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State of Emergency lifted - but Natal's being singled out is criticised by all

June 8 saw the lifting of the state of emergency country-wide but the dubious decision to reimpose it in Natal.

De Klerk said that by way of contrast to the rest of the country, where "the level of violence could be countered by the ordinary laws of the land", the situation in Natal, where "there is still a factional situation which seriously threatens the safety of the public and maintenance of public order" was markedly different. "The increasing phenomenon in Natal of violence among Blacks, which has led to destruction of human life and property and has assumed shocking proportions, as well as the exceptionally high level of intimidation that exists there must still be countered by the strongest means available."

Speaking in Paris where he called the lifting "a victory for the people of South Africa as a whole, both Black and White", ANC deputy president **Nelson Mandela** said: "I do not think retention of the state of emergency [in Natal] is going to help. It has been enforced since 1986, and despite the fact it has been repeated, the level of violence has not abated, so it has served no purpose whatsoever." ANC Southern Natal convenor "Terror" **Lekota** also said it had "made no difference", and that the only answer was a negotiated settlement "between the Government and the ANC". UDF president **Archie Gumede** added to this the fact that "it severely restricts leaders from communicating with their people in their efforts to end violence."

Inkatha president **Mangosuthu Buthelezi** also criticised the government's decision as "lamentably tragic". He said that in the current phase of negotiations, everyone should have free and open access to all the communities in the country. Without

this, "mandates taken to the table will be suspect", he added.

So the Charterists and Inkatha are in agreement on the uselessness of the emergency in Natal, but there the agreement ends. DP leader **Zach de Beer** said that the conflict in Natal was not between Blacks fighting for their rights against the White minority government, but one between Black organisations.

But this is the major point of dispute - the ANC/UDF's view is that Inkatha is part of the apartheid oppressor, an agent of the State directing violence against its peace-loving opponents. The ANC's present policy is that Inkatha be disarmed - UDF assistant general secretary **Mohammed Valli Moosa** said the violence would end only when the KwaZulu police were removed from the townships, when Buthelezi was dismissed as Minister of Police, and when the homeland was dismantled.

It is unfortunate that **Moosa** did not mention that the ANC has defended Umkhonto we Siswe's widescale recruitment as legitimate and necessary; that among much of its constituency the acceptance of negotiations is strongly qualified by a faith in insurrectionary strategies; that both Azapo and PAC supporters have suffered from Charterist violence; and that the rural mobilisation the ANC is engaging in is centred not on simply canvassing for support, but on replacing the existing structures of power with organs of people's power. Whatever the legitimacy of traditional rule, the fact that the ANC seeks to challenge Inkatha at this level is a recipe for conflict. If Inkatha and the ANC are going to mobilise in "each other's territories", a modus operandi between them is essential.

The common Charterist perception that Inkatha can and should be destroyed, is a dangerous one. They might not believe it, but despite the policies of certain powerful Inkatha leaders on the ground, there is much to indicate that Buthelezi and the Central Committee have on occasion had to hold back Inkatha's rank and file hardliners from going onto a real offensive. If provoked too far, what reaction will be forthcoming?

Buthelezi stressed that the state of emergency in Natal "must be lifted"; that "the total weight of all political forces should now be directed at restoring peace in the Natal/Kwa Zulu region"; and that were he and **Mandela** to meet and jointly promote peace, it would "produce an impact that no other two, or indeed other 10 or more, leaders could equal."

The ANC will at some stage have to accept Inkatha as a fait accompli or risk civil war - therefore, the sooner **Mandela** and Buthelezi get together, the better. ■

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Inkatha urges the UN to promote democratic forces in SA and for its recognition as a liberation movement

The Inkatha delegation headed by National Chairman Dr Frank Mdlalose, which on 15 June met the visiting United Nations delegation, concluded its presentation of how Inkatha viewed South Africa today with an appeal.

It stated that the UN should "recognise that every political group in South Africa has a legitimate role to play in assisting to bring about a race-free democracy", and that those groups playing a role in eradicating apartheid should be "applauded, encouraged and assisted."

While agreeing that the ANC must be at the negotiating table "because all political groups belong there", and that it should be "free to campaign amongst the people for the acceptance of its ideas", the Inkatha delegates also said that the ANC

"must accord all other Parties the freedom that other Parties accord it."

In particular, the UN should "now promote peace in South Africa and promote the development of democratic forces working for the new South Africa through non-violent means. It is time that the United Nations formerly recognised that while it accorded only the ANC and PAC recognition status in the past, circumstances have now so changed that this recognition must be considerably broadened.

"Inkatha demands the right to be recognised as a liberation force in its own right playing a Party political role that is dictated by its conscience and determined by its aims and objectives and its constitution."

Inkatha's perspective on South Africa today

Inkatha told the UN delegation that not only are changes going to take place in SA, but that for the first time this century, they will be sufficiently "far-reaching" and "meaningful" to the "disenfranchised and oppressed majority in South Africa to make them willing partners in bringing the changes about." They foresaw the approach of an era of Black/White consensus and co-operation.

sovereignty resides in the people

From Inkatha's perspective, it was essential in the achievement of "one South Africa with a political system authored by people in whom sovereignty resides", that there be reconciliation across race and class divides in the process of eradicating apartheid.

Thus political developments heightening racial tensions, polarising the country, and radicalising politics (on the right and left), must be avoided. The key to success, in terms of this view, was that there be "national unity based on the common acceptance of the way in which South Africa is governed." Once achieved, politics "can then become that which decides who governs the people the way they want to be governed."

But Inkatha warned that national unity is not synonymous with "ideological uniformity". In particular, this national unity would not be achieved if based on Marxist or Socialist ideologies. Although the country "may now be witnessing a proletarian phase of the struggle", and though the country may in future gravitate towards socialism, this is not the time for it.

Inkatha believed that this national unity was achievable, and that it could be produced through negotiations and the move towards a new democratic future. Inkatha's broadly stated position was that reflected in "The 1990 Inkatha Declaration".

government cannot turn back

An important issue for Inkatha was the belief that the National Party and government of De Klerk cannot turn back the clock. The survival of Whites guides a government which knows that apartheid cannot be forced on the people, that Whites cannot live under the political seige conditions that they

have, and that retrogression would lead to totally destructive economic consequences.

warns of "awesome" Black backlash

This realisation by the government means that cornerstones of apartheid still on the Statute Book such as the Land Act, the Group Areas Act and the Population Registration Act, must and will be removed. Thus Blacks cannot be beguiled into accepting their retention or be forced to do so through being forced into a weak negotiating position.

Inkatha stated that without the scrapping of these acts, there would be no democracy, and that they would be dismantled "by the people using whatever means are necessary." Any turning back by the government would produce "a totally unmanageable Black backlash", "awesome", if hopes for democracy were destroyed.

Inkatha told the UN delegation that since apartheid was doomed, and there was now a need to concentrate on laying the foundations for a new democracy, there was "no room for adventurism in South African politics" - the requirement was for methodical and achievement-oriented negotiation politics.

multi-party democracy and negotiations

The Inkatha delegates said that the only form of democracy that could stand any chance of being established in the first place, and of surviving thereafter in the fluidity and possible turmoil of the post-apartheid era, was a multi-party democracy in a parliamentary system resting on universal adult franchise.

But they added that this multi-party democracy requires multi-party negotiations, in which Inkatha (along with the government, ANC and others) intends participating. They noted that while the ANC talks of the need for representative negotiations, it "is working to establish the kind of united opposition front which amounts to trying to establish a monopoly opposition Party."

The delegates stated that whatever the future of this united front, **"Inkatha has always been totally independent of mind and [has] been totally independent in its choice of tactics and strategies and it will remain thus."**

The new Inkatha

The Inkatha delegates informed their UN counterparts that: "Inkatha is busy making a radical transition from being a liberation movement to a powerful political Party at the national level **enacting a national role on centre-stage South African politics.**"

Inkatha's importance

Inkatha's document to the UN - "South Africa today - an Inkatha perspective" - stated that Inkatha would move into further prominence as a consequence of the work it had done over the past 15 years to develop strong constituency and institutionalised support. It said Inkatha was important for the following reasons:"

- 1 It is the biggest membership-based black political grouping in South Africa.
- 2 It is led by the much respected President Buthelezi.
- 3 It led the opposition to apartheid from inside South Africa.
- 4 It led the fight against 'homelands' independence and started initiatives towards a non-racial region through the Buthelezi Commission and the Kwa-Zulu/Natal Indaba.
- 5 It fought successfully for the release of political prisoners.
- 6 It is against violence, and pro peaceful negotiation.
- 7 It is liked and respected by many people of all races in South Africa.
- 8 It believes in an enterprise-led growth economy.
- 9 It believes in establishing a multi-Party democracy

and it is actively building from its strength a fully effective, well organised, democratic political Party to fight elections in the new South Africa.

- 10 It is dedicated to harnessing the great resources of the country to fight the real enemies of the people, namely: poverty, hunger, unemployment, disease, ignorance, insecurity, loneliness and moral decay.
- 11 It is preparing to open its membership to all South Africans.
- 12 It is seeking alliances and partnerships with like-minded South Africans of all races and with democratic Parties."

The document added furthermore, that **Inkatha had a crucial role to play in producing national reconciliation**, which in turn would lead to the national unity and will required to "establish an open, free, non-racial, equal opportunity reconciled society with democratic safeguards for all people."

keep destructive ideologies at bay

Inkatha would work "to **keep destructive ideology at bay** when it comes to working out how best to redistribute wealth to service democracy and to protect democracy."

