attitude was reflected in a General Conference Resolution in 1981 which stated that

" This General Conference ... insists that leaders of other liberation movements and anti-apartheid groups must consult with our President before embarking on any action or programme which is expected to have mass countrywide support".

Dr Dhlomo said in 1984 that while there were no political differences between Inkatha and external mission of the ANC, there were clear differences of strategy. He added that Inkatha was "aware that Chief Buthelezi's uncompromising stand in support of non-violent change in South Africa was a source of great frustration for the ANC". His popularity and Zulu military

background made him the only leader who could mount an effective armed struggle in South Africa, he said. Inkatha was not prepared to accept that the ANC was entitled to claim the self-appointed status of being the sole authentic political representative of Africans. Chief Buthelezi told the KwaZulu legislative assembly in May 1984 that the ANC was intent only on seeking power for itself, and would sacrifice all to establish its supremacy. He said that the Nkomati accord meant that Africa had served notice that it was unable to "bear the burden of complying with the demands of the ANC", while so-called armed struggle "a bomb here and a bomb there" , would not topple the government at this stage.

Chief Buthelezi claimed in June 1984 that he regularly consulted with representatives of the ANC. In August he said that Inkatha was the "largest representative of the ANC tradition propounded by the fathers of the national liberation struggle".

In September 1984, it was reported that Mr Oliver Tambo, the ANC's president, had sent a telegram to Chief Buthelezi pleading with him to stop the violence in Lamontville. Chief Buthelezi said that Mr Tambo had shown in his telegram a willingness to talk about differences of opinion. He added that he would like them both to meet as soon as possible.

INKATHA'S POSITION g ARMED STRUGGLE

With a rapid increase in the success rate of ANC sabotage from 1979 onwards, a lot of pressure developed inside Inkatha to change the approach to armed struggle. Up until then Buthelezi repeatedly argued that the might of the South African government was too strong to be taken on by guerillas. There were few public acts of sabotage which contradicted him. The main source for a more militant approach was the Inkatha youth.

According to Mr Nkehli, a Central Committee member: "The youth in Inkatha is calling for great change ... the youth is becoming more militant, and is frustrated about the narrowing of options". Buthelezi stated on the question of the growing militancy within the youth: "rising militancy is as evident in Inkatha's adult membership as it is in its Youth Brigade".

Nevertheless, a constant theme in Buthelezi's speeches, particularly when speaking to young people, is that the time' is not yet ripe for armed struggle. At the Youth Brigade conference in 1979, for example, Buthelezi said that

"In certain quarters within our black community 'negotiation' and 'peaceful change', to which we in Inkatha are committed, have almost become swear words ... even from a pragmatic point of view we cannot see how blacks can pull off violence with all the forced arrayed against them".

Speaking at a Youth Leadership Training Course in 1978, Buthelezi

.told trainees that

"Even though Inkatha understands the impatience of the youth and the fact that others had no option but to choose the armed struggle, the Movement believes that constituency politics and the mobilisation of the people will bring about change ... I have a duty to warn you as our youth to be careful, and to make a distinction between real bravery and foolish bravado. We all admire and praise our brothers and sisters who have died in jail ... But we have to admit that we have achieved very little by their supreme sacrifices".

In an interview, Buthelezi said regarding the viability of a non-violent approach, that Inkatha believes that there is "too much glib talk" about the use of violence for political purposes in South Africa. He asserted that despite the ANC's commitment to a programme of violence for more than two decades, it has achieved less than Inkatha has in its non-violent commitments. It would seem that the Inkatha youth have been more or less convinced by the leadership that violence as a strategy against the government is not a strategy - for the moment. And this is a crucial point, for in many ways it is an approach used to mollify the youth. But it must be recognised that the approach condemning armed violence applies only to the question of programmatic armed struggle against the state; Inkatha uses violence against black opponents of the movement, as can be seen in many examples in this dossier, although it seldom admits it. In cases where it has been admitted (see, for example, the Ngoye massacre), it is justified by Buthelezi as being 'provoked' and a defense of the integrity of the movement and himself. It has, in other words, been the product of provocation leading to rage. He does not, however, allow others to use this as a justification for violence against the government. He has also condemned the violence of the townships residents and youth in 1985, which is to most eyes, defensive violence where residents and youth are protesting themselves from attack by the police and army.

Inkatha has had an enormous influence on the ability of Cosas (Congress of South African Students - now banned) to organise in Natal over the past few years. It has also been a strong force in blocking the demonstration of opposition to the Bantu education system which has been the source of so much conflict in South Africa. i

In 1980, the school boycotts in KwaZulu started in KwaMashu. When the boycotts began, Buthelezi told people that students were being used by external forces - ranging from 'those people in Reservoir Hills (an Indian township), the University of Durban Westville (an Indian university) and the Black Medical School' to the South African Communist Party and the Soviet Union. Buthelezi also claimed in the press that an unidentified white man was

'paying KwaMashu children R10 a day for continuing the boycott. The claim was later elaborated to a bonus for the schoolchildren if they stoned or burnt busses and buildings. Said a senior official of Inkatha, Gibson Thula: 'The money was came from overseas and was channelled through lawyers. It would not be politically wise to reveal the sources now.' They never have. Buthelezi later added to the thesis. He accused three Xhosa lawyers of agitating the schoolchildren because they received large ammounts of money from overseas for defending cases such as those of the boycotters. Agreeing with Buthelezi, a member of the KLA, a Mr Sithebe, told the press that Inkatha could see who was 'standing behind the school uniforms of the children. It smells like Poswa, like Mxenge (later to die at the hands of unknown assassins) and Skweyiya...This is very dangerous. We say: 'Hands off our children'. They just want to destroy so they can scavenge on what is left.' Another KLA member, Mr M. A. Nzuza also backed up Buthelezi's allegations. He told the KLA that he heard one of these lawyers say: "One sleeping Xhosa lawyer is worth ten Zulu lawyers'. Then he added: 'There you have the motivation. They think the Zulus were easy prey.' Besides these tribalist ' accusations, there were still more. One Indian journalist, accused of stirring up the students, was warned by name: 'You must be very careful. You are near the Indian Ocean and the Inkatha current is very strong.'

At the same time Buthelezi stated that there was very little wrong with Bantu Education, and vehemently attacked the boycotts. Oscar Dhlomo, the KwaZulu Minister of Education and Culture, said: 'We do not believe that children have the intellect to devise strategies under which the black man is to be liberated.' According to students and the press, Buthelezi followed up this verbal attack on the students by sending in his impis to attack boycotting students. They arrived with spears and assegais, attacking students in the streets. When students started defending themselves against attack, a war broke out between the students and the impis: fifteen Inkatha people died in the township. Students began to realise at the time that some of the Inkatha members who had attacked Cosas were also the parents of some of the students they were organising. So they then stopped retaliating, even though the attacks against them continued unabated.

Oscar Dhlomo had said: 'We must not be blamed for any action we take against those who are not in school on Monday (15/5/80). We must not be blamed if we lose patience.' In various court cases that were brough against Inkatha, students described how they were abducted, beaten up, their homes burnt, handcuffed by prominent Inkatha officials and their impis, and taken to Ulundi where the KwaZulu Legislative Assembly sits. There, some students claim they were forced to sit behind Buthelezi, who then told his supporters to hand them to the police. This was ,done. Other affidavits alleged that supporters of the boycott had their houses and cars burnt or destroyed. Others still were

assaulted. Women signed affidavits that Inkatha members beat them in their homes with sjamboks. And this was still in 1980. Yet another affidavit, which was the basis for a court case, alleged that a student was taken to an Inkatha rally and beaten up in front of Buthelezi.

After the boycotts had not died down despite the strength of the Inkatha reaction, Buthelezi described the boycott as a 'carefully orchestrated international campaign against Inkatha, my leadership and this Assembly.' He added that 'extra-Natalian African radical factions' were attempting to embarrass the KwaZulu leaders by inducing the Zulu children to boycott.

This train of events revealed very clearly how quickly the 'national' character of Inkatha can disappear when it feels threatened or when events and issues overtake it. It also reveals that, because its national character is only an image, that Inkatha cannot fit in with the mass struggles that are closest to . Africans in the townships -mainly because it never wages campaigns itself at all; never takes up mass issues; and has no programme challenging apartheid. The demands of the students were, one would expect, basic and acceptable: for a single, non-racial, compulsory and free education system to replace the divided, expensive and discriminatory Bantu education. Finally, these events revealed the structural problem in which Inkatha finds itself - where many of the democratic demands are made to both it (as the ruler of a homeland) and the government. This is a feature of Inkatha's choice to operate from a bantustan base. Its repressive response, as well as its ideological arguments, was very similar to that of the apartheid government. It assumed the repressive role of the state in trying to force children back to school, and the ideological role in arguing that 'some education is better than none' and 'intimidators and agitators' inspired by 'Moscow' were behind the boycotts anyway. This response was to repeat itself over and over - against the United Democratic Front, against unions like the National federation of Workers, against the university students organised into AZASO, . against township residents resisting incorporation into KwaZulu, against students once more, against youth battling to keep the army out of the townships, against mourners at Victoria Mxenge's funeral... The list is almost endless.

However, for the students at that time the clash did not end after they decided to return to school. For, after this intense battle waged against the students by Inkatha, students decided to form a co-ordinating structure and started Cosas in the schools in Kwamashu. At that stage KwaZulu did not allow any representation in the schools, and students began to demand democratic SRCs. But no sooner had this started than the open victimisation of Cosas supporters and any one else supporting the demand for SRCs came under attack.

In 1981 the Inkatha Youth Brigade had intensified its campaign to recruit students, and build opposition to Cosas: this was seen as a direct response to progressive student mobilisation, and a

vicious campaign to destroy Cosas was launched. Cosas members and any other students who dared to question Inkatha were victimised: Youth Brigade members spied on students in the schools, and . people had to be very careful about who they spoke to and trusted. Any person who discussed Cosas in the schools came under attack - many people's houses were burned - even if they were merely sympathetic to Cosas. Some of these cases were about to be brought to court, with some individuals being sued for arson, but Griffiths Mxenge, the lawyer for the cases, was assassinated before the court proceedings began.

In late 1981, Inkatha lessons were introduced in the schools. While Cosas had been momentarily blocked from operating openly in the schools, many students objected to this and challenged it in a somewhat unco-ordinated fashion. The Inkatha lessons were introduced to students as young as in the Lower Primary School, continuing through to the high schools. Students are forced to sing Inkatha songs, praising Buthelezi; even grammar. lessons involve sentence construction using examples of Inkatha and Buthelezi; poems, high school song competitions, and in social studies. (see further on in this section). It was felt by students that Inkatha used the methods of force and indoctrination to strengthen its organisation.

After 1981/82, the Youth Brigade virtually collapsed: the chairperson was forced to resign and was openly attacked. In 1982 however, Inkatha Youth continued to attempt to mobilise support - stating that they were the internal wing of the ANC. They claimed they had a membership of 50 000. Many students had, in fact, signed up for fear of their lives.

During the 1982 campaign for SRCs, the principals demanded that SRCs be under the control of Inkatha. It seemed that principals of schools and school inspectors were forced to be Inkatha members, and intimidated into opposing Cosas and independant SRC's. Dr Dhlomo announced in the KLA in 1978 that any teachers who remained outside the ambit of Inkatha would be suspect and might not be "entrusted with the future of our children... we do need teachers but certainly not the type who seemingly do not appreciate the fact that the nation is involved in a liberation struggle ... those teachers, who are known to the department, who refuse to join Inkatha and who ridicule it and its leaders in front of their pupils will not be entrusted to continue teaching".