It would have to ensure that "political decisions do not interfere with harnessing the great resources of the country which will be needed to make political victories meaningful to ordinary people by raising their standards of living."

For Inkatha, it was vital that it produces the "right mix of politics capable of not only establishing a democracy but maintaining it after it is established."

Inkatha's power base under seige

Inkatha told the UN that its past achievements in opposing apartheid and in frustrating the government's co-optive politics, combined with its grass-roots membership dominated by peasants and workers, "gives Inkatha **an unshakable power base.**"

Inkatha a "people's organisation"

The fact that from its inception Inkatha has held Annual general Conferences; that these AGMs are the movement's supreme decision-making bodies; that these conferences determine Inkatha's policies and objectives; and that Inkatha's leaders are elected by popular vote and are accountable to the people at the conferences, confirms that **Inkatha is "a people's organisation formed by the people and led by those whom the people choose to lead it."**

But, "it is because Inkatha has developed its own independent power base that it is attacked so vehemently by the ANC and its allies." The document claimed that **the ANC has used the same politics of coercion as that of the enemy**, the state, and that the politics of intimidation it practices is "part of the brutality of revolutionary violence".

This is in part a reflection of the view held by the ANC that "people are for it or against it and that there is **no room for neutrality.**" The document adds that the ANC has guarded against "Third Force" developments, wanting to put itself "in a position where it had a revolutionary command over the people of South Africa."

The document quotes a variety of ANC sources from the mid-1980s to the present indicating that the homelands should

be rendered **ungovernable** and Buthelezi vanquished. Some examples are quoted overleaf.

But the ANC's attacks on Inkatha, and the latter's self-defence, took place in a highly volatile and tense society, leading to the **"tragic and inevitable spreading of violence** as political violence against Inkatha turned into revenge violence, blood-feud violence, pre-emptive violence and criminal violence."

The document states that the problem of bringing Inkatha and the ANC together goes beyond the personalities of Buthelezi and Mandela, and quotes a variety of recent Charterist statements indicating that at the provincial, or intermediate level, **"ANC, UDF and Cosatu leadership resist dealing with Inkatha in any way that will show it to be a legitimate force in its own right."**

ANC to kill Buthelezi politically

ANC Southern Natal convenor "Terror" **Lekota**, for instance, in February said that Buthelezi was the obstacle to peace in Natal, his commitment to peace questionable. After claiming Buthelezi was losing support "faster than ever before", Lekota said this effectively meant "we are going to kill him politically. We will not kill him in the sense of shooting him, but we will kill him politically." Thus while believing that Mandela could make a difference to the prospects of peace in Natal, Lekota also said that Mandela should not meet Buthelezi: "Mr Mandela may make a case to meet Chief Buthelezi, but it will be a collective decision. We are not in favour of it."

Inkatha accuses the ANC of deliberately and specifically formulating a sequence of provocative propaganda statements

"as the ANC pits itself against Inkatha to try and annihilate it as a free political force." First is the accusation that Inkatha and Buthelezi are collaborators in implementing apartheid; second are statements that Buthelezi is responsible for the violence and brutality; and third are statements along the lines that the people have the right to self-defense, and that the ANC would step in as their saviour.

But in contrast to this, Inkatha quotes current Charterist documents showing quite clearly that **the ANC is intent on annihilating it**, especially in rural areas. It states: "Inkatha has suffered grievous losses, not only of its members but also of its leadership. In many areas Inkatha's leaders have been singled out to be murdered." Refer below to some of those killed.

ANC statements against Inkatha and Buthelezi

The Internal Commission Report on strategy and tactics of the Commission of Cadre Policy, Political and Ideological Work reporting to the ANC's June 1985 Consultative Conference noted: "The successful spread of **People's War** is inconceivable without the escalation of political and military struggle in the bantustans ... Clearly, the bantustans should also be the targets of our Movement's effort to render South Africa ungovernable. ... The openly **counter-revolutionary** role that Chief Gatsha Buthelezi has assumed should be noted. ... [This] must be exposed and we must work to win over his supporters and deprive him of his social base."

November 1985's Sechaba claimed: "The people have decided to render South Africa **ungovernable**. To Gatsha this is a nightmare. The people are saying: **their nightmares are our dreams**."

In 1986, ANC secretary general Alfred Nzo said "collaborators with the enemy" should be eliminated, and that necklacing was an acceptable means of doing so.

Sechaba 1986: "[Necklacing] is a weapon of the masses themselves to cleanse the townships from the very disruptive and even lethal activities of the **puppets and collaborators**."

Radio Freedom, 1987: "Gatsha must be exposed for what he is. He is not a leader of the Zulu people. ... He is a **stooge** placed there by imperialism and the reactionary circles in our country."

In July 1987, an ANC spokesman said Buthelezi's hands were "just as bloody as that of the South African Government", that he was "**part of the apartheid regime**."

In 1988 Alfred Nzo said Inkatha members were **thugs**, and Buthelezi a Pretoria **puppet**. Radio Freedom said it was in Buthelezi's "self-interest that the fighting continue", that he

But despite all this, **Inkatha claims it is still committed to peace, and reconciliation with the ANC.**

The Inkatha document examines the various peace initiatives, and their problems. Despite the difficulties there have been in the past, including the fact that the ANC was not itself a direct participant in the previous talks (though it can now be), the Inkatha delegates stated that:

"Inkatha's call now for a full-blown attempt to bring about peace in the strife-torn KwaZulu/Natal region must now be heard. We propose that the ANC, the UDF and Cosatu all be involved and that we should revert to full five-man strong delegations to tackle the grave problems with the utmost sincerity and energy."

supported his "employers" - "To take part in people's struggle against the apartheid regime is to deny Gatsha Buthelezi the monthly salary that he receives from the apartheid regime as a bantustan puppet and an active **policeman of the regime**."

Also in 1988, an ANC witness at the Bethal Treason Trial said he had been instructed to **kill Buthelezi**: "... I should go to Ulundi, reconnoitre the place and see if I could not get the opportunity to kill Gatsha."

Umkhonto we Sizwe chief Chris Hani was reported in the London Times as saying that targets for **assassination** included members of Inkatha's Central Committee. The paper said Hani "was unapologetic in his support for the selective killing of black 'collaborators', such as policemen and township councillors. He said the ANC's policy was to politically 'isolate and destroy' Inkatha leaders and KwaZulu Chief Minister Dr Mamgosuthu Buthelezi."

In 1989 Sactu said of peace negotiations with Inkatha: "It is inconceivable that the democratic movement and the broader national liberation movement can reach accommodation with the puppets in Inkatha. The hand of truce offered by Gatsha is a weak hand, and a sign that the people have made massive inroads into Inkatha's power-base and that the time is right to deliver the **death blow to this enemy of the people**. The onus is on us to neutralise Gatsha once and for all, the snake that is poisoning the people of South Africa needs to be hit on the head. ...

"[Negotiations] must never compromise the long-term objectives of the people, namely **the total destruction of Inkatha and its corrupt leadership**. ... The forces of counter-revolution must be defeated if we are to continue on the path to Freedom Day ... **Smash Inkatha!**"

Inkatha's dead

The Inkatha delegation appended a death list to their report to the UN. Stating that Inkatha is "subjected to one of the most vicious propaganda campaigns ever mounted through the South African media", in terms of which Inkatha is accused of being "responsible for all the violence", the report states that issues such as ungovernability and the assassination of Inkatha leaders is kept out of the public eye. Added to this is the ANC's continued call for the armed struggle and the glorification of "the most outrageous and unspeakable crimes perpetuated by the young - the so-called 'shock troops' of the 'struggle'."

This very recently compiled list of 52 names is by no means complete. Some of those killed are shown to show how they met their end.

- 1 Ms N Mthembu - Secretary - hacked to death, 1985
- 2 Mr S Dlamini - Chairman - petrol-bombed, 1985

- 9 Mr S Ngubane - Youth Chairmam - stabbed and shot, 1987
- 14 Mr V Mnomiya - Inkatha Executive - decapitated, 1987
- 16 Mr SS Cele - Chairman - burned to death, 1988
- 18 Mrs Dlamini - Chairperson - necklaced, 1988
- 22 Mr Nzuzo - Chairman - shot and stabbed, 1988
- 26 Mr A Mtolo - Chairman - hacked to death, 1988
- 33 Mr Gunundu - Chairman - stoned to death, 1989
- 35 Mr Kubheka - Treasurer - shot, stoned, chopped, 1989
- 39 M Gwala - Organiser - shot and burnt, 1989
- 43 Mr Mzizi - Chairperson - throat cut, 1990
- 46 Mr Ndlovu - Youth Chairmam - throat cut, 1990
- 47 Mr Mkhize - Chairman - necklaced, 1990 ■

PAC/ANC peace talks on internicine violence sorely needed

Violence between rival liberation movements is not restricted to that of the Charterists and Inkatha in Natal. Conflict between supporters of the PAC and the ANC on 31 May in Vosloorus, near Boksburg, saw three people killed and two injured in a spate of attacks on VCC (ANC-aligned Vosloorus Crisis Committee) activists' homes. The following day two VCC colleagues narrowly escaped death in a follow-up raid.

VCC members blamed the PAC for the attacks, said to have been in revenge for the 30 May hacking and burning to death of an Azanyu (Azanian National Youth Unity, PAC affiliate) member (John Rantho) in another clash between PAC and ANC youths.