However, some principals co-operated with students, helping them seek alternative strategies for their grievances. For example, there were discussions between teachers and students concerning the ability of students to use the prefect system to their own advantage - by converting it to assume the functions of the envisaged SRCs. This was soon stopped due to pressure exerted by the Kwazulu Education Department, and students that were not prepared to swear allegiance to Buthelezi were victimised. Coupled with' this problem was the fact that students' activity was unco-ordinated.

Throughout 1980, 1981 and 82, Inkatha began to sift out the . progressive students and activists from the schools. Students were expelled and had to re-apply for admission, which was only granted in certain cases. In late 1982, Cosas was banned in all the KwaZulu schools, a lead which the Ciskei followed and then the South African government. Students began to find out that all students in KwaZulu schools are automatically members of Inkatha - whether or not they wished it. The schools pay Inkatha membership fees of R1 for each student. However, no-one knew about this, until some students discovered their principal's receipt book.

THE NGOYE INCIDENT

The University of Zululand, popularly referred to as Ngoye, has a long history of conflict and confrontation with Inkatha and the KwaZulu administration. There is no doubt that this has been a thorn in Inkatha's flesh, for the students and Ngoye constitute a vital group from which future civil servants and professionals can be drawn into the movement. In addition, an "Inkatha campus" could play an important ideological role in the national student movement as a whole, giving an Inkatha 'line' and input and thereby potentially influencing students from other campuses as part of the attempt to attract support for Inkatha among youth all over the country.

The failure of Inkatha to win support at Ngoye is indicative of its failure to attract the more politicised youth in general and to have a restraining influence on more radical political groupings.

Conflict between Inkatha and the students flared up in 1980 (after numerous confrontations on the campus in previous years) around the graduation ceremony, and over the issue of Buthelezi's chancellorship of the university. The events at Ngoye during this period must be seen in the context of the schools boycott during that year, and in particular the role Inkatha played in attempting to break the boycott in KwaMashu and Umlazi.

In mid-May, a student body meeting adopted a resolution calling on Buthelezi to restrain Inkatha supporters from attending the graduation ceremony in their uniforms, and requested both the university and Buthelezi to not allow "traditional warriors armed with sticks" to be allowed on to the campus. In essence, their call was a request to Buthelezi to not turn the graduation ceremony into an Inkatha rally.

On the day of the graduation ceremony, police were called in by the university authorities to disperse large groups of students who were assembling at the entrance gates. Warning shots were fired, teargas and police dogs were used, and fifteen students were arrested, shortly before Inkatha impis arrived "in a massive show of force". This happened some three hours before the ceremony was due to begin.

-During the graduation ceremony, students were surprised to see Reggie Hadebe, SRC President, go up to receive his degree and be capped by Buthelezi. As Hadebe left the hall, however, he was attacked by Inkatha supporters and severely beaten. Several other students were also assaulted by Inkatha members. In the violence that followed the ceremony, the student hall, a science laboratory, and the dining hall were burnt down, causing estimated damage of R50 000. The following day the entire student body staged a sit in, and police were called in to break the meeting up. Hadebe expressed fears for his life, and told reporters that he was considering laying a charge of assault. In the piece de resistance of the entire affair, Buthelezi announced that Hadebe might be prosecuted for allegedly ordering acts of violence on the campus the previous week, and said that Hadebe was directly responsible for the attack on Inkatha members on 19 May, where the car of a member of the Central Committee, Dr S. Ngubane was stoned. The irony of this statement, following the assault on Hadebe which was witnessed by dozens of students, staff members and at least two newspaper reporters, seems to have escaped Buthelezi. He went on to praise Inkatha members and the traditional Zulu regiments who had accompanied him to the campus to attend the graduation ceremony. In his presidential address to the Inkatha General Conference at Ulundi in June 1980, Buthelezi referred to the incident at Ngoye and stated that -

"If I find a conflict between Inkatha's aims and objectives and our means of implementing those objectives on the one hand, and the activity encouraged or perhaps even tolerated by an institution such as the University of Zululand, even through a consortium of black lecturers manipulated by a clique of white academics, then I will question the authenticity of that university in our midst. I will have no hesitation in setting about the establishment of a true university of the people of KwaZulu if the current state of affairs continues. We are serious in our political commitment and we will not tolerate those who make a mockery of the mass response to the South African situation which is found in Inkatha. These are fighting words and I seek a mandate from this conference to back these words up with action if necessary".

At the same time, the question of Buthelezi's chancellorship of the university became a major issue among the students. A petition calling for his removal as chancellor was submitted to the university administration.

It was in the period 1980 and 1981 that two events of significance to the organisation of students at Ngoye occurred. Firstly, the SRC was dissolved. It is unclear as to whether it was the students' rejection of the structure of the SRC, or

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ultimately the rector's action which led to its dissolution. What is clear is that students were unhappy with the constitution of the SRC and were loath to participate in it until a more satisfactory constitution was accepted by the University Council. (and students had consistently been refused access to the constitution to enable them to work out a new one).

Secondly, AZASO was banned by the rector from operating on Ngoye campus. This meant that AZASO supporters were forced to operate covertly. Both these actions had an adverse effect on student organisation on the campus - as one student described it : "1981 and 82 were years of political confusion on campus".

In October 1981, several cars were stoned and the production of a play was disrupted on the campus by a group of approximately 300 law students, who were protesting their exam results. Apparently, 'Zulu warriors' who were in the play attacked the students with spears. The police were called in, and fifteen students were arrested. Three days later, at a meeting of the student body, it was decided to stage a sit-in. Camouflaged policemen with dogs were called in to 'man the campus', and students stated that they would consider boycotting exams the following week if the fifteen students were not released. Nkabinde's response to the boycott was to threaten that students who boycotted lectures in future 'without valid reasons' would have their study loans or bursaries withdrawn. In addition he warned students that state subsidies of boycotters would also be withdrawn. At a university where approximately 95% of the students receive loans or bursaries, the possibility of this threat being carried out placed the students in a very difficult situation.

The incidents outline above give a clear indication of Inkatha's inability to fully win the support of Ngoye students. This failure ultimately led to the bloody confrontation on the campus in October 1983, where Inkatha took a decision to show a massive display of force and to attempt to finally assert hegemony at Ngoye.

At the beginning of 1983, a number of students previously at Fort Hare and Turfloop universities registered at Ngoye, following the expulsion of many students from those universities in 1982. At this stage, between forty and fifty students were members of the Youth Brigade branch at Ngoye.

At the first formal meeting in 1983 of the Youth Brigade branch on campus, was attended by a number of 'non-Inkatha' students, "Youth Brigade members vowed to fight against the Xhosa and Sotho students, and claimed that they were polluting the university. Students at Ngoye reject the concept of race and we were thus very shocked by this attitude. Inkatha places so much stress on tribalism ... you must remember that it is the students from Natal itself that hate Buthelezi the most. We students do not accept the structure of the KwaZulu government; we do not accept people who work hand in hand with Pretoria".

From the beginning of the year, therefore, there was already a lot of tension on the campus, a tension that was created by the Youth Brigade itself.

Throughout the first half of the year, students successfully mobilised against Inkatha, and showed the lack of support for the movement at Ngoye. On 13 September, a meeting of all the male students on the campus was held to discuss the question of violence in the hostels. At the meeting, which was chaired by a member of the university administration, students called on the university to ban the Youth Brigade on campus. Their motivation for this request was that Inkatha's stress on tribalism was causing tension on the campus, which inevitably led to violence. A few weeks after this meeting, rumours began to circulate that Buthelezi was to address a meeting on the campus to commemorate the centenary of King Ceteswayo's death.

"When we heard that Buthelezi was coming, we knew that everywhere he goes, his warriors go. The time when he was due to come was a week before exams ... On the previous three occasions when Inkatha members had spoken at meetings, students had clearly and peacefully shown that there was no support for Inkatha on campus.... Two weeks before he was due to speak, Zulu warriors went into Lamontville looking for Rev. Xundu, and they beat up people ... we didn't want the same thing happening here. Then some people received threatening letters. Anonymous notices were posted up on the walls, warning us that people preventing Buthelezi from coming onto campus were challenging death. The majority of students do not support Buthelezi, and were therefore scared of being attacked ..."

In an effort to prevent Buthelezi from coming onto the campus, students approached the university administration and the AZASO executive for help. AZASO then approached the administration of the University of Natal and requested the Vice-Chancellor to attempt to dissuade Nkabinde from allowing the meeting to be held. According to AZASO, Nkabinde's reply was that he was "aware of the situation".

During the week before the rally, students were told by cleaners on the campus that the local headman had been contacted and told to tell the men in the surrounding areas to arm themselves and go to the campus on Saturday morning, the day of the meeting. Students were searched by university security as they entered or left the campus, and according to a number of students, Nkabinde was warned by university security to leave the campus, 'as violence was inevitable.

At a meeting of all students on Friday 28 October, a Crisis Committee was elected and mandated to go immediately to Durban in an attempt to obtain a court order to prevent the meeting from going ahead. This attempt was unsuccessful, as their lawyers

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advised the Crisis Committee that they did not have substantial enough evidence to prove that there would be violence on on the campus if Buthelezi addressed the meeting. After the Crisis Committee had left for Durban, some students decided to march to the university gate and back again. It seems that at this stage there was a clash between students and Youth Brigade members. Nkabinde called the police in, who attempted to disperse the students with teargas and batons. According to one of the students who made statements to the South African Institute of Race Relations following the incident, the police fired teargas into the F block of the womens' hostels.

"Then the police came to the mens' hostels ... the men students were calling them to divert them from the ladies ... Botha was giving orders to the police to go inside the hostels ... (they) broke windows and doors in C block and E block and put teargas inside the womens' hostels ... the police then went to the mens' hostels again, to New York and Moscow. (the names of two of the hostels). They broke into the rooms and arrested about eight or ten students ... then they threatened that they would come back at 8 pm and that we students must leave the campus ... the police camped next to Bhokuzulu and cars patrolled the campus the whole night ..."

Following the police warning, and terrified of further violence, a number of students left the campus that evening, but most had nowhere else to go to.

The precise chronology of events on the Saturday are somewhat unclear as both the students and Inkatha gave conflicting reports. The violence was, however, if not planned by Inkatha, then at least predicted. And they came prepared for it. It is clear that Inkatha was not prepared to brook any interference with their rally. From late on the Friday afternoon, Inkatha supporters began arriving on the campus from as far afield as Ladysmith, and as one student pointed out, the Inkatha people were not searched for weapons when they entered the university grounds. The vast majority of them came armed.

Violence flared early on Saturday morning and began while many students were either still asleep, washing or eating breakfast. The following are some of the comments made by students in interviews and in statements to the S.A.I.R.R. : -

"I woke up very early on Saturday morning, at about 5.30 am. There were already a number of buses on the campus. Inkatha people were in groups chanting slogans - "We are angry, our hearts are full of blood", and slogans like this. They moved first down to the womens' hostels, and then to the mens'. This was at about 6 am."

"The warriors moved to the female hostels ... they were chanting "we want Xhosas and Sothos out" and called on Zulu students to join them ... stone

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throwing started ... most of the students ran into the hostels ... the warriors went into various hostels ... there were many warriors; they went into New York on to all the floors, stabbing and beating students. They were egged on by Inkatha women and children".

"The whole of New York, which is seven stories high, was a mess - windows were broken, doors broken down, books torn"

"I could see what was happening - I know that the Inkatha people had a list of people that had disrupted Dhlomo's meeting. The doors were broken down of the rooms of political students..."

"It must have been well planned as Inkatha knew where they were heading. On the fourth floor were most of the active political students ... they also broke into rooms and looked at the stickers and posters students had in their rooms and damaged rooms with "Free Mandela" stickers in them..."

"The campus security did nothing - this went on for nearly an hour before the police intervened. And do you know, not one single Inkatha person was arrested".

"Students had run into New York as it was the last block - I was left standing in the middle and ran away into the bushes - they followed us there ... afterwards many students were found badly stabbed, lying in the bushes".

"I saw a body being thrown out of one of the floors of New York..."

"There was just blood everywhere, broken windows, smashed doors. The warriors had assegais, knives and kieres ... afterwards we found a bed in New York that had assegais thrown into it".

One of the students who was killed, Fumane Marivate, was specifically singled out by the Youth Brigade because of 'the prominent role he played in disrupting Dhlomo's speech. According to eye witnesses, the Inkatha youth assaulted Marivate until he was semi-conscious, then dragged him outside and hung him upside down from a tree and beat him until he died. According to an Inkatha member quoted in the Sunday Times, the Inkatha Womens' Brigade surrounded the womens' hostel and assaulted women students who would not join in chanting "Buthelezi is our leader". Students maintain that those students who were already injured, some of them very badly, were made to sing and dance praises to Buthelezi.

"It was all over by about 8 o'clock. There were

injured people lying all over ... we had to use our own cars to get people to doctors".

Four students were killed, and approximately 113 injured, at least fifteen seriously. The injuries sustained by students were mostly stab wounds. Photographs of the dormitories showed beds stained with blood, walls smeared by blood, seriously wounded students holding themselves up, and systematic destruction of student belongings. It was described in some newspapers as 'a massacre'. The public response of Buthelezi and Inkatha as a whole to the violence was predictable. In a statement to members of the KLA, Buthelezi expressed deep regret at the violence. He said that he deplored violence and had always tried to lead the youth into democratic and non-violent behaviour. He then went on to "put the events which took place at the University of Zululand into their proper perspective" :

"With a cultural event such as the one Inkatha students planned at the University, it is natural for young people to travel from great distances to attend the functions. The members of the Inkatha Youth Brigade began arriving on Friday and they continued arriving throughout the night, and filled with pride at being part of a commemoration of our great King Ceteswayo, they marched around the campus singing patriotic songs and expressing the joys of youth. I can imagine the deep sense of shock that they experienced when cliques of students began abusing me within their hearing. These cliques of mischief makers who had been plotting the violence that erupted deliberately goaded the Inkatha youth gathering on the campus by singing derogatory songs and saying "Gatsha is a dog, Gatsha is a shit" ... our youth are sons and daughters of a warrior nation and they had gone to the university to commemorate one of the greatest warriors in Zulu history, and the simple fact of the matter is that this violence so carefully plotted, so carefully orchestrated and so cunningly executed produced the inevitable counter-violence".

He went on to accuse COSAS, SASO and various staff members at Ngoye of being behind the incident:

"Mr Deputy Speaker Sir, Honourable Members, I know the background to the formation of Cosas. It was formed as a front organisation for the ANC's mission in exile. It is not representative of Black youth and South Africa will yet be witness to the fact that Inkatha youth rank amongst the country's most determined freedom fighters, and that the metal in their hearts, the deep commitment they have in the struggle for liberation, is not the commitment of cowardice.- On Saturday our youth did no more than defend my honour and the honour of His Majesty the King. In any circumstances it is tragic for youth to

be involved in violence. We deeply regret the violence which occurred on Saturday. Our youth were faced with violence and would have been maimed and perhaps even killed if they could not fend for themselves. We hope that it is now abundantly clear that they can in fact do so".

In another speech given on the Inkatha Youth Brigade, he said,

"What transpired at Ngoye on the 29 October last year must be laid in large measure on the doorstep of Cosas. Cosas has got no national strategy for youth: Cosas does not mobilise the youth, of the country. they have got no armoury of political weapons against apartheid. Facing the wrath of the South African Government makes them quake with fear and they run helter skelter in every direction to escape the real responsibility of Black South Africa to tackle apartheid as the first and foremost target of those involved in the Black struggle ...

Cosas ... dance to the tune of those who sit and sip whiskey in London, New York, Moscow and other capitals of the world. Cosas has no real organisation. Cosas' leadership thrive only on the nefarious activities of creating discord. Of all the youth groups in the country, they are by far the most bent upon creating Black/Black confrontations. Every time Cosas makes a move, the South African Government, the South African Army, the' South African Police Force, smile with pleasure. Cosas is undertaking the South African Government's dirty work of dividing Black political forces and setting Black brother upon Black brother and Black sister upon Black sister ... It is deeply tragic that Cosas is misleading some of our youth into believing that I and Inkatha are easy options..."

COURT EVIDENCE 9E INTIMIDATION g! lNkATHA

Inkatha's use of violence, intimidation and underhand tactics are well illustrated in a court case in which three applicants challenged Inkatha's activities - this was the first time such a challenge to Inkatha had been made publicly and legally. Thet three applicants were Themba Mbatha, a scholar at Mzuvele High; Mr B.S. Ngobese, member of the KwaMashu Civic and Ratepayers, Association; and Ms S. Kubheka, a typist and resident in KwaMashu. The respondents were Buthelezi; Mr G.E. Bengu, Inkatha regional chairman for KwaMashu and KwaMashu's representative in the KLA, Rev. C.H. Mngadi, Inkatha regional secretary in ' KwaMashu; and Mr S.S. Logungolo-Mtolo, chairman of the KwaMashu Council and an Inkatha member.

In his affidavit to the Court, Mbatha stated that on the night of 28 May, he was asleep at his home when he was woken up and ordered to accompany a group of about then men armed with sticks,
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sjamboks and knobkieries. These men threatened to assault this mother when she asked them when Mbatha would be released, and the family was under the impression that the men were plainclothes policemen. The men also demanded that Mbatha's sister accompany them, and they were taken to the garage of Mr Bengu, where they were told they would be interrogated. They were then handcuffed and put into a combi, under guard, and driven to the 'C' section offices in KwaMashu, where they were taken into the hall and marched onto the stage. It was at this point that Mbatha noticed the other applicants, who had also been detained.

"All the while I was terrified and apprehensive that some harm was to be inflicted on us, more especially as it seemed that the mob was aggressive and kept making remarks to the effect that they were going to teach us the lesson of our lives".

During the course of the evening, groups of men kept entering and leaving the hall and a number of children were 'frog-marched' in under guard. At one stage Rev. Mngadi and Councillor Mkhize came into the hall, and according to Mbatha appeared to be in charge. Mbatha was refused permission to talk to Mngadi.

At approximately four o'clock in the morning, the children were loaded into a combi, some of them still handcuffed, and were under the impression that they were being taken to the Veralum police station, where they would be detained. They were then told that they were being taken to Ulundi. They arrived in Ulundi shortly before eight o'clock and were taken to the Inkatha offices, and then to the KLA where they were made to sit in the public gallery immediately behind Buthelezi.

"A meeting was in progress and members of the KLA were all present. I then saw Councillor Mkhize speak to the congregated Assembly. He stated that the inciters to the riot had been apprehended. Upon hearing this the Assembly burst out in shouts. I and my companions feared for our lives thinking that we were going to be summarily dealt with by members of the Assembly".

Following further comments by Mkhize and Buthelezi, the Chief Minister announced that the pupils would be handed over to the KwaZulu police. Later that afternoon they were taken back to KwaMashu, but when they arrived they were taken to an Inkatha meeting, and not to their homes. At this stage they were still under guard.

"The meeting then progressed and we were all made to give our names and addresses and the schools which we attended. Various members at this meeting spoke out accusing us of being agitators ... thereafter each speaker who took the floor stated that we were chasing children out of schools. Threats were then made that our houses would be burnt down and that we would be taken and beaten to death".

They were finally released just before midnight.

Mbatha then went on to state that since their release, they had been reliably informed that on 1 June an Inkatha meeting at

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Umzuvele resolved to round up the children behind the boycott and taken them to the police. This meeting was chaired by the fourth respondent. Mbatha also drew the court's attention to the fact that there had been violent incidents in KwaMashu where houses had been attacked, and that Inkatha vigilantes were roaming the streets of KwaMashu at night and attacking people.

"My family as well as my close associates and intimate friends are living in fear of our lives and realise that the police are impotent to act in the present situation more especially in that we suspect that the Inkatha movement exercises tremendous influence in police channels..."

Mbatha stated that he believed that Inkatha was intent on stamping out "all forms of opposition and other democratic forms of expression where these are in opposition to the Inkatha movement", and that the movement was determined to cause him grievous bodily harm - "even if this means disposing of us permanently".

Mr Ngobese testified that he had been the chairman of the Local Residents Association of "G" Section, KwaMashu, for seventeen years, but that in 1980 following an announcement by the Ward Councillor that only Inkatha members could be elected as a Resident Chairman, decided not to stand for re-election.

Following this, he was threatened with violence by Rev. Mngadi, and on 3 June that year, his house was extensively damaged by a group of armed men. He stated that Inkatha was intent on using violence against those prominent members of the public who were opposed to the movement :

"As I am regarded as a prominent member of the public in KwaMashu and am not a member of the Inkatha movement, I fear and verily believe that members of this movement will assault and injure me."

Sinbongile Kubheka described attacks on her family by Inkatha members, pointed out that she was not a student and that, far from being an instigator of the boycott, believed that the boycott emanated from the students themselves, who were dissatisfied with the educational system. She stated that she feared that

"members of Inkatha will further incite one another against myself and other young people as well as the other applicants herein, who have already been accused of being instigators of the boycott ... At present members of Inkatha, including some of the respondents herein have formed vigilante groups which are patrolling the streets in KwaMashu ... these people conduct themselves as though they are the law unto themselves".

Kubheka can not be accused of exaggeration in this regard; in addition to the evidence of assaults and attacks on homes of anti-Inkatha people, contained in the various affidavits, a week before the appeal was brought before the Supreme Court, and two

days before the alleged attack on Mr Bengu's home, Buthelezi himself called for the creation of black vigilante groups to "protect buildings" and said that these vigilantes should "shoot to kill" if they found anybody "interfering" with buildings. What emerged from the affidavits submitted to the Court, was that a situation of open conflict had developed between Inkatha and KwaMashu residents opposed to the movement, and that this conflict had extended beyond the boycotting pupils to include parents and sympathisers.

Mr S. Baqwa, for example, told the Court that on 4 June he was woken by a neighbour at approximately eleven o'clock at night. The neighbour told him that he had been approached by certain students who wanted sleeping accommodation as they could not sleep at their homes for fear of being assaulted by Inkatha members. He was apprehensive, since he felt that, should he give shelter to the pupils, he would also be assaulted. The following day, Mr Baqwa was one of a group of concerned residents who approached the KwaMashu police and spoke to the Station Commander to appeal to him to exert more pressure on the perpetrators of the violence in an attempt to put a stop to their actions. That evening, on his way home, Mr Baqwa was set upon by a group of Inkatha men armed with knobkieries and assegais. He said that he believed that the attack had occurred because "I have allied myself with efforts to afford protection to individuals threatened by Inkatha."

A Durban attorney, Aubrey Nyembezi, who was also amongst those who approached the police, told reporters that "The violence has reached epidemic proportions. There are crowds of people hunting in vigilante groups. Several children are sleeping out in the veld because they are scared they will be caught at their homes and beaten up".

Bengu, the KwaMashu Inkatha chairman, responded by blaming "ANC inspired youths and adults" for attacks on the homes of Inkatha members. He said that Inkatha supporters were providing protection for pupils who wanted to attend school without being intimidated, and he stressed that this was at the wish of parents of children in KwaMashu.

After hearing the affidavits of the respondents, Mr Justice Howard granted an interim interdict in favour of the applicants.