PAC general secretary Benny Alexander denied that the PAC was involved in the fighting, stating that most members of the PAC-aligned Azanyu and Paso (Pan Africanist Students' Organisation) had already been driven from Vosloorus after Rantho's death. He blamed a third force, intent on sowing disruption, for the violence.

Following two days of peace talks held in Johannesburg by delegates from the Pretoria, Witwatersrand and Vereeniging regions, the PAC and ANC on 8 June issued a joint statement expressing "a genuine commitment" to finding a peaceful solution between the two organisations, agreeing to address the root causes of the conflict. The statement called for a cessation of hostilities and for the parties to report back to their constituencies to promote this. And in an apparent acceptance of guilt, the PAC distanced itself from the Vosloorus killings.

plea for tolerance and freedom of choice

On 11 June, James Mndaweni (PAC) and Kgalema Motlanthe (ANC) signed an interim agreement aimed at bringing peace to the area. In addition to reaffirming the two points above, they agreed that lines of communication must be opened between the two parties; there should be no public vilification of each other; schooling should be normalised; a civic association should represent everyone in the community, irrespective of political affiliation; there should be freedom of association and expression; the right to organise; and political tolerance. In addition, both sides should monitor the accord and "sinister forces" manipulating the situation would be ostracised from the community.

Whether the accord holds is questionable. On 9 June, the day after the first peace agreement was reached, about 100 heavily armed people attacked Mndaweni's Vosloorus house (he was not there at the time). He claimed that at a previous memorial service, the ANC had been singing provocative songs about "Mndaweni and his dogs", and that irrespective of the peace talks, "it would seem the violence and threatening of people's lives will continue. He added: "At times like this, political tolerance, freedom of expression and the right to belong to the organisation of your choice is vital."

Though this was perhaps a one-off attack that constituted the tail end of the Vosloorus violence, it appears as though this kind of conflict has an inevitability about it. Wits academic Alf Stadler said the violence was part of the process of change that would produce a fundamental political shift: "As political control of the State is weakened, turbulence is endemic as part of readjustment".

Certainly, the political competition between the ANC

and PAC is real, irrespective of such peace initiatives. After the Groote Schuur government/ANC talks, PAC president Zeph Mothopeng said he could not see the PAC and other major organisations agreeing on a common ground approach: "What is important is who has support among the people and what action they take on behalf of the people."

joint approach "becoming a farce"

Decrying ANC/PAC unity - "It is a good thing but it doesn't just come about, because you'll find that some people misuse the oppressed, impose their own views as those of the oppressed" - Mothopeng said that in the absence of what he termed "principled co-operation", the PAC is "prepared to go it alone and get what we want because we are confident that we will pursue it and have the African masses behind us." The call for a joint approach, he said, was "becoming a farce".

There is nevertheless a realisation that this kind of internicine conflict should be halted. Both the PAC and ANC held separate 16 June commemorative rallies. From the ANC side, Sayco (South African Youth Congress, and imminent ANC Youth League) said the rallies would serve as platforms "to reinforce the call for tolerance among organisations of different ideological persuasions". A joint statement issued by the ANC, Cosatu, Nusas and Sayco said: "The public undertakings that have been made by leaders of organisations on the need to respect the right of organisations to exist and to compete for support will be echoed all over the country. Organisations are expected to desist from public vilifications and condemnation of one another."

However, the violence comes from below rather than from the top, from the youthful activists in particular who are not necessarily yet ready to take orders from above. After ANC supporters attached Azapo members in Maokeng, near Kroonstad on 28 May, ANC Northern Free State convenor Chris Ravuku stated: "We are not at war with Azapo. What we have identified is that there is a lot of hooliganism. This is a problem many political parties will experience: **tsotsi elements often wear a particular organisation's T-shirt and then conduct a reign of terror.**" [Natal being a good example?] At a 2 June press conference Mandela admitted: "We have a certain amount of lack of discipline on the part of the activists but, fortunately, the leadership is united in condemning all forms of violence."

The two parties to the Vosloorus peace accord suggested that if the truce held, it would serve as a shining example to the rest of the country. It will be needed - peace between those liberation movements broadly constituting the left will continue for the simple reason that despite the leadership's calls for peace, there is little tolerance on the ground, and insufficient acceptance of authority by the youth whose intolerance was nurtured by the mid-1980s township revolt. On 21 June a meeting was to have been held (it was postponed) between the ANC and PAC after attacks on the PAC by what the PAC's Mndaweni claimed were undisciplined ANC supporters, this time in Munsieville. The purpose of the meeting was to reach a peace agreement similar to that of Vosloorus.

Though the Vosloorus accord was highly significant in being the first such agreement between the ANC and PAC, it is unfortunately unlikely to be the last. ■

The M-Plan: "a mass offensive is taking place around the country, particularly in the rural areas"

Despite SA's high level of urbanisation, a very significant percentage of the black population is rural, residing in either the homelands, or on white farms, and mobilising them has become a crucial issue to the ANC.

With the Central Statistical Services indicating in April that of SA's (non-TVBC?) black population of 21,3 million, **29% resides in Natal/KwaZulu** (compared to 2,5% in the Western Cape and 23% in the PWV area), the importance of mobilising in Natal is clear.

Chairperson of the ANC's Internal Leadership Core, **Walter Sisulu**, addressed a letter to his comrades on 23 March confirming the procedures to be followed in building up the ANC's regional structures within the country.

The attached document - "Building the ANC legally" - set out the proposed regional and national structures, membership, sectoral organisations, etc.

Its introduction states: "The conditions are now ripe for the development of the ANC into a mass vanguard movement." After affirming that the ANC must be "a solid and democratic organisation", serving as an important example "to other democratic forces", and that its structure must "express the social composition of the forces of our revolution", the document claims:

The ANC must redress the organisational weaknesses manifested in mass organisation in the recent past - in particular that of failing to organise adequately in the rural areas.

Despite the fact that most of the homelands' leadership has come out in support of the ANC, this varies from the strong (KaNgwane's Mabuza) to the relatively weak (Ciskei's Cqozo). However, sympathetic senior leadership is no guarantee of lower-level leadership support, especially from the chiefs whom it is essential that the ANC win over. Take the case of Transkei, for instance, whose military ruler Holomisa was described by MK Chief of Staff **Chris Hani** as "articulating good positions". In early May, after rejecting a motion by Chief **Patekile Holomisa** of **Contralesa** (the ANC-aligned Congress of Traditional Leaders of South Africa), more than 30 Transkei chiefs walked

out of an Umtata meeting refusing to take part in the formation of a new group called the Transkei Traditional Leaders Association.

The ANC knows how important rural mobilisation is and has acknowledged how its own weaknesses led to the growth of what it perceives to be the collaborative Inkatha movement. As a short-cut to conducting its own mobilising, the ANC encouraged Inkatha's formation as a mass-based populist movement, and subsequently lost out as Inkatha went its own way. It has no desire to make the same mistake again, but the problems in mobilising the rural masses are daunting.

In the first place, there is a strong **conservative** tradition amongst much of the chieftancy. Secondly, democratisation of rural society is potentially **threatening** to many chiefs. Thirdly, since most Charterist activists are youthful, there is the further problem of such mobilisation being transformed into a **youth vs traditional authority conflict**.

The ANC is being careful in its relationship with chiefs. ANC stalwart **Elias Motsoladi** told a rally in mid-April that ANC supporters should not be hostile to chiefs - those who were not members of Contralesa should be educated politically until they were won over by the people. Quite what he meant by political "education" and being "won over" was not clear, since he also called on the youth to return to school to further militant ideals: "To shoot down the enemy's aircraft you need mathematical knowledge, so get into the classrooms and learn military science."

In a visit to his Transkeian birthplace in late April, **Nelson Mandela** (himself of royal Thembu extraction) told the youth that they should respect their traditional tribal leaders - "Honour your leaders". He said their status was revered by the ANC, but he cautioned them against despotism - their decisions had to have the blessing of the people.

However, in addressing the misunderstanding that chiefs were not welcome in the ANC, Mandela also called on the chiefs and paramount chiefs in Transkei to support the ANC because they had always been part of the liberation struggle - tribal chiefs, he said, were welcome in the ANC.

ANC seeks destruction of Zulu power, says King

Innocent as this might well be, especially in areas where the ANC is not competing with others for support, the situation is hardly the same in Natal. The big question is how to mobilise in rural areas where the chiefs and much of the population are Inkatha supporters. Natal differs from the rest of the country in that when the ANC and its allies launched their attacks on "collaborators" and "agents of the system", they did so against councillors and tribal leaders belonging to a movement which also saw itself as an opponent of apartheid. Thus from Inkatha's perspective, **far from attacking the hated apartheid system, these attacks were directed at a rival liberatory movement.**


Zulu King Goodwill Zwelithini told a gathering of chiefs in Ulundi on 4 May that the ANC was intent on disrupting Zulu unity as a means of destroying Zulu power, and that the ANC sought to break down everything in the country and then "put the pieces back together in such a way that South Africa

becomes the ANC's property." Inkatha president **Buthelezi** told them: "Those who come into your midst to set the youths to toyi-toyi and to set up programmes of violent political action are purveyors of death not only now but in the future as well." Only Inkatha he said, stood between them and the destruction of the institution of chieftancy which no future government could ignore in rural areas.

There is thus a very grave danger that the already high levels of violence in Natal will escalate further, especially when the ANC moves into Inkatha's traditional strongholds.

At one level, there is **Inkatha/Charterist agreement**. Buthelezi has said on numerous occasions that there should be peace to enable political parties to seek mandates from the people, that violence and intimidation make this impossible, and that without peace, the whole negotiations process is threatened.

Possible structures for rural areas



NOTE: This whole plan is very speculative, since structures in the bantustans are still in the early stages of development

The ANC has espoused the same line. Southern Natal convenor "Terror" Lekota said in April: "We have no intention of stopping any organisation from seeking membership and from winning people towards its own policies. However, the fact that the others are doing this kind of thing means they are not committed to democracy in the sense that we understand democracy. If the trend persists, any election in the region would not accurately reflect the views and feelings of the people. It is a matter of deep concern to us."

The solution to the problem however, is not as clear-cut as it might thus appear to be. At heart is the political power struggle taking place between Inkatha and the Charterists, and

the methods being used to secure support.

Lekota, who had recently called on Buthelezi to be "killed politically" by drawing his supporters from him, also said: "Where Inkatha has support, it must be allowed to continue. If we can't co-operate with Inkatha, then we can't co-operate with any other political parties."

This accords with Mandela's address at Sayco's first National Conference in March. He said that it was not ANC policy to coerce people into joining the ANC, and that activists had to show respect and tolerance for those not agreeing with them.

But Lekota's comment cannot be taken at face value and

Lekota did qualify it. He added that there was a **sub-culture of violence** and a **lack of discipline** in certain communities, and that some sectors had lost touch with the political direction of the ANC, or had joined without really understanding what the organisation was all about. The implication is clear: Lekota would like it to be accepted that the ANC is tolerant of others' beliefs; seeks to mobilise in Natal, but in a peaceful way; and

that Inkatha's existing support should be accepted.

The reality however, is that the ANC still seeks to either marginalise Inkatha, or destroy it in toto. Chiefs partisan to Inkatha have also at times failed to demonstrate democratic tolerance. But the issue of rural mobilisation is a very delicate one when it is the chiefs who are threatened - if they are attacked are they be expected to sit by quietly doing nothing?

A semi-insurrectionary situation is developing ... a mass offensive is taking place ...

The clearest example of Charterist aims is the attitude of Sayco (the South African Youth Congress, see SA Update vol 2 no 8). Sayco calls for the **immediate destruction of the homelands**, in whose place should be established "organs of people's self-government, self-management and activation ...". The homelands system must be brought to "an immediate end, as part and parcel of our route to total liberation."

Further confirmation of this lies with the "Notes for the Need for an M-Plan" document currently circulating in Charterist circles, from which the diagramme overleaf is drawn.

The document claims the "Priority of the Moment" to be: **"To build mass-based, nationwide organs of people's power in every township, village, factory, mine and farm."** It answers the question "Why an M-Plan?" with the assertion that: **"We need to make a decisive intervention in a rapidly developing situation, otherwise we risk being swept aside by events."**

rich experience of 1985-1986

On "Why Now?", the document states:

- * A **semi-insurrectionary situation** is developing in the country, similar to 1985-1986. A **mass offensive** is taking place around the country, particularly in the **rural areas**.
- * The unbanning of the ANC/SACP, release of Mandela etc has not only created a **revolutionary mood and excitement**; it has also created unprecedented space to mobilise, and more importantly, organise our people. This space must be fully exploited.
- * The danger exists that the regime and other reactionary elements will use the developing situation to create conflict amongst the people, and provoke an uncontrollable situation as an excuse for a crack-down. Creating organs of people's power is the only way of ensuring proper direction, and taking the offensive forward in a disciplined way. The alternative is ungovernability and directionless conflict.
- * We have a **rich organisational experience from '85/'86**. Conditions exist for us to harness this experience to make a qualitative leap forward into a totally new situation, of a type extremely difficult for the regime to reverse through the use of repression, sham negotiations, or other tactics.
- * The time factor is critical: events are moving so rapidly that if we don't act decisively, history will pass us by; in addition the task of building mass ANC branches is on the horizon - this gives added urgency to the need to move rapidly on building organs of people's power, to provide the context for a mass ANC.

After discussing the timetable for setting up structures, its co-ordination, the issue of responsible control, etc, the document concludes:

The masses hold the key to change. The challenge

facing us is to unleash the creativity and power of the masses through new organisational forms corresponding to the new situation. This will lead to a situation of dual power which will put enormous pressure on the regime to see negotiations through to **genuine elections**. The alternative for the regime will be to face a scenario of **insurrection**. For us, the path to either option is essentially the same.

Although neither Sayco's call nor the M-Plan document centre their analysis upon Natal, the **implications for Natal** of there being a "semi-insurrectionary situation", and a "mass offensive", in rural areas in particular, is clear.

The most striking feature of the diagramme is that the **traditional structures are completely by-passed**, or are included only to the extent that they constitute part of Contralea.

Regardless of whether the intention is to build people's power to strengthen the ANC or weaken Inkatha's hold, the **inevitable result must be conflict**. And at the very least, how does it accord with Lekota's statement: "Where Inkatha has support, it must be allowed to continue"? Clearly the two are contradictory, and this is borne out by what has been happening on the Natal south coast over the past few months.

There is undoubtedly significance in the M-Plan document's assertion that the unbanning of the ANC/SACP etc has "created unprecedented space to mobilise, and more importantly, organise our people." Why should organisation take priority over mobilisation? This is possibly because **once an area is "organised", subsequent mobilisation is guaranteed**. Organisation, as the diagramme illustrates, does not simply refer to establishing ANC branches in an area to compete with other political movements. Organisation in the context of the M-Plan means the creation of people's power to replace existing structures. Once replaced, and the territory secured as an ANC constituency, what chance would other movements have?

sweep them aside

The April edition of *Sechaba* (the ANC's journal) was quite explicit on the ANC's goals. In asking whether a new approach to the homelands was now warranted, *Sechaba* notes that while some homeland leaders have moved closer to the Mass Democratic Movement, "others, such as Bophuthatswana, remain as oppressive as ever. **These must be subjected to massive political opposition with the aim of sweeping them aside.**" It adds that "it is very important that all democratic forces in the bantustans - as elsewhere - define their political positions in support of a joint platform against apartheid together with the CDF, the MDM and the ANC."

Since Inkatha is the ANC's declared enemy, and since the KwaZulu homeland has not moved closer towards the MDM, is there any reason not to believe that the ANC seeks to subject it to "massive political opposition" intended to sweep it aside? That is why the ANC's rural mobilisation in Natal is likely to result in heightened violence. Is civil war impossible? ■

Wooing Europe - Mandela softens De Klerk's impact, but EEC also softens

Mandela made the novel observation in the US that sanctions put pressure on both the government and the ANC to seek a solution as soon as possible in order to prevent the economy being wrecked. Though suggesting by this that sanctions could hurt the ANC as well, this is hardly its standard position, which is that sanctions are one of its key strategies to bring about a non-racial democracy in South Africa.

This, of course, was the government's previous major objections to sanctions. Its present rejection, however, is premised on something new, on De Klerk's assertion that **since apartheid and white minority are to be abolished through negotiations, sanctions are now unnecessary.**

The problem for De Klerk is that over the years the ANC has managed to persuade most countries employing sanctions (especially the West), to continue doing so until the reasons for their implementation fall away. The EEC summit in Strasbourg in December 1989, eg, said it would only reconsider sanctions when SA had achieved profound and irreversible change.

Though De Klerk's recent European tour ostensibly had little to do with persuading European countries to lift sanctions, he clearly expected a quid pro quo for the steps he had taken. De Klerk's motives were made clear in his statement that given the changes that taken place in SA, and given the government's commitment to eradicating apartheid, sanctions "simply do not make sense any more." Not for nothing did De Klerk's itinerary include addresses to businessmen and bankers in the hope that he could encourage fresh loans and investments.

And indeed, De Klerk appeared to have enjoyed some success, so impressing the previously hostile French, Dutch, and Greek governments in particular, that at a key meeting of **European Foreign Ministers** in Brussels on 6 June, there was proposed the measured lifting of sanctions to be agreed to on 18 June in preparation for the 25/26 June Dublin meeting where the issue would finally be decided upon.

By the time Mandela commenced his tour on 6 June, the row between the 12 EEC governments on just this had reached bitter proportions, with anti-apartheid movements working feverishly to revive the doubters' hitherto orthodox positions.

De Klerk "will regret his visit to Europe"

Whatever the secondary motives for Mandela's tour (such as fund-raising), it was primarily intended to ensure that the pressure was not allowed to abate now. Mandela on 26 May vowed to **scupper De Klerk's anti-isolation drive**, and his urging Europe to accept that the government was committed to "fundamental reform". He told a rally at Atteridgeville: "I am visiting Europe next week. I am visiting almost every capital he visited, and I can assure you that after I have spoken there he will regret his visit to Europe." He said that sanctions and other pressures on SA were designed to force the government to abandon apartheid and had to be applied "until the whole structure of apartheid is brought down".

Mandela made a great impression in Europe. Though the heads of state he spoke to were reticent on precisely what had been agreed to, Mandela was clearly delighted by the reception he received, denouncing as false and mischievous propaganda reports that his mission to ensure the continuation of sanctions was collapsing. His pragmatism, lack of bitterness and acknowledgement of De Klerk's bravery appeared to have

swung the waverers in his favour, so much so that on his departure to the US, he claimed that the tour had been successful "beyond my wildest dreams".