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The United Democratic Front (UDF) had to be aware that it would come to naught without Inkatha support, Chief Buthelezi said in April 1984 in the KwaZulu assembly. Reading from a pamphlet allegedly issued by the UDF about Inkatha, he said that it was a 'malicious lie' by those who had nothing to offer themselves to stigmatise Inkatha as a Zulu tribalistic organisation. The UDF stood in real danger of becoming only a paper organisation, living on the labours of the office-bearers of its affiliates. In May 1984, one of the UDF's presidents, Mr Archie Gumede, (73) was knocked unconscious by Inkatha supporters at a May Day meeting at Empangeni (Natal). Chief Buthelezi expressed regret at Mr Gumede's injuries, but denied that they were necessarily caused by Inkatha supporters. Mr Gumede claimed that the differences between Inkatha and the UDF were not of his making, and that Inkatha appeared to view the liberation struggle as its 'sole preserve', regarding others as 'interlopers creating divisions in the ranks of blacks'. He argued that while the UDF was a broadly based non-racial national movement, Inkatha was an exclusively black organisation with little support outside Natal. In September 1984, following an incident in which shots were fired at the cars of Inkatha members, the chairwoman of the Women's Brigade, Mrs Abbie Mchunu, blamed the UDF and said that the organisation was 'out to kill us'. In October, addressing the Women's Brigade conference, Chief Buthelezi criticised the UDF for a concern with 'high-profile media politics' instead of mobilising 'rank-and-file forces'. He said that it was cowardly of the UDF to deny connections with the ANC, when the two bodies "were the same".

In 1983, Buthelezi's position on the emergence of the UDF and National Forum was : "Our view of the UDF and NF will be determined by the extent to which they meet the demands of liberation by co-operating with us and other organisations". Chief Buthelezi claimed that because the ANC was unable to use Inkatha as an internally-based surrogate, it had set up the UDF in order to destroy Inkatha. He accused the UDF of attempting to create 'no-go' areas for him in Natal. Speaking at an Inkatha conference in June, Chief Buthelezi said that the UDF was doing a grave disservice to liberation by 'posturing as champions' of unity, and yet failing to achieve unity as promised. It was 'tragic' that UDF affiliates had 'made denigration of Inkatha a prime task', he said.

INKATHA 5E9 TOWNSHIP UNREST

Inkatha aha Jarac

During 1984, there was considerable friction between Inkatha and the Lamontville-based Joint Rent Action Committee (JORAC), an

affiliate of the UDF. Clashes in July and August in Lamontville and Hambanathi resulted in six deaths. Lamontville, a township in Durban, was due to be incorporated into KwaZulu by the South African government, a move which the residents opposed. Chief Buthelezi blamed the ANC for the unrest in Lamontville. "The problems of Lamontville revolve around the divisive tactics of the mission in exile working in cahoots with their surrogates", he said.

In Lamontville, students are increasingly identifying Inkatha with the police. Repression has been getting so bad in the area that students do not even have to go on boycott to be attacked. In August this year, police barged into classrooms, firing teargas and rubber bullets and lashing out with sjamboks. Not even the teachers escaped unharmed.

"The school is a double storey. So when police tried to get inside students tried to escape by jumping off the first floor," said a local student. "Others are getting injured, with broken legs, others are paralysed, others ran away to the road near the school. The police just want to close down the school", said one SRC member. "They say education is making us too militant."

The students are not surprised. Lamontville has long been a stronghold of progressives. The classrooms have UDF posters and SASPU NATIONAL clippings on the walls. Other schools in Lamontville have come out strongly in support. SRC members at Mwelase Secondary School in Lamontville said they were boycotting their trial examinations in solidarity with Lamontville High students: "If students at that school are injured we too are victims. We are implementing our slogan 'An injury to one is an injury to all'", they said.

"Also, teachers had organised a trip to Swaziland to disorganise students so we cancelled the trip. It is not good for us to recreate while our leaders are being killed." He was talking about the many attacks which Inkatha has launched on community leaders. Another student added: "We are saying one thing - Inkatha and the police will not stop our struggle for liberation. This is not the first time our leaders are being attacked by Inkatha. They and the police have repeatedly attacked us and our parents.'

The story is told of the Yengwa family. The Yengwa family of Lamontville had just gone to bed when all hell broke loose. Mrs Yengwa heard her son shouting from across the road so she pulled open the curtains. She saw men in balaclava's throwing buckets of petrol onto the windows.

"In the wink of an eye all the windows were aflame, followed by a petrol bomb", Mrs Yengwa told SASPU NATIONAL. Mrs Yengwa was a member of Inkatha and presently a member of the Natal Organisation of Women and the Lamontville Parent's Committee (Lapec). "We could not save anything. All the windows had flames. Each time you tried to escape they kept on shooting with shotguns. The very

same guns the police use. We could not move because they see you in the window and they shoot. The choice was ours - either to die from fire or from bullets. We had to move from one corner to another when it got hot. There were seven of them, say my neighbours. After burning the house and the car they waited. Nobody could save us because when my neighbours tried to help they kept on shooting at them. We could not even get help from our neighbour. She is a community councillor and a member of Inkatha. I know she is well armed as she has shot at people before. I don't know how they were saved. My husband was hit with 11 bullets and my daughter uncountable bullets. She was hit in the stomach and the doctors removed many from her intestines. She is still bad but off danger. They only left when they thought we were dead. We had stopped crying and were quiet so they were sure no-one could have lived. Then we heard footsteps. The neighbours saw a white kombi and one other. Two kombi's for only seven people? They wanted to make sure they could get away. They put out the fire that had damaged everything in my bedroom."

Mrs Yengwa did not want to say who she thought was responsible. "Even if I know very well, I can't say it to the newspapers. And I do know very well. Even if she has not done it with her own hands she has baked the bread. It is connected to other UDF burnings. Ever since the Mxenge funeral you don't know who is dying now. Even if some-one is your enemy he takes advantage of the situation."

But other people in Lamontville were quiet prepared to say who they thought was responsible. "It was Inkatha. The newspapers are saying it is unknown who is responsible. But we know very well. This is the work of Inkatha", one said. "Ever since we chased them from Lamontville they have been determined to get us."

The Vaal Uprisings

In October 1984, Chief Buthelezi described the conflict in the Vaal Triange townships as 'understandable but misdirected'. Speaking at the Shaka Day celebrations in Katlehong, the chairman of Inkatha's economic committee, Mr S Chonco, expressed disgust at the 'black-on-black confrontations and suggested that people unite for a peaceful solution to South Africa's problems.

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In November 1984, Chief Buthelezi accused the organisers of the two million strong two-day stayaway in the Transvaal of dividing Africans and harming the cause of liberation. He also accused the organisers of turning to intimidation and violence against fellow Africans when their campaign did not succeed. White intransigence, he said, would have to be taught a lesson (by Africans employing their power of labour and their consumer power. Chief Buthelezi said that he wanted to make the point that African organisations that were not membership based, but, like the UDF, relied on affiliation, did not speak for the broad masses when they called for stay-at-home protests.

Chief Buthelezi alleged that the "UDF national leadership, before

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the UDF threw its weight behind the stay-away, used an underhand power-play to deceive the world that the stay-away was democratically decided". He told a rally at the Jabulani Stadium in Soweto that the the South African government would not be toppled overnight, and that those who thought that they could easily make the country ungovernable were "vain in their stupidity". Chief Buthelezi later rejected a public appreciation of his stand against violence made by the State President, Mr PW Botha. He dismissed allegations of 'political collusion', and added that he had not moved 'one inch' from his known stand against apartheid.

Natal Community action

A violent campaign has been launched in Imbali to rid the township of UDF and youth activists. Petrol bombs, automatic rifles, spears and knobkieries have been used in attacks in which at least two people have been killed, many homes, taxi's, and private vehicles have been destroyed, and the Federal Seminary has been forced to close early.

The campaign of violence dates back to a DET meeting in August at which ways of ending the two-week old school boycott were discussed. Sources at the meeting claim that prominent Inkatha members from Imbali blamed the boycott and Sarmcol solidarity ' action on progressive teachers and members of the Imbali Civic Association. That evening, the 18th August, ICA chairperson Robert Dumas had his house attacked and his car burned.

Members of the Imbali Youth Organisation, who were present, say a group of eight men including an Inkatha member named Zondi, and the sons of another prominent Inkatha member and community councillor, Auretha, petrol-bombed the house and shouted that they were going to get "Duma, the dog!" The next day, Monday, a minority of Imbali parents tried to force their children back to school. At Siguongueni High School a student was stabbed when she refused to enter the school.

Monday also saw the start of Inkatha attacks on taxi-owners who were accused of siding with the students. A group of men, (including known Inkatha members with first-names Fakazi and Mandla) set up a road-block at the entrance to Imbali and stopped taxi's from entering. Angry commuters were forced to walk home from the roadblock. They were told "if the bosses can't enter then why should the taxi's be allowed to take you to your door?" Later in the day, taxi operators and youth group members joined forces and launched a commando-style attack on the group to disperse them. Police, despite a strong presence in the township, denied knowledge of the roadblock at the main entrance to Imbali. On Tuesday night Inkatha claimed their first killing. This was in line with their chants - now familiar in the township - of "we don't attack houses, we kill the dogs." Cosas member Matshwetshe Zondi died when a group of more than fifty armed Inkatha members attacked him. Witnesses say the mob had grouped near the house of community councillor Auretha earlier, claiming they were looking

for Zondi as he was guilty of manufacturing petrol bombs. They left, and returned soon after chanting victory slogans such as "we have killed the dog".

The war against taxi-owners meanwhile intensified. On this same night they received a message that one of their conductors had been killed in Mhlankosi Road. A convoy of taxis, sent to investigate, was greeted with a volley of automatic gunfire emanating from the vicinity of Inkatha member Auretha. One person was killed and 5 injured. A number of taxis were burnt out.

Police, who arrived within 4 minutes, confirmed that combis had been burned but denied that there had been gunfire.

On Thursday Kenneth Dlalala (a taxi-owner and vice-chair of the Imbali Civic Association) and Musi Mthuyane (a taxi-owner) were harassed by Auretha and other armed men in a KD registered car. The taxi-owners drove to the Plessislaer Police Station to report the harassment but were instead arrested by security police and charged with public violence. No arrests of any Inkatha member has yet occurred.

On Sunday, the 25 August, a meeting of a few hundred men armed with spears and allegedly with R1's was held in Imbali Community Hall. At this meeting, Kwa-Zulu mp Mr V.B. Ndlovu, urged the community to get rid of the Federal Seminary, who were accused of fomenting the unrest, and of harbouring criminals. (ICA Chairperson Duma had sought refuge there).

That afternoon 100 armed men, led by Ndlovu, Pakkies (Inkatha member and Mayor of Imbali) and Jele (Chairperson of Inkatha's Imbali branch) marched on Fedsem and told the President, Dr Mgojo, that the seminary had to be empty by the next Friday or else "it would be burnt to the ground." The seminary decided that it was wise to close early for the September vacation. In the meantime they brought an urgent interdict against Ndlovu and the others, restraining them from causing any damage.

When asked for comment, Jele claimed that "he was involved as a resident of Imbali, not as an Inkatha member". Pakkies also denied any Inkatha involvement. "It is the community, and that includes me, who want the troublemakers out." The interdict has been opposed. It was heard in the Supreme Court on 18 September. Residents of Imbali claim they are being forced to pay R1 each towards the costs of defending the interim interdict against the Inkatha members, Mr PC Pakkies and Mr V.B. Ndlovu. "People have been going around Imbali with a loud-hailer telling residents they must pay R1 towards the case between Pakkies Ndlovu and the Federal Seminary. Because these same people have been involved in attacks on school-children, union and youth activists, residents are fearful that if they don't pay the levy they will also be attacked," said a member of the Consumer Boycott Committee in Pietermaritzburg. Mr Pakkies denies knowledge of the R1 donation.