By the time the EEC heads of state met in Dublin, it was apparent that while there would be no unilateral lifting of sanctions, the sharp divide between those wanting no relaxation at all (such as Ireland) and those wanting to reward De Klerk (such as the UK) would demand a **compromise decision.**

The EEC on 26 June decided to praise De Klerk for his "foresight and courage", and promised to ease sanctions if more progress was made: "The European Council affirms its willingness to consider a gradual relaxation of this pressure when there is further clear evidence that the process of change already initiated continues in the direction called for at Strasbourg."

Europe softens its stance

Neither Mandela nor De Klerk lost - the ANC got the promise of sanctions staying in place for now, but De Klerk now knows there will be "a gradual relaxation" as further reforms are carried out, that the EEC will reward him incrementally rather than in terms of the ANC's future one-off cessation.

Since SA would undoubtedly survive the continuation of existing sanctions; since sanctions are no longer needed to pressurise the government into holding negotiations; and since De Klerk and Mandela fully briefed each other on the purpose of their tours; it might be thought that the efforts of both De Klerk and Mandela were little more than political showmanship, that sanctions have become more symbolic than substantive.

But whatever their symbolic nature, they remain central to the ANC for one crucial reason which the ANC's Brussels representative, Sisa Ngombane admitted to while De Klerk was in Europe. Since the international community had already partially succeeded in pressurising the ANC into giving up the armed struggle (as evidenced by the Groote Schuur accord), if **"the ANC does eventually decide to relinquish the armed struggle, we rely on sanctions as our sole bargaining instrument to reinforce us at the negotiating table. If sanctions are gone we will have nothing left if the government reneges on agreements."** Sanctions thus remain a crucial strategic concern of the ANC - Mandela urged the West not to simply maintain existing sanctions, but to increase them (a futile request).

Meanwhile, with both the ANC and government defending historical positions, the domestic debate took on a fresh look. Nothing symbolises just how complicated the question of sanctions has become than two fascinating policy reversals. First, no doubt concerned that the ANC not lose face at this delicate stage, DP economic advisor Sampie Terreblanche told a London newspaper that the lifting of sanctions now would ruin negotiations. Second, the editorial of the ANC-supporting **City Press** stated that despite its previous position, "the bitter truth is that [since] the majority of our people are daily losing their jobs at an alarming rate", and "in the light of the Government's reform policy, has the time not come for the ANC to review the use of sanctions as a strategy to end apartheid."

With Europe's softened stance, and Bush's firm signal to Mandela that he will urge Congress to drop sanctions once the necessary conditions are met, the ANC must know that despite the effects of Mandela's unprecedented and ecstatic personal popularity, De Klerk has good reason to be satisfied. ■

PAC U-turn: change is irreversible and negotiations inevitable, but a political settlement will do little for the masses

Considering the vehemency and frequency of the Pan Africanist Congress' statements decrying what it feared to be imminent negotiations, and its vilification of the ANC for its willingness to commence negotiations (once its preconditions had been met), the PAC's recent position paper on negotiations and economic policy represents a **significant departure** for this hard line ("one settler one bullet") liberation movement.

In a 2 June speech delivered on behalf of PAC president Zeph Mothopeng to an Achib dinner, general secretary Benny Alexander revealed what is possibly the PAC's first major and detailed position paper released by the movement since its 1959 breakaway from the ANC.

The document, entitled "The Economic Policy of the Pan Africanist Congress (PAC): an Exploratory, Diagnostic and Contingency Exposition", was ostensibly drafted by its external wing, and is being circulated locally for comment.

settlement will betray the masses

Though it stresses the PAC's economic policy, the paper also reveals a **fundamental shift in thinking on negotiations**. For the first time, the PAC accepts negotiations as inevitable, but only as a short-term measure towards realising the goals which it believes a negotiated settlement will inevitably betray.

Under the subheading "The Possible Outcomes of a Negotiated Political Settlement", the document reveals a highly **negative expectation** of what negotiations will in fact deliver.

settlement to save settlers, not Africans

"It should be mentioned at the outset that the need to reach a 'political settlement' is not to liberate Africans but to liberate the European settlers and their State from serious problems. Unless some form of political settlement is reached, the standard of living of the European settlers is seriously threatened; the economy is facing mounting problems; the interest of foreign financial and equity capital is threatened; the country is ungovernable; without negotiated political settlements the European settlers and their imperialist friends are likely to lose all or much. **Negotiated political settlement is bound to lead to limited benefits to the bulk of the African people in the country.**

"The negotiated settlement is devised to protect entrenched economic interest of the European capitalist settlers; to co-opt the African petty bourgeoisie and elites to the side of the 'system' or the 'new' state. In the negotiating table **Africans are going to be divided into:** main political organisations (PAC, ANC, BCM, Azapo, etc), the Bantustan leaders, leaders of civic

PAC's Strengths and weaknesses

"WEAKNESSES

- 1 The liberation movement has **failed to overthrow the South African State through revolutionary means**. The military force of the State is intact and is there to protect the political and economic interests of the European settlers.
- 2 The liberation movement **does not have a strong military presence** either in South Africa or in the neighbouring States to promote and protect the interest of the Africans: especially their economic interest.
- 3 There are a number of **constraints** that face the liberation movement with respect to ownership of the economy and the management of the economy and its industries. We shall list a few of such constraints:-
 - I Weaknesses of the African Constituents
The liberation movement and its African constituency lack the necessary technical, professional and managerial know-how to run the economy of the country.
 - II Ownership of Economic Assets
The African people have no land to talk about and it is reported that Africans own about 5% of the country's assets. Africans lack both money-capital and productive capital.
 - 111 Backlog
Here we would like to point out how the neglect of the past has accumulated serious constraints for Africans to meaningfully participate in the economy of the country as owners rather than wage/salary employees [the document then reports that African businesses contribute less than 1% of the country's GDP; that

only 2% of the African population are entrepreneurs; that only 0,5% of listed companies have "black" directors; and that Africans constitute a minute percentage of business and commerce graduates.]

IV Legal Constraints: Historical Perspective

The legal constraints to African participation and ownership of economic wealth have been numerous and have been represented by different general and specific legal instruments [the document lists various statutory restrictions and legal constraints inhibiting African economic development.]

- 4 The **control of the State is not going to pass to the liberation movement** through negotiated political accord. To a greater degree, it is the government [rather than] the liberation movement [that] is likely to have relative influence over its operations.
- 5 A **cohesive African voice and movement for the sole interest of the African people is lacking** due to years of suppressed political activities and the **invasion of the African political movement by European settler liberals** of all shapes. The fighting and political capacity of the African people has not been appropriately mobilised.
- 6 The **African states are tired of "waging war"** with South Africa. The increasing African indebtedness to international Financial capital makes the continent an unreliable long-term ally to the struggling African people in occupied Azania. The former allies of the African liberation movement are faced with their own domestic problems as well as their own regional and global interest. The African lib-

organisation, and possibly the Trade Union Federations. The ANC may incorporate UDF and MDM. By decree these entities will be made to represent some political opinion supposedly different from others. Neither they nor the ANC will refuse this position. It will also be in the interest of the **white liberals** to operate both within the ANC proper (in organic terms) and within the UDF and MDM. This will lead them to command considerable influence at the negotiating table. These are going to be responsible for **tilting the scale** either in favour of the government proposals or in favour of the ANC. It should be remembered that political power without economic power via the redistribution and restoration of national economic resources to the African people will be **meaningless**. This is where the ANC will discover that the European settlers, be they liberals, Communists or Conservatives will not be ready to part with acquired economic resources and privileges, irrespective of their political rhetorics.

army and police will protect settlers

"The African liberation movement will not be allowed, through divide and rule tactics, even to effectively control the government, let alone the State. The European settlers will protect their economic interest, if need be, with their army and the police force which will remain intact and on the side of the European settlers where they belong after all.

"The economy of the country is in such a mess that African rulers during the so-called post-Apartheid South African State, will find it very difficult to handle. This time **they shall be held responsible**. This reality was even expressed by the head of the Anglo-American economic empire, Mr Gavin Relly. The Financial Mail of July 21, 1989 reports on Relly's statement as follows:-

The total abolition of apartheid will not in itself prove a cure for all our economic malaise. The dangerous rate of population growth; the entrenchment of racial elites, particularly in the rural areas; the sheer cost of redressing the historical imbalances of privilege - these problems are common to "developing" countries and will endure beyond the moment of political accord. Added to the mounting costs of redressing historical inequalities, and the persuasive power pressure groups on the Treasury, there remains the problem of SA's international debt - which means that we "remain bound to repay capital on a scale that makes a mockery of the international community's claim to have the welfare of Africa at heart, and its aim to bring about a material and sustained improvement in living standards."

the struggle continues after negotiations

The document concluded that despite the economy being in a bad shape, and structurally weak - "We should also be aware of the weaknesses of the liberation movement and the fact that negotiations are essentially there to bail out the beleaguered South African regime, and to pre-empt whatever successes that the African liberation movement is likely to achieve. 'Successful' political negotiations will only provide minimum opportunity for the African liberation movement to continue to struggle for true political and economic independence. **It does also appear that the negotiation stage is unavoidable. What is important is not to make the African people to have too much expectations out of it.** But to make them aware that whatever positive outcomes that can be scrapped [scrapped?] out of these negotiations should be scrapped, but

analysis of the liberation movement

eration struggle has been taken out of their agenda and priorities.

- 7 The liberation movement has, in the past, excelled in **squandering revolutionary opportunities**. Reliance on external missions of the liberation involvement has undermined local initiatives by the Azanian people to liberate themselves. The **external missions** have used the African people in Azania as their instruments, principally for international publicity. The development of local political leadership has been dwarfed or has always been made to depend on ratification or blessing by and of the leadership of the external missions.
- 8 The African workers have tended to appendix their political struggle to the traditional political liberation organisations. Their politics have not stood on its own right and, thus, in political terms **their fortunes stand or fall with the fortunes of the nationalist political organisations**.