Unionists, students and political activists in Pietermaritzburg

claim unremitting violence against them by Inkatha members. Many have left the township and are staying with Indian, coloured and white democrats in the relative safety of the town. They have decided to take legal action against Inkatha. "Although this may be expensive," says a prominent UDF activist, "this seems to be the only way to defend ourselves and our families against these thugs who are heavily armed and able to operate at will in the township. The police, who are usually so quick to the draw, seem strangely paralysed when it comes to stopping Inkatha murders." Although most activists are no longer living in Imbali, their families are still the targets of intimidation. The wife of one activist, who works as a nurse at Edendale Hospital, was assaulted at the weekend and may lose one eye after being stabbed. The mother and father of the Imbali Youth Organisation's vice-chair have been given until Friday to get out of the township or have their house burned down. According to Midlands UDF Secretary, Sikhumbuzo Ngwenya, "the government is behind it all. They couldn't break the unity of the workers, students, teachers and parents as regards the consumer boycott or school boycott. They felt isolated and so found a group of people under Auretha (and Inkatha) to create an internal clash in the townships. Why has nothing been done to stop Inkatha? They've burnt houses and taxis. They have killed people. They man roadblocks. And often they are seen talking to the Community Councillors," said Ngwenya. "Things are difficult because we are dodging the forces - the system and Inkatha. But the struggles are creating unity and strengthening people's resolve. Parents are now upset at what's happening. They are supporting the ICA - the authentic voice of the community. Inkatha on the other hand is weak. They have to use outside forces to assist in their reign of terror. Despite the fact that our activists are in hiding, there are many other levels of people to carry the struggle forward," said Ngwenya. "This is in great part due to the education work of Cosas."

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INKATHA, THE UDF AND THE TOWNSHIP UPRISINGS

The recent clashes in the Durban area between Inkatha and UDF has a long and complicated background. However, some of the factors can be explained by looking at the 'incorporation' issue. KwaZulu and Buthelezi have for a long time been trying to get control of some of the townships surrounding Durban. They are both a source of potential support, as well as a potential source of income for the KwaZulu administration. The South African government also wants their incorporation into KwaZulu. It does not want the political, administrative and economic headache of running those townships. In addition, some of the townships are well-organised by progressive groups (such as those in the Hambanathi/Lamontville area).

One of the Durban townships which has been a target for incorporation is Inanda, where the most recent clashes have taken place. In Durban, there are more people squatting in shacks than living in houses. More than a quarter of a million of these squatters live in Inanda. When the first Indians were released from Indenture in Natal, they bought land and settled in Inanda. The large sprawling houses that were built then are still there - the only solid structures in a sea of shacks, in which African and Indian squatters live side by side in appalling conditions. Unemployment is at least 45%: squatters queue to buy water from water tankers, and each shack must organise its own sewerage disposal - not even a bucket system is laid on.

Half of Inanda has been incorporated into Kwazulu. The rest is 'Scheduled for incorporation, but one of the causes of delay is the ownership of 20% of the land by Indians. 80% of land is owned by Africans, but as long as there is Indian land-ownership, incorporation cannot go ahead. Indian land-owners claim there have been many pressures on them to leave. For example, they say that at the height of the drought, the Health Departments was trying to force them out by requiring they provide sewerage and water for their squatter tenants, while they claimed African landlords were not subject to the same pressure.

Earlier this year, Indian land-owners got letters from the Department of Co-operation and Development, wanting to buy their land. They refused the offer. In May, land-owners wrote affidavits that 'white men' were urging tenants on Indian land not to pay rent and were promising them free housing in Inanda 'New Town' - an Urban Foundation site and service scheme expected to be the next section of Inanda incorporated into Kwazulu.

Arising from these allegations, a survey of landlord-tenant relations was done by University of Natal academics.

A local African shop-owner, Roger Ngcobo, who was recently made mayor of the new area of Inanda, has allegedly been trying to buy up local Indian shops. It was also widely rumoured amongst the

Indian landlords and shop-owners that at the last regional Inkatha meeting, a major topic on the agenda was how to get the Indian landlords out of Inanda so it could be incorporated into KwaZulu. Inkatha does not however seem to have much support in Inanda. A person who went to an Inkatha branch meeting in Inanda said that the branch seemed to consist of about 20 old women who met in the school hall.

'There is very little organisation of any kind in Inanda,' says an NIC spokesperson. There are no UDF affiliates in Inanda. Residents in Inanda have little security. When plans for the Inanda Dam were drawn up, Buthelezi promised the people affected that they would not be moved against their will. But the removal of 5000 people began shortly afterwards, before any consultation. The attempts by Inkatha and the government to incorporate the townships into KwaZulu has led to conflict with the residents, who want nothing to do with the homelands. They do not wish to lose their citizenship, or be denied the right to access of the wealth they create in 'white' South Africa. The students do not wish for Bantu Education; but they refuse point blank to learn the Inkatha syllabus. The youth believe they have more chance of finding jobs if they keep their 'urban rights' than if they became part of a homeland and depended on the KwaZulu labour bureaux to find them jobs. The workers would lose the limited rights to unemployment benefits, pensions, etc. that they have now if they were incorporated into KwaZulu.

During 1984, there was considerable friction between Inkatha and the Lamontville-based Joint Rent Action Committee (JORAC), an affiliate of the UDF over the issue of incorporation. Clashes in July and August in Lamontville and Hambanathi resulted in six deaths. Chief Buthelezi blamed the ANC for the unrest in Lamontville. 'The problems of Lamontville revolve around the divisive tactics of the mission in exile working in cahoots with their surrogates', he said.

Thus these two groups have come into conflict. While the conflicts have at times been less intense, the underlying issues have remained. And the two sides have lined up on the basis of their stand on the issues: Inkatha and the government on one side, and the residents, youth, students and workers on the other. The result of the homeland policy can be seen clearly in the chronology that follows. When it is combined with the ethnic policies and race hatred that apartheid preaches, it becomes a destructive mixture.

In addition, it must be pointed out that the pattern of resistance to rent increases, transport fare increases, incorporation and other issues in the Durban and Pietermaritzburg areas is similar to that in other parts of the country. And this has probably shaped Buthelezi's reaction to community resistance in other parts of the country, as well as to the UDF.

A CHRONOLOGY OF EVENTS

1983:

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In 1983, Buthelezi's position on the emergence of the UDF and National Forum was : 'Our view of the UDF and NF will be determined by the extent to which they meet the demands of liberation by co-operating with us and other organisations'. Shortly after the Ngoye incident in October, a UDF meeting in Hammarsdale was prevented from continuing by Inkatha members, who attacked UDF supporters, burnt a bus, and damaged cars outside the meeting.

Inkatha was seen during this year to use violence against non-Inkatha chiefs. Chief Mpumalanga claimed he was assaulted by Inkatha youth for refusing to join Inkatha. Buthelezi alleged that Mpumalanga had 'almost' assaulted members of the Inkatha Central Committee.

There were clashes between Lamontville youths and members of the Inkatha Youth Brigade. Four people were killed.

The issue of the incorporation of Lamontville, Hambanathi and nearby townships into KwaZulu was put on the agenda. Cabinet Minister Koornhof -in charge of the incorporation process - consulted Buthelezi, but not the township residents themselves.

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Lawrence Schlemmer - head of the Inkatha institute - conducted a survey showing that St.Wendolins wanted incorporation. An independant survey, however, showed that 90% of the community were against incorporation.

When the Joint Rents Action Committee (Jorac) organised effective opposition to the incorporation of Lamontville and Hambanathi into Kwazulu, the scene was set for escalation conflict between Jorac and other UDF affiliates, and Inkatha.

April: The United Democratic Front (UDF) had to be aware that it would_ come to naught without Inkatha support, Chief Buthelezi said in the KwaZulu assembly. Reading from a pamphlet allegedly issued by the UDF about Inkatha, he said that it was a 'malicious lie' by those who had nothing to offer themselves to stigmatise Inkatha as a Zulu tribalistic organisation. The UDF stood in real danger of becoming only a paper organisation, living on the labours of the office-bearers of its affiliates. r

May: one of the UDF's presidents, Mr Archie Gumede, (73) was knocked unconscious by Inkatha supporters at a May Day meeting at Empangeni (Natal). Chief Buthelezi expressed regret at Mr Gumede's injuries, but denied that they were necessarily caused by Inkatha supporters. Mr Gumede claimed that the differences

between Inkatha and the UDF were not of his making, and that Inkatha appeared to view the liberation struggle as its 'sole preserve', regarding others as 'interlopers creating divisions in the ranks of blacks'. He argued that while the UDF was a broadly based non-racial national movement, Inkatha was an exclusively black organisation with little support outside Natal.

In June 1985, Buthelezi, who is both the KwaZulu Chief Minister as well as Minister of Police, called on the South African government to empower him to issue firearms so that KwaZulu citizens can defend themselves against attack. He said he had received many requests from KwaZulu citizens during the recent months of unrest, asking him to help them acquire licences for firearms. However, he was not constitutionally entitled to approve licence applications.

He said: "I have been powerless to exercise my judgement and help these people in desperate times to defend life and limb."

June: Chief Buthelezi claimed that because the ANC was unable to use Inkatha as an internally-based surrogate, it had set up the UDF in order to destroy Inkatha. He accused the UDF of attempting to create 'no-go' areas for him in Natal. Speaking at an Inkatha conference Chief Buthelezi said that the UDF was doing a grave disservice to liberation by 'posturing as champions' of unity, and yet failing to achieve unity as promised. It was 'tragic' that UDF affiliates had 'made denigration of Inkatha a prime task', he said.

July: At Lamontville community leader Msizi Dube's funeral, a large army of Inkatha people disrupted the service. The assassinated Dube had for many years opposed apartheid, community councils and the homelands structures, and was leading the community in resistance to rent increases. The Inkatha attack was repulsed by the large gathering, and 5 Inkatha members were killed.

19 July: Alleged Inkatha supporters burnt down a creche and the Tongaat and District African Child and Welfare Society building, of which Ian Mkhize (Jorac Treasurer) was chair.

August: Buthelezi announced he would be coming to hold a prayer meeting in Hambanathi on 3 September. Many UDF supporting residents feared that his visit would end in violence between residents and Inkatha, because of the level of opposition to incorporation. They suspected Buthelezi was interested not so much in peace as winning more support. They believed Buthelezi was trying to provoke a confrontation with the residents opposing incorporation into his homeland. Jorac tried to get a court interdict to prevent the meeting, but to no avail.

Monday, 30 August: Jorac holds a meeting with Buthelezi 'to convince him that his meeting in Lamontville would not be in the interests of peace. They are not well received by Buthelezi, and he rejected their request to call off the meeting.

Tuesday, 21 Aug: a mob of Inkatha supporters march around the township shouting Inkatha slogans. They were mostly hostel dwellers and squatters from outside the township. The police were called, but only 2 vans arrived, with Indian policemen, who drove around a few times with their sirens on. The mob scattered but regrouped.

Wednesday; 23 Aug: Ian Mkhize's home is attacked by Inkatha, and they try to burn his car. 'But we were there to help him. It wasn't such a big crowd of Inkatha people - about 30 -and we were able to stop them. Then we heard they were going to attack again, and do it seriously, with more force this time,' said a member of the Kwamashu Youth League.

Thursday; 24 Aug: The homes of 4 UDF activists houses were stoned by Inkatha supporters.