STRENGTHS

The strengths of the African liberation movement can be given as follows:

- 1 The capacity of the economy of South Africa and the limited logical outcomes of the negotiated political accord are going to **mobilise** the African people at a level unheard of before. The old political leadership of the African Liberation movement is, by and large, going to die with the abortive negotiated political settlement. In fact both the De Klerk government and the leadership of the African liberation movement will face the same demise.
- 2 As a result of the process leading to political negotiations

and the outcomes of such negotiations **the political struggle is going to be home-based and directed**. The full **revolutionary capacity** of the African people in Azania is going to be realised as a result of the limited outcomes of the political settlement.

- 3 It is going to be very difficult for the South African government to **reverse the steps** it has taken, no matter how limited these are. The South African Government has only one direction to move to give in as much as possible. This, of course, will depend on how the African people will be mobilised and the degree of political opportunism to be exhibited by the African political leadership.
- 4 The **Bantustan** political experiments are crumbling and the ruling petty bourgeoisie and bureaucrats are not going to survive the **workers and peasant uprisings** which is likely to be supported by some segments of the security forces.
- 5 In all, **the past cannot be re-made**. The political situation has possibilities for all, in a manner that is new in the history of occupied Azania. The liberation movement is going to be a beneficiary to this situation.
- 6 **The African workers** have become highly mobilised politically. This is at a level unknown in pre-independence Africa.

The most important thing to consider, with respect to the political dispensations taking place in occupied Azania, is that whatever will be the outcome of a negotiated political accord **the Africans sooner or later will be the beneficiaries**. The quality of such benefits will, of course, depend on the political skills of the leadership of the African liberation movement."

only as a means for further struggling."

A fascinating facet of the document is the pessimism as to the outcome of a settlement/accord, and the necessity for the continuation of the struggle thereafter - based on the probably realistic assumption that the "settlers" will win economically and that African rulers will be held responsible for SA's post-apartheid difficulties.

at the end of the day, Africans won't lose

In an interview conducted after the release of the document, Benny Alexander softened the paper's pessimism a little. While believing that little of substance would come out of the negotiations, he added that Africans would be the beneficiaries of any settlement, and that the masses would continue to press and fight for their demands.

He added: "The ruling class will use negotiations and its army to protect its interests, but any force will also be met with force by the African people. Whatever way negotiations go, at the end of the day the African people will not be losers because they will not accept white privileges." While realising that the liberation movement had not succeeded in overthrowing the government through "revolutionary means", victory was still attainable, though the struggle would now be more protracted - "We are therefore not looking at a short-term victory."

This "economic" document dealt with negotiations in some detail. Nevertheless, it constitutes only one of three PAC position papers - the others deal with a transition constituent assembly and negotiations.

In a SAPA interview conducted prior to his 13 June Foreign Correspondents' Association address, Benny Alexander detailed the mechanics of how the PAC saw the constituent assembly operating.

constituent assembly

He described the model as an inverted pyramid which "guarantees that the people will have the final say, with their representatives being directly elected and answerable to the masses on a non-racial basis."

The constituent assembly is seen as comprising 265 seats, with representatives being elected on a proportional basis. According to the document: "This means that one would vote for a political party and not specific individuals in demarcated areas. The total national individual votes will be counted at the end of the elections to determine the winner."

Since representation is directly proportional on a non-racial basis, this means that "the party with 40 percent of the total national individual votes will get 40 percent of the 265 seats in the CA [constituent assembly]."

Thereafter, these "people's delegates" will, on the same proportional basis, appoint constitutional experts. "In effect, this will mean that 40 percent of the seats in the Constituent Assembly will appoint 40 percent of the experts to draw up a new constitution. The term of office of these experts will expire when the constitution is adopted."

Nevertheless, prior to the constitution being presented to the constituent assembly, delegates will be mandated to take it back to their verified support base for comment and verification before it is tabled again in the assembly for final ratification.

Alexander defended this method of electing delegates to the constituent assembly: "Our belief in voting for representatives of political parties is a way out of the quagmire of racial representation and constituencies based along racial lines."

It is noteworthy that though the PAC is popularly perceived to have performed a summersault on negotiations, this commitment to negotiations is not one that concedes much to

De Klerk and his Groot Indaba.

Alexander was quite forthright on the PAC's rejection of minority rights. He said there was no question of the assembly dealing with minority or group rights "as they would be directly accountable to the vast masses, who do not want apartheid in any guise." The PAC's document is equally forthright: negotiations can only take place once the government accedes to straightforward majority rule, the redistribution of resources (especially land), and a representative constituent assembly.

This qualification of the PAC's previous "rejection" of negotiations is highly significant. Despite the PAC's previous (verbal) attacks on the ANC for its stand on negotiations, the PAC did not really reject negotiations in toto. It merely thought they were inappropriate now since the "settler regime" had not yet been brought to its knees - thus the stress upon the continuation of the armed struggle and mass resistance. The PAC's view was that negotiating now, with the regime as strong as it is, would inevitably lead to compromises, or, as PAC president Zeph Mothopeng frequently dubbed it, "appeasement".

some "appeasement" inevitable

It would seem that this position has been qualified somewhat, that because the state has not been overthrown, and because the military force of the state is intact, some form of appeasement is inevitable. In its analysis of "the [collective?] liberation movement", the PAC's document states that "whatever the outcome of a negotiated political accord the Africans sooner or later will be the beneficiaries."

The implication is quite clear - from the PAC's perspective, a negotiated settlement will result in a political accord which transfers political power to the majority, but which will not immediately alter the current economic structure or ownership of wealth (even though the Land Acts are abolished).

The PAC's about turn signifies a realisation that like it or not, negotiations are inevitable, and that by defining itself as a non-participant, it does nothing other than to marginalise itself from the increasingly normalised political process. However, it is important to emphasise that at the constitutional level at least, there is no talk of the compromising on fundamentals that Mandela referred to in February. Thus officially at least, until the government accepts the PAC's conditions, it will not participate in negotiations. Nevertheless, having taken a qualified inclusive position, there is the possibility that, just as the government, the ANC and Inkatha have realised that negotiations between equals must of necessity imply give and take, the PAC will also come round to qualifying its pre-conditions.

Azanyu rejects this "CIA" document

However, there is the equal likelihood of the PAC reverting to the kind of factionalism that characterised the movement abroad for so long. Azanyu (Azanian National Youth Unity), the PAC's youth organisation, on 14 June claimed that the document was unknown to PAC formations, and dismissed it as the work of the US Central Intelligence Agency.

Far from accepting the document's economic proposals, Azanyu secretary general Carter Seleke said that the PAC's policy remained unchanged as "the repossession of the land to establish a socialist order whose intention is to redistribute wealth to the African people." Azanyu added that since the PAC did not recognise the government, and "there can be no negotiations between master and slave", the PAC's position was identical to that outlined by president Zeph Mothopeng. If Alexander wrote the document, his position is threatened. If it was approved by the PAC's leadership, the youth will reject it. Either way, all is not well in the Africanist camp. ■

The PAC "has no interest in ruling over starving people"

PAC economic policy: Part one

If genuine, the PAC's new economic policy is as significant as its volta face on negotiations. The ANC's Africanists fought against the "multi-racialism" of the mid-1950s Congress Alliance, opposing the influence of communists within the ANC, and their role within the Congress of Democrats in getting the ANC to adopt the Freedom Charter in 1955.

Though their break from the ANC in 1959 under the leadership of Robert Sobukwe was an African nationalist (or perhaps a Pan-Africanist) one, by the mid-1970s the PAC was closely associated with a broadly speaking Marxist-Leninist position, though with strong Maoist overtones. The PAC's proposed Azania was to resolve the "have/have-nots" struggle by discarding capitalism and introducing a revolutionary socialist people's republic.

"scientific socialism" dropped?

This ideological predilection for "scientific socialism" (in whatever guise) remained fundamentally unaltered until the release of the position paper by PAC general secretary Benny Alexander on 2 June entitled: "The Economic Policy of the Pan African Congress (PAC): an Exploratory, Diagnostic and Contingency Exposition".

Supposedly authored by economists of the PAC's external wing, it is probably a response to the criticism - that the PAC lacked any clear policies - levelled at the PAC's external leadership by internal activists at the consultative conference held in Harare in early-March.

Nevertheless, given Benny Alexander's strident claims on the PAC's socialist position just prior to the movement's 2 February unbanning, the general content and tone of this paper reveal that much thought has gone into reversing the Charterist image of the PAC as being little more than what Lenin decried as "infantile socialists". The PAC has not dropped socialism from its agenda, but has developed a less simplistic conceptualisation of it, more akin to the mixed economy proposed by other political parties.

However, this revisionism is tempered by the document's introduction. This states: "It is important to note that the PAC has not produced what might be considered a comprehensive economic policy document and position, as products of a wide consensus within its membership and relevant constituencies." Decoded, this means the document is an **exploratory** one being circulated for comment and thus possible modification.

It adds a further **qualification**: "It is also too early to send a telegram to the enemies of true African liberation as to the specific economic policies that the PAC, as an important member of the National Liberation Movement in Azania, intends to pursue after being given or after assuming political hegemony or leadership in the country." That is, what we say and do are not necessarily the same.