Friday, 25 August: The attacks 'started to be serious', said a UDF member. A large mob burnt out the house of Simon Ntse, chair of the Hambanathi Residents Association. An eye witness to the attack said: 'They were chanting Inkatha slogans, and we were able to recognise Inkatha people from the township. But most were hostel dwellers brought in from Kwamashu and Umlazi.'

Saturday, 26 August: The homes of the following people were burnt down: Mrs Lindiwe Jacks (Hambanathi Womens Organisation) and Mrs Patia Makhetha (principal of Smandi creche and exec member of HRA and Jorac)

Sunday, 27 August: This was to become known as Black Sunday. It was the day of the first armed attack at Hambanathi. Two busloads of Inkatha people, supported by landrovers equipped with flamethrowers, attacked the township, killing Alfred Sithole (HRA), and, in the words of Ian Mkhize, 'wreaking utmost destruction'. Houses of the following people were burnt down: Mrs Makhetha (Hambanathi Residents Association(HRA), Elias Radebe (HRA), David Tyaliti (HRA), Richard Gumede (Chair of Jorac), Ian Mkhize (Treasurer of Jorac). 1 UDF supporters from Hambanathi sought refuge in Oakfort Priory, near Verulam.

Ian Mkhize described what followed: 'Peace initiatives were taken by Jorac, trying to reason with Inkatha that the war Jorac was waging was not against fellow oppressed, but against the Nationalist Government; that opposition to incorporation of townships into Kwazulu was against the government ideology of making people lose their citizenship rights. But Inkatha refused to understand our point of view.' Buthelezi said the only way the refugees at Oakfort would be allowed to return safely to Hambanathi was if they withdrew the charges laid against 34 Inkatha people for the attack, and apologised to him. Only one case went ahead, and the accused claimed that he had been paid by Inkatha to attack UDF homes.

September: following an incident in which shots were fired at the cars of Inkatha members, the chairwoman of the Women's Brigade, Mrs Abbie Mchunu, blamed the UDF and said that the organisation was 'out to kill us'.

October: addressing the Inkatha Women's Brigade conference, Chief Buthelezi criticised the UDF for a concern with 'high-profile media politics' instead of mobilising 'rank-and-file forces'. He said that it was cowardly of the UDF to deny connections with the ANC, when the two bodies 'were the same'.

Chief Buthelezi described the conflict in the Vaal Triangle townships as 'understandable but misdirected'. Speaking at the Shaka Day celebrations in Katlehong, the chairman of Inkatha's economic committee, Mr S Chonco, expressed disgust at the 'black-on-black confrontations and suggested that people unite for a peaceful solution to South Africa's problems.

November: Chief Buthelezi accused the organisers of the two million strong two-day stayaway in the Transvaal of dividing Africans and harming the cause of liberation. He also accused the organisers of turning to intimidation and violence against fellow Africans when their campaign did not succeed. White intransigence, he said, would have to be taught a lesson by Africans employing their power of labour and their consumer power. Chief Buthelezi said that he wanted to make the point that African organisations that were not membership based, but, like the UDF, relied on affiliation, did not speak for the broad masses when they called for stay-at-home protests.

Chief Buthelezi alleged that the 'UDF national leadership; before the UDF threw its weight behind the stay-away, used an underhand power-play to deceive the world that the stay-away was democratically decided'. He told a rally at the Jabulani Stadium in Soweto that the the South African government would not be toppled overnight, and that those who thought that they could easily make the country ungovernable were 'vain in their stupidity'. Chief Buthelezi later rejected a public appreciation of his stand against violence made by the State President, Mr PW Botha. He dismissed allegations of 'political collusion', and added that he had not moved 'one inch' from his known stand against apartheid.

SOME IMPORTANT HIGHLIGHTS pg INKATHA _I_N 1985

In March, Buthelezi gave a press conference after his month-long trip to the USA campaigning against disinvestment, during which he laid sharp criticism against the UDF, Winnie Mandela, Desmond Tutu and Allan Boesak. He said that these three were promoting black disunity through their words and actions, and that black disunity had brought nothing but chaos and bloodshed everywhere else in Africa. His attack on Mrs Mandela is unprecedented, since she is regarded by most South Africans as one of the "mothers of the struggle".

Buthlezi launched a scathing attack in April, of UDF patron, Dr Allan Boesak, calling him a "Johnny-come-lately posing as an important national political figure". Speaking at the KwaZulu Legislative Assembly, he said he would never have predicted that the "naive" theological student he met years ago would become such a figure. He blamed the Press for the rise to prominence. He said the Press had created Dr Boesak and anointed him as important, in spite of the fact that he was a product of the Dutch Reformed Church and was a chaplain and teacher at the University of the Western Cape (a seemingly "tribal college"). Gatsha Buthelezi wrote a letter in May 1985, which was addressed to a great number of white political, commercial and industrial leaders in the country, asking them to help him vindicate his stand on negotiation rather than violence.

He stated that he and the massive Inkatha movement were prepared to think about compromising their position on a one-man-one-vote system for the sake of reconciliation.

At Inkatha's conference in June this year at Ulundi, closer ties with Inkatha and the PFP were envisaged. Ten of the twenty-seven PFP parliament members attended, and Buthelezi praised the PFP highly. He said, "I have a growing sense of confidence that we will sit side-by-side around a future negotiating table".

At a time when the Prohibition of Political Interference Act caused the PFP to open its membership to all races, Inkatha was to postpone its decision on whether to do the same. It emerged at the time, however, that the PFP would have liked to see Inkatha joining the PFP, while still belonging to a "cultural liberation movement". Buthelezi preferred to see an alliance between the PFP, and rejected the notion of Inkatha as a "Zulu" organisation.

At the beginning of August this year, Buthelezi met with British Prime Minister, Mrs Margaret Thatcher. He urged her to maintain her opposition to sanctions against South Africa; he told her that economic action would "undermine the foundations of the future". He said that he believed Western governments should make clear their concern about the South African situation, but ambassadors of the EEC countries needed explanations about what was happening in South Africa. He said it was "tragic" that Blacks were turning against each other, and that the ANC was "sending messages into the country urging the liquidation, of collaborators". Buthelezi expressed support for British Government policy on South Africa and what he described as the British Government's realistic attitude to sanctions.

Die Afrikaner, the far-right Herstigte Nasionale Party mouthpiece said that Buthelezi had handled South Africa's case against disinvestment "far more efficiently" than Mr Pik Botha. The newspaper said that Mr Botha could take some tips from the Chief

in the excellent way he "humbled" Senator Edward Kennedy - which was "manna from heaven for the Government." The paper said furthermore, that the Chief's trip overseas was proof that he had suddenly entered a "partnership" with the Government. It suggested that the Government was secretly grooming the Chief for "an important political post".

'THE TRAGIC EVENTS IN NATAL :1985

E Jahuarg: The Hambanathi refugees returned, despite Buthelezi's threat.

E May: The Hambanathi refugees are expelled again, and were given refuge at the Ghandi Memorial. '

1 August: Victoria Mxenge - a UDF supporter, lawyer and wife of the assassinated Griffiths Mxenge - is herself assassinated. Her death sparked a chain of events that left Durban townships smouldering, and 70 people dead.

3 AuQuSti Cosas calls for a week-long class boycott in mourning for Mxenge's death.

Monday 2 August: all schools in Umlazi, Kwamashu and Lamontville are empty. Students marched in the streets with Cosas banners, and were dispersed by police.

Tuesday g E29 Wednesday 1 August: a number of political targets were attacked by township youth. The houses of two policemen, two councillors, and an alleged informer were burnt in Kwamashu; alleged informers' houses were burnt in Umlazi; and in Kwandengezi, a shop owned by a councillor was burnt.

In Kwamashu and Umlazi, looting of shops began. The first attacks on Indian-owned shops in Inanda took place on Tuesday night. Fear of largescale rioting spread, and some Indian families started to move out to stay with relatives in Phoenix. (The background to the events in Inanda are decribed immeadiately before this chronology.)

On Wednesday, a march of schobl pupils in Ntuzuma, near Inanda, was dispersed by police. Some of the pupils ran into Inandap and tried to regroup. Groups of unemployed youth in Inanda started to gather as well, and took up the momentum of the march. They attacked some shops. and some houses that had been deserted.

Wednesday night, 7 August: A UDF memorial service for Victoria EQEnge in UETEzi enaea'in a_bloodbath, with 20 mourners dead. It is known as the Bloodbath of Umlazi Cinema. A member of Masakane-Tongaart Youth Organisation (Matoya) described what happened: 'We heard rumours that busloads of Inkatha people from the hostels were coming to attack, so we had marshals outside to keep guard. 'Towards the end of the meeting, the marshals saw a large crowd

of about 300 Inkatha impis marching up the hill towards Umlazi Cinema. From inside. we heard the sound of a horn being blown, and at that point, some of the people sitting there with us jumped up, shouted the Inkatha war cry 'Usuthu!' and started attacking us with knives and pangas.

'At the same time, stones were thrown iat the windows from outside. There was chaos. People were jumping out of the second floor windows to get away.

'There were about 50 of us outside who tried to fight the mob off with stones, but they were heavily armed with knopkieries, pangas, and guns,' he said. Many of the people killed died of gunshot wounds.

The police arrived and threw teargas into the hall. 'Even Inkatha is affected by teagas. so they ran out too.'

When the crowd of armed men attacked the mourners, the bus drivers waiting to take people home fled with the buses, so hundreds of people were stranded in Umlazi for the night.

The taxis were also attacked. The Umlazi Taxi-Drivers Association is affiliated to Inkatha. However, when Cosas asked them to give free transport to the memorial service, they agreed.

'Inkatha attacked private cars and taxis alike, breaking windows and slashing tyres. So the taxi drivers sided with the mourners,' said a Matoyo member, who was picked up by a taxi while escaping from the scene. 'There was blood and glass all over the taxi, and the driver was rushing two people with gunshot wounds to the hospital. But they died on the way,' he said.

Thursday 8 and Friday 9 August: most townships in the Durban area

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are in flames. In Chesterville, two white policemen were stabbed to death. They appeared to have run out of ammunition, left their hippo and allegedly began stoning the crowd. Policemen's houses were burnt, and councillors houses were stoned. In Klaarwater, police cars were stoned. In Umlazi, four policemen were killed. In St Wendolins, 2 councillors houses were burnt, and a shop was looted. In Umlazi, Kwamashu and Clermont, many shops were burnt and looted.

Friday 2 August: a fake UDF pamphlet was distributed in Inanda, with a photograph of Billy Nair, saying 'Don't be afraid to kill!' Looting broke out in earnest in Inanda when most Indian families fled, leaving their possessions. Many people claim that 2-5 busloads of Sotho- and Tswana-speaking men were brought into Inanda, and started systematically looting Indian shops 'and houses.

Many Indian residents say they were told to leave Inanda by. a large mob who then looted and destroyed the houses. Some believe these to have been Inkatha, while others claim they were non-zulu speaking. No-one was injured, but one Indian woman died of a

heart-attack. In many of the houses that were looted, the Inkatha slogan 'Usuthu' was written on the wall.

As news of the looting spread, fear of a racial bloodbath spread too, and the remaining Indian families fled to Phoenix, some leaving all their possessions behind. Armed businessmen and youths from Phoenix aided in this evacuation.

However, the situation developed into one of wholesale looting, in which anyone with possessions of any value was a target, regardless of their race. 'All shops were looted, whether they were owned by Africans or Indians. And when that mob who were bussed in were going from one Indian house to the next, African squatters hid Indian squatters in their homes. In one case, they helped dress an Indian man up as a black domestic servant so he could cross safely to Phoenix,' said a resident of Inanda.