The paper commences with the **PAC's view of the state**. This is critical, because "a political party or organisation or movement can only conceive of developing an economic policy if it can control the Government, the executive hand of the State, and the State itself."

The paper claims that the PAC does not take a purely **instrumentalist** view of the state (where the State is a tool of

the dominant economic class), or a pure **liberal** view (where the State is a neutral arbiter of social conflict). Neither is the State entirely **autonomous**. Instead, the PAC conceives of the State as "that of an active role of **relative autonomy** subject to the interest of prevailing economic forces and other societal forces. ... The State can, depending on the composition of the social and political forces, play an important economic and political role contrary [to] or in support of the economic base", though **its freedom to do so is dependent upon the relative strengths and weaknesses of the forces dominating this economic base and those of the State**.

This issue is not one of mere self-indulgent and abstract theory - the document asks the very real question of whether the form of political change that takes place can lead to "the political power ascendancy of the liberation movement or party to enable it to formulate an actionable economic policy".

As the document's introduction clearly states: "**The operationalisation of this policy is contingent upon conditions that will prevail after the change of the State form in Azania.**" The document's diagnostic discussion of the nature of change that will take place and of negotiations, is thus a key feature of this ostensibly economic policy document. In other words: "In discussing economic policy we are in the realm of strategy formulation and execution." (See pp 10-12 for the negotiations implications.)

PAC's "mission position"

Within the framework of this strategy formulation, the document sets out the PAC's "**mission position**":

"The PAC stands for a political order and economy that will represent the economic and political interests of all Africans in Azania within the definition of an African which is based on loyalty to Africa and Azania, personal and recognition by others as being an African and being ready to live and participate in socio-political-economic processes under the African majority decision parameters. The production and distribution relations within this political economy must be non-exploitative. No member, group, or section of the society should subject other members, groups or sections of the society to economic exploitation and political oppression. The resources of the country, as democratic rights, belong to the born and unborn members of the freed society. These resources will be used to enhance the quality of life for all at different periods in the future.

Since the quality of life of a nation, of a people, is determined by the quantity and quality of goods and services (including cultural services) produced and distributed in the society, the use of national and state resources shall be developmental, accumulative, reproductive, restorative and equi-beneficial."

The document concludes this section by noting that: "The economic goals, strategies and policies of the PAC will be legitimised by the efficacy with which they are capable of attaining the MISSION POSITION of the party or at least their capacity to achieve the MISSION as approximately as possible subject to prevailing constraints societally and globally." ■

USSR increasingly sympathetic to the NP's "group" or "minority" rights? Just how conservative are the Soviets?

The Soviet Union's foreign policy shift over the past few years - emphasising means of finding a political solution rather than the armed struggle to bring about the end of apartheid - is related not to developments within SA itself as much as it is to the Soviet's changing global perspective under Gorbachev, and the imperatives of overhauling their own strife-ridden society and terminally ill economy.

This shift has had a number of significant implications for SA. Included are the Soviet Union's attitude towards the ANC as an ally, their stress upon a negotiated settlement, a de facto rejection of the armed struggle, caution on socialist economic policy, and a less hostile attitude towards compromise than might be expected. In most of these, Soviet perceptions are conservative rather than revolutionary.

Staunch ally of the ANC

Although the Soviets' internal ideological shift from traditional Marxist-Leninism and the need to cut costs in futile Third World conflicts saw a **reduction in assistance to its allies abroad** as far back as 1981 (which the Gorbachev government has built upon), the **ANC's role as an ally and friend of the USSR is not threatened**, and the Soviets continue to place a high value on the ANC.

Nevertheless, this does not mean that there is a complete policy convergence. Deputy director of the Institute of African Studies at the USSR Academy of Sciences **Goncharov**, stated in a 1987 interview that while the Soviets would not dictate to the ANC its choice of strategy, tactics and negotiating position, they could in principle "give a piece of advice to our comrades in the ANC."

Despite certain problems between the two (for example, Joe Slovo's biting public attacks on Soviet policy last year), there is little to indicate that the Soviets would ever break with the ANC or SACP. As German Sovietologist **Winrich Kuhne** wrote recently: "As has been the case in Angola, such a **crude dropping of a traditional ally is perceived as incompatible with the Soviet Union's status as a global power.**" A group of SA academics just returned from Moscow made a similar point. In early June **Yunus Carrim** said that though there was interest in other anti-apartheid forces, "the majority of the academics and Communist Party members were **insistent on the pre-eminent position of the ANC.**"

Doubts on the armed struggle

The Soviet attitude towards the armed struggle was reflected in **Gorbachev's** statement that "we do not subscribe to the 'worse the better' position", and in **Goncharov's** view on the armed struggle that if "we think that it is useless, we won't give anything." By 1987, the Soviets had adopted the SACP's view that change in SA could best be achieved through **negotiation and selective violence rather than all-out military action**. **Goncharov** said that Soviet support for the armed struggle was conditional upon the prospects of its success.

However, with the ANC's military activities having been anything but "all-out" in the past two years, the Soviets' **military aid to the ANC has been refined.**

UCT's **Hermann Gilomee** reported in June after a recent visit to the USSR that though the Soviet Africanists were reticent on the details of ANC military assistance, "the possibility cannot be discounted that a significant form of Soviet aid in the short to medium term future will consist of **training ANC guerillas in the use of sophisticated weaponry and in other skills required for their absorption in a regular army.**"

Umkhonto we Sizwe Chief of Staff **Chris Hani** said in the ANC's 11 March Newsbriefing that: "We will not at any stage be happy with a situation where leading officers of a future South African army are from the South African Defence Force. For a future army whose orientation is for a non-racial democratic South Africa, we need Umkhonto officers participating fully in the process of transforming the army."

South African conflict should be resolved through peaceful negotiations

The Soviets see a negotiated settlement as imperative. Since the Soviets' priority lies in its relationship with the USA, since regional conflict could escalate Soviet/US tensions, and since the USSR has minimal interests in SA, conflict here should be avoided.

Goncharov again: "In our very complicated world, the two super-powers should **avoid confrontation**, not only in South Africa, but in other parts of the world." He stressed the need to "behave more realistically, more flexibly, with every side **participating in the conflict ... to take everything into account and find the right solutions acceptable to everybody.**"

The Soviets, he said, would like to see less use of the ANC's "dogmatic formulations" and would like more "flexibility" and "objectivity". Both the government and the forces of national liberation would have to **compromise.**

Gorbachev, on the occasion of Mozambiquan President **Chissano's** visit to Moscow in August 1987 stressed the

need for a **political solution** in South Africa without even referring to the armed struggle.

By mid-1989, this view was reflected by other Soviet officials as well (rather than academics). **Yuri Yukalov**, head of the Foreign Ministry's Department of African Countries said: "We would prefer a **political settlement** and want apartheid to be dealt with by political means. **Any solution through military means will be shortlived.** ... We do not want to emphasise the need to enlarge the armed struggle. South Africa should not be destroyed. **It should also be spoken to not only through threats or pounding our fists on the table. There should be dialogue.**"

Soviet Deputy Foreign Minister **Anatoliy Adamishin** said in October 1989 that Gorbachev's policy was that conflicts be solved by "**peaceful means, by negotiations.**" He added that his country was willing to facilitate the process and would encourage the ANC to negotiate.

Caution as to the wisdom or practicality of socialism

On the question of the economic nature of the post-apartheid society, the Soviet Union clearly recognises that the transition to socialism, even if attainable, would be a long term policy.

In 1986 Kuhne stated, after intensive talks in Moscow, that the Soviets had recognised that objective factors would keep SA closely tied to the West economically, and that they did not believe Africa would ever advance to socialism. He quoted Mirsky, a Soviet development economist: "A sober assessment of the present day situation shows ... that today there is less evidence than a quarter of a century ago that newly-independent states are abandoning the capitalist road of development and shifting to the non-capitalist course."

A year later Stellenbosch's Phillip Nel said that the Soviets had problems with the trade unions' post-apartheid socialist policies, stating the view that socialism in Africa had not worked.

And Goncharov criticised some ANC members for putting the task of the socialist revolution before the national liberation movement now. While approving of the ANC's socialist line, he qualified its realism: "Maybe ten years, I say not less than ten years. Yes, I believe that in the end South Africa

will become socialist, maybe, not in 25 years but in a century ... I am an optimist."

In 1989, another academic from the Institute for African Studies, Vladimir Tikhomirov, said that given "all the social and political factors, one can say with a high degree of certainty that if radical economic reforms are carried out, a future South Africa will find itself on the threshold of a deep economic crisis."

More recently (reported in June), Leonid Fituni, head of the Sector of International Crisis Management at the Institute of African Studies, said in London that he foresaw a future SA experiencing a similar economic decline to that of the USSR when it switched to perestroika. A major change-over from one economic system to another brought about by a new government committed to economic restructuring, usually leads to an immediate decline in output before the new system starts to work (if ever).

This, he notes, has worrying implications for a future black government in SA, whose biggest problem will be to meet its followers' expectations, but which cannot afford to slip into economic decline, however briefly, if stability is not to be threatened.

Political compromise, minority rights, guarantees for whites

Finally, are Soviet views on the nature of the future constitutional system to be negotiated.

The most contentious of these, both within the USSR and with its allies, were those of Starushenko, an academic expert on the question of nationalities rather than South Africa, who in June 1986 proposed that:

- * there should be a programme of anti-racist forces which does not envisage "a broad nationalisation of capitalist property as an indispensable condition";
- * the ANC "might work out comprehensive guarantees for the white population which could be implemented after the elimination of the apartheid regime";
- * there should be a parliament comprising perhaps two chambers, one based on proportional representation, and the other, with veto rights, based on equal representation of the four major racial groups"; and
- * the post-apartheid state could be a unitary system with "autonomous components".