According to an NIC spokesperson, 'One family turned one of their trucks into an armoured vehicle, in the absence of police protection for victims of the violence, and they ferried families out of Inanda under cover of their own rifles. Unfortunately, they became a very reactionary force politically. The press presented the situation as a straightforward racial conflict. But we believe the events were orchestrated to force the Indians out of Inanda. The men that were bussed in went systematically to destroy Indian property. This generated fear and panic, fuelled by misinformation spread through rumours and through the distribution of fake pamphlets.'

THE GHANDI SETTLEMENT

Still on the Friday, the unrest in Inanda spilled over into Phoenix, and some Indian homes on the border of Phoenix were burnt and looted.

The Mahatma Gandhi Memorial Centre is between Inanda and Phoenix. UDF supporters from Hambanathi were still squatting there, after fleeing from Inkatha attacks in Hambanathi in May. A crowd of Indians marched from Phoenix to the Gandhi Memorial Centre to attack the Hambanathi squatters, who they believed were responsible for the looting in Phoenix.

'We had been warned that Inkatha members from Lindelane were coming to attack us, and then we found ourselves attacked by this crowd of about 50 people from Phoenix,' said one of the Hambanathi refugees.

'There were only 15 of us there, because we had told our mothers to run away and take the children. The Indians were armed with pangas and petrol bombs - we had only stones. Mewa Ramgobin from NIC was at the Gandhi Memorial Centre with us and tried to tell the crowd that we were innocent, but they slashed his arm with a panga, and he had to run away. The crowd went into the hall where we had been living, and tried to set it alight with a gas cylinder.' Police dispersed the crowd from Phoenix with teargas.

At the same time, a group of armed youths from Phoenix marched into Bhambayi. Bhambayi is one of the most impoverished areas in Inanda, and overflows on to Ghandi Settlement land. It is occupied largely by Pondo migrants, many of whom rely on the drug trade for their income. They have a tenuous status in the area, and Buthelezi has often referred to them as 'Xhosa-speaking trouble-makers.'

Bhambayi residents had attempted to form a Residents Association, and at the start of the violence, the Residents Association Chair made a statement that 'as long as no-one interferes in Bhambayi, we can keep the situation here under control.' Until the youth marched into Bhambayi, this was the case, but when they left, crowds of armed squatters from Bhambayi started looting as well. A crowd of Bhambayi squatters started to loot from the Ghandi Memorial Centre and from the houses there. 'These people from Bhambayi knew us, but they just looted everything - from the Indian houses and from us. They said oIf you don't want to die, then just keep quiet', said a Hambanathi refugee.

Meanwhile, word spread in Inanda that 0Indians' were attacking oAfricans' at the Ghandi settlement. People armed themselves, and started to gather along the border between Inanda and Phoenix, ululating and chanting 'Usuthu'.

This build-up on the one side was matched by an equal build-up on the Phoenix side. During the day, cars drove up and down the streets in Phoenix with loud-hailers, shouting 'The Africans are coming! The Africans are coming!'

Panic and fear spread, people armed themselves, and gathered at the road seperating Phoenix and Inanda.

A youth activist who mingled with the crowd in Phoenix described the scene: 'In the front were the criminal elements, armed with knives anf pangas: behind them were the businessmen in their trucks, with men packed on the back, armed with rifles, pistols and so on. As evening fell, they set up spotlights on the trucks, pointing at Inanda. Then behind them were the ordinary people, the Indian workers.

'You'd hear these workers talking about how 'our' shops had been burnt down, meaning Indian shops, when these same Indian shop-owners had been ripping them off all the time - slicing one block of margarine into 5, and charging 50c a slice. But now it was 0us and them' - Indians and Africans,' he said.

Police arrived on the scene only after several emergency calls were made. As more than 4000 people gathered on each side of the boundary, police kept their distance, watching from a nearby hill. Finally, (some say reluctantly) they dispersed the crowd, using loud-hailers only.

On this Friday, the UDF called together a range of community leaders, and set up a Crisis Committee to monitor the situation. Friday night, 2 August. During the night, 4 Indians and 2 Africans were killed in Inanda and Phoenix. Crowds of armed Inkatha men from the hostels start to patrol the streets of Umlazi and Kwamashu. Buthelezi announced that Inkatha was organising 'peace-keeping vigilantes' to bring the 'hooliganism' under control. According to eye-witnesses, SADF hippos were often seen following a short distance behind the Inkatha vigilante groups. The vigilante groups went from door to door, allegedly calling on men and boys to join them in finding the UDF and Cosas 'troublemakers'. People who refused, or who did not have Inkatha membership cards, were presumed to be UDF 'sympathisers'. 'But most UDF members carry an Inkatha membership card. It's like a Kwazulu dompas. You can't get a house, or a job, or a pass without one,' said a UDF supporter in Umlazi who asked to remain anonymous. (Since the initial unrest, a hit squad has burnt down the homes of more than 10 prominent UDF people.)

Saturday 10 August: the Vice Mayor of Kwamashu, Mr Jwara, and a group of Inkatha vigilantes were allegedly caught burning down the house of Mtutu, a Kwamashu Youth League member. Mtutu's mother claims to have witnessed the event, and has laid charges against the Vice Mayor with the police.

Sunday; 11 August. The police figures reveal that 63 people were killed and more than 1 000 hospitalised after the week of violence. The police acknowledge killing 37 people.

UDF supporters claim harsh treatment at the hands of Inkatha vigilantes. Rev Mabuza, a Methodist minister in Kwamashu, claims he was frog-marched from one end of the township to the other by Inkatha vigilantes, and made to chant 'UDF is a dog'. He claims he was instructed to come to an Inkatha rally at Ulundi stadium to apologise for allowing Kwamashu Youth League to use his church hall. His Church has been burnt down.

UDF supporters allege that a crowd of 200 Inkatha vigilantes chopped off the hands of several UDF supporters, and have thrown people into a lake.

Inkatha vigilantes allegedly tied one member of Kwamashu Youth League to a telephone pole with wire, and beat him with knokkies in broad daylight. He is in hospital at present.

Toto Makubane, also a KYL member, was kidnapped by unknown people, and his body was found with his arms and legs hacked off in a sugar-cane field outside Eshowe.

Nunu Kheswa, a Cosas activist, was stabbed to death outside his house.

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UDF supporters say they have no protection from hit squads or Inkatha, and cannot rely on the police. They have therefore formed their own 'people's militia' to protect themselves. In Lamontville, Cosas members claimed to have staved off 3 attempted attacks by Inkatha members bussed in late at night from the hostels. Some hostel-dwellers claim that during the unrest, buses arrived at the hostels and they were told to arm themselves and board the buses, as they were going to attack UDF.

Shortly afterwards, Wellington Sabelo, a key Inkatha figure in the hostels, was assaulted by some of the hostel-dwellers who allegedly resented being forced to attack UDF.

According to reports, many of the vigilantes are relatively unpoliticised, and have demanded to know where 'DDF' (sic) and 'COSCAS' (sic) people stay.

Vigilante groups have been formed in the Indian Townships as well. The core of these groups are often Indian police reservists. According to a UDF spokesperson, 'The vigilante groups attract people from rough backgrounds. For three or four days, these heavily armed elements patrolled the streets - they had effective urban rule.'

The vigilantes in the Indian areas have co-operated closely with the police and SADF, often being accompanied by hippos as they patrol the streets.

SADF soldiers have also been welcomed into some areas of the unrest-hit Indian townships, and have been served tea. on the street corners by residents.

According to an NIC spokesperson, 'A paramilitary situation has been entrenched in the Indian areas almost overnight.'

Many local youth organisations voiced opposition to the extension of conscription to Coloureds and Indians as one reason for boycotting the tricameral elections last year. Now, they fear that the basis for conscription is being laid in the Indian community.

The UDF claims that a group of Coloured youths from Newlands East have come forward and confessed to UDF officials that they were shown how to make petrol bombs by SADF men.

The NIC claims that one of the causes of the intense racism that spread in the Indian areas was the work of 'panic-raisers' - vans of people who went to quiet areas of Chatsworth and Phoenix, hooting and shouting 'The Africans are coming'. This caused people to arm themselves and run into the streets, expecting to -have to protect their lives and property.

Groups of armed youths were allowed free reign by the police, and were only disarmed on the Monday and Tuesday after the height of the tension. By then, several unfortunate incidents had taken

place.

On one occasion, two large groups of armed Indian youths saw two young African boys coming to a shop near to the Indian area. The youths shouted at them to move back, and then a 21 year old Indian youth shot twice, killing one of the youngsters. He has since been arrested, and has been charged with murder.

In the week after the violence, a meeting was set up between the Inkatha vigilante groups and the vigilantes in the Indian area, to discuss how to deal with the situation.

Mr Yellan Chinsamy, vice-president of the South African Black Alliance said that Inkatha, Chief Buthelezi's national movement, had "saved the day" for Indians at Inanda on the outskirts of Durban during the recent unrest and violence. He said he had personally asked Chief Buthelezi, president of the South African Black Alliance to help protect Indian lives and property. "The chief immediately co-operated and Inkatha was put on alert to save Indians", he said.

In Lamontville, students are increasingly identifying Inkatha with the police. Repression has been getting so bad in the area that students do not even have to go on boycott to be attacked.

In August this year, police barged into classrooms, firing teargas and rubber bullets and lashing out with sjamboks. Not even the teachers escaped unharmed.

'The school is a double storey. So when police tried to get inside students tried to escape by jumping off the first floor,' said a local student. 'Others are getting injured, with broken legs, others are paralysed, others ran away to the road near the school. The police just want to close down the school', said one SRC member. 'They say education is making us too militant.'

The students are not suprised. Lamontville has long been a stronghold of progressives. The classrooms have UDF posters and SASPU NATIONAL clippings on the walls. Other schools in Lamontville have come out strongly in support. SRC members at Mwelase Secondary School in Lamontville said they were boycotting their trial examinations in solidarity with Lamontville High students: 'If students at that school are injured we too are victims. We are implementing our slogan 'An injury to one is an injury to all", they said.

'Also, teachers had organised a trip to Swaziland to disorganise students so we cancelled the trip. It is not good for us to recreate while our leaders are being killed.' He was talking about the many attacks which Inkatha has launched on community leaders. Another student added: 'We are saying one thing - Inkatha and the police will not stop our struggle for liberation. This is not the first time our leaders are being attacked 'by Inkatha. They and the police have repeatedly attacked us and our parents.'

The story is told of the Yengwa family. The Yengwa family of Lamontville had just gone to bed when all hell broke loose. Mrs Yengwa heard her son shouting from across the road so she pulled open the curtains. She saw men in balaclava's throwing buckets of petrol onto the windows.

'In the wink of an eye all the windows were aflame, followed by a petrol bomb', Mrs Yengwa told SASPU NATIONAL. Mrs Yengwa was a member of Inkatha and presently a member of the Natal Organisation of Women and the Lamontville Parent's Committee (Lapec). 'We could not save anything. All the windows had flames. Each time you tried to escape they kept on shooting with shotguns. The very same guns the police use. We could not move because they see you in the window and they shoot. The choice was ours _ either to die from fire or from bullets. We had to move from one corner to another when it got hot. There were seven of them, say my neighbours. After burning the house and the car they waited. Nobody could save us because when my neighbours tried to help they kept on shooting at them. We could not even get help from our neighbour. She is a community councillor and a member of Inkatha. I know she is well armed as she has shot at people before. I don't know how they were saved. My husband was hit with 11 bullets and my daughter uncountable bullets. She was hit in the stomach and the doctors removed many from her intestines. She is still bad but off danger. They only left when they thought we were dead. We had stopped crying and were quiet so they were sure no-one could have lived. Then we heard footsteps. The neighbours saw a white kombi and one other. Two kombi's for only seven people? They wanted to make sure they could get away. They put out the fire that had damaged everything in my bedroom.'

Mrs Yengwa did not want to say who she thought was responsible. 'Even if I know very well, I can't say it to the newspapers. And I do know very well. Even if she has not done it with her own hands she has baked the bread. It is connected to other UDF burnings. Ever since the Mxenge funeral you don't know who is dying now. Even if some-one is your enemy he takes advantage of the situation.'

But other people in Lamontville were quiet prepared to say who they thought was responsible. 'It was Inkatha. The newspapers are saying it is unknown who is responsible. But we know very well. This is the work of Inkatha', one said. 'Ever since we chased them from Lamontville they have been determined to get us.'

Sunday, 18 AuQuSt: In Pietermaritzburg, near Durban, a ,DET meeting TE held at which ways of ending the two-week old school boycott were discussed. Sources at the meeting claim that prominent Inkatha members from Imbali blamed the boycott and Sarmcol solidarity action on progressive teachers and members of the Imbali Civic Association. That evening, ICA chairperson Robert Dumas had his house attacked and his car burned. Members of the Imbali Youth Organisation, who were present, say a group of eight men including an Inkatha member named Zondi, and the sons of another prominent Inkatha member and community

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councillor, Auretha, petrol-bombed the house and shouted that they were going to get 'Duma, the dog!'

They believed a violent campaign was launched in Imbali township to rid the township of UDF and youth activists. Petrol bombs, automatic rifles; spears and knobkieries have been used in attacks in which at least two people have been killed, many homes, taxi's, and private vehicles have been destroyed, and the Federal Seminary has been forced to close early.

Monday 12 AUGUST a minority of Imbali parents tried to force their children back to school. At Siguongueni High School a student was stabbed when she refused to enter the school. Inkatha began its attacks on taxi-owners, who were accused of siding with the students. A group of men, (including known Inkatha members with first-names Fakazi and Mandla) set up a road-block at the entrance to Imbali and stopped taxi's from entering. Angry commuters were forced to walk home from the roadblock. They were told 'if the bosses can't enter then why should the taxi's be " ' allowed to take you to your door?' Later in the day, taxi operators and youth group members joined forces and launched a commando-style attack on the group to disperse them. Police, despite a strong presence in the township, denied knowledge of the roadblock at the main entrance to Imbali.

Tuesday night 29 August chanting 'we don't attack houses, we kill the dogs', more than fifty armed Inkatha members attacked and killed Cosas member Matshwetshe Zondi. Witnesses say the mob had grouped near the house of community councillor Auretha earlier, claiming they were looking for Zondi as he was guilty of manufacturing petrol bombs. They left, and returned soon after chanting victory slogans such as 'we have killed the dog'.

On this same night taxi-owners received a message that one of their conductors had been killed in Mhlankosi Road. A convoy of taxis, sent to investigate, was greeted with a volley of automatic gunfire emanating from the vicinity of Inkatha member Auretha. One person was killed and 5 injured. A number of taxis " were burnt out. Police, who arrived within 4 minutes, confirmed that combis had been burned but denied that there had been gunfire.

Thursday 22 August! Kenneth Dladla (a taxi-owner and vice-chair of the Imbali Civic Association) and Musi Mthuyane (a taxi-owner) were harassed by Auretha and other armed men in a KD registered car. The taxi-owners drove to the Plessislaer Police Station to report the harassment but were instead arrested by security police and charged with public violence. No arrests of any Inkatha member has yet occurred.

Sunday, 26 August: a meeting of a few hundred men armed with spears and allegedly with R1's was held in Imbali Community Hall. At this meeting, Kwa-Zulu mp, Mr V.B. Ndlovu, urged the community to get rid of the Federal Seminary, who were accused of fomenting the unrest, and of harbouring criminals. (ICA Chairperson Duma

had sought refuge there).

That afternoon 100 armed men, led by Ndlovu, Pakkies (Inkatha member and Mayor of Imbali) and Jele (Chairperson of Inkatha's Imbali branch) marched on Fedsem and told the President, Dr Mgojo, that the seminary had to be empty by the next Friday or else 'it would be burnt to the ground.' The seminary decided that it was wise to close early for the September vacation. In the meantime they brought an urgent interdict against Ndlovu and the others, restraining them from causing any damage. When asked for comment, Jele claimed that 'he was involved as a resident of Imbali, not as an Inkatha member'. Pakkies also denied any Inkatha involvement; 'It is the community, and that includes me, who want the troublemakers out.' The interdict has been opposed. It was heard in the Supreme Court on 18 September. Residents of Imbali claim they are being forced to - an R1 each - towards the costs of defending the interim interdict against the Inkatha members, Mr PC Pakkies and Mr V.B. Ndlovu. 'People have'. been going around Imbali with a loud-hailer telling residents they must pay R1 towards the case between Pakkies Ndlovu and the Fedsem Seminary. Because these same people have been involved in attacks on school-children, union and youth activists, residents are fearful that if they don't pay the levy they will also be attacked,' said a member of the Consumer Boycott Committee in Pietermaritzburg. Mr Pakkies denies knowledge of the R1 donation.

Unionists, students and political activists in Pietermaritzburg have left the township and are staying with Indian, coloured and white democrats in the relative safety of the town. They have decided to take legal action against Inkatha. 'Although this may be expensive,' says a prominent UDF activist, 'this seems to be the only way to defend ourselves and our families against these thugs who are heavily armed and able to operate at will in the township. The police, who are usually so quick to the draw, seem strangely paralysed when it comes to stopping Inkatha murders.' . 1 September" Umlazi mayor Winnington Sabelo- also a KwaZulu Legislative Assembly member - announced that all UDF sympathisers should get out of Umlazi by the weekend. He said the move was meant to "protect the lives, homes and the property of the KwaZulu government". He said "If they refuse to get out by the weekend, then they will have to face the consequences". He also said that vehicles without the NUZ (Umlazi) registration will be turned away. He warned that UDF supporters and sympathisers ,of Lamontville and Hambanathi would also have to leave the townships by the weekend. i

September9: A UDF activist, Mandla Ndela was killed. His body was found with spear wounds. He was abducted by over a hundred armed impsis at his home in Umlazi. They came in a bus, and broke doors and windows while calling for Mr Ndlela's blood. They grabbed him and dragged him out of the house where other armed men were waiting. They then disappeared with him, leaving his house with

blood stains all over.

21 September; Although most activists are no longer living in Imbali, their families are still the targets of intimidation. The wife of one activist, who works as a nurse at Edendale Hospital, was assaulted and may lose one eye after being stabbed. The mother and father of the Imbali Youth Organisation's vice-chair have been given until Friday 26 September to get out of the township or have their house burned down.

According to Midlands UDF Secretary, Sikhumbuzo Ngwenya, 'the government is behind it all. They couldn't break the unity of the workers, students, teachers and parents as regards the consumer boycott or school boycott. They felt isolated and so found a group of people under Auretha (and Inkatha) to create an internal clash in the townships. Why has nothing been done to stop Inkatha? They've burnt houses and taxis. They have killed people. They man roadblocks. And often they are seen talking to the Community Councillors. Things are difficult because we are dodging the forces - the system and Inkatha. But the struggles are creating unity and strengthening people's resolve. Parents are now upset at what's happening. They are supporting the Imbali Civic Association - the authentic voice of the community. Inkatha on the other hand is weak. They have to use outside forces to assist in their reign of terror. Despite the fact that our activists are in hiding, there are many other levels of people to carry the struggle forward. This is in great part due to the education work of the now-banned Cosas.'

9 September: Azapo member James Ngubane, whose name was reportedly on a "hit-list" drawn up by vigilante impis, died after being brutally assaulted by seven stick-wielding men. Mr Imraan Moosa, Azapo publicity secretary said Azapo knew that some leading officials of a conservative black organisation were in the forefront of these attacks, and that power had been handed over to a band of vigilantes who were terrorising all known activists. i

28 September: Inkatha impis killed six township residents in Lamontville, Durban, and at least 12 people, including a three-year-old girl, were admitted to the hospital. It was the culmination of continuous attacks in the Durban area on people opposing Inkatha. The first attack (in which four people were killed) was launched on the same day Chief Gatsha Buthelezi spoke at a Shaka Day rally in Soweto, as Inkatha supporters were heading towards Umlazi for the rally. Late in the afternoon, Lamontville residents said the gang launched a second attack and two more men were killed. Three quarters of the way through Chief Buthelezi's speech, three busloads of Amabutho (warriors) - among them a top Inkatha official in tribal dress and many of them armed, left the Umlazi Stadium where the Chief Minister of KwaZulu was speaking, and went into the neighbouring township of Lamontville.

During the

meeting he declared his opposition to the 'black-on-black violence' which was being perpetrated by 'ANC supporters', and said that the ANC should renounce violence as a strategy to bring down the government.

A number of prominent UDF leaders have been abducted and brutally killed by Inkatha impis. Among them are:

h Thabo Molarena, a UDF trade unionist

h Toto Dweba, again found with a badly mutilated body.

September 29: The Federation of South African Trade Unions, Fosatu slammed the Government and "unknown" persons and organisations for conducting a campaign of repression against the federation and its members. In a statement, Fosatu said a number of its members had either been refused passports, been detained, killed, or had death threats made against them.

September 22: Umlazi Residents' Association chairman, David Gasa revealed knowledge of a plan by top-ranking Inkatha officials to kill him and then "cut him to pieces". He said he would not come out of hiding until he was sure he would not fall into the hands of Inkatha's impis. He told City Press that he was informed by firends who had infiltrated Inkatha that he featured prominently on a hit-list of UDF supporters and sympathisers in Umlazi. Mr Gasa fled his home last month after his home was petrol-bombed twice by armed men and razed to the ground. He had also received several death threats. One anonymous caller said he was going to be "cut into pieces".

An opinion survey conducted by the Institute of Black Research showed that most Africans blamed Inkatha for the recent unrest in Durban. It was found that Inkatha and the police were seen as starting the trouble and being the most active in it thereafter. The survey reflected a considerable loss of support for Chief Buthelezi - a finding that was supported in other recent surveys, such as that conducted by Professor Fatimah Meer of the University of Natal. '

CONVENTION ALLIANCE

The Convention Alliance, launched on 21 September, brought together 150 "top South Africans" who agreed in principle to unite moderate South Africans of all races under one umbrella. Chief Buthelezi said at the launch that a national convention in South Africa would be a dismal failure if Nelson Mandela and other jailed leaders were excluded, however, it would be an "equally dismal" failure if people like Mr PW Botha and tDr Andries Treurnicht were excluded. He said that although he did not think a national convention could be staged at present, he supported the PFP's call because "I believe that we should begin working for it".

The alliance formed between the PFP and Inkatha came at a time when the leftwing was in disarray and the rightwing was

directionless. Everyone was looking for a lead and Slabbert and Buthelezi came together to claim the middle ground. It has been said that it was an act of political opportunism on their parts to take advantage of the suppression of the UDF to stake out the ground for themselves.

It has been emphasised that the Alliance is not in itself a convention. Both leaders were hesitant about their chances of bringing about a national convention in the short or even the medium term. The UDF has issued strong words against the move, and has said that the only genuine road to non-racialism is through active democratic struggle with the majority.

A comment in the Weekly Mail stated "The Alliance has not brought us any closer to a national convention, nor is it likely to do so in the foreseeable future. What it has done is solidified the middle ground and put it firmly in the hands of Slabbert and Buthelezi. However, they are likely to find that, outside of Sandton (the affluent, northern-suburban area in Johannesburg at which the launch was held), the only middle ground that still exists is the no-man's-land between police armed with shotguns and youths armed with stones. And, if they want to hold on to the middle ground they claim, they will need to take the Alliance out of Sandton and into the townships".