Though Goncharov distanced himself from Starushenko's remarks, Kuhne is of the opinion that Starushenko's proposals were not simply personal views. He wrote more recently that "minority rights, special political guarantees for whites and group representation are not ruled out by those in Moscow considering options for SA."

It is notable that Deputy Foreign Minister Anatoliy Adamishin said in October last year that while the Soviets' role was that of encouraging negotiations rather than influencing the various participants, a "just solution" should "be acceptable for all the population of South Africa, both black and white." He spoke of a "peaceful solution and just solution which will suit all the population of your country - black people, Indian people, white people, and so on ..." without reference to the ANC's Harare Declaration which had been released just two months earlier.

The Soviets certainly recognise that some form of compromise will be necessary. In his March 1989 paper, Tikhomirov said that the crisis among defenders of the present system led to the dilemma of either preserving white's

material well-being at the price of a policy with no social or political future, or of reaching a peaceful settlement by sacrificing privilege. However, he added that "decades are needed to change social relations within a system and thus reform social groups." Nevertheless, he noted that racial discrimination and political inequality had to be eliminated as soon as possible, and that many whites would support this as long as they were guaranteed a safe life in the country. He stated: "It means in fact that there are objective grounds in South Africa for a compromise political settlement."

Adding to these signs of Soviet flexibility is a paper by Wits academic Mark Phillips following a visit to the USSR late last year during which he interviewed senior academics and officials specialising on Southern Africa.

Published in May, his "Beyond Rasberry Diplomacy? Current Soviet Policy Toward South Africa" states that the "most important stated objective of current Soviet policy in the region" is the creation of a democratic society in SA, and that "Soviet academics and officials are seriously considering a number of surprisingly conservative scenarios for the South African democracy of the future."

Within this framework, they are "increasingly sympathetic to the NP's 'group' or 'minority' rights proposal." The reasons for this are twofold. First is the fact that they want the conflict resolved quickly to the mutual satisfaction of all the major protagonists. This in turn involves compromise on all sides. Second is "the Soviet's own recent experience with their own nationalities problems." "More and more", he said, "Soviet analysts see South Africa's racial conflict through the prism of their own failed nationalities problem."

The implications of this for the ANC are clear. He suggests that "political organisations like the ANC which seek to establish a unitary, non-racial democracy in South Africa cannot count on unlimited Soviet support for their proposals."

Indeed, he adds: "Some South Africans may one day be surprised to discover that the Soviet Union, the South African Government's traditional enemy, could in fact be more sympathetic to constitutionally entrenched group rights than their traditional ally, the United States." ■

Oscar Dhlomo leaves Inkatha

On 1 June, Dr Oscar Dhlomo released a press statement on his resignation as KwaZulu minister of Education and Housing and from Inkatha, of which he is the Secretary General. It read:

"As from June 30 1990 I will cease to be a member of the KwaZulu Legislative Assembly, the KwaZulu Cabinet and Inkatha. I have already informed the Chief Minister and President of Inkatha of my decision and I have thanked him for affording me an opportunity to make a modest contribution in the service of our people. After twelve years of uninterrupted public service I feel it is time for me to make way for others so that I might be free to devote more time to my family and my other interests. I wish to thank all my colleagues in the Legislative Assembly, the Cabinet and Inkatha for their support and comradeship. I wish them well in the struggle that lies ahead. After 30 June 1990 I intend to rest and reflect on various options pertaining to my future occupation."

Following several days of heady speculation in the press and from other political organisations, Buthelezi commented on Dhlomo's resignation in the Legislative Assembly on 4 June.

"There is obviously speculation about what occasioned such a drastic move. I know of no conflict between us and I have had no discussion with Dr Dhlomo whatsoever. All I can do, and did so, was to issue a press statement thanking Dr Dhlomo for his great contribution to the development of Inkatha's position and for his work in the negotiations we undertook in the Provincial Council, latterly JEA and for his work in the Buthelezi Commission and also the KwaZulu Indaba. ... Dr Dhlomo joined us of his own free will and he leaves of his own free will. It is his personal right to make these choices. There is no umbrage between us and I say again Mr Speaker, I wish him, his wife and his family well in whatever they do."

Buthelezi questioned what he called "mischievous speculation" in the press. He denied a report in the Sunday Times that he had requested FW de Klerk to intercede with Dhlomo, that he had made a desperate bid to stop Dhlomo from quitting, and that he had offered Dhlomo an alternate post. He also denied a City Press report that there had been a power struggle between himself and Dhlomo, or that there had been persistent clashes between them.

After noting that he was making this statement merely to complete the Assembly's record, Buthelezi added: "I have no intention of entering into public debate about Dr Dhlomo's resignation from this House and from Inkatha. There is a long road ahead and I am sure that people of Dr Dhlomo's ability will find many ways to serve their country whether it be in business or whether it be in politics or in anything else." ■

Gwala rebuked by Lekota

Echoing his recent statements that the ANC is shooting its way to freedom, ANC Natal Midlands convenor Harry Gwala claimed at a surprisingly poorly-attended (10 000 people) Soweto Day gathering in Umlazi on 16 June: "When we negotiate, we negotiate with an AK-47".

Gwala, who refutes the idea that Marxism-Leninism is undergoing any crisis, and who also believes the introduction of private enterprise into formerly socialist countries is a denial of democracy, epitomises the Charterist hardliners. In speeches over the past few months, he has taken positions that conflict with the public image that the ANC would like popularised. He has claimed, for instance, that while the ANC does not want war, negotiations must be about the complete transference of power from the ruling class to the people. Criticising those within the ANC who say there must be negotiations, compromise, give and take, Gwala has stated that the ANC undertook to defend the people, to strive for freedom and the attainment of the ideals of the Freedom Charter through the armed struggle. Thus while

"some people" (a clear reference to Mandela) say they hate guns, others will blaze their way to freedom, and Buthelezi, a creation of the state, must be declared an enemy of the people and defeated.

Though some of Gwala's comments have previously created shockwaves, the ANC keeps disputes private. Thus Southern Natal convenor Lekota's 18 June disclaimer - "I wouldn't say we would negotiate with an AK-47", is as public a rebuke as one will get. ■

Mandela and Buthelezi to share a common platform?

In her 6 June lecture at the Carnegie Endowment for international Peace in Washington, Director of the Institute for Black Studies, official Mandela biographer, and long-time friend of Mandela, Professor Fatima Meer, said that Mandela was "very much a consensus man" who still seeks an alliance with Buthelezi's Inkatha movement. She said that Mandela had expressed the hope "that in the near future he and Buthelezi would share a common platform".

On 30 May, then Inkatha secretary general Oscar Dhlomo said that Inkatha did not see the ANC as an opponent. "We differ so vehemently on strategies to get there, that our differences appear to be differences of principle. We would not say we are more moderate than the ANC, just more pragmatic", he added.

He also said that the political violence in Natal could only end with a joint effort and with ANC/Inkatha reconciliation - no credible solution could succeed without bringing the two sides together. This reconciliation should ensure that the two sides could exercise peaceful co-existence where the existence of one organisation did not depend on the demise of the other.

But he warned that while there were those (such as church organisations) which could help the two get together, there were people in the ANC intent on keeping them apart. He said that their motivation lay in the fact that their own influence would be reduced, that they would have no target at which to direct their hatred, and that their propaganda would be proved false if there were closer contact between the leaders.

Fatima Meer also noted that Mandela could ill afford to ignore his constituency. As a "consensus man", Mandela "wants to carry his immediate followers and then his constituency as a whole with him. He does not want to march out of step."

The implication is that Mandela would still like to settle his differences with Buthelezi peacefully, but, as Mandela indicated in early May, his colleagues "nearly throttled" him over his proposed meeting with Buthelezi. Buthelezi has frequently repeated his invitation for the two leaders to get together to discuss peace.

By way of contrast to his conciliatory 25 February Durban address, while on his European tour Mandela directed some hard words against Buthelezi. And later (25 June), in the US, he told president Bush that the major responsibility for stopping the violence lay with the government rather than the ANC. Nevertheless, he said that it was important for the ANC and Inkatha to discuss the issue around the table, and that no solution in Natal was possible without Buthelezi's participation.

However, Mandela's "immediate followers" have not only refused to permit this, but have decided that Buthelezi should be totally excluded from whatever peace talks are conducted. Together with this is a campaign designed to allocate all blame for the violence on Inkatha. Then, as the final nail in the coffin, the ANC has in effect declared war on Inkatha by its assault on Inkatha's rural strongholds.

Mandela may not want to "march out of step" by alienating his "immediate followers", but it is questionable whether this group are feeding him with the true facts or only with their perceptions of what is going on. Shortly after his release from prison, Mandela said (12 February) that although the ANC had its problems with Buthelezi, "it seems to me to be correct to settle problems amicably." But he also said that on unity between black organisations, the ANC gave him instructions. Buthelezi was well aware of the dangers of this - on 7 February he said that Mandela, the "martyr of the struggle", might become a "captive" of the ANC, unable to act independently, especially on the issue of talking to Buthelezi.

Fatima Meer's comments firmly cement this. Mandela might well want to "share a common platform" with Buthelezi, and might well want an alliance with Inkatha, but if his advisors and colleagues do not permit it, or if he does not go above their heads, how else can the violence be stopped? ■

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